超级军网三锅也有明白人，印专家称国防技术达中国1998年水平差距 ...
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 13:06:50
印度《商业标准日报》7月18日发表了题为“中国的国防工业给印度上了一课”的文章，文章援引一名专家的话说，印度现有国防技术仅相当于中国1998年的水平。
报道称，在上周四的一场非公开讨论会上，一位致力于中国国防现代化研究的权威专家，在会上分析了中国人民解放军如何在短短十年内转变为拥有一流武器装备的军队的原因。他指出，与此形成鲜明对比的是，印度则“沦为”世界最大的军事装备进口国。
报道说，泰明成（音译）是一位与美国五角大楼有工作联系的教授，像他这样的学者一直专注于追踪研究中国人民解放军的军事和技术发展。他说，中、印同属于发展中国家，都试图几十年内在军事技术方面实现突飞猛进的发展。目前，虽然中国依旧不及美国和一些西方大国，但中国一直通过制定计划而奋起直追。从2004年全球创造性国家排名榜上的第24名跃居2009年的第6名，而中国的目标是到2040年—2050年在科技方面与美国“平起平坐”。
报道援引泰明成教授的话说，印度一直墨守成规，而中国却从“打破常规”中获益。这从上世纪90年代早期中国政府大规模重用前苏联的失业科学家就可见一斑。中国国家主席胡*锦*涛也常常说，科技是综合国力竞争的关键因素。中国将科技视为一种零和博弈，他们不依靠外国来提供关键技术。因此21世纪初，中国着手创建一支富有创新精神的队伍，并开始了“创造性改革”。
此外，中国具有极强的“消化”他国技术的能力，在发展中国家，一切都始于“消化吸收”能力而非发明创造能力。随后，中国又开始了“结构创新”，重组已有的组织结构。而目前，中国正处于改革创新的第三个阶段，需要先进的科学技术，这对于一个发展中国家而言具有一定难度。但当今年1月11日中国J-20隐形战斗机面世时，全世界都推测中国已经完成了其“颠覆性”的技术创新。
泰教授还在接受印度《商业标准报》的采访时说，近几年来，中国通过20世纪末的改革已经取得了国防技术的成功。但印度目前的国防技术因缺乏研究投入、失之监管，仅相当于1998年的中国。
http://mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2011-07/1830693.html
印度《商业标准日报》7月18日发表了题为“中国的国防工业给印度上了一课”的文章，文章援引一名专家的话说，印度现有国防技术仅相当于中国1998年的水平。
报道称，在上周四的一场非公开讨论会上，一位致力于中国国防现代化研究的权威专家，在会上分析了中国人民解放军如何在短短十年内转变为拥有一流武器装备的军队的原因。他指出，与此形成鲜明对比的是，印度则“沦为”世界最大的军事装备进口国。
报道说，泰明成（音译）是一位与美国五角大楼有工作联系的教授，像他这样的学者一直专注于追踪研究中国人民解放军的军事和技术发展。他说，中、印同属于发展中国家，都试图几十年内在军事技术方面实现突飞猛进的发展。目前，虽然中国依旧不及美国和一些西方大国，但中国一直通过制定计划而奋起直追。从2004年全球创造性国家排名榜上的第24名跃居2009年的第6名，而中国的目标是到2040年—2050年在科技方面与美国“平起平坐”。
报道援引泰明成教授的话说，印度一直墨守成规，而中国却从“打破常规”中获益。这从上世纪90年代早期中国政府大规模重用前苏联的失业科学家就可见一斑。中国国家主席胡*锦*涛也常常说，科技是综合国力竞争的关键因素。中国将科技视为一种零和博弈，他们不依靠外国来提供关键技术。因此21世纪初，中国着手创建一支富有创新精神的队伍，并开始了“创造性改革”。
此外，中国具有极强的“消化”他国技术的能力，在发展中国家，一切都始于“消化吸收”能力而非发明创造能力。随后，中国又开始了“结构创新”，重组已有的组织结构。而目前，中国正处于改革创新的第三个阶段，需要先进的科学技术，这对于一个发展中国家而言具有一定难度。但当今年1月11日中国J-20隐形战斗机面世时，全世界都推测中国已经完成了其“颠覆性”的技术创新。
泰教授还在接受印度《商业标准报》的采访时说，近几年来，中国通过20世纪末的改革已经取得了国防技术的成功。但印度目前的国防技术因缺乏研究投入、失之监管，仅相当于1998年的中国。
http://mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2011-07/1830693.html
报道称，在上周四的一场非公开讨论会上，一位致力于中国国防现代化研究的权威专家，在会上分析了中国人民解放军如何在短短十年内转变为拥有一流武器装备的军队的原因。他指出，与此形成鲜明对比的是，印度则“沦为”世界最大的军事装备进口国。
报道说，泰明成（音译）是一位与美国五角大楼有工作联系的教授，像他这样的学者一直专注于追踪研究中国人民解放军的军事和技术发展。他说，中、印同属于发展中国家，都试图几十年内在军事技术方面实现突飞猛进的发展。目前，虽然中国依旧不及美国和一些西方大国，但中国一直通过制定计划而奋起直追。从2004年全球创造性国家排名榜上的第24名跃居2009年的第6名，而中国的目标是到2040年—2050年在科技方面与美国“平起平坐”。
报道援引泰明成教授的话说，印度一直墨守成规，而中国却从“打破常规”中获益。这从上世纪90年代早期中国政府大规模重用前苏联的失业科学家就可见一斑。中国国家主席胡*锦*涛也常常说，科技是综合国力竞争的关键因素。中国将科技视为一种零和博弈，他们不依靠外国来提供关键技术。因此21世纪初，中国着手创建一支富有创新精神的队伍，并开始了“创造性改革”。
此外，中国具有极强的“消化”他国技术的能力，在发展中国家，一切都始于“消化吸收”能力而非发明创造能力。随后，中国又开始了“结构创新”，重组已有的组织结构。而目前，中国正处于改革创新的第三个阶段，需要先进的科学技术，这对于一个发展中国家而言具有一定难度。但当今年1月11日中国J-20隐形战斗机面世时，全世界都推测中国已经完成了其“颠覆性”的技术创新。
泰教授还在接受印度《商业标准报》的采访时说，近几年来，中国通过20世纪末的改革已经取得了国防技术的成功。但印度目前的国防技术因缺乏研究投入、失之监管，仅相当于1998年的中国。
http://mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2011-07/1830693.html
印度《商业标准日报》7月18日发表了题为“中国的国防工业给印度上了一课”的文章，文章援引一名专家的话说，印度现有国防技术仅相当于中国1998年的水平。
报道称，在上周四的一场非公开讨论会上，一位致力于中国国防现代化研究的权威专家，在会上分析了中国人民解放军如何在短短十年内转变为拥有一流武器装备的军队的原因。他指出，与此形成鲜明对比的是，印度则“沦为”世界最大的军事装备进口国。
报道说，泰明成（音译）是一位与美国五角大楼有工作联系的教授，像他这样的学者一直专注于追踪研究中国人民解放军的军事和技术发展。他说，中、印同属于发展中国家，都试图几十年内在军事技术方面实现突飞猛进的发展。目前，虽然中国依旧不及美国和一些西方大国，但中国一直通过制定计划而奋起直追。从2004年全球创造性国家排名榜上的第24名跃居2009年的第6名，而中国的目标是到2040年—2050年在科技方面与美国“平起平坐”。
报道援引泰明成教授的话说，印度一直墨守成规，而中国却从“打破常规”中获益。这从上世纪90年代早期中国政府大规模重用前苏联的失业科学家就可见一斑。中国国家主席胡*锦*涛也常常说，科技是综合国力竞争的关键因素。中国将科技视为一种零和博弈，他们不依靠外国来提供关键技术。因此21世纪初，中国着手创建一支富有创新精神的队伍，并开始了“创造性改革”。
此外，中国具有极强的“消化”他国技术的能力，在发展中国家，一切都始于“消化吸收”能力而非发明创造能力。随后，中国又开始了“结构创新”，重组已有的组织结构。而目前，中国正处于改革创新的第三个阶段，需要先进的科学技术，这对于一个发展中国家而言具有一定难度。但当今年1月11日中国J-20隐形战斗机面世时，全世界都推测中国已经完成了其“颠覆性”的技术创新。
泰教授还在接受印度《商业标准报》的采访时说，近几年来，中国通过20世纪末的改革已经取得了国防技术的成功。但印度目前的国防技术因缺乏研究投入、失之监管，仅相当于1998年的中国。
http://mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2011-07/1830693.html
我不认为印度有我们98年的战斗力，装备可能差不多但是战斗意志绝对差20年
就LCA这个艰难跟当年J8I 差不多吧40年吧。
这样的明白人要是到CD来，一定被人活活骂死
不管是真明白,还是假明白,此人需要派遣008去从精神和肉体上加以消灭,哇哈哈
必须要使用各种手段把这个专家贬为五卢比，然后继续在舆论上让印度自我感觉良好，这才是天朝复兴的关键
不怕他一直购买，就怕他明白过来。
必须要使用各种手段把这个专家贬为五卢比，然后继续在舆论上让印度自我感觉良好，这才是天朝复兴的关键
五卢比？那是多少啊？太不值钱了吧…
五卢比？那是多少啊？太不值钱了吧…
我觉得他们警察的装备和我们相比相差100年以上！！
我们要坚决，大力地一直鼓吹上海再有20年才能赶上孟买的论调
727055584 发表于 2011-7-19 09:22 ![]()
我不认为印度有我们98年的战斗力，装备可能差不多但是战斗意志绝对差20年
战斗意志多久他也赶不上
顶个20年的装备吧
我不认为印度有我们98年的战斗力，装备可能差不多但是战斗意志绝对差20年
战斗意志多久他也赶不上
顶个20年的装备吧
WDLEZ 发表于 2011-7-19 09:33 ![]()
必须要使用各种手段把这个专家贬为五卢比，然后继续在舆论上让印度自我感觉良好，这才是天朝复兴的关键
这个光荣而艰巨的任务就交给兄台吧！
必须要使用各种手段把这个专家贬为五卢比，然后继续在舆论上让印度自我感觉良好，这才是天朝复兴的关键
这个光荣而艰巨的任务就交给兄台吧！
AA们刺杀了他把，不能让这种人在阿三那里存在下去
一个两个睡醒了，在大环境里起到的作用有限
泰明成教授?怎么看出来是个印度专家？说不定是邰明成，一个华裔
1998年的中国武器和国防工业也不是印度可以比得.印度相当于中国1959年前吧.基本没国产化.
三狗子太有“明白人”了：
98年两国军事科技对比
中国 三狗子
J10+J11 无
99 无
167 无
中程、洲际蛋 无
战忽局 无
楼下请补充。。。
三狗子太有“明白人”了：
98年两国军事科技对比
中国 三狗子
J10+J11 无
99 无
167 无
中程、洲际蛋 无
战忽局 无
楼下请补充。。。
我们要坚决，大力地一直鼓吹上海再有20年也赶不上孟买的论调
话说不是一直有一种说法：九十年代是我军战斗力的最低谷吗？那三哥岂不是非常的悲剧
727055584 发表于 2011-7-19 09:22 ![]()
我不认为印度有我们98年的战斗力，装备可能差不多但是战斗意志绝对差20年
三哥很萌的，你们不要黑他。
我不认为印度有我们98年的战斗力，装备可能差不多但是战斗意志绝对差20年
三哥很萌的，你们不要黑他。
727055584 发表于 2011-7-19 09:22 ![]()
我不认为印度有我们98年的战斗力，装备可能差不多但是战斗意志绝对差20年
战斗意志这东西不会因为科技进步而进步的。
我不认为印度有我们98年的战斗力，装备可能差不多但是战斗意志绝对差20年
战斗意志这东西不会因为科技进步而进步的。
其实经济发展才是关键，没钱什么事都干不了
中国98年的家底有什么，这12年的发展又有多大。
zzyzhao 发表于 2011-7-19 10:07 ![]()
话说不是一直有一种说法：九十年代是我军战斗力的最低谷吗？那三哥岂不是非常的悲剧
装备差是真的，战斗精神还是很强的。
话说不是一直有一种说法：九十年代是我军战斗力的最低谷吗？那三哥岂不是非常的悲剧
装备差是真的，战斗精神还是很强的。
98年的中国跟现在比什么都不是吧
不是吧，三哥家还有这种人，你一定是搞错了？
红头阿三核武技术有天朝1998年水平？
三哥中的“JY”啊~~
从2004年全球创造性国家排名榜上的第24名跃居2009年的第6名..
这个假了，经济学人排名是45，中国科学院排名是23，都没有第六名。。
这个假了，经济学人排名是45，中国科学院排名是23，都没有第六名。。
虽然这种人在印度起不了太大的作用,但是还是最好进行定点清除
这篇文章要是网易发布的话，估计评论 又要把 兔子骂一顿。
盘古大神 发表于 2011-7-19 10:44 ![]()
红头阿三核武技术有天朝1998年水平？
开什么玩笑呢。。。
红头阿三核武技术有天朝1998年水平？
开什么玩笑呢。。。
如果是98年那还真是挺危险的
10+年我们就可以取得这样的进步，那么印度想要赶上也不是天方夜谈。
我认真问一句，印度真的想搞好国防吗？
我不得不好奇。一个钱学森就可以使小白兔换一面貌，印度那么多海外留学生，优秀的不乏其人，难道还没几个爱国的回来报效？没钱吗？看他们大把大把地买武器啊？真不明白。
真的怀疑，他们整天说要建设印度国防力量blabla，是不是只是为了多搞点军费挣回扣啊？
10+年我们就可以取得这样的进步，那么印度想要赶上也不是天方夜谈。
我认真问一句，印度真的想搞好国防吗？
我不得不好奇。一个钱学森就可以使小白兔换一面貌，印度那么多海外留学生，优秀的不乏其人，难道还没几个爱国的回来报效？没钱吗？看他们大把大把地买武器啊？真不明白。
真的怀疑，他们整天说要建设印度国防力量blabla，是不是只是为了多搞点军费挣回扣啊？
三哥？还是不说了。
印度。。。98年。。算了吧
hawaiixy 发表于 2011-7-19 09:37 ![]()
五卢比？那是多少啊？太不值钱了吧…
大概7毛2分人民币
五卢比？那是多少啊？太不值钱了吧…
大概7毛2分人民币
三锅家里还有这种明白人？太危险了。
文章的精髓没有翻译出来：
China's defence industry offers lessons to India
Ajai Shukla / New Delhi July 18, 2011, 0:31 IST
http://www.business-standard.com/india/new...o-india/443056/
In a closed-door discussion here on Thursday, a leading authority on China’s military modernisation explained how that country’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA, the term embraces navy and air force, too) has transformed into a top-rung, largely indigenously equipped force in barely a decade, even as India’s military languishes as the world’s biggest importer of defence equipment.
Tai Ming Cheung, who spoke to the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, is a professor working with the US Pentagon’s Minerva Project, in which academics like him pore over Beijing’s Chinese-language releases to track military and technological developments within the PLA.
Tai noted both China and India were “catch-up countries”, attempting a technological leapfrog by taking just decades to reach a technology level that Western countries had taken more than a century to achieve. China still trails the US and western European powers, but is catching up fast, powered by an official science & technology (S&T) roadmap that the leadership backs. From a global innovativeness ranking of 24 in 2004, China jumped to six in 2009. It now targets fifth place by 2020, with global leadership in the high-tech arenas of space, nuclear, information technology and biotechnology. By 2040-50, China aims at S&T parity with the US.
“Until the late 1990s, the Chinese approach to defence S&T was in a much worse state than what India is in today. They have been able to deal with a lot of these issues in the last decade alone,” says Tai.
The change
India largely plays by established rules — technology denial regimes, and an intellectual property rights (IPR) regime to safeguard technology leads. While, China has benefited from its willingness to defy rules. Beijing’s opportunism was evident in the early 1990s, from its large-scale recruitment of out-of-work scientists from the former Soviet Union. Its careful strategising is evident from an innovation plan endorsed and pushed from the highest levels of the political and military leadership.
“Hu Jintao (the Chinese president) always talks about S&T being a key component of the race for comprehensive national strength. China sees S&T as a zero-sum game; they can’t afford to depend upon foreign countries for critical technologies. Stealing, reverse engineering and cloning is acceptable,” says Tai.
At the start of the 21st century, in its first step towards becoming an innovative military builder, China embarked on a process of “creative adaptation”. Using its imitative capabilities, its aerospace industry indigenised critical parts of the Russian Sukhoi-27 fighter (an earlier version of India’s Su-30MKI), developing it into the “indigenous” J-11B fighter. In this high-end imitation, the basic platform remained Russian but key avionics, including the fire control system, were Chinese.
“It is all about being able to absorb technology from outside,” says Tai. “In catch-up countries, it is initially all about absorptive capacity, not about invention. The equipment has already been built elsewhere.”
Emboldened by Russia’s passive acceptance of the Su-27 IPR violations, China embarked upon its innovation path, the first step of which was ‘incremental innovation’. As evident from the J-10A, still China’s frontline fighter, this involves developing a basic platform and then incrementally indigenising and improving it, batch by batch. The J-10A initially contained many Russian and Israeli components, which the Chinese gradually indigenised.
From here, China moved to ‘architectural innovation’, transforming existing systems by rearranging their architecture. A commercial example is the iPad. Most of its components had been around for a while, but Apple rearranged these into a radical new product. In a similar way, Chinese engineers juggled existing technologies to build a missile that specifically targeted US Navy aircraft carriers, the Dong Feng 21B anti-ship ballistic missile. The DF-21B has surprised US defence planners not just technologically but also operationally, forcing them to cater to a completely new operational threat.
The third level of innovation, with which China is currently struggling, is ‘component innovation’. In this, improved components — microprocessors, precision engineered parts, digital components, etc — are used to improve platform efficiency. But this requires advanced scientific and technological skills, making such innovation difficult for a catch-up country.
“The Chinese have not been able to develop a world-class turbofan engine; their microprocessor capabilities are still relatively poor. So, they don’t yet qualify as a component innovator,” says Tai.
But on January 11 this year, when the Chinese J-20 stealth fighter made its first flight, there was a global firestorm of speculation that China had conducted a coup in “disruptive innovation”. This ultimate form of innovation combines architectural with component innovation, assembling improved components into a creative new design. But Tai dismisses such talk: “The J-20 is not really a “disruptive innovation”. It lacks the component level innovations and is, therefore, merely an architectural innovation.”
Contrast
Nevertheless, China’s defence industry has achieved major recent successes, triggered by its restructuring at the end of the 20th century. Earlier, the Chinese defence industry was separated, Soviet style, between research and development (R&D) and manufacturing units. When the R&D developed a product, the defence industrial ministry — called the Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (Costin) —would assign a factory to build the equipment. But when the factory got the blueprints, there was confusion because they had not been involved in the design.
“The Chinese leadership saw that this did not help the national interest; it only helped the defence industry. One of the first reforms was to overturn the power of Costin and allow the military a central role in overseeing the defence industry. If you don’t have end-users, particularly war fighters and the acquisitions community, playing a central role, then you’re not going to have innovation. If you’re just going to have industry administrators, then they are going to be looking just at their interests,” says Tai.
The result has been surging growth in the innovativeness of Chinese defence industry. In 1998, they filed for 313 patents. In 2008, it had gone up to 11,000 patents. In 2010, 15,000 patents were applied for.
India’s defence industry today mirrors its Chinese counterpart in 1998. The R&D element (the DRDO) functions separately from the manufacturing element (the defence PSUs). India’s military has little say, and no oversight, in what is researched and manufactured. And the Indian ministry of defence’s department of defence production is an accurate mirror image of China’s Costin, pushing back the innovative private sector to safeguard the interests of the state-owned enterprises.
China's defence industry offers lessons to India
Ajai Shukla / New Delhi July 18, 2011, 0:31 IST
http://www.business-standard.com/india/new...o-india/443056/
In a closed-door discussion here on Thursday, a leading authority on China’s military modernisation explained how that country’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA, the term embraces navy and air force, too) has transformed into a top-rung, largely indigenously equipped force in barely a decade, even as India’s military languishes as the world’s biggest importer of defence equipment.
Tai Ming Cheung, who spoke to the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, is a professor working with the US Pentagon’s Minerva Project, in which academics like him pore over Beijing’s Chinese-language releases to track military and technological developments within the PLA.
Tai noted both China and India were “catch-up countries”, attempting a technological leapfrog by taking just decades to reach a technology level that Western countries had taken more than a century to achieve. China still trails the US and western European powers, but is catching up fast, powered by an official science & technology (S&T) roadmap that the leadership backs. From a global innovativeness ranking of 24 in 2004, China jumped to six in 2009. It now targets fifth place by 2020, with global leadership in the high-tech arenas of space, nuclear, information technology and biotechnology. By 2040-50, China aims at S&T parity with the US.
“Until the late 1990s, the Chinese approach to defence S&T was in a much worse state than what India is in today. They have been able to deal with a lot of these issues in the last decade alone,” says Tai.
The change
India largely plays by established rules — technology denial regimes, and an intellectual property rights (IPR) regime to safeguard technology leads. While, China has benefited from its willingness to defy rules. Beijing’s opportunism was evident in the early 1990s, from its large-scale recruitment of out-of-work scientists from the former Soviet Union. Its careful strategising is evident from an innovation plan endorsed and pushed from the highest levels of the political and military leadership.
“Hu Jintao (the Chinese president) always talks about S&T being a key component of the race for comprehensive national strength. China sees S&T as a zero-sum game; they can’t afford to depend upon foreign countries for critical technologies. Stealing, reverse engineering and cloning is acceptable,” says Tai.
At the start of the 21st century, in its first step towards becoming an innovative military builder, China embarked on a process of “creative adaptation”. Using its imitative capabilities, its aerospace industry indigenised critical parts of the Russian Sukhoi-27 fighter (an earlier version of India’s Su-30MKI), developing it into the “indigenous” J-11B fighter. In this high-end imitation, the basic platform remained Russian but key avionics, including the fire control system, were Chinese.
“It is all about being able to absorb technology from outside,” says Tai. “In catch-up countries, it is initially all about absorptive capacity, not about invention. The equipment has already been built elsewhere.”
Emboldened by Russia’s passive acceptance of the Su-27 IPR violations, China embarked upon its innovation path, the first step of which was ‘incremental innovation’. As evident from the J-10A, still China’s frontline fighter, this involves developing a basic platform and then incrementally indigenising and improving it, batch by batch. The J-10A initially contained many Russian and Israeli components, which the Chinese gradually indigenised.
From here, China moved to ‘architectural innovation’, transforming existing systems by rearranging their architecture. A commercial example is the iPad. Most of its components had been around for a while, but Apple rearranged these into a radical new product. In a similar way, Chinese engineers juggled existing technologies to build a missile that specifically targeted US Navy aircraft carriers, the Dong Feng 21B anti-ship ballistic missile. The DF-21B has surprised US defence planners not just technologically but also operationally, forcing them to cater to a completely new operational threat.
The third level of innovation, with which China is currently struggling, is ‘component innovation’. In this, improved components — microprocessors, precision engineered parts, digital components, etc — are used to improve platform efficiency. But this requires advanced scientific and technological skills, making such innovation difficult for a catch-up country.
“The Chinese have not been able to develop a world-class turbofan engine; their microprocessor capabilities are still relatively poor. So, they don’t yet qualify as a component innovator,” says Tai.
But on January 11 this year, when the Chinese J-20 stealth fighter made its first flight, there was a global firestorm of speculation that China had conducted a coup in “disruptive innovation”. This ultimate form of innovation combines architectural with component innovation, assembling improved components into a creative new design. But Tai dismisses such talk: “The J-20 is not really a “disruptive innovation”. It lacks the component level innovations and is, therefore, merely an architectural innovation.”
Contrast
Nevertheless, China’s defence industry has achieved major recent successes, triggered by its restructuring at the end of the 20th century. Earlier, the Chinese defence industry was separated, Soviet style, between research and development (R&D) and manufacturing units. When the R&D developed a product, the defence industrial ministry — called the Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (Costin) —would assign a factory to build the equipment. But when the factory got the blueprints, there was confusion because they had not been involved in the design.
“The Chinese leadership saw that this did not help the national interest; it only helped the defence industry. One of the first reforms was to overturn the power of Costin and allow the military a central role in overseeing the defence industry. If you don’t have end-users, particularly war fighters and the acquisitions community, playing a central role, then you’re not going to have innovation. If you’re just going to have industry administrators, then they are going to be looking just at their interests,” says Tai.
The result has been surging growth in the innovativeness of Chinese defence industry. In 1998, they filed for 313 patents. In 2008, it had gone up to 11,000 patents. In 2010, 15,000 patents were applied for.
India’s defence industry today mirrors its Chinese counterpart in 1998. The R&D element (the DRDO) functions separately from the manufacturing element (the defence PSUs). India’s military has little say, and no oversight, in what is researched and manufactured. And the Indian ministry of defence’s department of defence production is an accurate mirror image of China’s Costin, pushing back the innovative private sector to safeguard the interests of the state-owned enterprises.
明白个毛线啊 典型的砖家 98年兔子有J10 有98式TK 阿三现在又什么？ LCA 阿穷？
什么叫“中国将科技视为一种零和博弈”？看球不懂