超级军网最新兰德报告：美能封锁中国40多个空军基地的跑道2到3天 ...
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/28 05:48:11
美国兰德公司在一份最新的报告中对比了中美两国在10个方面的军事实力，得出结论称，中国未来将具备更大的能力提高海上和空中作战能力，并就此认为美国的威慑力下降，可以“用武力解决问题”，“美国需要重新思考与中国的战争”。
兰德公司是美国最重要的以军事内容为主的综合性战略研究机构。据美国防务新闻网站18日报道，该公司的最新报告名为《美中军事记分卡：武力、地理和力量平衡的变迁，1997-2017》，共430页，以1996年、2003年、2010年和2017年的中美军力为研究对象进行分析、对比和预测。
报告称，对于中国打击空军基地的能力，外界认为，中国可以通过短程导弹多重打击并瘫痪台湾的空军基地。中国的短程导弹数量已经增长到1400枚，其精确度的误差也从数百米缩小到了5米，这将迫使美国空军飞行更远距离才能接触到中国部队。在空中作战能力方面，中国已将50%的战斗机替换成第四代战斗机，与美军的差距缩小。到2017年，美国指挥官将无法在台湾地区找到能保证美军7天不受中国袭击的基地。在美国渗透中国领空方面，报告认为，1996年至2017年，中国的防空力量将有长足的进步，如一体化的防空体系、第四代战斗机、空中预警机等，这使得美国更加难以在其领空附近活动。2010年，中国的地对空导弹拥有了更加复杂的追踪设备，其范围可以达到200公里。不过，在南沙群岛发生战斗的情况下，美国可以通过隐形战斗机渗透目标。对于美国打击中国空军基地能力，尽管美国渗透中国领空变得更加危险，但其制造的精确制导武器功能的进步能让美国有更多选择。1996年，美国可以封锁中国40多个空军基地的跑道达8小时，2010年，封锁时间延长至2-3天。
在海上军力方面，中国拥有最新的反舰弹道导弹，这将对美国的航空母舰构成威胁。尽管美国可能会研发出反制武器，但其必须面对这样的现实：中国已经开发出了定位并接触美国航母的能力。此外，美国必须考虑中国潜艇能力的提高。不过，报告认为，美国能成功阻止中国对台湾实现两栖登陆，“美国潜艇、战斗机和地面部队的优势能使中国40%的两栖作战舰船在7天的战斗中损毁”。
在太空能力方面，美国2002年开始资助反太空能力项目。报告建议美国开发高能武器，破坏中国卫星的光学传感器，部署弹道导弹拦截机来击落中国卫星。中国自2007年已经进行了3次反卫星导弹测试，还建设了激光测距站。在核能力上，美国的核弹头优势与中国相比是13：1。
报告得出结论，在未来5至15年，美国在亚洲的优势不断下降。报告建议，美国应向中国强调，与美军“相遇”会带来风险。美军采购重点应该转向远射武器、隐形战斗机等，加强反潜作战能力，并加强使用越南等地区国家的军事基地和设施。http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150919/44689232_0.shtml
当我以为我们阻止美军介入的能力增强时，美军认为他们封锁能力更强了？！怎么会这样？是美军虚张声势还是确有实力？谁有兰德的原文，贴出来看看？
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超大的现在技术性讨论的人怎么这么少了，放眼一看回复，尽是呵呵之流无非说兰德皮包之类顺便鄙视我智商。难道我不知道PLA发展好，实力上升？但兰德既然出了这个报告，有这个超出我们预料的结论，必然是有很多分析以及数据支撑的，对美国针对中国的军力部署必然有分析。回复里面的呵呵之流，你们跟我一样，只知道PLA的发展，那你们知道美国是怎么针对性布置的吗？如果答不出来，就去查资料，好好谈论，别用“呵呵”浪费你们的脑容量。
======================================================================
你们为什么会把注意力放在报告认为中美军力对比10年比96年大上？（原文可没有这样说）这就能证明美军没有实力封锁中国机场2天到3天吗？
美国兰德公司在一份最新的报告中对比了中美两国在10个方面的军事实力，得出结论称，中国未来将具备更大的能力提高海上和空中作战能力，并就此认为美国的威慑力下降，可以“用武力解决问题”，“美国需要重新思考与中国的战争”。
兰德公司是美国最重要的以军事内容为主的综合性战略研究机构。据美国防务新闻网站18日报道，该公司的最新报告名为《美中军事记分卡：武力、地理和力量平衡的变迁，1997-2017》，共430页，以1996年、2003年、2010年和2017年的中美军力为研究对象进行分析、对比和预测。
报告称，对于中国打击空军基地的能力，外界认为，中国可以通过短程导弹多重打击并瘫痪台湾的空军基地。中国的短程导弹数量已经增长到1400枚，其精确度的误差也从数百米缩小到了5米，这将迫使美国空军飞行更远距离才能接触到中国部队。在空中作战能力方面，中国已将50%的战斗机替换成第四代战斗机，与美军的差距缩小。到2017年，美国指挥官将无法在台湾地区找到能保证美军7天不受中国袭击的基地。在美国渗透中国领空方面，报告认为，1996年至2017年，中国的防空力量将有长足的进步，如一体化的防空体系、第四代战斗机、空中预警机等，这使得美国更加难以在其领空附近活动。2010年，中国的地对空导弹拥有了更加复杂的追踪设备，其范围可以达到200公里。不过，在南沙群岛发生战斗的情况下，美国可以通过隐形战斗机渗透目标。对于美国打击中国空军基地能力，尽管美国渗透中国领空变得更加危险，但其制造的精确制导武器功能的进步能让美国有更多选择。1996年，美国可以封锁中国40多个空军基地的跑道达8小时，2010年，封锁时间延长至2-3天。
在海上军力方面，中国拥有最新的反舰弹道导弹，这将对美国的航空母舰构成威胁。尽管美国可能会研发出反制武器，但其必须面对这样的现实：中国已经开发出了定位并接触美国航母的能力。此外，美国必须考虑中国潜艇能力的提高。不过，报告认为，美国能成功阻止中国对台湾实现两栖登陆，“美国潜艇、战斗机和地面部队的优势能使中国40%的两栖作战舰船在7天的战斗中损毁”。
在太空能力方面，美国2002年开始资助反太空能力项目。报告建议美国开发高能武器，破坏中国卫星的光学传感器，部署弹道导弹拦截机来击落中国卫星。中国自2007年已经进行了3次反卫星导弹测试，还建设了激光测距站。在核能力上，美国的核弹头优势与中国相比是13：1。
报告得出结论，在未来5至15年，美国在亚洲的优势不断下降。报告建议，美国应向中国强调，与美军“相遇”会带来风险。美军采购重点应该转向远射武器、隐形战斗机等，加强反潜作战能力，并加强使用越南等地区国家的军事基地和设施。http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150919/44689232_0.shtml
当我以为我们阻止美军介入的能力增强时，美军认为他们封锁能力更强了？！怎么会这样？是美军虚张声势还是确有实力？谁有兰德的原文，贴出来看看？
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
超大的现在技术性讨论的人怎么这么少了，放眼一看回复，尽是呵呵之流无非说兰德皮包之类顺便鄙视我智商。难道我不知道PLA发展好，实力上升？但兰德既然出了这个报告，有这个超出我们预料的结论，必然是有很多分析以及数据支撑的，对美国针对中国的军力部署必然有分析。回复里面的呵呵之流，你们跟我一样，只知道PLA的发展，那你们知道美国是怎么针对性布置的吗？如果答不出来，就去查资料，好好谈论，别用“呵呵”浪费你们的脑容量。
======================================================================
你们为什么会把注意力放在报告认为中美军力对比10年比96年大上？（原文可没有这样说）这就能证明美军没有实力封锁中国机场2天到3天吗？
强调13:1的核弹头比率有意义吗？你纵然可以毁灭我十次，但是你也要赔上上千万人伤亡的代价，外加几万公顷土地被核污染而无法在百年内耕种。这样的胜利有意义吗？
300战斧威武
什么叫你打你的我打我的，这是高深战法。
http://www.amazon.co.uk/U-S--China-Military-Scorecard-Geography-1996-2017/dp/0833082191艹。亚马逊有卖的。57刀····好贵
10年封锁土鳖2,3天；
20年被土鳖封锁2,3月；
20年被土鳖封锁2,3月；
很正常啊，一直在做这方面，外国杂志上都公开的，有空传点上来
没挑战，还能找国会要钱？威胁必须够大。
stonewanglei24 发表于 2015-9-19 11:43
强调13:1的核弹头比率有意义吗？你纵然可以毁灭我十次，但是你也要赔上上千万人伤亡的代价，外加几万公顷土 ...
关键是他说的 封锁机场2到3天····我觉得挺可怕的。不知道是怎么实现的
强调13:1的核弹头比率有意义吗？你纵然可以毁灭我十次，但是你也要赔上上千万人伤亡的代价，外加几万公顷土 ...
关键是他说的 封锁机场2到3天····我觉得挺可怕的。不知道是怎么实现的
对抗，从未停歇
这真是扯淡，能封锁2~3天什么鬼
只要可以封锁，这里就再也不会有跑道了，能封锁就是永久封锁，不存在2~3天的说法。
只要可以封锁，这里就再也不会有跑道了，能封锁就是永久封锁，不存在2~3天的说法。
我佛山人 发表于 2015-9-19 11:49
很正常啊，一直在做这方面，外国杂志上都公开的，有空传点上来
很想知道他是怎么封锁四十几个机场两三天的。
很正常啊，一直在做这方面，外国杂志上都公开的，有空传点上来
很想知道他是怎么封锁四十几个机场两三天的。
什么叫你打你的我打我的，这是高深战法。
没错，就算你封锁我机场3天，我一千多弹道导弹你能清除多少？
没错，就算你封锁我机场3天，我一千多弹道导弹你能清除多少？
我是7145871 发表于 2015-9-19 11:50
关键是他说的 封锁机场2到3天····我觉得挺可怕的。不知道是怎么实现的
当然是用宇宙中最强大的武器“嘴炮”来实现啊。。。
96年才只能封锁8个小时，而到2010年反倒是可以封锁2、3天了。
从这儿就可以看出这个报告有多不靠谱了。。。
我是7145871 发表于 2015-9-19 11:50
关键是他说的 封锁机场2到3天····我觉得挺可怕的。不知道是怎么实现的
当然是用宇宙中最强大的武器“嘴炮”来实现啊。。。
96年才只能封锁8个小时，而到2010年反倒是可以封锁2、3天了。
从这儿就可以看出这个报告有多不靠谱了。。。
我也能用嘴炮封锁全球一个月！
美军现在封锁大陆机场的代价将会十分惨重，飞机从日本和关岛起飞后，机场将被土共反封锁，共军将以一敌三，届时除了从美国本土出发的飞机对大陆机场造成威胁，台，日海空基地将被彻底摧毁，美军航母必退后1000公里，兰德公司请不要无视中国二炮！
难怪没有人提中国威胁论了。
以前台湾抵抗我们登陆只能扛两个礼拜，现在一个月没问题。
以前美国封锁我们机场只能封锁8个小时，现在2-3天没问题。
原来中国越来越弱了，我们整整发展20年，但一直在倒退。
这国怎！定体问！我陷思！
以前台湾抵抗我们登陆只能扛两个礼拜，现在一个月没问题。
以前美国封锁我们机场只能封锁8个小时，现在2-3天没问题。
原来中国越来越弱了，我们整整发展20年，但一直在倒退。
这国怎！定体问！我陷思！
怎样封锁？ 电战 网络战吗？
百臂巨人 发表于 2015-9-19 11:51
这真是扯淡，能封锁2~3天什么鬼
只要可以封锁，这里就再也不会有跑道了，能封锁就是永久封锁，不存在2~3天 ...
我觉得不是这样的。跑道可以修复。我猜测原意是压制使得空军难以有效作战2到3天。随着地面部队防空力量的介入，敌方难以继续压制，所以是2到3天。
这真是扯淡，能封锁2~3天什么鬼
只要可以封锁，这里就再也不会有跑道了，能封锁就是永久封锁，不存在2~3天 ...
我觉得不是这样的。跑道可以修复。我猜测原意是压制使得空军难以有效作战2到3天。随着地面部队防空力量的介入，敌方难以继续压制，所以是2到3天。
很想知道他是怎么封锁四十几个机场两三天的。
把几个关键点打掉，有详细讨论
把几个关键点打掉，有详细讨论
you can you up no can no bb
http://www.defensenews.com/story ... ght-china/72304540/
找到了网站报道的原文。
TAIPEI — A new RAND report challenges the US military to rethink a war with China. The report examines US and Chinese military capabilities in 10 operational areas, producing a “scorecard” for each, from four years: 1996, 2003, 2010, and 2017. Each of the scorecards evaluates capabilities in the context of geography and distance, each of the scorecards evaluates capabilities in the context of two scenarios: a Taiwan invasion and a Spratly Islands campaign. These scenarios center on locations that lie roughly 160 km and 940 km, respectively, from the Chinese coastline.
The 430-page report, U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1997-2017, was written by 14 scholars, including RAND’s wargaming whiz David Shlapak; modeling and simulation specialist Jeff Hagen; Kyle Brady, formerly with Lawrence Livermore; and operations researcher Michael Nixon.
This report is about muscle and machines, not about policy and political issues. This is an objective ‘where the rubber meets the road’ analysis that looks at China’s capabilities at clobbering US air bases in the region, sinking US aircraft carriers with new anti-ship ballistic missiles, and turning American spy and communication satellites into space junk.
The scorecard format with analysis gives the reader a sports-like feel for how bad things can go for the US military in a conflict with China. The 10 scorecards each address relative US and Chinese capabilities in a specific operational areas: air (1-4), maritime (5-6), space, cyber, and nuclear (7-10).
Scorecard 1: Chinese Capability to Attack Air Bases
Since the 1996-97 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, it has been assumed that China would cripple Taiwan’s air bases with multi-layered saturation attacks using short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). However, today that now includes Kadena Air Base on Okinawa. The number of SRBMs from 1996 have grown from a handful to around 1,400, and the circular error probability has shrunk from hundreds of meters to as little as five meters. Even a relatively small number of accurate missiles could shut Kadena down during the critical days at the outset of a war, and “committed attacks might close a single base for weeks.” This will force American aircraft to fly from longer distances to engage Chinese forces, e.g. Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.
Scorecard 2: Air Campaigns Over Taiwan and the Spratly Islands
China has replaced half of its fighter fleet with fourth-generation fighters. The impact of this effort has been to narrow, but not close, the qualitative gap between the US and China air forces. However, this has led to problems creeping into protecting Taiwan in 2017. By that year, “US commanders would be unable to find the basing required for US forces to prevail in a seven-day campaign,” but they could relax their time requirement and prevail in a more extended campaign, but this would entail leaving ground and naval forces vulnerable to Chinese air operations for a longer period of time.
Scorecard 3: US Penetration of Chinese Airspace
Chinese air defense advances have made it more difficult to operate in or near Chinese airspace. In 1996, China’s surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems were largely copies of older Russian systems, such as the 35 km range SA-2. By 2010, China deployed roughly 200 launchers for “double-digit SAMs” with more sophisticated seekers with ranges of up to 200 km. The analysis showed net gains for China from 1996 to 2017 with improved integrated air defense systems, fourth generation fighters, and airborne early warning aircraft. However, in a Spratly Island scenario, far from mainland China, the U.S. ability to penetrate targets is far more robust due to the use of stealth aircraft and a much smaller target set.
Scorecard 4: US Capability to Attack Chinese Air Bases
While penetrating Chinese airspace is more dangerous, the development of American-made precision weapons has given the US more options and greater punch in a Taiwan scenario. Examples such as the Joint Direct Attack Munitions and longer-range standoff weapons give the US some advantages in China’s backyard. The report modeled attacks on the 40 Chinese air bases within unrefueled fighter range of Taiwan. In 1996, the US could close down runways for an average of eight hours, and this increased to between two and three days by 2010, and remains roughly the same in 2017. “While ground attack represents a rare bright spot for relative US performance, it is important to note that the inventory of standoff weapons is finite, and performance in a longer conflict would depend on a wider range of factors.”
Scorecard 5: Chinese Anti-Surface Warfare Capabilities
China has a near obsession with US aircraft carriers since the US deployed two during the 1996-1997 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis. A common joke now bandied about amongst China defense analysts is that when there is a crisis, the US president always asks ‘where is the nearest aircraft carrier?’ But in a future crisis, the first thing a Chinese president asks is ‘where is the nearest US aircraft carrier?’
China has finally reached the point where it can hold at risk US aircraft carriers with new anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), the first ever deployed by any nation. Though the report indicates that the kill chain still makes ASBMs vulnerable to US countermeasures, the US has to face the fact that China has developed a capability to locate and engage US carriers that will only improve in the years to come. At present, China has an increasingly robust over-the-horizon intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, which includes military imaging satellites. Along with the ASBM threat, the US must consider the increased sophistication of Chinese submarines armed with cruise missiles and torpedoes.
Scorecard 6: US Anti-Surface Warfare Capabilities Versus Chinese Naval Ships
The US does a far better job preventing a Chinese amphibious landing on Taiwan. Thanks largely to submarines, air power, and surface forces, the report indicates that 40 percent of Chinese amphibious shipping would be destroyed during a seven-day campaign, “losses that would likely wreck havoc on the organizational integrity of a landing force.” However, China is improving its anti-submarine warfare helicopters and ships, and is continuing to expand its fleet of amphibious vessels. Since 1996, China has doubled its amphibious lift capabilities, and its fleet now includes four large Type 071-class transport docks that can carry four air cushion landing craft.
Scorecard 7: US Counterspace Capabilities Versus Chinese Space Systems
In response to China’s increased dependence on satellites and worrying signs it was developing counterspace weapons, in 2002 the US began funding selective counterspace capabilities. This includes the creation in 2004 of the Counter Communication System to jam enemy communications satellites. The report also suggests the US develop high-energy laser systems to dazzle Chinese satellites’ optical sensors, and task ballistic missile interceptors to shoot down Chinese satellites. These recommendations are largely the result of China’s 2007 shoot-down of one of its weather satellites, and not a unilateral decision made by the US.
Scorecard 8: Chinese Counterspace Capabilities Versus US Space Systems
China has tested three kinetic anti-satellite missile tests since 2007 at low earth orbits (LEO). China also operates laser-ranging stations that could dazzle US satellites or track their orbits to facilitate other forms of attack. The report found that threats to U.S. communication satellites in the form of jamming and imaging systems that are in LEO are severe. The report argues that “more worrisome” are the China’s Russian-made jamming systems and high-powered dual-use radio transmitters, which might be used against US communication and ISR satellites.
Scorecard 9: US and Chinese Cyberwarfare Capabilities
China’s cyber units have been in operation since the late 1990s and are closely tied or operated by the Chinese military. Though the US has suffered from serious attacks, most notably the recent US Office of Personnel Management incident, the report indicates the US “might not fare as poorly in the cyber domain as many assume” during wartime. The US Cyber Command works closely with the US National Security Agency and can draw heavily on the latter’s sophisticated toolkit. Despite the US advantage during wartime, both will “nevertheless face significant surprises” and US logistical efforts are particularly vulnerable, since they rely on unclassified networks on the Internet.
Scorecard 10: US and Chinese Strategic Nuclear Stability
This scorecard evaluates the survivability of both sides’ second-strike nuclear capabilities in the face of a first strike. China has improved its nuclear forces steadily since 1996 with the introduction of new intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the DF-31/31A and an upgraded MIRV-capable DF-5. The navy has also deployed their first operational JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile aboard its Jin-class submarines. Despite these new capabilities China does not have the capability of denying the US a second strike capability. The U.S. has a numerical warhead advantage of 13 to one.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The report states that over the next five to 15 years, if US and Chinese forces remain on current trajectories, Asia will witness a progressively receding frontier of US dominance. Chinese forces will become more capable of establishing temporary local air and naval superiority at the outset of a conflict, and this might enable China to “achieve limited objectives without defeating US forces.”
“Perhaps more worrisome from a military-political perspective, the ability to contest dominance might lead Chinese leaders to believe that they could deter US intervention in a conflict between it and one or more of its neighbors.” This could undermine US deterrence and could during a crisis tip the balance of debate in China as to the advisability of using force.
The report recommends that the US work to shape Chinese leaders misperceptions that US military strength is weakening in the region and emphasize there are serious risks of engaging US military forces.
Procurement priorities should be adjusted to emphasize base redundancy and survivability, more standoff weapons, stealthy survivable fighters and bombers, improved submarine and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and a robust space and counterspace program. The US military should also make rapid cuts to legacy fighter forces and decrease the emphasis on large aircraft carriers.
The US military should consider an active denial strategy that uses Asia’s strategic depth and “enables US forces to absorb initial blows and fight their way back.” Defense of static positions near China “may simply become unaffordable.”
Political-military relations with regional nations should be expanded with an emphasis on wartime access to facilities and bases, particularly in the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia.
Despite these efforts, the US faces serious challenges in the region. China has a narrower focus on a range of regional missions, especially Taiwan, which allows it to optimize its forces for those jobs. “Geographically — the ‘bones of strategy’ — vastly complicates the challenges faced by the United States.” The close proximity of China to areas of potential conflict allows it to capitalize on relatively secure staging areas. “This enables the PLA to focus largely on ‘tooth’ (combat forces) as opposed to ‘tail’ (support assets).” In contrast, the US must maintain an extensive sea and air logistical capacity, along with a largely space-based communication system, that are vulnerable to disruption by China.
找到了网站报道的原文。
TAIPEI — A new RAND report challenges the US military to rethink a war with China. The report examines US and Chinese military capabilities in 10 operational areas, producing a “scorecard” for each, from four years: 1996, 2003, 2010, and 2017. Each of the scorecards evaluates capabilities in the context of geography and distance, each of the scorecards evaluates capabilities in the context of two scenarios: a Taiwan invasion and a Spratly Islands campaign. These scenarios center on locations that lie roughly 160 km and 940 km, respectively, from the Chinese coastline.
The 430-page report, U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1997-2017, was written by 14 scholars, including RAND’s wargaming whiz David Shlapak; modeling and simulation specialist Jeff Hagen; Kyle Brady, formerly with Lawrence Livermore; and operations researcher Michael Nixon.
This report is about muscle and machines, not about policy and political issues. This is an objective ‘where the rubber meets the road’ analysis that looks at China’s capabilities at clobbering US air bases in the region, sinking US aircraft carriers with new anti-ship ballistic missiles, and turning American spy and communication satellites into space junk.
The scorecard format with analysis gives the reader a sports-like feel for how bad things can go for the US military in a conflict with China. The 10 scorecards each address relative US and Chinese capabilities in a specific operational areas: air (1-4), maritime (5-6), space, cyber, and nuclear (7-10).
Scorecard 1: Chinese Capability to Attack Air Bases
Since the 1996-97 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, it has been assumed that China would cripple Taiwan’s air bases with multi-layered saturation attacks using short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). However, today that now includes Kadena Air Base on Okinawa. The number of SRBMs from 1996 have grown from a handful to around 1,400, and the circular error probability has shrunk from hundreds of meters to as little as five meters. Even a relatively small number of accurate missiles could shut Kadena down during the critical days at the outset of a war, and “committed attacks might close a single base for weeks.” This will force American aircraft to fly from longer distances to engage Chinese forces, e.g. Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.
Scorecard 2: Air Campaigns Over Taiwan and the Spratly Islands
China has replaced half of its fighter fleet with fourth-generation fighters. The impact of this effort has been to narrow, but not close, the qualitative gap between the US and China air forces. However, this has led to problems creeping into protecting Taiwan in 2017. By that year, “US commanders would be unable to find the basing required for US forces to prevail in a seven-day campaign,” but they could relax their time requirement and prevail in a more extended campaign, but this would entail leaving ground and naval forces vulnerable to Chinese air operations for a longer period of time.
Scorecard 3: US Penetration of Chinese Airspace
Chinese air defense advances have made it more difficult to operate in or near Chinese airspace. In 1996, China’s surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems were largely copies of older Russian systems, such as the 35 km range SA-2. By 2010, China deployed roughly 200 launchers for “double-digit SAMs” with more sophisticated seekers with ranges of up to 200 km. The analysis showed net gains for China from 1996 to 2017 with improved integrated air defense systems, fourth generation fighters, and airborne early warning aircraft. However, in a Spratly Island scenario, far from mainland China, the U.S. ability to penetrate targets is far more robust due to the use of stealth aircraft and a much smaller target set.
Scorecard 4: US Capability to Attack Chinese Air Bases
While penetrating Chinese airspace is more dangerous, the development of American-made precision weapons has given the US more options and greater punch in a Taiwan scenario. Examples such as the Joint Direct Attack Munitions and longer-range standoff weapons give the US some advantages in China’s backyard. The report modeled attacks on the 40 Chinese air bases within unrefueled fighter range of Taiwan. In 1996, the US could close down runways for an average of eight hours, and this increased to between two and three days by 2010, and remains roughly the same in 2017. “While ground attack represents a rare bright spot for relative US performance, it is important to note that the inventory of standoff weapons is finite, and performance in a longer conflict would depend on a wider range of factors.”
Scorecard 5: Chinese Anti-Surface Warfare Capabilities
China has a near obsession with US aircraft carriers since the US deployed two during the 1996-1997 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis. A common joke now bandied about amongst China defense analysts is that when there is a crisis, the US president always asks ‘where is the nearest aircraft carrier?’ But in a future crisis, the first thing a Chinese president asks is ‘where is the nearest US aircraft carrier?’
China has finally reached the point where it can hold at risk US aircraft carriers with new anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), the first ever deployed by any nation. Though the report indicates that the kill chain still makes ASBMs vulnerable to US countermeasures, the US has to face the fact that China has developed a capability to locate and engage US carriers that will only improve in the years to come. At present, China has an increasingly robust over-the-horizon intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, which includes military imaging satellites. Along with the ASBM threat, the US must consider the increased sophistication of Chinese submarines armed with cruise missiles and torpedoes.
Scorecard 6: US Anti-Surface Warfare Capabilities Versus Chinese Naval Ships
The US does a far better job preventing a Chinese amphibious landing on Taiwan. Thanks largely to submarines, air power, and surface forces, the report indicates that 40 percent of Chinese amphibious shipping would be destroyed during a seven-day campaign, “losses that would likely wreck havoc on the organizational integrity of a landing force.” However, China is improving its anti-submarine warfare helicopters and ships, and is continuing to expand its fleet of amphibious vessels. Since 1996, China has doubled its amphibious lift capabilities, and its fleet now includes four large Type 071-class transport docks that can carry four air cushion landing craft.
Scorecard 7: US Counterspace Capabilities Versus Chinese Space Systems
In response to China’s increased dependence on satellites and worrying signs it was developing counterspace weapons, in 2002 the US began funding selective counterspace capabilities. This includes the creation in 2004 of the Counter Communication System to jam enemy communications satellites. The report also suggests the US develop high-energy laser systems to dazzle Chinese satellites’ optical sensors, and task ballistic missile interceptors to shoot down Chinese satellites. These recommendations are largely the result of China’s 2007 shoot-down of one of its weather satellites, and not a unilateral decision made by the US.
Scorecard 8: Chinese Counterspace Capabilities Versus US Space Systems
China has tested three kinetic anti-satellite missile tests since 2007 at low earth orbits (LEO). China also operates laser-ranging stations that could dazzle US satellites or track their orbits to facilitate other forms of attack. The report found that threats to U.S. communication satellites in the form of jamming and imaging systems that are in LEO are severe. The report argues that “more worrisome” are the China’s Russian-made jamming systems and high-powered dual-use radio transmitters, which might be used against US communication and ISR satellites.
Scorecard 9: US and Chinese Cyberwarfare Capabilities
China’s cyber units have been in operation since the late 1990s and are closely tied or operated by the Chinese military. Though the US has suffered from serious attacks, most notably the recent US Office of Personnel Management incident, the report indicates the US “might not fare as poorly in the cyber domain as many assume” during wartime. The US Cyber Command works closely with the US National Security Agency and can draw heavily on the latter’s sophisticated toolkit. Despite the US advantage during wartime, both will “nevertheless face significant surprises” and US logistical efforts are particularly vulnerable, since they rely on unclassified networks on the Internet.
Scorecard 10: US and Chinese Strategic Nuclear Stability
This scorecard evaluates the survivability of both sides’ second-strike nuclear capabilities in the face of a first strike. China has improved its nuclear forces steadily since 1996 with the introduction of new intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the DF-31/31A and an upgraded MIRV-capable DF-5. The navy has also deployed their first operational JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile aboard its Jin-class submarines. Despite these new capabilities China does not have the capability of denying the US a second strike capability. The U.S. has a numerical warhead advantage of 13 to one.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The report states that over the next five to 15 years, if US and Chinese forces remain on current trajectories, Asia will witness a progressively receding frontier of US dominance. Chinese forces will become more capable of establishing temporary local air and naval superiority at the outset of a conflict, and this might enable China to “achieve limited objectives without defeating US forces.”
“Perhaps more worrisome from a military-political perspective, the ability to contest dominance might lead Chinese leaders to believe that they could deter US intervention in a conflict between it and one or more of its neighbors.” This could undermine US deterrence and could during a crisis tip the balance of debate in China as to the advisability of using force.
The report recommends that the US work to shape Chinese leaders misperceptions that US military strength is weakening in the region and emphasize there are serious risks of engaging US military forces.
Procurement priorities should be adjusted to emphasize base redundancy and survivability, more standoff weapons, stealthy survivable fighters and bombers, improved submarine and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and a robust space and counterspace program. The US military should also make rapid cuts to legacy fighter forces and decrease the emphasis on large aircraft carriers.
The US military should consider an active denial strategy that uses Asia’s strategic depth and “enables US forces to absorb initial blows and fight their way back.” Defense of static positions near China “may simply become unaffordable.”
Political-military relations with regional nations should be expanded with an emphasis on wartime access to facilities and bases, particularly in the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia.
Despite these efforts, the US faces serious challenges in the region. China has a narrower focus on a range of regional missions, especially Taiwan, which allows it to optimize its forces for those jobs. “Geographically — the ‘bones of strategy’ — vastly complicates the challenges faced by the United States.” The close proximity of China to areas of potential conflict allows it to capitalize on relatively secure staging areas. “This enables the PLA to focus largely on ‘tooth’ (combat forces) as opposed to ‘tail’ (support assets).” In contrast, the US must maintain an extensive sea and air logistical capacity, along with a largely space-based communication system, that are vulnerable to disruption by China.
zxphony 发表于 2015-9-19 11:55
当然是用宇宙中最强大的武器“嘴炮”来实现啊。。。
96年才只能封锁8个小时，而到2010年反倒是可以 ...
真是这样吗？我们在进步，美国人也没闲着啊。人家的军费可比我们多多了
当然是用宇宙中最强大的武器“嘴炮”来实现啊。。。
96年才只能封锁8个小时，而到2010年反倒是可以 ...
真是这样吗？我们在进步，美国人也没闲着啊。人家的军费可比我们多多了
我是7145871 发表于 2015-9-19 11:56
我觉得不是这样的。跑道可以修复。我猜测原意是压制使得空军难以有效作战2到3天。随着地面部队防空力量的 ...
如果2010年可以所谓的“压制空军难以有效作战2-3天”，那请问1996年为何做不到呢？
我觉得不是这样的。跑道可以修复。我猜测原意是压制使得空军难以有效作战2到3天。随着地面部队防空力量的 ...
如果2010年可以所谓的“压制空军难以有效作战2-3天”，那请问1996年为何做不到呢？
两到三个小时，甚至分钟，好不！这明显是MD战忽局在故意唱衰自己
神圣的战争 发表于 2015-9-19 11:53
没错，就算你封锁我机场3天，我一千多弹道导弹你能清除多少？
封锁我机场3天，意味着3天内我方很多重要设施将得不到空军的有效保护。随便炸几个电厂都不得了
没错，就算你封锁我机场3天，我一千多弹道导弹你能清除多少？
封锁我机场3天，意味着3天内我方很多重要设施将得不到空军的有效保护。随便炸几个电厂都不得了
信兰德，得永生！。。。。。。呃。。。。。好像美国人都不信这个兰德，就一骗钱的皮包公司而已
大幅缩小。。。
真是这样吗？我们在进步，美国人也没闲着啊。人家的军费可比我们多多了
是96年的国力差距大还是现在的大？逻辑在哪里？
是96年的国力差距大还是现在的大？逻辑在哪里？
战略忽悠，拉住盟友
安慰弯弯，顶顶小三
安慰弯弯，顶顶小三
你再看看 发表于 2015-9-19 12:01
信兰德，得永生！。。。。。。呃。。。。。好像美国人都不信这个兰德，就一骗钱的皮包公司而已
谁告诉你的！
信兰德，得永生！。。。。。。呃。。。。。好像美国人都不信这个兰德，就一骗钱的皮包公司而已
谁告诉你的！
百臂巨人 发表于 2015-9-19 11:51
这真是扯淡，能封锁2~3天什么鬼
只要可以封锁，这里就再也不会有跑道了，能封锁就是永久封锁，不存在2~3天 ...
考虑了对方修复能力和自己的武器存量耗尽呗。
这真是扯淡，能封锁2~3天什么鬼
只要可以封锁，这里就再也不会有跑道了，能封锁就是永久封锁，不存在2~3天 ...
考虑了对方修复能力和自己的武器存量耗尽呗。
zxphony 发表于 2015-9-19 11:58
如果2010年可以所谓的“压制空军难以有效作战2-3天”，那请问1996年为何做不到呢？
这正是我本帖想问的地方啊。57刀好贵，买不起书啊
如果2010年可以所谓的“压制空军难以有效作战2-3天”，那请问1996年为何做不到呢？
这正是我本帖想问的地方啊。57刀好贵，买不起书啊
如果2010年可以所谓的“压制空军难以有效作战2-3天”，那请问1996年为何做不到呢？
96年不是做不到而是没必要。那些歼六歼七飞上天也是火鸡猎物，美国根本不在乎，也没必要冒风险来攻击机场
96年不是做不到而是没必要。那些歼六歼七飞上天也是火鸡猎物，美国根本不在乎，也没必要冒风险来攻击机场
谁告诉你的！
眼睛不瞎都看得见！
眼睛不瞎都看得见！
我是7145871 发表于 2015-9-19 12:11
这正是我本帖想问的地方啊。57刀好贵，买不起书啊
能得出这样连基本事实逻辑都不符的可笑结论，自然是完全在胡扯啊。
你买不买起书跟别人有何关系？是想来推销此书吗？
这种胡扯的东西恐怕很少会对此有兴趣。。。
这正是我本帖想问的地方啊。57刀好贵，买不起书啊
能得出这样连基本事实逻辑都不符的可笑结论，自然是完全在胡扯啊。
你买不买起书跟别人有何关系？是想来推销此书吗？
这种胡扯的东西恐怕很少会对此有兴趣。。。
96年不是做不到而是没必要。那些歼六歼七飞上天也是火鸡猎物，美国根本不在乎，也没必要冒风险来攻击机场
美国可以压制我方机场三天，我方可以压制美国机场十天并摧毁美国航母，最后美国还是然并卵。
美国可以压制我方机场三天，我方可以压制美国机场十天并摧毁美国航母，最后美国还是然并卵。
你再看看 发表于 2015-9-19 12:02
是96年的国力差距大还是现在的大？逻辑在哪里？
你家邻居10年前就每年挣一百万，你10年前每年挣五万。十年前你的资产比邻居少95万。这十年来，邻居依然每年挣100万，但你收入一直在增加，终于现在一年挣55万了。你跟邻居比，实力的确上去了，但是你的资产总数比邻居比邻居少了足足770万。想明白了没有？
是96年的国力差距大还是现在的大？逻辑在哪里？
你家邻居10年前就每年挣一百万，你10年前每年挣五万。十年前你的资产比邻居少95万。这十年来，邻居依然每年挣100万，但你收入一直在增加，终于现在一年挣55万了。你跟邻居比，实力的确上去了，但是你的资产总数比邻居比邻居少了足足770万。想明白了没有？
美国可以压制我方机场三天，我方可以压制美国机场十天并摧毁美国航母，最后美国还是然并卵。
这又不是小孩子斗嘴
这又不是小孩子斗嘴
你再看看 发表于 2015-9-19 12:01
信兰德，得永生！。。。。。。呃。。。。。好像美国人都不信这个兰德，就一骗钱的皮包公司而已
兰德公司是美国最重要的以军事为主的综合性战略研究机构。它先以研究军事尖端科学技术和重大军事战略而著称于世，继而又扩展到内外政策各方面，逐渐发展成为一个研究政治、军事、经济科技、社会等各方面的综合性思想库，被誉为现代智囊的“大脑集中营”、“超级军事学院”，以及世界智囊团的开创者和代言人。它可以说是当今美国乃至世界最负盛名的决策咨询机构。
信兰德，得永生！。。。。。。呃。。。。。好像美国人都不信这个兰德，就一骗钱的皮包公司而已
兰德公司是美国最重要的以军事为主的综合性战略研究机构。它先以研究军事尖端科学技术和重大军事战略而著称于世，继而又扩展到内外政策各方面，逐渐发展成为一个研究政治、军事、经济科技、社会等各方面的综合性思想库，被誉为现代智囊的“大脑集中营”、“超级军事学院”，以及世界智囊团的开创者和代言人。它可以说是当今美国乃至世界最负盛名的决策咨询机构。