基辛格《世界秩序》之亚洲秩序

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CHAPTER 6: Toward an Asian Order: Confrontation or Partnership
第六章 面对亚洲秩序：对抗or合作
Asia's International Order and China
亚洲国际秩序和中国
China and World Order
中国和世界秩序
A longer Perspective
展望未来


Henry Kissinger
World Order
Chapter5: The Multiplicity of Asia
Whatis an Asian Regional Order?
什么是亚洲秩序？
Thehistorical European order had been self-contained.England was,until the earlytwentieth century, able to preserve the balance through its insular positionand naval supremacy.Occasionally, European powers enlisted outside countries tostrengthen their positions temporarily-for example, France courting the OttomanEmpire in the sixteenth century or Britains early-twentieth-century alliancewith Japan –but non-Western powers,other than occasional surges from the MiddleEast or North Africa, had few interests in Europe and were not called on tointervene in European conflicts.
欧洲秩序是历史上独立发展起来的。直到20世纪前半叶，英国因为孤悬的岛屿位置和世界上最强大的海军保持了与欧洲的平衡。有时，欧洲国家为增强自己的力量与域外国家暂时结盟——比如，16世纪的法国和奥斯曼帝国，20世纪初期的英国和日本——但是与在中东和北非的风起云涌不同，非西方国家在欧洲几乎没有利益而且从来没有介入欧洲战争。

Bycontrast, the contemporary Asian order includes outside powers as an integralfeature: the United States, whose role as an Asia-Pacific power was explicitlyaffirmed in joint statements by U.S. President Barack Obama and ChinesePresident Hu Jintao in January 2011, and Chinese President Xi Jinping in June2013; and Russia, geographically an Asian power and participant in Asiangroupings such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,even if ovethree-quarters of its population lives in the European portion of Russianterritory.
相比起来，域外力量的介入一直是当代亚洲秩序的重要部分：2011年1月美国总统奥巴马和中国国家主席Hu的联合声明，2013年6月美国总统奥巴马和中国国家主席Xi的联合声明都清楚的确认了美国是亚太国家。而俄罗斯，即使他超过3/4的人口都居住在欧洲部分，他在地理上也是亚洲国家，还参加了亚洲组织，例如上海合作组织。

TheUnited States in modern times has occasionally been invited to act as abalancer of power.In the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905,it mediated the warbetween Russia and Japan;in World War 2,it defeated Japans quest for Asianhegemony. The United States played a comparable Asian role during the Cold Warwhen it sought to balance the Soviet Union through a network of alliancesstretching from Pakistan to the Philippines.
现代以来，美国偶尔被邀请扮演平衡角色，在1905年的朴次茅斯和约中调停了俄国和日本的战争；在第二次世界大战，美国打败了寻求亚洲霸权的日本。美国在冷战时相当程度上扮演了亚洲国家，他建立了一个从巴基斯坦到菲律宾的联盟平衡了苏联的影响。

The evolving Asian structure will have to take into account a plethora of statesnot dealt with in the preceding pages. Indonesia, anchoring Southeast Asiawhile affirming an Islamic orientation,plays an increasingly influential roleand has thus far managed a delicate balancing act between China, the UnitedStates, and the Muslim world. With Japan,Russia, and China as nerghbors, theRepublic of Korea has achieved a vibrant democracy bolstered by a globallycompetitive economy, including leadership in strategic industries such astelecommunications and shipbuilding. Many Asian countries-including China-viewNorth Koreas policies as destabilizing but regard a collapse of North Korea asa greater danger.South Korea on its part will have to deal with increasingdomestic pressures for unification.
正在发展的亚洲机构将必须考虑很多过去没接触过的国家。印度尼西亚，一个东南亚的穆斯林国家，正在扮演越来越重要的角色，很大程度上维持着和中国、美国、穆斯林世界之间微妙的平衡。韩国，日本、俄罗斯和中国共同的邻居，是一个在全球有竞争力的经济体，在战略行业（比如电信和造船工业）中位于国际领先位置，受此激励他的国内民主制度正在蓬勃发展。北朝鲜被很多亚洲国家，包括中国，看成是不稳定的因素，但是，这些国家同时也认为北朝鲜的崩溃是个巨大的灾难。而对南朝鲜来说，他将不得不面对国内越来越大的统一压力。

In theface of Asias vast scale and the scope of its diversity, its nations havefashioned a dazzling array of multilateral groupings and bilateralmechanisms.In contrast to the European Union,NATO,and the Commission onSecurity and Cooperation in Europe, these institutions deal with security andeconomic issues on a case-by-case basis, not as an expression of formal rulesof regional order . Some of the key groupings include the United States, andsome, including economic ones, are Asian only, of which the most elaborated andsignificant is ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The coreprinciple is to welcome those nations most directly involved with the issues athand.
因为亚洲大陆的巨大和多样，亚洲国家流行建立一系列让人眼花缭乱的多边组织和双边机制。与亚洲形成对比的是欧盟，北约和欧洲安全与合作组织是欧盟处理具体安全和经济问题的基础，而不是一个形式上的地区秩序准则。一些核心组织包括美国，一些只有亚洲经济体参与的，其中最重要和复杂的就是东盟（东南亚国家联盟）。核心原则是欢迎身边所有直接参与问题的国家。

Butdoes all this amount to an Asian system of or  order?In Europes equilibrium, theinterests of the main parties were comparable, if not congruent ,A balance ofpower could be developed not only inpractice-as is inevitable in the absence of hegemony-but as a system oflegitimac that facilitated decisions and moderated policies. Such a congruencedoes not exist in Asia, as is shown by the priorities the major countries haveassigned to themselves.While India appears mostly concerned with China as apeer competitor, in large measure a legacy of the 1962 border war, China seesits peer rivals in Japan and the United States. India has devoted fewermilitary resources to China than to Pakistan, which, if not a peeer competitor,has been a strategic preoccupation for New Delhi.
但是这些能称为亚洲的秩序么？在欧洲的平衡中，主要国家的利益如果不能说完全一致的话也是类似的。力量的平衡不是只可以在实践过程中慢慢发展，以现在的情形来说，缺乏领导是不可避免的了，但是，还可以建立一个合法的体系来促进产生共识和调节各方政策。但是各方并没有就此达成一致，表现在各主要国家都优先关注自己的利益。印度主要把中国看成是平等的竞争对手，很大原因是1962年边境战争的结果，中国则把日本和美国看成平等的竞争对手。印度的军事资源相比投向中国更多的投向了巴基斯坦，一个不平等的竞争对手却占据了新德里全部的战略注意。

Theamorphous nature of Asian groupings is partly because geography has dectated asharp dividing line between East Asia and South Asia throughouthistory.Cultural, philosophical, and religious influences have transcended thegeographic dividing lines, and Hindu and Confucian concepts of governance havecoexisted in Southeast Asia. But the mountain and jungle barriers were too impenetrableto permit military interaction between the great empires of East Asia and SouthAsia until the twentieth century. The Mongols and their successors entered theIndian subconinent from Central Asia, not through the Himalayan hign passes,andthey failed to reach the southern parts of India. The various regions of Asiahave geopolitically and historically pursued distinct courses.
亚洲组织的不确定性部分是由于地形使东亚和南亚在历史上被一条线很明显地分开。文化、哲学、宗教的影响可以跨越这条地理上的分割线，印度教和儒教在东南亚同时存在；但是在20世纪以前，高山和丛林却足以阻碍东亚和南亚两个伟大帝国的军事力量相互接触。蒙古和他的继承者虽然从中亚进入印度次大陆，不是越过喜马拉雅山过去，但是他们也没能到达印度的南部。亚洲各个地区在历史和地缘政治上都不一样。

Theregional orders constructed during these periods include none based onWestphalian premises.Where the European order embraced an equilibrium ofterritorially defined “sovereign states” recognizing each others legal equality, traditional Asian political powers operated by more ambiguous criteria. Untilwell into the modern era, an “inner Asian” world influenced by Mongol Empire,Russia, and Islam coexisted with a Chinese imperial tribute system; the latterreached outward to the kingdoms of Southeast Asia, which entertained Chinasclaims of universality even as they practiced a form of statecraft deeplyinfluenced by Hindu principles received from India that posited a form ofdivinity for monarchs.
在这些时期，地区秩序的构建没有受到过威斯特伐利亚体系的影响。欧洲秩序是建立在一群地区领主的平衡上的，他们都承认彼此平等的合法地位；而亚洲的传统政治建立在更加模糊的标准上。直到进入现代前，真正的亚洲是蒙古帝国、俄国、伊斯兰和一个中华帝国的朝贡体系共存的世界；后者向外扩展到东南亚诸国，虽然治国方法深受印度教影响同样假设国王有神性，但东南亚诸国还是接受了中国建立的世界体系。

Nowthese legacies are meeting, and there is far from a consensus among the variouscountries about the meaning of the journey they have taken or its lessons fortwenty-first-century world order. Under contemporary conditions, essentiallytwo balances of power are emerging:on in South Asia, the other in East Asia.Neither possesses the characteristic integral to the European balance of power:a balancer,a country capable of establishing an equilibrium by shifting itsweight to the weaker side. The United States(after its withdrawal fromAfghanistan) has refrained from treating the contemporary internal South Asianbalance primarily as a military problem. But it will have to be active in thediplomacy over reestablishing a regional order lest a vacuum is created, whichwould inevitably draw all surrounding countries into a regional confrontation.
现在，所有的历史遗产都相遇了，而且所有国家对在历史上经历的和学到的东西对建立21世纪世界秩序的意义没有达成共识。在当代，出现了两个关键的平衡力量，一个在南亚，一个在东亚。两个都不具有欧洲平衡力量那样作为整体的一部分的特点：做一个平衡者，一个国家可以通过和弱的一边站在一起来建立平衡。美国（从阿富汗撤军后）克制了自己，没有将当时的南亚内在平衡过程当成军事问题对待。但是他不得不在重建地区秩序上做积极的外交动作，以免出现真空地带，这将会不可避免的把周围国家卷入地区对抗中。

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The most common feature of asian states is their sense of representing “emerging” or “postcolonial” countries.All have sought to overcome the legacy of colonial rule by asserting a strong national identity. They share a conviction that world order is now rebalancing after an unnatural Western irruption over the past several centuries, but they have drawn vastly different lessons from their historical journeys. When top officials seek to evoke core interests, many of them look to a different cultural tradition and idealize a different golden age.
亚洲最一致的特征是他们代表了发展中和后殖民国家，都想通过强调民族主义来超越殖民历史。他们有共同的理念，在几个世纪西方残忍的入侵过去后，现在的世界秩序正在发生再平衡，但是他们从各自的历史经历中学到了非常不同的教训。当上层阶级开始追寻核心利益时，他们回顾各自不同的文化传统开始追求完全不同的理想中的黄金时代。
In Europes eighteenth- and nineteenth-century systems, the preservation of the equilibrium-and by implication the status quo-was seen as a positive virtue. In Asia, almost every state is impelled by its own dynamism.Convinced that it is “rising,”it operates with the conviction that the world has yet to affirm its full deserved role. Even while no state questions the others sovereignty and dignity and all affirm a dedication to “non-zero-sum” dilomacy, the simultaneous pursuit of so many programs of national prestige building introduces a measure of volatility to the rigional order.With the evolution of modern technology, the major powers of Asia have armed themselves with far more destructive military arsenals than even the strongest nineteenth-century Europena state possessed, compounding the risks of miscalculation.
在18和19世纪的欧洲体系中，均势的保持（保持现状）被看成优点。在亚洲，几乎所有的国家都是被自己内在动力所推动。他们通过达到他们在世界上应有的地位来确认自己的崛起。
即使没有国家质疑其他国家的主权和尊严和都承认“非零和”的外交准则的情况下，现在这些国家同时都在追求建立国家影响力将导致地区秩序的混乱。随着现代技术的发展，亚洲主要国家的军事装备武力已经过多，甚至远远超出了19世纪欧洲国家最强时所拥有的武力，这导致了误判的危险。
The organization of Asia is thus an inherent challenge for world order. Major countries perception and pursuit of their national interests, rather than the balance of power as a system,have shaped the mechanisms of order that have developed. Their test will be whether a transpacific partnership, providing a peaceful framework for the interplay of many established interests, will be possible.
因此，亚洲组织是对世界秩序的内在挑战。主要国家的感觉和对国家利益的追求，比当一个系统里的平衡力量更能影响正在发展的权利秩序机构。他们的考验是将来是否有可能建立一个横跨太平洋的伙伴关系，为很多互相影响的既有利益者提供和平的框架。
Asia's International Order and China
亚洲国际秩序和中国
Of all conceptions of world order in Asia, China operated the longest lasting, the most clearly defined, and the one furthest from Westphalian ideas. China has also taken the most complex journey, from ancient civilization through classical empire, to Communist revolution, to modern great-power status-a course which will have a profound impact on mankind.
在亚洲所有关于世界秩序的概念中，中国的是维持时间最长和定义最清楚的，而且是离威斯特伐利亚体系最遥远的。中国也是经历最复杂历史进程的，从古代文明经过古典帝国到社会主义革命，到现代超级大国地位——一个将会给人类带来巨大影响的过程。
From its unification as a single political entity in 221 B.C. through the early twentieth century, China’s position at the center of world order was so ingrained in its elite thinking that in the Chinese language there was no word for it. Only retrospectively did scholars define the “sinocentric” tribute system. In this traditional concept, China considered itself, in a sense, the sole sovereign government of the world. Its Emperor was treated as a figure of cosmic dimensions and the linchpin between the human and the divine. His purview was not a sovereign state of “china” _that is , the territories immediately under his rule_but “All under Heaven”,of which China formed the central,civilized part:”the Middle Kingdom,”inspiring and uplifting the rest of humanity.
自从公元前221年中国统一成一个独立的政治实体到20世纪前期，中国位于世界秩序中心的观念在中国精英的思想里根深蒂固，以致于在中国语言中没有与世界秩序对应的词，回溯过去，学者只有定义一个以中国为中心的朝贡体系。在这个传统概念中，中国认为自己是世界上唯一的主权国家。他们的皇帝被当成是宇宙的代表和连接人与天的关键。他的权力范围不只是中华帝国（这是直接在他管辖下的领土）而是“天下”，中国是“天下”的中心，文明的中心：“中央王国”，启发和激励其余的人类。
In this view, world order reflected a universal hierarchy, not an equilibrium of competing sovereign states. Every known society was conceived of as being in some kind of tributary relationship with China, based in part on its approximation of Chinese culture; none could reach equality with it. Other monarchs were not fellow sovereigns but earnest pupils in the art of governance,striving toward civilization. Diplomacy was not a bargaining process between multiple sovereign interests but a series of carefully contrived ceremonies in which foreign societies weere given the opportunity to affirm their assigned place in the global hierarchu. In keeping with this perspective, in classical china what would now be called foreign policy was the province of the Ministry of Rituals,which determined the shades of the tributary relationship, and the office of border affairs, charged with managing relations with nomadic tribes. A chinese foreign ministry was not established until the mid nineteenth century, and then perforce to deal with intruders from the West.Even then, officials considered their task the traditional practice of barbarian management , not anything that might be regarded as westphalian diplomacy. The new ministry carride the telling title ot the Office for the Management of the Affairs of All Nations, implying that China was not engaging in interstate diplomacy at all.
这种世界秩序反映了一种宇宙的等级制度，而不是一种互相竞争的主权国家的平衡。所有已知的社会按距离中华文明的远近都在某种程度上与中国建立从属关系；没有一个拥有与中国平等的地位。其他君主不是同属于统治阶级的同事，而是政治管理艺术真诚的学生，努力变得更加文明。外交不是多个君主为利益互相谈判的过程，而是一个精心设计的仪式，其他国家可以在这个仪式中确认他们在全球等级制度中被分配的地位。正是由于这种观点，在传统中国，现在被称作“外交部”的机构是属于礼部和边境事务部管辖的，礼部决定朝贡关系的形式，边境事务部管理与游牧部族的关系。中国直到19世纪中期才不得不建立外交部来处理和西方侵略者的关系。即便如此，官员们和以前一样认为他们的工作就是管理野蛮人，而不是什么威斯特伐利亚体系中的外交。这个新部门的名字“总理各国事务衙门”清楚的表明了这种认识的，它暗示中国并不被包含在这种各国之间的外交关系内。
The goal of the tribute system was to foster deference, not to extract economic benefit or to dominate foreign societies militarily. Chinas most imposing architectural achievement, the Great Wall eventually extending over roughly five thousand miles, was begun by the Emperor Qin Shi Huang, who had just defeated all rivals militarily,ending the period of Warring States and unifying China. It was a grandiose testimony to military victory but also to its inherent limits, denoting vast power coupled with a consciousness of vulnerability.For millennia, China sought to beguile and entice its adversaries more often than it attempted to defeat them by force of arms.Thus a minster in the Han Dynasty(206 B.C.-A.D. 220) described the five baits with which he proposed to manage the mounted Xiongnu tribes to Chinas northwetern frontier, though by conventional analysis China was the superior military power:
To gave them…elaborate clothes and carriages in order to corrupt their eyes; to give them fine food in order to corrupt their mouth; to give them music and women in order to corrupt their ears; to provide them with lofty buildings, granaries and slaves in order to corrupt their stomach…and, as for those who come to surrender, the emperor should show them favor by honoring them with an imperial reception party in which the emperor should personally serve them wine and food so as to corrupt their mind.These are what may be called the five baits.
朝贡体系的目标是培养差异性，而不是为了榨取经济利益或者军事统治外国。“长城”，这个总长超过5000英里的中国最伟大的建筑成就，是由打败了所有的对手，结束了战国时代，统一了中国的皇帝秦始皇开始修建的。它不仅是军事胜利的纪念碑，而且是这个超级帝国内在脆弱意识的证明。千年来，中国更常寻求通过欺骗和引诱来打败他的对手而不是通过武力。因此，汉朝（公元前206年——公元220年）尽管在传统研究中拥有更强大的军事力量，但他的一个官员（译者注：贾谊）提出“五饵”来应对中国西北边境的马上部落匈奴：（原文）
赐之盛服车乘以坏其目；
赐之盛食珍味以坏其口；
赐之音乐、妇人以坏其耳；
赐之高堂、邃宇、府库、奴婢以坏其腹；
于来降者，上以召幸之，相娱乐，亲酌而手食之，以坏其心；
此五饵也。
The hallmark of Chinas diplomatic rituals, the kowtow-kneeling and touching ones head to the ground to acknowledge the Emperors superior authority-was an abasement, to be sure, and proved a stumbling block to relations with modern Western states.But the kowtow was symbolically voluntary:it was the representative deference of a people that had been not so much conquered as awed.The tribute presented to China on such occasions was often exceeded in value by the Emperors return gifts.
中国外交程序的标志“磕头”——通过跪下让头碰到地来承认皇帝的优越权力——实话说是一个屈辱，而且在与现代西方国家交往的时候成为了一个障碍。但是“磕头”形式上是自愿的：典型的区别是人们更像是表达敬畏而不是被征服了。在这些仪式中外国给中国的贡品的价值常常还没有皇帝回赐的礼物高。
Traditionally, China sought to dominate psycholigically by its achievements and its conduct-interspersed with occasional military excursions to teach recalcitrant barbarians a lesson and to induce respect.Both these strategic goals and this fundamentally psychological approach to armed conflict were in evidence as recently as Chinas wars with India in1962 and Bietnam in 1979, as well as in the manner in which core interests vis-à-vis other neighbors are affirmed.
传统上，中国通过自己的成就和引导寻求心理上的统治，偶尔用武力教训不服从的野蛮人让他们敬服。这些战略目标和看似武力其实本质上是心理斗争的方法在中国最近的两次战争中被证实。中国在1962年的中印战争和1979年的中越战争中，都是通过这些方法来向邻国强调自己的核心利益。
Still, China was not a missionary society in the Western sense of the term. It sought to induce respect, not conversion; that subtle line could never be crossed.Its mission was its performance, which foreign societies were expected to recognize and acknowledge. It was possible for another country to become a friend, even an old friend, but it could never be treated as Chinas peer.Ironically, the only foreigners who achieved something akin to this status were conquerors.In one of historys most amazing feats of cultural imperialism, two peoples that conquered China-the Mongols in the thirteenth century and the Manchus in the seventeenth-were induced to adopt core elements of Chinese culture to facilitate the administration of a people so numerous and so obdurate in its assumption of cultural superiority. The conquerors were significantly assimilated by the defeated Chinese society, to a point where substantial parts of their home territory came to be treated as traditionally Chinee. China had not sought to export its political system;rather, it had seen others come to it. In that sense, it has expanded not by conquest but by osmosis.
而且，中国并不是西方意义上的传教士社会。他希望得到尊重而不是改变其他人；那条微妙的界限从来没有被跨越。他的目标是发展自己到领先的水平，并且希望其他国家承认和接受。其他国家可以成为朋友，甚至是老朋友，但绝没有可能作为一个平等的伙伴。讽刺的是，能达到这种地位的国家只能是他的征服者。文化帝国制度的一个令人瞩目的成就就是两个入侵中国的民族——13世纪的蒙古族和17世纪的满族——也接纳了中国文化的核心因素来管理中国，因为他的人民数量是如此的巨大和如此顽固的坚持自己的文化优越性。这些征服者明显被所征服的中国社会同化了，以至于连他们原来的家园也被当成了传统的中国领土。中国从来没有出口自己的政治制度，而是其他国家自主的学习他。也就是说，他的扩张不是靠武力征服而是靠渗透。
In modern era, West representatives with their own sense of cultural superiority set out to enroll China in the European World system,which was becoming the basic structure of international order. They pressured China to cultivate ties with the rest of the world through exchange ambassadors and free trade and to uplift its people through a modernizing economy and a society open to Christian proselytizing.
现代，西方代表们有自己的文化优越感并将中国拉入欧洲世界体系，而欧洲体系成为了国际秩序的基础架构。他们强迫中国通过交换大使和进行自由贸易建立与其他国家的联系，通过经济现代化和基督教传教开化他的人民。
What the West conceived of as a process of enlightenment and engagement treated in China as an assault. China tried at first to parry it and then to resist outright.When the first British envoy, George Macartney, arrived in the late eighteenth century, bringing with him some early products of the Industrial Revolution and a letter from King George 3 proposing free trade and the establishment of reciprocal resident embassies in Beijing and London, the Chinese boat that carried him from Guangzhou to Beijing was festooned with a banner that identified him as The English ambassador bringing tribute to the Emperor of China. He was dismissed with a letter to the King of England explaining that no ambassador could be permitted to reside in Beijing because Europe consists of many other nations besides your own :if each and all demanded to be represented at our court, how could we possibly consent ? The thing is utterly impracticable.The Emperor saw no need for trade beyond what was already occurring in limited , tightly regulated amounts ,because Britain had no goods China desired:
Swaying the wide world , I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the State; strange and costly objects do not interest me . If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to dispatch them from afar… As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things.
这些西方认为是启蒙和契约的行为在中国看来都是对自己的侵略。中国一开始试图闪避，接着公开反对这些行为。当18世纪后期，英国第一个公使乔治马戛尔尼带着早期工业革命的产品和英皇乔治三世要求自由贸易和北京与伦敦互设常驻使馆的信，坐船从广州被迎接到北京。中国人把他当成了带贡品给中国皇帝的英国使节，之后用一封中国皇帝给英格兰国王的信就把他打发回去了。信中拒绝了在北京设常驻大使的要求，原因是“况西洋诸国甚多，非止尔一国。若俱似尔国王恳请派人留京，岂能一一听许？是此事断断难行。（英译：除你之外欧洲还有很多国家，如果每一个都要求派代表到我们朝廷，我们怎么接受？这件事根本行不通。）”皇帝认为原有的那个有限的、受严格管控的贸易量已经足够了，没有增加的必要，因为英国没有什么东西是中国需要的（译者：我把原文和英译都给出来，大家可以看看英国人是怎么理解乾隆的信。）：　
天朝抚有四海，惟励精图治，办理政务，奇珍异宝，并不贵重。尔国王此次赍进各物，念其诚心远献，特谕该管衙门收纳。其实天朝德威远被，万国来王，种种贵重之物，梯航毕集，无所不有。
（英译：我虽然统治广阔的世界，但心中只有一个目标，就是保持一个完美的统治和负起国家责任，奇怪的贵重物品我不感兴趣。我已经命人收国王你这次送来的贡品，这仅仅是因为考虑到你从远方把它们运来精神可嘉……正如你的使节自己看到的那样，我们什么都有。）
After the defeat of Napoleon, as its mercantile expansion gathered pace, Britain attempted another overture, dispatching a second envoy with a similar proposal. Britains display of naval power during the Napoleonic Wars had done little to change Chinas estimate of the desiravility of diplomatic relations. When William Amherst, the envoy, declined to attend the kowtow ceremony, offering the excuse that his dress uniform had been delayed, his mission was dismissed , and any further attempt at diplomacy was explicitly discouraged. The Emperor dispatched a message to England’s Price Regent, explaining that as”overlord of all under Heaven,” China could not be troubled to walk each barbarian envoy through the correct protocol. The imperial records would duly acknowledge that “ thy kingdom far away across the oceans prffers its loyalty and yearns for civilization,” but (as a nineteenth-century Western missionary publication translated the edict):
Henceforward no more envoys need be sent over this distant route, as the result is but a vain waste og travelling energy. If thou canst but incline thine heart to submissive service, thou mayest dispense with sending missions to court at certain periods; that is the true way to turn toward civilization. That thou mayest for ever obey We now issue this mandate.
英国在打败拿破仑贸易进一步发展后，开始了一个新的尝试，再次向中国派遣使节。但是英国在与拿破仑战争中所表现出的强大海军实力并没有改变中国对双方外交关系的预期。当大事威廉阿美士德以制服不适合为理由拒绝进行扣头仪式后，他的外交任务也就失败了，中国明白地拒绝了他所有加深两国外交的尝试。中国皇帝给英格兰摄政王的信上说，“天下之主”中国不想纠正每一个蛮国大使的外交礼仪。帝国会正式记录和承认“贵国从遥远的海外来表达对文明的忠诚和向往”，但是（按照19世纪西方传教士翻译的版本）：
（原文）嗣后毋庸遣使远来，徒烦跋涉，但能倾心效顺，不必岁时来朝，如称问化也。俾尔永遵，故兹敕谕。
（英译）从今以后，不必再从如此遥远的地方派遣使节过来，这只不过是浪费路途上的巨大精力。只要你有一颗恭顺的心，就免除你隔一段时间派遣使节，这样你也能够真正受到文明的教化。我在这里授权你永远被臣民顺从。
Though such admonitions seem presumptuous by today’s standards-and were deeply offensive to the country that had just maintained the European equilibrium and could count itself Europe’s most advanced naval,economic,and industrial power-the Emperor expressing himself in a manner consistent with the ideas about this place in the world that had prevailed for millennia, and that many neighboring peoples had been induced to at least indulge.
这样的斥责用今天的标准看来很傲慢——尤其对一个刚刚维护了欧洲平衡和自认为有欧洲最先进海军、经济、工业的国家来说显得特别唐突——但是皇帝有次表现是因为中国在世界上已经领先了千年而且他的邻居们至少都迁就他。

（待续）http://www.ltaaa.com/bbs/thread-335111-1-1.htm

CHAPTER 6: Toward an Asian Order: Confrontation or Partnership
第六章 面对亚洲秩序：对抗or合作
Asia's International Order and China
亚洲国际秩序和中国
China and World Order
中国和世界秩序
A longer Perspective
展望未来


Henry Kissinger
World Order
Chapter5: The Multiplicity of Asia
Whatis an Asian Regional Order?
什么是亚洲秩序？
Thehistorical European order had been self-contained.England was,until the earlytwentieth century, able to preserve the balance through its insular positionand naval supremacy.Occasionally, European powers enlisted outside countries tostrengthen their positions temporarily-for example, France courting the OttomanEmpire in the sixteenth century or Britains early-twentieth-century alliancewith Japan –but non-Western powers,other than occasional surges from the MiddleEast or North Africa, had few interests in Europe and were not called on tointervene in European conflicts.
欧洲秩序是历史上独立发展起来的。直到20世纪前半叶，英国因为孤悬的岛屿位置和世界上最强大的海军保持了与欧洲的平衡。有时，欧洲国家为增强自己的力量与域外国家暂时结盟——比如，16世纪的法国和奥斯曼帝国，20世纪初期的英国和日本——但是与在中东和北非的风起云涌不同，非西方国家在欧洲几乎没有利益而且从来没有介入欧洲战争。

Bycontrast, the contemporary Asian order includes outside powers as an integralfeature: the United States, whose role as an Asia-Pacific power was explicitlyaffirmed in joint statements by U.S. President Barack Obama and ChinesePresident Hu Jintao in January 2011, and Chinese President Xi Jinping in June2013; and Russia, geographically an Asian power and participant in Asiangroupings such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,even if ovethree-quarters of its population lives in the European portion of Russianterritory.
相比起来，域外力量的介入一直是当代亚洲秩序的重要部分：2011年1月美国总统奥巴马和中国国家主席Hu的联合声明，2013年6月美国总统奥巴马和中国国家主席Xi的联合声明都清楚的确认了美国是亚太国家。而俄罗斯，即使他超过3/4的人口都居住在欧洲部分，他在地理上也是亚洲国家，还参加了亚洲组织，例如上海合作组织。

TheUnited States in modern times has occasionally been invited to act as abalancer of power.In the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905,it mediated the warbetween Russia and Japan;in World War 2,it defeated Japans quest for Asianhegemony. The United States played a comparable Asian role during the Cold Warwhen it sought to balance the Soviet Union through a network of alliancesstretching from Pakistan to the Philippines.
现代以来，美国偶尔被邀请扮演平衡角色，在1905年的朴次茅斯和约中调停了俄国和日本的战争；在第二次世界大战，美国打败了寻求亚洲霸权的日本。美国在冷战时相当程度上扮演了亚洲国家，他建立了一个从巴基斯坦到菲律宾的联盟平衡了苏联的影响。

The evolving Asian structure will have to take into account a plethora of statesnot dealt with in the preceding pages. Indonesia, anchoring Southeast Asiawhile affirming an Islamic orientation,plays an increasingly influential roleand has thus far managed a delicate balancing act between China, the UnitedStates, and the Muslim world. With Japan,Russia, and China as nerghbors, theRepublic of Korea has achieved a vibrant democracy bolstered by a globallycompetitive economy, including leadership in strategic industries such astelecommunications and shipbuilding. Many Asian countries-including China-viewNorth Koreas policies as destabilizing but regard a collapse of North Korea asa greater danger.South Korea on its part will have to deal with increasingdomestic pressures for unification.
正在发展的亚洲机构将必须考虑很多过去没接触过的国家。印度尼西亚，一个东南亚的穆斯林国家，正在扮演越来越重要的角色，很大程度上维持着和中国、美国、穆斯林世界之间微妙的平衡。韩国，日本、俄罗斯和中国共同的邻居，是一个在全球有竞争力的经济体，在战略行业（比如电信和造船工业）中位于国际领先位置，受此激励他的国内民主制度正在蓬勃发展。北朝鲜被很多亚洲国家，包括中国，看成是不稳定的因素，但是，这些国家同时也认为北朝鲜的崩溃是个巨大的灾难。而对南朝鲜来说，他将不得不面对国内越来越大的统一压力。

In theface of Asias vast scale and the scope of its diversity, its nations havefashioned a dazzling array of multilateral groupings and bilateralmechanisms.In contrast to the European Union,NATO,and the Commission onSecurity and Cooperation in Europe, these institutions deal with security andeconomic issues on a case-by-case basis, not as an expression of formal rulesof regional order . Some of the key groupings include the United States, andsome, including economic ones, are Asian only, of which the most elaborated andsignificant is ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The coreprinciple is to welcome those nations most directly involved with the issues athand.
因为亚洲大陆的巨大和多样，亚洲国家流行建立一系列让人眼花缭乱的多边组织和双边机制。与亚洲形成对比的是欧盟，北约和欧洲安全与合作组织是欧盟处理具体安全和经济问题的基础，而不是一个形式上的地区秩序准则。一些核心组织包括美国，一些只有亚洲经济体参与的，其中最重要和复杂的就是东盟（东南亚国家联盟）。核心原则是欢迎身边所有直接参与问题的国家。

Butdoes all this amount to an Asian system of or  order?In Europes equilibrium, theinterests of the main parties were comparable, if not congruent ,A balance ofpower could be developed not only inpractice-as is inevitable in the absence of hegemony-but as a system oflegitimac that facilitated decisions and moderated policies. Such a congruencedoes not exist in Asia, as is shown by the priorities the major countries haveassigned to themselves.While India appears mostly concerned with China as apeer competitor, in large measure a legacy of the 1962 border war, China seesits peer rivals in Japan and the United States. India has devoted fewermilitary resources to China than to Pakistan, which, if not a peeer competitor,has been a strategic preoccupation for New Delhi.
但是这些能称为亚洲的秩序么？在欧洲的平衡中，主要国家的利益如果不能说完全一致的话也是类似的。力量的平衡不是只可以在实践过程中慢慢发展，以现在的情形来说，缺乏领导是不可避免的了，但是，还可以建立一个合法的体系来促进产生共识和调节各方政策。但是各方并没有就此达成一致，表现在各主要国家都优先关注自己的利益。印度主要把中国看成是平等的竞争对手，很大原因是1962年边境战争的结果，中国则把日本和美国看成平等的竞争对手。印度的军事资源相比投向中国更多的投向了巴基斯坦，一个不平等的竞争对手却占据了新德里全部的战略注意。

Theamorphous nature of Asian groupings is partly because geography has dectated asharp dividing line between East Asia and South Asia throughouthistory.Cultural, philosophical, and religious influences have transcended thegeographic dividing lines, and Hindu and Confucian concepts of governance havecoexisted in Southeast Asia. But the mountain and jungle barriers were too impenetrableto permit military interaction between the great empires of East Asia and SouthAsia until the twentieth century. The Mongols and their successors entered theIndian subconinent from Central Asia, not through the Himalayan hign passes,andthey failed to reach the southern parts of India. The various regions of Asiahave geopolitically and historically pursued distinct courses.
亚洲组织的不确定性部分是由于地形使东亚和南亚在历史上被一条线很明显地分开。文化、哲学、宗教的影响可以跨越这条地理上的分割线，印度教和儒教在东南亚同时存在；但是在20世纪以前，高山和丛林却足以阻碍东亚和南亚两个伟大帝国的军事力量相互接触。蒙古和他的继承者虽然从中亚进入印度次大陆，不是越过喜马拉雅山过去，但是他们也没能到达印度的南部。亚洲各个地区在历史和地缘政治上都不一样。

Theregional orders constructed during these periods include none based onWestphalian premises.Where the European order embraced an equilibrium ofterritorially defined “sovereign states” recognizing each others legal equality, traditional Asian political powers operated by more ambiguous criteria. Untilwell into the modern era, an “inner Asian” world influenced by Mongol Empire,Russia, and Islam coexisted with a Chinese imperial tribute system; the latterreached outward to the kingdoms of Southeast Asia, which entertained Chinasclaims of universality even as they practiced a form of statecraft deeplyinfluenced by Hindu principles received from India that posited a form ofdivinity for monarchs.
在这些时期，地区秩序的构建没有受到过威斯特伐利亚体系的影响。欧洲秩序是建立在一群地区领主的平衡上的，他们都承认彼此平等的合法地位；而亚洲的传统政治建立在更加模糊的标准上。直到进入现代前，真正的亚洲是蒙古帝国、俄国、伊斯兰和一个中华帝国的朝贡体系共存的世界；后者向外扩展到东南亚诸国，虽然治国方法深受印度教影响同样假设国王有神性，但东南亚诸国还是接受了中国建立的世界体系。

Nowthese legacies are meeting, and there is far from a consensus among the variouscountries about the meaning of the journey they have taken or its lessons fortwenty-first-century world order. Under contemporary conditions, essentiallytwo balances of power are emerging:on in South Asia, the other in East Asia.Neither possesses the characteristic integral to the European balance of power:a balancer,a country capable of establishing an equilibrium by shifting itsweight to the weaker side. The United States(after its withdrawal fromAfghanistan) has refrained from treating the contemporary internal South Asianbalance primarily as a military problem. But it will have to be active in thediplomacy over reestablishing a regional order lest a vacuum is created, whichwould inevitably draw all surrounding countries into a regional confrontation.
现在，所有的历史遗产都相遇了，而且所有国家对在历史上经历的和学到的东西对建立21世纪世界秩序的意义没有达成共识。在当代，出现了两个关键的平衡力量，一个在南亚，一个在东亚。两个都不具有欧洲平衡力量那样作为整体的一部分的特点：做一个平衡者，一个国家可以通过和弱的一边站在一起来建立平衡。美国（从阿富汗撤军后）克制了自己，没有将当时的南亚内在平衡过程当成军事问题对待。但是他不得不在重建地区秩序上做积极的外交动作，以免出现真空地带，这将会不可避免的把周围国家卷入地区对抗中。

http://www.ltaaa.com/bbs/thread-337510-1-1.html

The most common feature of asian states is their sense of representing “emerging” or “postcolonial” countries.All have sought to overcome the legacy of colonial rule by asserting a strong national identity. They share a conviction that world order is now rebalancing after an unnatural Western irruption over the past several centuries, but they have drawn vastly different lessons from their historical journeys. When top officials seek to evoke core interests, many of them look to a different cultural tradition and idealize a different golden age.
亚洲最一致的特征是他们代表了发展中和后殖民国家，都想通过强调民族主义来超越殖民历史。他们有共同的理念，在几个世纪西方残忍的入侵过去后，现在的世界秩序正在发生再平衡，但是他们从各自的历史经历中学到了非常不同的教训。当上层阶级开始追寻核心利益时，他们回顾各自不同的文化传统开始追求完全不同的理想中的黄金时代。
In Europes eighteenth- and nineteenth-century systems, the preservation of the equilibrium-and by implication the status quo-was seen as a positive virtue. In Asia, almost every state is impelled by its own dynamism.Convinced that it is “rising,”it operates with the conviction that the world has yet to affirm its full deserved role. Even while no state questions the others sovereignty and dignity and all affirm a dedication to “non-zero-sum” dilomacy, the simultaneous pursuit of so many programs of national prestige building introduces a measure of volatility to the rigional order.With the evolution of modern technology, the major powers of Asia have armed themselves with far more destructive military arsenals than even the strongest nineteenth-century Europena state possessed, compounding the risks of miscalculation.
在18和19世纪的欧洲体系中，均势的保持（保持现状）被看成优点。在亚洲，几乎所有的国家都是被自己内在动力所推动。他们通过达到他们在世界上应有的地位来确认自己的崛起。
即使没有国家质疑其他国家的主权和尊严和都承认“非零和”的外交准则的情况下，现在这些国家同时都在追求建立国家影响力将导致地区秩序的混乱。随着现代技术的发展，亚洲主要国家的军事装备武力已经过多，甚至远远超出了19世纪欧洲国家最强时所拥有的武力，这导致了误判的危险。
The organization of Asia is thus an inherent challenge for world order. Major countries perception and pursuit of their national interests, rather than the balance of power as a system,have shaped the mechanisms of order that have developed. Their test will be whether a transpacific partnership, providing a peaceful framework for the interplay of many established interests, will be possible.
因此，亚洲组织是对世界秩序的内在挑战。主要国家的感觉和对国家利益的追求，比当一个系统里的平衡力量更能影响正在发展的权利秩序机构。他们的考验是将来是否有可能建立一个横跨太平洋的伙伴关系，为很多互相影响的既有利益者提供和平的框架。
Asia's International Order and China
亚洲国际秩序和中国
Of all conceptions of world order in Asia, China operated the longest lasting, the most clearly defined, and the one furthest from Westphalian ideas. China has also taken the most complex journey, from ancient civilization through classical empire, to Communist revolution, to modern great-power status-a course which will have a profound impact on mankind.
在亚洲所有关于世界秩序的概念中，中国的是维持时间最长和定义最清楚的，而且是离威斯特伐利亚体系最遥远的。中国也是经历最复杂历史进程的，从古代文明经过古典帝国到社会主义革命，到现代超级大国地位——一个将会给人类带来巨大影响的过程。
From its unification as a single political entity in 221 B.C. through the early twentieth century, China’s position at the center of world order was so ingrained in its elite thinking that in the Chinese language there was no word for it. Only retrospectively did scholars define the “sinocentric” tribute system. In this traditional concept, China considered itself, in a sense, the sole sovereign government of the world. Its Emperor was treated as a figure of cosmic dimensions and the linchpin between the human and the divine. His purview was not a sovereign state of “china” _that is , the territories immediately under his rule_but “All under Heaven”,of which China formed the central,civilized part:”the Middle Kingdom,”inspiring and uplifting the rest of humanity.
自从公元前221年中国统一成一个独立的政治实体到20世纪前期，中国位于世界秩序中心的观念在中国精英的思想里根深蒂固，以致于在中国语言中没有与世界秩序对应的词，回溯过去，学者只有定义一个以中国为中心的朝贡体系。在这个传统概念中，中国认为自己是世界上唯一的主权国家。他们的皇帝被当成是宇宙的代表和连接人与天的关键。他的权力范围不只是中华帝国（这是直接在他管辖下的领土）而是“天下”，中国是“天下”的中心，文明的中心：“中央王国”，启发和激励其余的人类。
In this view, world order reflected a universal hierarchy, not an equilibrium of competing sovereign states. Every known society was conceived of as being in some kind of tributary relationship with China, based in part on its approximation of Chinese culture; none could reach equality with it. Other monarchs were not fellow sovereigns but earnest pupils in the art of governance,striving toward civilization. Diplomacy was not a bargaining process between multiple sovereign interests but a series of carefully contrived ceremonies in which foreign societies weere given the opportunity to affirm their assigned place in the global hierarchu. In keeping with this perspective, in classical china what would now be called foreign policy was the province of the Ministry of Rituals,which determined the shades of the tributary relationship, and the office of border affairs, charged with managing relations with nomadic tribes. A chinese foreign ministry was not established until the mid nineteenth century, and then perforce to deal with intruders from the West.Even then, officials considered their task the traditional practice of barbarian management , not anything that might be regarded as westphalian diplomacy. The new ministry carride the telling title ot the Office for the Management of the Affairs of All Nations, implying that China was not engaging in interstate diplomacy at all.
这种世界秩序反映了一种宇宙的等级制度，而不是一种互相竞争的主权国家的平衡。所有已知的社会按距离中华文明的远近都在某种程度上与中国建立从属关系；没有一个拥有与中国平等的地位。其他君主不是同属于统治阶级的同事，而是政治管理艺术真诚的学生，努力变得更加文明。外交不是多个君主为利益互相谈判的过程，而是一个精心设计的仪式，其他国家可以在这个仪式中确认他们在全球等级制度中被分配的地位。正是由于这种观点，在传统中国，现在被称作“外交部”的机构是属于礼部和边境事务部管辖的，礼部决定朝贡关系的形式，边境事务部管理与游牧部族的关系。中国直到19世纪中期才不得不建立外交部来处理和西方侵略者的关系。即便如此，官员们和以前一样认为他们的工作就是管理野蛮人，而不是什么威斯特伐利亚体系中的外交。这个新部门的名字“总理各国事务衙门”清楚的表明了这种认识的，它暗示中国并不被包含在这种各国之间的外交关系内。
The goal of the tribute system was to foster deference, not to extract economic benefit or to dominate foreign societies militarily. Chinas most imposing architectural achievement, the Great Wall eventually extending over roughly five thousand miles, was begun by the Emperor Qin Shi Huang, who had just defeated all rivals militarily,ending the period of Warring States and unifying China. It was a grandiose testimony to military victory but also to its inherent limits, denoting vast power coupled with a consciousness of vulnerability.For millennia, China sought to beguile and entice its adversaries more often than it attempted to defeat them by force of arms.Thus a minster in the Han Dynasty(206 B.C.-A.D. 220) described the five baits with which he proposed to manage the mounted Xiongnu tribes to Chinas northwetern frontier, though by conventional analysis China was the superior military power:
To gave them…elaborate clothes and carriages in order to corrupt their eyes; to give them fine food in order to corrupt their mouth; to give them music and women in order to corrupt their ears; to provide them with lofty buildings, granaries and slaves in order to corrupt their stomach…and, as for those who come to surrender, the emperor should show them favor by honoring them with an imperial reception party in which the emperor should personally serve them wine and food so as to corrupt their mind.These are what may be called the five baits.
朝贡体系的目标是培养差异性，而不是为了榨取经济利益或者军事统治外国。“长城”，这个总长超过5000英里的中国最伟大的建筑成就，是由打败了所有的对手，结束了战国时代，统一了中国的皇帝秦始皇开始修建的。它不仅是军事胜利的纪念碑，而且是这个超级帝国内在脆弱意识的证明。千年来，中国更常寻求通过欺骗和引诱来打败他的对手而不是通过武力。因此，汉朝（公元前206年——公元220年）尽管在传统研究中拥有更强大的军事力量，但他的一个官员（译者注：贾谊）提出“五饵”来应对中国西北边境的马上部落匈奴：（原文）
赐之盛服车乘以坏其目；
赐之盛食珍味以坏其口；
赐之音乐、妇人以坏其耳；
赐之高堂、邃宇、府库、奴婢以坏其腹；
于来降者，上以召幸之，相娱乐，亲酌而手食之，以坏其心；
此五饵也。
The hallmark of Chinas diplomatic rituals, the kowtow-kneeling and touching ones head to the ground to acknowledge the Emperors superior authority-was an abasement, to be sure, and proved a stumbling block to relations with modern Western states.But the kowtow was symbolically voluntary:it was the representative deference of a people that had been not so much conquered as awed.The tribute presented to China on such occasions was often exceeded in value by the Emperors return gifts.
中国外交程序的标志“磕头”——通过跪下让头碰到地来承认皇帝的优越权力——实话说是一个屈辱，而且在与现代西方国家交往的时候成为了一个障碍。但是“磕头”形式上是自愿的：典型的区别是人们更像是表达敬畏而不是被征服了。在这些仪式中外国给中国的贡品的价值常常还没有皇帝回赐的礼物高。
Traditionally, China sought to dominate psycholigically by its achievements and its conduct-interspersed with occasional military excursions to teach recalcitrant barbarians a lesson and to induce respect.Both these strategic goals and this fundamentally psychological approach to armed conflict were in evidence as recently as Chinas wars with India in1962 and Bietnam in 1979, as well as in the manner in which core interests vis-à-vis other neighbors are affirmed.
传统上，中国通过自己的成就和引导寻求心理上的统治，偶尔用武力教训不服从的野蛮人让他们敬服。这些战略目标和看似武力其实本质上是心理斗争的方法在中国最近的两次战争中被证实。中国在1962年的中印战争和1979年的中越战争中，都是通过这些方法来向邻国强调自己的核心利益。
Still, China was not a missionary society in the Western sense of the term. It sought to induce respect, not conversion; that subtle line could never be crossed.Its mission was its performance, which foreign societies were expected to recognize and acknowledge. It was possible for another country to become a friend, even an old friend, but it could never be treated as Chinas peer.Ironically, the only foreigners who achieved something akin to this status were conquerors.In one of historys most amazing feats of cultural imperialism, two peoples that conquered China-the Mongols in the thirteenth century and the Manchus in the seventeenth-were induced to adopt core elements of Chinese culture to facilitate the administration of a people so numerous and so obdurate in its assumption of cultural superiority. The conquerors were significantly assimilated by the defeated Chinese society, to a point where substantial parts of their home territory came to be treated as traditionally Chinee. China had not sought to export its political system;rather, it had seen others come to it. In that sense, it has expanded not by conquest but by osmosis.
而且，中国并不是西方意义上的传教士社会。他希望得到尊重而不是改变其他人；那条微妙的界限从来没有被跨越。他的目标是发展自己到领先的水平，并且希望其他国家承认和接受。其他国家可以成为朋友，甚至是老朋友，但绝没有可能作为一个平等的伙伴。讽刺的是，能达到这种地位的国家只能是他的征服者。文化帝国制度的一个令人瞩目的成就就是两个入侵中国的民族——13世纪的蒙古族和17世纪的满族——也接纳了中国文化的核心因素来管理中国，因为他的人民数量是如此的巨大和如此顽固的坚持自己的文化优越性。这些征服者明显被所征服的中国社会同化了，以至于连他们原来的家园也被当成了传统的中国领土。中国从来没有出口自己的政治制度，而是其他国家自主的学习他。也就是说，他的扩张不是靠武力征服而是靠渗透。
In modern era, West representatives with their own sense of cultural superiority set out to enroll China in the European World system,which was becoming the basic structure of international order. They pressured China to cultivate ties with the rest of the world through exchange ambassadors and free trade and to uplift its people through a modernizing economy and a society open to Christian proselytizing.
现代，西方代表们有自己的文化优越感并将中国拉入欧洲世界体系，而欧洲体系成为了国际秩序的基础架构。他们强迫中国通过交换大使和进行自由贸易建立与其他国家的联系，通过经济现代化和基督教传教开化他的人民。
What the West conceived of as a process of enlightenment and engagement treated in China as an assault. China tried at first to parry it and then to resist outright.When the first British envoy, George Macartney, arrived in the late eighteenth century, bringing with him some early products of the Industrial Revolution and a letter from King George 3 proposing free trade and the establishment of reciprocal resident embassies in Beijing and London, the Chinese boat that carried him from Guangzhou to Beijing was festooned with a banner that identified him as The English ambassador bringing tribute to the Emperor of China. He was dismissed with a letter to the King of England explaining that no ambassador could be permitted to reside in Beijing because Europe consists of many other nations besides your own :if each and all demanded to be represented at our court, how could we possibly consent ? The thing is utterly impracticable.The Emperor saw no need for trade beyond what was already occurring in limited , tightly regulated amounts ,because Britain had no goods China desired:
Swaying the wide world , I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the State; strange and costly objects do not interest me . If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to dispatch them from afar… As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things.
这些西方认为是启蒙和契约的行为在中国看来都是对自己的侵略。中国一开始试图闪避，接着公开反对这些行为。当18世纪后期，英国第一个公使乔治马戛尔尼带着早期工业革命的产品和英皇乔治三世要求自由贸易和北京与伦敦互设常驻使馆的信，坐船从广州被迎接到北京。中国人把他当成了带贡品给中国皇帝的英国使节，之后用一封中国皇帝给英格兰国王的信就把他打发回去了。信中拒绝了在北京设常驻大使的要求，原因是“况西洋诸国甚多，非止尔一国。若俱似尔国王恳请派人留京，岂能一一听许？是此事断断难行。（英译：除你之外欧洲还有很多国家，如果每一个都要求派代表到我们朝廷，我们怎么接受？这件事根本行不通。）”皇帝认为原有的那个有限的、受严格管控的贸易量已经足够了，没有增加的必要，因为英国没有什么东西是中国需要的（译者：我把原文和英译都给出来，大家可以看看英国人是怎么理解乾隆的信。）：　
天朝抚有四海，惟励精图治，办理政务，奇珍异宝，并不贵重。尔国王此次赍进各物，念其诚心远献，特谕该管衙门收纳。其实天朝德威远被，万国来王，种种贵重之物，梯航毕集，无所不有。
（英译：我虽然统治广阔的世界，但心中只有一个目标，就是保持一个完美的统治和负起国家责任，奇怪的贵重物品我不感兴趣。我已经命人收国王你这次送来的贡品，这仅仅是因为考虑到你从远方把它们运来精神可嘉……正如你的使节自己看到的那样，我们什么都有。）
After the defeat of Napoleon, as its mercantile expansion gathered pace, Britain attempted another overture, dispatching a second envoy with a similar proposal. Britains display of naval power during the Napoleonic Wars had done little to change Chinas estimate of the desiravility of diplomatic relations. When William Amherst, the envoy, declined to attend the kowtow ceremony, offering the excuse that his dress uniform had been delayed, his mission was dismissed , and any further attempt at diplomacy was explicitly discouraged. The Emperor dispatched a message to England’s Price Regent, explaining that as”overlord of all under Heaven,” China could not be troubled to walk each barbarian envoy through the correct protocol. The imperial records would duly acknowledge that “ thy kingdom far away across the oceans prffers its loyalty and yearns for civilization,” but (as a nineteenth-century Western missionary publication translated the edict):
Henceforward no more envoys need be sent over this distant route, as the result is but a vain waste og travelling energy. If thou canst but incline thine heart to submissive service, thou mayest dispense with sending missions to court at certain periods; that is the true way to turn toward civilization. That thou mayest for ever obey We now issue this mandate.
英国在打败拿破仑贸易进一步发展后，开始了一个新的尝试，再次向中国派遣使节。但是英国在与拿破仑战争中所表现出的强大海军实力并没有改变中国对双方外交关系的预期。当大事威廉阿美士德以制服不适合为理由拒绝进行扣头仪式后，他的外交任务也就失败了，中国明白地拒绝了他所有加深两国外交的尝试。中国皇帝给英格兰摄政王的信上说，“天下之主”中国不想纠正每一个蛮国大使的外交礼仪。帝国会正式记录和承认“贵国从遥远的海外来表达对文明的忠诚和向往”，但是（按照19世纪西方传教士翻译的版本）：
（原文）嗣后毋庸遣使远来，徒烦跋涉，但能倾心效顺，不必岁时来朝，如称问化也。俾尔永遵，故兹敕谕。
（英译）从今以后，不必再从如此遥远的地方派遣使节过来，这只不过是浪费路途上的巨大精力。只要你有一颗恭顺的心，就免除你隔一段时间派遣使节，这样你也能够真正受到文明的教化。我在这里授权你永远被臣民顺从。
Though such admonitions seem presumptuous by today’s standards-and were deeply offensive to the country that had just maintained the European equilibrium and could count itself Europe’s most advanced naval,economic,and industrial power-the Emperor expressing himself in a manner consistent with the ideas about this place in the world that had prevailed for millennia, and that many neighboring peoples had been induced to at least indulge.
这样的斥责用今天的标准看来很傲慢——尤其对一个刚刚维护了欧洲平衡和自认为有欧洲最先进海军、经济、工业的国家来说显得特别唐突——但是皇帝有次表现是因为中国在世界上已经领先了千年而且他的邻居们至少都迁就他。

（待续）