中国航母之梦幻 -- 公海铁拳

中国航母之梦幻 -- 公海铁拳

2011-07-20


新加坡《海峡时报》7月16日文章，原题：公海铁拳

那艘灰色的巨轮就停泊在中国东北海港大连。尽管尚未有官方命名，但已经吸引了无数间谍卫星的注意。它就是中国保守最不严的军事秘密：该国首艘航母。

当最终下水执行首次任务时，它必将成为中国强国地位的象征。中国官员一直试图淡化其重要性，说它“只是个威慑力象征”。但航母的意义远甚于此，它将使中国有能力进行海上力量投放。假以时日，它还将改变亚洲的战略版图。

中国对航母的追求可追溯到半世纪前。1958年毛泽东提出要建造海上商船船队并用“无产阶级”航母护航。20世纪70年代末，华国锋决定购买轻型航母。但这两个计划都没进展，其原因归咎于成本、官僚机构和政策考虑。邓小平时代，重点是国内发展，航母被认为可能引发全球对中国意图的猜忌。

中国海军最终从一个意想不到的来源处得到了帮助。1996年大陆试射导弹，意在影响台湾首次“选举”，美国派遣两艘航母进入台湾海峡，中国只能怀着深深的挫败感退让。这使北京意识到，航母是个独特的政治资产，也是一个易于部署和灵活的巨大铁拳。

而后，中国冲破重重难关收购了乌克兰的瓦良格号。其精髓在于其推进器、电子设备和甲板上部署战机，而非船体本身。在这些领域，中国仍远远落后于美国。据美国评估，航母计划可能在未来4年内消耗中国200亿美元。除了多艘护卫舰，还需建造相关的战机和电子战设备。事实上，首艘航母的启动正是北京意图的声明。

中国的举动正值西方对航母的用处争执不休之际。上月发布的一篇论文中两名美国专家称，建造大型航母的计划是多余的，既价格昂贵又易受攻击。他们认为：在过去枪炮时代，规模和打击范围有直接关系。但在当今导弹时代并非一定如此。正在研发能打击航母的导弹的中国为他们提供了证明。尽管航母难以被侦测，但其巨大的电磁足迹能被传感器追踪，中国的超视距雷达也将派上用场，且同时发射多枚导弹会令航母的防御系统捉襟见肘。中国是否拥有这些能力，将成为美国情报界未来数年内的任务。

无论怎样，有一点显而易见：中国进入航母时代将引发新一轮海军军备竞赛。美国不会放弃海军发展，一些亚洲国家也将努力增强自身海军实力，开发反航母武器的兴趣也将大大上升。中国海军将继续航母项目，以期达到其他任何国家在一个世纪内都未曾实现的目标：在一场必将十分激烈的科技竞赛中战胜美国。

（作者乔纳森·艾亚尔，王晓雄译）



http://heresthenews.blogspot.com ... carrier-dreams.html

Saturday, July 16, 2011

China Aircraft Carrier Dreams

Jul 16, 2011
special report

Iron fists on the high seas

China's stature as a maritime power will get a major boost when its first aircraft carrier undertakes its sea trials soon. Straits Times correspondent Jonathan Eyal tells why these vessels pack a punch

THE giant, grey-painted ship docked right behind an Ikea superstore in the north-western Chinese seaport of Dalian has no official name or designation. But it has already attracted the attention of countless spy satellites. For it is China's worst-kept military secret: the country's first aircraft carrier.

And when it finally sets sail on its first operational mission - which could happen within weeks, says a China Daily report on Tuesday - it will serve as a vivid reminder of China's great power status.

Chinese officials have sought to play down its importance. 'It is a symbol of deterrence,' says retired general Xu Guangyu. 'It says: don't mess with me, don't think you can bully me.'

But the aircraft carrier does much more than that, for it gives China the ability to project its power far away from its shores. And, over time, this is guaranteed to transform Asia's strategic map.

China's quest for an aircraft carrier goes back half a century. The issue was first debated in 1958, when Mao Zedong tabled a plan for what he called the 'railways on the high seas'. Characteristically, Mao's dream was gigantic: it envisaged the construction of fleets of merchant ships, escorted by 'proletarian' aircraft carriers.

Nothing came of this idea, but scaled-down programmes to construct an aircraft carrier were subsequently raised in Beijing. At one point during the late 1970s, party boss Hua Guofeng made a decision to purchase a 'light' vessel of this type, but this also petered out.

Daunted by costs

THE reasons for the hesitation were, invariably, costs, bureaucratic infighting and broader policy considerations. When Mao dreamt of aircraft carriers, an average Soviet-built battleship would have devoured a quarter of the Chinese navy's then-procurement budget.

Furthermore, the Chinese navy lacked the political influence enjoyed by the ground or air forces to lobby for bigger funding.

And, as Deng Xiaoping became China's paramount leader, the main priority was domestic development; aircraft carriers were dismissed as platforms which would raise global concerns about Chinese intentions, for little practical benefits.

But the Chinese navy ultimately got help from an unexpected quarter: none other than the United States. When Taiwan's then-President Lee Teng-hui held the island's first open elections in 1996, China thought it could influence the ballot's outcome by holding missile-firing tests in waters adjacent to Taiwan. The strategy backfired spectacularly. The US responded by scrambling two of its aircraft carriers - one from the Middle East and another from the Pacific - to patrol the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese could do little more than watch the ships with deep frustration, and back down.

At the time, then US President Bill Clinton was hailed for this masterful use of sea power. Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, the 1996 Taiwan episode can be seen a classic example of a strategic victory with unintended consequences. For the humiliation which China experienced persuaded its leaders that aircraft carriers were a unique political asset, a huge iron fist which is both easily deployable and flexible - precisely what Chinese naval commanders have argued for decades. In effect, Mr Clinton made the case for China's aircraft carrier.

What followed was a saga worthy of the best spy novel. Seemingly out of the blue, a group of Chinese investors offered US$20 million to buy the Varyag, a disused Soviet-era aircraft carrier with no engines, which lay rusting in a Ukraine port. The investors, who by sheer chance just happened to include some retired Chinese military officers, claimed they wanted to use it as a floating casino in Macau, despite warnings from the territory's then- colonial masters that no such casino would be allowed, and that Macau's port was not deep enough to accommodate the beast. Strapped for cash and eager to rid itself of a problem, Ukraine accepted the offer in 1998.

But Turkey, whose consent was required for the ship to pass through the Dardanelles Strait, refused to cooperate. So the Varyag spent 18 months being towed aimlessly around the Black Sea, before the Turks were persuaded to let it through, in return for Chinese economic favours.

Egypt, which owns the Suez Canal, proved harder to please: It banned the Varyag. As a result, it had to sail all the way through the Mediterranean and around Africa, an odyssey during which it once caught fire and was twice almost broken up in storms.

Needless to say, it never moored anywhere near Macau. It was taken straight to Dalian and was swiftly painted a dull grey, not the colour usually favoured by casinos.

Western intelligence services knew all along what was happening, and official Chinese protestations - made as late as 2007 - that Beijing had 'no intention' of acquiring an aircraft carrier, were never taken seriously. Besides, even before the Varyag arrived at its new home port, Chinese sailors were already observed exercising on dummy replicas of the ship, while naval variants of Chinese aircraft were developed.

The acquisition of the Varyag is largely unimportant; it merely saved the Chinese some time and money, for the real essence of an aircraft carrier is to be found in the ship's propulsion, electronics and the jets deployed on its decks, rather than the hull itself. On all these counts, Chinese technology remains far behind that of the US.

Still, this is just the beginning of a bigger programme which, according to US assessments, may cost China about US$20 billion (S$24.4 billion) over the next four years. This will entail the development of many additional escort ships, as well aircraft and electronic warfare equipment. In effect, the launch of the first aircraft carrier is just a statement of intent.

The Chinese move comes at a time when the usefulness of carriers is increasingly questioned in the West. In a seminal article published last month in the authoritative journal of the US Naval Institute, two American experts jokingly dismissed their country's plans to build huge carriers as '$UPERfluous', arguing that they are too expensive and vulnerable to be effective. 'In past gun and aircraft eras, there was a linear relationship between size and reach. Now, in the missile era, a small combatant can reach as far as a large one,' the authors concluded.

Support for their position is provided by China itself, which is known to be developing a missile designed to hit aircraft carriers. Admiral Robert Willard, the US Pacific commander, recently admitted that China's new weapon, dubbed the DF-21D, may have reached 'initial operational capability'.

Hitting aircraft carriers at long distances is very difficult. Although the ships are big, they may be too small to be detected by satellites. While they may move slowly, their speed is still sufficient to prevent accurate missile targeting. Furthermore, incoming warheads can be intercepted and destroyed and, even if some hit, this may not be enough to sink a carrier.

Still, while an aircraft carrier may be tricky to detect, its massive electromagnetic footprint could be tracked by space-borne sensors. China's over-the- horizon radars could also help in this respect. Homing devices attached to missiles may improve their accuracy, and the possibility of firing many missiles simultaneously could overwhelm a carrier's defences. The question of whether China has perfected these capabilities will preoccupy the US intelligence community for years to come.

Either way, one conclusion seems obvious: China's entry into the aircraft carrier age will usher in a new naval arms race. The US is unlikely to abandon its programme, domestic critics notwithstanding. Some other Asian countries will beef up their own navies. And there will be keen interest in anti-carrier weapons.

Former commander of the Chinese navy Liu Huaqing, who spent all his professional life arguing in favour of aircraft carriers, never lived to see his dream come true: He died earlier this year. It is now up to his successors to carry on the programme, in the hope of achieving what no other nation accomplished in a century: to prevail against the US in what is guaranteed to be a furious technological competition.

jonathan.eyal@gmail.com中国航母之梦幻 -- 公海铁拳

2011-07-20


新加坡《海峡时报》7月16日文章，原题：公海铁拳

那艘灰色的巨轮就停泊在中国东北海港大连。尽管尚未有官方命名，但已经吸引了无数间谍卫星的注意。它就是中国保守最不严的军事秘密：该国首艘航母。

当最终下水执行首次任务时，它必将成为中国强国地位的象征。中国官员一直试图淡化其重要性，说它“只是个威慑力象征”。但航母的意义远甚于此，它将使中国有能力进行海上力量投放。假以时日，它还将改变亚洲的战略版图。

中国对航母的追求可追溯到半世纪前。1958年毛泽东提出要建造海上商船船队并用“无产阶级”航母护航。20世纪70年代末，华国锋决定购买轻型航母。但这两个计划都没进展，其原因归咎于成本、官僚机构和政策考虑。邓小平时代，重点是国内发展，航母被认为可能引发全球对中国意图的猜忌。

中国海军最终从一个意想不到的来源处得到了帮助。1996年大陆试射导弹，意在影响台湾首次“选举”，美国派遣两艘航母进入台湾海峡，中国只能怀着深深的挫败感退让。这使北京意识到，航母是个独特的政治资产，也是一个易于部署和灵活的巨大铁拳。

而后，中国冲破重重难关收购了乌克兰的瓦良格号。其精髓在于其推进器、电子设备和甲板上部署战机，而非船体本身。在这些领域，中国仍远远落后于美国。据美国评估，航母计划可能在未来4年内消耗中国200亿美元。除了多艘护卫舰，还需建造相关的战机和电子战设备。事实上，首艘航母的启动正是北京意图的声明。

中国的举动正值西方对航母的用处争执不休之际。上月发布的一篇论文中两名美国专家称，建造大型航母的计划是多余的，既价格昂贵又易受攻击。他们认为：在过去枪炮时代，规模和打击范围有直接关系。但在当今导弹时代并非一定如此。正在研发能打击航母的导弹的中国为他们提供了证明。尽管航母难以被侦测，但其巨大的电磁足迹能被传感器追踪，中国的超视距雷达也将派上用场，且同时发射多枚导弹会令航母的防御系统捉襟见肘。中国是否拥有这些能力，将成为美国情报界未来数年内的任务。

无论怎样，有一点显而易见：中国进入航母时代将引发新一轮海军军备竞赛。美国不会放弃海军发展，一些亚洲国家也将努力增强自身海军实力，开发反航母武器的兴趣也将大大上升。中国海军将继续航母项目，以期达到其他任何国家在一个世纪内都未曾实现的目标：在一场必将十分激烈的科技竞赛中战胜美国。

（作者乔纳森·艾亚尔，王晓雄译）



http://heresthenews.blogspot.com ... carrier-dreams.html

Saturday, July 16, 2011

China Aircraft Carrier Dreams

Jul 16, 2011
special report

Iron fists on the high seas

China's stature as a maritime power will get a major boost when its first aircraft carrier undertakes its sea trials soon. Straits Times correspondent Jonathan Eyal tells why these vessels pack a punch

THE giant, grey-painted ship docked right behind an Ikea superstore in the north-western Chinese seaport of Dalian has no official name or designation. But it has already attracted the attention of countless spy satellites. For it is China's worst-kept military secret: the country's first aircraft carrier.

And when it finally sets sail on its first operational mission - which could happen within weeks, says a China Daily report on Tuesday - it will serve as a vivid reminder of China's great power status.

Chinese officials have sought to play down its importance. 'It is a symbol of deterrence,' says retired general Xu Guangyu. 'It says: don't mess with me, don't think you can bully me.'

But the aircraft carrier does much more than that, for it gives China the ability to project its power far away from its shores. And, over time, this is guaranteed to transform Asia's strategic map.

China's quest for an aircraft carrier goes back half a century. The issue was first debated in 1958, when Mao Zedong tabled a plan for what he called the 'railways on the high seas'. Characteristically, Mao's dream was gigantic: it envisaged the construction of fleets of merchant ships, escorted by 'proletarian' aircraft carriers.

Nothing came of this idea, but scaled-down programmes to construct an aircraft carrier were subsequently raised in Beijing. At one point during the late 1970s, party boss Hua Guofeng made a decision to purchase a 'light' vessel of this type, but this also petered out.

Daunted by costs

THE reasons for the hesitation were, invariably, costs, bureaucratic infighting and broader policy considerations. When Mao dreamt of aircraft carriers, an average Soviet-built battleship would have devoured a quarter of the Chinese navy's then-procurement budget.

Furthermore, the Chinese navy lacked the political influence enjoyed by the ground or air forces to lobby for bigger funding.

And, as Deng Xiaoping became China's paramount leader, the main priority was domestic development; aircraft carriers were dismissed as platforms which would raise global concerns about Chinese intentions, for little practical benefits.

But the Chinese navy ultimately got help from an unexpected quarter: none other than the United States. When Taiwan's then-President Lee Teng-hui held the island's first open elections in 1996, China thought it could influence the ballot's outcome by holding missile-firing tests in waters adjacent to Taiwan. The strategy backfired spectacularly. The US responded by scrambling two of its aircraft carriers - one from the Middle East and another from the Pacific - to patrol the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese could do little more than watch the ships with deep frustration, and back down.

At the time, then US President Bill Clinton was hailed for this masterful use of sea power. Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, the 1996 Taiwan episode can be seen a classic example of a strategic victory with unintended consequences. For the humiliation which China experienced persuaded its leaders that aircraft carriers were a unique political asset, a huge iron fist which is both easily deployable and flexible - precisely what Chinese naval commanders have argued for decades. In effect, Mr Clinton made the case for China's aircraft carrier.

What followed was a saga worthy of the best spy novel. Seemingly out of the blue, a group of Chinese investors offered US$20 million to buy the Varyag, a disused Soviet-era aircraft carrier with no engines, which lay rusting in a Ukraine port. The investors, who by sheer chance just happened to include some retired Chinese military officers, claimed they wanted to use it as a floating casino in Macau, despite warnings from the territory's then- colonial masters that no such casino would be allowed, and that Macau's port was not deep enough to accommodate the beast. Strapped for cash and eager to rid itself of a problem, Ukraine accepted the offer in 1998.

But Turkey, whose consent was required for the ship to pass through the Dardanelles Strait, refused to cooperate. So the Varyag spent 18 months being towed aimlessly around the Black Sea, before the Turks were persuaded to let it through, in return for Chinese economic favours.

Egypt, which owns the Suez Canal, proved harder to please: It banned the Varyag. As a result, it had to sail all the way through the Mediterranean and around Africa, an odyssey during which it once caught fire and was twice almost broken up in storms.

Needless to say, it never moored anywhere near Macau. It was taken straight to Dalian and was swiftly painted a dull grey, not the colour usually favoured by casinos.

Western intelligence services knew all along what was happening, and official Chinese protestations - made as late as 2007 - that Beijing had 'no intention' of acquiring an aircraft carrier, were never taken seriously. Besides, even before the Varyag arrived at its new home port, Chinese sailors were already observed exercising on dummy replicas of the ship, while naval variants of Chinese aircraft were developed.

The acquisition of the Varyag is largely unimportant; it merely saved the Chinese some time and money, for the real essence of an aircraft carrier is to be found in the ship's propulsion, electronics and the jets deployed on its decks, rather than the hull itself. On all these counts, Chinese technology remains far behind that of the US.

Still, this is just the beginning of a bigger programme which, according to US assessments, may cost China about US$20 billion (S$24.4 billion) over the next four years. This will entail the development of many additional escort ships, as well aircraft and electronic warfare equipment. In effect, the launch of the first aircraft carrier is just a statement of intent.

The Chinese move comes at a time when the usefulness of carriers is increasingly questioned in the West. In a seminal article published last month in the authoritative journal of the US Naval Institute, two American experts jokingly dismissed their country's plans to build huge carriers as '$UPERfluous', arguing that they are too expensive and vulnerable to be effective. 'In past gun and aircraft eras, there was a linear relationship between size and reach. Now, in the missile era, a small combatant can reach as far as a large one,' the authors concluded.

Support for their position is provided by China itself, which is known to be developing a missile designed to hit aircraft carriers. Admiral Robert Willard, the US Pacific commander, recently admitted that China's new weapon, dubbed the DF-21D, may have reached 'initial operational capability'.

Hitting aircraft carriers at long distances is very difficult. Although the ships are big, they may be too small to be detected by satellites. While they may move slowly, their speed is still sufficient to prevent accurate missile targeting. Furthermore, incoming warheads can be intercepted and destroyed and, even if some hit, this may not be enough to sink a carrier.

Still, while an aircraft carrier may be tricky to detect, its massive electromagnetic footprint could be tracked by space-borne sensors. China's over-the- horizon radars could also help in this respect. Homing devices attached to missiles may improve their accuracy, and the possibility of firing many missiles simultaneously could overwhelm a carrier's defences. The question of whether China has perfected these capabilities will preoccupy the US intelligence community for years to come.

Either way, one conclusion seems obvious: China's entry into the aircraft carrier age will usher in a new naval arms race. The US is unlikely to abandon its programme, domestic critics notwithstanding. Some other Asian countries will beef up their own navies. And there will be keen interest in anti-carrier weapons.

Former commander of the Chinese navy Liu Huaqing, who spent all his professional life arguing in favour of aircraft carriers, never lived to see his dream come true: He died earlier this year. It is now up to his successors to carry on the programme, in the hope of achieving what no other nation accomplished in a century: to prevail against the US in what is guaranteed to be a furious technological competition.

jonathan.eyal@gmail.com