超级军网外媒：普京访华期间未搞定中俄的天然气价格协议
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 03:27:04
爬山虎翻译
http://www.ptfcn.com/?p=2034
链接：http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/NF09Ag01.html
冷兵器小将
发布于2012年06月13日 12:51
MONTREAL – Moscow and Beijing again failed to bridge their difference over the selling price for Siberian gas during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s just concluded visit to China, but the two sides compensated for this failure by signing a raft of other accords for economic cooperation and by confirming agreement on a series of anti-US realpolitik policy positions (for example, Syria).
来自于蒙特利尔–在俄国总统普京访华期间，莫斯科与北京未就西伯利亚的天然气出口价格缩短他们之间的分歧。做为对此的补偿，双方成功签署了一大堆经济合作协议，并在反对美国的政治决策方面达成了一致意见（例如对叙利亚的支持）。
The two countries’ boilerplate anti-Americanism papers over their increasingly cut-throat competition for hydrocarbon resources in Asia and the financial means to develop them. The “great game” between them centers on Siberia and Central Asia.
这两个国家的反美主张掩盖了他们在亚洲碳氢化合物能源方面的激烈竞争和利用金融手段去开发的事实。它们在西伯利亚和中亚对下一盘很大的棋。
In the run-up to the summit, the Russian side once again expressed hopes of reaching a price agreement for the 68 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of natural gas that it wishes to sell to China from both Eastern and Western Siberia through twodifferent pipeline systems still to be constructed. The Russian leader, who resumed the presidency for a third term earlier this month, took with him to Beijing the heads of gas giant Gazprom and other energy companies as well as six cabinet ministers.
在即将召开的中俄高峰会议上，俄罗斯再次表达希望达成与中国的天然气价格协议。它希望每年卖给中国680亿立方米的天然气，将通过2条仍在建设的管道从东西西伯利亚分别运来。第三次当上俄罗斯总统的普京，在他刚上任的早期，就带着俄罗斯天然气巨头—-俄罗斯天然气股份有限公司的头头们和其他一些能源公司的头头们，还有6位内阁部长一起去了北京。
Such a contract estimated at roughly US$1 trillion threatens to disappear like vapor. This contract has been under discussion between the two sides since the signature of a Gazprom-China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) memorandum of understanding in 2004. A route from Western Siberia would carry 30 bcm/y, while another from Eastern Siberia would carry 38 bcm/y. However, the two sides seem never even to have agreed which should be built first.
这份估计有1万亿美元之多的合同随时可能像蒸汽一样消失不见。自从俄罗斯天然气股份有限公司和中国石油天然气有限公司在04年签署谅解备忘录之时，这份合同就在被讨论。来自于西西伯利亚的管道一年将输送300亿立方米的天然气，另一条来自于东西伯利亚的管道每年将输送380亿立方米的天然气。然而双方还未同意哪一条管道将要先被建设。
Negotiations since then have also foundered over price, and in the meantime Beijing has diversified its energy suppliers to decrease its dependence on Russia. Last December, Turkmenistan agreed to increase its gas exports to China from the 40 bcm/y already planned to 65 bcm/y; China will also soon be importing 10 bcm/y from Kazakhstan. Those amounts are in addition to increasing liquefied natural gas imports from Middle East sources.
因为价格的原因，合同到现在还没有签订。于此同时，北京扩展了他的能源渠道来降低对俄罗斯的依赖。土库曼斯坦同意把对中国的油气出口从一年400亿立方米增加到650亿。中国不久将可以每年从哈萨克斯坦进口100亿立方米的天然气。除此以外，中国将要从中东增加液化的天然气进口。
For the Siberian gas, the Moscow business newspaper Kommersant cited sources late last year to the effect that the Kremlin was insisting on a price of $400 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) to China. However, the price of Turkmenistan’s gas to China was then reported to be about $250/tcm, and the Russian press agency RIA-Novosti this month cited the latter figure as the price that China was offering to Russia for the gas from Siberia.
拿西伯利亚的油气来说，莫斯科生意人报引用了上年来自于克里姆林宫的消息，大意是克里姆林宫坚持对中国的油气售价为每立方千米400美元。然而土库曼斯坦卖给中国的油气价格只有大概250美元每立方米。俄罗斯的新闻机构RIA这个月引用了后者的数字，这是中国要求俄罗斯卖给它的西伯利亚油气价格.
It is becoming apparent that Russia’s interest in selling the Siberian gas to China is more vital than China’s interest in buying it, especially as the price of oil, upon revenue from which the Russian state budget is highly dependent, continues to fall.
显而易见的是，俄罗斯要把西伯利亚的油气卖给中国的兴趣要比中国买它的兴趣要多的多。特别是比起依赖税收，俄罗斯的国家预算更依赖油气价格，而油气价格仍在回落。
Moscow pretends to Beijing that it can sell the gas for more than that to Europe. However, Putin is complicating matters for himself by telling European Union leaders in Brussels early this month, just before he left for the Beijing meetings, that they should negotiate with his planned Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which is intended to include several Central Asian states, since Russia has supposedly surrendered national competence to the EEU’s “Common Economic Space”.
莫斯科自称卖给欧洲的油气价格比卖给中国的要贵。然而在这个月的早些时候，普京在布鲁赛尔对欧盟领导人的讲话使得问题复杂化。就在他去北京参加会议之前，他说欧盟可以与他计划的欧亚经济联盟谈判，这个联盟将要包括几个中亚国家，自从俄罗斯将要放弃一些国家的权利去搞这个所谓的欧亚经济联盟的共同经济空间。
The EU and Russia have been negotiating a new basic agreement for their relationship for four years, but uncertainties about Russia’s World Trade Organization (WTO) status have stymied them since the beginning of last year. Russia could become a World Trade Organization (WTO) member this year, but Moscow’s creation of a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan has put question marks over the entry into force of its WTO agreement.
欧盟和俄罗斯已经就他们的国际关系达成了4年的基本协议，但是从去年开始，俄罗斯在世贸组织中的地位已经影响了他们之间的合作。今年俄罗斯变成了WTO的一名正式成员，但是莫斯科与白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦的关税创收同盟给WTO协议的生效打了一个问号。
In Putin’s view expressed earlier this month in Brussels, however, the EU’s European Commission “can and should” obtain a mandate to negotiate with the EEU and “take into account” Belarus’s and Kazakhstan’s commitment to the customs union, while the idea of the EEU could promote trade and cooperation “if based on WTO rules”.
在这个月的早些时候普京在布鲁塞尔表达了他的观点，尽然欧亚经济联盟会推动贸易和根据WTO规则进行合作，但是欧盟理事会还是就“能不能和应该不应该”授权签署与欧亚经济联盟的协议和是否白俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦会遵守关税联盟纳入了考虑。
The qualification is necessary because the EEU does not really exist yet, and is planned only for 2015, since its terms are still to be drawn up by the newly established Eurasian Economic Commission, not all members of which have yet been identified.
对此的考虑是必须的，因为欧亚经济联盟的条款仍然再由新成立的欧亚经济理事会起草，它的一些成员还未被认同，并且欧亚经济联盟直到2015年才会被计划成立。
How the EEU should dovetail with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a summit of which Putin was officially in Beijing to attend, is never explained. But then, the current SCO members have still not even agreed on rules for admitting new members. Its multilateralism seems mainly a shell, and any international juridical personality is largely passive.
此外欧亚经济联盟如何在政策上与上和接轨，普京在北京的高层峰会上并没有解释。从那时开始，现在的上和成员甚至未就接纳新成员达成一致的协议。欧亚经济联盟的多边主义看起来像一块空壳，它的国际法律概念是抽象的。
The continuing failure to establish a multilateral SCO development bank illustrates the dynamic at work. It is fairly clear tha t Russia and China, representing the two largest national economies in the SCO, would be the principal contributors of capital to any such bank.
接下来的建立一个上和的多边发展银行的失败表明了还有很多工作要做。中国和俄罗斯，上和2个最大的经济体，显而易见是建立这类银行的首要投资者。
However, Russia has no reason to promote such an institution because it can work through the Russia Direct Investment Fund if it wishes to promote investment in Russia and can always rely on its bilateral relations for a framework for its own investments in such other SCO countries as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
然和，俄罗斯没有足够的理由去推动建立这样的机构，如果它想推动在俄罗斯的投资，它可以直接通过自己的发展基金，或者依赖与上和的其他成员国，比如阿萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦的合作框架来实现自己的投资。
China’s Xinhua news agency, on the other hand, headlined a promise by the country’s President Hu Jintao to offer a loan of $10 billion “to support economic cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”. Nevertheless, the fine print makes clear that this is not the long talked-about multilateral institutional mechanism but merely a subsidy for its own people to study abroad, for scholarships in SCO countries, and for sponsoring foreigners to attend Confucius Institute language and cultural centers and other expert-level training.
另一方面，中国的新华社，刊登了一条有关中国国家主席胡锦涛提供100亿美元的贷款来促进上合组织内部的经济合作的头条新闻。然而，这条新闻的细节暴露了这不属于经常谈到的多边合作机制的一种方式，这笔钱而是用来为它在上和其他国家的留学生提供奖学金性质的补助，为外国人参加中国孔子学院付的赞助和其他一些专家级的培训。
China’s principal motive in the rhetorical push for the creation of an SCO development bank would merely be to help make the case for the yuan as an international currency. As Chen Yuan, chairman of China Development Bank (CDB) said in the margin of the SCO meeting, “We are trying to promote local currency settlements.”
中国推动建立上和发展银行背后最重要的原因是仅仅想让人民币变成国际货币。陈源，中国国家开发银行的主席，在上和会议的期间是这么说的，“我们在尽力推动人民币的国际化”。
Thus the CDB, which opened an office in India in 2007, has already lent $4.4 billion to Indian companies for projects for building roads, telecommunications, and other infrastructure, the Times of India reports. Chen, who is also a member of the Communist Party of China’s central committee, noted: “We look forward to increasing our role in India”.
印度时报报道07年在印度建立办公室的中国国家开发银行，已经借给印度公司44亿美元，用于建设道路，通讯，以及其他的一些基础设施项目。陈，同时也是一位中共中央委员会的成员，补充到：“我们希望扩大在印度的影响力”。
China does not need an SCO bank. The CDB was created in 1994. It focuses on financing mid- and long-term infrastructure and energy projects and claims to be the world’s largest development banking institution. It is financing the East Siberia – Pacific Ocean oil pipeline in Russia, which includes a spur delivering 300,000 barrels per day to China, as well as the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline and hydroelectric projects in Kazakhstan.
中国也不需要一个上和银行。于1994年设立的中国国家开发银行，主要从事一个中期的和长期的基础设施和能源项目的金融筹资活动，宣称它是世界上最大的发展银行机构。它曾为一个刺激性的每日交付30万桶的石油，从东西伯利亚到太平洋的石油管线筹资，为土库曼斯坦到中国的石油管线和哈萨克斯坦的水利发电项目做筹资。
The CDB’s investing arm, CDB Capital, was established in August 2009 and is the only Chinese bank subsidiary licensed to invest in yuan. Last December, offshore investment firm CDB International Holdings was inaugurated in Hong Kong, tasked with running CDB Capital’s overseas investment operations, particularly direct investment and asset management.
中国国家开发银行的得力干将，国开金融，于09年八月成立，它是中国银行的下级部门中唯一有可以投资人民币的资格的附属公司，去年12月，离岸投资公司–中国国家开发银行国际控股公司在香港成立了，负责处理国家开发银行海外资本的投资运作，特别是直接的投资和资产管理。
Nevertheless, the CDB has not participated in the China-Russia Investment Fund (CRIF), announced last year with a capital of between $2 billion and $4 billion. It is now formalized that both the Chinese and the Russian side will contribute only $1 billion each from state sources, with the other $2 billion to be sought from private Chinese investors, although why the latter should avail themselves of the CRIF remains to be seen.
然而国家开发银行并不参加中俄的投资基金，这个基金会上年宣传有20亿到40的资本。现在中俄每年都会从国家预算中各拿10亿美元拨给这个基金会，剩下的20亿将交由中国私人投资者买单，尽管这么做为什么对他们有利还有待观察。
In the event, the Chinese and Russian leaderships saved the day by promising to increase trade turnover from $84 billion last year to $100 billion in 2015 and $200 billion in 2020. Towards this end, they signed no fewer than 20 agreements, accords, and memoranda of understanding in a variety of fields including energy efficiency, nuclear power production, transport machine building, and research and development in high-tech industries including information technology. An agreement on a joint venture to develop and build long-haul aircraft apparently eluded negotiators.
事情最后，中国和俄罗斯的领导人通过许诺把之间的贸易额从去年的840亿美元增加到2015年的100亿，并到2020年增加到200亿来挽回局面。朝着这个目标，他们签署了不下20个协议、谅解备忘录，涵盖了从能源效率，核能生产，传动装置的建设到包括信息产业等高科技产业的研发。然而一个共同研发和制造航天器的长远合作显然不在公布的这些协议之中。爬山虎翻译
http://www.ptfcn.com/?p=2034
链接：http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/NF09Ag01.html
冷兵器小将
发布于2012年06月13日 12:51
MONTREAL – Moscow and Beijing again failed to bridge their difference over the selling price for Siberian gas during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s just concluded visit to China, but the two sides compensated for this failure by signing a raft of other accords for economic cooperation and by confirming agreement on a series of anti-US realpolitik policy positions (for example, Syria).
来自于蒙特利尔–在俄国总统普京访华期间，莫斯科与北京未就西伯利亚的天然气出口价格缩短他们之间的分歧。做为对此的补偿，双方成功签署了一大堆经济合作协议，并在反对美国的政治决策方面达成了一致意见（例如对叙利亚的支持）。
The two countries’ boilerplate anti-Americanism papers over their increasingly cut-throat competition for hydrocarbon resources in Asia and the financial means to develop them. The “great game” between them centers on Siberia and Central Asia.
这两个国家的反美主张掩盖了他们在亚洲碳氢化合物能源方面的激烈竞争和利用金融手段去开发的事实。它们在西伯利亚和中亚对下一盘很大的棋。
In the run-up to the summit, the Russian side once again expressed hopes of reaching a price agreement for the 68 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of natural gas that it wishes to sell to China from both Eastern and Western Siberia through twodifferent pipeline systems still to be constructed. The Russian leader, who resumed the presidency for a third term earlier this month, took with him to Beijing the heads of gas giant Gazprom and other energy companies as well as six cabinet ministers.
在即将召开的中俄高峰会议上，俄罗斯再次表达希望达成与中国的天然气价格协议。它希望每年卖给中国680亿立方米的天然气，将通过2条仍在建设的管道从东西西伯利亚分别运来。第三次当上俄罗斯总统的普京，在他刚上任的早期，就带着俄罗斯天然气巨头—-俄罗斯天然气股份有限公司的头头们和其他一些能源公司的头头们，还有6位内阁部长一起去了北京。
Such a contract estimated at roughly US$1 trillion threatens to disappear like vapor. This contract has been under discussion between the two sides since the signature of a Gazprom-China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) memorandum of understanding in 2004. A route from Western Siberia would carry 30 bcm/y, while another from Eastern Siberia would carry 38 bcm/y. However, the two sides seem never even to have agreed which should be built first.
这份估计有1万亿美元之多的合同随时可能像蒸汽一样消失不见。自从俄罗斯天然气股份有限公司和中国石油天然气有限公司在04年签署谅解备忘录之时，这份合同就在被讨论。来自于西西伯利亚的管道一年将输送300亿立方米的天然气，另一条来自于东西伯利亚的管道每年将输送380亿立方米的天然气。然而双方还未同意哪一条管道将要先被建设。
Negotiations since then have also foundered over price, and in the meantime Beijing has diversified its energy suppliers to decrease its dependence on Russia. Last December, Turkmenistan agreed to increase its gas exports to China from the 40 bcm/y already planned to 65 bcm/y; China will also soon be importing 10 bcm/y from Kazakhstan. Those amounts are in addition to increasing liquefied natural gas imports from Middle East sources.
因为价格的原因，合同到现在还没有签订。于此同时，北京扩展了他的能源渠道来降低对俄罗斯的依赖。土库曼斯坦同意把对中国的油气出口从一年400亿立方米增加到650亿。中国不久将可以每年从哈萨克斯坦进口100亿立方米的天然气。除此以外，中国将要从中东增加液化的天然气进口。
For the Siberian gas, the Moscow business newspaper Kommersant cited sources late last year to the effect that the Kremlin was insisting on a price of $400 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) to China. However, the price of Turkmenistan’s gas to China was then reported to be about $250/tcm, and the Russian press agency RIA-Novosti this month cited the latter figure as the price that China was offering to Russia for the gas from Siberia.
拿西伯利亚的油气来说，莫斯科生意人报引用了上年来自于克里姆林宫的消息，大意是克里姆林宫坚持对中国的油气售价为每立方千米400美元。然而土库曼斯坦卖给中国的油气价格只有大概250美元每立方米。俄罗斯的新闻机构RIA这个月引用了后者的数字，这是中国要求俄罗斯卖给它的西伯利亚油气价格.
It is becoming apparent that Russia’s interest in selling the Siberian gas to China is more vital than China’s interest in buying it, especially as the price of oil, upon revenue from which the Russian state budget is highly dependent, continues to fall.
显而易见的是，俄罗斯要把西伯利亚的油气卖给中国的兴趣要比中国买它的兴趣要多的多。特别是比起依赖税收，俄罗斯的国家预算更依赖油气价格，而油气价格仍在回落。
Moscow pretends to Beijing that it can sell the gas for more than that to Europe. However, Putin is complicating matters for himself by telling European Union leaders in Brussels early this month, just before he left for the Beijing meetings, that they should negotiate with his planned Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which is intended to include several Central Asian states, since Russia has supposedly surrendered national competence to the EEU’s “Common Economic Space”.
莫斯科自称卖给欧洲的油气价格比卖给中国的要贵。然而在这个月的早些时候，普京在布鲁赛尔对欧盟领导人的讲话使得问题复杂化。就在他去北京参加会议之前，他说欧盟可以与他计划的欧亚经济联盟谈判，这个联盟将要包括几个中亚国家，自从俄罗斯将要放弃一些国家的权利去搞这个所谓的欧亚经济联盟的共同经济空间。
The EU and Russia have been negotiating a new basic agreement for their relationship for four years, but uncertainties about Russia’s World Trade Organization (WTO) status have stymied them since the beginning of last year. Russia could become a World Trade Organization (WTO) member this year, but Moscow’s creation of a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan has put question marks over the entry into force of its WTO agreement.
欧盟和俄罗斯已经就他们的国际关系达成了4年的基本协议，但是从去年开始，俄罗斯在世贸组织中的地位已经影响了他们之间的合作。今年俄罗斯变成了WTO的一名正式成员，但是莫斯科与白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦的关税创收同盟给WTO协议的生效打了一个问号。
In Putin’s view expressed earlier this month in Brussels, however, the EU’s European Commission “can and should” obtain a mandate to negotiate with the EEU and “take into account” Belarus’s and Kazakhstan’s commitment to the customs union, while the idea of the EEU could promote trade and cooperation “if based on WTO rules”.
在这个月的早些时候普京在布鲁塞尔表达了他的观点，尽然欧亚经济联盟会推动贸易和根据WTO规则进行合作，但是欧盟理事会还是就“能不能和应该不应该”授权签署与欧亚经济联盟的协议和是否白俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦会遵守关税联盟纳入了考虑。
The qualification is necessary because the EEU does not really exist yet, and is planned only for 2015, since its terms are still to be drawn up by the newly established Eurasian Economic Commission, not all members of which have yet been identified.
对此的考虑是必须的，因为欧亚经济联盟的条款仍然再由新成立的欧亚经济理事会起草，它的一些成员还未被认同，并且欧亚经济联盟直到2015年才会被计划成立。
How the EEU should dovetail with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a summit of which Putin was officially in Beijing to attend, is never explained. But then, the current SCO members have still not even agreed on rules for admitting new members. Its multilateralism seems mainly a shell, and any international juridical personality is largely passive.
此外欧亚经济联盟如何在政策上与上和接轨，普京在北京的高层峰会上并没有解释。从那时开始，现在的上和成员甚至未就接纳新成员达成一致的协议。欧亚经济联盟的多边主义看起来像一块空壳，它的国际法律概念是抽象的。
The continuing failure to establish a multilateral SCO development bank illustrates the dynamic at work. It is fairly clear tha t Russia and China, representing the two largest national economies in the SCO, would be the principal contributors of capital to any such bank.
接下来的建立一个上和的多边发展银行的失败表明了还有很多工作要做。中国和俄罗斯，上和2个最大的经济体，显而易见是建立这类银行的首要投资者。
However, Russia has no reason to promote such an institution because it can work through the Russia Direct Investment Fund if it wishes to promote investment in Russia and can always rely on its bilateral relations for a framework for its own investments in such other SCO countries as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
然和，俄罗斯没有足够的理由去推动建立这样的机构，如果它想推动在俄罗斯的投资，它可以直接通过自己的发展基金，或者依赖与上和的其他成员国，比如阿萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦的合作框架来实现自己的投资。
China’s Xinhua news agency, on the other hand, headlined a promise by the country’s President Hu Jintao to offer a loan of $10 billion “to support economic cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”. Nevertheless, the fine print makes clear that this is not the long talked-about multilateral institutional mechanism but merely a subsidy for its own people to study abroad, for scholarships in SCO countries, and for sponsoring foreigners to attend Confucius Institute language and cultural centers and other expert-level training.
另一方面，中国的新华社，刊登了一条有关中国国家主席胡锦涛提供100亿美元的贷款来促进上合组织内部的经济合作的头条新闻。然而，这条新闻的细节暴露了这不属于经常谈到的多边合作机制的一种方式，这笔钱而是用来为它在上和其他国家的留学生提供奖学金性质的补助，为外国人参加中国孔子学院付的赞助和其他一些专家级的培训。
China’s principal motive in the rhetorical push for the creation of an SCO development bank would merely be to help make the case for the yuan as an international currency. As Chen Yuan, chairman of China Development Bank (CDB) said in the margin of the SCO meeting, “We are trying to promote local currency settlements.”
中国推动建立上和发展银行背后最重要的原因是仅仅想让人民币变成国际货币。陈源，中国国家开发银行的主席，在上和会议的期间是这么说的，“我们在尽力推动人民币的国际化”。
Thus the CDB, which opened an office in India in 2007, has already lent $4.4 billion to Indian companies for projects for building roads, telecommunications, and other infrastructure, the Times of India reports. Chen, who is also a member of the Communist Party of China’s central committee, noted: “We look forward to increasing our role in India”.
印度时报报道07年在印度建立办公室的中国国家开发银行，已经借给印度公司44亿美元，用于建设道路，通讯，以及其他的一些基础设施项目。陈，同时也是一位中共中央委员会的成员，补充到：“我们希望扩大在印度的影响力”。
China does not need an SCO bank. The CDB was created in 1994. It focuses on financing mid- and long-term infrastructure and energy projects and claims to be the world’s largest development banking institution. It is financing the East Siberia – Pacific Ocean oil pipeline in Russia, which includes a spur delivering 300,000 barrels per day to China, as well as the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline and hydroelectric projects in Kazakhstan.
中国也不需要一个上和银行。于1994年设立的中国国家开发银行，主要从事一个中期的和长期的基础设施和能源项目的金融筹资活动，宣称它是世界上最大的发展银行机构。它曾为一个刺激性的每日交付30万桶的石油，从东西伯利亚到太平洋的石油管线筹资，为土库曼斯坦到中国的石油管线和哈萨克斯坦的水利发电项目做筹资。
The CDB’s investing arm, CDB Capital, was established in August 2009 and is the only Chinese bank subsidiary licensed to invest in yuan. Last December, offshore investment firm CDB International Holdings was inaugurated in Hong Kong, tasked with running CDB Capital’s overseas investment operations, particularly direct investment and asset management.
中国国家开发银行的得力干将，国开金融，于09年八月成立，它是中国银行的下级部门中唯一有可以投资人民币的资格的附属公司，去年12月，离岸投资公司–中国国家开发银行国际控股公司在香港成立了，负责处理国家开发银行海外资本的投资运作，特别是直接的投资和资产管理。
Nevertheless, the CDB has not participated in the China-Russia Investment Fund (CRIF), announced last year with a capital of between $2 billion and $4 billion. It is now formalized that both the Chinese and the Russian side will contribute only $1 billion each from state sources, with the other $2 billion to be sought from private Chinese investors, although why the latter should avail themselves of the CRIF remains to be seen.
然而国家开发银行并不参加中俄的投资基金，这个基金会上年宣传有20亿到40的资本。现在中俄每年都会从国家预算中各拿10亿美元拨给这个基金会，剩下的20亿将交由中国私人投资者买单，尽管这么做为什么对他们有利还有待观察。
In the event, the Chinese and Russian leaderships saved the day by promising to increase trade turnover from $84 billion last year to $100 billion in 2015 and $200 billion in 2020. Towards this end, they signed no fewer than 20 agreements, accords, and memoranda of understanding in a variety of fields including energy efficiency, nuclear power production, transport machine building, and research and development in high-tech industries including information technology. An agreement on a joint venture to develop and build long-haul aircraft apparently eluded negotiators.
事情最后，中国和俄罗斯的领导人通过许诺把之间的贸易额从去年的840亿美元增加到2015年的100亿，并到2020年增加到200亿来挽回局面。朝着这个目标，他们签署了不下20个协议、谅解备忘录，涵盖了从能源效率，核能生产，传动装置的建设到包括信息产业等高科技产业的研发。然而一个共同研发和制造航天器的长远合作显然不在公布的这些协议之中。
http://www.ptfcn.com/?p=2034
链接：http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/NF09Ag01.html
冷兵器小将
发布于2012年06月13日 12:51
MONTREAL – Moscow and Beijing again failed to bridge their difference over the selling price for Siberian gas during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s just concluded visit to China, but the two sides compensated for this failure by signing a raft of other accords for economic cooperation and by confirming agreement on a series of anti-US realpolitik policy positions (for example, Syria).
来自于蒙特利尔–在俄国总统普京访华期间，莫斯科与北京未就西伯利亚的天然气出口价格缩短他们之间的分歧。做为对此的补偿，双方成功签署了一大堆经济合作协议，并在反对美国的政治决策方面达成了一致意见（例如对叙利亚的支持）。
The two countries’ boilerplate anti-Americanism papers over their increasingly cut-throat competition for hydrocarbon resources in Asia and the financial means to develop them. The “great game” between them centers on Siberia and Central Asia.
这两个国家的反美主张掩盖了他们在亚洲碳氢化合物能源方面的激烈竞争和利用金融手段去开发的事实。它们在西伯利亚和中亚对下一盘很大的棋。
In the run-up to the summit, the Russian side once again expressed hopes of reaching a price agreement for the 68 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of natural gas that it wishes to sell to China from both Eastern and Western Siberia through twodifferent pipeline systems still to be constructed. The Russian leader, who resumed the presidency for a third term earlier this month, took with him to Beijing the heads of gas giant Gazprom and other energy companies as well as six cabinet ministers.
在即将召开的中俄高峰会议上，俄罗斯再次表达希望达成与中国的天然气价格协议。它希望每年卖给中国680亿立方米的天然气，将通过2条仍在建设的管道从东西西伯利亚分别运来。第三次当上俄罗斯总统的普京，在他刚上任的早期，就带着俄罗斯天然气巨头—-俄罗斯天然气股份有限公司的头头们和其他一些能源公司的头头们，还有6位内阁部长一起去了北京。
Such a contract estimated at roughly US$1 trillion threatens to disappear like vapor. This contract has been under discussion between the two sides since the signature of a Gazprom-China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) memorandum of understanding in 2004. A route from Western Siberia would carry 30 bcm/y, while another from Eastern Siberia would carry 38 bcm/y. However, the two sides seem never even to have agreed which should be built first.
这份估计有1万亿美元之多的合同随时可能像蒸汽一样消失不见。自从俄罗斯天然气股份有限公司和中国石油天然气有限公司在04年签署谅解备忘录之时，这份合同就在被讨论。来自于西西伯利亚的管道一年将输送300亿立方米的天然气，另一条来自于东西伯利亚的管道每年将输送380亿立方米的天然气。然而双方还未同意哪一条管道将要先被建设。
Negotiations since then have also foundered over price, and in the meantime Beijing has diversified its energy suppliers to decrease its dependence on Russia. Last December, Turkmenistan agreed to increase its gas exports to China from the 40 bcm/y already planned to 65 bcm/y; China will also soon be importing 10 bcm/y from Kazakhstan. Those amounts are in addition to increasing liquefied natural gas imports from Middle East sources.
因为价格的原因，合同到现在还没有签订。于此同时，北京扩展了他的能源渠道来降低对俄罗斯的依赖。土库曼斯坦同意把对中国的油气出口从一年400亿立方米增加到650亿。中国不久将可以每年从哈萨克斯坦进口100亿立方米的天然气。除此以外，中国将要从中东增加液化的天然气进口。
For the Siberian gas, the Moscow business newspaper Kommersant cited sources late last year to the effect that the Kremlin was insisting on a price of $400 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) to China. However, the price of Turkmenistan’s gas to China was then reported to be about $250/tcm, and the Russian press agency RIA-Novosti this month cited the latter figure as the price that China was offering to Russia for the gas from Siberia.
拿西伯利亚的油气来说，莫斯科生意人报引用了上年来自于克里姆林宫的消息，大意是克里姆林宫坚持对中国的油气售价为每立方千米400美元。然而土库曼斯坦卖给中国的油气价格只有大概250美元每立方米。俄罗斯的新闻机构RIA这个月引用了后者的数字，这是中国要求俄罗斯卖给它的西伯利亚油气价格.
It is becoming apparent that Russia’s interest in selling the Siberian gas to China is more vital than China’s interest in buying it, especially as the price of oil, upon revenue from which the Russian state budget is highly dependent, continues to fall.
显而易见的是，俄罗斯要把西伯利亚的油气卖给中国的兴趣要比中国买它的兴趣要多的多。特别是比起依赖税收，俄罗斯的国家预算更依赖油气价格，而油气价格仍在回落。
Moscow pretends to Beijing that it can sell the gas for more than that to Europe. However, Putin is complicating matters for himself by telling European Union leaders in Brussels early this month, just before he left for the Beijing meetings, that they should negotiate with his planned Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which is intended to include several Central Asian states, since Russia has supposedly surrendered national competence to the EEU’s “Common Economic Space”.
莫斯科自称卖给欧洲的油气价格比卖给中国的要贵。然而在这个月的早些时候，普京在布鲁赛尔对欧盟领导人的讲话使得问题复杂化。就在他去北京参加会议之前，他说欧盟可以与他计划的欧亚经济联盟谈判，这个联盟将要包括几个中亚国家，自从俄罗斯将要放弃一些国家的权利去搞这个所谓的欧亚经济联盟的共同经济空间。
The EU and Russia have been negotiating a new basic agreement for their relationship for four years, but uncertainties about Russia’s World Trade Organization (WTO) status have stymied them since the beginning of last year. Russia could become a World Trade Organization (WTO) member this year, but Moscow’s creation of a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan has put question marks over the entry into force of its WTO agreement.
欧盟和俄罗斯已经就他们的国际关系达成了4年的基本协议，但是从去年开始，俄罗斯在世贸组织中的地位已经影响了他们之间的合作。今年俄罗斯变成了WTO的一名正式成员，但是莫斯科与白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦的关税创收同盟给WTO协议的生效打了一个问号。
In Putin’s view expressed earlier this month in Brussels, however, the EU’s European Commission “can and should” obtain a mandate to negotiate with the EEU and “take into account” Belarus’s and Kazakhstan’s commitment to the customs union, while the idea of the EEU could promote trade and cooperation “if based on WTO rules”.
在这个月的早些时候普京在布鲁塞尔表达了他的观点，尽然欧亚经济联盟会推动贸易和根据WTO规则进行合作，但是欧盟理事会还是就“能不能和应该不应该”授权签署与欧亚经济联盟的协议和是否白俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦会遵守关税联盟纳入了考虑。
The qualification is necessary because the EEU does not really exist yet, and is planned only for 2015, since its terms are still to be drawn up by the newly established Eurasian Economic Commission, not all members of which have yet been identified.
对此的考虑是必须的，因为欧亚经济联盟的条款仍然再由新成立的欧亚经济理事会起草，它的一些成员还未被认同，并且欧亚经济联盟直到2015年才会被计划成立。
How the EEU should dovetail with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a summit of which Putin was officially in Beijing to attend, is never explained. But then, the current SCO members have still not even agreed on rules for admitting new members. Its multilateralism seems mainly a shell, and any international juridical personality is largely passive.
此外欧亚经济联盟如何在政策上与上和接轨，普京在北京的高层峰会上并没有解释。从那时开始，现在的上和成员甚至未就接纳新成员达成一致的协议。欧亚经济联盟的多边主义看起来像一块空壳，它的国际法律概念是抽象的。
The continuing failure to establish a multilateral SCO development bank illustrates the dynamic at work. It is fairly clear tha t Russia and China, representing the two largest national economies in the SCO, would be the principal contributors of capital to any such bank.
接下来的建立一个上和的多边发展银行的失败表明了还有很多工作要做。中国和俄罗斯，上和2个最大的经济体，显而易见是建立这类银行的首要投资者。
However, Russia has no reason to promote such an institution because it can work through the Russia Direct Investment Fund if it wishes to promote investment in Russia and can always rely on its bilateral relations for a framework for its own investments in such other SCO countries as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
然和，俄罗斯没有足够的理由去推动建立这样的机构，如果它想推动在俄罗斯的投资，它可以直接通过自己的发展基金，或者依赖与上和的其他成员国，比如阿萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦的合作框架来实现自己的投资。
China’s Xinhua news agency, on the other hand, headlined a promise by the country’s President Hu Jintao to offer a loan of $10 billion “to support economic cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”. Nevertheless, the fine print makes clear that this is not the long talked-about multilateral institutional mechanism but merely a subsidy for its own people to study abroad, for scholarships in SCO countries, and for sponsoring foreigners to attend Confucius Institute language and cultural centers and other expert-level training.
另一方面，中国的新华社，刊登了一条有关中国国家主席胡锦涛提供100亿美元的贷款来促进上合组织内部的经济合作的头条新闻。然而，这条新闻的细节暴露了这不属于经常谈到的多边合作机制的一种方式，这笔钱而是用来为它在上和其他国家的留学生提供奖学金性质的补助，为外国人参加中国孔子学院付的赞助和其他一些专家级的培训。
China’s principal motive in the rhetorical push for the creation of an SCO development bank would merely be to help make the case for the yuan as an international currency. As Chen Yuan, chairman of China Development Bank (CDB) said in the margin of the SCO meeting, “We are trying to promote local currency settlements.”
中国推动建立上和发展银行背后最重要的原因是仅仅想让人民币变成国际货币。陈源，中国国家开发银行的主席，在上和会议的期间是这么说的，“我们在尽力推动人民币的国际化”。
Thus the CDB, which opened an office in India in 2007, has already lent $4.4 billion to Indian companies for projects for building roads, telecommunications, and other infrastructure, the Times of India reports. Chen, who is also a member of the Communist Party of China’s central committee, noted: “We look forward to increasing our role in India”.
印度时报报道07年在印度建立办公室的中国国家开发银行，已经借给印度公司44亿美元，用于建设道路，通讯，以及其他的一些基础设施项目。陈，同时也是一位中共中央委员会的成员，补充到：“我们希望扩大在印度的影响力”。
China does not need an SCO bank. The CDB was created in 1994. It focuses on financing mid- and long-term infrastructure and energy projects and claims to be the world’s largest development banking institution. It is financing the East Siberia – Pacific Ocean oil pipeline in Russia, which includes a spur delivering 300,000 barrels per day to China, as well as the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline and hydroelectric projects in Kazakhstan.
中国也不需要一个上和银行。于1994年设立的中国国家开发银行，主要从事一个中期的和长期的基础设施和能源项目的金融筹资活动，宣称它是世界上最大的发展银行机构。它曾为一个刺激性的每日交付30万桶的石油，从东西伯利亚到太平洋的石油管线筹资，为土库曼斯坦到中国的石油管线和哈萨克斯坦的水利发电项目做筹资。
The CDB’s investing arm, CDB Capital, was established in August 2009 and is the only Chinese bank subsidiary licensed to invest in yuan. Last December, offshore investment firm CDB International Holdings was inaugurated in Hong Kong, tasked with running CDB Capital’s overseas investment operations, particularly direct investment and asset management.
中国国家开发银行的得力干将，国开金融，于09年八月成立，它是中国银行的下级部门中唯一有可以投资人民币的资格的附属公司，去年12月，离岸投资公司–中国国家开发银行国际控股公司在香港成立了，负责处理国家开发银行海外资本的投资运作，特别是直接的投资和资产管理。
Nevertheless, the CDB has not participated in the China-Russia Investment Fund (CRIF), announced last year with a capital of between $2 billion and $4 billion. It is now formalized that both the Chinese and the Russian side will contribute only $1 billion each from state sources, with the other $2 billion to be sought from private Chinese investors, although why the latter should avail themselves of the CRIF remains to be seen.
然而国家开发银行并不参加中俄的投资基金，这个基金会上年宣传有20亿到40的资本。现在中俄每年都会从国家预算中各拿10亿美元拨给这个基金会，剩下的20亿将交由中国私人投资者买单，尽管这么做为什么对他们有利还有待观察。
In the event, the Chinese and Russian leaderships saved the day by promising to increase trade turnover from $84 billion last year to $100 billion in 2015 and $200 billion in 2020. Towards this end, they signed no fewer than 20 agreements, accords, and memoranda of understanding in a variety of fields including energy efficiency, nuclear power production, transport machine building, and research and development in high-tech industries including information technology. An agreement on a joint venture to develop and build long-haul aircraft apparently eluded negotiators.
事情最后，中国和俄罗斯的领导人通过许诺把之间的贸易额从去年的840亿美元增加到2015年的100亿，并到2020年增加到200亿来挽回局面。朝着这个目标，他们签署了不下20个协议、谅解备忘录，涵盖了从能源效率，核能生产，传动装置的建设到包括信息产业等高科技产业的研发。然而一个共同研发和制造航天器的长远合作显然不在公布的这些协议之中。爬山虎翻译
http://www.ptfcn.com/?p=2034
链接：http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/NF09Ag01.html
冷兵器小将
发布于2012年06月13日 12:51
MONTREAL – Moscow and Beijing again failed to bridge their difference over the selling price for Siberian gas during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s just concluded visit to China, but the two sides compensated for this failure by signing a raft of other accords for economic cooperation and by confirming agreement on a series of anti-US realpolitik policy positions (for example, Syria).
来自于蒙特利尔–在俄国总统普京访华期间，莫斯科与北京未就西伯利亚的天然气出口价格缩短他们之间的分歧。做为对此的补偿，双方成功签署了一大堆经济合作协议，并在反对美国的政治决策方面达成了一致意见（例如对叙利亚的支持）。
The two countries’ boilerplate anti-Americanism papers over their increasingly cut-throat competition for hydrocarbon resources in Asia and the financial means to develop them. The “great game” between them centers on Siberia and Central Asia.
这两个国家的反美主张掩盖了他们在亚洲碳氢化合物能源方面的激烈竞争和利用金融手段去开发的事实。它们在西伯利亚和中亚对下一盘很大的棋。
In the run-up to the summit, the Russian side once again expressed hopes of reaching a price agreement for the 68 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of natural gas that it wishes to sell to China from both Eastern and Western Siberia through twodifferent pipeline systems still to be constructed. The Russian leader, who resumed the presidency for a third term earlier this month, took with him to Beijing the heads of gas giant Gazprom and other energy companies as well as six cabinet ministers.
在即将召开的中俄高峰会议上，俄罗斯再次表达希望达成与中国的天然气价格协议。它希望每年卖给中国680亿立方米的天然气，将通过2条仍在建设的管道从东西西伯利亚分别运来。第三次当上俄罗斯总统的普京，在他刚上任的早期，就带着俄罗斯天然气巨头—-俄罗斯天然气股份有限公司的头头们和其他一些能源公司的头头们，还有6位内阁部长一起去了北京。
Such a contract estimated at roughly US$1 trillion threatens to disappear like vapor. This contract has been under discussion between the two sides since the signature of a Gazprom-China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) memorandum of understanding in 2004. A route from Western Siberia would carry 30 bcm/y, while another from Eastern Siberia would carry 38 bcm/y. However, the two sides seem never even to have agreed which should be built first.
这份估计有1万亿美元之多的合同随时可能像蒸汽一样消失不见。自从俄罗斯天然气股份有限公司和中国石油天然气有限公司在04年签署谅解备忘录之时，这份合同就在被讨论。来自于西西伯利亚的管道一年将输送300亿立方米的天然气，另一条来自于东西伯利亚的管道每年将输送380亿立方米的天然气。然而双方还未同意哪一条管道将要先被建设。
Negotiations since then have also foundered over price, and in the meantime Beijing has diversified its energy suppliers to decrease its dependence on Russia. Last December, Turkmenistan agreed to increase its gas exports to China from the 40 bcm/y already planned to 65 bcm/y; China will also soon be importing 10 bcm/y from Kazakhstan. Those amounts are in addition to increasing liquefied natural gas imports from Middle East sources.
因为价格的原因，合同到现在还没有签订。于此同时，北京扩展了他的能源渠道来降低对俄罗斯的依赖。土库曼斯坦同意把对中国的油气出口从一年400亿立方米增加到650亿。中国不久将可以每年从哈萨克斯坦进口100亿立方米的天然气。除此以外，中国将要从中东增加液化的天然气进口。
For the Siberian gas, the Moscow business newspaper Kommersant cited sources late last year to the effect that the Kremlin was insisting on a price of $400 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) to China. However, the price of Turkmenistan’s gas to China was then reported to be about $250/tcm, and the Russian press agency RIA-Novosti this month cited the latter figure as the price that China was offering to Russia for the gas from Siberia.
拿西伯利亚的油气来说，莫斯科生意人报引用了上年来自于克里姆林宫的消息，大意是克里姆林宫坚持对中国的油气售价为每立方千米400美元。然而土库曼斯坦卖给中国的油气价格只有大概250美元每立方米。俄罗斯的新闻机构RIA这个月引用了后者的数字，这是中国要求俄罗斯卖给它的西伯利亚油气价格.
It is becoming apparent that Russia’s interest in selling the Siberian gas to China is more vital than China’s interest in buying it, especially as the price of oil, upon revenue from which the Russian state budget is highly dependent, continues to fall.
显而易见的是，俄罗斯要把西伯利亚的油气卖给中国的兴趣要比中国买它的兴趣要多的多。特别是比起依赖税收，俄罗斯的国家预算更依赖油气价格，而油气价格仍在回落。
Moscow pretends to Beijing that it can sell the gas for more than that to Europe. However, Putin is complicating matters for himself by telling European Union leaders in Brussels early this month, just before he left for the Beijing meetings, that they should negotiate with his planned Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which is intended to include several Central Asian states, since Russia has supposedly surrendered national competence to the EEU’s “Common Economic Space”.
莫斯科自称卖给欧洲的油气价格比卖给中国的要贵。然而在这个月的早些时候，普京在布鲁赛尔对欧盟领导人的讲话使得问题复杂化。就在他去北京参加会议之前，他说欧盟可以与他计划的欧亚经济联盟谈判，这个联盟将要包括几个中亚国家，自从俄罗斯将要放弃一些国家的权利去搞这个所谓的欧亚经济联盟的共同经济空间。
The EU and Russia have been negotiating a new basic agreement for their relationship for four years, but uncertainties about Russia’s World Trade Organization (WTO) status have stymied them since the beginning of last year. Russia could become a World Trade Organization (WTO) member this year, but Moscow’s creation of a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan has put question marks over the entry into force of its WTO agreement.
欧盟和俄罗斯已经就他们的国际关系达成了4年的基本协议，但是从去年开始，俄罗斯在世贸组织中的地位已经影响了他们之间的合作。今年俄罗斯变成了WTO的一名正式成员，但是莫斯科与白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦的关税创收同盟给WTO协议的生效打了一个问号。
In Putin’s view expressed earlier this month in Brussels, however, the EU’s European Commission “can and should” obtain a mandate to negotiate with the EEU and “take into account” Belarus’s and Kazakhstan’s commitment to the customs union, while the idea of the EEU could promote trade and cooperation “if based on WTO rules”.
在这个月的早些时候普京在布鲁塞尔表达了他的观点，尽然欧亚经济联盟会推动贸易和根据WTO规则进行合作，但是欧盟理事会还是就“能不能和应该不应该”授权签署与欧亚经济联盟的协议和是否白俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦会遵守关税联盟纳入了考虑。
The qualification is necessary because the EEU does not really exist yet, and is planned only for 2015, since its terms are still to be drawn up by the newly established Eurasian Economic Commission, not all members of which have yet been identified.
对此的考虑是必须的，因为欧亚经济联盟的条款仍然再由新成立的欧亚经济理事会起草，它的一些成员还未被认同，并且欧亚经济联盟直到2015年才会被计划成立。
How the EEU should dovetail with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a summit of which Putin was officially in Beijing to attend, is never explained. But then, the current SCO members have still not even agreed on rules for admitting new members. Its multilateralism seems mainly a shell, and any international juridical personality is largely passive.
此外欧亚经济联盟如何在政策上与上和接轨，普京在北京的高层峰会上并没有解释。从那时开始，现在的上和成员甚至未就接纳新成员达成一致的协议。欧亚经济联盟的多边主义看起来像一块空壳，它的国际法律概念是抽象的。
The continuing failure to establish a multilateral SCO development bank illustrates the dynamic at work. It is fairly clear tha t Russia and China, representing the two largest national economies in the SCO, would be the principal contributors of capital to any such bank.
接下来的建立一个上和的多边发展银行的失败表明了还有很多工作要做。中国和俄罗斯，上和2个最大的经济体，显而易见是建立这类银行的首要投资者。
However, Russia has no reason to promote such an institution because it can work through the Russia Direct Investment Fund if it wishes to promote investment in Russia and can always rely on its bilateral relations for a framework for its own investments in such other SCO countries as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
然和，俄罗斯没有足够的理由去推动建立这样的机构，如果它想推动在俄罗斯的投资，它可以直接通过自己的发展基金，或者依赖与上和的其他成员国，比如阿萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦的合作框架来实现自己的投资。
China’s Xinhua news agency, on the other hand, headlined a promise by the country’s President Hu Jintao to offer a loan of $10 billion “to support economic cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”. Nevertheless, the fine print makes clear that this is not the long talked-about multilateral institutional mechanism but merely a subsidy for its own people to study abroad, for scholarships in SCO countries, and for sponsoring foreigners to attend Confucius Institute language and cultural centers and other expert-level training.
另一方面，中国的新华社，刊登了一条有关中国国家主席胡锦涛提供100亿美元的贷款来促进上合组织内部的经济合作的头条新闻。然而，这条新闻的细节暴露了这不属于经常谈到的多边合作机制的一种方式，这笔钱而是用来为它在上和其他国家的留学生提供奖学金性质的补助，为外国人参加中国孔子学院付的赞助和其他一些专家级的培训。
China’s principal motive in the rhetorical push for the creation of an SCO development bank would merely be to help make the case for the yuan as an international currency. As Chen Yuan, chairman of China Development Bank (CDB) said in the margin of the SCO meeting, “We are trying to promote local currency settlements.”
中国推动建立上和发展银行背后最重要的原因是仅仅想让人民币变成国际货币。陈源，中国国家开发银行的主席，在上和会议的期间是这么说的，“我们在尽力推动人民币的国际化”。
Thus the CDB, which opened an office in India in 2007, has already lent $4.4 billion to Indian companies for projects for building roads, telecommunications, and other infrastructure, the Times of India reports. Chen, who is also a member of the Communist Party of China’s central committee, noted: “We look forward to increasing our role in India”.
印度时报报道07年在印度建立办公室的中国国家开发银行，已经借给印度公司44亿美元，用于建设道路，通讯，以及其他的一些基础设施项目。陈，同时也是一位中共中央委员会的成员，补充到：“我们希望扩大在印度的影响力”。
China does not need an SCO bank. The CDB was created in 1994. It focuses on financing mid- and long-term infrastructure and energy projects and claims to be the world’s largest development banking institution. It is financing the East Siberia – Pacific Ocean oil pipeline in Russia, which includes a spur delivering 300,000 barrels per day to China, as well as the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline and hydroelectric projects in Kazakhstan.
中国也不需要一个上和银行。于1994年设立的中国国家开发银行，主要从事一个中期的和长期的基础设施和能源项目的金融筹资活动，宣称它是世界上最大的发展银行机构。它曾为一个刺激性的每日交付30万桶的石油，从东西伯利亚到太平洋的石油管线筹资，为土库曼斯坦到中国的石油管线和哈萨克斯坦的水利发电项目做筹资。
The CDB’s investing arm, CDB Capital, was established in August 2009 and is the only Chinese bank subsidiary licensed to invest in yuan. Last December, offshore investment firm CDB International Holdings was inaugurated in Hong Kong, tasked with running CDB Capital’s overseas investment operations, particularly direct investment and asset management.
中国国家开发银行的得力干将，国开金融，于09年八月成立，它是中国银行的下级部门中唯一有可以投资人民币的资格的附属公司，去年12月，离岸投资公司–中国国家开发银行国际控股公司在香港成立了，负责处理国家开发银行海外资本的投资运作，特别是直接的投资和资产管理。
Nevertheless, the CDB has not participated in the China-Russia Investment Fund (CRIF), announced last year with a capital of between $2 billion and $4 billion. It is now formalized that both the Chinese and the Russian side will contribute only $1 billion each from state sources, with the other $2 billion to be sought from private Chinese investors, although why the latter should avail themselves of the CRIF remains to be seen.
然而国家开发银行并不参加中俄的投资基金，这个基金会上年宣传有20亿到40的资本。现在中俄每年都会从国家预算中各拿10亿美元拨给这个基金会，剩下的20亿将交由中国私人投资者买单，尽管这么做为什么对他们有利还有待观察。
In the event, the Chinese and Russian leaderships saved the day by promising to increase trade turnover from $84 billion last year to $100 billion in 2015 and $200 billion in 2020. Towards this end, they signed no fewer than 20 agreements, accords, and memoranda of understanding in a variety of fields including energy efficiency, nuclear power production, transport machine building, and research and development in high-tech industries including information technology. An agreement on a joint venture to develop and build long-haul aircraft apparently eluded negotiators.
事情最后，中国和俄罗斯的领导人通过许诺把之间的贸易额从去年的840亿美元增加到2015年的100亿，并到2020年增加到200亿来挽回局面。朝着这个目标，他们签署了不下20个协议、谅解备忘录，涵盖了从能源效率，核能生产，传动装置的建设到包括信息产业等高科技产业的研发。然而一个共同研发和制造航天器的长远合作显然不在公布的这些协议之中。
太长了，不看了，楼主能不能浓缩点写啊。