纽约时报名记撰文称钓鱼岛是日本盗窃中国所得的甲午战争 ...

纽约时报著名记者尼古拉斯·克里斯托夫5日在纽约时报官方博客上撰文，称钓鱼岛是日本甲午战争的战利品，是从中国盗窃所得，日本驻纽约总领事15日当面向该记者抗议，16日召开记者会表示抗议。
http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20130117-00000384-yom-soci

「尖閣は日本の戦利品」と書いた米記者に抗議
読売新聞 1月17日(木)10時35分配信
　【ニューヨーク＝柳沢亨之】当地の日本総領事館は１６日、尖閣諸島は日本の「戦利品」とする記事を書いた米紙ニューヨーク・タイムズの著名コラムニスト、ニコラス・クリストフ氏に抗議した、と発表した。

　記事は５日付同紙ブログに掲載され、「日本は（日清戦争の）戦利品として事実上（中国から尖閣を）盗んだ」と主張。また、尖閣に「領土問題は存在しない」とする日本政府の立場を「ばかげている」とした。

　これに対し総領事館の川村泰久首席領事が１５日、同氏と面会。「戦利品」との主張は「事実に反する」と抗議し、日本政府の立場についても「国際法上、正当だ」とした。同氏は日本側との意見交換を続けたいと述べるにとどまったという。

附上52楼mandman提供的这篇文章英文版全文：
http ://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/chinas-new-leader-and-the-islands-dispute/

China’s New Leader, and the Islands Dispute

By NICHOLAS KRISTOF

My Sunday column, probably the last from this China trip, looks at the new Chinese paramount leader, Xi Jinping, and offers a pretty optimistic take about what may happen in the next 10 years under his leadership. I should acknowledge that plenty of Chinese disagree with me and think that Xi will be another drip like President Hu Jintao. But let me cling to my optimism as long as I can — and I welcome your views as well.

If I’d had more space in the column, I would have discussed the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute at greater length, because there is some risk that this will escalate out of control and even trigger a war.

Neither Japan nor China wants a war, and both would like to return to the previous status quo when it was a back-burner disagreement put off for future generations to resolve. That was Deng Xiaoping’s take, and he was exactly right: the issue is much too toxic to resolve now, so it needs to be deferred. But both Japan and China perceive that the other has escalated, and each feels the need to respond. Each country is led by a more self-confident assertive leader who feels the need to show he’s boss. Another worry: Japan and the United States are convinced that if a conflict did erupt, Japan would destroy the Chinese navy or air force assets sent to the area; some people in the Chinese military, on the other hand, think that its air force would triumph over Japan’s. If each side thinks it would win, it becomes less determined to avoid a fight.

My starting point is that China makes a decent case for ownership of the islands. It seems pretty clear from Meiji era documents that Japan effectively stole the islands as spoils of war in 1895, although Japan can also make a plausible argument that prior to that in 1895 they weren’t Chinese but terra nullis, owned by no one. I also think it’s absurd for Japan to claim that there is no dispute at all — of course there’s a dispute, and that’s why there’s some risk of war.

翻译：我认为中国对钓鱼岛的主权主张理由更加充分。日本明治政府时代的官方文件清楚地表明，日本通过1895年的战争实质上窃取了钓鱼岛。

China argues that Japan started the latest round of escalation by buying the islands and making them government property. I’m not so sure: There was a real risk that a volatile grenade-thrower like Governor Ishihara of Tokyo or other rightists would organize visits to the islands or even set up a presence there, which would have been far more destabilizing — and in a democracy, there’s not much the central government could have done. So I’m sympathetic to Tokyo’s argument that it was trying to calm tensions rather than inflame them, but it certainly didn’t manage to explain that effectively. Then China escalated by playing the nationalist card and permitting major anti-Japan demonstrations, and by sending in ships and, recently, airplanes. That unquestionably was a dangerous escalation. If planes collide (as a US and Chinese plane did near Hainan in 2001), we’ll have a huge problem.

So my take is that both Japan and China have mishandled the situation — and so has the US as well. The United States officially doesn’t take a position on who owns the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, but it seems clear to me that it de facto sides with Japan. Washington says that under the US-Japan Security Treaty, it must help Japan defend not only its own territory but also lands “administered” by Japan. And since the islands are administered by Japan, the US says it would join militarily with Japan in any conflict. Presumably the US thought this would intimidate China and reduce the risk of a conflict, but if so it misjudged: China has sent more ships and planes into the area since. And the US shouldn’t be taking sides in this dispute, especially when in reality I don’t see any American President going on TV and saying: “The US is now going to deploy naval vessels and risk nuclear war with China over a few uninhabited rocks in the Pacific that you’ve never heard of.” Effectively, the US managed to further escalate the crisis rather than deescalate it.

¶One good sign is that China has said recently that it will refer the issue of its continental shelf in the area to the UN — that diffuses the conflict, brings in multilateral actors, and lowers the temperature a bit. It would be great if China and Japan agreed to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice, but I don’t see that happening. There are rumors that China will finally clarify its sea claims this year, which would help its position. In the South China Sea, China has a dashed line around nearly the whole sea, but it has always refused to explain what exactly it claims. Is it sovereignty over the entire South China Sea? Is it the islands within the sea? Last year, the Foreign Ministry took a helpful step forward by explaining that it claimed not the waters but the land within the dashed line. But when I asked a Chinese general about that, he responded: “That’s the Foreign Ministry position. That’s not China’s position.” (PLA generals have often been particularly vociferous in their claims and sometimes anti-American, and I thought it was a good sign on this trip that three different generals all said that they couldn’t see me — I had the sense that they had been reined in to avoid further mishaps. Which is quite appropriate.)

¶We desperately need to return to the previous status quo with the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. My suggestion is that Japan acknowledge that there is a dispute in fact, while insisting that it is in the right, and open discussions with China about how to avoid shots being fired. Maybe China would agree to make periodic ritual shipping (but not aerial) visits to the general area, stopping at a 12 mile limit, and Japan would refrain from confronting the ships. Both sides would continue to insist on ownership of the islands, and acknowledge the dispute, but there would be less risk of a naval or aerial confrontation. Effectively Japan would concede that there is a dispute, and China would pull back from air and sea patrols within 12 miles of the islands. Your thoughts?



纽约时报著名记者尼古拉斯·克里斯托夫5日在纽约时报官方博客上撰文，称钓鱼岛是日本甲午战争的战利品，是从中国盗窃所得，日本驻纽约总领事15日当面向该记者抗议，16日召开记者会表示抗议。
http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20130117-00000384-yom-soci

「尖閣は日本の戦利品」と書いた米記者に抗議
読売新聞 1月17日(木)10時35分配信
　【ニューヨーク＝柳沢亨之】当地の日本総領事館は１６日、尖閣諸島は日本の「戦利品」とする記事を書いた米紙ニューヨーク・タイムズの著名コラムニスト、ニコラス・クリストフ氏に抗議した、と発表した。

　記事は５日付同紙ブログに掲載され、「日本は（日清戦争の）戦利品として事実上（中国から尖閣を）盗んだ」と主張。また、尖閣に「領土問題は存在しない」とする日本政府の立場を「ばかげている」とした。

　これに対し総領事館の川村泰久首席領事が１５日、同氏と面会。「戦利品」との主張は「事実に反する」と抗議し、日本政府の立場についても「国際法上、正当だ」とした。同氏は日本側との意見交換を続けたいと述べるにとどまったという。

附上52楼mandman提供的这篇文章英文版全文：
http ://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/chinas-new-leader-and-the-islands-dispute/

China’s New Leader, and the Islands Dispute

By NICHOLAS KRISTOF

My Sunday column, probably the last from this China trip, looks at the new Chinese paramount leader, Xi Jinping, and offers a pretty optimistic take about what may happen in the next 10 years under his leadership. I should acknowledge that plenty of Chinese disagree with me and think that Xi will be another drip like President Hu Jintao. But let me cling to my optimism as long as I can — and I welcome your views as well.

If I’d had more space in the column, I would have discussed the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute at greater length, because there is some risk that this will escalate out of control and even trigger a war.

Neither Japan nor China wants a war, and both would like to return to the previous status quo when it was a back-burner disagreement put off for future generations to resolve. That was Deng Xiaoping’s take, and he was exactly right: the issue is much too toxic to resolve now, so it needs to be deferred. But both Japan and China perceive that the other has escalated, and each feels the need to respond. Each country is led by a more self-confident assertive leader who feels the need to show he’s boss. Another worry: Japan and the United States are convinced that if a conflict did erupt, Japan would destroy the Chinese navy or air force assets sent to the area; some people in the Chinese military, on the other hand, think that its air force would triumph over Japan’s. If each side thinks it would win, it becomes less determined to avoid a fight.

My starting point is that China makes a decent case for ownership of the islands. It seems pretty clear from Meiji era documents that Japan effectively stole the islands as spoils of war in 1895, although Japan can also make a plausible argument that prior to that in 1895 they weren’t Chinese but terra nullis, owned by no one. I also think it’s absurd for Japan to claim that there is no dispute at all — of course there’s a dispute, and that’s why there’s some risk of war.

翻译：我认为中国对钓鱼岛的主权主张理由更加充分。日本明治政府时代的官方文件清楚地表明，日本通过1895年的战争实质上窃取了钓鱼岛。

China argues that Japan started the latest round of escalation by buying the islands and making them government property. I’m not so sure: There was a real risk that a volatile grenade-thrower like Governor Ishihara of Tokyo or other rightists would organize visits to the islands or even set up a presence there, which would have been far more destabilizing — and in a democracy, there’s not much the central government could have done. So I’m sympathetic to Tokyo’s argument that it was trying to calm tensions rather than inflame them, but it certainly didn’t manage to explain that effectively. Then China escalated by playing the nationalist card and permitting major anti-Japan demonstrations, and by sending in ships and, recently, airplanes. That unquestionably was a dangerous escalation. If planes collide (as a US and Chinese plane did near Hainan in 2001), we’ll have a huge problem.

So my take is that both Japan and China have mishandled the situation — and so has the US as well. The United States officially doesn’t take a position on who owns the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, but it seems clear to me that it de facto sides with Japan. Washington says that under the US-Japan Security Treaty, it must help Japan defend not only its own territory but also lands “administered” by Japan. And since the islands are administered by Japan, the US says it would join militarily with Japan in any conflict. Presumably the US thought this would intimidate China and reduce the risk of a conflict, but if so it misjudged: China has sent more ships and planes into the area since. And the US shouldn’t be taking sides in this dispute, especially when in reality I don’t see any American President going on TV and saying: “The US is now going to deploy naval vessels and risk nuclear war with China over a few uninhabited rocks in the Pacific that you’ve never heard of.” Effectively, the US managed to further escalate the crisis rather than deescalate it.

¶One good sign is that China has said recently that it will refer the issue of its continental shelf in the area to the UN — that diffuses the conflict, brings in multilateral actors, and lowers the temperature a bit. It would be great if China and Japan agreed to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice, but I don’t see that happening. There are rumors that China will finally clarify its sea claims this year, which would help its position. In the South China Sea, China has a dashed line around nearly the whole sea, but it has always refused to explain what exactly it claims. Is it sovereignty over the entire South China Sea? Is it the islands within the sea? Last year, the Foreign Ministry took a helpful step forward by explaining that it claimed not the waters but the land within the dashed line. But when I asked a Chinese general about that, he responded: “That’s the Foreign Ministry position. That’s not China’s position.” (PLA generals have often been particularly vociferous in their claims and sometimes anti-American, and I thought it was a good sign on this trip that three different generals all said that they couldn’t see me — I had the sense that they had been reined in to avoid further mishaps. Which is quite appropriate.)

¶We desperately need to return to the previous status quo with the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. My suggestion is that Japan acknowledge that there is a dispute in fact, while insisting that it is in the right, and open discussions with China about how to avoid shots being fired. Maybe China would agree to make periodic ritual shipping (but not aerial) visits to the general area, stopping at a 12 mile limit, and Japan would refrain from confronting the ships. Both sides would continue to insist on ownership of the islands, and acknowledge the dispute, but there would be less risk of a naval or aerial confrontation. Effectively Japan would concede that there is a dispute, and China would pull back from air and sea patrols within 12 miles of the islands. Your thoughts?