超级军网美国标准周刊书评：中国是如何丢失的？ How China Was \' ...
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/05/02 20:15:42
美国标准周刊书评：中国是如何丢失的？
How China Was 'Lost'
原文地址：http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/how-china-was-lost_696345.html?page=1
原创翻译：龙腾
How China Was 'Lost'
中国是如何丢失的？
And could it have been saved?
它能被挽回吗？
Jan 28, 2013, Vol. 18, No. 19 ? By ARTHUR WALDRON
* What was called by some “the loss of China”—the unexpected victory in 1949 of the Chinese Communists over the American-backed Nationalists—also destroyed the career of the diplomat John Paton Davies Jr. (1908-1999) as, in the 1950s, he and other like-minded “China hands” were wrongly accused of having been responsible for the defeat. Davies’s China reporting had certainly been pessimistic about Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government—which Franklin Roosevelt was determined should take its place as one of the “Big Four” after World War II—while consistently upbeat about the Communists, to whom, he forecast, “China’s destiny” belonged.
什么叫做“中国的损失”－－1949年中国GCD出人意料的战胜了美国支持的国民党－－也毁掉了外交官约翰.佩顿.戴维斯 Jr（1908－1999）的职业生涯，在1950年代，他与另一个志同道合的“中国通”被错误地指控要为失败负责。戴维斯的中国报告对蒋介石和他的国民党政府抱持明确的悲观态度－－富兰克林.罗斯福总统决定在二战后把他们作为“四大国”之一 －－却对GCD始终抱以乐观，对于他们，他预测，“中国的命运”属于他们。
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang, General Joseph Stilwell, 1942
蒋介石总司令，蒋太太，约瑟夫.史迪威将军，1942。
The charge, however, confused accuracy (the Communists did, in fact, win) with advocacy, needlessly sacrificing one of the ablest diplomats of his generation.
这个指控，无论如何，是在大张旗鼓地混淆是非（GCD实际上胜利了），那个时代的一位有才华的外交官被无谓的牺牲了。
Davies was born in China to missionary parents and educated at the University of Wisconsin, Yenching University in Beijing (which was built by American philanthropy, abolished by the Communists, and whose architecturally distinguished Chinese-style campus now houses Peking University), and Columbia University. He served in consular posts from 1933 to 1940. In 1942, he was assigned by the State Department to serve with General Joseph W. Stilwell in Chungking (now Chongqing), the Chinese wartime capital.
戴维斯出生于中国，父母是传教士，受教育于威斯康星大学，北京的燕京大学（该校由美国的慈善组织建立，被GCD关闭，其著名的中式风格的建筑现在由北京大学拥有）及哥伦比亚大学，从1933年至1940年，他任职于领事职位，1942年，他被国务院分派给在重庆的约瑟夫.W.史迪威将军，重庆当时是中国的战时首都。
General George C. Marshall wanted Stilwell, a superb ground fighter, to advise Generalissimo Chiang on military matters and to command Chinese and Allied operations in Burma that would secure Chinese supply lines from India. Stilwell did all of that superbly, but he was a difficult man—nicknamed “Vinegar Joe”—who scarcely concealed his contempt for Chiang, whom he called “the peanut.” When Roosevelt sought to make Stilwell commander of all troops, including the Chinese, Chiang objected, and Stilwell was recalled in 1944 amidst bitter controversy, which also touched Davies. Davies then went directly to Moscow, where he became first secretary, and returned to Washington in 1947 to serve five years on George F. Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff, followed by a year in Germany. The emergence of Senator Joseph McCarthy, who included a number of leading China specialists among his targets, led to Davies’s sidelining to the embassy in Peru. In 1954, John Foster Dulles dismissed Davies from the Foreign Service. His already brilliant career went no further. Thereafter, he manufactured avant-garde furniture in Latin America and traveled the world. He also published two books about China and diplomacy. His clearances were restored in 1969, and he retired to Asheville, North Carolina.
乔治.C.马歇尔将军希望史迪威这位杰出的陆军战士在军事问题上辅助最高统帅蒋并指挥中国人在缅甸的联合行动，以确保印度至中国的补给线。史迪威出色的执行了任务，但他是一个不易相处的人－－绰号为“酸醋乔”－－他几乎不掩饰他对蒋的轻视，称其为“花生米”。当罗斯福寻求任命史迪威为包括中国部队在内的所有部队的指挥官时，蒋加以拒绝，然后，在刺耳的公开争吵中，史迪威于1944年被召回美国，这也波及到了戴维斯。戴维斯随后直接去了莫斯科，在那里他任职一秘，1947年他回到华盛顿，在乔治.F.凯南的政策计划室任职了五年，其后一年内在德国。以许多首要的中国问题专家为靶子的参议员约瑟夫.麦凯锡的出现，导致戴维斯被排挤到驻秘鲁大使馆，1954年，约翰.福斯特.杜勒斯将戴维斯从国务院驻外事务处解雇，他闪光的职业生涯走到了尽头，在那以后，他在拉丁美洲从事先锋派家具的制造并周游世界，也出版了与中国和外交有关的两本书，1969年，他的官方许可（指美国敏感公职人员或情报人员的政审－－译注）被恢复，退休后去了北卡罗莱纳的阿什维尔。美国标准周刊书评：中国是如何丢失的？
How China Was 'Lost'
原文地址：http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/how-china-was-lost_696345.html?page=1
原创翻译：龙腾
How China Was 'Lost'
中国是如何丢失的？
And could it have been saved?
它能被挽回吗？
Jan 28, 2013, Vol. 18, No. 19 ? By ARTHUR WALDRON
* What was called by some “the loss of China”—the unexpected victory in 1949 of the Chinese Communists over the American-backed Nationalists—also destroyed the career of the diplomat John Paton Davies Jr. (1908-1999) as, in the 1950s, he and other like-minded “China hands” were wrongly accused of having been responsible for the defeat. Davies’s China reporting had certainly been pessimistic about Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government—which Franklin Roosevelt was determined should take its place as one of the “Big Four” after World War II—while consistently upbeat about the Communists, to whom, he forecast, “China’s destiny” belonged.
什么叫做“中国的损失”－－1949年中国GCD出人意料的战胜了美国支持的国民党－－也毁掉了外交官约翰.佩顿.戴维斯 Jr（1908－1999）的职业生涯，在1950年代，他与另一个志同道合的“中国通”被错误地指控要为失败负责。戴维斯的中国报告对蒋介石和他的国民党政府抱持明确的悲观态度－－富兰克林.罗斯福总统决定在二战后把他们作为“四大国”之一 －－却对GCD始终抱以乐观，对于他们，他预测，“中国的命运”属于他们。
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang, General Joseph Stilwell, 1942
蒋介石总司令，蒋太太，约瑟夫.史迪威将军，1942。
The charge, however, confused accuracy (the Communists did, in fact, win) with advocacy, needlessly sacrificing one of the ablest diplomats of his generation.
这个指控，无论如何，是在大张旗鼓地混淆是非（GCD实际上胜利了），那个时代的一位有才华的外交官被无谓的牺牲了。
Davies was born in China to missionary parents and educated at the University of Wisconsin, Yenching University in Beijing (which was built by American philanthropy, abolished by the Communists, and whose architecturally distinguished Chinese-style campus now houses Peking University), and Columbia University. He served in consular posts from 1933 to 1940. In 1942, he was assigned by the State Department to serve with General Joseph W. Stilwell in Chungking (now Chongqing), the Chinese wartime capital.
戴维斯出生于中国，父母是传教士，受教育于威斯康星大学，北京的燕京大学（该校由美国的慈善组织建立，被GCD关闭，其著名的中式风格的建筑现在由北京大学拥有）及哥伦比亚大学，从1933年至1940年，他任职于领事职位，1942年，他被国务院分派给在重庆的约瑟夫.W.史迪威将军，重庆当时是中国的战时首都。
General George C. Marshall wanted Stilwell, a superb ground fighter, to advise Generalissimo Chiang on military matters and to command Chinese and Allied operations in Burma that would secure Chinese supply lines from India. Stilwell did all of that superbly, but he was a difficult man—nicknamed “Vinegar Joe”—who scarcely concealed his contempt for Chiang, whom he called “the peanut.” When Roosevelt sought to make Stilwell commander of all troops, including the Chinese, Chiang objected, and Stilwell was recalled in 1944 amidst bitter controversy, which also touched Davies. Davies then went directly to Moscow, where he became first secretary, and returned to Washington in 1947 to serve five years on George F. Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff, followed by a year in Germany. The emergence of Senator Joseph McCarthy, who included a number of leading China specialists among his targets, led to Davies’s sidelining to the embassy in Peru. In 1954, John Foster Dulles dismissed Davies from the Foreign Service. His already brilliant career went no further. Thereafter, he manufactured avant-garde furniture in Latin America and traveled the world. He also published two books about China and diplomacy. His clearances were restored in 1969, and he retired to Asheville, North Carolina.
乔治.C.马歇尔将军希望史迪威这位杰出的陆军战士在军事问题上辅助最高统帅蒋并指挥中国人在缅甸的联合行动，以确保印度至中国的补给线。史迪威出色的执行了任务，但他是一个不易相处的人－－绰号为“酸醋乔”－－他几乎不掩饰他对蒋的轻视，称其为“花生米”。当罗斯福寻求任命史迪威为包括中国部队在内的所有部队的指挥官时，蒋加以拒绝，然后，在刺耳的公开争吵中，史迪威于1944年被召回美国，这也波及到了戴维斯。戴维斯随后直接去了莫斯科，在那里他任职一秘，1947年他回到华盛顿，在乔治.F.凯南的政策计划室任职了五年，其后一年内在德国。以许多首要的中国问题专家为靶子的参议员约瑟夫.麦凯锡的出现，导致戴维斯被排挤到驻秘鲁大使馆，1954年，约翰.福斯特.杜勒斯将戴维斯从国务院驻外事务处解雇，他闪光的职业生涯走到了尽头，在那以后，他在拉丁美洲从事先锋派家具的制造并周游世界，也出版了与中国和外交有关的两本书，1969年，他的官方许可（指美国敏感公职人员或情报人员的政审－－译注）被恢复，退休后去了北卡罗莱纳的阿什维尔。
How China Was 'Lost'
原文地址：http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/how-china-was-lost_696345.html?page=1
原创翻译：龙腾
How China Was 'Lost'
中国是如何丢失的？
And could it have been saved?
它能被挽回吗？
Jan 28, 2013, Vol. 18, No. 19 ? By ARTHUR WALDRON
* What was called by some “the loss of China”—the unexpected victory in 1949 of the Chinese Communists over the American-backed Nationalists—also destroyed the career of the diplomat John Paton Davies Jr. (1908-1999) as, in the 1950s, he and other like-minded “China hands” were wrongly accused of having been responsible for the defeat. Davies’s China reporting had certainly been pessimistic about Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government—which Franklin Roosevelt was determined should take its place as one of the “Big Four” after World War II—while consistently upbeat about the Communists, to whom, he forecast, “China’s destiny” belonged.
什么叫做“中国的损失”－－1949年中国GCD出人意料的战胜了美国支持的国民党－－也毁掉了外交官约翰.佩顿.戴维斯 Jr（1908－1999）的职业生涯，在1950年代，他与另一个志同道合的“中国通”被错误地指控要为失败负责。戴维斯的中国报告对蒋介石和他的国民党政府抱持明确的悲观态度－－富兰克林.罗斯福总统决定在二战后把他们作为“四大国”之一 －－却对GCD始终抱以乐观，对于他们，他预测，“中国的命运”属于他们。
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang, General Joseph Stilwell, 1942
蒋介石总司令，蒋太太，约瑟夫.史迪威将军，1942。
The charge, however, confused accuracy (the Communists did, in fact, win) with advocacy, needlessly sacrificing one of the ablest diplomats of his generation.
这个指控，无论如何，是在大张旗鼓地混淆是非（GCD实际上胜利了），那个时代的一位有才华的外交官被无谓的牺牲了。
Davies was born in China to missionary parents and educated at the University of Wisconsin, Yenching University in Beijing (which was built by American philanthropy, abolished by the Communists, and whose architecturally distinguished Chinese-style campus now houses Peking University), and Columbia University. He served in consular posts from 1933 to 1940. In 1942, he was assigned by the State Department to serve with General Joseph W. Stilwell in Chungking (now Chongqing), the Chinese wartime capital.
戴维斯出生于中国，父母是传教士，受教育于威斯康星大学，北京的燕京大学（该校由美国的慈善组织建立，被GCD关闭，其著名的中式风格的建筑现在由北京大学拥有）及哥伦比亚大学，从1933年至1940年，他任职于领事职位，1942年，他被国务院分派给在重庆的约瑟夫.W.史迪威将军，重庆当时是中国的战时首都。
General George C. Marshall wanted Stilwell, a superb ground fighter, to advise Generalissimo Chiang on military matters and to command Chinese and Allied operations in Burma that would secure Chinese supply lines from India. Stilwell did all of that superbly, but he was a difficult man—nicknamed “Vinegar Joe”—who scarcely concealed his contempt for Chiang, whom he called “the peanut.” When Roosevelt sought to make Stilwell commander of all troops, including the Chinese, Chiang objected, and Stilwell was recalled in 1944 amidst bitter controversy, which also touched Davies. Davies then went directly to Moscow, where he became first secretary, and returned to Washington in 1947 to serve five years on George F. Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff, followed by a year in Germany. The emergence of Senator Joseph McCarthy, who included a number of leading China specialists among his targets, led to Davies’s sidelining to the embassy in Peru. In 1954, John Foster Dulles dismissed Davies from the Foreign Service. His already brilliant career went no further. Thereafter, he manufactured avant-garde furniture in Latin America and traveled the world. He also published two books about China and diplomacy. His clearances were restored in 1969, and he retired to Asheville, North Carolina.
乔治.C.马歇尔将军希望史迪威这位杰出的陆军战士在军事问题上辅助最高统帅蒋并指挥中国人在缅甸的联合行动，以确保印度至中国的补给线。史迪威出色的执行了任务，但他是一个不易相处的人－－绰号为“酸醋乔”－－他几乎不掩饰他对蒋的轻视，称其为“花生米”。当罗斯福寻求任命史迪威为包括中国部队在内的所有部队的指挥官时，蒋加以拒绝，然后，在刺耳的公开争吵中，史迪威于1944年被召回美国，这也波及到了戴维斯。戴维斯随后直接去了莫斯科，在那里他任职一秘，1947年他回到华盛顿，在乔治.F.凯南的政策计划室任职了五年，其后一年内在德国。以许多首要的中国问题专家为靶子的参议员约瑟夫.麦凯锡的出现，导致戴维斯被排挤到驻秘鲁大使馆，1954年，约翰.福斯特.杜勒斯将戴维斯从国务院驻外事务处解雇，他闪光的职业生涯走到了尽头，在那以后，他在拉丁美洲从事先锋派家具的制造并周游世界，也出版了与中国和外交有关的两本书，1969年，他的官方许可（指美国敏感公职人员或情报人员的政审－－译注）被恢复，退休后去了北卡罗莱纳的阿什维尔。美国标准周刊书评：中国是如何丢失的？
How China Was 'Lost'
原文地址：http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/how-china-was-lost_696345.html?page=1
原创翻译：龙腾
How China Was 'Lost'
中国是如何丢失的？
And could it have been saved?
它能被挽回吗？
Jan 28, 2013, Vol. 18, No. 19 ? By ARTHUR WALDRON
* What was called by some “the loss of China”—the unexpected victory in 1949 of the Chinese Communists over the American-backed Nationalists—also destroyed the career of the diplomat John Paton Davies Jr. (1908-1999) as, in the 1950s, he and other like-minded “China hands” were wrongly accused of having been responsible for the defeat. Davies’s China reporting had certainly been pessimistic about Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government—which Franklin Roosevelt was determined should take its place as one of the “Big Four” after World War II—while consistently upbeat about the Communists, to whom, he forecast, “China’s destiny” belonged.
什么叫做“中国的损失”－－1949年中国GCD出人意料的战胜了美国支持的国民党－－也毁掉了外交官约翰.佩顿.戴维斯 Jr（1908－1999）的职业生涯，在1950年代，他与另一个志同道合的“中国通”被错误地指控要为失败负责。戴维斯的中国报告对蒋介石和他的国民党政府抱持明确的悲观态度－－富兰克林.罗斯福总统决定在二战后把他们作为“四大国”之一 －－却对GCD始终抱以乐观，对于他们，他预测，“中国的命运”属于他们。
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang, General Joseph Stilwell, 1942
蒋介石总司令，蒋太太，约瑟夫.史迪威将军，1942。
The charge, however, confused accuracy (the Communists did, in fact, win) with advocacy, needlessly sacrificing one of the ablest diplomats of his generation.
这个指控，无论如何，是在大张旗鼓地混淆是非（GCD实际上胜利了），那个时代的一位有才华的外交官被无谓的牺牲了。
Davies was born in China to missionary parents and educated at the University of Wisconsin, Yenching University in Beijing (which was built by American philanthropy, abolished by the Communists, and whose architecturally distinguished Chinese-style campus now houses Peking University), and Columbia University. He served in consular posts from 1933 to 1940. In 1942, he was assigned by the State Department to serve with General Joseph W. Stilwell in Chungking (now Chongqing), the Chinese wartime capital.
戴维斯出生于中国，父母是传教士，受教育于威斯康星大学，北京的燕京大学（该校由美国的慈善组织建立，被GCD关闭，其著名的中式风格的建筑现在由北京大学拥有）及哥伦比亚大学，从1933年至1940年，他任职于领事职位，1942年，他被国务院分派给在重庆的约瑟夫.W.史迪威将军，重庆当时是中国的战时首都。
General George C. Marshall wanted Stilwell, a superb ground fighter, to advise Generalissimo Chiang on military matters and to command Chinese and Allied operations in Burma that would secure Chinese supply lines from India. Stilwell did all of that superbly, but he was a difficult man—nicknamed “Vinegar Joe”—who scarcely concealed his contempt for Chiang, whom he called “the peanut.” When Roosevelt sought to make Stilwell commander of all troops, including the Chinese, Chiang objected, and Stilwell was recalled in 1944 amidst bitter controversy, which also touched Davies. Davies then went directly to Moscow, where he became first secretary, and returned to Washington in 1947 to serve five years on George F. Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff, followed by a year in Germany. The emergence of Senator Joseph McCarthy, who included a number of leading China specialists among his targets, led to Davies’s sidelining to the embassy in Peru. In 1954, John Foster Dulles dismissed Davies from the Foreign Service. His already brilliant career went no further. Thereafter, he manufactured avant-garde furniture in Latin America and traveled the world. He also published two books about China and diplomacy. His clearances were restored in 1969, and he retired to Asheville, North Carolina.
乔治.C.马歇尔将军希望史迪威这位杰出的陆军战士在军事问题上辅助最高统帅蒋并指挥中国人在缅甸的联合行动，以确保印度至中国的补给线。史迪威出色的执行了任务，但他是一个不易相处的人－－绰号为“酸醋乔”－－他几乎不掩饰他对蒋的轻视，称其为“花生米”。当罗斯福寻求任命史迪威为包括中国部队在内的所有部队的指挥官时，蒋加以拒绝，然后，在刺耳的公开争吵中，史迪威于1944年被召回美国，这也波及到了戴维斯。戴维斯随后直接去了莫斯科，在那里他任职一秘，1947年他回到华盛顿，在乔治.F.凯南的政策计划室任职了五年，其后一年内在德国。以许多首要的中国问题专家为靶子的参议员约瑟夫.麦凯锡的出现，导致戴维斯被排挤到驻秘鲁大使馆，1954年，约翰.福斯特.杜勒斯将戴维斯从国务院驻外事务处解雇，他闪光的职业生涯走到了尽头，在那以后，他在拉丁美洲从事先锋派家具的制造并周游世界，也出版了与中国和外交有关的两本书，1969年，他的官方许可（指美国敏感公职人员或情报人员的政审－－译注）被恢复，退休后去了北卡罗莱纳的阿什维尔。
This superb memoir, now thankfully published a dozen years after Davies’s death, can be read in two ways. Viewed as a commentary on Chinese politics, it is very much as one would expect, given Davies’s reputation. It is almost merciless in its chastising of Chiang Kai-shek, of his formidable, Wellesley-educated wife, Mayling Soong, and his smart, constantly intriguing, Harvard-educated brother-in-law, T.V. Soong, as well as their circle of foreign admirers. These included General Claire Chennault of “Flying Tigers” fame, a tireless advocate in Chungking of an airpower-based strategy against the Japanese (anathema to Stilwell), and the patrician journalist and OSS officer Joseph Alsop, among others.
现在，非常感谢在戴维斯去世多年后这个优秀的回忆录得以出版，它能从两个方面来读，从作为一个中国政治的评论来看，鉴于戴维斯的声誉，它是非常令人期待的。它几乎是无情的谴责了蒋介石和他那可畏的在卫斯理女子学院受过教育的妻子宋美龄，以及他精明风趣的毕业于哈佛大学的内弟宋子文，也有他们的外国崇拜者圈子，包括以飞虎队闻名的，为一个基于空军的对日战略在重庆不知疲倦地呼吁的陈纳德将军（对史迪威深恶痛绝），此外，还有出身名门的新闻记者和战略情报局（OSS）的官员约瑟夫.艾索普。
The surprise is Davies’s relentless and telling criticism of Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom he analyzes and criticizes more thoroughly than he does any Chinese actor. It quickly becomes clear that the vagaries of Roosevelt’s ill-considered and amateurish approach to China not only vexed serious Foreign Service professionals like Davies, but also sowed, early in the war, the seeds of the catastrophe that would overtake China when the Communists came to power some four years after the war’s end. Most commentary on the Communist victory in China, and how America did or did not contribute to it, concentrates on the end of World War II and the immediate postwar period. To read Davies is to be abruptly reminded how badly China was handled by the Roosevelt administration, with what adverse consequences, and from how early a time. The fundamental problem was that Roosevelt embraced a mythicized version of Chinese reality, in which he identified China as one of the Big Four great powers that would take responsibility for the postwar world, with its leader Chiang (whose name FDR characteristically rendered as “Shang”) in the same class as Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, and himself. Strongly promoted by the Chinese government, this was an illusion from which Roosevelt never took the trouble to free himself.
令人吃惊的是戴维斯的毫不留情和对富兰克林.罗斯福的深度批判，他对罗斯福的分析和批判比对其它中国对象更加彻底。它快速的使读者明白，易变的罗斯福以他欠考虑和业余级别的对华方式，不仅使戴维斯这样认真的驻外专业人员生气，也在战争早期播撒了战争结束四年后GCD掌权时压制中国这个悲剧的种子。大部分对GCD在中国获胜的评论，和美国有没有做什么去促成它，都集中于二战末期和最接近的战后时期。读戴维斯（的书）可以猛然意识到中国（问题）被罗斯福政府处理得多么拙劣，及其带来的不利后果，还有其源自于何时。根本的问题是罗斯福接受一个关于中国现实的神化了的版本，为此他认定中国可作为为战后世界负责的四大强国之一，并使它的领导人蒋（罗斯福特有的口音称其为“商”）与斯大林，邱吉尔，及他自己平起平坐。在中国政府大力的推广宣传下，这形成了一个错觉，好似罗斯福从未不辞劳苦去解放他们自己。
True, Chiang had managed by 1928 to impose a fragile unity on the country. But in 1931 hostilities with Tokyo began when Japanese troops annexed Manchuria (today the three provinces of Northeast China). That struggle became total in 1937, when the Japanese invaded the heart of China to the south, including Shanghai, into the battle for which Chiang threw his best German-trained divisions. When that was lost, a long, bloody fighting retreat ensued—through Nanking (now Nanjing, where the terrible massacre occurred), up the vast Yangtze River to Wuhan (where Davies had been consul), and finally to Chungking in the distant southwest. This city was chosen as last refuge because it lay above the precipitous three gorges of the Yangtze, which were impassable to land forces, and was thus one of the few places in China the Japanese could not reach—except by air: They bombed it regularly.
确实，蒋在1928年设法将国家拼凑为一个脆弱的统一体，但在1931年日本军队侵占满洲（今天中国的东北三省）时，对东京的敌对状态便开始了，1937年，对抗转变为全面战争，当日本向南入侵包括上海在内的中国心脏地带时，蒋将他最好的德式训练的部队投入了战场，失败后，伴随着漫长而血腥的战斗从南京（此地发生了令人震惊的大屠杀）沿宽广的长江而上撤退至武汉（戴维斯在此任领事），最后到达了遥远的西南部的重庆，这个城市被选为最后的避难所是因为它位于险峻的长江三峡的上游，对陆军而言无法通行，它成为日军不能到达的中国少数几个地方之一－－除非利用空军：他们经常轰炸它。
现在，非常感谢在戴维斯去世多年后这个优秀的回忆录得以出版，它能从两个方面来读，从作为一个中国政治的评论来看，鉴于戴维斯的声誉，它是非常令人期待的。它几乎是无情的谴责了蒋介石和他那可畏的在卫斯理女子学院受过教育的妻子宋美龄，以及他精明风趣的毕业于哈佛大学的内弟宋子文，也有他们的外国崇拜者圈子，包括以飞虎队闻名的，为一个基于空军的对日战略在重庆不知疲倦地呼吁的陈纳德将军（对史迪威深恶痛绝），此外，还有出身名门的新闻记者和战略情报局（OSS）的官员约瑟夫.艾索普。
The surprise is Davies’s relentless and telling criticism of Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom he analyzes and criticizes more thoroughly than he does any Chinese actor. It quickly becomes clear that the vagaries of Roosevelt’s ill-considered and amateurish approach to China not only vexed serious Foreign Service professionals like Davies, but also sowed, early in the war, the seeds of the catastrophe that would overtake China when the Communists came to power some four years after the war’s end. Most commentary on the Communist victory in China, and how America did or did not contribute to it, concentrates on the end of World War II and the immediate postwar period. To read Davies is to be abruptly reminded how badly China was handled by the Roosevelt administration, with what adverse consequences, and from how early a time. The fundamental problem was that Roosevelt embraced a mythicized version of Chinese reality, in which he identified China as one of the Big Four great powers that would take responsibility for the postwar world, with its leader Chiang (whose name FDR characteristically rendered as “Shang”) in the same class as Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, and himself. Strongly promoted by the Chinese government, this was an illusion from which Roosevelt never took the trouble to free himself.
令人吃惊的是戴维斯的毫不留情和对富兰克林.罗斯福的深度批判，他对罗斯福的分析和批判比对其它中国对象更加彻底。它快速的使读者明白，易变的罗斯福以他欠考虑和业余级别的对华方式，不仅使戴维斯这样认真的驻外专业人员生气，也在战争早期播撒了战争结束四年后GCD掌权时压制中国这个悲剧的种子。大部分对GCD在中国获胜的评论，和美国有没有做什么去促成它，都集中于二战末期和最接近的战后时期。读戴维斯（的书）可以猛然意识到中国（问题）被罗斯福政府处理得多么拙劣，及其带来的不利后果，还有其源自于何时。根本的问题是罗斯福接受一个关于中国现实的神化了的版本，为此他认定中国可作为为战后世界负责的四大强国之一，并使它的领导人蒋（罗斯福特有的口音称其为“商”）与斯大林，邱吉尔，及他自己平起平坐。在中国政府大力的推广宣传下，这形成了一个错觉，好似罗斯福从未不辞劳苦去解放他们自己。
True, Chiang had managed by 1928 to impose a fragile unity on the country. But in 1931 hostilities with Tokyo began when Japanese troops annexed Manchuria (today the three provinces of Northeast China). That struggle became total in 1937, when the Japanese invaded the heart of China to the south, including Shanghai, into the battle for which Chiang threw his best German-trained divisions. When that was lost, a long, bloody fighting retreat ensued—through Nanking (now Nanjing, where the terrible massacre occurred), up the vast Yangtze River to Wuhan (where Davies had been consul), and finally to Chungking in the distant southwest. This city was chosen as last refuge because it lay above the precipitous three gorges of the Yangtze, which were impassable to land forces, and was thus one of the few places in China the Japanese could not reach—except by air: They bombed it regularly.
确实，蒋在1928年设法将国家拼凑为一个脆弱的统一体，但在1931年日本军队侵占满洲（今天中国的东北三省）时，对东京的敌对状态便开始了，1937年，对抗转变为全面战争，当日本向南入侵包括上海在内的中国心脏地带时，蒋将他最好的德式训练的部队投入了战场，失败后，伴随着漫长而血腥的战斗从南京（此地发生了令人震惊的大屠杀）沿宽广的长江而上撤退至武汉（戴维斯在此任领事），最后到达了遥远的西南部的重庆，这个城市被选为最后的避难所是因为它位于险峻的长江三峡的上游，对陆军而言无法通行，它成为日军不能到达的中国少数几个地方之一－－除非利用空军：他们经常轰炸它。
Such was the dire situation when the United States entered World War II in December 1941. Strategically, China was a spent force, though fighting continued all over the map. It was incapable of a war effort remotely comparable to what the British, Soviets, and Americans were mounting. Not only that: Its government, never strong throughout the country, had been greatly weakened, while the Communists, who favored low-casualty guerrilla tactics, were growing in strength.
在美国于1941年12月加入二战时，这是一种可怕的状态，战略上，中国耗尽了力量，尽管战斗仍在所有的地方继续。它的战绩远远无法与英国，苏联和美国所正在取得的相比，不仅如此：它的政府管辖从未有力的遍及全国，当重视低伤亡的游击战术的GCD日渐壮大时，它更加被削弱了。
Nor was the United States in a position to offer much help. Washington judged Europe to be the primary theater, which meant that material aid to the embattled Chinese was “only a trickle” during 1942-43, years when aid poured into Europe and the Soviet Union. In 1944, an all-out Japanese offensive came very close to toppling Chiang’s government, and Washington briefly panicked. Yet none of this struck home: FDR’s “geopolitical assumption” remained that China, under Chiang’s leadership, would become a great power after the war. Such an outcome would have been possible only if America had designated China the primary theater in the war against Japan: if they had landed hundreds of thousands of troops there, systematically built up Nationalist forces, and moved deliberately from south to north, retaking the vast continent of China, mile by mile and battle by battle, as was done in Europe. That approach was discarded, however, in favor of the far less casualty-intensive strategy of island-hopping and bombing Japan.
美国也不能够提供非常多的帮助，华盛顿当时以欧洲为首要战场，这意味着在1942－43年期间，当援助大量注入欧洲和苏联时，对陷入困境的中国进行的物资援助“仅是一个细流”。1944年，一次日本人倾巢而出的攻势非常接近于推翻蒋的政府，华盛顿短暂地恐慌过。然而没人击中要害：罗斯福的“地缘政治设想”保留了蒋领导下的中国将成为战后的一个大国，只要美国认定中国是对日战争的首要战场，这样一个结局将是可能的：如果他们有投入成百上千的部队在那里，系统性的建设国民党部队，然后谋划从南方转战到北方，（就能）重新控制中国的广阔土地，步步为营，如同在欧洲那样。这个途径被放弃，无论如何，对此的赞成远不及伤亡众多的越岛作战战略和轰炸日本。
Instead of joining the war in China, the best the administration could do, as Davies observes, was “to present Chiang Kai-shek with a high-ranking military officer as adviser .??.??. an earnest of large-scale support to come.” Rather than grappling with the inescapable issues that Davies and others were already pressing—e.g., how to work with a faction-ridden Chinese government whose armies were being bled white; whether to adopt a China-based or Pacific-based strategy against Japan; how to deal with the inevitable territorial demands Stalin would make, certainly extending to Manchuria—
按戴维斯的观察，取代在中国参战，政府能做得最好的是“派遣一个高级别的军事官员给蒋介石作为顾问.？？..？.一个诚挚的大规模支持就会到来”，而不是抓紧应对戴维斯和其他人面对的已经迫切的不可回避的问题－－例如，如何与一个派别林立的军力已被榨尽的中国政府共事；对日战略是基于中国还是以基于太平洋，如何应付斯大林必将提出的肯定会延伸到满洲的领土要求。
The President put great store by getting along with the Generalissimo. His vision of the Big Four gaining victory and dispensing a just peace depended on, he thought, avoiding unpleasantness with Chiang.
To make matters worse, Roosevelt was “a politician not an executive,” and was accustomed to undercutting and bypassing his formal officialdom, treating even his secretaries of state as “greeters” while he and Harry Hopkins ran foreign policy.
与最高统帅蒋取得共识后，罗斯福总统送去了大量储备（物质），他以为，他的四大国赢得胜利并执行一个正义的和平的美好愿望，有赖于避免与蒋之间发生不快。
更糟糕的是，罗斯福是“一个政治家而不是一个执行官”，习惯于从下面出击，绕过正式的官方途径，在他与哈利.霍普金斯一起做外交政策时，甚至对待他的国务卿象一个“接待员”（当时的国务卿是科德尔·赫尔，霍普金斯是首席外交顾问－－译注）
Not surprisingly, the most compelling reading in this memoir is Davies’s description of how, exactly, this was done. Particularly delicious is his rendering of the remarkable procession of personal envoysone of Roosevelt’s favorite expedients—who regularly arrived in Chungking with utterly vague remits, while keeping the American premise of China’s great-powerdom inflated, creating unrealistic Chinese expectations, and utterly confusing lines of responsibility and command.
不出人意料，这本回忆录中最可读的是戴维斯的描述方式，的确，这被做到了。尤其有意思的是他对引人注目的个人特使队伍的描述－－罗斯福喜好的临时手段之一－－他们带着不明确的事项定期来到重庆，期间，保持美国对中国膨胀的大国地位的假定，建立不切实际的中国期望，完全混淆了责任与指挥的界线。
The first was Lauchlin Currie, “a brisk, little, rimless-bespectacled Harvard economist who had been acquired by Roosevelt as a special assistant.” When Davies came to know him in Washington, Currie was developing “an interest in Chinese affairs and took to phoning me to ask for information or my comments on Chinese events. I thought it odd that he should occupy himself with matters so evidently outside his expertise. But then this spontaneous straying into other jurisdictions to dabble therein was characteristic of the helter-skelter Roosevelt administration.”
Currie was eventually sent to Chungking as a “special adviser” to Roosevelt. On the basis of the most superficial inspection, he recommended “the recall of Stilwell and [Ambassador Clarence E.] Gauss.” Not only that, he “considered himself to be the most suitable replacement for Gauss, a dream that was not to be realized.”
第一位是劳克林.居里，“一个活泼的小个子，戴着无框眼镜，哈佛大学经济系毕业，获任为罗斯福的特别助理”，当戴维斯在华盛顿认识他时，居里正在发展“对中国事务的兴趣并喜欢打电话给我打听消息或我对中国的事情的评论，我感到奇怪，他明显以他专业以外的事占用自己的时间。不过另一方面，这种自发的偏离自己的职务而涉足其它领域的行为是杂乱无章的罗斯福政府的特点。”
居里最终被派到重庆去作为罗斯福的“特别顾问”，根据最肤浅的调查，他建议“召回史迪威和（驻华大使克拉伦斯）高斯。”不仅如此，他还“认为他自己是高斯是最合适的替代者，这是一个没有成真的美梦。”
Then, the 1940 Republican presidential candidate Wendell Willkie turned up, “visiting China on a round-the-world junket meant to fabricate an image for himself as a man of vision.” General Chennault prevailed upon Wilkie to carry a letter from him to Roosevelt asking for “105 fighters, 30 medium bombers, [and] 12 heavy bombers,” with which Chennault promised to accomplish “the downfall of Japan.” General Marshall dismissed this as “just nonsense,” but the approach appealed to FDR as a quick and easy solution to an otherwise impossible problem.
然后，1940年共和党总统候选人温德尔.威尔吉出现了，“在一个环球旅行中访问了中国，意欲把自己打扮成一个有洞察力的人。”陈纳德将军说服威尔吉带给罗斯福一封信，要求“105架战机，30架中型轰炸机，（和）12架重型轰炸机，”随之还有陈纳德对实现“日本垮台”的承诺。马歇尔将军以“胡言乱语”驳回了这些，但是这个方法对罗斯福有吸引力，因为对原本不可能的问题，这是一个快速而容易的方案。
In 1943, Davies and Stilwell attended the Cairo Conference, at which Chiang joined Churchill and Roosevelt to discuss the Asian theater. Churchill, who was ready to let China fall, tried without success to persuade Chiang and his wife to go sight-seeing while the others met. Roosevelt was solicitous of the Chinese leader. Stilwell understood this method, confiding to his diary, “The Squire [FDR] was in good spirits, looking for short cuts.” Davies was appalled to find that FDR was dispensing with any State Department aid in translation or negotiation. Ignored at the conference was his colleague, Willys Peck, who “spoke Chinese fluently, for years had been acquainted with Chiang, and was the soul of discretion.”
1943年，戴维斯和史迪威参加了开罗会议，蒋有参与并和邱吉尔及罗斯福一起讨论了亚洲的战局，邱吉尔本打算让中国垮台，试图说服蒋和他的妻子在其他人会晤时去观光，但未成功，罗斯福记挂着这个中国领袖，史迪威明白其中的道道，他在日记中透露，“这个乡绅（罗斯福）精神抖擞，寻找着捷径。”戴维斯惊骇地发现，罗斯福省去了任何国务院的人参与翻译和谈判，在会议中被忽略的人是他的同事，威利.佩克，他“能说流利的汉语，与蒋相识多年，是一位最谨慎的人。”
Such was the dire situation when the United States entered World War II in December 1941. Strategically, China was a spent force, though fighting continued all over the map. It was incapable of a war effort remotely comparable to what the British, Soviets, and Americans were mounting. Not only that: Its government, never strong throughout the country, had been greatly weakened, while the Communists, who favored low-casualty guerrilla tactics, were growing in strength.
在美国于1941年12月加入二战时，这是一种可怕的状态，战略上，中国耗尽了力量，尽管战斗仍在所有的地方继续。它的战绩远远无法与英国，苏联和美国所正在取得的相比，不仅如此：它的政府管辖从未有力的遍及全国，当重视低伤亡的游击战术的GCD日渐壮大时，它更加被削弱了。
Nor was the United States in a position to offer much help. Washington judged Europe to be the primary theater, which meant that material aid to the embattled Chinese was “only a trickle” during 1942-43, years when aid poured into Europe and the Soviet Union. In 1944, an all-out Japanese offensive came very close to toppling Chiang’s government, and Washington briefly panicked. Yet none of this struck home: FDR’s “geopolitical assumption” remained that China, under Chiang’s leadership, would become a great power after the war. Such an outcome would have been possible only if America had designated China the primary theater in the war against Japan: if they had landed hundreds of thousands of troops there, systematically built up Nationalist forces, and moved deliberately from south to north, retaking the vast continent of China, mile by mile and battle by battle, as was done in Europe. That approach was discarded, however, in favor of the far less casualty-intensive strategy of island-hopping and bombing Japan.
美国也不能够提供非常多的帮助，华盛顿当时以欧洲为首要战场，这意味着在1942－43年期间，当援助大量注入欧洲和苏联时，对陷入困境的中国进行的物资援助“仅是一个细流”。1944年，一次日本人倾巢而出的攻势非常接近于推翻蒋的政府，华盛顿短暂地恐慌过。然而没人击中要害：罗斯福的“地缘政治设想”保留了蒋领导下的中国将成为战后的一个大国，只要美国认定中国是对日战争的首要战场，这样一个结局将是可能的：如果他们有投入成百上千的部队在那里，系统性的建设国民党部队，然后谋划从南方转战到北方，（就能）重新控制中国的广阔土地，步步为营，如同在欧洲那样。这个途径被放弃，无论如何，对此的赞成远不及伤亡众多的越岛作战战略和轰炸日本。
Instead of joining the war in China, the best the administration could do, as Davies observes, was “to present Chiang Kai-shek with a high-ranking military officer as adviser .??.??. an earnest of large-scale support to come.” Rather than grappling with the inescapable issues that Davies and others were already pressing—e.g., how to work with a faction-ridden Chinese government whose armies were being bled white; whether to adopt a China-based or Pacific-based strategy against Japan; how to deal with the inevitable territorial demands Stalin would make, certainly extending to Manchuria—
按戴维斯的观察，取代在中国参战，政府能做得最好的是“派遣一个高级别的军事官员给蒋介石作为顾问.？？..？.一个诚挚的大规模支持就会到来”，而不是抓紧应对戴维斯和其他人面对的已经迫切的不可回避的问题－－例如，如何与一个派别林立的军力已被榨尽的中国政府共事；对日战略是基于中国还是以基于太平洋，如何应付斯大林必将提出的肯定会延伸到满洲的领土要求。
The President put great store by getting along with the Generalissimo. His vision of the Big Four gaining victory and dispensing a just peace depended on, he thought, avoiding unpleasantness with Chiang.
To make matters worse, Roosevelt was “a politician not an executive,” and was accustomed to undercutting and bypassing his formal officialdom, treating even his secretaries of state as “greeters” while he and Harry Hopkins ran foreign policy.
与最高统帅蒋取得共识后，罗斯福总统送去了大量储备（物质），他以为，他的四大国赢得胜利并执行一个正义的和平的美好愿望，有赖于避免与蒋之间发生不快。
更糟糕的是，罗斯福是“一个政治家而不是一个执行官”，习惯于从下面出击，绕过正式的官方途径，在他与哈利.霍普金斯一起做外交政策时，甚至对待他的国务卿象一个“接待员”（当时的国务卿是科德尔·赫尔，霍普金斯是首席外交顾问－－译注）
Not surprisingly, the most compelling reading in this memoir is Davies’s description of how, exactly, this was done. Particularly delicious is his rendering of the remarkable procession of personal envoysone of Roosevelt’s favorite expedients—who regularly arrived in Chungking with utterly vague remits, while keeping the American premise of China’s great-powerdom inflated, creating unrealistic Chinese expectations, and utterly confusing lines of responsibility and command.
不出人意料，这本回忆录中最可读的是戴维斯的描述方式，的确，这被做到了。尤其有意思的是他对引人注目的个人特使队伍的描述－－罗斯福喜好的临时手段之一－－他们带着不明确的事项定期来到重庆，期间，保持美国对中国膨胀的大国地位的假定，建立不切实际的中国期望，完全混淆了责任与指挥的界线。
The first was Lauchlin Currie, “a brisk, little, rimless-bespectacled Harvard economist who had been acquired by Roosevelt as a special assistant.” When Davies came to know him in Washington, Currie was developing “an interest in Chinese affairs and took to phoning me to ask for information or my comments on Chinese events. I thought it odd that he should occupy himself with matters so evidently outside his expertise. But then this spontaneous straying into other jurisdictions to dabble therein was characteristic of the helter-skelter Roosevelt administration.”
Currie was eventually sent to Chungking as a “special adviser” to Roosevelt. On the basis of the most superficial inspection, he recommended “the recall of Stilwell and [Ambassador Clarence E.] Gauss.” Not only that, he “considered himself to be the most suitable replacement for Gauss, a dream that was not to be realized.”
第一位是劳克林.居里，“一个活泼的小个子，戴着无框眼镜，哈佛大学经济系毕业，获任为罗斯福的特别助理”，当戴维斯在华盛顿认识他时，居里正在发展“对中国事务的兴趣并喜欢打电话给我打听消息或我对中国的事情的评论，我感到奇怪，他明显以他专业以外的事占用自己的时间。不过另一方面，这种自发的偏离自己的职务而涉足其它领域的行为是杂乱无章的罗斯福政府的特点。”
居里最终被派到重庆去作为罗斯福的“特别顾问”，根据最肤浅的调查，他建议“召回史迪威和（驻华大使克拉伦斯）高斯。”不仅如此，他还“认为他自己是高斯是最合适的替代者，这是一个没有成真的美梦。”
Then, the 1940 Republican presidential candidate Wendell Willkie turned up, “visiting China on a round-the-world junket meant to fabricate an image for himself as a man of vision.” General Chennault prevailed upon Wilkie to carry a letter from him to Roosevelt asking for “105 fighters, 30 medium bombers, [and] 12 heavy bombers,” with which Chennault promised to accomplish “the downfall of Japan.” General Marshall dismissed this as “just nonsense,” but the approach appealed to FDR as a quick and easy solution to an otherwise impossible problem.
然后，1940年共和党总统候选人温德尔.威尔吉出现了，“在一个环球旅行中访问了中国，意欲把自己打扮成一个有洞察力的人。”陈纳德将军说服威尔吉带给罗斯福一封信，要求“105架战机，30架中型轰炸机，（和）12架重型轰炸机，”随之还有陈纳德对实现“日本垮台”的承诺。马歇尔将军以“胡言乱语”驳回了这些，但是这个方法对罗斯福有吸引力，因为对原本不可能的问题，这是一个快速而容易的方案。
In 1943, Davies and Stilwell attended the Cairo Conference, at which Chiang joined Churchill and Roosevelt to discuss the Asian theater. Churchill, who was ready to let China fall, tried without success to persuade Chiang and his wife to go sight-seeing while the others met. Roosevelt was solicitous of the Chinese leader. Stilwell understood this method, confiding to his diary, “The Squire [FDR] was in good spirits, looking for short cuts.” Davies was appalled to find that FDR was dispensing with any State Department aid in translation or negotiation. Ignored at the conference was his colleague, Willys Peck, who “spoke Chinese fluently, for years had been acquainted with Chiang, and was the soul of discretion.”
1943年，戴维斯和史迪威参加了开罗会议，蒋有参与并和邱吉尔及罗斯福一起讨论了亚洲的战局，邱吉尔本打算让中国垮台，试图说服蒋和他的妻子在其他人会晤时去观光，但未成功，罗斯福记挂着这个中国领袖，史迪威明白其中的道道，他在日记中透露，“这个乡绅（罗斯福）精神抖擞，寻找着捷径。”戴维斯惊骇地发现，罗斯福省去了任何国务院的人参与翻译和谈判，在会议中被忽略的人是他的同事，威利.佩克，他“能说流利的汉语，与蒋相识多年，是一位最谨慎的人。”
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
应译为广大群众喜闻乐见的委员长常公凯申
应译为广大群众喜闻乐见的委员长常公凯申
Without the inhibiting presence of a knowledgeable American at his side, Roosevelt plunged into cultivation of Chiang and soliciting the Generalissimo’s collaboration in building a Rooseveltian world order. Madame Chiang .??.??. bedizened as for a cocktail party interpreted at the private meeting between FDR and her husband.
The president’s utterly “dilettantish foreign policy” became even clearer when some of the Americans were treated to an informal session with him:
身边没有有见识的美国人的制约作用存在，罗斯福投入的栽培蒋介石并且征求这位最高统帅的合作去建立一个罗斯福的世界秩序，蒋太太...珠光宝气的...参加一个鸡尾酒会在罗斯福与她丈夫的私人会晤中作口译。
当一些美国人和他在一个非正式会议上被招待时，总统十足的“一知半解的外交政策”甚至变得更明显。
We heard a good deal about his ancestors. The one who went to China, made a million, returned home, lost it in a coal mine investment, went back to China, made another million, went home and put it in railroad stock which did not pay a dividend until two years after his death. Told with much laughter.
Davies and Stilwell left confused and depressed.
我们听到他大谈他的祖上，他的祖上去过中国，发了大财回家，在一个煤矿投资中失败，再次到中国，又发了大财回家，把钱都买了直到他死后两年都不付股息的铁路股票。他大笑着说。
戴维斯和史迪威只有迷茫跟沮丧。
It was part of the politician’s brush-off technique. He never directly came to grips with the real subject at hand—what did he want the General to say to Chiang[?] .??.??. What instructions as to policy toward China did he have?
In the car on the way back to the Mena House hotel, Stilwell “held his head in his hands.”
这是政治家的拒绝技巧的一部分，他从不直接应对手头上真正的主题－－他希望史迪威将军对蒋说什么？ .??.??.他有什么对华政策指示？
在返回米娜宫饭店的汽车里，史迪威“双手抱头”。
When they returned to Chung-king, the flow of emissaries continued. Vice President Henry Wallace arrived. Roosevelt had ostensibly sent him to help with the problems between the Nationalists and their Communist rivals. Davies explains that the real point of the mission was to ease Wallace out of the United States so that Roosevelt could “lay the ground for unloading him as running mate at the upcoming Democratic convention.” Wallace, too, recommended the removal of Gauss and Stilwell.
Following Wallace, and as FDR’s “personal representative for economic matters,” was Donald Nelson, deposed head of the War Production Board, whom the president also did not want in Washington. Harry Hopkins told Davies that he was perplexed as to how the “personal representative” might actually occupy himself, but added that “Nelson would be happy if the Chinese provided him with four or five girls—that would keep him quiet.”
当他们回到重庆时，特使流还是继续，副总统亨利.华莱士到了，罗斯福假装派遣他来就国民党和他的GCD对手间的问题提供帮助，戴维斯解释说，这个使命的真正要点是要使华莱士在外头轻松一下，以便罗斯福能“在即将到来的民主党大会上取消他做竞选搭档一事落实。”华莱士也建议召回高斯和史迪威。
接着华莱士的是任罗斯福“个人经济事务代表”的唐纳德.尼尔森，被免职的战时生产委员会的负责人，总统也不想他呆在华盛顿。哈利.霍普金斯告诉戴维斯，他迷惘的是作为“个人代表”的作为实际上可能占据他自己的空间，但补充说“如果中国人提供四五个女孩子，尼尔森会高兴的－－那能让他保持安静。”
Most disastrous of all of Roosevelt’s envoys was Patrick J. Hurley, an Oklahoma lawyer who had been Herbert Hoover’s secretary of war. An honorary major general in the National Guard who was given to Choctaw war whoops and other “flamboyant displays of mesquite, tomahawk, and six-shooter culture,” he floundered hopelessly as he tried to make peace between the irreconcilable Communists and Nationalists. But, inexplicably, Roosevelt radioed Hurley late in 1944: “Your intimate knowledge of the situation there both from the military and diplomatic stand-points .??.??. eminently qualifies you to be Ambassador to China.” And so it was. Had Roosevelt consciously sought to ruin his China policy through incompetent staff, he could scarcely have done worse.
罗斯福的特使中最具灾难性的是帕特里克.J.赫尔利，一个当过胡佛总统的陆军部长的俄克拉荷马州律师，国民警卫队的名誉少将，其癖好是的印第安式的战斗呐喊和“炫耀梅斯基特，印第安战斧，还有左轮手枪文化（俄克拉俄马州有全美最多的印第安人－－译注）”，他无望的辗转于不可能和解的GCD和国民党之间去作调和，但是，莫名其妙的，罗斯福于1944年末致电赫尔利：“你对那里的军事和外交两方面都很精通.??.??.完全可以胜任驻华大使。”所以事情就这样了。罗斯福有意识地寻求透过不称职的官员去毁灭他的中国政策，他做得不能再差了。
The president’s utterly “dilettantish foreign policy” became even clearer when some of the Americans were treated to an informal session with him:
身边没有有见识的美国人的制约作用存在，罗斯福投入的栽培蒋介石并且征求这位最高统帅的合作去建立一个罗斯福的世界秩序，蒋太太...珠光宝气的...参加一个鸡尾酒会在罗斯福与她丈夫的私人会晤中作口译。
当一些美国人和他在一个非正式会议上被招待时，总统十足的“一知半解的外交政策”甚至变得更明显。
We heard a good deal about his ancestors. The one who went to China, made a million, returned home, lost it in a coal mine investment, went back to China, made another million, went home and put it in railroad stock which did not pay a dividend until two years after his death. Told with much laughter.
Davies and Stilwell left confused and depressed.
我们听到他大谈他的祖上，他的祖上去过中国，发了大财回家，在一个煤矿投资中失败，再次到中国，又发了大财回家，把钱都买了直到他死后两年都不付股息的铁路股票。他大笑着说。
戴维斯和史迪威只有迷茫跟沮丧。
It was part of the politician’s brush-off technique. He never directly came to grips with the real subject at hand—what did he want the General to say to Chiang[?] .??.??. What instructions as to policy toward China did he have?
In the car on the way back to the Mena House hotel, Stilwell “held his head in his hands.”
这是政治家的拒绝技巧的一部分，他从不直接应对手头上真正的主题－－他希望史迪威将军对蒋说什么？ .??.??.他有什么对华政策指示？
在返回米娜宫饭店的汽车里，史迪威“双手抱头”。
When they returned to Chung-king, the flow of emissaries continued. Vice President Henry Wallace arrived. Roosevelt had ostensibly sent him to help with the problems between the Nationalists and their Communist rivals. Davies explains that the real point of the mission was to ease Wallace out of the United States so that Roosevelt could “lay the ground for unloading him as running mate at the upcoming Democratic convention.” Wallace, too, recommended the removal of Gauss and Stilwell.
Following Wallace, and as FDR’s “personal representative for economic matters,” was Donald Nelson, deposed head of the War Production Board, whom the president also did not want in Washington. Harry Hopkins told Davies that he was perplexed as to how the “personal representative” might actually occupy himself, but added that “Nelson would be happy if the Chinese provided him with four or five girls—that would keep him quiet.”
当他们回到重庆时，特使流还是继续，副总统亨利.华莱士到了，罗斯福假装派遣他来就国民党和他的GCD对手间的问题提供帮助，戴维斯解释说，这个使命的真正要点是要使华莱士在外头轻松一下，以便罗斯福能“在即将到来的民主党大会上取消他做竞选搭档一事落实。”华莱士也建议召回高斯和史迪威。
接着华莱士的是任罗斯福“个人经济事务代表”的唐纳德.尼尔森，被免职的战时生产委员会的负责人，总统也不想他呆在华盛顿。哈利.霍普金斯告诉戴维斯，他迷惘的是作为“个人代表”的作为实际上可能占据他自己的空间，但补充说“如果中国人提供四五个女孩子，尼尔森会高兴的－－那能让他保持安静。”
Most disastrous of all of Roosevelt’s envoys was Patrick J. Hurley, an Oklahoma lawyer who had been Herbert Hoover’s secretary of war. An honorary major general in the National Guard who was given to Choctaw war whoops and other “flamboyant displays of mesquite, tomahawk, and six-shooter culture,” he floundered hopelessly as he tried to make peace between the irreconcilable Communists and Nationalists. But, inexplicably, Roosevelt radioed Hurley late in 1944: “Your intimate knowledge of the situation there both from the military and diplomatic stand-points .??.??. eminently qualifies you to be Ambassador to China.” And so it was. Had Roosevelt consciously sought to ruin his China policy through incompetent staff, he could scarcely have done worse.
罗斯福的特使中最具灾难性的是帕特里克.J.赫尔利，一个当过胡佛总统的陆军部长的俄克拉荷马州律师，国民警卫队的名誉少将，其癖好是的印第安式的战斗呐喊和“炫耀梅斯基特，印第安战斧，还有左轮手枪文化（俄克拉俄马州有全美最多的印第安人－－译注）”，他无望的辗转于不可能和解的GCD和国民党之间去作调和，但是，莫名其妙的，罗斯福于1944年末致电赫尔利：“你对那里的军事和外交两方面都很精通.??.??.完全可以胜任驻华大使。”所以事情就这样了。罗斯福有意识地寻求透过不称职的官员去毁灭他的中国政策，他做得不能再差了。
As Davies reflected, contemplating the sorry group of political outcasts with whom he had to work, “China is apparently to the American political scene what Siberia is to the Russians. Only, Roosevelt’s technique is quicker and more humane.”
Eventually, Stilwell was replaced by General Albert C. Wedemeyer, and Davies went to Moscow. Relations between the Chinese and Americans in Chungking became less “rancid,” but the basic problems remained, particularly that of Soviet ambitions.
戴维斯的反应是，注视着这群他不得不一起工作的可悲的政治弃儿，“显然，中国对美国的政治舞台而言就象西伯利亚对于俄罗斯，只是，罗斯福的手法更快更仁慈。”
最后，史迪威被阿尔伯特.魏德迈将军替换，戴维斯去了莫斯科，在重庆的中美联系变得少了些“讨厌”，但是基本问题仍然存在，尤其是苏联的野心。
To Davies’s disgust, the dying Roosevelt had, at Yalta in February 1945, endorsed Stalin’s postwar occupation of Manchuria, something on which Chiang would have choked, given that Japanese annexation of the territory had been the cause of war with Japan in the first place. Moreover, as Davies observes, Stalin would have taken it in any case; blessing such an action served no American end.
Davies understood, as well, that Soviet-occupied Manchuria would become a sanctuary for the Chinese Communists, and perhaps a Soviet client state, the possibility of which FDR seemed entirely unaware of. So thoroughly did Yalta shred the myth of China as one of the Big Four—a myth Roosevelt had been at pains to preserve—that a typical Rooseveltian ruse had to be invoked: Chiang was not to be told of the agreement’s full contents until the time was judged right.
出于对戴维斯的厌恶，在1945年2月的雅尔塔会议上，老迈的罗斯福赞同斯大林在战后占领满洲，考虑到日本对这块领土的侵占是最初的对日战争的起因，这是会让蒋窒息的事情，此外，按戴维斯的观察，斯大林无论如何都将把它拿走，并祈祷这一行动没有美国的参与。
戴维斯也明白，苏联占领的满洲会变成中共的避难所，或者苏联的附庸国，罗斯福好似完全没有意识到这个可能性，所以完全执行了雅尔塔协议，实际上这个协议粉碎了把中国作为四大强国之一这个神话－－这个神话是罗斯福已经尽力去维持的－－一个典型的罗斯福式的诡计不得不被调用：蒋没有被告知协议的全部内容，直到时机被判断合适。
As it turned out, the Nationalist attempt to retake Manchuria in the first phase of the Chinese Civil War would prove their strategic undoing, the great mistake that led to the loss not only of that territory, but of the rest of China as well.
作为它带来的结果，国民党试图在中国内战的第一阶段收回满洲证实是他们的战略祸根，这个大错导致的损失不仅仅是那块领土，还有中国其余的地方。
Here we are brought, finally, to the once-politically-explosive question of what, if anything, the United States might have done differently that could have helped spare China the bitter fate of Communist rule, which Mao’s biographer Jung Chang estimates cost some 70 million lives. Questions over this ruined Davies’s career; we cannot leave the man without considering them.
最终，这带给我们一个有朝一日会爆炸的政治问题，如果有可能，美国可以做点不同的事去帮助中国免于GCD统治的痛苦命运，毛的传记作者张戎对此的估计是大约7000万人的生命代价。问题是这毁了戴维斯的事业，我们在考虑他们之外不能遗忘这个人。
Like many China hands of his generation, both diplomats and journalists, John Paton Davies certainly had a higher opinion of the Communists than he did of the Nationalists. The Nationalists he knew intimately, at first-hand, in intrigue-ridden and climatically oppressive Chungking. The Communists he knew more through reports and through one visit he made to their wartime redoubt, Yenan (now Yan’an) in the Loess Plateau region of the northwest, where bracing clear weather was more the order.
就象他那一代的许多中国通，无论是外交官还是新闻记者，戴维斯确实对GCD比对国民党有一个更高的评价，在充斥着阴谋诡计和气氛压抑的重庆，他对国民党有第一手的深入了解，他了解GCD更多的是通过报道和通过对他们的战时根据地延安的一次访问，延安坐落在中国西北部的黄土高原地区，那里空气清新，令人振奋，更有秩序。
Moreover, Davies was convinced that what was happening in China was more than a war. As he later put it when explaining why a Marshall Plan could not save the Nationalists in China as it did Western Europe, the country was in the throes of a “profound political, economic, and social revolution.” For that reason, Davies never saw Chiang as personally responsible for the problems of his government. Their ultimate source was China’s obsolete social and political structure, which would frustrate any attempt at mobilization or national reconstruction. Chiang was “a captive of the sorry forces he manipulated.”
此外，戴维斯确信中国大地上正在发生的不止是一场战争，正如他后来在解释为何马歇尔计划不能象在西欧那样在中国挽救国民党时所说的，这个国家是处在“深刻的政治，经济和社会革命”的剧痛之中，鉴于此，戴维斯从未见到蒋为他的政府的问题负上个人责任，它们的根源是中国陈腐的社会和政治结构，它会挫败任何在国家重建和动员方面的尝试，蒋是“一个他掌握的可悲的部队的迷恋者。”
Eventually, Stilwell was replaced by General Albert C. Wedemeyer, and Davies went to Moscow. Relations between the Chinese and Americans in Chungking became less “rancid,” but the basic problems remained, particularly that of Soviet ambitions.
戴维斯的反应是，注视着这群他不得不一起工作的可悲的政治弃儿，“显然，中国对美国的政治舞台而言就象西伯利亚对于俄罗斯，只是，罗斯福的手法更快更仁慈。”
最后，史迪威被阿尔伯特.魏德迈将军替换，戴维斯去了莫斯科，在重庆的中美联系变得少了些“讨厌”，但是基本问题仍然存在，尤其是苏联的野心。
To Davies’s disgust, the dying Roosevelt had, at Yalta in February 1945, endorsed Stalin’s postwar occupation of Manchuria, something on which Chiang would have choked, given that Japanese annexation of the territory had been the cause of war with Japan in the first place. Moreover, as Davies observes, Stalin would have taken it in any case; blessing such an action served no American end.
Davies understood, as well, that Soviet-occupied Manchuria would become a sanctuary for the Chinese Communists, and perhaps a Soviet client state, the possibility of which FDR seemed entirely unaware of. So thoroughly did Yalta shred the myth of China as one of the Big Four—a myth Roosevelt had been at pains to preserve—that a typical Rooseveltian ruse had to be invoked: Chiang was not to be told of the agreement’s full contents until the time was judged right.
出于对戴维斯的厌恶，在1945年2月的雅尔塔会议上，老迈的罗斯福赞同斯大林在战后占领满洲，考虑到日本对这块领土的侵占是最初的对日战争的起因，这是会让蒋窒息的事情，此外，按戴维斯的观察，斯大林无论如何都将把它拿走，并祈祷这一行动没有美国的参与。
戴维斯也明白，苏联占领的满洲会变成中共的避难所，或者苏联的附庸国，罗斯福好似完全没有意识到这个可能性，所以完全执行了雅尔塔协议，实际上这个协议粉碎了把中国作为四大强国之一这个神话－－这个神话是罗斯福已经尽力去维持的－－一个典型的罗斯福式的诡计不得不被调用：蒋没有被告知协议的全部内容，直到时机被判断合适。
As it turned out, the Nationalist attempt to retake Manchuria in the first phase of the Chinese Civil War would prove their strategic undoing, the great mistake that led to the loss not only of that territory, but of the rest of China as well.
作为它带来的结果，国民党试图在中国内战的第一阶段收回满洲证实是他们的战略祸根，这个大错导致的损失不仅仅是那块领土，还有中国其余的地方。
Here we are brought, finally, to the once-politically-explosive question of what, if anything, the United States might have done differently that could have helped spare China the bitter fate of Communist rule, which Mao’s biographer Jung Chang estimates cost some 70 million lives. Questions over this ruined Davies’s career; we cannot leave the man without considering them.
最终，这带给我们一个有朝一日会爆炸的政治问题，如果有可能，美国可以做点不同的事去帮助中国免于GCD统治的痛苦命运，毛的传记作者张戎对此的估计是大约7000万人的生命代价。问题是这毁了戴维斯的事业，我们在考虑他们之外不能遗忘这个人。
Like many China hands of his generation, both diplomats and journalists, John Paton Davies certainly had a higher opinion of the Communists than he did of the Nationalists. The Nationalists he knew intimately, at first-hand, in intrigue-ridden and climatically oppressive Chungking. The Communists he knew more through reports and through one visit he made to their wartime redoubt, Yenan (now Yan’an) in the Loess Plateau region of the northwest, where bracing clear weather was more the order.
就象他那一代的许多中国通，无论是外交官还是新闻记者，戴维斯确实对GCD比对国民党有一个更高的评价，在充斥着阴谋诡计和气氛压抑的重庆，他对国民党有第一手的深入了解，他了解GCD更多的是通过报道和通过对他们的战时根据地延安的一次访问，延安坐落在中国西北部的黄土高原地区，那里空气清新，令人振奋，更有秩序。
Moreover, Davies was convinced that what was happening in China was more than a war. As he later put it when explaining why a Marshall Plan could not save the Nationalists in China as it did Western Europe, the country was in the throes of a “profound political, economic, and social revolution.” For that reason, Davies never saw Chiang as personally responsible for the problems of his government. Their ultimate source was China’s obsolete social and political structure, which would frustrate any attempt at mobilization or national reconstruction. Chiang was “a captive of the sorry forces he manipulated.”
此外，戴维斯确信中国大地上正在发生的不止是一场战争，正如他后来在解释为何马歇尔计划不能象在西欧那样在中国挽救国民党时所说的，这个国家是处在“深刻的政治，经济和社会革命”的剧痛之中，鉴于此，戴维斯从未见到蒋为他的政府的问题负上个人责任，它们的根源是中国陈腐的社会和政治结构，它会挫败任何在国家重建和动员方面的尝试，蒋是“一个他掌握的可悲的部队的迷恋者。”
Davies supported the creation of the American observer mission in Yenan in July 1944, and the supply of weapons to the Communists as well as to the Nationalists. While in China, he took Communist affirmations of pro-American and democratic principles seriously enough to consider whether it might be possible to wean them from Moscow and win them over. He was distressed, when Mao and his colleague Zhou Enlai expressed a desire to visit the United States, that Roosevelt took no action: Any contact with the Communists ran afoul of the generalissimo.
在1944年7月，戴维斯支持在延安创建美国观察团，和对GCD进行与国民党一样的武器供应，当在中国时，他认为GCD亲美的事实和其民主原则已确实足以去让人考虑是否有可能让他们与莫斯科断奶并把他们争取过来，他很痛苦，当毛和他的同事周恩来表达了访问美国的愿望时，罗斯福毫无回应：任何与GCD的联系都与最高统帅相冲突。
The Communists were not only more modern than the Nationalists, thought Davies, they were also less autocratic. Late in 1945, when Davies was already in Moscow, Mao had given Reuters an interview in which he promised a fully democratic, secret-ballot, multi-party system should he come to power. Many foreigners were persuaded by this. So, too, were Chinese. Davies saw the Communists trending toward “more or less democratic nationalism.”
戴维斯认为，GCD不仅比国民党更具现代思想，他们也少于专制。1945年末，当戴维斯已在莫斯科时，毛接受了路透社的采访，采访中他承诺了一个完全民主的，秘密投票的多党制体制，他应该能上台。许多外国人都相信这个，的确如此，也包括中国人。戴维斯认为GCD人倾向于“或多或少的民主主义”。
Such views were widespread at the time, particularly within the Foreign Service and among those associated with General Stilwell. They were, as is clear with more information today, incorrect in certain ways. But they were long influential. John Fairbank, who taught this reviewer at Harvard, had come to the same conclusions during his time with the OSS in China, confessing to a close colleague, “I’ve supported these people since the 1940s.” (His break with the Communists came only with the Tiananmen massacre of 1989.)
这样的见解在那时是普遍的，尤其在驻外事务处内部和那些与史迪威将军有关联的人之中，因为今天有更多的信息得以批露，在某些方面他们是错误的，但是他们的影响很长远。在哈佛执教的约翰.费正清在中国任职于OSS时，也得出了同样的结论，他向亲近的同事坦承，“我从1940年代就支持这些人了”（他因为XX事件切断了与GCD的来往）。
The positive view of Chinese communism was largely silenced in America during and after the McCarthy period, only to regain life as controversy mounted over the Vietnam war. In 1972, the journalist Barbara Tuchman won the Pulitzer Prize for her Stilwell and the American Experience in China: 1911-1945, very much the right book at the right time. There, and even more explicitly in a 1972 article in Foreign Affairs (“If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives”), Tuchman argued that, by failing to embrace Mao and his colleagues in the war and its immediate aftermath, the United States had lost the chance to help power a liberal, modernizing, and pro-Western People’s Republic of China, while avoiding the wars in Korea and Vietnam.
在美国的麦卡锡时代期间及以后，对中国的共产主义的正面评价大部分是沉默的，唯一的复活是在对越南战争问题进行争论时。在1972年，新闻工作者芭芭拉·塔奇曼以她的“史迪威与美国的在中国的经验：1911－1945”获得了普利策奖，这是在正确的时间出现的非常正确的书，那时，甚至有一篇更坦率的1972年的外交事务的文章（“如果毛来到了华盛顿：一个可供选择的尝试”）。塔奇曼认为，因为在战争时期和它的余波期失于去拥抱毛和他的同事，美国已经丧失了机会去帮助建立起一个自由主义的，现代化的，亲西方的中华人民共和国，其间也可以避免在朝鲜和越南的战争。
Davies’s wartime writings, along with those of some of his colleagues, became fundamental texts of this view—which, for a while, ruled among academics and the American foreign policy elite. Davies, however, never embraced the “lost chance.” Clearly, he was bitter about the bungling of the Roosevelt administration, with its single-minded concentration on the Nationalists—not to mention its disgraceful treatment of him. But readers of this volume will clearly understand that Davies’s primary concern was keeping the Soviet Union from extending its sway into northern China, possibly even to Peking, and forestalling the emergence of a Sino-Soviet bloc.
戴维斯的战时作品，与他的同事们的那些一起，成为了这些观点的基本文字资料－－这些，在当时，在学术界和美国外交政策的精英中居于支配地位，然而，戴维斯从未拥有过这个“失去的机会”，显然，他的痛苦来自于罗斯福政府拙劣的外交政策，及此政策中对国民党的专一－－更别提对他的可耻的对待了。但是这本书籍的读者将会明白，戴维斯主要关心的是防止苏联扩张它的影响至中国北部，甚至可能到北京，预防一个中苏集团的出现。
Thus, he writes:
因此，他写到：
Davies supported the creation of the American observer mission in Yenan in July 1944, and the supply of weapons to the Communists as well as to the Nationalists. While in China, he took Communist affirmations of pro-American and democratic principles seriously enough to consider whether it might be possible to wean them from Moscow and win them over. He was distressed, when Mao and his colleague Zhou Enlai expressed a desire to visit the United States, that Roosevelt took no action: Any contact with the Communists ran afoul of the generalissimo.
在1944年7月，戴维斯支持在延安创建美国观察团，和对GCD进行与国民党一样的武器供应，当在中国时，他认为GCD亲美的事实和其民主原则已确实足以去让人考虑是否有可能让他们与莫斯科断奶并把他们争取过来，他很痛苦，当毛和他的同事周恩来表达了访问美国的愿望时，罗斯福毫无回应：任何与GCD的联系都与最高统帅相冲突。
The Communists were not only more modern than the Nationalists, thought Davies, they were also less autocratic. Late in 1945, when Davies was already in Moscow, Mao had given Reuters an interview in which he promised a fully democratic, secret-ballot, multi-party system should he come to power. Many foreigners were persuaded by this. So, too, were Chinese. Davies saw the Communists trending toward “more or less democratic nationalism.”
戴维斯认为，GCD不仅比国民党更具现代思想，他们也少于专制。1945年末，当戴维斯已在莫斯科时，毛接受了路透社的采访，采访中他承诺了一个完全民主的，秘密投票的多党制体制，他应该能上台。许多外国人都相信这个，的确如此，也包括中国人。戴维斯认为GCD人倾向于“或多或少的民主主义”。
Such views were widespread at the time, particularly within the Foreign Service and among those associated with General Stilwell. They were, as is clear with more information today, incorrect in certain ways. But they were long influential. John Fairbank, who taught this reviewer at Harvard, had come to the same conclusions during his time with the OSS in China, confessing to a close colleague, “I’ve supported these people since the 1940s.” (His break with the Communists came only with the Tiananmen massacre of 1989.)
这样的见解在那时是普遍的，尤其在驻外事务处内部和那些与史迪威将军有关联的人之中，因为今天有更多的信息得以批露，在某些方面他们是错误的，但是他们的影响很长远。在哈佛执教的约翰.费正清在中国任职于OSS时，也得出了同样的结论，他向亲近的同事坦承，“我从1940年代就支持这些人了”（他因为XX事件切断了与GCD的来往）。
The positive view of Chinese communism was largely silenced in America during and after the McCarthy period, only to regain life as controversy mounted over the Vietnam war. In 1972, the journalist Barbara Tuchman won the Pulitzer Prize for her Stilwell and the American Experience in China: 1911-1945, very much the right book at the right time. There, and even more explicitly in a 1972 article in Foreign Affairs (“If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives”), Tuchman argued that, by failing to embrace Mao and his colleagues in the war and its immediate aftermath, the United States had lost the chance to help power a liberal, modernizing, and pro-Western People’s Republic of China, while avoiding the wars in Korea and Vietnam.
在美国的麦卡锡时代期间及以后，对中国的共产主义的正面评价大部分是沉默的，唯一的复活是在对越南战争问题进行争论时。在1972年，新闻工作者芭芭拉·塔奇曼以她的“史迪威与美国的在中国的经验：1911－1945”获得了普利策奖，这是在正确的时间出现的非常正确的书，那时，甚至有一篇更坦率的1972年的外交事务的文章（“如果毛来到了华盛顿：一个可供选择的尝试”）。塔奇曼认为，因为在战争时期和它的余波期失于去拥抱毛和他的同事，美国已经丧失了机会去帮助建立起一个自由主义的，现代化的，亲西方的中华人民共和国，其间也可以避免在朝鲜和越南的战争。
Davies’s wartime writings, along with those of some of his colleagues, became fundamental texts of this view—which, for a while, ruled among academics and the American foreign policy elite. Davies, however, never embraced the “lost chance.” Clearly, he was bitter about the bungling of the Roosevelt administration, with its single-minded concentration on the Nationalists—not to mention its disgraceful treatment of him. But readers of this volume will clearly understand that Davies’s primary concern was keeping the Soviet Union from extending its sway into northern China, possibly even to Peking, and forestalling the emergence of a Sino-Soviet bloc.
戴维斯的战时作品，与他的同事们的那些一起，成为了这些观点的基本文字资料－－这些，在当时，在学术界和美国外交政策的精英中居于支配地位，然而，戴维斯从未拥有过这个“失去的机会”，显然，他的痛苦来自于罗斯福政府拙劣的外交政策，及此政策中对国民党的专一－－更别提对他的可耻的对待了。但是这本书籍的读者将会明白，戴维斯主要关心的是防止苏联扩张它的影响至中国北部，甚至可能到北京，预防一个中苏集团的出现。
Thus, he writes:
因此，他写到：
In retrospect, the idea of politically capturing the Chinese Communists was unrealistic. It reflected my underestimation of the Communists’ commitment to ideology. Better grounded was the calculation that American aid to the Chinese Communists, who I assumed would take over China in any event, could free them of material dependence on the Soviet Union and thereby reduce the Kremlin’s influence on them.
回顾往事，从政治上夺得中国GCD的主意是不切实际的，它反映了我对GCD人的恪守意识形态的承诺估计不足，最好应基于美国援助中国GCD来推算，我假定不管如何他们将会接管中国，那能使他们免于依赖苏联的物资，从而减少克里姆林宫对他们的影响。
China Hand is absorbing reading, characterized by a clear style, rigorous and razor-sharp analysis, and steady irony. It is also a very important contribution to the underresearched history of American China policy in wartime. Davies’s story suggests that the roots of the Cold War in Asia lie very much in failing, from the outset, to consider the postwar interaction of the Soviet Union and China. He does not say it, but others have observed that if Washington and Moscow had agreed on clear spheres of influence in China (and Korea), as they did in Europe—in effect partitioning China and confining its leaders to set postwar zones (roughly the Communists to Manchuria, the Nationalists to the south)—a far more stable and less troubled region would have been the result.
中国通正在吸引阅读（者），清晰的风格是其特点，（还有）严密而犀利的分析和一贯的讽刺，它对研究不足的战时美中政策的历史也是一大贡献。戴维斯的故事提示亚洲的冷战根源的谎言非常失败，从一开始，它就考虑到了战后苏联与中国的相互作用。他没有说出来，但别人已经看出，如果华盛顿和莫斯科同意明确在中国（和朝鲜）的势力范围，如同他们在欧洲所做的－－实质上把中国分区并限制它的领导人去设置战后的地盘（大致上满洲归GCD，南方归国民党）－－一个稳定得多并少有动乱的地区将会产生。
Franklin Roosevelt thought of China as a power already securely held by “Shang.” But John Paton Davies recognized how tenuous was the generalissimo’s hold on power, while understanding as well that once the Japanese were defeated, China would become a power vacuum, tempting to Moscow, and beyond the capability of the Nationalists to control. In that sense, the collapse of China into communism was aided by the incompetence of Roosevelt’s policy.
富兰克林.罗斯福认为中国作为一个强国已经被“商”牢固的掌握着，但是戴维斯意识到这位最高统帅掌握的权力是多么的脆弱，虽然也懂得一旦日本战败，中国将成为一个权力真空，（这里存在）莫斯科的诱惑，以及国民党的控制能力以外（的事）。在这层意义上，中国转入共产主义的崩溃是罗斯福的政策不当促进的。
But China Hand must be digested by anyone interested in China, then or now. We still live, after all, in an age of myth about China.
但是中国通（的文章）应当被任何对中国有兴趣的人领悟吸收，抚今追昔。毕竟，我们仍然生活在一个关于中国的神话时代。
Arthur Waldron, Lauder professor of international relations at the University of Pennsylvania, is the author of several works on China, and the editor, most recently, of China in Africa.
亚瑟.沃尔德伦，宾夕法尼亚大学国际关系学兰黛教授，是数篇关于中国的作品的作者和编辑，最近的是中国在非洲一书。
回顾往事，从政治上夺得中国GCD的主意是不切实际的，它反映了我对GCD人的恪守意识形态的承诺估计不足，最好应基于美国援助中国GCD来推算，我假定不管如何他们将会接管中国，那能使他们免于依赖苏联的物资，从而减少克里姆林宫对他们的影响。
China Hand is absorbing reading, characterized by a clear style, rigorous and razor-sharp analysis, and steady irony. It is also a very important contribution to the underresearched history of American China policy in wartime. Davies’s story suggests that the roots of the Cold War in Asia lie very much in failing, from the outset, to consider the postwar interaction of the Soviet Union and China. He does not say it, but others have observed that if Washington and Moscow had agreed on clear spheres of influence in China (and Korea), as they did in Europe—in effect partitioning China and confining its leaders to set postwar zones (roughly the Communists to Manchuria, the Nationalists to the south)—a far more stable and less troubled region would have been the result.
中国通正在吸引阅读（者），清晰的风格是其特点，（还有）严密而犀利的分析和一贯的讽刺，它对研究不足的战时美中政策的历史也是一大贡献。戴维斯的故事提示亚洲的冷战根源的谎言非常失败，从一开始，它就考虑到了战后苏联与中国的相互作用。他没有说出来，但别人已经看出，如果华盛顿和莫斯科同意明确在中国（和朝鲜）的势力范围，如同他们在欧洲所做的－－实质上把中国分区并限制它的领导人去设置战后的地盘（大致上满洲归GCD，南方归国民党）－－一个稳定得多并少有动乱的地区将会产生。
Franklin Roosevelt thought of China as a power already securely held by “Shang.” But John Paton Davies recognized how tenuous was the generalissimo’s hold on power, while understanding as well that once the Japanese were defeated, China would become a power vacuum, tempting to Moscow, and beyond the capability of the Nationalists to control. In that sense, the collapse of China into communism was aided by the incompetence of Roosevelt’s policy.
富兰克林.罗斯福认为中国作为一个强国已经被“商”牢固的掌握着，但是戴维斯意识到这位最高统帅掌握的权力是多么的脆弱，虽然也懂得一旦日本战败，中国将成为一个权力真空，（这里存在）莫斯科的诱惑，以及国民党的控制能力以外（的事）。在这层意义上，中国转入共产主义的崩溃是罗斯福的政策不当促进的。
But China Hand must be digested by anyone interested in China, then or now. We still live, after all, in an age of myth about China.
但是中国通（的文章）应当被任何对中国有兴趣的人领悟吸收，抚今追昔。毕竟，我们仍然生活在一个关于中国的神话时代。
Arthur Waldron, Lauder professor of international relations at the University of Pennsylvania, is the author of several works on China, and the editor, most recently, of China in Africa.
亚瑟.沃尔德伦，宾夕法尼亚大学国际关系学兰黛教授，是数篇关于中国的作品的作者和编辑，最近的是中国在非洲一书。
确定不是机翻？...
花生米。。 蒋公有这绰号啊。。
党首被称为花生米 要是建国了 那不整个党派称为米党？ 果然一脉相承
罗斯福高看空一格倒不是坏事，不然TG那来五大流氓的位置
MARX 发表于 2013-5-28 05:24 
花生米。。 蒋公有这绰号啊。。
难道是花生米夫人告诉戴维斯的...
花生米。。 蒋公有这绰号啊。。
难道是花生米夫人告诉戴维斯的...
lost应该翻译做失败吧？
如果大家看《美国人和中国共产党人》这本书就会了解40年代TG和美国观察组的交往了。
通篇都是援助，影响，甚至分治，归根到底都是从美国的利益出发。可我认为，目前的格局就是从中国利益出发的最佳格局。
MD后悔莫及啊。
Chiang Kai-shek，总算明白了常凯申这个名字是怎么来的了。
翻译的太晦涩了，读起来感觉在啃皮带。不过还是能感觉到当时在华的美国人对国共双方有比较清醒的认识，这评论里的部分内容可以拿去打国粉的脸。
看起来各种错乱...
反正校长说美帝不给力，美帝说校长不给力。狗咬狗而已
翻译不行，完全没整明白。
确定不是机翻？...
看来不止我一个人有这种感觉啊。
看来不止我一个人有这种感觉啊。
确定不是机翻？...
别逗，你确定你语文是语文老师教的？这样的文章还机翻？
别逗，你确定你语文是语文老师教的？这样的文章还机翻？
没有接触gcd 来影响他们走向和美国交好的道路？
打脸好材料，楼主谢谢啊
老美没有殖民的传统，其次中国太大及人口众多，援助力有不逮。
通篇都在为美国对华政策失败找替罪羊，最后找到了——美国历史上最伟大的、一举奠定美国日后国际地位的总统。这种书之所以会出现，是因为一个日渐强大、有可能取代美国的国际地位的、且不听命于美国的中国让很多美国精英感觉到了极大的失落，于是忍不住要出来想当年，接着泛酸和吐槽一番，吐着吐着就吐到老罗身上了。说到对华政策的失败，怎么轮也轮不到罗斯福来背这个黑锅啊。说到底，老美还是对于为什么失败没想明白。MD二战后在的中国政策失败，主要原因不是凯申公，而是老毛（周相也相当重要）。
翻译渣渣…来自: Android客户端
翻译成迷失会不会好一点。。
罗斯福虽然是美国历史上最伟大的总统，但是他在中国问题上却拒绝接受他委派到中国来的，两个最重要工作人员史迪威和戴维斯的意见，不得不说伟人也有犯错的时候，不过这对中国很好，至少中国避免成为了第二个日本的命运！
翻译成司徒雷登不是要熟悉点
饱食而乱喷 发表于 2013-5-28 03:28
In retrospect, the idea of politically capturing the Chinese Communists was unrealistic. It reflecte ...
本文是评述曾经的美国外交官、中国通 戴维斯的 回忆录。
但是，作为美国的专家，居然引用一个叫张戎的女人编造的历史。
可见，美国的这些专家是多么的不靠谱。
我无意冒犯超大的文科出生的网友，但我不得不说。
在中国，专家的名声被范文科的专家们毁了；美国，范文科专家也不遑多让。
究其原因——人文社科领域对智商的分辨率不高。
我不是说人文社科领域研究不需要智商，而是即使智商不高，也能在该领域混。
Here we are brought, finally, to the once-politically-explosive question of what, if anything, the United States might have done differently that could have helped spare China the bitter fate of Communist rule, which Mao’s biographer Jung Chang estimates cost some 70 million lives. Questions over this ruined Davies’s career; we cannot leave the man without considering them.
最终，这带给我们一个有朝一日会爆炸的政治问题，如果有可能，美国可以做点不同的事去帮助中国免于GCD统治的痛苦命运，毛的传记作者张戎对此的估计是大约7000万人的生命代价。问题是这毁了戴维斯的事业，我们在考虑他们之外不能遗忘这个人。
In retrospect, the idea of politically capturing the Chinese Communists was unrealistic. It reflecte ...
本文是评述曾经的美国外交官、中国通 戴维斯的 回忆录。
但是，作为美国的专家，居然引用一个叫张戎的女人编造的历史。
可见，美国的这些专家是多么的不靠谱。
我无意冒犯超大的文科出生的网友，但我不得不说。
在中国，专家的名声被范文科的专家们毁了；美国，范文科专家也不遑多让。
究其原因——人文社科领域对智商的分辨率不高。
我不是说人文社科领域研究不需要智商，而是即使智商不高，也能在该领域混。
Here we are brought, finally, to the once-politically-explosive question of what, if anything, the United States might have done differently that could have helped spare China the bitter fate of Communist rule, which Mao’s biographer Jung Chang estimates cost some 70 million lives. Questions over this ruined Davies’s career; we cannot leave the man without considering them.
最终，这带给我们一个有朝一日会爆炸的政治问题，如果有可能，美国可以做点不同的事去帮助中国免于GCD统治的痛苦命运，毛的传记作者张戎对此的估计是大约7000万人的生命代价。问题是这毁了戴维斯的事业，我们在考虑他们之外不能遗忘这个人。
adolfhi 发表于 2013-5-28 06:19
lost应该翻译做失败吧？
这里应理解为失去
文章的意思是，美国原本有机会把中国变成一个像现在的ww那样听话的的走狗，但他们丢失了这个机会，中国成了中国人的中国。
adolfhi 发表于 2013-5-28 06:19
lost应该翻译做失败吧？
这里应理解为失去
文章的意思是，美国原本有机会把中国变成一个像现在的ww那样听话的的走狗，但他们丢失了这个机会，中国成了中国人的中国。
中国本来也不是美国的，谈不上失去。
大执政官 发表于 2013-5-28 09:57
通篇都在为美国对华政策失败找替罪羊，最后找到了——美国历史上最伟大的、一举奠定美国日后国际地位的总统 ...
MD二战后在中国的政策失败，归根结底是因其自私自利。
MD希望中国成为一个大而不强的
商品倾销基地的（美国成为金融帝国之前）
能为美国提供廉价劳动力（美国成为金融帝国之后）
的国家。
即便是在极度亲美的猫总统治时期，美国也掩饰不了希望中国崩溃做其附庸的贪婪卑劣本性。
三婊时代，美帝依然不放过这个资产阶级的代理人，几度打脸。
直到胡哥时期，中国才回国神——美国忘我弱我之心从未死过。
而中国，不出现毛泽东，会出现李泽东、刘泽东——中华文化决定了中国不会甘做小弟，
也不会长期隐忍一个流氓的欺负。
通篇都在为美国对华政策失败找替罪羊，最后找到了——美国历史上最伟大的、一举奠定美国日后国际地位的总统 ...
MD二战后在中国的政策失败，归根结底是因其自私自利。
MD希望中国成为一个大而不强的
商品倾销基地的（美国成为金融帝国之前）
能为美国提供廉价劳动力（美国成为金融帝国之后）
的国家。
即便是在极度亲美的猫总统治时期，美国也掩饰不了希望中国崩溃做其附庸的贪婪卑劣本性。
三婊时代，美帝依然不放过这个资产阶级的代理人，几度打脸。
直到胡哥时期，中国才回国神——美国忘我弱我之心从未死过。
而中国，不出现毛泽东，会出现李泽东、刘泽东——中华文化决定了中国不会甘做小弟，
也不会长期隐忍一个流氓的欺负。
建议把英文和中文集中分割，别一段段的分，看着眼晕
MARX 发表于 2013-5-28 05:24
花生米。。 蒋公有这绰号啊。。
史迪威到任不久，委员长就中国武装力量的使用问题发表了两个小时的演讲，让总参谋长感到目瞪口呆。按蒋的说法，在战术上，要用三个中国师对付一个日本师。如果日本人发起进攻，则要用五个中国师去对付一个日本师。蒋命令史迪威稳妥行事，让日本人采取主动。只有当日本人的攻势停下来，开始后撤时，中国军队才能发起反击。蒋警告史迪威，在任何情况下都不要集结部队。如果中国军队一集结便会立刻被歼灭。史迪威则主张用纵深防御战术，即部队要一个方阵接一个方阵连续出击，距离不超过50公里。蒋对他的部队战斗力的估计也许是正确的，但他的观点与美国的军事理论完全相悖。美国的军事理论强调进攻而不允许把部队化整为零，削弱其战斗力。史迪威是一位战术专家，对蒋有意放弃主动性感到特别生气。由此开始，史迪威与蒋介石的关系日趋恶化甚至彼此都不存幻想。“什么命令!”史迪威在日记中写道：“一头蠢驴!”。史迪威喜欢给被他瞧不起的人取绰号。他为中国战区最高统帅精心挑选的绰号是“花生”(注：“花生”一词在美国口语中指“无聊的人”)。史迪威正要着手把毫无基础的杂牌部队建设成有效的战斗力量一一这是一项近乎不可能的任务，一一一项更加不可能的工作又落到他头上。
花生米。。 蒋公有这绰号啊。。
史迪威到任不久，委员长就中国武装力量的使用问题发表了两个小时的演讲，让总参谋长感到目瞪口呆。按蒋的说法，在战术上，要用三个中国师对付一个日本师。如果日本人发起进攻，则要用五个中国师去对付一个日本师。蒋命令史迪威稳妥行事，让日本人采取主动。只有当日本人的攻势停下来，开始后撤时，中国军队才能发起反击。蒋警告史迪威，在任何情况下都不要集结部队。如果中国军队一集结便会立刻被歼灭。史迪威则主张用纵深防御战术，即部队要一个方阵接一个方阵连续出击，距离不超过50公里。蒋对他的部队战斗力的估计也许是正确的，但他的观点与美国的军事理论完全相悖。美国的军事理论强调进攻而不允许把部队化整为零，削弱其战斗力。史迪威是一位战术专家，对蒋有意放弃主动性感到特别生气。由此开始，史迪威与蒋介石的关系日趋恶化甚至彼此都不存幻想。“什么命令!”史迪威在日记中写道：“一头蠢驴!”。史迪威喜欢给被他瞧不起的人取绰号。他为中国战区最高统帅精心挑选的绰号是“花生”(注：“花生”一词在美国口语中指“无聊的人”)。史迪威正要着手把毫无基础的杂牌部队建设成有效的战斗力量一一这是一项近乎不可能的任务，一一一项更加不可能的工作又落到他头上。
中国难道是属于美国的？
名字是越来越多了啊