苏联载人登月计划失败流产警示录

来源:百度文库 编辑:超级军网 时间:2024/04/29 16:04:40
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UP!!!!
UP!!!!
只是钱的问题难办啊。这些东西无不是要大量烧钱的
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因此中国的未来登月火箭不必追求必须与"土星五号"同行比肩,1200至2000吨级别起飞质量的火箭恐怕才是未来星际火箭的主流
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除非核火箭能实用,否则为了更远的星际旅途还是得预研3000吨火箭


欧洲与日本之所以如此热忱于深空探测,原因就在于他们拥有电子技术与及精密仪器工业上的巨大优势,而中国'俄罗斯在这些方面的差距极大
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怎么个巨大法?
进来看看咯//
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搂住应该看看《From The Earth To The Moon》这部戏
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我说楼主,白云的意思你还是没看懂啊
阿波罗时代是真正狂热的空间探测时代,你真的以为当年的美国不能载人登陆火星?!好好看看吧.
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我倒是想知道当年的米国有什么能耐载人登陆火星,在登月都是故障重重的情况下
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苏联登月的障碍主要不在技术上,而在战略方向上
苏联只有美国gdp的1/8,没有资金允许他这样消耗
美国搞这个到后来都吃不消了
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原帖由 高凉陈君CT 于 2007-11-28 06:38 发表
白云兄,如果当年的苏联根本上就从来没有计划过要实施其的载人登月计划,而且也从来没有设计研制过H1火箭,那么其最终与载人登月无缘这本来就没有什么可遗憾的.但问题出就出在苏联当的确为此而进行过巨大的努力,并为此而 ...

您太客气了,你所说的技术路线是有可行性的,但问题主要在于,成本和收益。
苏联投入月球竞赛时,目标要么定成登月,要么就不搞,如果一开始只是打算环月,那是没什么出息也没什么意义的,注定要被美国的登上月球所击败。
而一旦决定登月,那么是不可能同时搞一种3000吨级的巨型火箭和一种1500~2000吨级的小巨型火箭,美国人这样搞估计财力也紧张。 那就只有先搞巨型的进行核美国的竞赛。 后来N-1火箭失败4次,计划彻底完蛋的时间,是美国已经赢得了这场比赛,世界范围内的注意力都转移到其他领域的时间,此时再花巨资去环月是没有意义的。 苏联有限的资源从这个时候开始转向空间站,新巨型火箭还更合适些。因为1500吨以上级的火箭确实没什么市场需求。苏联集中力量搞出来能源火箭是由自己的思路的,但基本搞出来时这个国家也不行了,这是另外的问题了。

其实派了人过去却只是环月,是很没面子的,阿波罗8号环月是作为登月的前奏,有里程碑意义, 当你是后来者时,如果这后面没有跟着一个是在的登月进程表,只是近距离看一下,那表现的只能是技术的无奈。
所以我还是认为,要去人就要登上去,只是环月,即没有宣传的意义,也没有实际的收益。
前面有人说到登陆火星,那在阿波罗计划的年代是不可能的, 登月是那个时代的技术极限。
登火星和月球的难度有着本质的不同:
几乎没有任何一个领域可以简单类比
原帖由 白云居士 于 2007-11-28 10:17 发表
所以我还是认为,要去人就要登上去,只是环月,即没有宣传的意义,也没有实际的收益。

白云兄,我感觉楼主说的有道理,即:载人绕月飞行是载人登月工程的一个重大阶段性目标,能实现这一点,基本上载人登月80%的工作量就做完了。制订计划虽然要考虑宣传因素,但决不能被宣传因素所左右。您说呢?
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原帖由 zlaser 于 2007-11-28 10:25 发表

白云兄,我感觉楼主说的有道理,即:载人绕月飞行是载人登月工程的一个重大阶段性目标,能实现这一点,基本上载人登月80%的工作量就做完了。制订计划虽然要考虑宣传因素,但决不能被宣传因素所左右。您说呢?

你没有把冷战期间美苏航天竞赛这个历史背景考虑进去!
好比说,苏联载人绕月飞行成功了,哪怕是在美国之前,可是紧接着美国却先登月成功,苏联却迟迟上不去,那么苏联的绕月只是放了一枚哑炮,而且还给自己造了个非得登上去的深坑,不知还要往里投多少资源。
实际上美国在阿波罗计划中搞了一种“土星-1B”火箭作过渡,就是出于进度和稳妥的考虑而做的“分步走”的安排,在“土星-5”成熟之前,“土星-1B”火箭为阿波罗计划立下了汗马功劳!
“土星-1B”火箭的起飞推力大致就在1000吨级(不过是8台发动机),
毛子可能是时间太紧,也想省钱,结果……
俄罗斯民族的无主见不仅仅表现在苏联时期,甚至在今天俄罗斯的政府也表现得极为明显---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------这句话最搞笑,一个不了解当时历史背景、条件、国情、需求取向的人轻率的说出了一句搞笑的话!!;P
我觉得楼主完全没有想过为什么要探月
为了民族荣誉,政治宣传
美国人40年前就上去过了,谁再去只能是老二
而且是落后很多的老二
然后就是经济利益和军事利益
这一定要在月球上建立永久基地
要让人上去,就必须有水,要能自己生产食物
否则不断用巨型火箭给月球输送补给
任何一个超级大国都会被拖垮
下一步的主要工作其实就是找水
进行月球地质勘察
看看建立永久基地究竟有没有可能
所以大家都比较吝啬,美国人自从克莱门汀号之后
连个自动探测器都没有发射上去过
是他们不能么?
恐怕根本就不怎么感兴趣
就算解决了水的问题
零件设备必须从地球上补给,那代价也大的不可想象
国际空间站现在都成了个烧钱的无底洞
更何况月球
猎户座计划恐怕主要还是代替航天飞机的作用
登月只是有可能的话顺便搞搞
在现有的推进技术没有获得本质提高的情况下(目前比较可行的是:空天飞机+核动力离子发动机)
什么开矿,基地,前哨站之类,都是镜中月,水中花
所以说啊,目前官方宣传是很谨慎的,和平利用
只有国外在鼓吹什么登月竞赛
咱国力是提高了,但也架不住折腾啊
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原帖由 暗夜流星 于 2007-11-28 11:19 发表
我觉得楼主完全没有想过为什么要探月
为了民族荣誉,政治宣传
美国人40年前就上去过了,谁再去只能是老二
而且是落后很多的老二
然后就是经济利益和军事利益
这一定要在月球上建立永久基地
要让人上去,就必须 ...

航天的目的是控制地球,不是外星移民,除非地球实在带不下去了!!;P
如果推进技术成熟,太阳系肯定要开发的
土星/木星上丰富的资源想想都让人流口水
火星可以当成新的殖民地
卡尔萨根还想象过改造金星
到时候地球就是人类的后花园
全建成高级住宅区
一定得选最好的黄金地带
雇金星设计师
楼上有花园
楼里有游泳池
楼里站一火星管家
戴一假发
特绅士的那种
........:b


原帖由 caijingrong 于 2007-11-28 11:45 发表

航天的目的是控制地球,不是外星移民,除非地球实在带不下去了!!;P
原帖由 暗夜流星 于 2007-11-28 11:54 发表
如果推进技术成熟,太阳系肯定要开发的
土星/木星上丰富的资源想想都让人流口水
火星可以当成新的殖民地
卡尔萨根还想象过改造金星
到时候地球就是人类的后花园
全建成高级住宅区
一定得选最好的黄金地带
雇金 ...

暗夜兄还是理想主义者!我可不是,我就觉得地球好,打死不移民外星!!;P
原帖由 暗夜流星 于 2007-11-28 11:54 发表
如果推进技术成熟,太阳系肯定要开发的
土星/木星上丰富的资源想想都让人流口水
火星可以当成新的殖民地
卡尔萨根还想象过改造金星
到时候地球就是人类的后花园
全建成高级住宅区
一定得选最好的黄金地带
雇金 ...

嚯嚯嚯,流星大虾NIUBILITY!!!!!!!!!!!!:P :P :P
原帖由 zlaser 于 2007-11-28 10:25 发表

白云兄,我感觉楼主说的有道理,即:载人绕月飞行是载人登月工程的一个重大阶段性目标,能实现这一点,基本上载人登月80%的工作量就做完了。制订计划虽然要考虑宣传因素,但决不能被宣传因素所左右。您说呢?

你这样说就过了,不要说80%,绕月完成的40%可能都不到, 比如说火箭,如果要实现登月,那么月球轨道运载能力就要翻倍,那就是完全不同的火箭了。登月舱的技术含量可是非常的高的,老美是研制了7年才算是成熟。
土星1B也没用来绕月,尽管阿波罗8号并没有携带登月舱。
你如果有本事登月,先期绕一下当然无妨,但如果你的技术条件不够登月,那么此时绕一下既无意义,代价又大,说不定还惹人耻笑。
UR-700M -
Credit: Mark Wade. 6,911 bytes. 73 x 480 pixels.


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Family: UR. Country: Russia. Status: Design 1972.
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By the middle of 1969, NASA was pressing for funding for a manned expedition to Mars. On 30 June 1969 he Soviet Ministry of Defence authorised preparation of Soviet draft projects for a manned Mars expedition. Code named Aelita, the TTZ specification called for a launch vehicle with a low earth orbit payload of 200 to 250 tonnes to be available by 1976. Chelomei抯 response used a modular approach to the launch vehicle design in order to achieve payloads of 300 to 800 tonnes. This would allow an expedition to Mars using a single docking in low earth orbit.

The proposed UR-700M launch vehicle had a gross lift-off mass of 16,000 tonnes and could deliver 750 tonnes to a 250 km, 51.6 degree orbit. It consisted of three stages: Stage 1 and 2 used Lox/Kerosene propellants, and stage 3 Lox/LH2. As in the UR-700, all the engines of Stage 1 and Stage 2 operated at lift-off, but the engines of the second stage were fed from propellant tanks in the first stage. The vehicle consisted of five 9 m diameter first stage blocks with a dry mass of 750 tonnes, three second stage blocks (two of 9 m diameter flanking a 12.5 m diameter core block) with a dry mass of 500 tonnes, and a 12.5 m diameter, 200 tonne empty mass third stage. Each of the outer blocks had 4 x 600 tf engines by KBEM (two 300 tf chambers per engine), while the 12.5 m diameter core block had a total of 6 x 600 tf engines. The third stage had 6 x NK-35 engines of 200 tf each.

The UR-700M/LK-700 advanced project was reviewed by the expert commission in 1972. The commission concluded the Mars project - and the UR-700M booster - were beyond the technical and economical capabilities of the Soviet Union and should be shelved indefinitely.

In 1962 Vladimir Chelomei proposed a family of modular launch vehicles. The UR-700 was designed for direct manned flight to the surface of the moon. While approval to proceed with development of the UR-500 came in April 1962, no such go-ahead was received for the UR-700. Studies continued however, and report index number 4855CC by TsNIIMASH in 1966 showed that any development of improved versions of the N1 would be practically equivalent to design and qualification of a new rocket, while the UR-700 modular approach allowed a range of payloads without requalification. UR-700 derivatives could better support the DLB lunar base, Venus/Mars manned flybys and Mars landing expeditions. Development of the UR-700 was approved on 17 September 1967. However no go-ahead to proceed past the design phase was forthcoming in 1968.

By January 1969, Chelomei was proposing the UR-900 for the Mars expedition. Chertok asked Chelomei what would happen if, God forbid, such a booster exploded on the launch pad. Wouldn't the entire launch complex be rendered a dead zone for 18 to 20 years? Chelomei's reply was that it wouldn't explode, since Glushko's engines were reliable and didn't fail. Aside from that, these propellants had been used in hundreds of military rockets, deployed in silos, aboard ships and submarines, with no problem. Fear of these propellants was irrational. Related propellants were used by the Americans on the Apollo manned spacecraft.

Less than three months later, on 2 April 1969, the unimaginable happened. A Proton rocket, one tenth the size of the planned UR-900, was launched in an attempt to send an unmanned probe to Mars. The leadership of the Soviet Rocket Forces and most of the Chief Designers were present for the event. The Proton rocket lifted off, but one engine failed. The vehicle flew at an altitude of 50 m horizontally, finally exploding only a few dozen metres from the launch pad, spraying the whole complex with poisonous propellants that were quickly spread by the wind. Everyone took off in their autos to escape, but which direction to go? Finally it was decided that the launch point was the safest, but this proved to be even more dangerous - the second stage was still intact and liable to explode. The contamination was so bad that there was no way to clean up - the only possibility was just had to wait for rain to wash it away. This didn't happen until the Mars 1969 launch window was closed, so the first such probe was not put into space until 1971.

This accident seems to have made a powerful impression on the military, and plans for a new generation of space launchers drawn up in the early 1970's specified use of non-toxic liquid oxygen and kerosene propellants. This also forced Chelomei to specify these propellants in the redesignated UR-700M for the Mars expedition.

By the middle of 1969, in the post-Apollo moon landing euphoria, NASA was pressing for funding for a manned expedition to Mars. Ministry of Defence decree 232 of 30 June 1969 authorised preparation of Soviet draft projects for a manned Mars expedition. Code named Aelita, the TTZ specification for the expedition was prepared by TsNIIMASH and NIITI. The TTZ called for a launch vehicle with a low earth orbit payload of 200 to 250 tonnes to be available by 1976. This vehicle would be used to support a Soviet lunar base, heavy military and civilian space stations, and a Mars expedition spacecraft of 1,500 tonnes mass.

Analysis of the requirement by Chelomei indicated a larger launch vehicle than that required by the TTZ would be optimum. Opportunities for launches to Mars had limited launch windows at two year intervals. The combined proability of successfully launching, docking, and assembling a half dozen payloads in low earth orbit was relatively low. The optimum chance for mission success was to use no more than one or two dockings in earth orbit. (NASA came to a similar conclusion in the early 1960's, leading to the Nova launch vehicle studies). Chelomei used a modular approach to the launch vehicle design in order to achieve payloads of 300 to 800 tonnes. By the advanced project stage the MK-700 Mars spacecraft assembly sequence had been reduced to two variants:


Variant 1, with 750 to 800 tonnes payload (2 launches, 1 docking to assemble Mars spacecraft)
Variant 2, or PA, with 480 to 520 tonnes payload (3 launches, 2 dockings to assemble spacecraft)

The first variant was considered preferable to avoid losses in net payload due to systems and propellants required for docking.
Unit p/ya A-1233 of TsKBM determined that it would be possible to reduce the mass of the Mars spacecraft to 900 to 1,000 tonnes. This would allow the Variant 2 booster to be used with only one docking.

The design evolved considerably over the next three years. The preliminary draft project utilised the following design principles of the UR-700M were:


Expedition to Mars using a single docking in low earth orbit
Packet scheme for launch vehicle, with first and second stages firing in parallel at launch, as in the UR-700
Since engines of the thrust and reliability required were not available, engines would be clustered in each block with one reserve engine in the likely event of an engine failure. A total of 8 to 12 engines would be used per rocket block
The rocket blocks would be modular and their sub-units would be completed at the factory. They would be transported by air (An-22) or water (Soviet national canal system) to a launch site on the Arkhangelsk Peninsula. This would limit the necessary transport investment to 150 million roubles and allow the transport systems to be used for other purposes when not transporting the rocket units.
Extensive ground stand tests of all systems before flight

The final payload for the Mars expedition was determined to be 1200 to 1400 tonnes in a 250 km / 51.6 degree parking orbit. A thermal nuclear stage would be used for trans-Mars injection from the parking orbit. Two variants of the expedition were considered:

Variant 1: Used a nuclear engine for trans-Mars injection. Payload in low earth orbit 1400 tonnes, requiring two launches.
Variant 2: Used chemical propulsion for trans-Mars injection. Payload in low earth orbit 2500 tonnes, requiring four launches.

The UR-700M launch vehicle had a gross lift-off mass of 16,000 tonnes and could deliver 750 tonnes to a 250 km, 51.6 degree orbit. It consisted of three stages: Stage 1 and 2 used Lox/Kerosene propellants, and stage 3 Lox/LH2. As in the UR-700, all the engines of Stage 1 and Stage 2 operated at lift-off, but the engines of the second stage were fed from propellant tanks in the first stage. The vehicle consisted of five 9 m diameter first stage blocks with a dry mass of 750 tonnes, three second stage blocks (two of 9 m diameter flanking a 12.5 m diameter core block) with a dry mass of 500 tonnes, and a 12.5 m diameter, 200 tonne empty mass third stage. Each of the outer blocks had 4 x 600 tf engines by KBEM (two 300 tf chambers per engine), while the12.5 m diameter core block had a total of 6 x 600 tf engines. The third stage had 6 x NK-35 engines of 200 tf each.
The UR-700M/LK-700 advanced project was reviewed by the expert commission in 1972. Their conclusions were:


The problem of crew survival of the 650 day long trip to Mars had not been solved. 12 to 15 years of research aboard space stations in low earth orbit on the adaptation of the human organism to the weightlessness and radiation environment of space would be needed.
The nuclear engines of 3.6 tf and 40 tf in the Mars-injection stage of the first variant were only in the draft project stage at that time. 15 to 20 years of development would be needed before they would be ready for use in manned spacecraft
The radiation safety problem of nuclear propulsion had only been solved theoretically. Negotiations would be needed with the United States before international permission could be obtained to place large nuclear reactors in orbit.
Without the use of nuclear energy, the spacecraft mass of 2500 to 3000 tonnes was too large to be practical.
30 to 40 billion roubles would be needed at 1973 prices to accomplish this project. No such sum was considered to be available.

Therefore the commission concluded the Mars project - and the UR-700M booster - should be shelved indefinitely.
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Specifications
LEO Payload: 750,000 kg. to: 200 km Orbit. at: 51.0 degrees. Liftoff Thrust: 20,400,000 kgf. Total Mass: 16,000,000 kg. Core Diameter: 31.0 m. Total Length: 175.0 m.

Stage Number: 1. 1 x UR-700M-1 Gross Mass: 8,000,000 kg. Empty Mass: 750,000 kg. Thrust (vac): 20,805,000 kgf. Isp: 337 sec. Burn time: 115 sec. Isp(sl): 311 sec. Diameter: 9.0 m. Span: 30.5 m. Length: 35.0 m. Propellants: Lox/Kerosene No Engines: 32. RLA-600

Stage Number: 2. 1 x UR-700M-2 Gross Mass: 5,250,000 kg. Empty Mass: 500,000 kg. Thrust (vac): 10,402,500 kgf. Isp: 337 sec. Burn time: 200 sec. Isp(sl): 311 sec. Diameter: 12.5 m. Span: 30.5 m. Length: 30.0 m. Propellants: Lox/Kerosene No Engines: 16. RLA-600

Stage Number: 3. 1 x UR-700M-3 Gross Mass: 2,000,000 kg. Empty Mass: 200,000 kg. Thrust (vac): 1,200,000 kgf. Isp: 455 sec. Burn time: 670 sec. Diameter: 12.5 m. Span: 12.5 m. Length: 16.0 m. Propellants: Lox/LH2 No Engines: 6. NK-15VM


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UR-700M Chronology


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1969 Jun 30 -
MK-700/UR-700M manned Mars expedition development approved. Spacecraft: MK-700.
Ministry of General Machine Building (MOM) Decree 232 'On start of work on the UR-700M rocket' was issued. The decree allowed development of an advanced project for a manned Mars expedition using the UR-700M booster and MK-700 spacecraft. The TTZ specification document was written by the TsNIIMASH and NIITI institutes, and the project was given the code name 'Aelita'.



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- 1972 During the Year -
Soviet Mars expedition work ends Spacecraft: MK-700.
Chelomei's preliminary draft project for the UR-700M launch vehicle and LK-700 spacecraft was reviewed by a government expert commission. Based on the decades worth of development and tens of billions or roubles required to realise the project, the state commission recommended that further work on manned Mars expeditions be deferred indefinitely.



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Bibliography:

367 - Chertok, Boris Yevseyevich, Raketi i lyudi, Mashinostroenie, Moscow, 1994-1999..
443 - Yeteyev, Ivan, Operezhaya vremya, Ocherki, Moscow, 1999..

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冷战时代的空间科学家们的想象力真是无穷的大.近地轨道达1000多吨的特大型火箭各位网友们猜猜还要多少年才能够见于地球?!本贴纯娱乐,仅仅供大家开心一下.
原帖由 暗夜流星 于 2007-11-28 11:54 发表
如果推进技术成熟,太阳系肯定要开发的
土星/木星上丰富的资源想想都让人流口水
火星可以当成新的殖民地
卡尔萨根还想象过改造金星
到时候地球就是人类的后花园
全建成高级住宅区
一定得选最好的黄金地带
雇金 ...

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
土星、木星之类的巨行星是不能登的,类木行星没有固体的表面,它们的表面都是气态物质。
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难道现在嫦娥也被人笑吗,,不会的,,只要我们有个长远的计划,,,那么那会给人笑啊
长五运载力可以达到25吨,,,,那么如果再挖下潜力,我想五十吨不成问题,,,到时
Nova Advanced Concepts - Martin Marietta
Credit: © Mark Wade. 10,905 bytes. 641 x 351 pixels.


Before there was Saturn, when it was still known as the Juno V, there was - NOVA. The US Air Force had begun development of a 1.5 million pound thrust engine, the F-1, in the 1950抯. When NASA was formed, it considered a new launch vehicle beyond the Saturn, using the F-1 engine and capable of sending a manned expedition to the moon. This launch vehicle was identified as Nova in NASA抯 first long range plan, delivered to President Eisenhower on January 27, 1959.

NASA, Von Braun抯 team at Huntsville, and major aerospace contractors conducted a number of design studies of Nova from January 1959 to June 1960. A common characteristic was the clustering of modular units consisting of an F-1 or J-2 engine and their associated propellant tanks. The first Nova designs used four F-1抯 in the first stage and had a translunar payload of only 24 tonnes. Once the three-man, 5 tonne Apollo capsule was settled on, payload for a direct landing on the moon increased quickly - first to 45 tonnes, then finally over 60 tonnes. The number of F-1抯 in the first stage correspondingly increased to 8 or 9.


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In April 1961 President Kennedy set a national goal of a manned lunar landing before 1970. As NASA and its contractors scrambled to make the necessary decisions to reach this goal, it was felt that Nova, which would require construction of new manufacturing facilities, could not be developed in time to meet the deadline. Instead a member of the Saturn family, would have to be used. It was initially planned that two Saturn C-3抯 (three F-1抯 in the first stage) would put the Apollo spacecraft and its translunar boost stage into earth orbit. After docking and fuel transfer, the combined spacecraft would set off for the moon. Eventually lunar orbit rendezvous was selected as the landing mode, resulting in a single Saturn C-4 launch to send the Apollo spacecraft and lunar module toward the moon. At the last minute an extra F-1 engine was slid in 慺or insurance?and the Saturn C-5 was the configuration that went into production. The dimensions of Saturn were limited by the mundane realities of the ceiling height and bay lengths of an existing factory at Michoud, Louisiana, where the Von Braun team intended to build the S-IC first stage. Ironically, the Saturn V as it eventually flew was of essentially the same lift-off mass and payload capability as the Nova!
Despite the selection of Saturn in 1961, studies on Nova continued into the middle of 1962. There were those at NASA headquarters who advocated using large solid rocket motors in place of an F-1 liquid fuelled first stage. They were sure these could be developed in time for the deadline, allowing the use of Nova to launch a direct landing mission to the moon. The first Nova did not finally die until the great 憁ode debate?was settled in June 1962 with the selection of lunar orbit rendezvous for the landing method. This marked the end of consideration of Nova designs dedicated to launch of a direct-landing Apollo spacecraft.

But was not quite the end of Nova. The launch vehicle was now recharacterised as the 憂ext?launch vehicle after the Saturn V. Design objective was a million-pound payload to low earth orbit. Two major rocket companies that did not receive production contracts for Saturn stages - General Dynamics (Convair) and Martin Marietta - were given 慶onsolation?study contracts for Nova in July 1962. Philip Bono of Douglas Aircraft characteristically did his own study without a contract. The contractors were to make preliminary designs of million-pound-payload launch vehicles that explored all possible combinations of:


one versus two stages
use of existing (F-1A and M-1) engines versus higher thrust, higher performance engines
recovery and reuse of either or both stages


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Martin handed in the most comprehensive study, with all possible combinations evaluated, and advanced concepts such as plug nozzles and air augmented engines being considered.

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General Dynamics had the most conservative designs, using existing engines or enormous conventional bell-chamber engines in the 3 million pound thrust class.

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Bono at Douglas characteristically was optimistic about achievable stage mass fractions and had designs with masses considerably less than calculated by the other two contractors.
The following table cross tabulates the Nova launch vehicle types versus contractor, indicating lift-off masses, in millions of kg, normalised to a million pound payload:

Type Martin Marietta General Dynamics Douglas Aircraft
2 stage, F-1A Lox/Kerosene Stage 1 11.7 14.2 7
2 stage, Advanced Lox/Kerosene Stage 1 - 11.7 5.2
2 stage, Solid Stage 1 14.4 19.4 -
--------------------------- - - -
2 Stage, Lox/LH2 Stage 2 6.4  6.6
2 Stage, Lox/LH2, 1st stage reused 6.9 - -
2 Stage, Lox/LH2, all reused 7.8 - -
--------------------------- - - -
1 1/2 stage Lox/LH2 9.3 8.9 -
--------------------------- - - -
Single stage to orbit, Lox/LH2 8.4 - 8.5
Single stage to orbit, Lox/LH2, reused 7.8 - 11.4
--------------------------- - - -
Single stage to orbit, Air augmented 6.9 - -
Single stage to orbit, Air augmented, reused 9.7 - -


Another aspect of Nova was how to transport and erect such huge launch vehicles. NASA had already selected and purchased land for Nova launch sites north of the Saturn V抯 LC-39. Nova and others of its ilk essentially require transport by water from the factory to the launch site and launch from sea or at least seaside facilities. NASA had the Army Corps of Engineers study some ingenious launch facility designs using barges and water channels under the pad to move the vehicle into position. Because of the enormous sound that would be generated in a Nova launch, remote off shore or towed launch platforms were considered essential. One exotic concept was to launch Nova not from Cape Canaveral, but from launch tubes hollowed into the side of Hawaiian cliffs!

By the end of 1963 NASA no longer foresaw any need for such huge launch vehicles. Saturn V studies had already begun which indicated that, using solid strap-on motors, the Saturn could deliver up to a million pounds to orbit without the need to build new vehicles or facilities. More importantly, most at NASA saw the follow-on to the Saturn V to be a reusable winged shuttle, which would land at air strips and be fully reusable. Nova was cancelled quietly in 1964. However throughout the 1960抯 visionaries like Truax and Bono continued to design and advocate very large or single stage to orbit designs like Sea Dragon and Rombus. But in the absence of political support for human colonisation of space or exploration of Mars, the need for such large launch vehicles has not materialised to this day.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova 4L. Earliest Nova design, using only 4 F-1's, capability less than later Saturn designs.  


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Launch Vehicle: Nova NASA. The Nova vehicle most often illustrated in the popular press and histories. As in other early concepts, used F-1 engine in both first and second stages. Resulting performance and total liftoff mass was equivalent to later Saturn V.  


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Launch Vehicle: Nova 4S. Cluster of 4 240 inch solid motors used as first stage; upper stages as Nova 7S and 8L.  


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Launch Vehicle: Nova 5S. Nova design using segmented solid motors in first and second stages. Five six segment motors in first stage; four four segment motors in second stage, equivalent to 9 x F-1 first stage and 4 x F-1 second stage.  


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Launch Vehicle: Nova 7S. Cluster of 7 160 inch solid motors used as first stage; upper stages as Nova 4S and 8L.  


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Launch Vehicle: Nova 8L.
Most capable Nova studied just prior to selection of Saturn for moon landing. Used a three stage configuration of eight F-1 engines in stage 1, two M-1 engines in stage 2, and one J-2 engine in stage 3. Similar to the Saturn C-8 except in the use of M-1 engines. Unlike other modular Nova designs of the time, this one had the unitary stage construction of Saturn.



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Launch Vehicle: Nova 8L Mod. First two stages use short Nova building blocks with 2 F-1's in each block. Four used in stage 1, one in stage 2. Typical of early Nova designs with F-1's in both first and second stages.  


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Launch Vehicle: Nova 9L. Nova design using clustered small diameter tanks; 9 x F-1 first stage and 4 x F-1 second stage; compared with solid Nova using five six segment solid motors in first stage and four four segment motors in second stage.  


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Launch Vehicle: Nova A. Convair/Ehricke Nova design using standard tank/engine modules of 4.9 m diameter in both first and second stages; 4 F-1 engine/modules in first stage, 4 J-2 engine/modules in second stage.  


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Launch Vehicle: Nova B. Convair/Ehricke Nova design using standard tank/engine modules of 4.9 m diameter in both first and second stages; 6 F-1 engine/modules in first stage, 6 J-2 engine/modules in second stage.  


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Launch Vehicle: Nova C. Vehicle using Nova A as first two stages, nuclear spacecraft with jettisonable tanks as upper stage.  


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Launch Vehicle: Nova D. Vehicle using Nova B as first two stages, nuclear spacecraft with jettisonable tanks as upper stage.  


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Launch Vehicle: Nova DAC ISI. Douglas/Bono design for Nova using LH2/Lox in both stages. Improved Specific Impulse chemical stage uses many engines feeding into single large nozzle.  


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Launch Vehicle: Nova GD-B.
Nova design using existing engines. Recoverable engine package; separation at 3,398 m/s at 76,200 m altitude; splashdown using retrorockets under 7 30 m diameter parachutes 1300 km downrange. Massed estimated based on tank volumes, total thrust, and first stage burnout conditions.



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Launch Vehicle: Nova GD-E.
Nova design using 325 inch solid motors as first stage, M-1 engines in second stage. Recoverable solid motors, separation at 1,972 m/s at 53,000 m altitude; splashdown using retrorockets under 3 61 m diameter parachutes 610 km downrange. Recovery of solid motors forshadowed same approach on shuttle 15 years later. Masses estimated based on tank volumes, total thrust, and first stage burnout conditions.



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Launch Vehicle: Nova GD-F.
Nova design using new 3.5 million kgf Lox/Kerosene engines in first stage. Recoverable stage; separation at 3,365 m/s at 89,300 m altitude; splashdown using retrorockets under 8 46 m diameter parachutes 1300 km downrange. Massed estimated based on tank volumes, total thrust, and first stage burnout conditions.



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Launch Vehicle: Nova GD-H.
Nova design using 1 1/2 stage arrangement and new 2.4 million kgf Lox/LH2 engines. Recoverable booster 4 engine package would separate at 2,980 m/s at 87,800 m altitude; splashdown under 4 46 m diameter parachutes 1,000 km downrange. Massed estimated based on tank volumes, total thrust, and first stage burnout conditions.



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Launch Vehicle: Nova GD-J.
Nova design using recoverable Lox/RP-1 stage of ballistic shape with 3 million kgf engines; separation at 3,420 m/s at 93,900 m altitude; splashdown using retrorockets under 7 parachutes 1340 km downrange. Massed estimated based on tank volumes, total thrust, and first stage burnout conditions.



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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM 14A. Nova design using 4 300 inch solids as first stage, 5 M-1 in second stage. Operational date would have been April 1973


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM 14B. Nova design using 4 280 inch solids as first stage, 4 M-1 in second stage. Operational date would have been February 1973


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM 1B. Nova design using existing engines; 14 F-1A in the first stage, 2 M-1 in the second. Operational date would have been December 1972


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM 1C. Nova design using existing engines; 18 F-1A in the first stage, 3 M-1 in the second. Operational date would have been February 1973


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM 24G. Nova design using new high pressure LH2/Lox engines; 18 in the first stage in a plug nozzle arrangement, 2 in the second. Operational date would have been December 1974.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM 33. Nova single stage to orbit design with 24 new high pressure LH2/Lox engines in the first stage in a plug nozzle arrangement. Operational date would have been April 1975.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM 34. Nova 1 1/2 stage design with 4 new 3 million kgf LH2/Lox engines in the jettisonable booster section and a single 3 million kgf sustainer. Operational date would have been June 1976.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM R10E-2. Expendable version of most exotic Martin Nova vairant; single stage to orbit, 30 cd module air augmented engines in annular shroud. Operational date would have been October 1980.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM R10R-2. Reusable version of most exotic Martin Nova vairant; single stage to orbit, 30 cd module air augmented engines in annular shroud. Operational date would have been October 1980.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM S10E-1. Expendable single stage to orbit Nova using cylindrical shape, 24 CD module engines in zero-length plug nozzle. Operational date would have been October 1977.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM S10E-2. Expendable single stage to orbit Nova using conical shape, 30 CD module engines in zero-length plug nozzle. Operational date would have been November 1977.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM S10R-1. Reusable single stage to orbit Nova using cylindrical shape, 24 CD module engines in zero-length plug nozzle. Operational date would have been June 1978.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM S10R-2. Reusable single stage to orbit Nova using conical shape, 30 CD module engines in zero-length plug nozzle. Operational date would have been July 1978.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM T10EE-1. Two stage Nova using CD modules; expendable first stage with 18 modules exhausting to a 10% length plug nozzle; expendable second stage with 2 CD module engines. Operational date would have been November 1976.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM T10RE-1. Two stage Nova using CD modules; reusable first stage with 18 modules exhausting to a 10% length plug nozzle; expendable second stage with 2 CD module engines. Operational date would have been January 1977.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM T10RR-2. Two stage Nova using CD modules; reusable first stage with 24 modules exhausting to a zero length plug nozzle; reusable second stage with a toroidal plug nozzle engine. Operational date would have been December 1976.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova MM T10RR-3. Two stage Nova using CD modules; reusable first stage with 18 modules exhausting to a 10% length plug nozzle; reusable second stage with 2 CD module engines. Operational date would have been July 1977.


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Launch Vehicle: Nova-1 DAC. Douglas/Bono design for Nova using Lox/RP-1 in first stage, existing engines.  


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Launch Vehicle: Nova-2 DAC. Douglas/Bono design for Nova using LH2/Lox in both stages.  

在冷战时代沉重的压力背景下,无论是政治领导人还是空间科学家们往往都有不少奇异惊人的想法.其实如果当年的美国\苏联能够将他们白白浪费在越南与及阿富汗战场的金钱投入于空间事业,还是能够为后人与及历史学家们留下不少值得永远回忆的"空间奇迹"的.呵呵!毕竟那种年代真的是"几百年不能一遇"啊!
人家那是不要黄油要大炮
]]
  实际上在赫鲁晓夫执政的后四五年里,苏联对宇航事业的投入日趋保守,没有明确的目标,没有新型号的运载火箭,也没有新架构的飞船,上升号只是东方号的小修小改,而且仅飞行了两次,苏联在那几年做的只是竭力挖掘P7和东方号的潜力,看起来不断书写纪录,但实际上进步缓慢,此间各设计局都有新的方案计划提出,但是大部分都没有得到批准。
绕月花的钱不会少,但是政治和技术意义却比登月小的多,这恐怕才是苏联放弃载人绕月的原因
另外别拿冷战时期的火箭发展策略和今天比,冷战时期是不惜代价的,而今天则是要从商业角度考虑的.土星5专为阿波罗配套,能源专为暴风雪配套这样的事情恐怕不会再出现了,从这个角度讲,即使安加拉不先进,如果能做到低成本的话在商业上就完全成功了,而发射成本问题你总不该怀疑俄国人的实力了吧.