外交家:明确台湾利益

外交家:明确台湾利益
The Benefits of Being Clear on Taiwan

充分领会，这被认为是中美之间对台湾的立场形成的默契，这将化解两个大国之间紧张关系的重要组成部分，中国和美国政府已经在这个问题上表现出相当的克制。
原文地址：http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/the-benefits-of-being-clear-on-taiwan/
翻译：龙腾

The Benefits of Being Clear on Taiwan
明确台湾利益
Could making whatever impliedunderstanding exists on Taiwan more explicit reduce tensions in East Asia?
不许对台湾存在任何暗示以避免加深东亚地区紧张局势？

Making more explicit that which is viewed by many as animplicit understanding between China and the United States regarding the statusof Taiwan would constitute a major step in defusing tensions between the twopowers. The governments of both China and the United States have already shownconsiderable restraint in this matter, ignoring demands from Chinese who wishto use force to “reclaim” Taiwan as part of the mainland and from Americans whocall for recognizing Taiwan as an independent nation. These measures of self-restraint should be mademore explicit, by letting it be known that as long as Chinadoes not use force to coerce Taiwan to become part of the People’s Republic ofChina (as it did with Tibet), the United States will continue to refrain fromtreating Taiwan as an independent state.
充分领会，这被认为是中美之间对台湾的立场形成的默契，这将化解两个大国之间紧张关系的重要组成部分，中国和美国政府已经在这个问题上表现出相当的克制。忽视一些中国人希望使用武力“收回”台湾而成为大陆的一部分的要求，与来自美国人呼吁承认台湾成为一个独立的国家的要求，采取更加明确的措施保持自我克制，让人们知道，只要中国不使用武力迫使台湾成为中国的一部分（比如XZ），美国将继续阻止台湾成为一个独立的国家。
True, the wayTaiwan is treated is currently a much less pressing issue than settling thedifferences about the status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and otherterritorial matters concerning the South China Sea and the various re drawingsof Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) in the region. However, if oneseeks to resolve simmering conflicts and to draw on such resolutionsto build constructive relations between China and the United States based onmutually assured restraint – rather than containment or a Cold War-style armsrace – clarifying the status of Taiwan could serve as a major step forward.
事实上，目前台湾问题，比解决钓鱼岛争端以及南中国海领土争端和防空识别区争端（ADIZ）都不紧迫。然而，若寻找一个旨在解决潜在冲突的决心，并利用这种决心在中美之间相互克制的基础上建立建设性的关系-而不是遏制或冷战式的军备竞赛-明确对台湾的立场，可让两国关系向前迈出一大步。
Irecently asked eight experts on Taiwan whether there was an implicitunderstanding between China and the U.S. about the ways Taiwan should betreated. Fiveresponded that there was no such understanding; two responded by saying thatthe answer to my question was not clear; and one held that indeed there wassuch an understanding. The range of their responses serves to verify that the issue surelycould benefit from clarification.Indeed, it turns out that matter is far more complex than it may at firstseem.
我近期访问过八位台湾问题专家，他们是如何看待中美之在处理台湾问题时是否有种隐含约定，五位专家对此未作出回应，两个回答说对此问题不太清楚。
一位认为确实有过这样的约定。从他们所反应出的态度可以看出，该问题的解决取决于（立场上）的明确。事实上，得出的结论是它比当初看起来更为复杂
One scholar wrote,“You are correct that there is an implicit agreement between U.S. and Chinathat China will not use military force to “reclaim” Taiwan. […] There is animplicit understanding between U.S. and Taiwan that should China invade Taiwan,the U.S. may intervene, partly to honor the fact that Taiwan has been an important ally in thePacific Rim and partly to protect U.S. interests in the region.”
一位学者写过，“你是对的，这是美中之间的一个隐含约定，那就是中国不能利用武力‘ 收回’台湾。…这个约定可理解为美国和台湾之间，当中国入侵台湾时，美国可能进行干预，一方面为了履行承诺，因为台湾一直是太平洋地区的一个重要盟友，在另一方面也是为了保护美国在该地区的利益
Another scholar,however, wrote, “I am not aware of any such implicit understanding. That is whythe Taiwan issue remains such a sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations. Manyassume that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if China attacked without provocation,but that it would not if Taiwan declared independence unilaterally. The U.S.[government] has never made clear what its policy actually is, if itindeed has a policy other than encouraging neither side to upset the status quo.”Note that after indicating that he is unaware of such an understanding, thisexpert outlines a key element of such an understanding. The factthat it is not “clear” and merely “many assume” is what others might view as animplicit understanding.
另一位学者却写道，“我不知道有任何这样的隐含约定，这就是为什么台湾问题在美中关系中仍是一个非常敏感的问题。美国[政府]从来没有明确（对台）政策究竟是什么，要是确实存在某种鼓励双方保持现状的政策该多好”。请注意，在表示他不知道这样的约定，该专家阐明这种理念的一个关键因素，这就是，它不是“明确的”，仅仅是“许多假设”这就是为什么其他人可能认为这是一个隐含协议的原因。
A third scholar’sresponse was still different. He held that “No, there is NO such implicitunderstanding on this between [China] and [the United States]. One wishes so,but it’s not the case. China has NEVER renounced the option of using force, ifnecessary, but in the 1982 Joint Communique did use language to the effect that it seeks‘peaceful unification.’”
第三位学者的答复还是有些不同，他认为“不，在中美之间从来没有这种隐含约定。希望如此，但它并非如此。中国从未放弃使用武力，除非必要，但在1982年联合公报中说要用交流的方式寻求“和平统一
A fourth expert captured the ambiguitieswell, writing, “It is hard to say there is an implicit agreement because anagreement implies is it is more than just implicit! I think China would neveracknowledge that there is such an agreement. They have not given up the rightto use force to resolve the Taiwan problem. But since they have not used forceto this end, you can argue that there is an implicit agreement. [It gets]rather circular[...] The position of the [United States] has always been thatthe Taiwan problem should be resolved peacefully with the consent of the peopleon both sides of the Taiwan Strait.” This scholar proceeded to note that “theUnited States ‘acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the TaiwanStrait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. TheUnited States Government does not challenge that position’ [according to theShanghai Communique]. This [is the] one China ‘principle’ in contrast toChina’s one China ‘policy’ (more simply that Taiwan IS in fact part of ‘oneChina’). Implicit in this, though, is the understanding, expressed by variousadministrations[,] that the [United States] will not support a Taiwandeclaration of independence.” He closedwith the pregnant line, “So this might be seen as abasis for an implicit agreement. We oppose a declaration of independence; Chinaforgoes the use of force.”
第四位专家试图在这些模糊的表述中抓出真实含义，写到“很难说有一个隐含约定，因为约定的表述不应该模糊不清。我认为中国也不会承认有这样一个约定，他们没有放弃使用武力解决台湾问题的权利，但由于直到目前他们都没有使用武力，因此，你可以争辩说，有个隐含约定。好像又绕回来了... ,美国的态度对台湾问题一直是，海峡两岸人民同意和平解决”这位学者开始注意到，美国承认，台湾海峡两岸的所有中国人都认为只有一个中国，台湾是中国的一部分。美国政府没有改变那份协议[根据上海联合公报]，这[是]中国的一个原则”与中国的“一个中国”政策（很简单，其实台湾就是中国的一部分”）隐含在这，虽然，是领会的，由不同的部门表述。[美国]将不支持台湾独立的宣言"，他其实想象中封闭的线，所以这可能被视为一个隐含约定的基础。（那就是）我们反对（台湾）独立的一个宣言；中国放弃使用武力。
One may well ask whether it is not best tolet sleeping dogs lie. One reason to clarify both sides’ policies is that hawks in bothnations that use the cause of Taiwan to justify building up theirrespective military forces in an era in which capping these and focusing oneconomic,social, and environmental issues at home is needed by both nations. Thus, DanielTwining from the Hoover Institution points out that aggressive Chinese militarymodernization is justified in part by the need to ready to reclaim Taiwan. A2013 report to Congress from the Department of Defense concurs, stating,“Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait appears to remain theprincipal focus and primary driver of China’s military investment.” In the sameyear China carried out a military exercise – Mission 2013B – in which the PLAsimulated “a Normandy-style invasion” of Taiwan.”
有人可能会问，这是否是说最好不要去惹麻烦。其中一个原因是双方国内的鹰派明确一下各自的政策,利用台湾问题，进一步增强他们各自的军事力量，在这个时代，那些经济热点、社会，和国内的环境问题都需要这两个国家。因此，丹尼尔·川宁从胡佛研究（报告）中所指出，积极推进中国军事现代化，部分是为了准备收回台湾的理由是合理的，国防部在2013向国会报告中陈述道：“预防台湾海峡的潜在冲突似乎仍然是中国军事投入的重点和主要动力”在同一年，中国进行了一次军事演习–任务2013b–解放军模拟“诺曼底式入侵台湾”
In the UnitedStates, a leading expert of the Center for Naval Analysis Elbridge Colby warnedthat the not unfounded perception that the U.S. is becoming less capable ofdefending Taiwan is common in the U.S. as well as in Taiwan and China, andargues that maintaining a position of strength is critical to security forTaiwan and the region more broadly. A 2003 report from the Council on ForeignRelations examined China’s growing military power and held that “[minimizingthe chances that a cross-strait crisis will occur] means maintaining the clearability and willingness to counter any application of military force againstTaiwan.”
在美国，一位美国海军分析师埃尔布里奇科尔比警告说，美国通常认为美国正变得不那么有能力保护台湾，在美国常有这种说法，同样持这样认为的还有台湾和中国。认为实力对于台湾和该地区的安全至关重要，一个在2003年对外关系委员会的报告仔细研究了中国日益增长的军事力量，认为“[最大限度地减少两岸危机发生的可能性] 保持清晰的能力和意愿来应对任何军事打击台湾的可能。
True,even if the restraint both sides imposed onthemselves (and on their respective hawks) is made more explicit, either sidecould violate it. However, the more explicit the agreement the lesslikely is that it will be subject to misunderstandings and the more likely itis to survive. It may well be impossible at this stage to turn the implicitunderstanding, such as there is – if there is one – into anexplicit one; however, the more than it can be clarified andsolidified, the more this important simmering point of conflict can beassuaged.
真的，即使克制的双方对自己(与双方的鹰派)更加明确，任何一方都可能违反它。不过，然而，更明确的协议是不可能的，它会受到误解，它或许是不可能在这个阶段将隐含约定挑明，如有—如果有的话—也会变得模糊的，它应该变得更加清晰与充实，更重要的是可以平息一触即发的冲突点.
I am quite awareof the theories of the merits of “creative ambiguities”; they canenable one to squeeze extra leverage out of the relatively small amounts ofpower. In East Asia, however, they are much more likely toproduce miscalculations and conflicts than significant gains.
我完全知道的“创造性模糊理论”，他们可以利用杠杆作用施加较小的力来达到额外目的，然而，在东亚，较比得到重大利益他们更容易产生错误和冲突。
Finally, reducingthe tension on this issue would help to narrow thedifferences between the U.S. and China, especially if integrated into a moregeneral policy of mutually assured restraint. That would encourage both statesto focus on the many issues in which they have shared or complementaryinterests.
最后，减小这个问题上的紧张关系，将有助于缩小美国与中国之间的分歧，特别是如果达成相互保证克制政策的共识。形成共同的或互补的利益这将鼓励双方关注更多问题。
（ Amitai Etzioni乔治华盛顿大学国际关系教授）

评论
Brian
January 18, 2014at 13:14
The “mutually assured restraint” the author calls for will be thesituation for the foreseeable future, in my opinion. I thinkthat if this is the case Taiwan is China’s for the taking justbecause China has more to offer Taiwan than the U.S. does right now.I think the economic benefits that China can extended towards Taiwan will leadto China’s influence in Taiwan growing drastically in the next five to tenyears. This of course being the case if China stays away fromTaiwanese independence. If Taiwan plays this right they could see U.S.military backing and Chinese economic developmental assistance.
“确保相互克制”，在我的理解，作者喊出了在未来可预见的情况，，我认为，如果是这样的话，台湾将是中国的, 只是因为中国提供台湾的比美国还多，我认为，中国的对台湾经济上的影响将导致中国在台湾的影响力在未来五到十年大幅增长，如果台湾远离台独这是必然的结果，如果台湾把握的好，仍能看到美国军方的支持和中国经济发展上的帮助
akira
January 18, 2014at 11:29
If one suspectsthat the U.S. is” becoming less capable of defending Taiwan” from China, thenI’d like to ask if China is capable of defending Taiwan from the U.S.? Itworks both ways. How much force must China deploy on Taiwan if itwere to become capable of defending it? How unstable would such deploymentcause East Asia to become?
My second secondquestion is, based on what international treaty is the territory of Taiwanceded to China? Most of the readers surely must know that territorial cessionfrom one state to another need to be SPECIFIED BY A TREATY between the twostates. No treaty, no transfer of sovereignty.
如果有人怀疑美国面对中国是“越来越没有能力保护台湾”，那么我想问中国能否够防卫来台的美国？大家都彼此彼此…中国在台湾究竟部署多少武力才能捍卫它？这种部署动机将会把东亚变成何种不稳定？
我的第二个问题是，根据国际条约台湾领土是割让给中国的？大多数的读者肯定都知道领土从一个国家割让到另一个，需要由两个国家之间的签订条约，（可是）没有条约，没有主权交付

外交家:明确台湾利益
The Benefits of Being Clear on Taiwan

充分领会，这被认为是中美之间对台湾的立场形成的默契，这将化解两个大国之间紧张关系的重要组成部分，中国和美国政府已经在这个问题上表现出相当的克制。
原文地址：http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/the-benefits-of-being-clear-on-taiwan/
翻译：龙腾

The Benefits of Being Clear on Taiwan
明确台湾利益
Could making whatever impliedunderstanding exists on Taiwan more explicit reduce tensions in East Asia?
不许对台湾存在任何暗示以避免加深东亚地区紧张局势？

Making more explicit that which is viewed by many as animplicit understanding between China and the United States regarding the statusof Taiwan would constitute a major step in defusing tensions between the twopowers. The governments of both China and the United States have already shownconsiderable restraint in this matter, ignoring demands from Chinese who wishto use force to “reclaim” Taiwan as part of the mainland and from Americans whocall for recognizing Taiwan as an independent nation. These measures of self-restraint should be mademore explicit, by letting it be known that as long as Chinadoes not use force to coerce Taiwan to become part of the People’s Republic ofChina (as it did with Tibet), the United States will continue to refrain fromtreating Taiwan as an independent state.
充分领会，这被认为是中美之间对台湾的立场形成的默契，这将化解两个大国之间紧张关系的重要组成部分，中国和美国政府已经在这个问题上表现出相当的克制。忽视一些中国人希望使用武力“收回”台湾而成为大陆的一部分的要求，与来自美国人呼吁承认台湾成为一个独立的国家的要求，采取更加明确的措施保持自我克制，让人们知道，只要中国不使用武力迫使台湾成为中国的一部分（比如XZ），美国将继续阻止台湾成为一个独立的国家。
True, the wayTaiwan is treated is currently a much less pressing issue than settling thedifferences about the status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and otherterritorial matters concerning the South China Sea and the various re drawingsof Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) in the region. However, if oneseeks to resolve simmering conflicts and to draw on such resolutionsto build constructive relations between China and the United States based onmutually assured restraint – rather than containment or a Cold War-style armsrace – clarifying the status of Taiwan could serve as a major step forward.
事实上，目前台湾问题，比解决钓鱼岛争端以及南中国海领土争端和防空识别区争端（ADIZ）都不紧迫。然而，若寻找一个旨在解决潜在冲突的决心，并利用这种决心在中美之间相互克制的基础上建立建设性的关系-而不是遏制或冷战式的军备竞赛-明确对台湾的立场，可让两国关系向前迈出一大步。
Irecently asked eight experts on Taiwan whether there was an implicitunderstanding between China and the U.S. about the ways Taiwan should betreated. Fiveresponded that there was no such understanding; two responded by saying thatthe answer to my question was not clear; and one held that indeed there wassuch an understanding. The range of their responses serves to verify that the issue surelycould benefit from clarification.Indeed, it turns out that matter is far more complex than it may at firstseem.
我近期访问过八位台湾问题专家，他们是如何看待中美之在处理台湾问题时是否有种隐含约定，五位专家对此未作出回应，两个回答说对此问题不太清楚。
一位认为确实有过这样的约定。从他们所反应出的态度可以看出，该问题的解决取决于（立场上）的明确。事实上，得出的结论是它比当初看起来更为复杂
One scholar wrote,“You are correct that there is an implicit agreement between U.S. and Chinathat China will not use military force to “reclaim” Taiwan. […] There is animplicit understanding between U.S. and Taiwan that should China invade Taiwan,the U.S. may intervene, partly to honor the fact that Taiwan has been an important ally in thePacific Rim and partly to protect U.S. interests in the region.”
一位学者写过，“你是对的，这是美中之间的一个隐含约定，那就是中国不能利用武力‘ 收回’台湾。…这个约定可理解为美国和台湾之间，当中国入侵台湾时，美国可能进行干预，一方面为了履行承诺，因为台湾一直是太平洋地区的一个重要盟友，在另一方面也是为了保护美国在该地区的利益
Another scholar,however, wrote, “I am not aware of any such implicit understanding. That is whythe Taiwan issue remains such a sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations. Manyassume that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if China attacked without provocation,but that it would not if Taiwan declared independence unilaterally. The U.S.[government] has never made clear what its policy actually is, if itindeed has a policy other than encouraging neither side to upset the status quo.”Note that after indicating that he is unaware of such an understanding, thisexpert outlines a key element of such an understanding. The factthat it is not “clear” and merely “many assume” is what others might view as animplicit understanding.
另一位学者却写道，“我不知道有任何这样的隐含约定，这就是为什么台湾问题在美中关系中仍是一个非常敏感的问题。美国[政府]从来没有明确（对台）政策究竟是什么，要是确实存在某种鼓励双方保持现状的政策该多好”。请注意，在表示他不知道这样的约定，该专家阐明这种理念的一个关键因素，这就是，它不是“明确的”，仅仅是“许多假设”这就是为什么其他人可能认为这是一个隐含协议的原因。
A third scholar’sresponse was still different. He held that “No, there is NO such implicitunderstanding on this between [China] and [the United States]. One wishes so,but it’s not the case. China has NEVER renounced the option of using force, ifnecessary, but in the 1982 Joint Communique did use language to the effect that it seeks‘peaceful unification.’”
第三位学者的答复还是有些不同，他认为“不，在中美之间从来没有这种隐含约定。希望如此，但它并非如此。中国从未放弃使用武力，除非必要，但在1982年联合公报中说要用交流的方式寻求“和平统一
A fourth expert captured the ambiguitieswell, writing, “It is hard to say there is an implicit agreement because anagreement implies is it is more than just implicit! I think China would neveracknowledge that there is such an agreement. They have not given up the rightto use force to resolve the Taiwan problem. But since they have not used forceto this end, you can argue that there is an implicit agreement. [It gets]rather circular[...] The position of the [United States] has always been thatthe Taiwan problem should be resolved peacefully with the consent of the peopleon both sides of the Taiwan Strait.” This scholar proceeded to note that “theUnited States ‘acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the TaiwanStrait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. TheUnited States Government does not challenge that position’ [according to theShanghai Communique]. This [is the] one China ‘principle’ in contrast toChina’s one China ‘policy’ (more simply that Taiwan IS in fact part of ‘oneChina’). Implicit in this, though, is the understanding, expressed by variousadministrations[,] that the [United States] will not support a Taiwandeclaration of independence.” He closedwith the pregnant line, “So this might be seen as abasis for an implicit agreement. We oppose a declaration of independence; Chinaforgoes the use of force.”
第四位专家试图在这些模糊的表述中抓出真实含义，写到“很难说有一个隐含约定，因为约定的表述不应该模糊不清。我认为中国也不会承认有这样一个约定，他们没有放弃使用武力解决台湾问题的权利，但由于直到目前他们都没有使用武力，因此，你可以争辩说，有个隐含约定。好像又绕回来了... ,美国的态度对台湾问题一直是，海峡两岸人民同意和平解决”这位学者开始注意到，美国承认，台湾海峡两岸的所有中国人都认为只有一个中国，台湾是中国的一部分。美国政府没有改变那份协议[根据上海联合公报]，这[是]中国的一个原则”与中国的“一个中国”政策（很简单，其实台湾就是中国的一部分”）隐含在这，虽然，是领会的，由不同的部门表述。[美国]将不支持台湾独立的宣言"，他其实想象中封闭的线，所以这可能被视为一个隐含约定的基础。（那就是）我们反对（台湾）独立的一个宣言；中国放弃使用武力。
One may well ask whether it is not best tolet sleeping dogs lie. One reason to clarify both sides’ policies is that hawks in bothnations that use the cause of Taiwan to justify building up theirrespective military forces in an era in which capping these and focusing oneconomic,social, and environmental issues at home is needed by both nations. Thus, DanielTwining from the Hoover Institution points out that aggressive Chinese militarymodernization is justified in part by the need to ready to reclaim Taiwan. A2013 report to Congress from the Department of Defense concurs, stating,“Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait appears to remain theprincipal focus and primary driver of China’s military investment.” In the sameyear China carried out a military exercise – Mission 2013B – in which the PLAsimulated “a Normandy-style invasion” of Taiwan.”
有人可能会问，这是否是说最好不要去惹麻烦。其中一个原因是双方国内的鹰派明确一下各自的政策,利用台湾问题，进一步增强他们各自的军事力量，在这个时代，那些经济热点、社会，和国内的环境问题都需要这两个国家。因此，丹尼尔·川宁从胡佛研究（报告）中所指出，积极推进中国军事现代化，部分是为了准备收回台湾的理由是合理的，国防部在2013向国会报告中陈述道：“预防台湾海峡的潜在冲突似乎仍然是中国军事投入的重点和主要动力”在同一年，中国进行了一次军事演习–任务2013b–解放军模拟“诺曼底式入侵台湾”
In the UnitedStates, a leading expert of the Center for Naval Analysis Elbridge Colby warnedthat the not unfounded perception that the U.S. is becoming less capable ofdefending Taiwan is common in the U.S. as well as in Taiwan and China, andargues that maintaining a position of strength is critical to security forTaiwan and the region more broadly. A 2003 report from the Council on ForeignRelations examined China’s growing military power and held that “[minimizingthe chances that a cross-strait crisis will occur] means maintaining the clearability and willingness to counter any application of military force againstTaiwan.”
在美国，一位美国海军分析师埃尔布里奇科尔比警告说，美国通常认为美国正变得不那么有能力保护台湾，在美国常有这种说法，同样持这样认为的还有台湾和中国。认为实力对于台湾和该地区的安全至关重要，一个在2003年对外关系委员会的报告仔细研究了中国日益增长的军事力量，认为“[最大限度地减少两岸危机发生的可能性] 保持清晰的能力和意愿来应对任何军事打击台湾的可能。
True,even if the restraint both sides imposed onthemselves (and on their respective hawks) is made more explicit, either sidecould violate it. However, the more explicit the agreement the lesslikely is that it will be subject to misunderstandings and the more likely itis to survive. It may well be impossible at this stage to turn the implicitunderstanding, such as there is – if there is one – into anexplicit one; however, the more than it can be clarified andsolidified, the more this important simmering point of conflict can beassuaged.
真的，即使克制的双方对自己(与双方的鹰派)更加明确，任何一方都可能违反它。不过，然而，更明确的协议是不可能的，它会受到误解，它或许是不可能在这个阶段将隐含约定挑明，如有—如果有的话—也会变得模糊的，它应该变得更加清晰与充实，更重要的是可以平息一触即发的冲突点.
I am quite awareof the theories of the merits of “creative ambiguities”; they canenable one to squeeze extra leverage out of the relatively small amounts ofpower. In East Asia, however, they are much more likely toproduce miscalculations and conflicts than significant gains.
我完全知道的“创造性模糊理论”，他们可以利用杠杆作用施加较小的力来达到额外目的，然而，在东亚，较比得到重大利益他们更容易产生错误和冲突。
Finally, reducingthe tension on this issue would help to narrow thedifferences between the U.S. and China, especially if integrated into a moregeneral policy of mutually assured restraint. That would encourage both statesto focus on the many issues in which they have shared or complementaryinterests.
最后，减小这个问题上的紧张关系，将有助于缩小美国与中国之间的分歧，特别是如果达成相互保证克制政策的共识。形成共同的或互补的利益这将鼓励双方关注更多问题。
（ Amitai Etzioni乔治华盛顿大学国际关系教授）

评论
Brian
January 18, 2014at 13:14
The “mutually assured restraint” the author calls for will be thesituation for the foreseeable future, in my opinion. I thinkthat if this is the case Taiwan is China’s for the taking justbecause China has more to offer Taiwan than the U.S. does right now.I think the economic benefits that China can extended towards Taiwan will leadto China’s influence in Taiwan growing drastically in the next five to tenyears. This of course being the case if China stays away fromTaiwanese independence. If Taiwan plays this right they could see U.S.military backing and Chinese economic developmental assistance.
“确保相互克制”，在我的理解，作者喊出了在未来可预见的情况，，我认为，如果是这样的话，台湾将是中国的, 只是因为中国提供台湾的比美国还多，我认为，中国的对台湾经济上的影响将导致中国在台湾的影响力在未来五到十年大幅增长，如果台湾远离台独这是必然的结果，如果台湾把握的好，仍能看到美国军方的支持和中国经济发展上的帮助
akira
January 18, 2014at 11:29
If one suspectsthat the U.S. is” becoming less capable of defending Taiwan” from China, thenI’d like to ask if China is capable of defending Taiwan from the U.S.? Itworks both ways. How much force must China deploy on Taiwan if itwere to become capable of defending it? How unstable would such deploymentcause East Asia to become?
My second secondquestion is, based on what international treaty is the territory of Taiwanceded to China? Most of the readers surely must know that territorial cessionfrom one state to another need to be SPECIFIED BY A TREATY between the twostates. No treaty, no transfer of sovereignty.
如果有人怀疑美国面对中国是“越来越没有能力保护台湾”，那么我想问中国能否够防卫来台的美国？大家都彼此彼此…中国在台湾究竟部署多少武力才能捍卫它？这种部署动机将会把东亚变成何种不稳定？
我的第二个问题是，根据国际条约台湾领土是割让给中国的？大多数的读者肯定都知道领土从一个国家割让到另一个，需要由两个国家之间的签订条约，（可是）没有条约，没有主权交付