西方智囊集团论述我解放军反卫星武器发展战略模式的理论 ...

Contention 3: Hegemony 3/5

Missile Defense is key to US hegemony because it dissuades other countries from asserting greater regional and global roles

Marko Beljac ’03 (writer for Dissident Voice, PhD from Monash University, and is a professor at the University of Melbourne, studies the interface between science and global security October 21, 2003 “The Political Economy of Hegemony, Survival and Self Deterrence” h t t p : / / dissidentvoice.org/Articles9/Beljac_Military-Economy.htm)
Ballistic Missile Defense is also meant to shore up US hegemony in another important respect. The Bush administration's National Security Strategy of the United States as well as its Nuclear Posture Review state that US military dominance, including strategic nuclear dominance, is necessary in order to "dissuade" any major centre of world power from even thinking about asserting greater regional and global roles. The ultimate expression of this would be the attainment of a global first strike nuclear capability, most especially over China and Russia but also keeping a weary eye over a possible Euro deterrent. Such a capability would ensure that the US would not have a comparative advantage in the use of force but an absolute advantage. Supercomputer simulations of the likely major attack options of the US nuclear war plan (Single Integrated Operational Plan or SIOP), the ones focused on Russia, indicate that after Russian capabilities have been degraded by about 90% diminishing returns rapidly set in. Hence the achievement of a first strike capability requires more than just an offence. A defense is needed in order to deal with any remaining weapons left after a first strike. Ballistic Missile Defense, we may surmise, is an important part of providing a shield or shadow behind which the US may continue to use military force to uphold the system of world order, a necessary task given the fact that this system does not enjoy the support of the world's population. One of the most important aspects of BMD is that it acts as a Trojan horse for the militarization of space. The logic on this is quite obvious. Any space based missile defense system will be highly vulnerable to counter-measures such as attack satellites. The Bush administrations National Security Presidential Directive 23 accordingly states, "the Defense Department plans to employ an evolutionary approach to the development and deployment of missile defenses to improve our defenses over time. The United States will not have a final, fixed missile defense architecture. Rather, we will deploy an initial set of capabilities that will evolve to meet the changing threat and to take advantage of technological developments." This is a clear indication that the architecture for the militarization of space will be built around missile defense, using the defense of the defense as a rationale for placing offensive weapons in space.

Contention 3: Hegemony 4/5

Space Weapons allow US to display dominance while being able to limit  spending of imperial ambitions

Everett C. Dolman, ’10 (Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS)”The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment )
There is little reason to believe the United States will forego the capacity to influence decisions and events beyond its borders, with military force if necessary. Whether that capacity comes from space as well as the other military domains is undetermined. But, the operational deployment of space weapons would increase that capacity by providing for nearly instantaneous force projection worldwide. This force would be precise, unstoppable, and deadly. At the same time, the United States would forgo some of its ability to intervene directly in other states because the necessary budget tradeoffs would diminish its capacity to do so. A space-heavy American military would structurally limit potential American imperial ambitions while simultaneously extending its global leadership role. The need to limit collateral damage, the requirement for precision to allay the low volume of fire, and the tremendous cost of space weapons will ensure they are used for high-value, time-sensitive targets. An opposing state’s calculation of survival no longer would depend on interpreting whether or not the United States desires to be a good neighbor; whether it will invade and occupy its territory. Without sovereignty at risk, fear of a space-dominant American military will subside. The United States will maintain its position of hegemony as well as its security, and the world will not be threatened by the specter of a future American empire. Geopolitics is in ascendance because it provides practical guidance to those who perceive the world in realist terms. The primary tenet of geostrategy is simple. In order to dominate the battlespace, it is necessary to control the most vital positions. If the most vital positions cannot be controlled, then they must be contested. The opponent cannot have uninhibited access to them. This simple dictum, known by every strategist and tactician but articulated so clearly by Mackinder, is the essence of the geostrategist’s logic. Control is desirable, contestation is imperative. This dictum applies to every medium and theater of war.

Contention 3: Hegemony 5/5

Heg good. US decline would be historically unprecedented and result in major conflict and global war

Robert A. Pape, ’09 ( Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest, January 2009 - February 2009)

THE UNITED States has always prided itself on exceptionalism, and the U.S. downfall is indeed extraordinary. Something fundamental has changed. America’s relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. Indeed, in size, it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline, the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  Most disturbing, whenever there are major changes in the balance of power, conflict routinely ensues. Examining the historical record reveals an important pattern: the states facing the largest declines in power compared to other major powers were apt to be the target of opportunistic aggression. And this is surely not the only possible danger from relative decline; states on the power wane also have a history of launching preventive wars to strengthen their positions. All of this suggests that major relative declines are often accompanied by highly dangerous international environments. So, these declines matter not just in terms of economics, but also because of their destabilizing consequences.

Contention 4: Solvency 1/2

Developing offensive counterspace capabilities, such as BMD, dissuade China from attacking US satellites.

Ashley Tellis 07, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. 'China's Military Space Strategy', Survival, 49:3, 41 – 72, h t t p : / / w w w .carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_china_space1.pdf

This has led some observers, such as US Senator Jon Kyl, to conclude that the solution to redressing emerging American space vulnerabilities in the context of competition with China lies in developing, among other things, US offensive counterspace capabilities. 90 These will almost certainly be required, if for no other reason than to deter Beijing’s use of anti-space weaponry and to hold at risk its own emerging assets in space, which are likely to become even more important for both economic and military purposes as China evolves into a great power. 91 Offensive American counterspace instruments serve the limited but critical purpose of raising the costs of China’s evolving space-denial strategy, increasing the probability that Beijing will desist from asymmetric attacks on US space assets.
U.S. Space Weaponization key to leadership, security and intelligence.
Rozoff ‘09 Rick Rozoff is an analyst with Liberty News Radio. June 18, 2009. “Militarization Of Space: “Threat Of Nuclear War On Earth”. h t t p : / / w w w .opednews.com/articles/Militarization-Of-Space-T-by-Rick-Rozoff-090619-728.html.

“Russian military experts see in this doctrine a disguised bid by the US for the weaponization of outer space. Anti-satellite weapons makes an integral part of the U.S. missile defence system.” The U.S. National Space Policy of 2006 states that “In this new century, those who effectively utilize space will enjoy added prosperity and security and will hold a substantial advantage over those who do not. Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power. In order to increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and to enhance the national security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space capabilities.” It further identifies goals of the policy to include the intention to: Strengthen the nation’s space leadership and ensure that space capabilities are available in time to further U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives Enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there Develop and deploy space capabilities that sustain U.S. advantage and support defense and intelligence transformation and provide, as launch agent for both the defense and intelligence sectors, reliable, affordable, and timely space access for national security purposes Support military planning and satisfy operational requirements as a major intelligence mission The same Russian general quoted above cited as an example of Washington’s space war plans the Pentagon’s downing of an American spy satellite in February of 2008, allegedly because it had become disabled.

Contention 4: Solvency 2/2

The solution is to build a powerful BMD system.

Howard Kleinberg 2011, member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington, April 2011. US Army Field Artillery Association, “A Global Missile Defense 'networK': Terrestrial High-Energy Lasers and Aerospace Mirrors,” p. Lexis
Fortunately, this recently -revealed, real-world ASAT threat also brings a silver lining in it. As is the case with ballistic missiles, SBBMD weapons can also defend against ASATs. All ASATs, at least, whether direct-ascent or co-orbiting, must first be launched from the Earth's surface, regardless of the launch platform, and must first go through a boost phase. And since SB-BMD provides the single best way to stop any such missile attack from taking place, Robert Butterworth, suggests inhis article, "Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs," it would also provide the single best way to defend against ASAT attacks; same mission, different payload inside the threat missile. SB-BMDs could also intercept ASATs in other phases of their flight, at least within lower Earth orbit. For instance, the Missile Defense Agency's GMD can intercept ICBM warheads at the peak of their trajectories, some 1, 100 km (500 miles) or so. Similarly, an ASAT (direct-ascent or co-orbiting) on terminal approach towards a satellite in LEO would present a target of comparable size, density and velocity as a "mid-course" ICBM warhead (if not even larger), at a similar altitude, and possibly similar speed and trajectory. As a result, the AS AT could also be targeted and interceptedby a midcoursedefense-capable SB-BMD weapon, in addition to its primary role of boost-phase defense, giving a "second-chance" round of shots with which to try to stop any ASAT.

Inherency

No Space Weapons Now

U.S. Lacks the space weapons to Back Up its Space Deterrence Policy

US State Department April 27th, 2007 (Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board, h t t p : / / w w w .state.gov/documents/organization/85263.pdf)

The ideal way, if possible, to protect our space assets is to dissuade others from developing and deploying ways to threaten them, but given the many ways available and the difficulty of identifying potential threats, this does not provide sufficient confidence. Besides, the United States has not been successful in dissuading at least a small number of countries from developing and acquiring means to attack its space systems. These capabilities exist, and are growing and spreading. Next, we need to be able to deter attacks on our systems, but what attacks and how? To rely on deterrence requires that we clearly define our interests and what we will regard as threats to them. It requires that all states and non-state actors be convinced that the United States will not tolerate attacks on or deliberate interference with our vital space systems, and that the United States has effective means to deal with such threats. This requires that the United States possess highly credible and potentially highly damaging responses, such that we can place confidence in reliance on deterrence. The ISAB is worried that deterrence against attacks confined to U.S. space assets, even though vital, lacks the high confidence necessary. At this time, the United States relies on dissuasion and deterrence, because it lacks the means to defend our space assets and to deny successful attacks on them. This is so despite the requirement in the 1996 and 2006 space policy directives that the United States be able to "deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests."

Solvency

Solvency General 1/2

The US Must defend its assets in space through Militarization

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis ’09 [Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Independent Working Group, 2009, “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, & The 21st century” h t t p : / / w w w .ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf]

Access to a secure space environment is indispensable if the United States is to deploy a robust, layered missile defense. It is essential not only to assure that the United States will be able to use space for missile defense, but also to develop the means to protect other space-based assets and infrastructure. Space has become an arena of crucial importance to the United States both for commercial purposes and for national security. Just as it must maintain capabilities to defend its interests in the air, at sea, and on land, the United States needs to defend its space-based assets. At the same time we must deny the hostile use of space by our enemies. Just as land, the seas, and the air have been conflict arenas, space is changing how wars are fought and where they will be fought.
Space Militarization will greatly help the US
Lambakis ’07 [Steven Lambakis, Writer for Hoover Institution, 2007, “Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense”

There are three combat mission areas in particular that could benefit significantly from a more thoroughgoing exploitation of space—space control, offensive strike, and missile defense. I will focus on the latter. Adding a space-based layer of hit-tokill interceptors to enhance the performance of the newly deployed United States ballistic missile defense system could offer numerous military and diplomatic advantages. Highly effective defenses against ballistic missiles carrying nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction would offer a great pay-off over the long-term when one takes into account threat and national vulnerability to catastrophic attack.

The US heavily relies on space and must militarize before anyone else does

Wilson ’01 [Tom Wilson, Space Commission Staff Member, 2001, “Threats to United States Space Capabilities” h t t p : / / w w w .globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2001/nssmo/article05.html]

The employment of space systems increases the effectiveness of terrestrial warfighters by performing as a force multiplier. In peace, space systems are a key element of deterrence. In crisis, they provide a wide spectrum of options to the National Command Authorities and Commanders in Chief while providing confidence to our allies. In war, space systems enhance combat effectiveness, reduce casualties and minimize equipment loss. At the same time, the United States' (U.S.) increasing economic and military dependence on space creates a vulnerability that is an attractive target for our foreign adversaries. If adversaries are able to employ offensive counterspace operations--operations which are intended to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy U.S. space systems--the force multiplication effect they provide would be reduced or eliminated. This could lead to more expensive victories or even to defeat.

Solvency General 2/2

U.S. should Develop and Test Space Weapons to Avoid Strategic Surprise

John E. Hyten April 2000 (A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space, Urbana-Champaign, IL, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, h t t p : / / acdis.illinois.edu/Research/OPs/Hyten/html/cover.html)

Failure to fully develop and test such capabilities and such weapons could make the United States vulnerable to surprises from other nations in the future. Gen. John L. Piotrowski, former commander of the U.S. Space Command said, on many occasions, that when it came to space weapons the one thing the United States couldn’t afford to be was second. A robust program developing capabilities for space control should be laid out to explore new technologies, integrate them into new weapons systems, and fully test them both in laboratory and field demonstrations. Since the goal would be not to deploy such weapons until absolutely required (and when that time would come is unknown), an urgent "crash" program is not needed. However, unless aggressive programs (in terms of funding and schedules) are developed, little progress will be made. In this time of strategic pause, programs can be implemented that are aggressive, but take the necessary time to time to fully explore different technologies and thoroughly test and check out systems when developed. If the systems actually reach maturity, and there is still no pressing need for deployment, they can be set aside until such a situation arises.

Military Commanders and Policymakers need a range of options, including Space Weapons, to Respond to Attacks on U.S. Space Assets

Marc J. Berkowitz, March 2007 (Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2, h t t p : / / w w w .spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf)

Given that doing nothing in the face of enemy aggression in space is not an attractive option, and diplomatic demarches and economic sanctions may not achieve the desired results, national security planners must be prepared in advance with a range of options for the impending contingency of responding to hostile interference with US interests in space. The tailoring of responses involving military activities must take into account the possibility that the adversary may not own or operate spacecraft or find a tat-for-tat response sufficiently compelling to change its behavior. Deterring additional strikes and disarming the enemy's ability to inflict further damage on critical US space assets should take priority. Countering the enemy's space control weapons, C2, and targeting, as noted above, will be important approaches to achieving such a counterforce mission objective.

ASAT Solvency 1/2

Developing offensive counterspace capabilities, such as BMD, dissuade China from attacking US satellites.

Ashley Tellis, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. 'China's Military Space Strategy', Survival, 49:3, 41 – 72, h t t p : / / w w w .carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_china_space1.pdf

This has led some observers, such as US Senator Jon Kyl, to conclude that the solution to redressing emerging American space vulnerabilities in the context of competition with China lies in developing, among other things, US offensive counterspace capabilities. 90 These will almost certainly be required, if for no other reason than to deter Beijing’s use of anti-space weaponry and to hold at risk its own emerging assets in space, which are likely to become even more important for both economic and military purposes as China evolves into a great power. 91 Offensive American counterspace instruments serve the limited but critical purpose of raising the costs of China’s evolving space-denial strategy, increasing the probability that Beijing will desist from asymmetric attacks on US space assets.

U.S. Space Weaponization key to leadership, security and intelligence.

Rozoff ‘09 Rick Rozoff is an analyst with Liberty News Radio. June 18, 2009. “Militarization Of Space: “Threat Of Nuclear War On Earth”. h t t p : / / w w w .opednews.com/articles/Militarization-Of-Space-T-by-Rick-Rozoff-090619-728.html.
“Russian military experts see in this doctrine a disguised bid by the US for the weaponization of outer space. Anti-satellite weapons makes an integral part of the U.S. missile defence system.” The U.S. National Space Policy of 2006 states that “In this new century, those who effectively utilize space will enjoy added prosperity and security and will hold a substantial advantage over those who do not. Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power. In order to increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and to enhance the national security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space capabilities.” It further identifies goals of the policy to include the intention to: Strengthen the nation’s space leadership and ensure that space capabilities are available in time to further U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives Enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there Develop and deploy space capabilities that sustain U.S. advantage and support defense and intelligence transformation and provide, as launch agent for both the defense and intelligence sectors, reliable, affordable, and timely space access for national security purposes Support military planning and satisfy operational requirements as a major intelligence mission The same Russian general quoted above cited as an example of Washington’s space war plans the Pentagon’s downing of an American spy satellite in February of 2008, allegedly because it had become disabled.

ASAT Solvency 2/2

The solution is to build a powerful BMD system.

Howard Kleinberg, member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington, April 2011. US Army Field Artillery Association, “A Global Missile Defense 'networK': Terrestrial High-Energy Lasers and Aerospace Mirrors,” p. Lexis
Fortunately, this recently -revealed, real-world ASAT threat also brings a silver lining in it. As is the case with ballistic missiles, SBBMD weapons can also defend against ASATs. All ASATs, at least, whether direct-ascent or co-orbiting, must first be launched from the Earth's surface, regardless of the launch platform, and must first go through a boost phase. And since SB-BMD provides the single best way to stop any such missile attack from taking place, Robert Butterworth, suggests inhis article, "Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs," it would also provide the single best way to defend against ASAT attacks; same mission, different payload inside the threat missile. SB-BMDs could also intercept ASATs in other phases of their flight, at least within lower Earth orbit. For instance, the Missile Defense Agency's GMD can intercept ICBM warheads at the peak of their trajectories, some 1, 100 km (500 miles) or so. Similarly, an ASAT (direct-ascent or co-orbiting) on terminal approach towards a satellite in LEO would present a target of comparable size, density and velocity as a "mid-course" ICBM warhead (if not even larger), at a similar altitude, and possibly similar speed and trajectory. As a result, the AS AT could also be targeted and interceptedby a midcoursedefense-capable SB-BMD weapon, in addition to its primary role of boost-phase defense, giving a "second-chance" round of shots with which to try to stop any ASAT.

Hegemony Solvency 1/3

America must act now, before its too late and the national and global community would be affected for the worse

Dolman ’05 [Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” 9-14-05, h t t p : / / w w w .e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf]


Space weaponization is a critical and necessary component in the process of transformation well under way, a process that cannot be reversed. Once America demonstrated the capacity to strike precisely, it could only go back to the kind of indiscriminant targeting and heavy collateral damage that characterized pre-space warfare if it were engaged in a war of national survival. And if there are future technological, economic, and perhaps social benefits to be derived from developing and deploying weapons, they will certainly not come from increasing the stock of current systems. They will only come, if at all, from the development of new, highly complex and scientifically heuristic space, stealth, precision, and information systems. As leader of the international community, the United States finds itself in the unenviable position that it must make decisions for the good of all. On the issue of space weaponization, there appears no one best option. No matter the choice selected, there are those who will benefit and those who will suffer. The tragedy of American power is that it must make a choice, and the worst choice is to do nothing. And yet, in the process of choosing, it has a great advantage—the moral ambiguity of its people regarding the use of power. There is no question that corrupted power is a dangerous thing, but perhaps only Americans are so concerned with the possibility that they themselves will be corrupted. They fear what they could become. No other state has such potential for self-restraint. It is this introspection, this self-angst that makes America the best choice to lead the world today and tomorrow. It is not perfect, but perhaps it is perfectible.

US dominance allows it to police the globe and keep other states under surveillance.

Bruce Sterling, April 2002 (“Peace is War”, Wired Magazine Volume 10, No.4, h t t p : / / w w w .wired.com/wired/archive/10.04/sdi.html)

The US military improves every time it does this. Its skill today boggles the mind. Satellites detect objects on the ground and relay their coordinates to commanders in hardened bunkers thousands of miles away, who radio the data to Green Berets and Delta Force soldiers carrying laser pointers in the field. The pointers point. The bombers bomb. The enemy evaporates. The world's fourth-largest army: smashed. Battle-hardened Balkan fighters: smashed. The most feared and respected mountain bandits on earth: smashed. It's a new strategic reality. The Pentagon's role in world affairs has gone through an epochal transformation: from the Fulda Gap to the Highway of Death, from Agent Orange to GPS, from arsenal of democracy to global cop. When you're a cop, sometimes you kick doors in. Most of the time you stay on patrol. Outer space is where a global cop patrols. America's eyes, ears, and nerves are up there, all day, everyday, circling the blue yonder. Space vehicles are the ultimate asymmetrical asset. They can't be reached with a hijacked jet. They laugh at anthrax. The point of having cops is to manage robbers. The trick is to keep the robbers earthbound.

Contention 3: Hegemony 3/5

Missile Defense is key to US hegemony because it dissuades other countries from asserting greater regional and global roles

Marko Beljac ’03 (writer for Dissident Voice, PhD from Monash University, and is a professor at the University of Melbourne, studies the interface between science and global security October 21, 2003 “The Political Economy of Hegemony, Survival and Self Deterrence” h t t p : / / dissidentvoice.org/Articles9/Beljac_Military-Economy.htm)
Ballistic Missile Defense is also meant to shore up US hegemony in another important respect. The Bush administration's National Security Strategy of the United States as well as its Nuclear Posture Review state that US military dominance, including strategic nuclear dominance, is necessary in order to "dissuade" any major centre of world power from even thinking about asserting greater regional and global roles. The ultimate expression of this would be the attainment of a global first strike nuclear capability, most especially over China and Russia but also keeping a weary eye over a possible Euro deterrent. Such a capability would ensure that the US would not have a comparative advantage in the use of force but an absolute advantage. Supercomputer simulations of the likely major attack options of the US nuclear war plan (Single Integrated Operational Plan or SIOP), the ones focused on Russia, indicate that after Russian capabilities have been degraded by about 90% diminishing returns rapidly set in. Hence the achievement of a first strike capability requires more than just an offence. A defense is needed in order to deal with any remaining weapons left after a first strike. Ballistic Missile Defense, we may surmise, is an important part of providing a shield or shadow behind which the US may continue to use military force to uphold the system of world order, a necessary task given the fact that this system does not enjoy the support of the world's population. One of the most important aspects of BMD is that it acts as a Trojan horse for the militarization of space. The logic on this is quite obvious. Any space based missile defense system will be highly vulnerable to counter-measures such as attack satellites. The Bush administrations National Security Presidential Directive 23 accordingly states, "the Defense Department plans to employ an evolutionary approach to the development and deployment of missile defenses to improve our defenses over time. The United States will not have a final, fixed missile defense architecture. Rather, we will deploy an initial set of capabilities that will evolve to meet the changing threat and to take advantage of technological developments." This is a clear indication that the architecture for the militarization of space will be built around missile defense, using the defense of the defense as a rationale for placing offensive weapons in space.

Contention 3: Hegemony 4/5

Space Weapons allow US to display dominance while being able to limit  spending of imperial ambitions

Everett C. Dolman, ’10 (Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS)”The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment )
There is little reason to believe the United States will forego the capacity to influence decisions and events beyond its borders, with military force if necessary. Whether that capacity comes from space as well as the other military domains is undetermined. But, the operational deployment of space weapons would increase that capacity by providing for nearly instantaneous force projection worldwide. This force would be precise, unstoppable, and deadly. At the same time, the United States would forgo some of its ability to intervene directly in other states because the necessary budget tradeoffs would diminish its capacity to do so. A space-heavy American military would structurally limit potential American imperial ambitions while simultaneously extending its global leadership role. The need to limit collateral damage, the requirement for precision to allay the low volume of fire, and the tremendous cost of space weapons will ensure they are used for high-value, time-sensitive targets. An opposing state’s calculation of survival no longer would depend on interpreting whether or not the United States desires to be a good neighbor; whether it will invade and occupy its territory. Without sovereignty at risk, fear of a space-dominant American military will subside. The United States will maintain its position of hegemony as well as its security, and the world will not be threatened by the specter of a future American empire. Geopolitics is in ascendance because it provides practical guidance to those who perceive the world in realist terms. The primary tenet of geostrategy is simple. In order to dominate the battlespace, it is necessary to control the most vital positions. If the most vital positions cannot be controlled, then they must be contested. The opponent cannot have uninhibited access to them. This simple dictum, known by every strategist and tactician but articulated so clearly by Mackinder, is the essence of the geostrategist’s logic. Control is desirable, contestation is imperative. This dictum applies to every medium and theater of war.

Contention 3: Hegemony 5/5

Heg good. US decline would be historically unprecedented and result in major conflict and global war

Robert A. Pape, ’09 ( Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest, January 2009 - February 2009)

THE UNITED States has always prided itself on exceptionalism, and the U.S. downfall is indeed extraordinary. Something fundamental has changed. America’s relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. Indeed, in size, it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline, the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  Most disturbing, whenever there are major changes in the balance of power, conflict routinely ensues. Examining the historical record reveals an important pattern: the states facing the largest declines in power compared to other major powers were apt to be the target of opportunistic aggression. And this is surely not the only possible danger from relative decline; states on the power wane also have a history of launching preventive wars to strengthen their positions. All of this suggests that major relative declines are often accompanied by highly dangerous international environments. So, these declines matter not just in terms of economics, but also because of their destabilizing consequences.

Contention 4: Solvency 1/2

Developing offensive counterspace capabilities, such as BMD, dissuade China from attacking US satellites.

Ashley Tellis 07, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. 'China's Military Space Strategy', Survival, 49:3, 41 – 72, h t t p : / / w w w .carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_china_space1.pdf

This has led some observers, such as US Senator Jon Kyl, to conclude that the solution to redressing emerging American space vulnerabilities in the context of competition with China lies in developing, among other things, US offensive counterspace capabilities. 90 These will almost certainly be required, if for no other reason than to deter Beijing’s use of anti-space weaponry and to hold at risk its own emerging assets in space, which are likely to become even more important for both economic and military purposes as China evolves into a great power. 91 Offensive American counterspace instruments serve the limited but critical purpose of raising the costs of China’s evolving space-denial strategy, increasing the probability that Beijing will desist from asymmetric attacks on US space assets.
U.S. Space Weaponization key to leadership, security and intelligence.
Rozoff ‘09 Rick Rozoff is an analyst with Liberty News Radio. June 18, 2009. “Militarization Of Space: “Threat Of Nuclear War On Earth”. h t t p : / / w w w .opednews.com/articles/Militarization-Of-Space-T-by-Rick-Rozoff-090619-728.html.

“Russian military experts see in this doctrine a disguised bid by the US for the weaponization of outer space. Anti-satellite weapons makes an integral part of the U.S. missile defence system.” The U.S. National Space Policy of 2006 states that “In this new century, those who effectively utilize space will enjoy added prosperity and security and will hold a substantial advantage over those who do not. Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power. In order to increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and to enhance the national security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space capabilities.” It further identifies goals of the policy to include the intention to: Strengthen the nation’s space leadership and ensure that space capabilities are available in time to further U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives Enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there Develop and deploy space capabilities that sustain U.S. advantage and support defense and intelligence transformation and provide, as launch agent for both the defense and intelligence sectors, reliable, affordable, and timely space access for national security purposes Support military planning and satisfy operational requirements as a major intelligence mission The same Russian general quoted above cited as an example of Washington’s space war plans the Pentagon’s downing of an American spy satellite in February of 2008, allegedly because it had become disabled.

Contention 4: Solvency 2/2

The solution is to build a powerful BMD system.

Howard Kleinberg 2011, member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington, April 2011. US Army Field Artillery Association, “A Global Missile Defense 'networK': Terrestrial High-Energy Lasers and Aerospace Mirrors,” p. Lexis
Fortunately, this recently -revealed, real-world ASAT threat also brings a silver lining in it. As is the case with ballistic missiles, SBBMD weapons can also defend against ASATs. All ASATs, at least, whether direct-ascent or co-orbiting, must first be launched from the Earth's surface, regardless of the launch platform, and must first go through a boost phase. And since SB-BMD provides the single best way to stop any such missile attack from taking place, Robert Butterworth, suggests inhis article, "Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs," it would also provide the single best way to defend against ASAT attacks; same mission, different payload inside the threat missile. SB-BMDs could also intercept ASATs in other phases of their flight, at least within lower Earth orbit. For instance, the Missile Defense Agency's GMD can intercept ICBM warheads at the peak of their trajectories, some 1, 100 km (500 miles) or so. Similarly, an ASAT (direct-ascent or co-orbiting) on terminal approach towards a satellite in LEO would present a target of comparable size, density and velocity as a "mid-course" ICBM warhead (if not even larger), at a similar altitude, and possibly similar speed and trajectory. As a result, the AS AT could also be targeted and interceptedby a midcoursedefense-capable SB-BMD weapon, in addition to its primary role of boost-phase defense, giving a "second-chance" round of shots with which to try to stop any ASAT.

Inherency

No Space Weapons Now

U.S. Lacks the space weapons to Back Up its Space Deterrence Policy

US State Department April 27th, 2007 (Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board, h t t p : / / w w w .state.gov/documents/organization/85263.pdf)

The ideal way, if possible, to protect our space assets is to dissuade others from developing and deploying ways to threaten them, but given the many ways available and the difficulty of identifying potential threats, this does not provide sufficient confidence. Besides, the United States has not been successful in dissuading at least a small number of countries from developing and acquiring means to attack its space systems. These capabilities exist, and are growing and spreading. Next, we need to be able to deter attacks on our systems, but what attacks and how? To rely on deterrence requires that we clearly define our interests and what we will regard as threats to them. It requires that all states and non-state actors be convinced that the United States will not tolerate attacks on or deliberate interference with our vital space systems, and that the United States has effective means to deal with such threats. This requires that the United States possess highly credible and potentially highly damaging responses, such that we can place confidence in reliance on deterrence. The ISAB is worried that deterrence against attacks confined to U.S. space assets, even though vital, lacks the high confidence necessary. At this time, the United States relies on dissuasion and deterrence, because it lacks the means to defend our space assets and to deny successful attacks on them. This is so despite the requirement in the 1996 and 2006 space policy directives that the United States be able to "deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests."

Solvency

Solvency General 1/2

The US Must defend its assets in space through Militarization

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis ’09 [Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Independent Working Group, 2009, “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, & The 21st century” h t t p : / / w w w .ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf]

Access to a secure space environment is indispensable if the United States is to deploy a robust, layered missile defense. It is essential not only to assure that the United States will be able to use space for missile defense, but also to develop the means to protect other space-based assets and infrastructure. Space has become an arena of crucial importance to the United States both for commercial purposes and for national security. Just as it must maintain capabilities to defend its interests in the air, at sea, and on land, the United States needs to defend its space-based assets. At the same time we must deny the hostile use of space by our enemies. Just as land, the seas, and the air have been conflict arenas, space is changing how wars are fought and where they will be fought.
Space Militarization will greatly help the US
Lambakis ’07 [Steven Lambakis, Writer for Hoover Institution, 2007, “Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense”

There are three combat mission areas in particular that could benefit significantly from a more thoroughgoing exploitation of space—space control, offensive strike, and missile defense. I will focus on the latter. Adding a space-based layer of hit-tokill interceptors to enhance the performance of the newly deployed United States ballistic missile defense system could offer numerous military and diplomatic advantages. Highly effective defenses against ballistic missiles carrying nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction would offer a great pay-off over the long-term when one takes into account threat and national vulnerability to catastrophic attack.

The US heavily relies on space and must militarize before anyone else does

Wilson ’01 [Tom Wilson, Space Commission Staff Member, 2001, “Threats to United States Space Capabilities” h t t p : / / w w w .globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2001/nssmo/article05.html]

The employment of space systems increases the effectiveness of terrestrial warfighters by performing as a force multiplier. In peace, space systems are a key element of deterrence. In crisis, they provide a wide spectrum of options to the National Command Authorities and Commanders in Chief while providing confidence to our allies. In war, space systems enhance combat effectiveness, reduce casualties and minimize equipment loss. At the same time, the United States' (U.S.) increasing economic and military dependence on space creates a vulnerability that is an attractive target for our foreign adversaries. If adversaries are able to employ offensive counterspace operations--operations which are intended to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy U.S. space systems--the force multiplication effect they provide would be reduced or eliminated. This could lead to more expensive victories or even to defeat.

Solvency General 2/2

U.S. should Develop and Test Space Weapons to Avoid Strategic Surprise

John E. Hyten April 2000 (A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space, Urbana-Champaign, IL, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, h t t p : / / acdis.illinois.edu/Research/OPs/Hyten/html/cover.html)

Failure to fully develop and test such capabilities and such weapons could make the United States vulnerable to surprises from other nations in the future. Gen. John L. Piotrowski, former commander of the U.S. Space Command said, on many occasions, that when it came to space weapons the one thing the United States couldn’t afford to be was second. A robust program developing capabilities for space control should be laid out to explore new technologies, integrate them into new weapons systems, and fully test them both in laboratory and field demonstrations. Since the goal would be not to deploy such weapons until absolutely required (and when that time would come is unknown), an urgent "crash" program is not needed. However, unless aggressive programs (in terms of funding and schedules) are developed, little progress will be made. In this time of strategic pause, programs can be implemented that are aggressive, but take the necessary time to time to fully explore different technologies and thoroughly test and check out systems when developed. If the systems actually reach maturity, and there is still no pressing need for deployment, they can be set aside until such a situation arises.

Military Commanders and Policymakers need a range of options, including Space Weapons, to Respond to Attacks on U.S. Space Assets

Marc J. Berkowitz, March 2007 (Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2, h t t p : / / w w w .spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf)

Given that doing nothing in the face of enemy aggression in space is not an attractive option, and diplomatic demarches and economic sanctions may not achieve the desired results, national security planners must be prepared in advance with a range of options for the impending contingency of responding to hostile interference with US interests in space. The tailoring of responses involving military activities must take into account the possibility that the adversary may not own or operate spacecraft or find a tat-for-tat response sufficiently compelling to change its behavior. Deterring additional strikes and disarming the enemy's ability to inflict further damage on critical US space assets should take priority. Countering the enemy's space control weapons, C2, and targeting, as noted above, will be important approaches to achieving such a counterforce mission objective.

ASAT Solvency 1/2

Developing offensive counterspace capabilities, such as BMD, dissuade China from attacking US satellites.

Ashley Tellis, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. 'China's Military Space Strategy', Survival, 49:3, 41 – 72, h t t p : / / w w w .carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_china_space1.pdf

This has led some observers, such as US Senator Jon Kyl, to conclude that the solution to redressing emerging American space vulnerabilities in the context of competition with China lies in developing, among other things, US offensive counterspace capabilities. 90 These will almost certainly be required, if for no other reason than to deter Beijing’s use of anti-space weaponry and to hold at risk its own emerging assets in space, which are likely to become even more important for both economic and military purposes as China evolves into a great power. 91 Offensive American counterspace instruments serve the limited but critical purpose of raising the costs of China’s evolving space-denial strategy, increasing the probability that Beijing will desist from asymmetric attacks on US space assets.

U.S. Space Weaponization key to leadership, security and intelligence.

Rozoff ‘09 Rick Rozoff is an analyst with Liberty News Radio. June 18, 2009. “Militarization Of Space: “Threat Of Nuclear War On Earth”. h t t p : / / w w w .opednews.com/articles/Militarization-Of-Space-T-by-Rick-Rozoff-090619-728.html.
“Russian military experts see in this doctrine a disguised bid by the US for the weaponization of outer space. Anti-satellite weapons makes an integral part of the U.S. missile defence system.” The U.S. National Space Policy of 2006 states that “In this new century, those who effectively utilize space will enjoy added prosperity and security and will hold a substantial advantage over those who do not. Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power. In order to increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and to enhance the national security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space capabilities.” It further identifies goals of the policy to include the intention to: Strengthen the nation’s space leadership and ensure that space capabilities are available in time to further U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives Enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there Develop and deploy space capabilities that sustain U.S. advantage and support defense and intelligence transformation and provide, as launch agent for both the defense and intelligence sectors, reliable, affordable, and timely space access for national security purposes Support military planning and satisfy operational requirements as a major intelligence mission The same Russian general quoted above cited as an example of Washington’s space war plans the Pentagon’s downing of an American spy satellite in February of 2008, allegedly because it had become disabled.

ASAT Solvency 2/2

The solution is to build a powerful BMD system.

Howard Kleinberg, member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington, April 2011. US Army Field Artillery Association, “A Global Missile Defense 'networK': Terrestrial High-Energy Lasers and Aerospace Mirrors,” p. Lexis
Fortunately, this recently -revealed, real-world ASAT threat also brings a silver lining in it. As is the case with ballistic missiles, SBBMD weapons can also defend against ASATs. All ASATs, at least, whether direct-ascent or co-orbiting, must first be launched from the Earth's surface, regardless of the launch platform, and must first go through a boost phase. And since SB-BMD provides the single best way to stop any such missile attack from taking place, Robert Butterworth, suggests inhis article, "Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs," it would also provide the single best way to defend against ASAT attacks; same mission, different payload inside the threat missile. SB-BMDs could also intercept ASATs in other phases of their flight, at least within lower Earth orbit. For instance, the Missile Defense Agency's GMD can intercept ICBM warheads at the peak of their trajectories, some 1, 100 km (500 miles) or so. Similarly, an ASAT (direct-ascent or co-orbiting) on terminal approach towards a satellite in LEO would present a target of comparable size, density and velocity as a "mid-course" ICBM warhead (if not even larger), at a similar altitude, and possibly similar speed and trajectory. As a result, the AS AT could also be targeted and interceptedby a midcoursedefense-capable SB-BMD weapon, in addition to its primary role of boost-phase defense, giving a "second-chance" round of shots with which to try to stop any ASAT.

Hegemony Solvency 1/3

America must act now, before its too late and the national and global community would be affected for the worse

Dolman ’05 [Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” 9-14-05, h t t p : / / w w w .e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf]


Space weaponization is a critical and necessary component in the process of transformation well under way, a process that cannot be reversed. Once America demonstrated the capacity to strike precisely, it could only go back to the kind of indiscriminant targeting and heavy collateral damage that characterized pre-space warfare if it were engaged in a war of national survival. And if there are future technological, economic, and perhaps social benefits to be derived from developing and deploying weapons, they will certainly not come from increasing the stock of current systems. They will only come, if at all, from the development of new, highly complex and scientifically heuristic space, stealth, precision, and information systems. As leader of the international community, the United States finds itself in the unenviable position that it must make decisions for the good of all. On the issue of space weaponization, there appears no one best option. No matter the choice selected, there are those who will benefit and those who will suffer. The tragedy of American power is that it must make a choice, and the worst choice is to do nothing. And yet, in the process of choosing, it has a great advantage—the moral ambiguity of its people regarding the use of power. There is no question that corrupted power is a dangerous thing, but perhaps only Americans are so concerned with the possibility that they themselves will be corrupted. They fear what they could become. No other state has such potential for self-restraint. It is this introspection, this self-angst that makes America the best choice to lead the world today and tomorrow. It is not perfect, but perhaps it is perfectible.

US dominance allows it to police the globe and keep other states under surveillance.

Bruce Sterling, April 2002 (“Peace is War”, Wired Magazine Volume 10, No.4, h t t p : / / w w w .wired.com/wired/archive/10.04/sdi.html)

The US military improves every time it does this. Its skill today boggles the mind. Satellites detect objects on the ground and relay their coordinates to commanders in hardened bunkers thousands of miles away, who radio the data to Green Berets and Delta Force soldiers carrying laser pointers in the field. The pointers point. The bombers bomb. The enemy evaporates. The world's fourth-largest army: smashed. Battle-hardened Balkan fighters: smashed. The most feared and respected mountain bandits on earth: smashed. It's a new strategic reality. The Pentagon's role in world affairs has gone through an epochal transformation: from the Fulda Gap to the Highway of Death, from Agent Orange to GPS, from arsenal of democracy to global cop. When you're a cop, sometimes you kick doors in. Most of the time you stay on patrol. Outer space is where a global cop patrols. America's eyes, ears, and nerves are up there, all day, everyday, circling the blue yonder. Space vehicles are the ultimate asymmetrical asset. They can't be reached with a hijacked jet. They laugh at anthrax. The point of having cops is to manage robbers. The trick is to keep the robbers earthbound.

increases radiation levels in the Earth’s natural radiation belts.

Solvency-Only Space BMD Solves 2/2

Space BMD proven and developed
Unknown author July 26, 2006 “Coyle takes aim at Brilliant Pebbles”. The Claremont Institute: Claremont, CA
Would Brilliant Pebbles work? Coyle does not mention that Brilliant Pebbles had successfully completed its simulation stage and was ready to move to the proof-of-concept, prototype, and performance testing stages when it was effectively starved of funding as the Clinton administration came to power. Nor does he mention that in 1994 NASA launched a deep-space probe mission known as “Clementine,” constructed with first-generation Brilliant Pebbles hardware. The mission, which cost $80 million, effectively “space-qualified” Brilliant Pebbles technology, even though the missile defense program had already been eliminated.
        
Would Brilliant Pebbles be too expensive? The newly released report by the Independent Working Group entitled Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century—the report cited by the UPI piece—puts the total cost of a 1,000-satellite constellation of Brilliant Pebbles at $16 billion, based on the fully approved Defense Acquisition Board plan from 1991. The figure includes the costs of developing, testing, deploying, and operating Brilliant Pebbles over a 20-year period using a low-to-moderate risk, event-driven acquisition schedule. Many would agree that $16 billion dollars is a small price to pay for the protection of the U.S. and its allies from ballistic missile attack and nuclear devastation.

Brilliant Pebbles technology space-tested
Hoffman, Ian September 10, 2002. (“Physicists' war games led to brilliant space defense plan” Oakland Tribune.
Teller and Wood sold the idea in Washington and translated it into hardware, with Wood towing a sample pebble on a cart through the corridors of power. At the time, wags joked that after smart rocks and Brilliant Pebbles could only come "genius dust." Critics rolled their eyes and denounced the weaponization of the heavens. But of all SDI's beams and schemes, the pebbles came closest to the reality. Its major components were tested next to exploding nuclear bombs in the Nevada desert. They flew to the moon and mapped it in the Clementine mission
The Soviets couldn’t counter Brilliant Pebbles
Hoffman, Ian September 10, 2002. (“Physicists' war games led to brilliant space defense plan” Oakland Tribune.
In 1991, former Soviet weaponeers told Canavan that they labored hard but couldn't theorize a cost-effective assault against Brilliant Pebbles. "They said they realized at their level of technology they could not beat the Brilliant Pebble and it would bankrupt them to even try. So they didn't try."
Brilliant Pebbles technology space-tested
Hoffman, Ian September 10, 2002. (“Physicists' war games led to brilliant space defense plan” Oakland Tribune.
Teller and Wood sold the idea in Washington and translated it into hardware, with Wood towing a sample pebble on a cart through the corridors of power. At the time, wags joked that after smart rocks and Brilliant Pebbles could only come "genius dust." Critics rolled their eyes and denounced the weaponization of the heavens. But of all SDI's beams and schemes, the pebbles came closest to the reality. Its major components were tested next to exploding nuclear bombs in the Nevada desert. They flew to the moon and mapped it in the Clementine mission

Solvency – First Mover Key 1/2

Other countries would not try to counter the American nuclear weapons, as long as America is the first to deploy
Dolman ’05 [Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” 9-14-05, h t t p : / / w w w .e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf]

Indeed, it is concern for the unanticipated arrival of technology X that initially motivates my own preference for a policy advocating immediate deployment of space weapons. So long as America is the state most likely to acquire a breakthrough technology in this area, my concern is limited to the problem of letting technology take us where it will. But what if an enemy of democratic liberalism should suddenly acquire the means to place quickly and cheaply multiple weapons into orbit? The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any liberal state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to our already-dependent military force could cause the immediate demise of the extant international system. The longer the US dithers on its responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America could respond. And America would respond … finally. But would another state? If America were to weaponize space today, it is unlikely that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the infrastructure necessary is too high; hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment it would take to achieve a minimal counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the US to entrench itself in space, and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments in kind. They might oppose US interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively America uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the US deploy weapons there—at least for the next few years—is extremely remote.
Various Countries including China and India already have technology that could be used to attack US Satellites
Major Adkins ’05 [Major Larry Adkins, High Frontier Journal, 9-15-2005, “ Space Superiority: Does the US Really Have It? h t t p : / / w w w .afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070622-057.pdf]

Technologically, our adversaries have the capability to blind imagery satellites or jam satellite signals. 4 According to Leonard David’s article in Space.com, laser technology is rapidly becoming available to blind imagery satellites. 5 Countries and individuals have also shown they are willing and able to deliberately disrupt communication satellites. In 1997, India jammed Tongasat because of a disagreement over possession of a geosynchronous orbit slot. 6 In 1998, MED-TV accused Turkey of jamming its Kurdish broadcast channel that is beamed to 70 countries. 7 In early 2003, the FBI charged six people for selling software and decryption devices that allowed consumers to “steal” satellite television signals (e.g., DirectTV) which they had not paid for. 8 As late as the summer of 2003, the Iranian Embassy in Cuba reportedly jammed Voice of America satellite broadcasts being sent to Iran.

Solvency – First Mover Key 2/2

US space militarization key to counter threats from China and Russia.

Bill Gertz, 1/17/2007 (editor of Washington Times, Moscow, Beijing eye space weapons; Senate alerted to Pentagon fears, h t t p : / / w w w .lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/)

China and Russia are developing space weapons and are among several nations working on systems to threaten U.S. satellites with lasers or missiles, says the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In Senate testimony last week, Army Lt. Gen. Michael Maples for the first time raised Pentagon concerns about secret Chinese and Russian space weapons programs. "Russia and China continue to be the primary states of concern regarding military space and counterspace programs," Gen. Maples said at the annual threat briefing of the Senate intelligence committee. Gen. Maples said that "several countries continue to develop capabilities that have the potential to threaten U.S. space assets, and some have already deployed systems with inherent anti-satellite capabilities, such as satellite-tracking laser range-finding devices and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles." Other countries are working on improving space-object tracking and "kinetic or directed energy weapons capabilities." Gen. Maples did not discuss the reported testing of a Chinese anti-satellite laser against a U.S. satellite, which triggered high-level Bush administration worries about Beijing's growing space-weapons program. U.S. officials said details about the Chinese anti-satellite laser shot remain classified so as not to alert China about U.S. knowledge of what intelligence officials say may have been a test shot of an anti-satellite weapon. China has developed several types of ground-based lasers with Russian and Israeli technology, U.S. officials have said. Russia developed anti-satellite weapons during the Cold War, and U.S. officials think the Russian military is continuing work on the weapons, which include both anti-satellite missiles and ground-based lasers. Both Russia and China deny that they are building space weapons and have sought to curb U.S. space defenses through a proposed international ban on weapons in space. The Air Force in 2004 deployed the 76th Space Control Squadron, which can disrupt or knock out foreign satellites using electronic jammers from the ground. Nations other than Russia and China that have space capabilities in key areas also "will acquire military and commercial space-based assets," Gen. Maples said. "Increasing levels of international cooperation, along with the growing number of commercial space consortia, is allowing the proliferation of advanced satellite technologies and knowledge of space systems operations to become available to nations lacking a domestic space capability," he said. Gen. Maples said that building space weapons is "financially taxing" and that "most countries assessed to be pursuing these capabilities are not expected to acquire them within the next few years." He warned, however, that less-developed states and "nonstate entities" also "are pursuing more limited and asymmetric approaches that do not require excessive financial resources or a high-tech industrial base."

Solvency – Militarization  Deterrence

If the US militarizes space, the impact of that presence will deter other countries from doing something similar
Whiting ’02 [Stephen N. Whiting, School of  Advanced Airpower Studies, June 2002, “Policy, Influence, and Diplomacy: Space as a Natural Element” h t t p : / / w w w . au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/whiting.pdf]
The sixth component of space assets’ diplomatic power is the ability to shape behavior and exert influence through presence. As defined in the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting United States influence and access.  Put another way, presence is the proximity of space assets to a location, such that international actors change their behavior or are deterred based solely on the location of space assets. The ability to influence other states due to the presence of space assets, or any military force, is based on the impact of those forces on other states’ decision making, not on the distance of our forces to a given geographic location, nor on the ability of other states to physically see our forces. Although the joint definition does not include space assets, it is clear that space assets can achieve some of the same effects as forward deployed terrestrial forces although the fact that space assets cannot physically punish another state, a capability possessed by terrestrial forces, is an important distinction. To be sure, the ability to punish with terrestrial forces may have a stronger impact on an adversary’s decision calculus, but this does not preclude the ability of space assets to also affect that decision calculus through their presence. Space assets do provide some advantages over terrestrial forces, however, such as their tremendous field of view which allows them to exert presence over a wider area than terrestrial forces

Chinese ASAT 2AC Extensions

Uniqueness 1/3

China is prepared for war with the US
Capaccio 9 (Tony, Staff Writer, Bloomberg, “China’s New Weapons May Threaten U.S. Bases, Ships, Gates Says”, h t t p : / / w w w .bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=am6ExRzB1cjo) MAT
China is developing new weapons that could threaten the U.S. military presence in the Pacific, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said today. “We should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the U.S. -- fighter-to-fighter or ship-to-ship -- and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options,” Gates told an audience of airpower advocates during a speech in suburban Maryland. His comments reflect a growing concern within the U.S. intelligence and military community over the range and sophistication of China’s weaponry. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair told the Senate Intelligence Committee in April that China has “dramatically expanded” its ability to hack into U.S. government computers. “Information warfare has become the pillar of China’s military modernization program and war planning,” Blair said.

China will weaponize

Meteyer, David O. August 2005(The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. INSS Occasional Paper 60. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies)

The military only system criterion represents one portion of the overall military, economic, and diplomatic conditions necessary for the successful dissuasion of China’s space weapons. Other conditions and their respective criteria, summarized in Table 6, are necessary. Conditions include the unassailability of US systems, the overwhelming US economy, and the strong interdependence of US– PRC relations. Unfortunately, it is neither possible nor highly likely that many of the conditions necessary for successful dissuasion exist now or will in the future. For example, it is nearly impossible for the Pentagon to make its systems unassailable, whether it is through advanced defensive mechanisms, replenishment, or alternative source capabilities. The economic condition looks similarly unattainable since the China–US economic gap is rapidly closing. In the future, China may surpass the United States as the biggest economy in the world and would place itself in a position to develop more and better space systems.

Uniqueness 2/3

China has rapidly modernized in order to compete with the US

Zhang 4 (Baohui, Ph.D and Prof of Political Science at Univ of Texas, Asian Perspective, “American Hegemony and China’s U.S. Policy”, 28 (3), p. 86-89) MAT
China’s rapid modernization has increased its global influence at an impressive pace. However, this rising China faces the question of how to manage its relations with the world’s greatest power, the United States. China’s national interests will be profoundly affected by that relationship. In recent years, the bilateral relationship has seen much uncertainty and in fact, in both countries there have been hot debates over policy choices toward each other. In the United States, the debate centers on whether a rising China will be a revisionist state that seeks to change the world order, or a status-quo state that will respect and play by international rules. Some observers argue that China is a revisionist state and thus the United States must contain China to suppress its power. Most, however, believe that through engagement the United States can influence China to play by the accepted rules of the world community.1 Chinese policymakers are concerned with a similar question, which is how China should best pursuer its interests in a world dominated by American hegemony. Chinese policy choices, they believe, should be based on both an interpretation of American intentions toward China and a projected balance of power between the two countries in the future. In theory, benign or hostile U.S. intentions, and a favorable balance of power, would result in rational choices of different policies toward the United States. Unfortunately, it is widely known that discerning one country’s intention toward another is difficult at best. It is hampered by prejudice, lack of intention, and insufficient communication. Chinese policymakers and experts are inevitably divided with regard to their interpretation of American intentions toward China.2 National capabilities or power, on the other hand, are substantially easier to measure. This article argues that China’s policy toward the United States must incorporate the power factor. In fact, this is the classic perspective of the realist tradition in world politics. It emphasizes the central role of power in the choices of foreign policies. The articles raises the question, given the projected balance of power between China and the United States, what is China’s most realistic policy to maximize its national interests and global influence? One policy pursues rivalry and competition with the United States. The other policy recognizes American global dominance and promotes China’s interests through cooperation with the United States. This article argues that the only realistic policy choice for China is the cooperation strategy. This view is based on the projected balance of power between the two countries. In essence, it recognizes that China will be unlikely to match the power of the United States. The following sections will examine the Chinese view of the future balance of power versus the United States and the appropriate responses from China.

Uniqueness 3/3

China competes with and challenges the US with its space programs
Ian Easton, Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009.  “The Great Game in Space,” h t t p : / / w w w . project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf       

China has been devoting significant resources to directed-energy weapons systems, particularly ground-based lasers, and have used them to target U.S. reconnaissance satellites. In August and September of 2006, China used high-powered, ground-based lasers to blind or “paint” U.S. reconnaissance satellites on several occasions as they passed over China. Reports stated that these were either ASAT tests or relatively “low-power” laser ranging devices intended to precisely determine satellite orbits for ASAT targeting purposes. 22 According to one account, the “Chinese routinely turn powerful lasers skywards, demonstrating their potential to dazzle or permanently blind spy satellites.” This report went on to quote Gary Payton, a senior Pentagon official who said “They let us see their lasers. It is as if they are trying to intimidate us.” 23 According to a Hong Kong news website, China has at least one very large “ASAT laser artillery” weapon deployed | The Great Game in Space | China’s evolving ASAT Weapons Programs and Their Implications for Future U.S. Strategy| 5 somewhere in its North Western territory, possibly somewhere high in Xinjiang’s Tianshan Mountains where there would be far less atmospheric interference to deal with. 24 China has also been developing (and in some cases fielding) cyber warfare units to hack into space control systems; co-orbital ASAT systems to covertly disable enemy satellites; radiofrequency weapons to jam satellite signals; and high-powered microwave weapons to destroy satellites from Earth. Some of these systems have been in development for over a decade, and the cyber warfare and laser programs are particularly mature. 25 In terms of co-orbital ASAT development, China’s recent BX-1 micro-satellite test, which was carried out as a part of the manned Shenzhou-7 mission, demonstrated technology that can be used as a base for future covert satellite inspection missions, as well as co-orbital ASAT attacks. The BX-1 test was particularly notable for the fact that it pasted within 25 km of the International Space Station (ISS) in what may have been a simulated attack run. 26 In the near future, it is possible that China could use this technology to launch co-orbital, micro-satellite ASAT weapons from its Xichang Satellite Launch Center (or Base 27) to attack U.S. national security satellites in GEO. Looking longer term, such weapons could potentially be launched using road-mobile launchers as well. The summation of this broad and assertive Chinese ASAT weapons program is a clear challenge to U.S. space operations, and by way thereof, nearly all modern U.S. war fighting capabilities. This fact has not gone unnoticed, especially in the Pacific theater of operations, where the U.S. is especially reliant upon its space assets.

Links 1/8

The US satellite space system, economy, and national security are at risk.

Charles H. Cynamon (USAF Major) 1999, Protecting Commercial Space Systems: A Critical National Security Issue, USAF study thesis, published by the USAF in April 1999, psu.edu  
As set forth in the first chapter, the case to be made for the protection of commercial space systems hinged on the ability to prove commercial space systems are critical to national security. The three elements required to prove this point do exist. First, commercial space reliance is rapidly increasing, economically and militarily. Second, although industry is primarily concerned with hazards facing their systems, viable and serious threats to these systems exist and cannot be ignored. Third, the consequences associated with the loss of commercial space systems poses a severe blow not only to the commercial space industry but to various other sectors of the US economy. Additionally, commercial space systems are force-enhancers for today’s armed forces. The loss of these systems would seriously jeopardize our ability to effectively wage wars with minimal loss of life. These factors force us to conclude this is a critical national security issue just as many in high-level government positions are now realizing.
China is increasingly dominating global economics and could soon start to dominate space as well
Dolman ’10 [Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, 8-30-2010, “The Case for Weapons in Space: A geopolitical assessment”

China's current space program is readily imagined as a New Age Great Wall. Competing with the West in the highest technological endeavors, and doing so despite significant capital disparities, enhances the legitimacy of the communist party. China's domestic population rationalizes lower per capita income as the state completes its rise among nations to superpower status. International audiences are awed by the accomplishments, conveying further legitimacy to the state. They acknowledge China's domestic right to self-determination, but more importantly give credence to the capacity of Chinese manufacturing to produce quality high technology goods. This perception helps to increase the sale of advanced Chinese-made products abroad. While its comprehensive space program enhances foreign and domestic perceptions of legitimacy, and raises awareness of Chinese industrial and manufacturing acumen, its military space efforts directly threaten the relatively stable international system. It is this latter issue that presents a wicked problem for strategists.

Links 2/8

Chinese expansion into space challenges US national security
William C. Martel (Professor of National Security Affairs at Naval War College, RI) and Toshi Yoshihara (Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts) 2003, Avoiding a Sino-American Space Race, Washington Quarterly: Autumn 2003 issue, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, h t t p : / / pdfserve.informaworld.com/440173_915549761_918386378.pdf  

This prevailing indifference, however, risks overlooking the longer-term consequences of China's growing space power and, more dangerously, the potential collision of U.S. and Chinese interests in space. From China's perspective, the United States' self-appointed guardianship of space is presumptuous and represents a genuine challenge to China's national security concerns. For the United States, China's extension into space symbolizes its ambitions to challenge U.S. national security. Deeply seated, mutual suspicions are evident in both countries' strategic assessments as the contours of potential strategic competition between Washington and Beijing emerge. In essence, both sides agree that the other represents a challenge. Although this potential clash of interests is not yet sufficiently severe to be visible to casual observers, the United States and China are on the threshold of a space race that could radically influence international security.

Links 3/8

US satellites vulnerable to attack from China

William C. Martel (Professor of National Security Affairs at Naval War College, RI) and Toshi Yoshihara (Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts) 2003, Avoiding a Sino-American Space Race, Washington Quarterly: Autumn 2003 issue, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, h t t p : / / pdfserve.informaworld.com/440173_915549761_918386378.pdf  

In sum, because U.S. military effectiveness and commercial competitiveness depend so overwhelmingly on space, the country is increasingly vulnerable to an adversary's malicious use of space or attacks against space systems. As the Rumsfeld Commission report warned The United States and China are on the threshold of a space race. ominously, "If the United States is to avoid a 'space Pearl Harbor,' it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on U.S. space systems. The nation's leaders must assure that the vulnerability of the United States is reduced and that the consequences of a surprise attack on U.S. space assets are limited in their effects."7 At present, most nations cannot challenge the United States directly, but there are fears that states might someday attack U.S. satellites to cripple its military capabilities. Policymakers in the United States are increasingly concerned that this is precisely China's strategy.

China can destroy US satellites

Bruce W. MacDonald (Senior Director at the United States Institute of Peace) 2008, China, Space Weapons, and US Security, Council Special Report No.38, September 2008, published by the Council on Foreign Relations,
h t t p : / / books.google.com/bookshl=en&lr=&id=o0GkabrNftIC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=Bruce+W.+MacDonald+(Senior+Director+at+the+United+States+Institute+of+Peace)+2008,+China,+Space+Weapons,+and+US+Security,+Council+Special+Report+No.38,+September+2008,+published+by+the+Council+on+Foreign+Relations&ots=OTkmlF7uGY&sig=ncw52NFQTbv6Zh5k4EefU7dtgqw#v=onepage&q&f=false

On January 11, 2007, China launched a missile into space, releasing a homing vehicle that destroyed an old Chinese weather satellite. The strategic reverberations of that collision have shaken up security thinking in the 1 Inked States and around the world. This test demonstrated that, it it so chose, China could build a substantial number ot these anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and thus might soon be able to destroy substantial numbers of U.S. satellites in low earth orbit (LEO), upon which the U.S. military heavily depends. On lebruary 21, 2008, the United States launched a modified missile-defense interceptor, destroying a U.S. satellite carrying one thousand pounds ot toxic fuel about to make an uncontrolled atmospheric reentry. Thus, within fourteen months, China and the I inked States both demonstrated the capability to destroy \MO satellites, heralding the arrival of an era where space is a potentially tar more contested domain than in the past, with few rules.1

MahmoudClone 发表于 2012-1-14 04:36
Hegemony Solvency 2/3

U.S. Space Weaponization key to leadership, security and intelligence.

Solvency-Only Space BMD Solves 2/2

Space BMD proven and developed
Unknown author July 26, 2006 “Coyle takes aim at Brilliant Pebbles”. The Claremont Institute: Claremont, CA
Would Brilliant Pebbles work? Coyle does not mention that Brilliant Pebbles had successfully completed its simulation stage and was ready to move to the proof-of-concept, prototype, and performance testing stages when it was effectively starved of funding as the Clinton administration came to power. Nor does he mention that in 1994 NASA launched a deep-space probe mission known as “Clementine,” constructed with first-generation Brilliant Pebbles hardware. The mission, which cost $80 million, effectively “space-qualified” Brilliant Pebbles technology, even though the missile defense program had already been eliminated.
        
Would Brilliant Pebbles be too expensive? The newly released report by the Independent Working Group entitled Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century—the report cited by the UPI piece—puts the total cost of a 1,000-satellite constellation of Brilliant Pebbles at $16 billion, based on the fully approved Defense Acquisition Board plan from 1991. The figure includes the costs of developing, testing, deploying, and operating Brilliant Pebbles over a 20-year period using a low-to-moderate risk, event-driven acquisition schedule. Many would agree that $16 billion dollars is a small price to pay for the protection of the U.S. and its allies from ballistic missile attack and nuclear devastation.

Brilliant Pebbles technology space-tested
Hoffman, Ian September 10, 2002. (“Physicists' war games led to brilliant space defense plan” Oakland Tribune.
Teller and Wood sold the idea in Washington and translated it into hardware, with Wood towing a sample pebble on a cart through the corridors of power. At the time, wags joked that after smart rocks and Brilliant Pebbles could only come "genius dust." Critics rolled their eyes and denounced the weaponization of the heavens. But of all SDI's beams and schemes, the pebbles came closest to the reality. Its major components were tested next to exploding nuclear bombs in the Nevada desert. They flew to the moon and mapped it in the Clementine mission
The Soviets couldn’t counter Brilliant Pebbles
Hoffman, Ian September 10, 2002. (“Physicists' war games led to brilliant space defense plan” Oakland Tribune.
In 1991, former Soviet weaponeers told Canavan that they labored hard but couldn't theorize a cost-effective assault against Brilliant Pebbles. "They said they realized at their level of technology they could not beat the Brilliant Pebble and it would bankrupt them to even try. So they didn't try."
Brilliant Pebbles technology space-tested
Hoffman, Ian September 10, 2002. (“Physicists' war games led to brilliant space defense plan” Oakland Tribune.
Teller and Wood sold the idea in Washington and translated it into hardware, with Wood towing a sample pebble on a cart through the corridors of power. At the time, wags joked that after smart rocks and Brilliant Pebbles could only come "genius dust." Critics rolled their eyes and denounced the weaponization of the heavens. But of all SDI's beams and schemes, the pebbles came closest to the reality. Its major components were tested next to exploding nuclear bombs in the Nevada desert. They flew to the moon and mapped it in the Clementine mission

Solvency – First Mover Key 1/2

Other countries would not try to counter the American nuclear weapons, as long as America is the first to deploy
Dolman ’05 [Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” 9-14-05, h t t p : / / w w w .e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf]

Indeed, it is concern for the unanticipated arrival of technology X that initially motivates my own preference for a policy advocating immediate deployment of space weapons. So long as America is the state most likely to acquire a breakthrough technology in this area, my concern is limited to the problem of letting technology take us where it will. But what if an enemy of democratic liberalism should suddenly acquire the means to place quickly and cheaply multiple weapons into orbit? The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any liberal state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to our already-dependent military force could cause the immediate demise of the extant international system. The longer the US dithers on its responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America could respond. And America would respond … finally. But would another state? If America were to weaponize space today, it is unlikely that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the infrastructure necessary is too high; hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment it would take to achieve a minimal counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the US to entrench itself in space, and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments in kind. They might oppose US interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively America uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the US deploy weapons there—at least for the next few years—is extremely remote.
Various Countries including China and India already have technology that could be used to attack US Satellites
Major Adkins ’05 [Major Larry Adkins, High Frontier Journal, 9-15-2005, “ Space Superiority: Does the US Really Have It? h t t p : / / w w w .afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070622-057.pdf]

Technologically, our adversaries have the capability to blind imagery satellites or jam satellite signals. 4 According to Leonard David’s article in Space.com, laser technology is rapidly becoming available to blind imagery satellites. 5 Countries and individuals have also shown they are willing and able to deliberately disrupt communication satellites. In 1997, India jammed Tongasat because of a disagreement over possession of a geosynchronous orbit slot. 6 In 1998, MED-TV accused Turkey of jamming its Kurdish broadcast channel that is beamed to 70 countries. 7 In early 2003, the FBI charged six people for selling software and decryption devices that allowed consumers to “steal” satellite television signals (e.g., DirectTV) which they had not paid for. 8 As late as the summer of 2003, the Iranian Embassy in Cuba reportedly jammed Voice of America satellite broadcasts being sent to Iran.

Solvency – First Mover Key 2/2

US space militarization key to counter threats from China and Russia.

Bill Gertz, 1/17/2007 (editor of Washington Times, Moscow, Beijing eye space weapons; Senate alerted to Pentagon fears, h t t p : / / w w w .lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/)

China and Russia are developing space weapons and are among several nations working on systems to threaten U.S. satellites with lasers or missiles, says the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In Senate testimony last week, Army Lt. Gen. Michael Maples for the first time raised Pentagon concerns about secret Chinese and Russian space weapons programs. "Russia and China continue to be the primary states of concern regarding military space and counterspace programs," Gen. Maples said at the annual threat briefing of the Senate intelligence committee. Gen. Maples said that "several countries continue to develop capabilities that have the potential to threaten U.S. space assets, and some have already deployed systems with inherent anti-satellite capabilities, such as satellite-tracking laser range-finding devices and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles." Other countries are working on improving space-object tracking and "kinetic or directed energy weapons capabilities." Gen. Maples did not discuss the reported testing of a Chinese anti-satellite laser against a U.S. satellite, which triggered high-level Bush administration worries about Beijing's growing space-weapons program. U.S. officials said details about the Chinese anti-satellite laser shot remain classified so as not to alert China about U.S. knowledge of what intelligence officials say may have been a test shot of an anti-satellite weapon. China has developed several types of ground-based lasers with Russian and Israeli technology, U.S. officials have said. Russia developed anti-satellite weapons during the Cold War, and U.S. officials think the Russian military is continuing work on the weapons, which include both anti-satellite missiles and ground-based lasers. Both Russia and China deny that they are building space weapons and have sought to curb U.S. space defenses through a proposed international ban on weapons in space. The Air Force in 2004 deployed the 76th Space Control Squadron, which can disrupt or knock out foreign satellites using electronic jammers from the ground. Nations other than Russia and China that have space capabilities in key areas also "will acquire military and commercial space-based assets," Gen. Maples said. "Increasing levels of international cooperation, along with the growing number of commercial space consortia, is allowing the proliferation of advanced satellite technologies and knowledge of space systems operations to become available to nations lacking a domestic space capability," he said. Gen. Maples said that building space weapons is "financially taxing" and that "most countries assessed to be pursuing these capabilities are not expected to acquire them within the next few years." He warned, however, that less-developed states and "nonstate entities" also "are pursuing more limited and asymmetric approaches that do not require excessive financial resources or a high-tech industrial base."

Solvency – Militarization  Deterrence

If the US militarizes space, the impact of that presence will deter other countries from doing something similar
Whiting ’02 [Stephen N. Whiting, School of  Advanced Airpower Studies, June 2002, “Policy, Influence, and Diplomacy: Space as a Natural Element” h t t p : / / w w w . au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/whiting.pdf]
The sixth component of space assets’ diplomatic power is the ability to shape behavior and exert influence through presence. As defined in the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting United States influence and access.  Put another way, presence is the proximity of space assets to a location, such that international actors change their behavior or are deterred based solely on the location of space assets. The ability to influence other states due to the presence of space assets, or any military force, is based on the impact of those forces on other states’ decision making, not on the distance of our forces to a given geographic location, nor on the ability of other states to physically see our forces. Although the joint definition does not include space assets, it is clear that space assets can achieve some of the same effects as forward deployed terrestrial forces although the fact that space assets cannot physically punish another state, a capability possessed by terrestrial forces, is an important distinction. To be sure, the ability to punish with terrestrial forces may have a stronger impact on an adversary’s decision calculus, but this does not preclude the ability of space assets to also affect that decision calculus through their presence. Space assets do provide some advantages over terrestrial forces, however, such as their tremendous field of view which allows them to exert presence over a wider area than terrestrial forces

Chinese ASAT 2AC Extensions

Uniqueness 1/3

China is prepared for war with the US
Capaccio 9 (Tony, Staff Writer, Bloomberg, “China’s New Weapons May Threaten U.S. Bases, Ships, Gates Says”, h t t p : / / w w w .bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=am6ExRzB1cjo) MAT
China is developing new weapons that could threaten the U.S. military presence in the Pacific, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said today. “We should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the U.S. -- fighter-to-fighter or ship-to-ship -- and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options,” Gates told an audience of airpower advocates during a speech in suburban Maryland. His comments reflect a growing concern within the U.S. intelligence and military community over the range and sophistication of China’s weaponry. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair told the Senate Intelligence Committee in April that China has “dramatically expanded” its ability to hack into U.S. government computers. “Information warfare has become the pillar of China’s military modernization program and war planning,” Blair said.

China will weaponize

Meteyer, David O. August 2005(The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. INSS Occasional Paper 60. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies)

The military only system criterion represents one portion of the overall military, economic, and diplomatic conditions necessary for the successful dissuasion of China’s space weapons. Other conditions and their respective criteria, summarized in Table 6, are necessary. Conditions include the unassailability of US systems, the overwhelming US economy, and the strong interdependence of US– PRC relations. Unfortunately, it is neither possible nor highly likely that many of the conditions necessary for successful dissuasion exist now or will in the future. For example, it is nearly impossible for the Pentagon to make its systems unassailable, whether it is through advanced defensive mechanisms, replenishment, or alternative source capabilities. The economic condition looks similarly unattainable since the China–US economic gap is rapidly closing. In the future, China may surpass the United States as the biggest economy in the world and would place itself in a position to develop more and better space systems.

Uniqueness 2/3

China has rapidly modernized in order to compete with the US

Zhang 4 (Baohui, Ph.D and Prof of Political Science at Univ of Texas, Asian Perspective, “American Hegemony and China’s U.S. Policy”, 28 (3), p. 86-89) MAT
China’s rapid modernization has increased its global influence at an impressive pace. However, this rising China faces the question of how to manage its relations with the world’s greatest power, the United States. China’s national interests will be profoundly affected by that relationship. In recent years, the bilateral relationship has seen much uncertainty and in fact, in both countries there have been hot debates over policy choices toward each other. In the United States, the debate centers on whether a rising China will be a revisionist state that seeks to change the world order, or a status-quo state that will respect and play by international rules. Some observers argue that China is a revisionist state and thus the United States must contain China to suppress its power. Most, however, believe that through engagement the United States can influence China to play by the accepted rules of the world community.1 Chinese policymakers are concerned with a similar question, which is how China should best pursuer its interests in a world dominated by American hegemony. Chinese policy choices, they believe, should be based on both an interpretation of American intentions toward China and a projected balance of power between the two countries in the future. In theory, benign or hostile U.S. intentions, and a favorable balance of power, would result in rational choices of different policies toward the United States. Unfortunately, it is widely known that discerning one country’s intention toward another is difficult at best. It is hampered by prejudice, lack of intention, and insufficient communication. Chinese policymakers and experts are inevitably divided with regard to their interpretation of American intentions toward China.2 National capabilities or power, on the other hand, are substantially easier to measure. This article argues that China’s policy toward the United States must incorporate the power factor. In fact, this is the classic perspective of the realist tradition in world politics. It emphasizes the central role of power in the choices of foreign policies. The articles raises the question, given the projected balance of power between China and the United States, what is China’s most realistic policy to maximize its national interests and global influence? One policy pursues rivalry and competition with the United States. The other policy recognizes American global dominance and promotes China’s interests through cooperation with the United States. This article argues that the only realistic policy choice for China is the cooperation strategy. This view is based on the projected balance of power between the two countries. In essence, it recognizes that China will be unlikely to match the power of the United States. The following sections will examine the Chinese view of the future balance of power versus the United States and the appropriate responses from China.

Uniqueness 3/3

China competes with and challenges the US with its space programs
Ian Easton, Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009.  “The Great Game in Space,” h t t p : / / w w w . project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf       

China has been devoting significant resources to directed-energy weapons systems, particularly ground-based lasers, and have used them to target U.S. reconnaissance satellites. In August and September of 2006, China used high-powered, ground-based lasers to blind or “paint” U.S. reconnaissance satellites on several occasions as they passed over China. Reports stated that these were either ASAT tests or relatively “low-power” laser ranging devices intended to precisely determine satellite orbits for ASAT targeting purposes. 22 According to one account, the “Chinese routinely turn powerful lasers skywards, demonstrating their potential to dazzle or permanently blind spy satellites.” This report went on to quote Gary Payton, a senior Pentagon official who said “They let us see their lasers. It is as if they are trying to intimidate us.” 23 According to a Hong Kong news website, China has at least one very large “ASAT laser artillery” weapon deployed | The Great Game in Space | China’s evolving ASAT Weapons Programs and Their Implications for Future U.S. Strategy| 5 somewhere in its North Western territory, possibly somewhere high in Xinjiang’s Tianshan Mountains where there would be far less atmospheric interference to deal with. 24 China has also been developing (and in some cases fielding) cyber warfare units to hack into space control systems; co-orbital ASAT systems to covertly disable enemy satellites; radiofrequency weapons to jam satellite signals; and high-powered microwave weapons to destroy satellites from Earth. Some of these systems have been in development for over a decade, and the cyber warfare and laser programs are particularly mature. 25 In terms of co-orbital ASAT development, China’s recent BX-1 micro-satellite test, which was carried out as a part of the manned Shenzhou-7 mission, demonstrated technology that can be used as a base for future covert satellite inspection missions, as well as co-orbital ASAT attacks. The BX-1 test was particularly notable for the fact that it pasted within 25 km of the International Space Station (ISS) in what may have been a simulated attack run. 26 In the near future, it is possible that China could use this technology to launch co-orbital, micro-satellite ASAT weapons from its Xichang Satellite Launch Center (or Base 27) to attack U.S. national security satellites in GEO. Looking longer term, such weapons could potentially be launched using road-mobile launchers as well. The summation of this broad and assertive Chinese ASAT weapons program is a clear challenge to U.S. space operations, and by way thereof, nearly all modern U.S. war fighting capabilities. This fact has not gone unnoticed, especially in the Pacific theater of operations, where the U.S. is especially reliant upon its space assets.

Links 1/8

The US satellite space system, economy, and national security are at risk.

Charles H. Cynamon (USAF Major) 1999, Protecting Commercial Space Systems: A Critical National Security Issue, USAF study thesis, published by the USAF in April 1999, psu.edu  
As set forth in the first chapter, the case to be made for the protection of commercial space systems hinged on the ability to prove commercial space systems are critical to national security. The three elements required to prove this point do exist. First, commercial space reliance is rapidly increasing, economically and militarily. Second, although industry is primarily concerned with hazards facing their systems, viable and serious threats to these systems exist and cannot be ignored. Third, the consequences associated with the loss of commercial space systems poses a severe blow not only to the commercial space industry but to various other sectors of the US economy. Additionally, commercial space systems are force-enhancers for today’s armed forces. The loss of these systems would seriously jeopardize our ability to effectively wage wars with minimal loss of life. These factors force us to conclude this is a critical national security issue just as many in high-level government positions are now realizing.
China is increasingly dominating global economics and could soon start to dominate space as well
Dolman ’10 [Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, 8-30-2010, “The Case for Weapons in Space: A geopolitical assessment”

China's current space program is readily imagined as a New Age Great Wall. Competing with the West in the highest technological endeavors, and doing so despite significant capital disparities, enhances the legitimacy of the communist party. China's domestic population rationalizes lower per capita income as the state completes its rise among nations to superpower status. International audiences are awed by the accomplishments, conveying further legitimacy to the state. They acknowledge China's domestic right to self-determination, but more importantly give credence to the capacity of Chinese manufacturing to produce quality high technology goods. This perception helps to increase the sale of advanced Chinese-made products abroad. While its comprehensive space program enhances foreign and domestic perceptions of legitimacy, and raises awareness of Chinese industrial and manufacturing acumen, its military space efforts directly threaten the relatively stable international system. It is this latter issue that presents a wicked problem for strategists.

Links 2/8

Chinese expansion into space challenges US national security
William C. Martel (Professor of National Security Affairs at Naval War College, RI) and Toshi Yoshihara (Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts) 2003, Avoiding a Sino-American Space Race, Washington Quarterly: Autumn 2003 issue, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, h t t p : / / pdfserve.informaworld.com/440173_915549761_918386378.pdf  

This prevailing indifference, however, risks overlooking the longer-term consequences of China's growing space power and, more dangerously, the potential collision of U.S. and Chinese interests in space. From China's perspective, the United States' self-appointed guardianship of space is presumptuous and represents a genuine challenge to China's national security concerns. For the United States, China's extension into space symbolizes its ambitions to challenge U.S. national security. Deeply seated, mutual suspicions are evident in both countries' strategic assessments as the contours of potential strategic competition between Washington and Beijing emerge. In essence, both sides agree that the other represents a challenge. Although this potential clash of interests is not yet sufficiently severe to be visible to casual observers, the United States and China are on the threshold of a space race that could radically influence international security.

Links 3/8

US satellites vulnerable to attack from China

William C. Martel (Professor of National Security Affairs at Naval War College, RI) and Toshi Yoshihara (Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts) 2003, Avoiding a Sino-American Space Race, Washington Quarterly: Autumn 2003 issue, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, h t t p : / / pdfserve.informaworld.com/440173_915549761_918386378.pdf  

In sum, because U.S. military effectiveness and commercial competitiveness depend so overwhelmingly on space, the country is increasingly vulnerable to an adversary's malicious use of space or attacks against space systems. As the Rumsfeld Commission report warned The United States and China are on the threshold of a space race. ominously, "If the United States is to avoid a 'space Pearl Harbor,' it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on U.S. space systems. The nation's leaders must assure that the vulnerability of the United States is reduced and that the consequences of a surprise attack on U.S. space assets are limited in their effects."7 At present, most nations cannot challenge the United States directly, but there are fears that states might someday attack U.S. satellites to cripple its military capabilities. Policymakers in the United States are increasingly concerned that this is precisely China's strategy.

China can destroy US satellites

Bruce W. MacDonald (Senior Director at the United States Institute of Peace) 2008, China, Space Weapons, and US Security, Council Special Report No.38, September 2008, published by the Council on Foreign Relations,
h t t p : / / books.google.com/bookshl=en&lr=&id=o0GkabrNftIC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=Bruce+W.+MacDonald+(Senior+Director+at+the+United+States+Institute+of+Peace)+2008,+China,+Space+Weapons,+and+US+Security,+Council+Special+Report+No.38,+September+2008,+published+by+the+Council+on+Foreign+Relations&ots=OTkmlF7uGY&sig=ncw52NFQTbv6Zh5k4EefU7dtgqw#v=onepage&q&f=false

On January 11, 2007, China launched a missile into space, releasing a homing vehicle that destroyed an old Chinese weather satellite. The strategic reverberations of that collision have shaken up security thinking in the 1 Inked States and around the world. This test demonstrated that, it it so chose, China could build a substantial number ot these anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and thus might soon be able to destroy substantial numbers of U.S. satellites in low earth orbit (LEO), upon which the U.S. military heavily depends. On lebruary 21, 2008, the United States launched a modified missile-defense interceptor, destroying a U.S. satellite carrying one thousand pounds ot toxic fuel about to make an uncontrolled atmospheric reentry. Thus, within fourteen months, China and the I inked States both demonstrated the capability to destroy \MO satellites, heralding the arrival of an era where space is a potentially tar more contested domain than in the past, with few rules.1

huge cloud of electrons.” However, because four-fifths of America’s military data is transmitted through unhardened commercial satellites, and a single Global Hawk unmanned surveillance drone flying over the Middle East can consume several times more bandwidth than was used in the whole of the 1991 war against Iraq, Air Force officers commonly describe space as being America’s “Achilles Heel.” 34 Referring to China’s January 11, 2007 direct-ascent ASAT test, General Hamel of the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center said “if they take our asymmetric advantage in space, we go from an information age war machine to an industrial age war machine…shifting the balance; the edge will go to the adversary.” 35 Many specialists also argue that, the aside from the U.S. military dependency on orbital space U.S. economy, and in turn, much of the world economy, is also rapidly becoming dependent on space-based systems. They posit that, in effect, the U.S. is now a “space faring” nation whose very way of life is tied to the myriad capabilities provided by the orbital space medium.

Links 6/8

Loss of US satellites would cause global economic and communication failure
William C. Martel (Professor of National Security Affairs at Naval War College, RI) and Toshi Yoshihara (Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts) 2003, Avoiding a Sino-American Space Race, Washington Quarterly: Autumn 2003 issue, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, h t t p : / / pdfserve.informaworld.com/440173_915549761_918386378.pdf  

Conventional wisdom holds that space is so vital to national security and economic prosperity that the United States will do whatever it takes to protect its ability to use space. This rationale was enshrined in an influential report issued in January 2001 by a blue-ribbon commission on space,1 headed by Donald Rumsfeld before he became secretary of defense, which strongly advocated greater protection for U.S. space assets. The Rumsfeld Commission asserted that "[t]he security and economic well being of the United States and its allies and friends depend on the nation's ability to operate successfully in space. To be able to contribute to peace and stability in a distinctly different but still dangerous and complex global environment, the [United States] needs to remain at the forefront in space, technologically and operationally, as we have in the air, on land and at sea."2 Furthermore, the report argued that "the present extent of U.S. dependence on space, the rapid pace at which this dependence is increasing, and the vulnerabilities it creates, all demand that U.S. national security space interests be recognized as a top national security priority."3 In economic terms, the United States relies on space technologies and capabilities to support a wide range of commercial activities. Among the most important commercial assets in space is the constellation of Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation satellites. The precise timing signals emitted from the GPS allow automobiles, aircraft, and ships to locate their positions and establish the chronological order for virtually all financial transactions. Indeed, the global financial network would collapse without GPS. Equally important, commercial satellites carry most global communications. Despite the phenomenal growth rate of fiber optics networks, commercial satellites still dominate long-haul global communications.

Links 7/8

US dependent on GPS satellites for national security
William C. Martel (Professor of National Security Affairs at Naval War College, RI) and Toshi Yoshihara (Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts) 2003, Avoiding a Sino-American Space Race, Washington Quarterly: Autumn 2003 issue, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, h t t p : / / pdfserve.informaworld.com/440173_915549761_918386378.pdf  

The United States is extraordinarily dependent on space for its national security.4 The U.S. military has integrated space technologies into virtually all aspects of military operations, dramatically improving U.S. military power. Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which is widely considered the first "space war," the Pentagon has relied on electro-optical, hyperspectral, infrared, and radar satellites to see what is happening on the battlefield.5 Communication satellites allow military commanders to be connected to their forces, while the navigation signal from GPS satellites is essential for precision attacks. The air campaigns over Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq also demonstrated the value of space assets in modern warfare. Similarly, U.S. military commanders increasingly rely on imagery from commercially owned satellites; in fact, commercial satellites handled 80 percent of U.S. military communications during the Kosovo operation in 1999.6 20 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY • AUTUMN 2003 Downloaded By: [Optimised: University of California, Berkeley] At: 02:35 22 June 2011 Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race I Government agencies often pay private firms to collect and process vital satellite imagery. For the first five months of the Afghan campaign, the Department of Defense paid the Space Imaging Corporation $1.9 million per month for images of Afghanistan collected by its Ilconos imaging satellite. This new commercial satellite market also creates vulnerabilities because of the ability of hostile governments or terrorist organizations to gain access to readily available satellite imagery. Such information could be used to harm U.S. interests in various ways, including attacking military bases and disrupting military operations.

Links 8/8

Satellites are needed to measure ocean surface temperatures and track global warming, precipitation, and climate change. Impact is warming
Frank J. Wentz (Remote Sensing Systems), Chelle Gentemann (Remote Sensing Systems), Deborah Smith (Remote Sensing Systems) and Dudley Chelton (College of Oceanic and Atmospheric Sciences, Oregon State University) 2000, Satellite Measurements of Sea Surface Temperature Through Clouds, Science 5 May 2000: Vol. 288 no. 5467 pp. 847-850, h t t p : / / w w w .sciencemag.org/content/288/5467/847.full

Satellite measurements of SST began in the 1970s, using infrared radiometers flying aboard the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's geostationary and polar orbiting platforms (6). Satellite infrared SST measurements have resulted in major advancements in oceanography, meteorology, and climatology (2, 7–10). However, the infrared SST retrievals have two significant limitations: (i) Retrievals cannot be done when clouds (which cover roughly half the Earth) are present. (ii) Atmospheric aerosols from volcanoes and large fires can cause a spurious cooling in the SST retrieval (11, 12). The aerosol problem has been particularly troublesome when trying to construct multiyear time series to infer climate change (11). Furthermore, the cloud detection algorithms are not totally reliable, with some clouds going undetected. It has long been recognized that microwave radiometry offers a solution to the cloud and aerosol problem. At frequencies below about 12 GHz, the surface radiance is proportional to SST and microwaves penetrate clouds with little attenuation, giving a clear view of the sea surface under all weather conditions except rain. Furthermore, at these frequencies, atmospheric aerosols have no effect, making it possible to produce a very reliable SST time series for climate studies. The first satellite microwave radiometers operating at these low frequencies were flown on SeaSat and Nimbus-7, launched in 1978. These early missions demonstrated the feasibility of measuring SST with microwaves (13, 14) and led to some notable scientific results (15). However, the usefulness of these early radiometers was significantly limited by a poor calibration system. Subsequent microwave radiometers launched in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the Special Sensor Microwave Imager (SSM/I), used improved calibration systems but lacked the low-frequency channels needed to retrieve SST. In November 1997, the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) spacecraft was launched (16). The TRMM microwave imager (TMI) has a full suite of channels ranging from 10.7 to 85 GHz and represents the first satellite sensor that is capable of accurately measuring SST through clouds.

Impacts 1/4

Loss of satellites cripples the military- causes greater losses.
Charles H. Cynamon (USAF Major) 1999, Protecting Commercial Space Systems: A Critical National Security Issue, USAF study thesis, published by the USAF in April 1999, psu.edu  

For the military, it’s a forgone conclusion commercial space will be key to providing fully mission-capable operational forces. Because our operational forces are now predominantly stationed in the continental United States (CONUS), we must be expeditionary in our ability to meet America’s global commitments. We must be ready to operate in an environment with little or no existing communications infrastructure, areas where little mapping has occurred, and vast expanses where continuous overhead intelligence collection will be key to real-time situational awareness. Among other burdens this reality incurs, it places a premium on such commercial capability as satellite communications to connect our forces with their logistics pipelines in the 26 US or to connect our combatant commanders with their CONUS-based staffs and in-theater component commanders. Even in today’s peacetime environment, the military relies on commercial products and services, such as imagery and communications.7 As important as these commercial capabilities are for training and exercises, they are vital for conducting operational planning and implementing military operational as directed by the National Command Authority. The military implications should these commercial capabilities not be available is rather simple. The military mantra is “train like we fight.” The sudden loss of critical information to support war planning and execution will significantly diminish our military effectiveness. One should not and could not say this alone would spell defeat. However, there is no doubt a diminishing of military effectiveness directly equates to the number of body bags for US forces.

If the US loses satellites to Chinese ASAT, Taiwan conflict will explode into US-China war.
Ian Easton, Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009.  “The Great Game in Space,” h t t p : / / w w w .project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf       

Any possible U.S. military contingency around the Taiwan Strait would require secure satellites as the U.S. becomes ever more reliant upon its space systems. Moreover, reconnaissance satellites are thought to limit the risk inherent in the build-up of forces that both the PRC and the U.S. could be expected to deploy to the region in the event of a crisis. However, if the U.S. was blinded as the result of a preemptive Chinese ASAT attack, the conflict could quickly escalate to a dangerous level. According to two experts on the subject, “if there is a great-power war in the twenty-first century, our crystal ball says that it will be between the United States and China over Taiwan, with a very serious potential for a horrible escalatory process.” 38 This underscores the gravity of the topic as well as the negative impact the Chinese shift towards fielding ASAT weapons could have.

Impacts 2/4

Losing satellites would devastate our economy and cripple our military allowing competitors to get the edge, undermining our hegemony.
Charles H. Cynamon (USAF Major) 1999, Protecting Commercial Space Systems: A Critical National Security Issue, USAF study thesis, published by the USAF in April 1999, psu.edu  

Qualitative assessment convinces us the economic implications of losing commercial space capability are real and too painful to bear. The May 1998 failure of the Galaxy IV satellite should stand as testament of the havoc an adversary might create. The more our economy becomes dependent on the information and services provided by these systems, the more significant the impacts are sure to be. The loss of a single Iridium satellite will not be catastrophic, not even significant. Many of these big low earth orbit (LEO) systems will provide on-orbit spares to enable near real-time switchover to the spare. However, we must be concerned with the potential for an “Informational Pearl Harbor” whether perpetrated by another 25 state or a terrorist intending to cripple our economy in the furtherance of their own interests. In this scenario, a peer competitor could attack our commercial space systems (a decisive point) to damage our economy (a center of gravity) via our financial markets. By devastating the US economy, an adversary might employ this diversionary tactic to turn our national focus inward. If US intervention can be prevented, our adversary’s goals are more likely to be achieved. A secondary benefit would be the negation of US military effectiveness in countering our adversary’s aggression. One might argue, an “Informational Pearl Harbor” is a worst case scenario we cannot afford to defend against. Unfortunately, the threat of an asymmetrical attack on the US is growing. The drug trafficking war on our southwestern border is analogous to the threats against our commercial systems. We know we can never completely negate the flow of drugs with surveillance and response alone. However, like the drug threat, we must take the necessary steps to reduce the threat to an acceptable level by using all of the tools at our disposal to identify, classify and, if possible, negate the sources before they manifest themselves.

Impacts 3/4

Continued economic decline will result in global war.
Mead, 9 (Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. The New Republic, “Only Makes You Stronger,” February 4 2009.  h t t p : / / w w w .tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2 AD 6/30/09) JM
Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well.If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

Impacts 4/4

Economic collapse causes nuclear war
Lewis 98, (Chris H., environmental historian, University of Colorado-Boulder), THE COMING AGE OF SCARCITY, 1998, p. 56 AD: 7-7-09 CS

Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed world, the United States, Europe, Japan, and others will fight neocolonial wars to force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars. If First World countries choose military confrontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these neocolonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations' economic and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of our global industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex economic and trading networks and squander material, biological, and energy resources that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the earth's 6 to 8 billion people. This would be the worst-case scenario for the collapse of global civilization.

Chinese Realism- War Inevitable 1/4

China is a rising power
Aaron L. Friedberg (Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University), The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Confict Inevitable?, Fall 2005, Vol. 30, No. 2, Pages 7-45

For realist pessimists, the single most important feature of the PRC today is its rising power. Everything else, including the likely character of the U.S.-China relationship, follows from this fact. Taking aggregate economic capacity as a rough surrogate for overall national power, it is apparent that China’s growth has been extraordinarily rapid. Since the start of economic reforms in 1978, the PRC’s gross national product (GNP) is thought to have increased by a factor of four and, according to some estimates, it could double again by the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century. 26 What is especially impressive about the Chinese economy is not only the speed with which it appears to be expanding but its growing mass and enormous potential. Given the sheer size of its population and the rising productivity of its workers, China may one day regain its historic position as the world’s largest economy. Although such projections are fraught with difficulties and uncertainties, some experts have calculated that China’s economy could overtake that of the United States as early as 2015. 27 The combination of the speed and the magnitude of China’s growth in recent decades appears to be unprecedented. The closest analogy is probably the emergence of the United States as the world’s preponderant economy over the course of the nineteenth century.

Chinese Realism- War Inevitable 2/4

Realism and historical evidence indicate rising powers like China are likely to challenge established powers like the US.
Aaron L. Friedberg (Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University), The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Confict Inevitable?, Fall 2005, Vol. 30, No. 2, Pages 7-45

Realist pessimists note that, throughout history, rising powers have tended to be troublemakers, at least insofar as their more established counterparts in the international system are concerned. This is the case, in the realists’ view, regardless of regime type; it was as true of a rising, democratic United States as it was of a rising, autocratic Germany. As Samuel Huntington has pointed out, International Security 30:2 18 Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050,” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No. 99 (New York: Goldman Sachs Group, 2003). 28. For estimates of China’s defense spending, see U.S.-China Security Review Commission, The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China, pp. 167–177. 29. For an analysis of Chinese military imports, see Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for “Superb and Secret Weapons” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Regarding China’s protracted and painful efforts to develop its own ballistic missile submarines, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994). 30. Regarding the progress of China’s military modernization efforts, see Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, May 28, 2004, h t t p : / / w w w .defenselink.mil/pubs/ d20040528PRC.pdf. See also Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999); James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China’s Military Faces the Future (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1999); Col. Susan M. Puska, ed., People’s Liberation Army after Next (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).“The external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization and economic development.” 31 There appear to be a number of reasons for this pattern. As a state’s capabilities grow, its leaders tend to define their interests more expansively and to seek a greater degree of influence over what is going on around them. Rising powers seek not only to secure their frontiers but to reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials, and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far from home, defend their foreign friends and allies, and promulgate their values; and, in general, to have what they consider to be their legitimate say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world. This correlation between growing power and expanding interests has been succinctly summarized by Robert Gilpin: “A more wealthy and more powerful state . . . will select a larger bundle of security and welfare goals than a less wealthy and less powerful state.” 32 As they seek to assert themselves, rising powers are often drawn to challenge territorial boundaries, international institutional arrangements, and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they were relatively weak. Their leaders and people often feel that they were unfairly left out when the pie was divided up, and may even believe that, because of their prior weakness, they were robbed of what was rightfully theirs. Like Germany at the turn of the twentieth century, rising powers tend to want their “place in the sun,” and this often brings them into conflict with more established great powers, which are typically the architects and principal beneciaries of the existing international system. 33

Its military would be obliged to hunker down in defensive crouch while it prepared to withdraw from dozens of then-untenable foreign deployments. For the good of its civilian population, and for itself, the United States military—in particular the United States Air Force—is charged with protecting space capabilities from harm and ensuring reliable space operations for the foreseeable future. As a martial organization, the Air Force naturally looks to military means in achievement of its assigned ends. And so it should.
Uniqueness

They believe that the U.S. tested a new type of weapons capable of destroying spacecraft.” A year later, February of 2009, an American and Russian satellite were reported to have collided over northeastern Russia.

Russia 2AC Extensions

Russia wont engage in an arms race.

Krepon and Katz-Hyman ‘05
Michael Krepon is co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs. Michael Katz-Hyman is a research Assistant at the Henry L. Stimson Center.  “Space Weapons and Proliferation.” July 2005. h t t p : / / w w w .stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Space_Weapons_and_Proliferation.pdf.

For space warfare initiatives to generate an arms race, both contestants need to be able to compete, and see value or necessity in the competition. Moscow’s ability to engage in an arms race with the United States is now very much in doubt. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates Russian military expenditures to be approximately $20 billion a year, or less than five percent of the US defense budget. Russia’s deployed nuclear forces continue to decline in numbers, the result of block obsolescence of Cold War-era investments, funding constraints, defense production impediments, and national decisions to apply limited resources to other priorities. From a high point in 1986 of over 40,000 stockpiled warheads, the Russian nuclear arsenal is estimated to consist of 16,000 warheads, about half of which may now be operational. By contrast, during virulent phases of the Cold War, the Soviet Union increased its stockpile size by 1,000 warheads per year.

A2 Case

A2: Insufficient Defense

A good plan will provide sufficient defense and be able to defend the US from various threats

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis ’09 [Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Independent Working Group, 2009, “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, & The 21st century” h t t p : / / w w w .ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf]
A global layered defense capability is necessary to counter these threats. Near-term options exist for augmenting seabased defenses and deploying space-based defenses within the next decade, resulting in a comprehensive, global layered missile defense system. Layered defenses provide multiple opportunities to destroy attacking missiles in all thrree phases of flight from any direction regardless of their geographic starting point. Furthermore, a layered defense makes the countermeasures available to the offensive systems much less effective than would be the case if interdiction was only possible in one (or two) phase(s) of the missile’s flight. Boostphase intercepts, most efficiently conducted by components deployed in space, are particularly desirable because a missile is most vulnerable during this segment since it is relatively slow moving, presents a readily identifiable target (bright rocket plume), and has not released any of its warheads or countermeasures that would complicate interception in subsequent phases. Boost-phase interception has the added advantage that the missile’s payload may, depending on how early interdiction occurs, fall back on the attacking nation. This situation could deter the launching state if it is confronted with the likelihood of serious damage to its own territory. In addition, depending on the number of assets deployed, a space-based boost-phase defense could always be on station on a world-wide basis, unfettered by sovereignty issues of overflight and operations on another nation’s territory.

Anti-missile defense needed

Mackenzie Eaglen 2010(Research Fellow for National Security Studies at the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation. “Why Missile Defense is Still Needed” h t t p : / / w w w .riponsociety.org/forum310g.htm)
Iran will likely achieve nuclear status in the near future, and the world has limited visibility into their program and even less into their leaders’ intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency is having difficulty developing a comprehensive picture of Iran’s nuclear program, but officials believe Iran may be working on affixing a nuclear warhead to one of its growing classes of ballistic missiles. Even the U.S. military estimates that Iran will be capable of fielding an intercontinental ballistic missile by 2015.
Numbers tell the rest of the story. In just the past decade, the number of nuclear states around the globe has grown from six to nine. Meanwhile a total of 28 countries have ballistic missile capabilities. Some are rapidly improving their arsenals with help from other states. China, for example, has shown it is capable of targeting U.S. satellites with ballistic missiles and electromagnetic pulse warheads. In January 2007, China launched an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) at one of its own satellites. The Chinese referred to the test as an experiment and not a deliberate anti-satellite test. Nevertheless, the action proved Chinese capabilities and demonstrates their potential for growth  In just the past decade, the number of nuclear states around the globe has grown from six to nine. Meanwhile a total of 28 countries have ballistic missile capabilities.  North Korea has some 1,000 missiles and is selling them to other countries. It has tested at least 25 missiles with ranges of up to 1,200 miles. This means North Korean missiles are capable of reaching South Korea and Japan. Its leaders are also developing a new ICBM with a minimum range of 3,700 miles that could hit Alaska and some parts of Hawaii if it functioned at its full capacity. Judging by capabilities (missile arsenals) as well as intentions (official statements from world leaders), the need for a U.S. missile defense system is clear.

space weapons are offensive by their very nature. They deter violence by the omnipresent threat of precise, measured, and unstoppable retaliation. They offer no advantage if the target set considered is not global. But they also offer no advantage in the mission of territorial occupation. As such, they are far less threatening to the international environment than any combination of weapons employed in their stead. A state employing offensive deterrence through space-weapons can punish a transgressor state, but is in a poor position to challenge its sovereignty. The transgressor state is less likely to succumb to the security dilemma if it perceives its national survival is not at risk. Moreover, the tremendous expense of space weapons inhibits their indiscriminate use. Over time, the world of sovereign states will recognize that the US does not threaten self-determination internally, though it challenges any attempts to intervene militarily in the politics of others, and has severely restricted its own capacity to do so.

A2: Arms Race 3/3

Developing offensive counterspace capabilities, such as BMD, dissuade China from attacking US satellites.

Ashley Tellis, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. 'China's Military Space Strategy', Survival, 49:3, 41 – 72, h t t p : / / w w w .carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_china_space1.pdf

This has led some observers, such as US Senator Jon Kyl, to conclude that the solution to redressing emerging American space vulnerabilities in the context of competition with China lies in developing, among other things, US offensive counterspace capabilities. 90 These will almost certainly be required, if for no other reason than to deter Beijing’s use of anti-space weaponry and to hold at risk its own emerging assets in space, which are likely to become even more important for both economic and military purposes as China evolves into a great power. 91 Offensive American counterspace instruments serve the limited but critical purpose of raising the costs of China’s evolving space-denial strategy, increasing the probability that Beijing will desist from asymmetric attacks on US space assets.

A2: Space Militarization Impossible 1/2

Space Militarization is feasible, and is already occurring with much success

Orr ’04 [Jackie Orr, Department of Sociology Syracuse University, 2004, The Militarization of Outer Space, h t t p : / / crs.sagepub.com/content/30/2/451.full.pdf+html]

The battles for which the U.S. Space Command is prepared are not futuristic science fiction scenarios. As the command center responsible for the protection and proliferation of military and commercial satellites, and for the rejuvenated National Missile Defense program, the Space Command is already a key player in the conduct of U.S. war. Satellitemediated infotech warfare has arrived. The militarized use of space-based satellites to provide real-time flows of information and imagery debuted in the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, developed in the 1990s during the U.S.-led war against Iraq and in the killing fields of Kosovo, and is today an integral component of U.S. military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq (Gray 1997; Grossman 2001). “Space support to NATO’s operations in Kosovo was a perfect example of how the United States will fight its wars in the future,” the Space Command reported in 2002, “Satelliteguided munitions, communications, navigation, and weather all combined to achieve military objectives in a relatively short amount of time and without the loss of a single U.S. troop.” (From the website of the U.S. Space Command at w w w .spacecom.mil/Fact%20SheetMilitarySpaceForces.htm, April 22, 2002.) As home to an increasingly sophisticated and expensive infrastructure of satellites, and to a proposed network of (possibly nuclear-powered) space stations equipped with laser weaponry, ‘outer space’ is now the final, fantastic frontier for the U.S. military’s imaginary and material battlefields.

Missile Defense Works

Mackenzie Eaglen 2010(Research Fellow for National Security Studies at the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation. “Why Missile Defense is Still Needed” h t t p : / / w w w .riponsociety.org/forum310g.htm)
Our investment in missile defense is what prevents others from building up their own arsenals and reduces their perceived need to acquire additional weapons. The United States today provides security for more than 30 countries around the world and thus prevents these nations from pursuing large missile programs of their own. As a result, the number of weapons throughout the world has decreased, which is a desirable outcome.

The bottom line is that missile defense decreases the importance and utility of ballistic missiles. This dramatically limits their attractiveness to potential enemies, given that such an attack would more than likely fail.

There have been tests of space weapons with high success

Lambakis ’07 [Steven Lambakis, Writer for Hoover Institution, 2007, “Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense”

With several successful hit-to-kill intercept tests in the bag and the proven combat performance of short-range land-based defenses, we have shown that we can “hit-a-bullet-with-a-bullet.” We also have made great strides in component miniaturization and advances in materials, and over the past twenty years have improved performance in interceptors, sensors, and battle management. This technological progress is key to considering whether the operation of space-based interceptors is feasible, effective (as part of the overall US missile defense system), and affordable.

A2: Space Militarization Impossible 2/2

The US already has successful anti-satellite technology, as shown in 1985

Miller ’02 [John J. Miller, National Review, July 15, 2002, “Our Next Manifest Destiny” h t t p : / / w w w .freerepublic.com/focus/news/714383/posts]

On the morning of September 13, 1985, Air Force Major Doug Pearson smashed through the sound barrier in his F-15. Pointed almost directly upward more than seven miles above the Pacific Ocean, he tapped a little red button on the side of his control stick, and released a missile strapped to the belly of his plane. The missile blazed out of sight, leaving the earth's atmosphere quickly and reaching a speed of 13,000 miles per second. Pearson wondered if it would hit anything. The mission was classified, so Pearson had developed a code with the folks back at Edwards Air Force Base: The radioman would tell him to level off at a certain altitude if his missile struck its target, an obsolete scientific probe orbiting 345 miles over Hawaii. As it happened, the code wasn't necessary. When Pearson checked in a few minutes after firing, he could hear cheering in the background from the control room. It was the one time an American pilot had ever destroyed an object in outer space. People still talk about Pearson as the country's first "space ace." He remains its only space ace. A few weeks after the satellite was destroyed, Congress banned further tests. "We had hoped to conduct more," recalls Pearson, now a general. "But politics were what they were, and the nation decided to go another way."

A2: Space Debris

Space debris is inevitable and is not a big risk. It is not a Reason to Reject Anti-Satellite Weapons

CIAO Focus 2007 (CIAO Focus, 2007: Space Debris is not a Reason to Reject Anti-Satellite Weapons, h t t p : / / spacedebate.org/argument/2597/)

Space debris is an inevitable fact of all space activity and will have to be dealt with in some way. The U.S. can develop methods to mitigate the risks from space debris when disabling target satellites but this should not be an overriding concern.

Space Debris is an Inevitable Consequence of Space Activity.
Taylor Dinerman, January 22nd, 2007 (Sticky airbags and grapples: kinetic ASATs without the debris, The Space Review, h t t p : / / w w w .thespacereview.com/article/789/1)

Dangerous space debris is both man-made and natural, in the latter case in the form of micrometeoroids. Confusing the two is a great way to make the issue into more of a problem than it already is. The environment around Earth is certainly filled with space junk, but if this was as dangerous as has been claimed, spacecraft would be breaking up on an almost weekly basis. Space junk is a problem and always will be. The international agreements designed to mitigate the dangers have been useful, but cannot halt the creation of more debris any more than recycling laws halt the production of garbage. The trend has been moving in the right direction, at least until our Chinese friends decided to make a statement.

Anti-Satellite Weapons could be Developed that Would not Create Space Debris
Taylor Dinerman, January 22nd, 2007 (Sticky airbags and grapples: kinetic ASATs without the debris, The Space Review, h t t p : / / w w w .thespacereview.com/article/789/1)

Fortunately, a few years ago a proposal was floated for as class of weapons that would destroy target spacecraft without directly creating any debris. This type of "co-orbital" ASAT would approach its target and envelop it with an airbag covered in a type of sticky substance. It would then fire a thruster so that the conjoined satellites would burn up in the atmosphere. If it worked as designed, no debris would be created. In practice it would be no easy task to design, test, and operate such a weapon, but it is not beyond the state of the art and would not create any debris. Figuring out what kind of sticky material is right for such a system would, by itself, be a fascinating project. The substance might have applications in other military and perhaps civil space systems. If the sticky airbag solution proves too difficult, the same goals might be reached using an ASAT equipped with grappling arms that would grasp the target before pushing down towards the atmosphere. The challenges of such a system are evident, not the least of which would be the need for some sort of decision-making software that would choose the best places to seize the enemy satellite during the final moments before contact.

A2: Militarization Destabilizing 1/2

History shows that character and motivations of states is more important than technology for determining what is 'destabilizing'.

Steven Lambakis February 2011 (Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics Policy Review, h t t p : / / w w w .hoover.org/publications/policy-review/feb01/lambakis.html)

When we look at what incites war, history instructs us that what matter most are the character and motivation of the states involved, along with the general balance of power (i.e., are we in the world of 1914, 1945, or 2001?). Fluctuations in national arsenals, be they based on earth or in space, do not determine, but rather more accurately are a reflection of, the course of politics among nations. In other words, it matters not so much that there are nuclear weapons, but rather whether Saddam Hussein or Tony Blair controls them and in what security context. The same may be said for space weapons.

Loss of a communications satellite won’t necessarily cause crisis escalation.

Steven Lambakis February 2011 (Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics Policy Review, h t t p : / / w w w .hoover.org/publications/policy-review/feb01/lambakis.html)

In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite, for example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces are redundant. Urgent communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves. Other means are also available to perform special reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our ability to know what transpires in space is growing -- so we are not always in the dark.

A2: Militarization Destabilizing 2/2

Space Weapons will not pose offensive threat to other countries’ sovereignty

Everett C. Dolman 2006 (US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space, SAIS Review. XXVI, No. 1, h t t p : / / spacedebate.org/evidence/2322/)

Hence, the argument that the unilateral deployment of space weapons will precipitate a disastrous arms race is further eroded. To be sure, space weapons are offensive by their very nature. They deter violence by the omnipresent threat of precise, measured, and unstoppable retaliation. But they offer no advantage in the mission of territorial occupation. As such, they are far less threatening to the international environment than any combination of conventional weapons employed in their stead. What would be more threatening to a state in opposition to American hegemony: a dozen lasers in space with pinpoint accuracy, or (for about the same price) 15 infantry divisions massed on the border? A state employing offensive deterrence through space weapons can punish a transgressor state, but it is in a poor position to challenge that state’s sovereignty. A transgressor state is less likely to succumb to the security dilemma if it perceives that its national survival is not at risk. Moreover, the tremendous expense of space weapons would inhibit their indiscriminate use. Over time, the world of sovereign states would recognize that the United States could not and would not use space weapons to threaten another country’s internal self-determination. The United States still would challenge any attempts to intervene militarily in the politics of others, and it would have severely restricted its own capacity to do the latter. Judicious and non-arbitrary use of a weaponized space eventually could be seen as a net positive, an effective global police force that punishes criminal acts but does not threaten to engage in aggressive behavior.

Past 65 years of escalating military space activity have not been destabilizing, no reason to expect weaponization would be either

Andrew T. Park, 2006 (Incremental Stepps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space, Houston Journal of International Law, h t t p : / / w w w .hjil.org/ArticleFiles/28_3_871.pdf)

The fact of the matter is that the world has not fallen apart after sixty years of increasing military activity in space. The evolution of the militarization of space has been particularly shaped by pressing national security requirements of the United States, and as many space hawks firmly believe, “this is how it will continue to be.” The U.S. quest for space dominance may arguably serve to further selfish military desires, but it can also provide a degree of stability that the current legal regime has been unable to provide.

A2: Nuclear Weapons Good

A single nuclear detonation is devastating

Lambakis, Steven. February and March 2007. ("Missile Defense From Space." Policy Review. No. 141)
And the stakes couldn't be higher. A ballistic missile delivering a nuclear payload to an American city would be truly devastating. For comparison, the Insurance Information Institute estimates total economic loss so far from Hurricane Katrina at more than $100 billion. By some calculations, it is going to take New Orleans 25 years to recover fully, and the cost of rebuilding the city is predicted to be as high as $200 billion. The direct cost to the New York City economy following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks was between $80 billion and $100 billion. These figures do not include indirect costs or the incalculable human losses.
Now just imagine the costs imposed by a ballistic missile nuclear strike against a U.S. city. The economic toll from a single nuclear attack against a major city, which would involve extensive decontamination activities and impact the national economy, could rise above $4 trillion. The economy could also be devastated by the electromagnetic pulse generated by a high-altitude nuclear explosion. The resulting electromagnetic shock would fry transformers within regional electrical power grids. The interdependent telecommunications (including computers), transportation, and banking and financial infrastructures that people and businesses rely on would be significantly damaged. Such an event would leave us, in some cases, with nineteenth-century technologies. This situation S Moreover, the paralysis leaders would experience would leave the country and its allies exposed to highly lethal twenty-first century threats. The blackmail possibilities of these weapons are as mind-numbing as they are terrifying.

A2: Other tech solves 1/2

Missile Defense is the most recent, necessary, and best space weapon

David C. Gompert and Jeffrey A. Isaacson ‘99(David C gompert is a senior fellow at the RAND corporation and is the former Senior Advisor for National Security and Defense for the Coalition  and is a part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Jeffrey A. Isaacson is the Vice President, Army Research Division; Director, RAND Arroyo Center “Planning a Ballistic Missile Defense System of Systems” h t t p : / / w w w .rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP181/index2.html)

The United States is edging toward deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system to protect itself from limited ballistic missile attacks by rogue nations. [1] Although a definitive decision to deploy NMD has not been made, the Clinton administration is taking steps in that direction: (1) affirming that a rogue nation ballistic missile threat could exist in the near future, (2) budgeting funds for NMD deployment in the Future Years Defense Program, and (3) declaring that NMD deployment might require modifications to the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The administration has promised a deployment decision as early as July 2000, assuming the technology is ready and the threat looms. Congress appears even more committed, with both the House and Senate recently voting to deploy a system as soon as technologically possible. This growing interest in at least limited NMD has been fueled by concerns about the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ballistic missiles, and technologies to produce both. Three particular developments in 1998 catalyzed the push to deploy: (1) the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, which validated fears of further nuclear proliferation; (2) the Rumsfeld Commission report, which found that the ballistic missile threat to the United States is broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly than originally surmised and that it may emerge with little or no warning (Rumsfeld, 1998); and (3) the Taepo Dong-1 missile test by North Korea, which reinforced the Rumsfeld Commission findings by illustrating that key technological hurdles to intercontinental ballistic missile development (in this case, multiple staging) may be overcome without warning. Yet, with both widening support and a heightened sense of urgency for at least limited NMD, there is a danger that the United States will take a path of least technical, bureaucratic, and diplomatic resistance, instead of making a considered judgment of what missile defense capabilities and treaty rights it needs. Current plans for a near-term NMD--the so-called "C1 capability"--are essentially a point solution to a point problem, with limited long-term value. At worst, the current plans point to a fragile initial capability that may be inadequate even to meet the immediate threat, much less other threats. It follows that negotiating only those changes to the ABM Treaty needed to permit the planned point solution will either prevent the United States from having adequate missile defense or require more wholesale treaty changes down the road. A different point solution is not the answer. What is needed, instead, is a long-term strategy that addresses the evolving ballistic missile defense problem broadly and flexibly, while also neutralizing the near-term threat. This strategy would call for an integrated and adaptable "system of systems" to defend U.S. territory, forces, allies, and other interests worth protecting. Such an approach is essential for coherent investment, technological, and negotiating strategies and should therefore be crafted in parallel with--indeed, as the framework for--a response to the immediate threat. In this paper, we present the case for and the components of such a general solution. We offer a durable strategic rationale for a ballistic missile defense, suggest how to assess the adequacy of any solution, illustrate a general solution, and identify potential steps to align the near-term program with the general solution. We also examine strategies for managing the ABM Treaty, Russia, China, and strategic offensive forces that are consistent with the general solution. To set the stage, we begin with a brief description of current U.S. ballistic missile defense programs and the ABM Treaty.

A2: Other tech solves 2/2

National Missile Defense technology already in progress

Wade Boese (Editorial Advisor to Arms Control Association “News Analysis: Missile Defense: Deploying a Work in Progress” September 04 h t t p : / / w w w .armscontrol.org/act/2004_09/Missile_Defense)
Sometime over the next several weeks, most likely around Oct. 1, President George W. Bush or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld will stride to a podium and announce that the initial elements of a missile defense system are now in place and ready for action. They will proclaim that the deployment fulfills the president’s promise four years ago to guard America against a rogue state or terrorist group armed with a ballistic missile. The hyperbole has already begun. As the system’s first missile interceptor booster was placed into its silo in Alaska July 22, Major General John W. Holly, charged with developing the system, said it “marks the end of an era where we have not been able to defend our country against long-range ballistic missile attacks.” On a campaign stop in August, Bush proclaimed, “It’s the beginning of a missile defense system that was envisioned by Ronald Reagan.” He added, “We want to continue to perfect this system, so we say to those tyrants who believe they can blackmail America and the free world: You fire, we’re going to shoot it down.”

MahmoudClone 发表于 2012-1-14 05:50
A2: Arms Race 1/3

US space dominance prevents arms race
A2: Missiles bad for US Russia Relations

Missile Defense Good for U.S.-Russia relations.

Spring ‘11
Baker Spring is the F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy at The Heritage Foundation. He specializes in examining the threat of ballistic missiles from Third World countries and U.S. national security issues. The Heritage Foundation. “Russian Control of U.S. Missile Defenses? Just Say No. April 11, 2011. h t t p : / / blog.heritage.org/2011/04/11/russian-control-of-u-s-missile-defenses-just-say-no/

While the U.S. is right to be seeking Russian cooperation in the area of missile defense—more defensive strategic postures would benefit both the U.S. and Russia in addressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the missiles used to deliver them—the U.S. should reject this Russian demand. The Russian demand defies rational explanation. The missile defense system will serve only one purpose: to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles already launched at a target. In this context, the Russians cannot believe that U.S. and allied operation of a missile defense system will pose a threat to them unless they think they need to threaten both with a nuclear-armed missile attack. If this is the basis of Russian thinking, then this negotiation is about anything but cooperation. Genuine cooperation in the realm of missile defense is not about the possession of capabilities by the U.S., U.S. allies, or Russia; it is about all three parties standing together in the intention to oppose aggression through the use of ballistic missiles by rogue states. The Russians can be motivated only by either of two desires in demanding direct operational control. The first is to deny the U.S. and its allies the ability to operate a missile defense system for their own protection. The second is for the Russians to operate the system only for their own benefit, effectively expecting the U.S. and its allies to build a missile defense system and turn it over to Russia. Either way, the demand will leave the U.S. and its allies vulnerable to missile attack. Interestingly, there is no evidence that the Russians have made an offer to the U.S. and its allies in these negotiations to allow them operational control over the Russian missile defense system deployed around Moscow. Fortunately, there is another option for genuine cooperation in the field of missile defense between the U.S. and its allies on the one side and the Russians on the other: to pursue coordinated deployments of missile defense systems to address shared threats. This approach permits each to control the missile defenses in their possession to meet their security needs while also providing all the opportunity for cooperation even where there may be differences of opinion of what constitutes a genuine threat. The coordinated deployment option would also deny Russia the ability to assert that missile defenses are inherently destabilizing no matter which country possesses a missile defense capability. Russia made just such an assertion by insisting on the inclusion of anti-missile defense language in the preamble to the New START arms control treaty with the U.S., which has just entered into force. Russia, by acknowledging that it has a missile defense capability of its own in the contribution to coordinated deployments for countering shared threats, will no longer be able to assert that missile defenses are destabilizing under all circumstances. In the course of negotiations on missile defense cooperation, the U.S. and its allies should not buckle to the Russian demand for operational control. If they do, the agreement will only serve to perpetuate U.S. and allied vulnerability to missile attack. In this case, what was supposed to be a negotiation about cooperating in the field of missile defense will become a negotiation over cooperation in restricting missile defense. It will be an agreement that will not serve U.S. or allied interests.

A2: Space Weapons Bad 1/2

Rival countries will expand now

Trevor Brown, MSc, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009.  Air & Space Power Journal, “Soft Power and Space Weaponization,” h t t p : / / w w w .airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html
Without a doubt, we must guard at all costs the celestial lines of communications that link society and the military. Consider the consequences if satellites that we use every day for military operations, financial transactions, communications, weather forecasting, and air navigation failed without warning. Devastating strikes on critical nodes in space not only could place the lives of millions at serious risk, but also could result in incalculable economic losses to the nation.
Throughout the Cold War, the United States struggled to obtain a position of military superiority over the Soviet Union in order to protect American values and interests. A legacy of that struggle is the United States’ current space capability. Should the United States permit security for its values and interests to lapse by discontinuing attempts to retain the military superiority that it has achieved? Are we to believe that US security could somehow increase by forgoing military supremacy?
Some people speak as if they believe that a country can choose whether to pursue national security through arms or through arms control.10 But Russia’s interest in banning space weapons is motivated by a desire to stunt the growth of US military space programs in order to buy time for covertly advancing its own space-weapons program and achieving technological parity.11 Russia bases its opposition to space weaponization not on a scrupulous set of principles but on strategic objectives. Two scholars contend that “to understand whether Russia could indeed change its position on the weaponization of space, we need to go beyond official statements and discussion among Russian military experts. The course of the military space program in Russia will be determined primarily by the availability of the resources required to support the program and by the ability of the industry and the military to manage development projects for the military use of space.”12
Despite China’s repeated calls for a ban on all space weapons, historical evidence suggests that little separates Chinese and Russian motivations for such bans. “Because a broad interpretation of space weapons would rule out almost all U.S. missile defense systems, Chinese officials who want to limit U.S. missile defense deployments would advocate a ban that used this interpretation.”13 Interestingly, after the Clinton administration scrapped the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1993, China redoubled its efforts in military space and gained ground on the United States.14 By 1999 “China’s test of a spacecraft intended for manned flight demonstrated a low-thrust rocket propulsion system that could be used to make warheads maneuver to defeat a BMD [ballistic missile defense] system.”15
Perhaps there remains a belief in the US strategic community that “the deployment of U.S. space weapons is likely to make space assets—including commercial communications and broadcast satellites—even more vulnerable, since no other country is pursuing, let alone deploying, space attack weapons.”16 Such notions were shattered when China conducted its first successful ASAT test in January 2007, suggesting that it had spent many years developing ASAT capabilities. The United States—as well as the rest of the world, for that matter—should not allow itself to be duped. The record shows that although officials in the Chinese Communist Party rail against military space as a threat to peace and stability, the People’s Liberation Army busies itself with the acquisition of space weapons.
The notion that the United States can keep space from becoming a “shooting gallery” by agreeing to a comprehensive ban on space weapons is naïve.17 The hard truth is that as long as US economic and military power depends on massive, complex, and expensive sets of vulnerable space assets, the incentive for any potential foe to develop ways of attacking them remains too great to be overcome by any international agreement.18 If, however, such an agreement can constrain the United States from developing and deploying effective countermeasures, foes would have every reason to pressure Washington into limiting its own actions.19 As space technology spreads, the incentives for small and medium states to seek space-warfare capabilities increase, and the destruction of a major US satellite would represent both a substantive and symbolic victory over the United States.20 There is, therefore, no question of whether to proceed with space weapons—only a question of how to do so with the requisite political skill in order to retain soft power while expanding hard power.

A2: Space Weapons bad 2/2

U.S. must deploy to stay ahead

Brian Berger and Lon Rains, “Northrop to Buy SpaceShipOne Builder: Scaled Composites Already Crafting ‘SpaceShipTwo’ for Tourists,” MSNBC, 20 July 2007, h t t p : / / w w w .msnbc.msn.com/id/19877344 (accessed 9 March 2008).

A glance at the global strategic situation reveals many nations rushing to develop space capabilities. Ostensibly civilian, the capabilities in development around the world are largely dual use and will have profound effects on the balance of power. The United States, therefore, would be foolish to slow the pace of its own space development. The issue at hand is whether to proceed with space weapons and how to proceed with these capabilities and effectively manage the security dilemmas that will inevitably arise.
By assuming a posture which suggests that its intentions in space are competitive scientific and commercial pursuits—and which does not suggest the desire to barricade the medium in times of peace for the purpose of geopolitical leverage—the United States can proceed without causing undue angst in the international community. Once we have laid the foundation for commercial activities (i.e., “merchant shipping”), military capabilities—or “military shipping”—will follow in due course and with far less controversy. If US policy makers can showcase scientific and commercial space endeavors while avoiding the perception of orbital despotism, they can steadily build dominant military space capabilities and retain soft power.

A2 Politics DA

A2: Politics Link – International Backlash

International Community will support the US rather than try to militarize themselves

Lambakis ’01 [Steven Lambakis, a writer for Hoover Digest, 2-1-2001, “Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics”

Similar international support may be expected in the future, even if the United States were to deploy space-based interceptors to slap down ballistic missiles aimed at New York or Los Angeles or antisatellite weapons to blind prying eyes in times of crisis or conflict. When the stakes are high and the United States must act militarily in self-defense or to protect its interests, allies and friends are likely to judge U.S. activities in space to affect politico-strategic conditions on Earth appropriately and in context.

A2: Politics DA-No Link

Doing the plan doesn’t cause Obama to lose political capital; neg doesn’t have link

Hoppin ’08 [Andrew Hoppin, Former Chief Information Officer to US Senate, co-founder of NASA co-lab, 2-29-2008, “Space Policy under an Obama Administration” h t t p : / / globehoppin.com/2008/02/29/space-policy-under-an-obama-administration/]

Many space constituents are publicly critical of the Obama campaign for campaign rhetoric that is less overtly supportive of the status quo of the US space program than that of the Clinton or McCain campaigns. However, to this constituent of space, Obama’s ambivalence makes him THE MOST ATTRACTIVE Presidential candidate in this campaign. Why? Because I believe that the WORST CASE scenario for the US space program under a new Administration is the status quo, and that we’re quite unlikely– even under an Obama administration– to experience major cutbacks in public space spending, due to the political capital that the status quo of space policy enjoys in key large States.

A2: Plan Unpopular 1/2

The Republicans strongly support missile defense and always have

Korb ’08 [Lawrence Korb,  Senior Fellow at center for American Progress, Senior Advisor to the Center of Defense Information, 4-25-08, “Republicans, Missile Defense, and the Reagan Legacy” h t t p : / / w w w .thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/republicans-missile-defense-and-the-reagan-legacy]

In addition, a foolproof national missile defense would enable Republicans to go it alone in the world and not have to rely on other nations or international treaties to provide security. This philosophy can be summed up as "unilateral if we can, multilateral if we must." Thus, if national missile defense can protect the United States against North Korean, Iranian, or Chinese missiles, why negotiate or make concessions? Or if the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia prevents Washington from forging ahead with national missile defense, why not just scrap the treaty regardless of how it affects U.S.-Russian relations? Or why ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty? Instead, move ahead with the development of the bunker-buster or the reliable replacement warhead. Consequently, when the Republicans are in power, they push missile defense relentlessly. After the Republicans won both the Senate and House of Representatives in 1995, they passed a law, the National Missile Defense Act, which said that it was U.S. policy to deploy national missile defense as soon as possible. Never mind that the Soviet Union had collapsed, that the Clinton administration had just concluded an agreement with North Korea to freeze its development of plutonium at Yongbyon, or that there was no evidence then that Iran was violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Democrats also want to develop stronger Missile Defense systems
Democratic National Platform 2k [Democratic National Platform, quoted/compiled on the site OnTheIssues.com, 8-15-2000, “Develop limited Military Defense Systems” h t t p : / / w w w .ontheissues.org/celeb/Democratic_Party_Defense.htm]

Our first priority is to continue to cut stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, halting testing, and ensuring that weapons and weapons-grade material do not fall into the wrong hands. In light of the possibility that U.S. forces will have to contend with hostile tactical range ballistic missiles, we have been working rapidly to develop anti-tactical ballistic missile systems. We reject Republican plans to endanger our security with massive unilateral cuts in our arsenal and to construct an unproven, expensive, and ill-conceived missile defense system that would plunge us into a new arms race. Democrats support the development of the technology for a limited national missile defense system.

A2: Plan Unpopular 2/2

Missile defense has bipartisan support

Hodge 2/11 – staff writer for the Wall Street Journal (Nathan, 2/11/11, “Pentagon Loses War to Zap Airborne Laser From Budget,” h t t p : / / online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704570104576124173372065568.html)

In March 1999, the General Accounting Office recommended the Air Force reconsider plans to order a second aircraft. That fall, the Pentagon began considering a plan to cut $258 million from the Airborne Laser to make up other budget shortfalls.  In response, a group of 19 Republican senators and one Democrat, led by Sen. Thad Cochran (R., Miss.), sent a letter to then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen urging him to keep funding intact. The Clinton administration pressed ahead with the proposed cuts, only for the Republican-controlled Congress in 2000 to restore funding. Mr. Cohen, like Mr. Gates, was a Republican defense secretary in a Democratic administration.  Missile defense was transformed under President George W. Bush. The Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency took over management of the Airborne Laser. In addition to developing "boost phase" defenses like Airborne Laser, the agency focused efforts on fielding "hit-to-kill" systems—rocket-launched interceptors that would steer into the path of an incoming missile and destroy warheads by sheer impact.  Riki Ellison, head of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, said bipartisan support continued to grow with each successful test of interceptor systems.

Missile Defense is popular, poll proves

Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance ’05 (non-profit that seeks support for testing, development & deployment of missile defense systems, “Views of American Public on Missile Defense” h t t p : / / w w w .missiledefenseadvocacy.org/data/files/polls/viewsofthe americanpubliconmissiledefense.pdf)

There is broad support for a missile defense system: 79% of Americans support a missile defense system to protect the United States. (70% Independents, 70% Democrats, and 91% Republicans)Americans perceive missile defense as a public safety issue: 70% of Americans state that Missile Defense is a public safety issue and part of the nation’s homeland security program. Americans will feel safer with a missile defense system: 71% of Americans stated they will feel safer with a Missile Defense System in place to protect the United States. The majority of Americans believe the building of a missile defense system is affordable. 53% of Americans believe Missile Defense is affordable and is money well spent

Winners Win

Political Capital is not finite-the more Obama pushes plans through congress, the more polcap he gains

Singer ‘09  (Jonathan Singer-senior writer and editor for MyDD. Singer is perhaps best known for his various interviews with prominent politicians. His interviews have included John Kerry, Walter Mondale, Bob Dole, and George McGovern, Barack Obama, John Edwards, and Tom Vilsack. He has been cited by sources including Newsweek, NY Times, and USA today. 3-3-2009, “By Expanding Capital, Obama Grows his Capital” h t t p : / / mydd.com/2009/3/3/by-expending-capital-obama-grows-his-capital]

Some believe that political capital is finite, that it can be used up. To an extent that's true. But it's important to note, too, that political capital can be regenerated -- and, specifically, that when a President expends a great deal of capital on a measure that was difficult to enact and then succeeds, he can build up more capital. Indeed, that appears to be what is happening with Barack Obama, who went to the mat to pass the stimulus package out of the gate, got it passed despite near-unanimous opposition of the Republicans on Capitol Hill, and is being rewarded by the

A2 Spending DA

Spending Good – Jobs

U.S. Millitiary Spending key to jobs.

Pollin and Garrett-Peltier ‘07
Robert Pollin and Heidi Garrett-Peltier Department of Economics and Political Economy Research Institute University of Massachusetts, Amherst. October 2007. University of Massachusetts. h t t p : / / w w w .ips-dc.org/reports/071001-jobcreation.pdf.
The U.S. government spent an estimated $572 billion on the military in 2007. This amounts to about $1,800 for every resident of the country. The level of military spending has risen dramatically since 2001, with the increases beginning even before September 11, 2001. In total dollar terms (after controlling for inflation), military spending has risen at an average rate of 10 percent per year from 2000 – 2006, the full years of the Bush presidency to date. By contrast, the overall U.S. economy grew at an average annual rate of 2.7 percent. As a share of GDP, the military budget rose from 3.0 to 4.4 percent of GDP during the Bush Presidency. At the current size of the economy, a difference between a military budget at 4.4 rather than 3.0 percent of GDP amounts to $134 billion. The largest increases in the military budget during the Bush presidency have been associated with the Afghanistan and especially the Iraq wars. The Iraq war alone now costs an average of $360 million a day (according to the Congressional Research Service), or $138 billion over the 2007 fiscal year. Thus, the $138 billion spent on Iraq in 2007 was basically equal to the total increase in military spending resulting from moving the military budget from 3.0 to 4.4 percent of GDP. Amid the debates on the political and strategic merits of the Iraq war, one aspect of the current level of military spending by the U.S. government that has been largely neglected is its effects on the U.S. economy. $600 billion is a vast sum of money—greater than the combined GDP of Sweden and Thailand, and eight times the amount of U.S. federal spending on education. It is therefore reasonable to ask what the benefits might be to U.S. taxpayers if some significant share of the $600 billion now going to the military were instead devoted to alternative domestic purposes, such as health care, education, or the environment. A view is often expressed that the military budget is a cornerstone of the U.S. economy. The Pentagon is often said to be a major underwriter of, and stimulus to, important technical innovations. It is also often cited as a major employer, providing good jobs—jobs that are stable and at least decently paid—to millions of Americans.
Studies prove Military Spending key to Economy anand Jobs.

UAB 10.
University of Alabama Birmingham study led by Assistant Professor of Sociology Casey Borch, Ph.D. June 17, 2010. “UAB Study Confirms Military Spending Helps States Survive Poor Economy”  h t t p : / / main.uab.edu/Sites/MediaRelations/articles/78097/.

States in which defense spending is high are better equipped to withstand the effects of an economic downturn than others, according to a new study led by The University of Alabama at Birmingham Assistant Professor of Sociology Casey Borch, Ph.D. The study, published this week in the June issue of the journal Social Forces, confirms that states with high levels of defense spending have lower poverty rates, less income inequality, lower unemployment and higher median family income. It also demonstrates that the U.S. economy is increasingly dependent on military spending. "Politicians always have assumed that military spending helps the economy, but there have been very few studies to prove that it's true. No studies have examined the effects of military spending on as many measures of economic well-being at the state level as our study," said Borch, who teaches in the UAB Department of Sociology and Social Work. For this study, Borch and his team examined data taken from 49 states during the post-Vietnam War era, from 1977 to 2004, to determine the role of military spending in a peacetime economy. The time span coincided with a 30-year decline in and dependence on manufacturing in the United States, Borch said. The researchers reviewed spending on defense contracts and military personnel and compared it to changes in economic indicators over time - poverty and unemployment rates, median family income and income disparities. The researchers also adjusted for variables such as the dominant political party in a state, strength of labor unions, number of Fortune 500 companies, gross state product (GSP) from manufacturing and proportion of military and non-military federal spending. The researchers found, for example, that an increase in a state's dependence on military spending, from 5 to 10 percent of its total GSP, increased employment about 1 percent - despite nationwide declines in manufacturing - and a $14,000 per household increase in median family income. In addition, the Gini Index, a measure of income distribution across a population, fell about 6 percent. Poverty rates fell about 2 percent. Data in the study showed that decreased military spending coincided with times of economic hardship in the states. For example, the 1990s were marked by slowdowns in military spending, and many state economies dependent on military spending suffered higher unemployment, slow economic growth and widening income inequality, Borch said. "For some cities and states, military spending is an incredibly important part of the local economy," said Borch. "For example, in places like Virginia, which has military bases and a shipbuilding center, there is an enormous amount of military spending, and Huntsville, Ala., is the third most dependent metropolitan statistical area in the country. Other states like Montana and Idaho enjoy less. Therefore, you have politicians and community leaders who work to get military spending funneled into their states because it helps the state economy." The United States ranks No. 1 in the world for military spending, said Borch. Russia ranks second, with a military budget about seven times smaller than the United States.

2AC Spending – No Link

Spending on Space Militarization doesn’t add to spending, just refocuses it.

Dolman 05
Everett Dolman is an Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. 14 September 2005. h t t p : / / w w w .e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf.
The immediate budget impact of significant funding increases for space weapons would be to decrease funding for combat aircraft, the surface battle fleet, and ground forces. This may well set the proponents of space weaponization at odds with both proponents and opponents of increased defense spending. Space advocates must sell their ideas to fellow pro-weapons groups by making the case that the advantages they provide outweigh the capabilities forgone. This is a mighty task. The tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars needed to develop, test and deploy a minimal space weapons system with the capacity to engage a few targets around the world could displace a half-dozen or more aircraft carrier battle groups, entire aircraft procurement programs such as the F-22, and several heavy armored divisions. This is a tough sell for supporters of a strong military.

Twice in the last eight years, in the Caspian Sea, the Iranians have tested their ability to launch ballistic missiles in a way to set off an EMP. The congressionally mandated EMP Commission, with some of America's finest scientists, has released its findings and issued two separate reports, the most recent in April, describing the devastating effects of such an attack on the U.S.  The only solution to this problem is a robust, multilayered missile-defense system. The most effective layer in this system is in space, using space-based interceptors that destroy an enemy warhead in its ascent phase when it is easily identifiable, slower, and has not yet deployed decoys. We know it can work from tests conducted in the early 1990s. We have the technology. What we lack is the political will to make it a reality.  An EMP attack is not one from which America could recover as we did after Pearl Harbor. Such an attack might mean the end of the United States and most likely the Free World. It is of the highest priority to have a president and policy makers not merely acknowledge the problem, but also make comprehensive missile defense a reality as soon as possible.

Spending 2AC 3/3

BMD solves ASATs

Howard Kleinberg, member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington, April 2011. US Army Field Artillery Association, “A Global Missile Defense 'networK': Terrestrial High-Energy Lasers and Aerospace Mirrors,” p. Lexis
Fortunately, this recently -revealed, real-world ASAT threat also brings a silver lining in it. As is the case with ballistic missiles, SBBMD weapons can also defend against ASATs. All ASATs, at least, whether direct-ascent or co-orbiting, must first be launched from the Earth's surface, regardless of the launch platform, and must first go through a boost phase. And since SB-BMD provides the single best way to stop any such missile attack from taking place, Robert Butterworth, suggests in his article, "Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs," it would also provide the single best way to defend against ASAT attacks; same mission, different payload inside the threat missile. SB-BMDs could also intercept ASATs in other phases of their flight, at least within lower Earth orbit. For instance, the Missile Defense Agency's GMD can intercept ICBM warheads at the peak of their trajectories, some 1, 100 km (500 miles) or so. Similarly, an ASAT (direct-ascent or co-orbiting) on terminal approach towards a satellite in LEO would present a target of comparable size, density and velocity as a "mid-course" ICBM warhead (if not even larger), at a similar altitude, and possibly similar speed and trajectory. As a result, the ASAT could also be targeted and intercepted by a midcourse defense-capable SB-BMD weapon, in addition to its primary role of boost-phase defense, giving a "second-chance" round of shots with which to try to stop any ASAT.

Collapses the economy

Ian Easton, Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009.  “The Great Game in Space,” h t t p : / / w w w .project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf
Many specialists also argue that aside from the U.S. military dependency on orbital space, the U.S. economy, and in turn, much of the world economy, is also rapidly becoming dependent on space-based systems. They posit that, in effect, the U.S. is now a “spacefaring” nation whose very way of life is tied to the myriad capabilities provided by the orbital space medium. War games conducted as part of U.S. national security protocols, such as the Army-After-Next, Navy Global and Air Force Global Engagement series, Space Game 2 and Schriever 1 & 2, as well as the privately conducted “DEADSATS” war games, conducted from the late 1990s and the early 2000s, confirm this view. According to some space experts who were intimately involved with the war games, the exercises exposed “a critical national Achilles heel that politicians, economists and corporate CEOs have largely ignored…losses in space can quickly affect the economic, social, and national security fabric not only of the United States, but of the entire world.” These experts further speculate that “large military powers,” such as the United States, could “be held hostage by the unknowns inherent in a new kind of war.” 36 These concerns are directly linked with China’s ASAT weapons and their potential applicability in any future U.S.-Sino conflict. A more recent war game, “Pacific Vision,” conducted by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) underscored the vulnerability of the unprotected commercial communication satellite channels on which the Air Force relies, as well as its cyber and radar vulnerabilities to Chinese attack.

MahmoudClone 发表于 2012-1-14 05:55
America spends billions on war in Afghanistan refocusing spending on space saves money.

Cooper  ...
Ext – Economy

Space based BMD key to combat EMP attacks that collapse the economy

Dr. Steven Lambakis, Senior Defense Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy, 2007.  High Frontier, 3:2, “Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense,” p. 28-29
Will there ever be a time when we will need the powerful capabilities discussed above? Robust missile defenses, at a minimum, could further the defensive goals of dissuading our allies from investing in ballistic missile programs and deterring aggressive missile behavior. Yet there are instances imaginable too when we would want to have the strongest, most reliable, most effective defenses possible. What if, for example, a hostile country decided that the best military option it had available, an option that would inflict maximum damage on the US, would be to launch and then detonate a nuclear weapon several hundred kilometers above the US? Although nobody would die, not immediately at least, and no buildings would be destroyed, the resulting explosion would send out an invisible electro-magnetic pulse that would disable or destroy the electrical, financial, communications, and transportation infrastructures of part or all of the country. The impact on the economy and the health and safety of citizens would be felt worldwide. According to a recent report by a congressionally chartered commission to look at the electromagnetic pulse threat, “a regional or national recovery would be long and difficult and would seriously degrade the safety and overall viability of our Nation.”  Indeed, our vulnerability might invite such an attack. The stakes, in fact, are that high, and the possible threat posed by a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile is that chilling. A robust missile defense system may be the only recourse we have to defend ourselves against such a threat.  Now who is in favor of having the most efficient, most effective missile defenses in place? And if most of us favor strengthening defenses to improve our ability to kill long-range missiles early enough in their trajectory (that is, from boost phase to early midcourse phase), why would we not be in favor of a vigorous program to develop and deploy interceptors that provide on-call, worldwide reach, and a boost phase layer within the currently deployed ballistic missile defense system? Why, in other words, would we not want to investigate more fully the performance possibilities of space-based interceptors?


目录：

Index 1/2

1AC        3
Plan text        4
Contention 1: Inherency        5
Contention 2: Chinese ASAT 1/8        6
Contention 3: Hegemony 1/5        14
Contention 4: Solvency 1/2        19
Inherency        21
No Space Weapons Now        22
Solvency        23
Solvency General 1/2        24
ASAT Solvency 1/2        26
Hegemony Solvency 1/3        28
Solvency-Military Defense key for GPS Satellites        31
Solvency-NMD Popular        32
Solvency-Enhanced Missile Defence 1/3        33
Solvency-Missile Interception        36
Solvency-Prevents Asteroid Impacts        37
Nuclear Conflict Impact Turn        38
Solvency-Only Space BMD Solves 1/2        39
Solvency-Space BMD Proven and Ready (Brilliant Pebbles)        41
Solvency – First Mover Key 1/2        42
Solvency – Militarization  Deterrence        44
Chinese ASAT 2AC Extensions        45
Uniqueness 1/3        46
Links 1/8        49
Impacts 1/4        57
Chinese Realism- War Inevitable 1/4        61
Solvency-Military Defense key for GPS Satellites        65
Hegemony 2AC Extensions        66
US Hegemony Keeps Peace 1/2        67
Space Weapons Key to Hegemony 1/2        69
Other Countries Waiting for US to Make the First Move        71
Missile Defense and Relations        72
Space Assets Vulnerable 1/2        73
Uniqueness        75
Foreign Countries already have power 1/3        76
Militarization Inevitable        80
Alternative Advantage: Russia        81
Russia Advantage 1AC 1/3        82
Russia Solvency        85
Russia 2AC Extensions        86
Index 2/2

A2 Case        87
A2: Insufficient Defense        88
A2: Arms Race 1/3        89
A2: Space Militarization Impossible 1/2        92
A2: Space Debris        94
A2: Militarization Destabilizing 1/2        95
A2: Nuclear Weapons Good        97
A2: Other tech solves 1/2        98
A2: Missiles bad for US Russia Relations        100
A2: Space Weapons Bad 1/2        101
A2 Politics DA        103
A2: Politics Link – International Backlash        104
A2: Politics DA-No Link        105
A2: Plan Unpopular 1/2        106
Winners Win        108
A2 Spending DA        109
Spending Good – Jobs        110
2AC Spending – No Link        111
A2: Spending Hurts Growth        112
Turn        113
Loss of Space Assets kills Economy 1/2        114
Spending 2AC 1/3        116
Ext – Economy        119

来源：Space-National-Missile-Defense-Affirmative---CNDI.docx


补充内容 (2012-1-17 05:16):
下载镜像站：h t t p : / / chestertondebate.wikispaces.com/file/xml/Space-National-Missile-Defense-Affirmative---CNDI.docx?v=rss_2_0

我的娘哎，一点鼠标，以为到了外网了LZ既然这么辛苦当了回搬运工，能否再辛苦当回翻译官？

方言是各种不懂啊!!!!!

此刻的心情正是LS的头像

以为我是研究生啊，各种看不懂

大意是说：楼主不用翻译机，肯定木有小JJ。   同意的请顶一下。

大段方言，有心无力。

有普通话版的吗

cloudzm 发表于 2012-1-14 10:44
方言是各种不懂啊!!!!!
头像赞，顶～

请说普通话，真不行东北话也可以啊，搞啥子方言啊

楼主，曲高和寡啊，你把那文改成通俗的，普通话版的吧。
文盲啊，连找个人帮帮念一下都困难。
嗨，就是有人帮我念，我还是听不懂。

方言不懂哎，求字幕组，翻译帝。

坑X啊，搬运工也不能这样当啊，怎么也得机器翻译一下吧，建议斑竹碰上这样的贴子，直接扣分

推广普通话太有必要了

我靠，简直是天书

老师从小就教导我们，公共场合，要说普通话！
实在不行，粤语也凑合，要不，东北话也行啊！！

求翻译帝

虽然我自认英语不错，但想看完这么大一段还是要下很大决心滴

MahmoudClone 发表于 2012-1-14 06:56
Ext – Economy

Space based BMD key to combat EMP attacks that collapse the economy
源文件的链接给一下。