超级军网zt Use plural, India has thermonuclear bombs: Kakodk ...
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http://ibnlive.in.com/news/use-plural-india-has-thermonuclear-bombs-kakodkar/107038-3-p0.html
After weeks of doubt, it is time to ask the question: how credible is India's thermonuclear deterrent? That is the key issue Karan Thapar discussed in this week's Devil's Advocate with the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr Anil Kakodkar.
Karan Thapar: Dr Kakodkar, four leading scientists--Dr K Santhanam, Dr P K Iyengar, Dr H Sethna and Dr A N Prasad--have raised serious doubts about India's thermonuclear tests of 1998.
Dr Santhanam says we have hard evidence on a purely factual basis that not only was the yield of the thermonuclear device far below the design production, but that it actually failed. Do you have a problem on your hands?
Anil Kakodkar: No, I think this is a totally erroneous conclusion. The yield of thermonuclear tests was verified, not by one method but several redundant methods based on different principles, done by different groups. These have been reviewed in detail and in fact I had described the tests in 1998 as perfect and I stand by that.
Karan Thapar: I am glad that you began talking by the yield because both Dr Santhanam and Dr Iyenger have questioned the yield of the thermonuclear tests.
Dr Santhanam says that the DRDO seismic instruments measured the yield as something between 20-25 kilotonnes which is hugely different from the claim put out by the Atomic Energy Commission that it was 45 kilotonnes. How confident are you of the 45-kilotonne yield?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, let me first of all say that that DAE and DRDO we both work together as a team. DRDO did deploy some instruments for measurements but the fact is that the seismic instruments did not work. I myself had reviewed all the results immediately after the tests and we concluded that the instruments did not work.
Karan Thapar: Dr Santhanam says that the Bhabha Atomic Energy Center accepted the DRDO's instruments and their estimation for the yield of their fission bomb but not for the fusion or the thermonuclear. He says how can it be that the instruments worked in one case and not the others?
Anil Kakodkar: Well that's not true because the instrument measure and the ground motion at the place where the instrument is located - we had to separate out the information which was coming out from the thermonuclear and which was coming from the fission test. So the point that I am making is that the seismic instruments did not work.
So there is no question of the yield of the fission test being right and the thermonuclear test being wrong because no conclusion can be drawn from those instruments either ways.
Karan Thapar: But do you have proof that the yield of the thermonuclear test was 45 kilotonnes?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes. In fact we have within limits of what can be said and I must make it clear here that no country has given so much scientific details on their tests as we have given and this we have published with the maximum possible clarity.
Karan Thapar: The problem is that even in 1998, foreign monitors questioned the yield of the thermonuclear tests. At that time, Indian doubts were only expressed in private. Now, Indian doubts have burst out into the open and they are being heard in public.
Does it not worry you that these doubts continue--now both abroad and at home--and that they have continued for 11 years?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, it's unfortunate but it doesn't worry me because facts are facts and there is no question of getting worried about this. The point is that the measurements which have been done, they have been done--as I mentioned earlier--by different groups.
People who carry out the measurements on seismic instruments is a different group. People who carry out the measurements on radiochemical instruments are a different group. There are other methods that you can use, for example the simulation of ground motion. That's another group and all these groups have come to their own conclusions which match with each other.
Karan Thapar: And all these five or six different ways of measuring the yield have come to the conclusion that the yield was 45 kilotonnes for the thermonuclear device?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right.
Karan Thapar: So in your mind there is no doubt about it whatsoever?
Anil Kakodkar: Absolutely not.
Karan Thapar: Now, Dr Santhanam, in addition to disputing the yield, has other reasons to believe that the thermonuclear device failed. He said that given that the fission device, which produced a yield of around 25 kilotonnes, created a crater of 25 metres in diameter then the fusion bomb which produced a yield of 45 kilotonnes should have created a crater of around 70 metres in diameter. He says that that didn't happen and there was in fact no crater at all.
Anil Kakodkar: That's a layman’s way of looking at it. The fact of the matter is the fission device yield was 15 kilotonnes, not 25 kilotonnes.
Karan Thapar: So he's wrong in saying that it was 25 kilotonnes?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right and secondly although the two devices were about 1.5 kilometers apart, the geology within that distance has changed quite a bit partly because of the layers that exist and their slopes but more importantly because their depths have been different.
So the placement of the device of the fission kind is in one kind of medium and the placement of the device of the thermonuclear kind is in another medium.
Karan Thapar: So in fact what you are saying is that Dr Santhanam is making two mistakes and possibly making them deliberately.
First of all he's exaggerating the yield of the fission device and secondly he is completely ignoring the fact that the geology of the placement of the fusion was very different.
Anil Kakodkar: That's right
Karan Thapar: And both of those have led him to an erroneous conclusion?
Anil Kakodkar: And in fact we have gone through detailed simulation. For example in simulation you can locate the thermonuclear device where the fission device was placed and you can locate the fission device where the thermonuclear device was placed. And you get a much bigger crater now because the yield is higher.
Karan Thapar: This is a very important point that you are making.
Anil Kakodkar: Yes. And the fission device which is now placed in the thermo-heat pit now produces much less ground displacement.
Karan Thapar: So if in simulation you place the thermonuclear device where the fission device was placed, you would get a much bigger crater--much closer to the 70 meters in diameter that Dr Santhanam would like to see.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, I don't remember how much it was but this is actually true. This has been verified by calculations
Karan Thapar: Dr Santhanam has yet one more reason for believing that the thermonuclear device failed. He says if it had succeeded, both the shaft and the a-frame would have been totally destroyed. Instead, writing in ‘The Hindu’, he says the shaft remained totally undamaged and as for the a-frame, he says, it remained completely intact.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, I think you must understand the phenomena of ground motion when a nuclear test takes place. Depending on the depth of burial and of course the medium in which it is buried, you could get several manifestations on the surface.
You could get a crater and there are different kinds of craters that one could see. You can just get a mound - the ground rises and remains there and on the other extreme it can vent out. So in case of the thermonuclear device, the placement was in hard rock—granite--and with the depth and the yield for 45 kilotonnes, one expects only a mound to rise, which is what happened.
Karan Thapar: And not a crater?
Anil Kakodkar: And not a crater.
Karan Thapar: What about the shaft and the a-frame?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, if the ground simply rises - and in fact you can see a lot of fracture on the ground around that for a fairly large distance so it's clear that there was a cracking of the ground for a fairly large distance, but the phenomena was that it rises as a mound, then comes down slightly but it still remains a mound. So there is no question of damage to the a-frame.
Karan Thapar: So in fact the fact that the shaft and the a-frame survived intact can be quite easily explained. It's not proof that the thermonuclear device failed?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes, yes, it has been seen in detailed simulations and by the way I must tell you that this simulation, which I am telling you about, is done on codes which have been actually verified in 3-D situations on the test data available from abroad and validated and these have been published in international journals.
Karan Thapar: So you have had multiple validations of these.
Anil Kakodkar: That's right.
Karan Thapar: Clearly you are dismissive of Dr Santhanam's doubts. Now let me quote to you what one of your predecessors, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Dr P K Iyenger, said in a statement he issued on September 24, 2009. He says: "The recent revelations by Dr Santhanam are the clincher. He was one of the four leaders associated with Pokhran II, the team leader from the DRDO side, and he must certainly have known many of the details, particularly with regard to the seismic measurements. If he says that the yield was much lower than projected, that there was virtually no crater formed, then there is considerable justification for reasonable doubt regarding the credibility of the thermonuclear test."
Does it worry you that your predecessors seem to disagree with you but agree with Dr Santhanam?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, first of all I respect everybody. I respect Dr Iyenger, I respect Dr Santhanam, but the fact is that Dr Iyenger was nowhere involved in the 1998 tests. He was of course a key figure in the 1974 tests. Also, the fact is that before the 1990 and 1998 tests, all work was done under cover - we were not in the open - and we required a lot of logistical support and all and that all was being provided by DRDO.
But things were still being done on a need to know basis. So to assume that Dr Santhanam knew everything is not true.
Karan Thapar: You are making two important points. One you are saying that the DRDO and Dr Santhanam did not know everything - the fact that he was DRDO team leader does not mean that he knew everything that was happening.
Anil Kakodkar: He knew everything within his realm of responsibility.
Karan Thapar: Everything that he needed to know but not more?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right.
Karan Thapar: You are also saying that Dr Iyenger isn't fully in the picture and therefore his opinion is not necessarily valid.
Anil Kakodkar: He is not in the picture as far as the 1998 tests are concerned.
Karan Thapar: So he doesn't really know about the 1998 tests.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, he knows only as much as has been published and nothing more.
Karan Thapar: His comment therefore is not backed by knowledge and insight.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, that's for you to judge.
Karan Thapar: Let's purse the credibility and the doubts surrounding India's thermonuclear deterrent in a somewhat different way.
Dr Santhanam says that these doubts were formally raised by the DRDO with the Government as far back as in 1998 itself. And in a meeting arranged by the then National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, they were brushed aside in a manner which Dr Santhanam compares to a sort of frivolous voice vote.
Anil Kakodkar: Immediately after the tests, we carried out a review with both teams present: BARC team as well as the DRDO team.
We looked at the measurements done by the BARC team and we looked at the measurements done by the DRDO team and I told you the conclusions and on the basis of that review, it was clear that what basis we could go by and what conclusions we could draw.
Now, the question is that if the instruments didn't work, where is the question of going by any assertions which are based on ... what is the basis of any assertions?
Karan Thapar: So when Dr Santhanam says that the DRDO's doubts were brushed aside lightly, then that is wrong. They were considered and they were evaluated?
Anil Kakodkar: I think yes. I think they were evaluated, that's right.
Karan Thapar: And they were dismissed because they were found to be faulty. They were not just brushed aside.
Anil Kakodkar: No, they were not brushed aside.
Karan Thapar: In an article that Dr Santhanam has written recently on November 15, 2009 for ‘The Tribune’, he says: The Department of Atomic Energy--the department to which you were ex-officio secretary--is in fact hiding facts from successive Indian governments, from Parliament and from Indian people. How do you respond to that accusation?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, as I said earlier, we are perhaps unique in giving out the maximum information and that too very promptly - immediately after the tests.
Karan Thapar: There is no hiding?
Anil Kakodkar: There is no hiding. There are limits to what can be revealed. These have been discussed in the Atomic Energy Commission in not one but four meetings after the 1998 tests. And there are people who are knowledgeable. Dr Ramanna was a member of the commission at that time. So where is the hiding?
Karan Thapar: Let me put it like this: you may not be hiding facts as Dr Santhanam alleges but a controversy has arisen and it grows and it won't disappear. Many people believe that the only way to resolve this issue is to now organise a peer group of scientists to review the results of the 1998 thermonuclear tests. Would you agree?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, let me first repeat what I said earlier. There are methods through which one has assessed the test results. Each one of them is a specialisation in itself and there are different groups, not just individuals but groups, which have looked at these. The fact is that this is also on a need-to-know basis. Now, if all of them come to conclusions which are by and large similar, what other things can you do in terms of forming a peer group of scientists?
Karan Thapar: So there is no need for a peer group review yet again?
Anil Kakodkar: That's what I would say.
Karan Thapar: The matter is conclusively sorted out?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right. And this has been after this controversy has been raised and it was again reviewed by the Atomic Energy Commission, we had gone through the records and the commission has come out with an authoritative statement.
Karan Thapar: Let me put to you two or three critical issues. Given the fact that you have concluded several reviews, including one recently after the doubts were raised, the doubts continue. And given that there are doubts about India's one and only thermonuclear test do we need more tests?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, I would say no because the important point to note is that the thermo nuclear test, the fission test and the sub-kilotonne test all worked as designed. They are diverse.
In terms of detailed design, their content is quite different. And so we think that the design which has been done is validated and within this configuration which has been tested one can build devices ranging from low kilotonne all the way to 200 kilotonnes. And that kind of fully assures the deterrence.
Karan Thapar: You are saying that India doesn't need more thermonuclear tests but the truth is that all the established thermonuclear powers needed more than one test. Can India be the exception?
Anil Kakodkar: Well if you go by Dil Maange More, that's another story. But we are talking about a time where the knowledge base has expanded, the capability has expanded and you carry out a design and prove you are confident that on the basis of that design and that test, one can build a range of systems right up to 200 kilotonnes.
Karan Thapar: I want to pick up on that last point that you have just made. Given that doubts continue and given that there are going to be no further tests and you are not saying that there is any need for further tests - can you say India has a credible thermonuclear bomb?
Anil Kakodkar: Of course.
Karan Thapar: We have a credible thermonuclear bomb?
Anil Kakodkar: Why are you using singular? Make that plural.
Karan Thapar: The reason I ask is because Dr Santhanam writing in ‘The Hindu’ says that the thermonuclear device has not been weaponsied even 11 years after the tests.
Anil Kakodkar: How does he know? He is not involved.
Karan Thapar: So you are saying to me that we have thermonuclear bombs--in the plural?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes.
Karan Thapar: With a yield of at least 45 kilotonnes each.
Anil Kakodkar: Much more than that.
Karan Thapar: Much more than that?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes. I told you we have the possibility of a deterrence of low kilotonne to 200 kilotonnes.
Karan Thapar: So when people like former Army chief, General Malik say, that because of the doubts in the public arena, the Army wants assurance of the yield and the efficacy of India's thermonuclear bomb, what is your answer to them?
Anil Kakodkar: I think that is guaranteed. The Army should be fully confident and defend the country. There is no issue about the arsenal at their command.
Karan Thapar: Dr Kakodkar, a pleasure talking to you.
Anil Kakodkar: Thank you. http://ibnlive.in.com/news/use-plural-india-has-thermonuclear-bombs-kakodkar/107038-3-p0.html
After weeks of doubt, it is time to ask the question: how credible is India's thermonuclear deterrent? That is the key issue Karan Thapar discussed in this week's Devil's Advocate with the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr Anil Kakodkar.
Karan Thapar: Dr Kakodkar, four leading scientists--Dr K Santhanam, Dr P K Iyengar, Dr H Sethna and Dr A N Prasad--have raised serious doubts about India's thermonuclear tests of 1998.
Dr Santhanam says we have hard evidence on a purely factual basis that not only was the yield of the thermonuclear device far below the design production, but that it actually failed. Do you have a problem on your hands?
Anil Kakodkar: No, I think this is a totally erroneous conclusion. The yield of thermonuclear tests was verified, not by one method but several redundant methods based on different principles, done by different groups. These have been reviewed in detail and in fact I had described the tests in 1998 as perfect and I stand by that.
Karan Thapar: I am glad that you began talking by the yield because both Dr Santhanam and Dr Iyenger have questioned the yield of the thermonuclear tests.
Dr Santhanam says that the DRDO seismic instruments measured the yield as something between 20-25 kilotonnes which is hugely different from the claim put out by the Atomic Energy Commission that it was 45 kilotonnes. How confident are you of the 45-kilotonne yield?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, let me first of all say that that DAE and DRDO we both work together as a team. DRDO did deploy some instruments for measurements but the fact is that the seismic instruments did not work. I myself had reviewed all the results immediately after the tests and we concluded that the instruments did not work.
Karan Thapar: Dr Santhanam says that the Bhabha Atomic Energy Center accepted the DRDO's instruments and their estimation for the yield of their fission bomb but not for the fusion or the thermonuclear. He says how can it be that the instruments worked in one case and not the others?
Anil Kakodkar: Well that's not true because the instrument measure and the ground motion at the place where the instrument is located - we had to separate out the information which was coming out from the thermonuclear and which was coming from the fission test. So the point that I am making is that the seismic instruments did not work.
So there is no question of the yield of the fission test being right and the thermonuclear test being wrong because no conclusion can be drawn from those instruments either ways.
Karan Thapar: But do you have proof that the yield of the thermonuclear test was 45 kilotonnes?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes. In fact we have within limits of what can be said and I must make it clear here that no country has given so much scientific details on their tests as we have given and this we have published with the maximum possible clarity.
Karan Thapar: The problem is that even in 1998, foreign monitors questioned the yield of the thermonuclear tests. At that time, Indian doubts were only expressed in private. Now, Indian doubts have burst out into the open and they are being heard in public.
Does it not worry you that these doubts continue--now both abroad and at home--and that they have continued for 11 years?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, it's unfortunate but it doesn't worry me because facts are facts and there is no question of getting worried about this. The point is that the measurements which have been done, they have been done--as I mentioned earlier--by different groups.
People who carry out the measurements on seismic instruments is a different group. People who carry out the measurements on radiochemical instruments are a different group. There are other methods that you can use, for example the simulation of ground motion. That's another group and all these groups have come to their own conclusions which match with each other.
Karan Thapar: And all these five or six different ways of measuring the yield have come to the conclusion that the yield was 45 kilotonnes for the thermonuclear device?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right.
Karan Thapar: So in your mind there is no doubt about it whatsoever?
Anil Kakodkar: Absolutely not.
Karan Thapar: Now, Dr Santhanam, in addition to disputing the yield, has other reasons to believe that the thermonuclear device failed. He said that given that the fission device, which produced a yield of around 25 kilotonnes, created a crater of 25 metres in diameter then the fusion bomb which produced a yield of 45 kilotonnes should have created a crater of around 70 metres in diameter. He says that that didn't happen and there was in fact no crater at all.
Anil Kakodkar: That's a layman’s way of looking at it. The fact of the matter is the fission device yield was 15 kilotonnes, not 25 kilotonnes.
Karan Thapar: So he's wrong in saying that it was 25 kilotonnes?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right and secondly although the two devices were about 1.5 kilometers apart, the geology within that distance has changed quite a bit partly because of the layers that exist and their slopes but more importantly because their depths have been different.
So the placement of the device of the fission kind is in one kind of medium and the placement of the device of the thermonuclear kind is in another medium.
Karan Thapar: So in fact what you are saying is that Dr Santhanam is making two mistakes and possibly making them deliberately.
First of all he's exaggerating the yield of the fission device and secondly he is completely ignoring the fact that the geology of the placement of the fusion was very different.
Anil Kakodkar: That's right
Karan Thapar: And both of those have led him to an erroneous conclusion?
Anil Kakodkar: And in fact we have gone through detailed simulation. For example in simulation you can locate the thermonuclear device where the fission device was placed and you can locate the fission device where the thermonuclear device was placed. And you get a much bigger crater now because the yield is higher.
Karan Thapar: This is a very important point that you are making.
Anil Kakodkar: Yes. And the fission device which is now placed in the thermo-heat pit now produces much less ground displacement.
Karan Thapar: So if in simulation you place the thermonuclear device where the fission device was placed, you would get a much bigger crater--much closer to the 70 meters in diameter that Dr Santhanam would like to see.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, I don't remember how much it was but this is actually true. This has been verified by calculations
Karan Thapar: Dr Santhanam has yet one more reason for believing that the thermonuclear device failed. He says if it had succeeded, both the shaft and the a-frame would have been totally destroyed. Instead, writing in ‘The Hindu’, he says the shaft remained totally undamaged and as for the a-frame, he says, it remained completely intact.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, I think you must understand the phenomena of ground motion when a nuclear test takes place. Depending on the depth of burial and of course the medium in which it is buried, you could get several manifestations on the surface.
You could get a crater and there are different kinds of craters that one could see. You can just get a mound - the ground rises and remains there and on the other extreme it can vent out. So in case of the thermonuclear device, the placement was in hard rock—granite--and with the depth and the yield for 45 kilotonnes, one expects only a mound to rise, which is what happened.
Karan Thapar: And not a crater?
Anil Kakodkar: And not a crater.
Karan Thapar: What about the shaft and the a-frame?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, if the ground simply rises - and in fact you can see a lot of fracture on the ground around that for a fairly large distance so it's clear that there was a cracking of the ground for a fairly large distance, but the phenomena was that it rises as a mound, then comes down slightly but it still remains a mound. So there is no question of damage to the a-frame.
Karan Thapar: So in fact the fact that the shaft and the a-frame survived intact can be quite easily explained. It's not proof that the thermonuclear device failed?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes, yes, it has been seen in detailed simulations and by the way I must tell you that this simulation, which I am telling you about, is done on codes which have been actually verified in 3-D situations on the test data available from abroad and validated and these have been published in international journals.
Karan Thapar: So you have had multiple validations of these.
Anil Kakodkar: That's right.
Karan Thapar: Clearly you are dismissive of Dr Santhanam's doubts. Now let me quote to you what one of your predecessors, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Dr P K Iyenger, said in a statement he issued on September 24, 2009. He says: "The recent revelations by Dr Santhanam are the clincher. He was one of the four leaders associated with Pokhran II, the team leader from the DRDO side, and he must certainly have known many of the details, particularly with regard to the seismic measurements. If he says that the yield was much lower than projected, that there was virtually no crater formed, then there is considerable justification for reasonable doubt regarding the credibility of the thermonuclear test."
Does it worry you that your predecessors seem to disagree with you but agree with Dr Santhanam?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, first of all I respect everybody. I respect Dr Iyenger, I respect Dr Santhanam, but the fact is that Dr Iyenger was nowhere involved in the 1998 tests. He was of course a key figure in the 1974 tests. Also, the fact is that before the 1990 and 1998 tests, all work was done under cover - we were not in the open - and we required a lot of logistical support and all and that all was being provided by DRDO.
But things were still being done on a need to know basis. So to assume that Dr Santhanam knew everything is not true.
Karan Thapar: You are making two important points. One you are saying that the DRDO and Dr Santhanam did not know everything - the fact that he was DRDO team leader does not mean that he knew everything that was happening.
Anil Kakodkar: He knew everything within his realm of responsibility.
Karan Thapar: Everything that he needed to know but not more?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right.
Karan Thapar: You are also saying that Dr Iyenger isn't fully in the picture and therefore his opinion is not necessarily valid.
Anil Kakodkar: He is not in the picture as far as the 1998 tests are concerned.
Karan Thapar: So he doesn't really know about the 1998 tests.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, he knows only as much as has been published and nothing more.
Karan Thapar: His comment therefore is not backed by knowledge and insight.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, that's for you to judge.
Karan Thapar: Let's purse the credibility and the doubts surrounding India's thermonuclear deterrent in a somewhat different way.
Dr Santhanam says that these doubts were formally raised by the DRDO with the Government as far back as in 1998 itself. And in a meeting arranged by the then National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, they were brushed aside in a manner which Dr Santhanam compares to a sort of frivolous voice vote.
Anil Kakodkar: Immediately after the tests, we carried out a review with both teams present: BARC team as well as the DRDO team.
We looked at the measurements done by the BARC team and we looked at the measurements done by the DRDO team and I told you the conclusions and on the basis of that review, it was clear that what basis we could go by and what conclusions we could draw.
Now, the question is that if the instruments didn't work, where is the question of going by any assertions which are based on ... what is the basis of any assertions?
Karan Thapar: So when Dr Santhanam says that the DRDO's doubts were brushed aside lightly, then that is wrong. They were considered and they were evaluated?
Anil Kakodkar: I think yes. I think they were evaluated, that's right.
Karan Thapar: And they were dismissed because they were found to be faulty. They were not just brushed aside.
Anil Kakodkar: No, they were not brushed aside.
Karan Thapar: In an article that Dr Santhanam has written recently on November 15, 2009 for ‘The Tribune’, he says: The Department of Atomic Energy--the department to which you were ex-officio secretary--is in fact hiding facts from successive Indian governments, from Parliament and from Indian people. How do you respond to that accusation?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, as I said earlier, we are perhaps unique in giving out the maximum information and that too very promptly - immediately after the tests.
Karan Thapar: There is no hiding?
Anil Kakodkar: There is no hiding. There are limits to what can be revealed. These have been discussed in the Atomic Energy Commission in not one but four meetings after the 1998 tests. And there are people who are knowledgeable. Dr Ramanna was a member of the commission at that time. So where is the hiding?
Karan Thapar: Let me put it like this: you may not be hiding facts as Dr Santhanam alleges but a controversy has arisen and it grows and it won't disappear. Many people believe that the only way to resolve this issue is to now organise a peer group of scientists to review the results of the 1998 thermonuclear tests. Would you agree?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, let me first repeat what I said earlier. There are methods through which one has assessed the test results. Each one of them is a specialisation in itself and there are different groups, not just individuals but groups, which have looked at these. The fact is that this is also on a need-to-know basis. Now, if all of them come to conclusions which are by and large similar, what other things can you do in terms of forming a peer group of scientists?
Karan Thapar: So there is no need for a peer group review yet again?
Anil Kakodkar: That's what I would say.
Karan Thapar: The matter is conclusively sorted out?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right. And this has been after this controversy has been raised and it was again reviewed by the Atomic Energy Commission, we had gone through the records and the commission has come out with an authoritative statement.
Karan Thapar: Let me put to you two or three critical issues. Given the fact that you have concluded several reviews, including one recently after the doubts were raised, the doubts continue. And given that there are doubts about India's one and only thermonuclear test do we need more tests?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, I would say no because the important point to note is that the thermo nuclear test, the fission test and the sub-kilotonne test all worked as designed. They are diverse.
In terms of detailed design, their content is quite different. And so we think that the design which has been done is validated and within this configuration which has been tested one can build devices ranging from low kilotonne all the way to 200 kilotonnes. And that kind of fully assures the deterrence.
Karan Thapar: You are saying that India doesn't need more thermonuclear tests but the truth is that all the established thermonuclear powers needed more than one test. Can India be the exception?
Anil Kakodkar: Well if you go by Dil Maange More, that's another story. But we are talking about a time where the knowledge base has expanded, the capability has expanded and you carry out a design and prove you are confident that on the basis of that design and that test, one can build a range of systems right up to 200 kilotonnes.
Karan Thapar: I want to pick up on that last point that you have just made. Given that doubts continue and given that there are going to be no further tests and you are not saying that there is any need for further tests - can you say India has a credible thermonuclear bomb?
Anil Kakodkar: Of course.
Karan Thapar: We have a credible thermonuclear bomb?
Anil Kakodkar: Why are you using singular? Make that plural.
Karan Thapar: The reason I ask is because Dr Santhanam writing in ‘The Hindu’ says that the thermonuclear device has not been weaponsied even 11 years after the tests.
Anil Kakodkar: How does he know? He is not involved.
Karan Thapar: So you are saying to me that we have thermonuclear bombs--in the plural?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes.
Karan Thapar: With a yield of at least 45 kilotonnes each.
Anil Kakodkar: Much more than that.
Karan Thapar: Much more than that?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes. I told you we have the possibility of a deterrence of low kilotonne to 200 kilotonnes.
Karan Thapar: So when people like former Army chief, General Malik say, that because of the doubts in the public arena, the Army wants assurance of the yield and the efficacy of India's thermonuclear bomb, what is your answer to them?
Anil Kakodkar: I think that is guaranteed. The Army should be fully confident and defend the country. There is no issue about the arsenal at their command.
Karan Thapar: Dr Kakodkar, a pleasure talking to you.
Anil Kakodkar: Thank you.
After weeks of doubt, it is time to ask the question: how credible is India's thermonuclear deterrent? That is the key issue Karan Thapar discussed in this week's Devil's Advocate with the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr Anil Kakodkar.
Karan Thapar: Dr Kakodkar, four leading scientists--Dr K Santhanam, Dr P K Iyengar, Dr H Sethna and Dr A N Prasad--have raised serious doubts about India's thermonuclear tests of 1998.
Dr Santhanam says we have hard evidence on a purely factual basis that not only was the yield of the thermonuclear device far below the design production, but that it actually failed. Do you have a problem on your hands?
Anil Kakodkar: No, I think this is a totally erroneous conclusion. The yield of thermonuclear tests was verified, not by one method but several redundant methods based on different principles, done by different groups. These have been reviewed in detail and in fact I had described the tests in 1998 as perfect and I stand by that.
Karan Thapar: I am glad that you began talking by the yield because both Dr Santhanam and Dr Iyenger have questioned the yield of the thermonuclear tests.
Dr Santhanam says that the DRDO seismic instruments measured the yield as something between 20-25 kilotonnes which is hugely different from the claim put out by the Atomic Energy Commission that it was 45 kilotonnes. How confident are you of the 45-kilotonne yield?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, let me first of all say that that DAE and DRDO we both work together as a team. DRDO did deploy some instruments for measurements but the fact is that the seismic instruments did not work. I myself had reviewed all the results immediately after the tests and we concluded that the instruments did not work.
Karan Thapar: Dr Santhanam says that the Bhabha Atomic Energy Center accepted the DRDO's instruments and their estimation for the yield of their fission bomb but not for the fusion or the thermonuclear. He says how can it be that the instruments worked in one case and not the others?
Anil Kakodkar: Well that's not true because the instrument measure and the ground motion at the place where the instrument is located - we had to separate out the information which was coming out from the thermonuclear and which was coming from the fission test. So the point that I am making is that the seismic instruments did not work.
So there is no question of the yield of the fission test being right and the thermonuclear test being wrong because no conclusion can be drawn from those instruments either ways.
Karan Thapar: But do you have proof that the yield of the thermonuclear test was 45 kilotonnes?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes. In fact we have within limits of what can be said and I must make it clear here that no country has given so much scientific details on their tests as we have given and this we have published with the maximum possible clarity.
Karan Thapar: The problem is that even in 1998, foreign monitors questioned the yield of the thermonuclear tests. At that time, Indian doubts were only expressed in private. Now, Indian doubts have burst out into the open and they are being heard in public.
Does it not worry you that these doubts continue--now both abroad and at home--and that they have continued for 11 years?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, it's unfortunate but it doesn't worry me because facts are facts and there is no question of getting worried about this. The point is that the measurements which have been done, they have been done--as I mentioned earlier--by different groups.
People who carry out the measurements on seismic instruments is a different group. People who carry out the measurements on radiochemical instruments are a different group. There are other methods that you can use, for example the simulation of ground motion. That's another group and all these groups have come to their own conclusions which match with each other.
Karan Thapar: And all these five or six different ways of measuring the yield have come to the conclusion that the yield was 45 kilotonnes for the thermonuclear device?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right.
Karan Thapar: So in your mind there is no doubt about it whatsoever?
Anil Kakodkar: Absolutely not.
Karan Thapar: Now, Dr Santhanam, in addition to disputing the yield, has other reasons to believe that the thermonuclear device failed. He said that given that the fission device, which produced a yield of around 25 kilotonnes, created a crater of 25 metres in diameter then the fusion bomb which produced a yield of 45 kilotonnes should have created a crater of around 70 metres in diameter. He says that that didn't happen and there was in fact no crater at all.
Anil Kakodkar: That's a layman’s way of looking at it. The fact of the matter is the fission device yield was 15 kilotonnes, not 25 kilotonnes.
Karan Thapar: So he's wrong in saying that it was 25 kilotonnes?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right and secondly although the two devices were about 1.5 kilometers apart, the geology within that distance has changed quite a bit partly because of the layers that exist and their slopes but more importantly because their depths have been different.
So the placement of the device of the fission kind is in one kind of medium and the placement of the device of the thermonuclear kind is in another medium.
Karan Thapar: So in fact what you are saying is that Dr Santhanam is making two mistakes and possibly making them deliberately.
First of all he's exaggerating the yield of the fission device and secondly he is completely ignoring the fact that the geology of the placement of the fusion was very different.
Anil Kakodkar: That's right
Karan Thapar: And both of those have led him to an erroneous conclusion?
Anil Kakodkar: And in fact we have gone through detailed simulation. For example in simulation you can locate the thermonuclear device where the fission device was placed and you can locate the fission device where the thermonuclear device was placed. And you get a much bigger crater now because the yield is higher.
Karan Thapar: This is a very important point that you are making.
Anil Kakodkar: Yes. And the fission device which is now placed in the thermo-heat pit now produces much less ground displacement.
Karan Thapar: So if in simulation you place the thermonuclear device where the fission device was placed, you would get a much bigger crater--much closer to the 70 meters in diameter that Dr Santhanam would like to see.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, I don't remember how much it was but this is actually true. This has been verified by calculations
Karan Thapar: Dr Santhanam has yet one more reason for believing that the thermonuclear device failed. He says if it had succeeded, both the shaft and the a-frame would have been totally destroyed. Instead, writing in ‘The Hindu’, he says the shaft remained totally undamaged and as for the a-frame, he says, it remained completely intact.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, I think you must understand the phenomena of ground motion when a nuclear test takes place. Depending on the depth of burial and of course the medium in which it is buried, you could get several manifestations on the surface.
You could get a crater and there are different kinds of craters that one could see. You can just get a mound - the ground rises and remains there and on the other extreme it can vent out. So in case of the thermonuclear device, the placement was in hard rock—granite--and with the depth and the yield for 45 kilotonnes, one expects only a mound to rise, which is what happened.
Karan Thapar: And not a crater?
Anil Kakodkar: And not a crater.
Karan Thapar: What about the shaft and the a-frame?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, if the ground simply rises - and in fact you can see a lot of fracture on the ground around that for a fairly large distance so it's clear that there was a cracking of the ground for a fairly large distance, but the phenomena was that it rises as a mound, then comes down slightly but it still remains a mound. So there is no question of damage to the a-frame.
Karan Thapar: So in fact the fact that the shaft and the a-frame survived intact can be quite easily explained. It's not proof that the thermonuclear device failed?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes, yes, it has been seen in detailed simulations and by the way I must tell you that this simulation, which I am telling you about, is done on codes which have been actually verified in 3-D situations on the test data available from abroad and validated and these have been published in international journals.
Karan Thapar: So you have had multiple validations of these.
Anil Kakodkar: That's right.
Karan Thapar: Clearly you are dismissive of Dr Santhanam's doubts. Now let me quote to you what one of your predecessors, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Dr P K Iyenger, said in a statement he issued on September 24, 2009. He says: "The recent revelations by Dr Santhanam are the clincher. He was one of the four leaders associated with Pokhran II, the team leader from the DRDO side, and he must certainly have known many of the details, particularly with regard to the seismic measurements. If he says that the yield was much lower than projected, that there was virtually no crater formed, then there is considerable justification for reasonable doubt regarding the credibility of the thermonuclear test."
Does it worry you that your predecessors seem to disagree with you but agree with Dr Santhanam?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, first of all I respect everybody. I respect Dr Iyenger, I respect Dr Santhanam, but the fact is that Dr Iyenger was nowhere involved in the 1998 tests. He was of course a key figure in the 1974 tests. Also, the fact is that before the 1990 and 1998 tests, all work was done under cover - we were not in the open - and we required a lot of logistical support and all and that all was being provided by DRDO.
But things were still being done on a need to know basis. So to assume that Dr Santhanam knew everything is not true.
Karan Thapar: You are making two important points. One you are saying that the DRDO and Dr Santhanam did not know everything - the fact that he was DRDO team leader does not mean that he knew everything that was happening.
Anil Kakodkar: He knew everything within his realm of responsibility.
Karan Thapar: Everything that he needed to know but not more?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right.
Karan Thapar: You are also saying that Dr Iyenger isn't fully in the picture and therefore his opinion is not necessarily valid.
Anil Kakodkar: He is not in the picture as far as the 1998 tests are concerned.
Karan Thapar: So he doesn't really know about the 1998 tests.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, he knows only as much as has been published and nothing more.
Karan Thapar: His comment therefore is not backed by knowledge and insight.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, that's for you to judge.
Karan Thapar: Let's purse the credibility and the doubts surrounding India's thermonuclear deterrent in a somewhat different way.
Dr Santhanam says that these doubts were formally raised by the DRDO with the Government as far back as in 1998 itself. And in a meeting arranged by the then National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, they were brushed aside in a manner which Dr Santhanam compares to a sort of frivolous voice vote.
Anil Kakodkar: Immediately after the tests, we carried out a review with both teams present: BARC team as well as the DRDO team.
We looked at the measurements done by the BARC team and we looked at the measurements done by the DRDO team and I told you the conclusions and on the basis of that review, it was clear that what basis we could go by and what conclusions we could draw.
Now, the question is that if the instruments didn't work, where is the question of going by any assertions which are based on ... what is the basis of any assertions?
Karan Thapar: So when Dr Santhanam says that the DRDO's doubts were brushed aside lightly, then that is wrong. They were considered and they were evaluated?
Anil Kakodkar: I think yes. I think they were evaluated, that's right.
Karan Thapar: And they were dismissed because they were found to be faulty. They were not just brushed aside.
Anil Kakodkar: No, they were not brushed aside.
Karan Thapar: In an article that Dr Santhanam has written recently on November 15, 2009 for ‘The Tribune’, he says: The Department of Atomic Energy--the department to which you were ex-officio secretary--is in fact hiding facts from successive Indian governments, from Parliament and from Indian people. How do you respond to that accusation?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, as I said earlier, we are perhaps unique in giving out the maximum information and that too very promptly - immediately after the tests.
Karan Thapar: There is no hiding?
Anil Kakodkar: There is no hiding. There are limits to what can be revealed. These have been discussed in the Atomic Energy Commission in not one but four meetings after the 1998 tests. And there are people who are knowledgeable. Dr Ramanna was a member of the commission at that time. So where is the hiding?
Karan Thapar: Let me put it like this: you may not be hiding facts as Dr Santhanam alleges but a controversy has arisen and it grows and it won't disappear. Many people believe that the only way to resolve this issue is to now organise a peer group of scientists to review the results of the 1998 thermonuclear tests. Would you agree?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, let me first repeat what I said earlier. There are methods through which one has assessed the test results. Each one of them is a specialisation in itself and there are different groups, not just individuals but groups, which have looked at these. The fact is that this is also on a need-to-know basis. Now, if all of them come to conclusions which are by and large similar, what other things can you do in terms of forming a peer group of scientists?
Karan Thapar: So there is no need for a peer group review yet again?
Anil Kakodkar: That's what I would say.
Karan Thapar: The matter is conclusively sorted out?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right. And this has been after this controversy has been raised and it was again reviewed by the Atomic Energy Commission, we had gone through the records and the commission has come out with an authoritative statement.
Karan Thapar: Let me put to you two or three critical issues. Given the fact that you have concluded several reviews, including one recently after the doubts were raised, the doubts continue. And given that there are doubts about India's one and only thermonuclear test do we need more tests?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, I would say no because the important point to note is that the thermo nuclear test, the fission test and the sub-kilotonne test all worked as designed. They are diverse.
In terms of detailed design, their content is quite different. And so we think that the design which has been done is validated and within this configuration which has been tested one can build devices ranging from low kilotonne all the way to 200 kilotonnes. And that kind of fully assures the deterrence.
Karan Thapar: You are saying that India doesn't need more thermonuclear tests but the truth is that all the established thermonuclear powers needed more than one test. Can India be the exception?
Anil Kakodkar: Well if you go by Dil Maange More, that's another story. But we are talking about a time where the knowledge base has expanded, the capability has expanded and you carry out a design and prove you are confident that on the basis of that design and that test, one can build a range of systems right up to 200 kilotonnes.
Karan Thapar: I want to pick up on that last point that you have just made. Given that doubts continue and given that there are going to be no further tests and you are not saying that there is any need for further tests - can you say India has a credible thermonuclear bomb?
Anil Kakodkar: Of course.
Karan Thapar: We have a credible thermonuclear bomb?
Anil Kakodkar: Why are you using singular? Make that plural.
Karan Thapar: The reason I ask is because Dr Santhanam writing in ‘The Hindu’ says that the thermonuclear device has not been weaponsied even 11 years after the tests.
Anil Kakodkar: How does he know? He is not involved.
Karan Thapar: So you are saying to me that we have thermonuclear bombs--in the plural?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes.
Karan Thapar: With a yield of at least 45 kilotonnes each.
Anil Kakodkar: Much more than that.
Karan Thapar: Much more than that?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes. I told you we have the possibility of a deterrence of low kilotonne to 200 kilotonnes.
Karan Thapar: So when people like former Army chief, General Malik say, that because of the doubts in the public arena, the Army wants assurance of the yield and the efficacy of India's thermonuclear bomb, what is your answer to them?
Anil Kakodkar: I think that is guaranteed. The Army should be fully confident and defend the country. There is no issue about the arsenal at their command.
Karan Thapar: Dr Kakodkar, a pleasure talking to you.
Anil Kakodkar: Thank you. http://ibnlive.in.com/news/use-plural-india-has-thermonuclear-bombs-kakodkar/107038-3-p0.html
After weeks of doubt, it is time to ask the question: how credible is India's thermonuclear deterrent? That is the key issue Karan Thapar discussed in this week's Devil's Advocate with the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr Anil Kakodkar.
Karan Thapar: Dr Kakodkar, four leading scientists--Dr K Santhanam, Dr P K Iyengar, Dr H Sethna and Dr A N Prasad--have raised serious doubts about India's thermonuclear tests of 1998.
Dr Santhanam says we have hard evidence on a purely factual basis that not only was the yield of the thermonuclear device far below the design production, but that it actually failed. Do you have a problem on your hands?
Anil Kakodkar: No, I think this is a totally erroneous conclusion. The yield of thermonuclear tests was verified, not by one method but several redundant methods based on different principles, done by different groups. These have been reviewed in detail and in fact I had described the tests in 1998 as perfect and I stand by that.
Karan Thapar: I am glad that you began talking by the yield because both Dr Santhanam and Dr Iyenger have questioned the yield of the thermonuclear tests.
Dr Santhanam says that the DRDO seismic instruments measured the yield as something between 20-25 kilotonnes which is hugely different from the claim put out by the Atomic Energy Commission that it was 45 kilotonnes. How confident are you of the 45-kilotonne yield?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, let me first of all say that that DAE and DRDO we both work together as a team. DRDO did deploy some instruments for measurements but the fact is that the seismic instruments did not work. I myself had reviewed all the results immediately after the tests and we concluded that the instruments did not work.
Karan Thapar: Dr Santhanam says that the Bhabha Atomic Energy Center accepted the DRDO's instruments and their estimation for the yield of their fission bomb but not for the fusion or the thermonuclear. He says how can it be that the instruments worked in one case and not the others?
Anil Kakodkar: Well that's not true because the instrument measure and the ground motion at the place where the instrument is located - we had to separate out the information which was coming out from the thermonuclear and which was coming from the fission test. So the point that I am making is that the seismic instruments did not work.
So there is no question of the yield of the fission test being right and the thermonuclear test being wrong because no conclusion can be drawn from those instruments either ways.
Karan Thapar: But do you have proof that the yield of the thermonuclear test was 45 kilotonnes?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes. In fact we have within limits of what can be said and I must make it clear here that no country has given so much scientific details on their tests as we have given and this we have published with the maximum possible clarity.
Karan Thapar: The problem is that even in 1998, foreign monitors questioned the yield of the thermonuclear tests. At that time, Indian doubts were only expressed in private. Now, Indian doubts have burst out into the open and they are being heard in public.
Does it not worry you that these doubts continue--now both abroad and at home--and that they have continued for 11 years?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, it's unfortunate but it doesn't worry me because facts are facts and there is no question of getting worried about this. The point is that the measurements which have been done, they have been done--as I mentioned earlier--by different groups.
People who carry out the measurements on seismic instruments is a different group. People who carry out the measurements on radiochemical instruments are a different group. There are other methods that you can use, for example the simulation of ground motion. That's another group and all these groups have come to their own conclusions which match with each other.
Karan Thapar: And all these five or six different ways of measuring the yield have come to the conclusion that the yield was 45 kilotonnes for the thermonuclear device?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right.
Karan Thapar: So in your mind there is no doubt about it whatsoever?
Anil Kakodkar: Absolutely not.
Karan Thapar: Now, Dr Santhanam, in addition to disputing the yield, has other reasons to believe that the thermonuclear device failed. He said that given that the fission device, which produced a yield of around 25 kilotonnes, created a crater of 25 metres in diameter then the fusion bomb which produced a yield of 45 kilotonnes should have created a crater of around 70 metres in diameter. He says that that didn't happen and there was in fact no crater at all.
Anil Kakodkar: That's a layman’s way of looking at it. The fact of the matter is the fission device yield was 15 kilotonnes, not 25 kilotonnes.
Karan Thapar: So he's wrong in saying that it was 25 kilotonnes?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right and secondly although the two devices were about 1.5 kilometers apart, the geology within that distance has changed quite a bit partly because of the layers that exist and their slopes but more importantly because their depths have been different.
So the placement of the device of the fission kind is in one kind of medium and the placement of the device of the thermonuclear kind is in another medium.
Karan Thapar: So in fact what you are saying is that Dr Santhanam is making two mistakes and possibly making them deliberately.
First of all he's exaggerating the yield of the fission device and secondly he is completely ignoring the fact that the geology of the placement of the fusion was very different.
Anil Kakodkar: That's right
Karan Thapar: And both of those have led him to an erroneous conclusion?
Anil Kakodkar: And in fact we have gone through detailed simulation. For example in simulation you can locate the thermonuclear device where the fission device was placed and you can locate the fission device where the thermonuclear device was placed. And you get a much bigger crater now because the yield is higher.
Karan Thapar: This is a very important point that you are making.
Anil Kakodkar: Yes. And the fission device which is now placed in the thermo-heat pit now produces much less ground displacement.
Karan Thapar: So if in simulation you place the thermonuclear device where the fission device was placed, you would get a much bigger crater--much closer to the 70 meters in diameter that Dr Santhanam would like to see.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, I don't remember how much it was but this is actually true. This has been verified by calculations
Karan Thapar: Dr Santhanam has yet one more reason for believing that the thermonuclear device failed. He says if it had succeeded, both the shaft and the a-frame would have been totally destroyed. Instead, writing in ‘The Hindu’, he says the shaft remained totally undamaged and as for the a-frame, he says, it remained completely intact.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, I think you must understand the phenomena of ground motion when a nuclear test takes place. Depending on the depth of burial and of course the medium in which it is buried, you could get several manifestations on the surface.
You could get a crater and there are different kinds of craters that one could see. You can just get a mound - the ground rises and remains there and on the other extreme it can vent out. So in case of the thermonuclear device, the placement was in hard rock—granite--and with the depth and the yield for 45 kilotonnes, one expects only a mound to rise, which is what happened.
Karan Thapar: And not a crater?
Anil Kakodkar: And not a crater.
Karan Thapar: What about the shaft and the a-frame?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, if the ground simply rises - and in fact you can see a lot of fracture on the ground around that for a fairly large distance so it's clear that there was a cracking of the ground for a fairly large distance, but the phenomena was that it rises as a mound, then comes down slightly but it still remains a mound. So there is no question of damage to the a-frame.
Karan Thapar: So in fact the fact that the shaft and the a-frame survived intact can be quite easily explained. It's not proof that the thermonuclear device failed?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes, yes, it has been seen in detailed simulations and by the way I must tell you that this simulation, which I am telling you about, is done on codes which have been actually verified in 3-D situations on the test data available from abroad and validated and these have been published in international journals.
Karan Thapar: So you have had multiple validations of these.
Anil Kakodkar: That's right.
Karan Thapar: Clearly you are dismissive of Dr Santhanam's doubts. Now let me quote to you what one of your predecessors, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Dr P K Iyenger, said in a statement he issued on September 24, 2009. He says: "The recent revelations by Dr Santhanam are the clincher. He was one of the four leaders associated with Pokhran II, the team leader from the DRDO side, and he must certainly have known many of the details, particularly with regard to the seismic measurements. If he says that the yield was much lower than projected, that there was virtually no crater formed, then there is considerable justification for reasonable doubt regarding the credibility of the thermonuclear test."
Does it worry you that your predecessors seem to disagree with you but agree with Dr Santhanam?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, first of all I respect everybody. I respect Dr Iyenger, I respect Dr Santhanam, but the fact is that Dr Iyenger was nowhere involved in the 1998 tests. He was of course a key figure in the 1974 tests. Also, the fact is that before the 1990 and 1998 tests, all work was done under cover - we were not in the open - and we required a lot of logistical support and all and that all was being provided by DRDO.
But things were still being done on a need to know basis. So to assume that Dr Santhanam knew everything is not true.
Karan Thapar: You are making two important points. One you are saying that the DRDO and Dr Santhanam did not know everything - the fact that he was DRDO team leader does not mean that he knew everything that was happening.
Anil Kakodkar: He knew everything within his realm of responsibility.
Karan Thapar: Everything that he needed to know but not more?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right.
Karan Thapar: You are also saying that Dr Iyenger isn't fully in the picture and therefore his opinion is not necessarily valid.
Anil Kakodkar: He is not in the picture as far as the 1998 tests are concerned.
Karan Thapar: So he doesn't really know about the 1998 tests.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, he knows only as much as has been published and nothing more.
Karan Thapar: His comment therefore is not backed by knowledge and insight.
Anil Kakodkar: Well, that's for you to judge.
Karan Thapar: Let's purse the credibility and the doubts surrounding India's thermonuclear deterrent in a somewhat different way.
Dr Santhanam says that these doubts were formally raised by the DRDO with the Government as far back as in 1998 itself. And in a meeting arranged by the then National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, they were brushed aside in a manner which Dr Santhanam compares to a sort of frivolous voice vote.
Anil Kakodkar: Immediately after the tests, we carried out a review with both teams present: BARC team as well as the DRDO team.
We looked at the measurements done by the BARC team and we looked at the measurements done by the DRDO team and I told you the conclusions and on the basis of that review, it was clear that what basis we could go by and what conclusions we could draw.
Now, the question is that if the instruments didn't work, where is the question of going by any assertions which are based on ... what is the basis of any assertions?
Karan Thapar: So when Dr Santhanam says that the DRDO's doubts were brushed aside lightly, then that is wrong. They were considered and they were evaluated?
Anil Kakodkar: I think yes. I think they were evaluated, that's right.
Karan Thapar: And they were dismissed because they were found to be faulty. They were not just brushed aside.
Anil Kakodkar: No, they were not brushed aside.
Karan Thapar: In an article that Dr Santhanam has written recently on November 15, 2009 for ‘The Tribune’, he says: The Department of Atomic Energy--the department to which you were ex-officio secretary--is in fact hiding facts from successive Indian governments, from Parliament and from Indian people. How do you respond to that accusation?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, as I said earlier, we are perhaps unique in giving out the maximum information and that too very promptly - immediately after the tests.
Karan Thapar: There is no hiding?
Anil Kakodkar: There is no hiding. There are limits to what can be revealed. These have been discussed in the Atomic Energy Commission in not one but four meetings after the 1998 tests. And there are people who are knowledgeable. Dr Ramanna was a member of the commission at that time. So where is the hiding?
Karan Thapar: Let me put it like this: you may not be hiding facts as Dr Santhanam alleges but a controversy has arisen and it grows and it won't disappear. Many people believe that the only way to resolve this issue is to now organise a peer group of scientists to review the results of the 1998 thermonuclear tests. Would you agree?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, let me first repeat what I said earlier. There are methods through which one has assessed the test results. Each one of them is a specialisation in itself and there are different groups, not just individuals but groups, which have looked at these. The fact is that this is also on a need-to-know basis. Now, if all of them come to conclusions which are by and large similar, what other things can you do in terms of forming a peer group of scientists?
Karan Thapar: So there is no need for a peer group review yet again?
Anil Kakodkar: That's what I would say.
Karan Thapar: The matter is conclusively sorted out?
Anil Kakodkar: That's right. And this has been after this controversy has been raised and it was again reviewed by the Atomic Energy Commission, we had gone through the records and the commission has come out with an authoritative statement.
Karan Thapar: Let me put to you two or three critical issues. Given the fact that you have concluded several reviews, including one recently after the doubts were raised, the doubts continue. And given that there are doubts about India's one and only thermonuclear test do we need more tests?
Anil Kakodkar: Well, I would say no because the important point to note is that the thermo nuclear test, the fission test and the sub-kilotonne test all worked as designed. They are diverse.
In terms of detailed design, their content is quite different. And so we think that the design which has been done is validated and within this configuration which has been tested one can build devices ranging from low kilotonne all the way to 200 kilotonnes. And that kind of fully assures the deterrence.
Karan Thapar: You are saying that India doesn't need more thermonuclear tests but the truth is that all the established thermonuclear powers needed more than one test. Can India be the exception?
Anil Kakodkar: Well if you go by Dil Maange More, that's another story. But we are talking about a time where the knowledge base has expanded, the capability has expanded and you carry out a design and prove you are confident that on the basis of that design and that test, one can build a range of systems right up to 200 kilotonnes.
Karan Thapar: I want to pick up on that last point that you have just made. Given that doubts continue and given that there are going to be no further tests and you are not saying that there is any need for further tests - can you say India has a credible thermonuclear bomb?
Anil Kakodkar: Of course.
Karan Thapar: We have a credible thermonuclear bomb?
Anil Kakodkar: Why are you using singular? Make that plural.
Karan Thapar: The reason I ask is because Dr Santhanam writing in ‘The Hindu’ says that the thermonuclear device has not been weaponsied even 11 years after the tests.
Anil Kakodkar: How does he know? He is not involved.
Karan Thapar: So you are saying to me that we have thermonuclear bombs--in the plural?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes.
Karan Thapar: With a yield of at least 45 kilotonnes each.
Anil Kakodkar: Much more than that.
Karan Thapar: Much more than that?
Anil Kakodkar: Yes. I told you we have the possibility of a deterrence of low kilotonne to 200 kilotonnes.
Karan Thapar: So when people like former Army chief, General Malik say, that because of the doubts in the public arena, the Army wants assurance of the yield and the efficacy of India's thermonuclear bomb, what is your answer to them?
Anil Kakodkar: I think that is guaranteed. The Army should be fully confident and defend the country. There is no issue about the arsenal at their command.
Karan Thapar: Dr Kakodkar, a pleasure talking to you.
Anil Kakodkar: Thank you.
Anil Kakodkar( Marathi : अनिल काकोडकर ) is an eminent Indian nuclear scientist and mechanical engineer. He was the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India and the Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy. Before leading India's Nuclear Programme, he was the Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay from 1996-2000. He was awarded the Padma Vibhushan, India's second highest civilian honour, on January 26, 2009.
Champion of self-Reliance
Apart from playing a major role in India's nuclear tests asserting sovereignty, Dr. Kakodkar is a champion of India's self-reliance on Thorium as a fuel for nuclear energy.
Academic and Scientific Career
Kakodkar was born in 1943 (November 11, 1943), in Barwani Princely State (present day Madhya Pradesh state) to Mrs. Kamala Kakodkar & Mr. Purushottam Kakodkar, both Gandhian Freedom Fighters. He had his early education at Barwani, until moving to Mumbai for post-matriculation studies.
Higher Education
Kakodkar graduated from Ruparel College, then from VJTI, University of Mumbai with a degree in Mechanical Engineering in 1963. He joined the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in 1964. He obtained a masters degree in experimental stress analysis from the University of Nottingham in 1969.
Career in BARC
He joined the Reactor Engineering Division of the BARC and played a key role in design and construction of the Dhruva reactor, a completely original but high-tech project. He was a part of the core team of architects of India's Peaceful Nuclear Tests in 1974 and 1998. Further he has led the indigenous development in India's Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor Technology. His work in the rehabilitation of the two reactors at Kalpakkam and the first unit at Rawatbhata, which at one stage were on the verge of being written off, are examples of his engineering capability.
In 1996 he became Director of the BARC and since 2000 he is leading the Atomic Energy Commission of India and also is the secretary of the Department of Atomic Energy.
He has published over 250 scientific papers.
Energy and the Future of Peaceful Nuclear Technology
Making India fully self-reliant in energy, especially from the cheap national thorium resources, seems to be his mission statement and he still pursues this dream with great dedication. He has, over the years, built competent teams of highly specialised scientists and engineers in the reactor engineering programme. Today, he continues to engage in designing the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor, that uses thorium-uranium 233 as the primary energy source with plutonium as the driver fuel. The unique reactor system, with simplified but safe technology, will generate 75 per cent of electricity from thorium.
If Kakodkar's dream comes true, it will solve India's energy crisis.
Other Positions of Repute
He is currently the Chairman, Board of Governors, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay.
He is a Fellow of the Indian National Academy of Engineering and served as its President during 1999-2000.
He is a Fellow of the Indian Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Sciences, India and the Maharashtra Academy of Sciences.
He is a member of the International Nuclear Energy Academy, Honorary member of the World Innovation Foundation and Council of Advisers of World Nuclear Association. He was member of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) during 1999-2002
He is on the board of Governors of VJTI, Mumbai
He is currently the Chairman, Board of Governors, Center for Excellence in Basic Sciences, Mumbai
He is currently the Chairman, Board of Governors, [Dr BR Ambedkar National Institute of Technology, Jalandhar]
National Awards
Padma Shri in 1998.
Padma Bhushan in 1999.
Padma Vibhushan in 2009.
Other Awards
Highest civilian award of the Goa state-Gomant Vibhushan Award(2010)
Hari Om Ashram Prerit Vikram Sarabhai Award (1988)
H. K. Firodia Award for Excellence in Science and Technology (1997)
Rockwell Medal for Excellence in Technology (1997)
FICCI Award for outstanding contribution to Nuclear Science and Technology (1997-98)
ANACON - 1998 Life Time Achievement Award for Nuclear Sciences
Indian Science Congress Association's H. J. Bhabha Memorial Award (1999-2000)
Godavari Gaurav Award (2000)
Dr. Y. Nayudamma Memorial Award (2002)
Chemtech Foundation's Achiever of the Year Award for Energy (2002)
Gujar Mal Modi Innovative Science and Technology Award in 2004.
Homi Bhabha Lifetime Achievement Award 2010.
Champion of self-Reliance
Apart from playing a major role in India's nuclear tests asserting sovereignty, Dr. Kakodkar is a champion of India's self-reliance on Thorium as a fuel for nuclear energy.
Academic and Scientific Career
Kakodkar was born in 1943 (November 11, 1943), in Barwani Princely State (present day Madhya Pradesh state) to Mrs. Kamala Kakodkar & Mr. Purushottam Kakodkar, both Gandhian Freedom Fighters. He had his early education at Barwani, until moving to Mumbai for post-matriculation studies.
Higher Education
Kakodkar graduated from Ruparel College, then from VJTI, University of Mumbai with a degree in Mechanical Engineering in 1963. He joined the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in 1964. He obtained a masters degree in experimental stress analysis from the University of Nottingham in 1969.
Career in BARC
He joined the Reactor Engineering Division of the BARC and played a key role in design and construction of the Dhruva reactor, a completely original but high-tech project. He was a part of the core team of architects of India's Peaceful Nuclear Tests in 1974 and 1998. Further he has led the indigenous development in India's Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor Technology. His work in the rehabilitation of the two reactors at Kalpakkam and the first unit at Rawatbhata, which at one stage were on the verge of being written off, are examples of his engineering capability.
In 1996 he became Director of the BARC and since 2000 he is leading the Atomic Energy Commission of India and also is the secretary of the Department of Atomic Energy.
He has published over 250 scientific papers.
Energy and the Future of Peaceful Nuclear Technology
Making India fully self-reliant in energy, especially from the cheap national thorium resources, seems to be his mission statement and he still pursues this dream with great dedication. He has, over the years, built competent teams of highly specialised scientists and engineers in the reactor engineering programme. Today, he continues to engage in designing the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor, that uses thorium-uranium 233 as the primary energy source with plutonium as the driver fuel. The unique reactor system, with simplified but safe technology, will generate 75 per cent of electricity from thorium.
If Kakodkar's dream comes true, it will solve India's energy crisis.
Other Positions of Repute
He is currently the Chairman, Board of Governors, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay.
He is a Fellow of the Indian National Academy of Engineering and served as its President during 1999-2000.
He is a Fellow of the Indian Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Sciences, India and the Maharashtra Academy of Sciences.
He is a member of the International Nuclear Energy Academy, Honorary member of the World Innovation Foundation and Council of Advisers of World Nuclear Association. He was member of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) during 1999-2002
He is on the board of Governors of VJTI, Mumbai
He is currently the Chairman, Board of Governors, Center for Excellence in Basic Sciences, Mumbai
He is currently the Chairman, Board of Governors, [Dr BR Ambedkar National Institute of Technology, Jalandhar]
National Awards
Padma Shri in 1998.
Padma Bhushan in 1999.
Padma Vibhushan in 2009.
Other Awards
Highest civilian award of the Goa state-Gomant Vibhushan Award(2010)
Hari Om Ashram Prerit Vikram Sarabhai Award (1988)
H. K. Firodia Award for Excellence in Science and Technology (1997)
Rockwell Medal for Excellence in Technology (1997)
FICCI Award for outstanding contribution to Nuclear Science and Technology (1997-98)
ANACON - 1998 Life Time Achievement Award for Nuclear Sciences
Indian Science Congress Association's H. J. Bhabha Memorial Award (1999-2000)
Godavari Gaurav Award (2000)
Dr. Y. Nayudamma Memorial Award (2002)
Chemtech Foundation's Achiever of the Year Award for Energy (2002)
Gujar Mal Modi Innovative Science and Technology Award in 2004.
Homi Bhabha Lifetime Achievement Award 2010.
我就看懂一个核弹…
看不懂方言。。。请说普通话，最好是简体。。
静候翻译帝出现。
此帖隐约有尿，感觉要火。留爪
此帖隐约有尿，感觉要火。留爪斑竹别怪我。。。应该能理解我的心情。。。
看了这贴子我就一个感觉。。。想骂人。。。
看了这贴子我就一个感觉。。。想骂人。。。
请用华文··
sorry, now I am using a computer which has not chinese input, so I have to copy the original article in english.
Besides, my english is very poor, I dont have much time for translation, and the article is also not so difficult, hence I will not translate it.
Just make a copy, thats all.
Besides, my english is very poor, I dont have much time for translation, and the article is also not so difficult, hence I will not translate it.
Just make a copy, thats all.
楼主是三哥？
经过几个星期的疑问，现在是时候提出这样的问题：如何可信的是印度的热核的阻吓作用？这是问题的关键卡兰塔帕尔在本周的魔鬼代言人讨论了原子能委员会前主席，阿尼尔Kakodkar博士。
卡兰塔帕尔：博士Kakodkar，四大主导科学家 - 博士K Santhanam，博士PK艾扬格，博士和博士H塞特纳AN普拉萨德 - 提出了关于1998年印度的热核试验严重怀疑。
Santhanam博士说，我们有一个纯粹的事实依据，不仅是远低于设计生产热核装置产量的确凿证据，但它实际上失败了。你有你的手的问题？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：不，我认为这是一个完全错误的结论。热核试验的产量进行了验证，而不是一种方法，但对不同群体进行不同的原则，根据一些多余的方法。这些都被详细审查，其实我已经描述了1998年的测试，完美的，我该立场。
卡兰塔帕尔：我很高兴你开始讲的产量，因为这两个博士Santhanam博士和Iyenger质疑的热核试验产量。
医生Santhanam说，DRDO地震仪器测得的20-25千吨之间是巨大的投入由原子能委员会，这是45千吨出不同的东西要求的产量。你有多少信心的45千吨收益呢？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，让我先说，这个DAE和DRDO我们都作为一个团队一起工作。 DRDO并部署一些测量仪器，但事实是，地震仪器不工作。我自己已经审查后，立即测试的所有结果，我们得出的结论是没有工作的工具。
卡兰塔帕尔：博士Santhanam说，巴巴原子能中心接受了他们的原子弹，但不融合或热产生DRDO的工具和他们的估计。他说，怎么能说，文书工作在一种情况下，而不是别人呢？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，这不是真实的，因为仪器的测量和在那里的仪器所在地的地面运动 - 我们不得不分离出的资料，是来自热核，哪些是从裂变测试出来。因此，问题是我提出的是，地震仪器不工作。
因此，有没有对被测试的裂变权利和热核试验所产生的问题，因为任何错误的结论可以从这些文书或者方法绘制。
卡兰塔帕尔：但你有证据证明的热核试验产量为45千吨？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：是的。事实上，我们有什么范围内可以说是极限，我必须说清楚在这里，没有一个国家给了他们这么多的科学试验的细节，因为我们已经给出，这与我们有最大可能的清晰度出版。
卡兰塔帕尔：问题是，即使在1998年，外国显示器质疑热核试验产量。当时，印度的疑虑只表示在私下进行。现在，印度的疑虑已经迸发出的公开化，并陆续公开审理。
这岂不是担心你，这些疑虑继续 - 现在都在国外和国内 - 和他们有11年的持续？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，这是不幸的，但我并不担心，因为事实就是事实，也没有获得关于这个担心的问题。问题的关键是，已完成测量，他们已经完成 - 正如我前面提到的 - 由不同的群体。
人们谁开展地震仪器的测量是一个不同的组。人们谁开展放射化学仪器的测量是一个不同的组。还有其他方法，您可以使用，例如，地面运动模拟。这是另一个组和所有这些团体都来到他们的相互匹配自己的结论。
卡兰塔帕尔：而所有这些五六测量产生不同的方式得出的结论是，产量45热核装置千吨？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是正确的。
卡兰塔帕尔：那么在你心中有没有疑问没有？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：绝对不是。
卡兰塔帕尔：现在，医生Santhanam，除争议的产量，有其他理由相信，热核装置失败。他说，鉴于裂变装置，它产生了大约25千吨的产量，创造了一个直径25米的大坑，然后融合炸弹，产生了45千吨产量应该已经创建了一个直径约70米的弹坑。他说，这并不发生，其实有没有火山口的。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是一个外行的看它的方式。而事实上是裂变装置产量为15千吨，而不是25千吨。
卡兰塔帕尔：所以他的错，称这是25千吨？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是正确的，其次，虽然这两个装置分别相距约1.5公里，这个距离内的地质改变相当部分是由于层存在和他们的斜坡位，但更重要的是因为他们的深度有所不同。
因此，对这类设备的裂变放置在一个中等和实物的热核装置放置在另一种媒介是一种。
卡兰塔帕尔：所以其实你要说的是，医生Santhanam正在两个错误，可能使他们故意的。
所有他的夸大了裂变装置产量，其次他完全是无视事实，对融合安置地质非常不同的第一。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是正确的
卡兰塔帕尔：和那些使他都有一个错误的结论呢？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：而事实上我们通过详细的模拟了。对于模拟例如，你可以找到热核装置所在的裂变装置被放置，你可以找到裂变装置所在的热核装置被放置。 ，你会得到一个更大的火山口现在因为产量较高。
卡兰塔帕尔：这是一个很重要的一点，你决策。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：是的。而裂变装置，是目前在热热坑放在现在少得多地面产生位移。
卡兰塔帕尔：因此，如果您放置在模拟热核装置所在的裂变装置被放置，你会得到一个更大的陨石坑 - 直径更接近到70米，博士Santhanam想看到的。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，我不记得有多少是但其实这是真实的。这已被验证的计算
卡兰塔帕尔：博士Santhanam还没有多一个热核装置相信失败的原因。他说，如果它成功了，无论是轴和A -帧将被完全摧毁。相反，在“印度教徒报”的写作，他说，轴仍然完全没有损坏和为A型架，他说，它仍然完全不变。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，我想你一定了解时地面运动的现象发生核试验。根据不同的埋葬，当然它是在中等埋藏深度，你可以得到表面上的一些表现。
你可以得到一个火山口，并有火山口，人们可以看到不同种类。你可以只得到一个土堆 - 地面上升并保持与另一个极端可以发泄出来。所以在热核装置的情况下，放置在坚硬的岩石，花岗岩 - 与深度，为45千吨的产量，人们希望只有一个土堆上升，这是发生了什么。
卡兰塔帕尔：而不是一个火山口？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：而不是一个陨石坑。
卡兰塔帕尔：关于轴和A -帧是什么？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，如果地面只是上升 - 事实上你可以看到一个断裂的周围是一个相当大的距离地面很多，所以很显然，有一个为一个相当大的距离地面开裂，但现象是，它作为一个土堆升起，然后是略有下降，但它仍然是一个土堆。因此，不存在损害到A帧的问题。
卡兰塔帕尔：所以实际上一个事实，即轴和A型架幸存完好，可以很容易解释。这不是证明了热核装置失败了？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：是的，是的，它一直被视为在详细模拟并顺便我必须告诉你，这种模拟，而我告诉你一下，是已实际在3 - D验证的情况下完成测试代码数据可从国外和验证，这些已在国际刊物上发表。
卡兰塔帕尔：那么你有过这些多重验证。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是正确的。
卡兰塔帕尔：显然你是医生Santhanam的怀疑不屑一顾。现在让我引述你什么你的前任，原子能委员会前主席Iyenger PK博士，一个在一份声明中，他在2009年9月24日发出的说。他说：“博士Santhanam最近的启示是硬道理，他与博克兰II，从DRDO方队有关的四国领导人的领导者之一，他一定要知道很多细节，特别是关于。 。地震测量如果他说，产量比预期的要低得多，这基本上没有陨石坑形成的，再有就是合理的关于热核试验的可信度相当怀疑的理由。“
是否担心你，你的前任似乎不同意你，但与Dr Santhanam同意吗？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，首先我尊重每个人的第一。我尊重医生Iyenger，我尊重医生Santhanam，但事实是，医生Iyenger无处在1998年的测试工作。他当然是在1974年测试的关键人物。此外，事实是，在1990年和1998年的测试，所有的工作是做掩护下 - 我们是在开不 - 我们需要的大量后勤支持，所有，所有正由DRDO提供。
但事情仍在做一个需要了解的基础。因此，假设医生Santhanam知道这一切都是事实并非如此。
卡兰塔帕尔：您正在两个要点。一个说，你是DRDO和博士Santhanam不知道一切 - 其实他是DRDO队长并不意味着他知道正在发生的一切。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：他知道他的职责范围内的一切。
卡兰塔帕尔：他需要的一切，但不知道？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是正确的。
卡兰塔帕尔：你也说，医生Iyenger是不完全的图片，因此他的意见不一定是有效的。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：他是在画面不及1998年的测试问题。
卡兰塔帕尔：所以他并不真正了解1998年的测试。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，他只知道尽可能已经出版，仅此而已。
卡兰塔帕尔：他的意见，因此不支持由知识和洞察力。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：好，这是为你判断。
卡兰塔帕尔：让我们钱包的信誉和周围的疑虑有所不同的方式在印度的热核威慑力。
医生说，这些怀疑Santhanam正式向政府提出了由DRDO早在1998年本身。而在由当时的国家安全顾问米什拉安排了会议，他们置之不理的方式其中博士Santhanam比较的轻薄语音投票排序。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：立即测试后，我们进行了两队目前的检讨：BARC团队以及DRDO团队。
我们着眼于由BARC团队所做的测量，我们在由DRDO团队所做的测量望去，我告诉你的结论和在该审查的基础上，很明显，我们凭什么能去的，什么结论，我们可以平局。
现在的问题是，如果仪器没有工作，哪里是由任何基于断言去的问题... ...什么是任何断言的依据？
卡兰塔帕尔：所以，当医生Santhanam说，DRDO的疑虑轻轻拨开，那是错误的。他们认为，他们进行了评估？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：我想是的。我认为他们进行了评价，这是正确的。
卡兰塔帕尔：他们被解雇，因为他们被发现有故障。他们不仅置之不理。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：不，他们不是置之不理。
卡兰塔帕尔：在这写博士Santhanam 11月15日2009近期对“芝加哥论坛报”的文章，他说：原子能署 - 向哪个部门你的当然秘书 - 其实隐藏的事实是从历届印度政府，议会和由印度人民。您如何回应这种指责？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，正如我刚才所说，我们也许是独一无二给予了最大的信息，并且也非常及时 - 后立即测试。
卡兰塔帕尔：没有隐瞒什么？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：有没有藏身。有什么可以透露的限制。这些都已经讨论了原子能委员会不是一个而是1998年后4测试会议。而有些人谁是知识。医生Ramanna是该委员会成员当时。那么，是藏？
卡兰塔帕尔：让我这样说：你可能不隐瞒事实的指控，但作为医生Santhanam争议已经出现，它的增长，它不会消失。许多人认为，只有这样，才能解决这个问题到现在组织的科学家同行小组，检讨1998年热核试验的结果。你是否同意？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，让我先重复我刚才所说。有哪一个已通过评估测试结果的方法。他们每个人本身就是一个专业化和有不同的群体，而不仅仅是个人，而是群体，这已在这些看去。事实上，这也是在有需要时方知的基础。现在，如果他们都来的结论，大体上是相似的，还有什么事情可以做在形成了科学家同行组条款？
卡兰塔帕尔：那么有没有对等体组再次检讨需要？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这就是我想说的。
卡兰塔帕尔：这个问题是决定性整理出来？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是正确的。这已是经过这个争议已经提出，并再次由原子能委员会审查，我们经历了纪录，该委员会又拿出一个权威的表。
卡兰塔帕尔：让我向你提出两个或三个关键问题。鉴于你已经缔结了若干评论，其中包括一个最近提出了质疑后，事实上，质疑不断。并给予大约有印度的热核试验之一，只怀疑我们是否需要更多的测试？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，我会说没有，因为重要的一点需要注意的是，该热的核试验，测试和裂变分千吨测试所有担任设计。他们是多种多样的。
在详细设计方面，其内容是完全不同的。因此，我们认为，目前已完成设计验证，并在此配置已经测试可以建立设备从低千吨不等一路200千吨。而这一种充分保证了威慑力。
卡兰塔帕尔：您是说，印度并不需要更多的热核试验，但事实是，所有既定的热核权力需要多个测试。印度能成为例外呢？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，如果你通过DIL Maange走多了，那是另一回事。但我们讨论的是哪里的知识基础已经扩大时说，能力扩大了，你进行设计，并证明你有信心，在该设计和测试的基础上，可以建立一个系统范围直到200千吨。
卡兰塔帕尔：我要挑上最后一点，你刚才提出的。由于怀疑继续下去，因为那里将要没有进一步的测试，你是不是说有任何进一步的测试需要 - 你能说，印度有一个可信的热核炸弹？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：当然。
卡兰塔帕尔：我们有一个可靠的热核炸弹？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：你为什么要使用单数？作出这样的复数。
卡兰塔帕尔：我之所以问是因为医生Santhanam在“印度教徒报”说，写热核装置尚未甚至11年后的测试weaponsied。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：他怎么知道？他没有参与。
卡兰塔帕尔：那么你是对我说，我们已经热核炸弹 - 在复数？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：是的。
卡兰塔帕尔：具有至少每45千吨的产量。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：远不止于此。
卡兰塔帕尔：比呢？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：是的。我告诉你，我们有一千吨至200千吨低威慑的可能性。
卡兰塔帕尔：所以当像前陆军参谋长，马利克将军说，那是因为在公共领域的疑虑，陆军希望的产量和印度的热核炸弹的疗效保证的人，你有什么答案呢？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：我认为这是保证。陆军应该完全有信心，保卫国家。有没有关于阿森纳在他们的指挥问题。
经过几个星期的疑问，现在是时候提出这样的问题：如何可信的是印度的热核的阻吓作用？这是问题的关键卡兰塔帕尔在本周的魔鬼代言人讨论了原子能委员会前主席，阿尼尔Kakodkar博士。
卡兰塔帕尔：博士Kakodkar，四大主导科学家 - 博士K Santhanam，博士PK艾扬格，博士和博士H塞特纳AN普拉萨德 - 提出了关于1998年印度的热核试验严重怀疑。
Santhanam博士说，我们有一个纯粹的事实依据，不仅是远低于设计生产热核装置产量的确凿证据，但它实际上失败了。你有你的手的问题？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：不，我认为这是一个完全错误的结论。热核试验的产量进行了验证，而不是一种方法，但对不同群体进行不同的原则，根据一些多余的方法。这些都被详细审查，其实我已经描述了1998年的测试，完美的，我该立场。
卡兰塔帕尔：我很高兴你开始讲的产量，因为这两个博士Santhanam博士和Iyenger质疑的热核试验产量。
医生Santhanam说，DRDO地震仪器测得的20-25千吨之间是巨大的投入由原子能委员会，这是45千吨出不同的东西要求的产量。你有多少信心的45千吨收益呢？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，让我先说，这个DAE和DRDO我们都作为一个团队一起工作。 DRDO并部署一些测量仪器，但事实是，地震仪器不工作。我自己已经审查后，立即测试的所有结果，我们得出的结论是没有工作的工具。
卡兰塔帕尔：博士Santhanam说，巴巴原子能中心接受了他们的原子弹，但不融合或热产生DRDO的工具和他们的估计。他说，怎么能说，文书工作在一种情况下，而不是别人呢？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，这不是真实的，因为仪器的测量和在那里的仪器所在地的地面运动 - 我们不得不分离出的资料，是来自热核，哪些是从裂变测试出来。因此，问题是我提出的是，地震仪器不工作。
因此，有没有对被测试的裂变权利和热核试验所产生的问题，因为任何错误的结论可以从这些文书或者方法绘制。
卡兰塔帕尔：但你有证据证明的热核试验产量为45千吨？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：是的。事实上，我们有什么范围内可以说是极限，我必须说清楚在这里，没有一个国家给了他们这么多的科学试验的细节，因为我们已经给出，这与我们有最大可能的清晰度出版。
卡兰塔帕尔：问题是，即使在1998年，外国显示器质疑热核试验产量。当时，印度的疑虑只表示在私下进行。现在，印度的疑虑已经迸发出的公开化，并陆续公开审理。
这岂不是担心你，这些疑虑继续 - 现在都在国外和国内 - 和他们有11年的持续？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，这是不幸的，但我并不担心，因为事实就是事实，也没有获得关于这个担心的问题。问题的关键是，已完成测量，他们已经完成 - 正如我前面提到的 - 由不同的群体。
人们谁开展地震仪器的测量是一个不同的组。人们谁开展放射化学仪器的测量是一个不同的组。还有其他方法，您可以使用，例如，地面运动模拟。这是另一个组和所有这些团体都来到他们的相互匹配自己的结论。
卡兰塔帕尔：而所有这些五六测量产生不同的方式得出的结论是，产量45热核装置千吨？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是正确的。
卡兰塔帕尔：那么在你心中有没有疑问没有？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：绝对不是。
卡兰塔帕尔：现在，医生Santhanam，除争议的产量，有其他理由相信，热核装置失败。他说，鉴于裂变装置，它产生了大约25千吨的产量，创造了一个直径25米的大坑，然后融合炸弹，产生了45千吨产量应该已经创建了一个直径约70米的弹坑。他说，这并不发生，其实有没有火山口的。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是一个外行的看它的方式。而事实上是裂变装置产量为15千吨，而不是25千吨。
卡兰塔帕尔：所以他的错，称这是25千吨？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是正确的，其次，虽然这两个装置分别相距约1.5公里，这个距离内的地质改变相当部分是由于层存在和他们的斜坡位，但更重要的是因为他们的深度有所不同。
因此，对这类设备的裂变放置在一个中等和实物的热核装置放置在另一种媒介是一种。
卡兰塔帕尔：所以其实你要说的是，医生Santhanam正在两个错误，可能使他们故意的。
所有他的夸大了裂变装置产量，其次他完全是无视事实，对融合安置地质非常不同的第一。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是正确的
卡兰塔帕尔：和那些使他都有一个错误的结论呢？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：而事实上我们通过详细的模拟了。对于模拟例如，你可以找到热核装置所在的裂变装置被放置，你可以找到裂变装置所在的热核装置被放置。 ，你会得到一个更大的火山口现在因为产量较高。
卡兰塔帕尔：这是一个很重要的一点，你决策。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：是的。而裂变装置，是目前在热热坑放在现在少得多地面产生位移。
卡兰塔帕尔：因此，如果您放置在模拟热核装置所在的裂变装置被放置，你会得到一个更大的陨石坑 - 直径更接近到70米，博士Santhanam想看到的。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，我不记得有多少是但其实这是真实的。这已被验证的计算
卡兰塔帕尔：博士Santhanam还没有多一个热核装置相信失败的原因。他说，如果它成功了，无论是轴和A -帧将被完全摧毁。相反，在“印度教徒报”的写作，他说，轴仍然完全没有损坏和为A型架，他说，它仍然完全不变。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，我想你一定了解时地面运动的现象发生核试验。根据不同的埋葬，当然它是在中等埋藏深度，你可以得到表面上的一些表现。
你可以得到一个火山口，并有火山口，人们可以看到不同种类。你可以只得到一个土堆 - 地面上升并保持与另一个极端可以发泄出来。所以在热核装置的情况下，放置在坚硬的岩石，花岗岩 - 与深度，为45千吨的产量，人们希望只有一个土堆上升，这是发生了什么。
卡兰塔帕尔：而不是一个火山口？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：而不是一个陨石坑。
卡兰塔帕尔：关于轴和A -帧是什么？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，如果地面只是上升 - 事实上你可以看到一个断裂的周围是一个相当大的距离地面很多，所以很显然，有一个为一个相当大的距离地面开裂，但现象是，它作为一个土堆升起，然后是略有下降，但它仍然是一个土堆。因此，不存在损害到A帧的问题。
卡兰塔帕尔：所以实际上一个事实，即轴和A型架幸存完好，可以很容易解释。这不是证明了热核装置失败了？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：是的，是的，它一直被视为在详细模拟并顺便我必须告诉你，这种模拟，而我告诉你一下，是已实际在3 - D验证的情况下完成测试代码数据可从国外和验证，这些已在国际刊物上发表。
卡兰塔帕尔：那么你有过这些多重验证。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是正确的。
卡兰塔帕尔：显然你是医生Santhanam的怀疑不屑一顾。现在让我引述你什么你的前任，原子能委员会前主席Iyenger PK博士，一个在一份声明中，他在2009年9月24日发出的说。他说：“博士Santhanam最近的启示是硬道理，他与博克兰II，从DRDO方队有关的四国领导人的领导者之一，他一定要知道很多细节，特别是关于。 。地震测量如果他说，产量比预期的要低得多，这基本上没有陨石坑形成的，再有就是合理的关于热核试验的可信度相当怀疑的理由。“
是否担心你，你的前任似乎不同意你，但与Dr Santhanam同意吗？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，首先我尊重每个人的第一。我尊重医生Iyenger，我尊重医生Santhanam，但事实是，医生Iyenger无处在1998年的测试工作。他当然是在1974年测试的关键人物。此外，事实是，在1990年和1998年的测试，所有的工作是做掩护下 - 我们是在开不 - 我们需要的大量后勤支持，所有，所有正由DRDO提供。
但事情仍在做一个需要了解的基础。因此，假设医生Santhanam知道这一切都是事实并非如此。
卡兰塔帕尔：您正在两个要点。一个说，你是DRDO和博士Santhanam不知道一切 - 其实他是DRDO队长并不意味着他知道正在发生的一切。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：他知道他的职责范围内的一切。
卡兰塔帕尔：他需要的一切，但不知道？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是正确的。
卡兰塔帕尔：你也说，医生Iyenger是不完全的图片，因此他的意见不一定是有效的。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：他是在画面不及1998年的测试问题。
卡兰塔帕尔：所以他并不真正了解1998年的测试。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，他只知道尽可能已经出版，仅此而已。
卡兰塔帕尔：他的意见，因此不支持由知识和洞察力。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：好，这是为你判断。
卡兰塔帕尔：让我们钱包的信誉和周围的疑虑有所不同的方式在印度的热核威慑力。
医生说，这些怀疑Santhanam正式向政府提出了由DRDO早在1998年本身。而在由当时的国家安全顾问米什拉安排了会议，他们置之不理的方式其中博士Santhanam比较的轻薄语音投票排序。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：立即测试后，我们进行了两队目前的检讨：BARC团队以及DRDO团队。
我们着眼于由BARC团队所做的测量，我们在由DRDO团队所做的测量望去，我告诉你的结论和在该审查的基础上，很明显，我们凭什么能去的，什么结论，我们可以平局。
现在的问题是，如果仪器没有工作，哪里是由任何基于断言去的问题... ...什么是任何断言的依据？
卡兰塔帕尔：所以，当医生Santhanam说，DRDO的疑虑轻轻拨开，那是错误的。他们认为，他们进行了评估？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：我想是的。我认为他们进行了评价，这是正确的。
卡兰塔帕尔：他们被解雇，因为他们被发现有故障。他们不仅置之不理。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：不，他们不是置之不理。
卡兰塔帕尔：在这写博士Santhanam 11月15日2009近期对“芝加哥论坛报”的文章，他说：原子能署 - 向哪个部门你的当然秘书 - 其实隐藏的事实是从历届印度政府，议会和由印度人民。您如何回应这种指责？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，正如我刚才所说，我们也许是独一无二给予了最大的信息，并且也非常及时 - 后立即测试。
卡兰塔帕尔：没有隐瞒什么？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：有没有藏身。有什么可以透露的限制。这些都已经讨论了原子能委员会不是一个而是1998年后4测试会议。而有些人谁是知识。医生Ramanna是该委员会成员当时。那么，是藏？
卡兰塔帕尔：让我这样说：你可能不隐瞒事实的指控，但作为医生Santhanam争议已经出现，它的增长，它不会消失。许多人认为，只有这样，才能解决这个问题到现在组织的科学家同行小组，检讨1998年热核试验的结果。你是否同意？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，让我先重复我刚才所说。有哪一个已通过评估测试结果的方法。他们每个人本身就是一个专业化和有不同的群体，而不仅仅是个人，而是群体，这已在这些看去。事实上，这也是在有需要时方知的基础。现在，如果他们都来的结论，大体上是相似的，还有什么事情可以做在形成了科学家同行组条款？
卡兰塔帕尔：那么有没有对等体组再次检讨需要？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这就是我想说的。
卡兰塔帕尔：这个问题是决定性整理出来？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：这是正确的。这已是经过这个争议已经提出，并再次由原子能委员会审查，我们经历了纪录，该委员会又拿出一个权威的表。
卡兰塔帕尔：让我向你提出两个或三个关键问题。鉴于你已经缔结了若干评论，其中包括一个最近提出了质疑后，事实上，质疑不断。并给予大约有印度的热核试验之一，只怀疑我们是否需要更多的测试？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，我会说没有，因为重要的一点需要注意的是，该热的核试验，测试和裂变分千吨测试所有担任设计。他们是多种多样的。
在详细设计方面，其内容是完全不同的。因此，我们认为，目前已完成设计验证，并在此配置已经测试可以建立设备从低千吨不等一路200千吨。而这一种充分保证了威慑力。
卡兰塔帕尔：您是说，印度并不需要更多的热核试验，但事实是，所有既定的热核权力需要多个测试。印度能成为例外呢？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：嗯，如果你通过DIL Maange走多了，那是另一回事。但我们讨论的是哪里的知识基础已经扩大时说，能力扩大了，你进行设计，并证明你有信心，在该设计和测试的基础上，可以建立一个系统范围直到200千吨。
卡兰塔帕尔：我要挑上最后一点，你刚才提出的。由于怀疑继续下去，因为那里将要没有进一步的测试，你是不是说有任何进一步的测试需要 - 你能说，印度有一个可信的热核炸弹？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：当然。
卡兰塔帕尔：我们有一个可靠的热核炸弹？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：你为什么要使用单数？作出这样的复数。
卡兰塔帕尔：我之所以问是因为医生Santhanam在“印度教徒报”说，写热核装置尚未甚至11年后的测试weaponsied。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：他怎么知道？他没有参与。
卡兰塔帕尔：那么你是对我说，我们已经热核炸弹 - 在复数？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：是的。
卡兰塔帕尔：具有至少每45千吨的产量。
阿尼尔Kakodkar：远不止于此。
卡兰塔帕尔：比呢？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：是的。我告诉你，我们有一千吨至200千吨低威慑的可能性。
卡兰塔帕尔：所以当像前陆军参谋长，马利克将军说，那是因为在公共领域的疑虑，陆军希望的产量和印度的热核炸弹的疗效保证的人，你有什么答案呢？
阿尼尔Kakodkar：我认为这是保证。陆军应该完全有信心，保卫国家。有没有关于阿森纳在他们的指挥问题。
阿尼尔Kakodkar（Marathi：अनिलकाकोडकर）是一位杰出的印度核科学家和机械工程师。他是印度原子能委员会和向印度政府秘书，原子能部的主席。在领先的印度的核计划，他是在巴巴原子能研究中心主任，特朗贝从1996-2000年。他被授予了帕德玛Vibhushan，印度的第二最高平民荣誉1月26日，2009年。
冠军自力更生
除了发挥在维护主权印度进行核试验的主要作用，博士Kakodkar是印度对钍自力更生作为核能燃料的冠军。
学术和科学事业
Kakodkar出生于1943年（1943年11月11日），在Barwani王侯的状态（现在的中央邦州）及夫人卡马拉Kakodkar先生Purushottam Kakodkar，既甘地自由战士。他曾在Barwani他的早期教育，直到移动后的预科学习到孟买。
高等教育
Kakodkar毕业于Ruparel学院，从VJTI，孟买大学，然后用机械工程学士学位，1963年。他于1964年的巴巴原子能研究中心（BARC）。他获得了英国诺丁汉大学于1969年在实验应力分析的硕士学位。
事业在BARC
他加入了BARC堆工程部，起到了设计和德鲁瓦反应堆，完全原创的，但高科技项目建设中的关键作用。他是对印度的和平在1974年和1998年核试验建筑师核心团队的一部分。此外，他领导了在印度的加压重水反应堆技术土著发展。他在在卡尔帕卡姆的两个反应堆的复兴和在Rawatbhata，在某一阶段对被注销的边缘，首台机组的工作是他的工程能力的例子。
1996年，他成为了巴巴原子能研究中心主任，自2000年，他领导的印度原子能委员会，也就是原子能部部长。
他已发表250多篇科学论文。
能源与和平核技术的未来
使印度完全自力更生的能源，特别是从廉价的国家钍资源，似乎是他的使命声明，他仍然以极大的奉献精神追求这个梦想。他，多年来，建成高度专业化的科学家和工程师主管反应堆工程方案团队。今天，他继续从事设计先进重水反应堆，它使用作为与作为驱动燃料钚的主要能源来源钍 - 铀233。独特的反应器系统，具有简化而安全的技术，将生成钍75％的电力。
如果Kakodkar的梦想成真，这将解决印度的能源危机。
在信誉良好的其他职位
他目前是主席，理事会，印度理工学院孟买局。
他是印度国家工程院院士，作为其在1999-2000年期间担任主席。
他是在印度科学院，中国科学院国家科学院，印度马哈拉施特拉邦和科学科学院院士。
他是国际核能研究院，世界创新基金会和理事会的世界核协会顾问委员会名誉委员。他是国际核安全咨询组（INSAG）的成员在1999-2002年
他是对的VJTI，孟买理事会
他目前是主席，理事会，为基础科学卓越中心，孟买
他目前是主席，理事会，[BR安贝德卡博士国立技术学院，贾朗达尔]
国家奖
帕德玛的Shri于1998年。
帕德玛Bhushan在1999年。
帕德玛Vibhushan在2009年。
其它奖项
平民的最高奖果阿国家Gomant Vibhushan奖（2010）
哈日庵聚会所Prerit维克拉姆萨拉巴伊奖（1988）
香港Firodia奖科学与技术卓越（1997）
罗克韦尔奖章的技术卓越（1997）
FICCI杰出贡献奖核科学与技术（1997-98）
ANACON - 1998寿命为核科学成就奖
印度科学大会协会的HJ巴巴纪念奖（1999-2000）
戈达瓦里Gaurav奖（2000）
Y. Nayudamma博士纪念奖（2002）
凯泰基金会的成就者为能源（2002）年度奖
Gujar玛莫迪创新的科学技术奖于2004年。
霍米巴巴终身成就奖2010年。
冠军自力更生
除了发挥在维护主权印度进行核试验的主要作用，博士Kakodkar是印度对钍自力更生作为核能燃料的冠军。
学术和科学事业
Kakodkar出生于1943年（1943年11月11日），在Barwani王侯的状态（现在的中央邦州）及夫人卡马拉Kakodkar先生Purushottam Kakodkar，既甘地自由战士。他曾在Barwani他的早期教育，直到移动后的预科学习到孟买。
高等教育
Kakodkar毕业于Ruparel学院，从VJTI，孟买大学，然后用机械工程学士学位，1963年。他于1964年的巴巴原子能研究中心（BARC）。他获得了英国诺丁汉大学于1969年在实验应力分析的硕士学位。
事业在BARC
他加入了BARC堆工程部，起到了设计和德鲁瓦反应堆，完全原创的，但高科技项目建设中的关键作用。他是对印度的和平在1974年和1998年核试验建筑师核心团队的一部分。此外，他领导了在印度的加压重水反应堆技术土著发展。他在在卡尔帕卡姆的两个反应堆的复兴和在Rawatbhata，在某一阶段对被注销的边缘，首台机组的工作是他的工程能力的例子。
1996年，他成为了巴巴原子能研究中心主任，自2000年，他领导的印度原子能委员会，也就是原子能部部长。
他已发表250多篇科学论文。
能源与和平核技术的未来
使印度完全自力更生的能源，特别是从廉价的国家钍资源，似乎是他的使命声明，他仍然以极大的奉献精神追求这个梦想。他，多年来，建成高度专业化的科学家和工程师主管反应堆工程方案团队。今天，他继续从事设计先进重水反应堆，它使用作为与作为驱动燃料钚的主要能源来源钍 - 铀233。独特的反应器系统，具有简化而安全的技术，将生成钍75％的电力。
如果Kakodkar的梦想成真，这将解决印度的能源危机。
在信誉良好的其他职位
他目前是主席，理事会，印度理工学院孟买局。
他是印度国家工程院院士，作为其在1999-2000年期间担任主席。
他是在印度科学院，中国科学院国家科学院，印度马哈拉施特拉邦和科学科学院院士。
他是国际核能研究院，世界创新基金会和理事会的世界核协会顾问委员会名誉委员。他是国际核安全咨询组（INSAG）的成员在1999-2002年
他是对的VJTI，孟买理事会
他目前是主席，理事会，为基础科学卓越中心，孟买
他目前是主席，理事会，[BR安贝德卡博士国立技术学院，贾朗达尔]
国家奖
帕德玛的Shri于1998年。
帕德玛Bhushan在1999年。
帕德玛Vibhushan在2009年。
其它奖项
平民的最高奖果阿国家Gomant Vibhushan奖（2010）
哈日庵聚会所Prerit维克拉姆萨拉巴伊奖（1988）
香港Firodia奖科学与技术卓越（1997）
罗克韦尔奖章的技术卓越（1997）
FICCI杰出贡献奖核科学与技术（1997-98）
ANACON - 1998寿命为核科学成就奖
印度科学大会协会的HJ巴巴纪念奖（1999-2000）
戈达瓦里Gaurav奖（2000）
Y. Nayudamma博士纪念奖（2002）
凯泰基金会的成就者为能源（2002）年度奖
Gujar玛莫迪创新的科学技术奖于2004年。
霍米巴巴终身成就奖2010年。
杯具啊，我就看懂24个字母
che 发表于 2011-6-27 21:57 ![]()
楼主是三哥？
经过几个星期的疑问，现在是时候提出这样的问题：如何可信的是印度的热核的阻吓作用？这是 ...
还是没看明白
楼主是三哥？
经过几个星期的疑问，现在是时候提出这样的问题：如何可信的是印度的热核的阻吓作用？这是 ...
还是没看明白drakan 发表于 2011-6-27 22:05 ![]()
还是没看明白
大家都议论说三哥的氢蛋失败了。但神油科学家说木问题，他说我那天用一个园子蛋引爆了另一个和这个园子蛋差不多大的氢蛋
还是没看明白
大家都议论说三哥的氢蛋失败了。但神油科学家说木问题，他说我那天用一个园子蛋引爆了另一个和这个园子蛋差不多大的氢蛋
翻译之后我更看不懂了
che 发表于 2011-6-27 22:08 ![]()
大家都议论说三哥的氢蛋失败了。但神油科学家说木问题，他说我那天用一个园子蛋引爆了另一个和这个园子蛋 ...
这个三哥太牛了
大家都议论说三哥的氢蛋失败了。但神油科学家说木问题，他说我那天用一个园子蛋引爆了另一个和这个园子蛋 ...
这个三哥太牛了看不懂的飘过
大家都议论说三哥的氢蛋失败了。但神油科学家说木问题，他说我那天用一个园子蛋引爆了另一个和这个园子蛋 ...
这个太狠了…
这个太狠了…
只能说，阿三的神油了不起啊抹了太猛，喝了比泡菜还给力看了翻译,我发觉我没学好的不只英语
没翻译前看懂了25个字母，翻译以后就都不懂了
让你不好好上学
真诚发问：我可以骂人吗？
India's Nuclear Weapons Program
Operation Shakti: 1998
"India is now a nuclear weapons state."
"We have the capacity for a big bomb now. Ours will never be weapons of aggression."
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, Thursday 14 May 1998
Despite the U.S. government's self-declared "surprise" at India's multiple tests in May 1998, India's march towards an openly declared nuclear capability underscored by new tests was clear for a number of years.
During the last several years the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party, or BJP) has emerged as the dominant power in domestic politics. One of its key platform issues has been its desire to make India an openly declared nuclear power. The BJP created a short-lived government for 13 days in May 1996, and it is now known that Vajpayee actually authorized nuclear tests at that time, and the devices got as far as being placed in the test shafts, before he called them off when it became evident that his government was unlikely to survive long enough to deal with the aftermath.
Two years later however, on 10 March 1998, the BJP achieved a strong electoral victory and finally succeeded in putting together a governing coalition of 13 (later 20) parties. The BJP wasted no time in making clear its intention to deploy nuclear weapons. On 18 March 1998, the day before he was sworn in as Prime Minister, PM-designate Vajpayee declared "There is no compromise on national security. We will exercise all options including nuclear options to protect security and sovereignty,". An official planning report further stated directly that the new BJP government intended to "re-evaluate the nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons".
Considering the numerous test preparations that had been detected over the past three years, and Vajpayee's 1996 actual test authorization which was undoubtedly known to U.S. intelligence by that time, and after such announcements there would seem to be little excuse for being "surprised" by subsequent events. The underlying reason seems to have been a very ill advised cut-back in the analysis of imagery of the Pokhran site, combined with greater stealth on the part of the Indians. Given the considerable activity at the site over the previous three years, and the intelligence that the CIA undoubtedly had by then that Vajpayee had actually ordered tests during his previous short-lived government, it was not a difficult assessment to realize that Pokhran should be watched more carefully after Vajpayee took office, rather than less. It appears that the one NIMA (National Imagery and Mapping Agency) assigned to the site actually did detect suspicious activity on the morning of May 11, 6 hours before the tests (and about the time they were originally scheduled for detonation) and was waiting for further review of his findings when the tests were announced.
The 1998 election (like all Indian national elections) was held in phases from 16 February to 7 March.
The BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party - the Indian People's Party) had been growing steadily in strength over the past decade, riding on a wave of ethnic-religious politics advocating Hindu-based nationalism. The BJP, and its allied parties the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) and RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) had been largely responsible for creating this religious separatism through agitation like the Ram Temple campaign, that had led to a mob assault on the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya and its destruction, followed by nation-wide rioting that had killed 3000.
The 1998 BJP campaign was marked by some very unfortunate grandstanding - like Prime Minister candidate Vajpayee's declaration on 25 February that a BJP government would "take back that part of Kashmir that is under Pakistan's occupation." An important part of the BJP platform was its declared intention to "exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons" - that is, to open deploy a nuclear arsenal. This was in keeping with the position that the BJP, its predecessor the Jana Sangh, and Vajpayee himself had held for 35 years that India should become an openly nuclear power to garner the respect on the world stage that India deserved. The BJP's declarations on the subject were toned down a bit from earlier years, a move that can be understood as an effort to make their program palatable to as large a segment of India's voting population as possible. The BJP had formed a 13 day government two years earlier, and needed all the support it could get to form a stable government.
On 10 March 1998 it was announced that the BJP had won 26 percent of the popular vote, and gained 250 seats in the Lok Sabha, 22 short of an outright majority. President Raman Narayanan gave Vajpayee the first opportunity to form a government, and after several days of negotiations he finally succeeded in putting together a governing coalition of 13 (later 20) parties. The BJP wasted no time in making clear its intention to deploy nuclear weapons. On 18 March 1998, the day before he was sworn in as Prime Minister, PM-designate Vajpayee declared "There is no compromise on national security. We will exercise all options including nuclear options to protect security and sovereignty,". An official planning report reiterated the campaign position that the new BJP government intended to "re-evaluate the nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons".
Prime Minister-Elect Vajpayee consulted with Abdul Kalam the day before he was sworn in to office and asked him to join the cabinet. Kalam declined, indicating that he was needed at his current post to support the nuclear program. It is possible that at this meeting Vajpayee indicated his intention to prepare for and conduct nuclear tests. Certainly Kalam, keenly aware of Vajpayee's previous near brush with testing anticipated that tests would be imminent, and would likely have brought the subject up. Vajpayee consulted again with both Kalam and AEC Chairman R. Chidambaram on 20 March. Chidambaram had declared in an interview only days before that nuclear tests were needed. Chidambaram briefed Vajpayee extensively on the nuclear program, and the devices that had been prepared; Kalam presented the status of the missile program. At the conclusion of the meeting Vajpayee told them to be ready to test, but made no committment to conduct tests. Accordingly, the test preparations began immediately after the meeting even though the tests had not yet been approved.
On 28 March the BJP-led coalition passed a vote of confidence, 275 to 260. This was the milestone that had prevented tests from being conducted by the BJP in 1996. The way was now clear to go forward. On 9 April Vajpayee met again with Kalam and Chidambaram and asked how long it would take to conduct tests, Kalam indicated that tests could be conducted 30 days from the decision to go ahead, Vajpayee told them to fix a date and coordinate it with Brajesh Mishra, Principal Secretary to PM Vajpayee (and an ardent advocate of nuclear armament for India). The next day, the scientists reviewed preparations at Pokhran. Thirty days from 10 April was 10 May, but President Narayanan was scheduled to be touring Latin America from 26 April and 10 May. Narayanan was not in the loop on nuclear tests, and it would have been diplomatically awkward to have him surprised by the tests, and the inevitable controversy while abroad. Further, attempting to accelerate the tests by testing before 26 April would not work since Chidambaram's daughter was getting married on 27 April. Chidambaram's absence at his own daughter's wedding and preparations would have been a red flag that something was afoot. Kalam and Chidambaram provided Mishra with the date 11 May as the earliest practical date. Mishra checked the date with Vajpayee who then gave the authorization for the tests.
Operation Shakti: 1998
"India is now a nuclear weapons state."
"We have the capacity for a big bomb now. Ours will never be weapons of aggression."
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, Thursday 14 May 1998
Despite the U.S. government's self-declared "surprise" at India's multiple tests in May 1998, India's march towards an openly declared nuclear capability underscored by new tests was clear for a number of years.
During the last several years the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party, or BJP) has emerged as the dominant power in domestic politics. One of its key platform issues has been its desire to make India an openly declared nuclear power. The BJP created a short-lived government for 13 days in May 1996, and it is now known that Vajpayee actually authorized nuclear tests at that time, and the devices got as far as being placed in the test shafts, before he called them off when it became evident that his government was unlikely to survive long enough to deal with the aftermath.
Two years later however, on 10 March 1998, the BJP achieved a strong electoral victory and finally succeeded in putting together a governing coalition of 13 (later 20) parties. The BJP wasted no time in making clear its intention to deploy nuclear weapons. On 18 March 1998, the day before he was sworn in as Prime Minister, PM-designate Vajpayee declared "There is no compromise on national security. We will exercise all options including nuclear options to protect security and sovereignty,". An official planning report further stated directly that the new BJP government intended to "re-evaluate the nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons".
Considering the numerous test preparations that had been detected over the past three years, and Vajpayee's 1996 actual test authorization which was undoubtedly known to U.S. intelligence by that time, and after such announcements there would seem to be little excuse for being "surprised" by subsequent events. The underlying reason seems to have been a very ill advised cut-back in the analysis of imagery of the Pokhran site, combined with greater stealth on the part of the Indians. Given the considerable activity at the site over the previous three years, and the intelligence that the CIA undoubtedly had by then that Vajpayee had actually ordered tests during his previous short-lived government, it was not a difficult assessment to realize that Pokhran should be watched more carefully after Vajpayee took office, rather than less. It appears that the one NIMA (National Imagery and Mapping Agency) assigned to the site actually did detect suspicious activity on the morning of May 11, 6 hours before the tests (and about the time they were originally scheduled for detonation) and was waiting for further review of his findings when the tests were announced.
The 1998 election (like all Indian national elections) was held in phases from 16 February to 7 March.
The BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party - the Indian People's Party) had been growing steadily in strength over the past decade, riding on a wave of ethnic-religious politics advocating Hindu-based nationalism. The BJP, and its allied parties the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) and RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) had been largely responsible for creating this religious separatism through agitation like the Ram Temple campaign, that had led to a mob assault on the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya and its destruction, followed by nation-wide rioting that had killed 3000.
The 1998 BJP campaign was marked by some very unfortunate grandstanding - like Prime Minister candidate Vajpayee's declaration on 25 February that a BJP government would "take back that part of Kashmir that is under Pakistan's occupation." An important part of the BJP platform was its declared intention to "exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons" - that is, to open deploy a nuclear arsenal. This was in keeping with the position that the BJP, its predecessor the Jana Sangh, and Vajpayee himself had held for 35 years that India should become an openly nuclear power to garner the respect on the world stage that India deserved. The BJP's declarations on the subject were toned down a bit from earlier years, a move that can be understood as an effort to make their program palatable to as large a segment of India's voting population as possible. The BJP had formed a 13 day government two years earlier, and needed all the support it could get to form a stable government.
On 10 March 1998 it was announced that the BJP had won 26 percent of the popular vote, and gained 250 seats in the Lok Sabha, 22 short of an outright majority. President Raman Narayanan gave Vajpayee the first opportunity to form a government, and after several days of negotiations he finally succeeded in putting together a governing coalition of 13 (later 20) parties. The BJP wasted no time in making clear its intention to deploy nuclear weapons. On 18 March 1998, the day before he was sworn in as Prime Minister, PM-designate Vajpayee declared "There is no compromise on national security. We will exercise all options including nuclear options to protect security and sovereignty,". An official planning report reiterated the campaign position that the new BJP government intended to "re-evaluate the nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons".
Prime Minister-Elect Vajpayee consulted with Abdul Kalam the day before he was sworn in to office and asked him to join the cabinet. Kalam declined, indicating that he was needed at his current post to support the nuclear program. It is possible that at this meeting Vajpayee indicated his intention to prepare for and conduct nuclear tests. Certainly Kalam, keenly aware of Vajpayee's previous near brush with testing anticipated that tests would be imminent, and would likely have brought the subject up. Vajpayee consulted again with both Kalam and AEC Chairman R. Chidambaram on 20 March. Chidambaram had declared in an interview only days before that nuclear tests were needed. Chidambaram briefed Vajpayee extensively on the nuclear program, and the devices that had been prepared; Kalam presented the status of the missile program. At the conclusion of the meeting Vajpayee told them to be ready to test, but made no committment to conduct tests. Accordingly, the test preparations began immediately after the meeting even though the tests had not yet been approved.
On 28 March the BJP-led coalition passed a vote of confidence, 275 to 260. This was the milestone that had prevented tests from being conducted by the BJP in 1996. The way was now clear to go forward. On 9 April Vajpayee met again with Kalam and Chidambaram and asked how long it would take to conduct tests, Kalam indicated that tests could be conducted 30 days from the decision to go ahead, Vajpayee told them to fix a date and coordinate it with Brajesh Mishra, Principal Secretary to PM Vajpayee (and an ardent advocate of nuclear armament for India). The next day, the scientists reviewed preparations at Pokhran. Thirty days from 10 April was 10 May, but President Narayanan was scheduled to be touring Latin America from 26 April and 10 May. Narayanan was not in the loop on nuclear tests, and it would have been diplomatically awkward to have him surprised by the tests, and the inevitable controversy while abroad. Further, attempting to accelerate the tests by testing before 26 April would not work since Chidambaram's daughter was getting married on 27 April. Chidambaram's absence at his own daughter's wedding and preparations would have been a red flag that something was afoot. Kalam and Chidambaram provided Mishra with the date 11 May as the earliest practical date. Mishra checked the date with Vajpayee who then gave the authorization for the tests.
The atmosphere was tense in the following few weeks leading up to Operation Shakti (Operation Power, the May 1998 nuclear test series). Pakistan's Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub (also referred to as Gohar Ayub Khan) had offered a "carrot" of soothing rhetoric on the day of Vajpayee's swearing in, saying at a Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that Pakistan would offer India "an agreement with India for an equal and mutual restraint in conventional, missile and nuclear fields."
The "stick" side of the Pakistani equation was reemphasized on 6 April when Pakistan tested a new missile, named Ghauri, with a range of 1500 km (900 miles) and a payload of 700 kg (though it flew only 800 km in this test). This missile program had been known since 1997, and Pakistan had hinted about the imminent test on 23 March, but the test came as a shock to India which had felt itself far ahead of Pakistan with the Agni program although this program had been dormant for four years now. This escalation of the strategic challenge fro Pakistan could only have strengthened Vajpayee's to conduct the tests.
In an inauspiciously timed visit, Bill Richardson, leading a high level U.S. delegation that visited New Delhi on 14 August, chose to take that opportunity to reassert the existence of a special relationship with Pakistan.
The next day, the Richardson delegation visited Pakistan. During the visit Dr. Abdul Qader Khan, the self-proclaimed father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, always ready to take the spotlight with inflammatory rhetoric, told the Urdu daily Ausaf on 15 April "We are ready to carry out nuclear explosion anytime and the day this political decision will be made, we will show the world," during an informal chat with journalists. "We have achieved uranium enrichment capability way back in 1978 and after that several times we asked different governments to grant us permission to carry out a nuclear test. But we did not get the permission," the daily quoted him as saying. Asked when Pakistan would carry out a nuclear test, Dr. Khan was quoted as having said, "Get permission from the government." Khan was not a spokesman for the government at the time, but he remained extremely influential and was still closely connected with the corridors of power in Pakistan.
And throughout the 52 day period between Vajpayees swearing-in and the tests, occasional artillery and small arms fire was exchanged between the two nations, as it has been for years, on the Siachen glacier, the world's highest and coldest battlefield.
On 4 May the colorful and controversial Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes reemphasized his views on nuclear arms, saying that ""My views have not changed after I became defense minister, ... I agree with our decision not to sign the CTBT or NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). We should not only keep the nuclear option open, but also think about exercising this option to make nuclear weapons". Only two days later Fernandes set off an international tiff with China when he declared China to be India's "potential enemy number one" and claimed that many tactical nuclear weapons were stationed on the Indian border. In retrospect these remarks by Fernandes seemed part of a deliberate strategy to prepare the ground for India's tests -- illustrating that India regards itself as acting on the world stage and facing threats from a recognized world power, rather than needing defenses against a regional state like Pakistan. In fact Fernandes, like the Defense Minister's who preceded him, was not in the loop regarding nuclear decisions. He was not on the very short list of government leaders who knew what was up.
1998 Weapon Development Team
Project Leaders:
Dr. Avil (Abdul) Pakir Jainulabdeen Kalam
Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister
Head of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO)
Dr. Rajagopala Chidambaram
Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
Chairman of the Department of Atomic energy (DAE)
Development and Test Teams
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Leads
Anil Kakodkar, Director of BARC
Satinder Kumar Sikka, Lead for Thermonuclear Weapon Development
M.S. Ramakumar, Director of Nuclear Fuel and Automation Manufacturing Group;
Lead for nuclear component manufacture
D.D. Sood, Director of Radiochemistry and Isotope Group;
Lead for nuclear material acquisition
S.K. Gupta, Solid State Physics and Spectroscopy Group;
Device design and assessment
G. Govindraj, Associate Director of Electronic and Instrumentation Group;
Lead for field instrumentation
DRDO Leads
K. Santhanam; lead for test site preparations
Chairman of the Department of Atomic energy (DAE)
The "stick" side of the Pakistani equation was reemphasized on 6 April when Pakistan tested a new missile, named Ghauri, with a range of 1500 km (900 miles) and a payload of 700 kg (though it flew only 800 km in this test). This missile program had been known since 1997, and Pakistan had hinted about the imminent test on 23 March, but the test came as a shock to India which had felt itself far ahead of Pakistan with the Agni program although this program had been dormant for four years now. This escalation of the strategic challenge fro Pakistan could only have strengthened Vajpayee's to conduct the tests.
In an inauspiciously timed visit, Bill Richardson, leading a high level U.S. delegation that visited New Delhi on 14 August, chose to take that opportunity to reassert the existence of a special relationship with Pakistan.
The next day, the Richardson delegation visited Pakistan. During the visit Dr. Abdul Qader Khan, the self-proclaimed father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, always ready to take the spotlight with inflammatory rhetoric, told the Urdu daily Ausaf on 15 April "We are ready to carry out nuclear explosion anytime and the day this political decision will be made, we will show the world," during an informal chat with journalists. "We have achieved uranium enrichment capability way back in 1978 and after that several times we asked different governments to grant us permission to carry out a nuclear test. But we did not get the permission," the daily quoted him as saying. Asked when Pakistan would carry out a nuclear test, Dr. Khan was quoted as having said, "Get permission from the government." Khan was not a spokesman for the government at the time, but he remained extremely influential and was still closely connected with the corridors of power in Pakistan.
And throughout the 52 day period between Vajpayees swearing-in and the tests, occasional artillery and small arms fire was exchanged between the two nations, as it has been for years, on the Siachen glacier, the world's highest and coldest battlefield.
On 4 May the colorful and controversial Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes reemphasized his views on nuclear arms, saying that ""My views have not changed after I became defense minister, ... I agree with our decision not to sign the CTBT or NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). We should not only keep the nuclear option open, but also think about exercising this option to make nuclear weapons". Only two days later Fernandes set off an international tiff with China when he declared China to be India's "potential enemy number one" and claimed that many tactical nuclear weapons were stationed on the Indian border. In retrospect these remarks by Fernandes seemed part of a deliberate strategy to prepare the ground for India's tests -- illustrating that India regards itself as acting on the world stage and facing threats from a recognized world power, rather than needing defenses against a regional state like Pakistan. In fact Fernandes, like the Defense Minister's who preceded him, was not in the loop regarding nuclear decisions. He was not on the very short list of government leaders who knew what was up.
1998 Weapon Development Team
Project Leaders:
Dr. Avil (Abdul) Pakir Jainulabdeen Kalam
Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister
Head of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO)
Dr. Rajagopala Chidambaram
Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
Chairman of the Department of Atomic energy (DAE)
Development and Test Teams
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Leads
Anil Kakodkar, Director of BARC
Satinder Kumar Sikka, Lead for Thermonuclear Weapon Development
M.S. Ramakumar, Director of Nuclear Fuel and Automation Manufacturing Group;
Lead for nuclear component manufacture
D.D. Sood, Director of Radiochemistry and Isotope Group;
Lead for nuclear material acquisition
S.K. Gupta, Solid State Physics and Spectroscopy Group;
Device design and assessment
G. Govindraj, Associate Director of Electronic and Instrumentation Group;
Lead for field instrumentation
DRDO Leads
K. Santhanam; lead for test site preparations
Chairman of the Department of Atomic energy (DAE)
The nuclear devices were moved from their vaults at the BARC complex in Mumbai in the early morning hours of 1 May, around 3 a.m., by four Army trucks under the command of Col. Umang Kapur of the DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organization). They were transported to Mumbai airport and flown at dawn in AN-32 transports to Jaisalmer airport, two hours away. An Army convoy of four trucks took the explosive devices to Pokhran, about an hours trip from the airport. Three trips were required to complete the delivery of the devices and associated equipment. The devices were delivered directly to the device preparation building which was designated Prayer Hall.
The Shakti Test Devices
Shakti I Two stage thermonuclear device with fusion boosted primary, intended for missile warhead;
test design yield 45 kt, with a 200 kt deployed yield
Shakti II Lightweight pure fission tactical bomb/missile warhead, 12 kt design yield
Shakti III Fission experimental device, reportedly made with reactor-grade plutonium.
Probably a fusion boosted design without the fusion fuel, 0.3 kt design yield
Shakti IV 0.5 kt experimental device
Shakti V 0.2 kt experimental device
Shakti VI Not fired; another low yield experimental device?
According to Chengappa the plutonium for the devices weighed 3 to 8 kg, depending of the device, and were colored gray due to the coating applied to contain the radioactivity (and no doubt to prevent oxidation of the plutonium). The explosives surrounding the cores was colored a dull orange.
Three laboratories of the DRDO were involved in designing, testing and producing components like advanced detonators, the implosion systems, high-voltage trigger systems. They were also responsible for weaponization -- systems engineering, aerodynamics, safety interlocks and flight trials.
The tests were organized into two groups that were fired separately, with all of the devices in a group fired at the same time. The first group consisted of the thermonuclear device, the fission bomb, and a sub-kiloton device, and two more sub-kiloton devices made up the second group.
The Shakti Test Devices
Shakti I Two stage thermonuclear device with fusion boosted primary, intended for missile warhead;
test design yield 45 kt, with a 200 kt deployed yield
Shakti II Lightweight pure fission tactical bomb/missile warhead, 12 kt design yield
Shakti III Fission experimental device, reportedly made with reactor-grade plutonium.
Probably a fusion boosted design without the fusion fuel, 0.3 kt design yield
Shakti IV 0.5 kt experimental device
Shakti V 0.2 kt experimental device
Shakti VI Not fired; another low yield experimental device?
According to Chengappa the plutonium for the devices weighed 3 to 8 kg, depending of the device, and were colored gray due to the coating applied to contain the radioactivity (and no doubt to prevent oxidation of the plutonium). The explosives surrounding the cores was colored a dull orange.
Three laboratories of the DRDO were involved in designing, testing and producing components like advanced detonators, the implosion systems, high-voltage trigger systems. They were also responsible for weaponization -- systems engineering, aerodynamics, safety interlocks and flight trials.
The tests were organized into two groups that were fired separately, with all of the devices in a group fired at the same time. The first group consisted of the thermonuclear device, the fission bomb, and a sub-kiloton device, and two more sub-kiloton devices made up the second group.
The thermonuclear device was emplaced in the shaft code named White House (over 200 m deep), while the Taj Mahal shaft (over 150 m deep) was assigned to the fission bomb, and Kumbhkaran to the first sub-kiloton shot. The other three shafts for the second test series were designated NT 1,2, and 3.
The Regiment 58 Engineers had learned a lot since 1995 about how to avoid detection by U.S. spy satellites. A lot of work was done at night, and heavy equipment was always returned to the same parking spot at dawn so that image analysts would conclude that they had never moved. Piles of sand were shaped to mimic the wind-aligned and shaped dune forms in the area. When cables were laid they were carefully covered and native vegetation replaced to conceal the digging.
The first three devices were emplaced on 10 May, the day before the tests. The shafts were L-shaped, with a horizontal chamber for the test device. The first device to be placed was the sub-kiloton device in the Kumbhkaran shaft. The Army engineers sealed the shaft at 8:30 p.m. Then the thermonuclear device was lowered in the White House shaft, sealing this shaft took until 4 a.m. the next morning. By then the atomic bomb was being emplaced in the Taj Mahal shaft. It was sealed at 7:30 a.m., just 90 minutes from the planned test time.
The actual timing of the tests were dependent on the local weather conditions. It was hot in the Thar Desert in early May, it reached 43 C on the day of the test. But the critical factor was the wind. Although the tests were underground, they were shallow tests and the sealing of the shaft could not be guaranteed to be leakproof (a number of shaft seal failures had occurred in the U.S. despite much deeper burials). Winds blowing toward inhabited areas, as occurred on the morning on 11 May were not acceptable. But by early afternoon the winds had died down and the scientists decided to go ahead with the tests. Prime Minister Vaypayee and Brajesh Mishra, his Principal Secretary, had waited at the official residence since at least 9 a.m. to hear the test results. Kalam called at 3 p.m. to tell the Prime Minister that the winds were dying down and the tests could be conducted during the next hour.
K. Santhanam of the DRDO, who was in charge of the test site preparations, gave the two keys that activated the test countdown to Vasudev, the range safety officer, who was responsible for verifying that all test indicators were normal. After checking the indicators, Vasudev handed one key each to a representative of BARC and of the DRDO, who together unlocked the countdown system. At 3:45 p.m. the three devices detonated.
The tests were conducted on the Buddhist festival day of Buddha Purnima, the same festival day on which the 1974 test was conducted. This appears to have been a coincidence, the tests having been conducted at the earliest date that they could be made ready, though it has been widely assumed to have been intentional.
The Regiment 58 Engineers had learned a lot since 1995 about how to avoid detection by U.S. spy satellites. A lot of work was done at night, and heavy equipment was always returned to the same parking spot at dawn so that image analysts would conclude that they had never moved. Piles of sand were shaped to mimic the wind-aligned and shaped dune forms in the area. When cables were laid they were carefully covered and native vegetation replaced to conceal the digging.
The first three devices were emplaced on 10 May, the day before the tests. The shafts were L-shaped, with a horizontal chamber for the test device. The first device to be placed was the sub-kiloton device in the Kumbhkaran shaft. The Army engineers sealed the shaft at 8:30 p.m. Then the thermonuclear device was lowered in the White House shaft, sealing this shaft took until 4 a.m. the next morning. By then the atomic bomb was being emplaced in the Taj Mahal shaft. It was sealed at 7:30 a.m., just 90 minutes from the planned test time.
The actual timing of the tests were dependent on the local weather conditions. It was hot in the Thar Desert in early May, it reached 43 C on the day of the test. But the critical factor was the wind. Although the tests were underground, they were shallow tests and the sealing of the shaft could not be guaranteed to be leakproof (a number of shaft seal failures had occurred in the U.S. despite much deeper burials). Winds blowing toward inhabited areas, as occurred on the morning on 11 May were not acceptable. But by early afternoon the winds had died down and the scientists decided to go ahead with the tests. Prime Minister Vaypayee and Brajesh Mishra, his Principal Secretary, had waited at the official residence since at least 9 a.m. to hear the test results. Kalam called at 3 p.m. to tell the Prime Minister that the winds were dying down and the tests could be conducted during the next hour.
K. Santhanam of the DRDO, who was in charge of the test site preparations, gave the two keys that activated the test countdown to Vasudev, the range safety officer, who was responsible for verifying that all test indicators were normal. After checking the indicators, Vasudev handed one key each to a representative of BARC and of the DRDO, who together unlocked the countdown system. At 3:45 p.m. the three devices detonated.
The tests were conducted on the Buddhist festival day of Buddha Purnima, the same festival day on which the 1974 test was conducted. This appears to have been a coincidence, the tests having been conducted at the earliest date that they could be made ready, though it has been widely assumed to have been intentional.
楼主你再这样，可别怪我用方言骂人了呀~~~~·
The Tests
Seismic data collected by stations outside of India have placed the total magnitude of the first event at 5.0 (+/- 0.4), making it one of the largest seismic events in the world during the 24 hr period in which it occurred. The measured seismic center of the triple event was located at 27.0716 deg N latitude, and 71.7612 deg E longitude, which places it only 2.8 km from the 1974 test site (which was at 27.095 deg N, 71.752 deg E). The general area of these tests is usually given as Pokharan (or Pokhran), a town about 25 km away. This is area is a military test range with four areas (A through D). The test sites are just outside the abandoned village of Malka, are 6 km to the northeast of the nearest inhabited village of Khetolai (population 1200), and 10 km south of Loharki, and are about 100 km from the Indian border with Pakistan.
The first group of three tests (Shakti I, II, and III) were reported to have a combined yield of about 55 (or 58) kilotons and consisted of a two stage thermonuclear weapon design (Shakti I) with a yield of 43 kt, +/- 3 kt, (also stated to be 43-45 kt), a 12 kt test of a light compact weaponized tactical fission bomb, and a 0.2 kt tactical fission weapon. There were three shafts located about 1 km from each other and 3.5 km from the control room. The Shakti I shaft was designated "White House" (also called "Whisky"), the Shakti II shaft was known as "Taj Mahal" (also called "Tango"), and the Shakti III shaft was called "Kumbhkaran". The shots were fired simultaneously. The second phase of two tests (Shakti IV and V) had yields of 0.5 and 0.3 kilotons, and were fired in shafts designated NT 1 and 2 (for Navtala, the area where they were dug). A third device and shaft (NT 3) was prepared but was not fired. The second group of shots was conducted to generate additional data for improved computer simulation of designs.
The claimed yields of these devices is not well supported by available evidence. Assigning yields to the different devices from direct outside measurement is impossible since only the total yield of all three can be measured. For detailed discussion of this see"What Are the Real Test Yields?".
Test: Shakti I
Time: 15:47:07 11 May 1998 (IST);
10:17:07 UCT (Indian Government), 10:13:42 UCT (USGS)
Location: Pokhran, Thar Desert, Rajasthan, India, 27.0716 deg N, 71.7612 deg E
Test Height and Type: Underground, more than -200 m
Yield: 30 kt est. (22-30 kt possible range; 43-45 kt claimed)
Test: Shakti II
Time: 15:47:07 11 May 1998 (IST);
10:17:07 UCT (Indian Government), 10:13:42 UCT (USGS)
Location: Pokhran, Thar Desert, Rajasthan, India, 27.0716 deg N, 71.7612 deg E
Test Height and Type: Underground, more than -150 m
Yield: 12 kt
Test: Shakti III
Time: 15:47:07 11 May 1998 (IST);
10:17:07 UCT (Indian Government), 10:13:42 UCT (USGS)
Location: Pokhran, Thar Desert, Rajasthan, India, 27.0716 deg N, 71.7612 deg E
Test Height and Type: Underground
Yield: 0.3 kt
Test: Shakti IV and V
Time: 12:21 13 May 1998 (IST);
6:51 13 May 1998 (UCT)
Location: Pokhran, Thar Desert, Rajasthan, India, 27.0716 deg N, 71.7612 deg E
Test Height and Type: Two shots, both shallow underground
Yield: < 0.1 kt each?? (0.5 kt and 0.3 kt claimed)
The Indian government held a triumphal press conference with the entire scientific and engineering leadership three days after the second group of tests. This conference was notable, even unprecedented, in the level of detail about the tests that was released - discussing yields and the general characteristics of the devices. By comparison the US and USSR/Russia has kept the exact yields and purpose the vast number underground shots dating back to the early 1960s classified up to the present day. In fact most of the information about the nature and intent of the test available almost three years after the tests were released at this press conference or in the few days following it. Most of the information was conveyed by two top officials -- Drs. Avil (Abdul) Pakir Jainulabdeen Kalam, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister and head of the DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organization), and Rajagopala Chidambaram, chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Department of Atomic energy (DAE).
The largest device tested, Shakti I, was a two-stage thermonuclear design using a boosted fission primary which Chidambaram claimed had a yield of 43 kt (also described as 43 kt +/- 3 kt). Shakti II, the next largest device, was a refined lightweight pure fission device with a yield of 12 kt. Shakti III the third device tested on 11 May was a 0.3 kt fission device using less-than-weapon grade plutonium. Both of the devices in the second test group, with yields of 0.5 and 0.3 kilotons, were experimental devices detonated to generate additional data for improved computer simulation of weapon designs.
On the other hand, there continues to be considerable controversy about the accuracy of this information, particularly regarding the yields of the thermonuclear device, and the second series of sub-kiloton shots. In summary the balance of the evidence indicates that the claimed yields are significantly overstated - particularly regarding the thermonuclear device, and the total yields of both test groups. The available information indicates that Shakti I could not have had a yield larger than 25 kt, but was at least 22 kt (based on Indian drilling data). The evidence offered by the Indian government to date to support the 43 kt yield claim is weak, in fact a plain reading of their own seismic evidence puts the yield at or below 25 kt. Accepting the radiological and photographic evidence for this second group of tests offered by BARC as valid, the complete absence of a seismic signal for theses shots defies explanation at the present time if the stated test time and yields are even is even remotely correct. BARC does not appear to have offered an explanation for this anomaly.
Based on this evidence the most plausible interpretation of the 11 May tests is that the fission bomb was successful and yielded 12 kt. The straightforward nature of this technology and the lengthy time India had to master it makes doubts about its performance difficult to support. The yield of the thermonuclear device was apparently 22-25 kt. This is at or above the expected yield range of a thermonuclear primary, so it appears that the fusion boosted device used for the primary was successful. The plausible yield for the secondary stage is from 10 to 15 kt, well below the 30 kt or so apparently expected by India. The 0.3 kt yield for the third device is appropriate for the unboosted yield of a boosted fission design - that is, a device that is fired without the deuterium-tritium boost gas. It suggests that India now as the ability to employ full yield fusion boosted weapons using less-than-weapon grade plutonium. This could be fuel grade plutonium as is produced by India's power reactors or perhaps an intermediate grade. In the first case all of India's considerable holdings of plutonium could be used for weapon manufacture, in the second case the stock of weapon grade material could be extended by mixing it with fuel grade plutonium.
The reasons given for the second group of tests are entirely credible and are consistent with the objectives of other nuclear weapons nations in recent testing activities (either nuclear tests prior to the CTBT signing, or sub-critical tests afterward). India's stated interest in gathering high quality physical data for use in simulations is quite consistent with a well planned weapon development effort.
The use of simultaneous detonations of multiple nuclear devices has been a routine practice by other nuclear weapons states. The principal purposes of this technique are to minimize the ability of other nations to collect intelligence data about the tests (ironically too successful, given India's subsequent and not entirely convincing efforts to publicize its test results), and to reduce the cost and difficulty of test preparations. In India's case the desire to minimize political repercussions and outside pressure also motivated a compressed schedule of simultaneous tests.
Corroboration of a sort for India's explanations for the different tests on 11 May was given immediately after they were fired, and four days before the official AEC/DRDO announcements, by commentary on their military significance offered by P.K. Iyengar, the former chairman of India's AEC. On 12 May he told Reuters in Mumbai (Bombay) that their differing sizes corresponded to three ways in which nuclear bombs might be used.
According to Iyengar, the smallest was the size that might be fired as an artillery shell or dropped from a combat support aircraft. The mid-size blast was from a standard fission device equivalent to about 12 kilotons -- the size that might be dropped from a bomber plane. The largest of the three warheads tests on Monday was not a full hydrogen bomb. Most of its 50 to 100 kiloton explosive force came from the primary, a fission device which serves as a trigger for the H-bomb's big fusion explosion. Iyengar said the device contained only a token amount of the hydrogen variant tritium. It showed that India's thermonuclear technology worked, but did not produce the megaton explosion typical of a full H-bomb.
""We need not go for a megaton explosion while testing an H-bomb," said Iyengar, one of the scientists involved in India's only other nuclear test, in 1974. "Such tests are required only if we are planning for a total destruction of the opposite side. They don't have relevance in our strategy.""
One technical issue that affects all three of the low yield tests, with yields of 0.2, 0.3, and 0.5 kilotons, is that the yields of low yield fission tests are very sensitive to physical parameters like the amount of fissile material present, the degree and uniformity of compression, and the nuclear properties of the materials. Even if the Indian designers have achieved very accurate control over the implosion process, without test data in this yield range to calibrate their models they would have difficulty predicting the exact yield of their devices. This of course is one reason for conducting these tests in the first place, but it also means that there is a good chance of overshooting or undershooting the target yields. Thus the intended yields of these devices may be significantly different than the yields produced, on the other hand if the advertised yields are the expected ones, then the actual ones may be significantly different.
Seismic data collected by stations outside of India have placed the total magnitude of the first event at 5.0 (+/- 0.4), making it one of the largest seismic events in the world during the 24 hr period in which it occurred. The measured seismic center of the triple event was located at 27.0716 deg N latitude, and 71.7612 deg E longitude, which places it only 2.8 km from the 1974 test site (which was at 27.095 deg N, 71.752 deg E). The general area of these tests is usually given as Pokharan (or Pokhran), a town about 25 km away. This is area is a military test range with four areas (A through D). The test sites are just outside the abandoned village of Malka, are 6 km to the northeast of the nearest inhabited village of Khetolai (population 1200), and 10 km south of Loharki, and are about 100 km from the Indian border with Pakistan.
The first group of three tests (Shakti I, II, and III) were reported to have a combined yield of about 55 (or 58) kilotons and consisted of a two stage thermonuclear weapon design (Shakti I) with a yield of 43 kt, +/- 3 kt, (also stated to be 43-45 kt), a 12 kt test of a light compact weaponized tactical fission bomb, and a 0.2 kt tactical fission weapon. There were three shafts located about 1 km from each other and 3.5 km from the control room. The Shakti I shaft was designated "White House" (also called "Whisky"), the Shakti II shaft was known as "Taj Mahal" (also called "Tango"), and the Shakti III shaft was called "Kumbhkaran". The shots were fired simultaneously. The second phase of two tests (Shakti IV and V) had yields of 0.5 and 0.3 kilotons, and were fired in shafts designated NT 1 and 2 (for Navtala, the area where they were dug). A third device and shaft (NT 3) was prepared but was not fired. The second group of shots was conducted to generate additional data for improved computer simulation of designs.
The claimed yields of these devices is not well supported by available evidence. Assigning yields to the different devices from direct outside measurement is impossible since only the total yield of all three can be measured. For detailed discussion of this see"What Are the Real Test Yields?".
Test: Shakti I
Time: 15:47:07 11 May 1998 (IST);
10:17:07 UCT (Indian Government), 10:13:42 UCT (USGS)
Location: Pokhran, Thar Desert, Rajasthan, India, 27.0716 deg N, 71.7612 deg E
Test Height and Type: Underground, more than -200 m
Yield: 30 kt est. (22-30 kt possible range; 43-45 kt claimed)
Test: Shakti II
Time: 15:47:07 11 May 1998 (IST);
10:17:07 UCT (Indian Government), 10:13:42 UCT (USGS)
Location: Pokhran, Thar Desert, Rajasthan, India, 27.0716 deg N, 71.7612 deg E
Test Height and Type: Underground, more than -150 m
Yield: 12 kt
Test: Shakti III
Time: 15:47:07 11 May 1998 (IST);
10:17:07 UCT (Indian Government), 10:13:42 UCT (USGS)
Location: Pokhran, Thar Desert, Rajasthan, India, 27.0716 deg N, 71.7612 deg E
Test Height and Type: Underground
Yield: 0.3 kt
Test: Shakti IV and V
Time: 12:21 13 May 1998 (IST);
6:51 13 May 1998 (UCT)
Location: Pokhran, Thar Desert, Rajasthan, India, 27.0716 deg N, 71.7612 deg E
Test Height and Type: Two shots, both shallow underground
Yield: < 0.1 kt each?? (0.5 kt and 0.3 kt claimed)
The Indian government held a triumphal press conference with the entire scientific and engineering leadership three days after the second group of tests. This conference was notable, even unprecedented, in the level of detail about the tests that was released - discussing yields and the general characteristics of the devices. By comparison the US and USSR/Russia has kept the exact yields and purpose the vast number underground shots dating back to the early 1960s classified up to the present day. In fact most of the information about the nature and intent of the test available almost three years after the tests were released at this press conference or in the few days following it. Most of the information was conveyed by two top officials -- Drs. Avil (Abdul) Pakir Jainulabdeen Kalam, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister and head of the DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organization), and Rajagopala Chidambaram, chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Department of Atomic energy (DAE).
The largest device tested, Shakti I, was a two-stage thermonuclear design using a boosted fission primary which Chidambaram claimed had a yield of 43 kt (also described as 43 kt +/- 3 kt). Shakti II, the next largest device, was a refined lightweight pure fission device with a yield of 12 kt. Shakti III the third device tested on 11 May was a 0.3 kt fission device using less-than-weapon grade plutonium. Both of the devices in the second test group, with yields of 0.5 and 0.3 kilotons, were experimental devices detonated to generate additional data for improved computer simulation of weapon designs.
On the other hand, there continues to be considerable controversy about the accuracy of this information, particularly regarding the yields of the thermonuclear device, and the second series of sub-kiloton shots. In summary the balance of the evidence indicates that the claimed yields are significantly overstated - particularly regarding the thermonuclear device, and the total yields of both test groups. The available information indicates that Shakti I could not have had a yield larger than 25 kt, but was at least 22 kt (based on Indian drilling data). The evidence offered by the Indian government to date to support the 43 kt yield claim is weak, in fact a plain reading of their own seismic evidence puts the yield at or below 25 kt. Accepting the radiological and photographic evidence for this second group of tests offered by BARC as valid, the complete absence of a seismic signal for theses shots defies explanation at the present time if the stated test time and yields are even is even remotely correct. BARC does not appear to have offered an explanation for this anomaly.
Based on this evidence the most plausible interpretation of the 11 May tests is that the fission bomb was successful and yielded 12 kt. The straightforward nature of this technology and the lengthy time India had to master it makes doubts about its performance difficult to support. The yield of the thermonuclear device was apparently 22-25 kt. This is at or above the expected yield range of a thermonuclear primary, so it appears that the fusion boosted device used for the primary was successful. The plausible yield for the secondary stage is from 10 to 15 kt, well below the 30 kt or so apparently expected by India. The 0.3 kt yield for the third device is appropriate for the unboosted yield of a boosted fission design - that is, a device that is fired without the deuterium-tritium boost gas. It suggests that India now as the ability to employ full yield fusion boosted weapons using less-than-weapon grade plutonium. This could be fuel grade plutonium as is produced by India's power reactors or perhaps an intermediate grade. In the first case all of India's considerable holdings of plutonium could be used for weapon manufacture, in the second case the stock of weapon grade material could be extended by mixing it with fuel grade plutonium.
The reasons given for the second group of tests are entirely credible and are consistent with the objectives of other nuclear weapons nations in recent testing activities (either nuclear tests prior to the CTBT signing, or sub-critical tests afterward). India's stated interest in gathering high quality physical data for use in simulations is quite consistent with a well planned weapon development effort.
The use of simultaneous detonations of multiple nuclear devices has been a routine practice by other nuclear weapons states. The principal purposes of this technique are to minimize the ability of other nations to collect intelligence data about the tests (ironically too successful, given India's subsequent and not entirely convincing efforts to publicize its test results), and to reduce the cost and difficulty of test preparations. In India's case the desire to minimize political repercussions and outside pressure also motivated a compressed schedule of simultaneous tests.
Corroboration of a sort for India's explanations for the different tests on 11 May was given immediately after they were fired, and four days before the official AEC/DRDO announcements, by commentary on their military significance offered by P.K. Iyengar, the former chairman of India's AEC. On 12 May he told Reuters in Mumbai (Bombay) that their differing sizes corresponded to three ways in which nuclear bombs might be used.
According to Iyengar, the smallest was the size that might be fired as an artillery shell or dropped from a combat support aircraft. The mid-size blast was from a standard fission device equivalent to about 12 kilotons -- the size that might be dropped from a bomber plane. The largest of the three warheads tests on Monday was not a full hydrogen bomb. Most of its 50 to 100 kiloton explosive force came from the primary, a fission device which serves as a trigger for the H-bomb's big fusion explosion. Iyengar said the device contained only a token amount of the hydrogen variant tritium. It showed that India's thermonuclear technology worked, but did not produce the megaton explosion typical of a full H-bomb.
""We need not go for a megaton explosion while testing an H-bomb," said Iyengar, one of the scientists involved in India's only other nuclear test, in 1974. "Such tests are required only if we are planning for a total destruction of the opposite side. They don't have relevance in our strategy.""
One technical issue that affects all three of the low yield tests, with yields of 0.2, 0.3, and 0.5 kilotons, is that the yields of low yield fission tests are very sensitive to physical parameters like the amount of fissile material present, the degree and uniformity of compression, and the nuclear properties of the materials. Even if the Indian designers have achieved very accurate control over the implosion process, without test data in this yield range to calibrate their models they would have difficulty predicting the exact yield of their devices. This of course is one reason for conducting these tests in the first place, but it also means that there is a good chance of overshooting or undershooting the target yields. Thus the intended yields of these devices may be significantly different than the yields produced, on the other hand if the advertised yields are the expected ones, then the actual ones may be significantly different.
2011-6-30 19:26 上传
Why the US missed India's nuclear tests
Submitted by Mr. S.S. Vasan (May 13, 1998)
WASHINGTON, May 12 - Despite a $27 billion budget and a galaxy of spy satellites, U.S. Intelligence agencies failed to detect India's preparation for Monday's nuclear blast. Why? U.S. officials are blaming it on a leak to The New York Times. Senior Intelligence and military officials tell NBC News that India put its nuclear testing equipment underground in 1996 following a leak to The New York Times that U.S. spy satellites were monitoring that nation's nuclear test site.
"There was a leak that we knew would have a reaction and it did," said one senior intelligence official. "We watched as they put it underground... We warned back then that India now had the capability to test very quickly and predicted that we wouldn't be able to tell."
The Times report ran Dec. 14, 1995, and quoted unnamed government officials as saying satellites had recorded activity in western India that suggested a test might be imminent. No tests occurred and an Indian government spokesman said the Times report was "highly speculative." As a result, said officials, India was able to very "quickly and subtly" make preparations for the test of three nuclear devices Monday.
In fact, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger told reporters the United States still had no confirmation of the test nearly 12 hours after the blast occurred. India calculated the orbits of spy satellites and then moved equipment at times when they believed nothing was overhead. India, several officials noted, has long had a space program and is capable of determining what satellites are in which orbit. "They were in our blind spot," said a senior military official. Moreover, intelligence officials note that the Indian nuclear weapons program is the "most secretive" of all Third World programs. "We know more about the North Korean program than we do about the Indian program."
Satellite Imaging Capability
The reasons, say officials in both Washington and New Delhi, are varied. India has its own satellite-imaging capability, which gives it an understanding of what can and can't be seen from space. It's nuclear program is kept separate from its military, which like many militaries is prone to boasting and leaking. And unlike many programs, India's is not as dependent on outside help. India has a large pool of trained nuclear scientists and electrical engineers and an industrial infrastructure capable of producing key equipment. Much U.S. intelligence on other nations' nuclear programs is derived from electronic eavesdropping on sales of equipment related to weapons development. India has prevented Western intelligence from recruiting spies in India by an aggressive program of counterintelligence that includes surveillance and even attempted recruitment of diplomats and suspected agents. "They are very, very good," said one official. "Remember, this is the same country that produced the scientists who designed the Pentium chips," added an official. "They don't need a lot of outside help. They can do it on their own."
Televised Announcement
CIA officials say the United States did not know anything about the tests until Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced the tests on television Monday morning, four hours after they had taken place. The announcement even preceded analysis of the seismic data on the tests. "A lot of people had their hair on fire," said one intelligence official. Intelligence officials say policy officials deserve some of the blame for the tests, noting that intelligence officials have repeatedly warned that India's Hindu Nationalist BJP party was serious about "going nuclear." Bill Richardson, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, told the Pakistani government last month that he was impressed with BJP "restraint" when he met with party officials prior to his visit to Islamabad. "The U.S. charge d'affaires got his butt chewed by the Pakistanis last night," an official noted, saying that the United States should have known of the Indian plan and that the tests proved there was little restraint in New Delhi.
Clinton Warned
The Pakistani ambassador to the United States said Tuesday that his prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, had warned President Bill Clinton of India's intentions, if not its specific plans. "South Asia has been on the back burner in this administration," said another official. "They have taken Indian restraint for granted and didn't take the BJP threats seriously." As for why India tested the weapons now, the intelligence assessment is that the tests were driven more by domestic political concerns, rather than any action by Pakistan. "The BJP couldn't get budget through by the end of the month without something to help them. If the budget deal fell through, they would have had to call new elections," said a senior intelligence official. "It was done clearly for nationalistic and domestic political concerns."
Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence officials say that in spite of Pakistani claims that it will match India's nuclear tests, there are no indications that Pakistan is preparing for such a test. The United States has moved its satellites and increased electronic surveillance to monitor Pakistan's nuclear test site in the Chagai Hills in the desert of western Pakistan. Officials note that Sharif is scheduled to return to Islamabad quickly from a trip to Kazakhstan. Once home, say officials, the United States expects some decisions. U.S. officials expect that if the Pakistanis don't detonate a nuclear device, they will probably again test the Ghauri missile, which is nuclear-capable. Pakistan first tested the missile, which it bought from North Korea, the first week of April.
Submitted by Mr. S.S. Vasan (May 13, 1998)
WASHINGTON, May 12 - Despite a $27 billion budget and a galaxy of spy satellites, U.S. Intelligence agencies failed to detect India's preparation for Monday's nuclear blast. Why? U.S. officials are blaming it on a leak to The New York Times. Senior Intelligence and military officials tell NBC News that India put its nuclear testing equipment underground in 1996 following a leak to The New York Times that U.S. spy satellites were monitoring that nation's nuclear test site.
"There was a leak that we knew would have a reaction and it did," said one senior intelligence official. "We watched as they put it underground... We warned back then that India now had the capability to test very quickly and predicted that we wouldn't be able to tell."
The Times report ran Dec. 14, 1995, and quoted unnamed government officials as saying satellites had recorded activity in western India that suggested a test might be imminent. No tests occurred and an Indian government spokesman said the Times report was "highly speculative." As a result, said officials, India was able to very "quickly and subtly" make preparations for the test of three nuclear devices Monday.
In fact, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger told reporters the United States still had no confirmation of the test nearly 12 hours after the blast occurred. India calculated the orbits of spy satellites and then moved equipment at times when they believed nothing was overhead. India, several officials noted, has long had a space program and is capable of determining what satellites are in which orbit. "They were in our blind spot," said a senior military official. Moreover, intelligence officials note that the Indian nuclear weapons program is the "most secretive" of all Third World programs. "We know more about the North Korean program than we do about the Indian program."
Satellite Imaging Capability
The reasons, say officials in both Washington and New Delhi, are varied. India has its own satellite-imaging capability, which gives it an understanding of what can and can't be seen from space. It's nuclear program is kept separate from its military, which like many militaries is prone to boasting and leaking. And unlike many programs, India's is not as dependent on outside help. India has a large pool of trained nuclear scientists and electrical engineers and an industrial infrastructure capable of producing key equipment. Much U.S. intelligence on other nations' nuclear programs is derived from electronic eavesdropping on sales of equipment related to weapons development. India has prevented Western intelligence from recruiting spies in India by an aggressive program of counterintelligence that includes surveillance and even attempted recruitment of diplomats and suspected agents. "They are very, very good," said one official. "Remember, this is the same country that produced the scientists who designed the Pentium chips," added an official. "They don't need a lot of outside help. They can do it on their own."
Televised Announcement
CIA officials say the United States did not know anything about the tests until Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced the tests on television Monday morning, four hours after they had taken place. The announcement even preceded analysis of the seismic data on the tests. "A lot of people had their hair on fire," said one intelligence official. Intelligence officials say policy officials deserve some of the blame for the tests, noting that intelligence officials have repeatedly warned that India's Hindu Nationalist BJP party was serious about "going nuclear." Bill Richardson, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, told the Pakistani government last month that he was impressed with BJP "restraint" when he met with party officials prior to his visit to Islamabad. "The U.S. charge d'affaires got his butt chewed by the Pakistanis last night," an official noted, saying that the United States should have known of the Indian plan and that the tests proved there was little restraint in New Delhi.
Clinton Warned
The Pakistani ambassador to the United States said Tuesday that his prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, had warned President Bill Clinton of India's intentions, if not its specific plans. "South Asia has been on the back burner in this administration," said another official. "They have taken Indian restraint for granted and didn't take the BJP threats seriously." As for why India tested the weapons now, the intelligence assessment is that the tests were driven more by domestic political concerns, rather than any action by Pakistan. "The BJP couldn't get budget through by the end of the month without something to help them. If the budget deal fell through, they would have had to call new elections," said a senior intelligence official. "It was done clearly for nationalistic and domestic political concerns."
Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence officials say that in spite of Pakistani claims that it will match India's nuclear tests, there are no indications that Pakistan is preparing for such a test. The United States has moved its satellites and increased electronic surveillance to monitor Pakistan's nuclear test site in the Chagai Hills in the desert of western Pakistan. Officials note that Sharif is scheduled to return to Islamabad quickly from a trip to Kazakhstan. Once home, say officials, the United States expects some decisions. U.S. officials expect that if the Pakistanis don't detonate a nuclear device, they will probably again test the Ghauri missile, which is nuclear-capable. Pakistan first tested the missile, which it bought from North Korea, the first week of April.
ktown 发表于 2011-6-30 19:33 ![]()
Why the US missed India's nuclear tests
Submitted by Mr. S.S. Vasan (May 13, 1998)
干，尼玛你就不能发中文，别在这装！你这中士是怎么灌出来的
Why the US missed India's nuclear tests
Submitted by Mr. S.S. Vasan (May 13, 1998)
干，尼玛你就不能发中文，别在这装！你这中士是怎么灌出来的
一下可以放完的屁，拉那么长的放，神油抹到屁眼上了？？？
大家表生气啊，坐等翻译帝和概括帝。
肾虚道长 发表于 2011-6-30 19:37 ![]()
干，尼玛你就不能发中文，别在这装！你这中士是怎么灌出来的
楼主说他的电脑没法输入中文，且文章难度不高，有兴趣的话慢慢看可以看懂。大热天的别这么着急上火的，待会就有筒子大概的翻译下中心思想了。
干，尼玛你就不能发中文，别在这装！你这中士是怎么灌出来的
楼主说他的电脑没法输入中文，且文章难度不高，有兴趣的话慢慢看可以看懂。大热天的别这么着急上火的，待会就有筒子大概的翻译下中心思想了。
地下核爆,计算监视卫星轨道,so 躲过了md的监测.玩笑这么开,是在鄙视大家的智商么?
不过可以肯定的是印度希望其他几个核大国承认他的核地位.大口水仗
不过可以肯定的是印度希望其他几个核大国承认他的核地位.大口水仗
ktown 发表于 2011-6-27 21:56 ![]()
sorry, now I am using a computer which has not chinese input, so I have to copy the original article ...
你英语还差！
哥我看到满篇的字母就头晕了啊！
sorry, now I am using a computer which has not chinese input, so I have to copy the original article ...
你英语还差！
哥我看到满篇的字母就头晕了啊！
Indien–Elefant auf einem Bein?
von Ralf Ostner
Neben China ist Indiens Aufstieg zu einer Großmacht die Perspektive, die Strategen am meisten in Asien beschäftigt hält. In letzter Zeit werden jedoch Bedenken geäußert, ob Indien die militärischen Bedrohungen richtig definiert hat und ob sich das enorme Wirtschaftswachstum, das eine Modernisierung und Aufrüstung des indischen Militärs zur Folge hat, auch effektiv in militärische Macht umsetzt. Vor allem zwei Beiträge beschäftigten sich mit diesen Fragen. Zum einen:
Ein programmatischer Artikel in Forbes India „Seven Security Nightmares India must prepare for“ (http://business.in.com/article/india-and-the-world/seven-security-nightmares-india-must-prepare-for/16512/0),
bei dem es um mögliche Bedrohungsszenarien geht und um die Frage, ob Indien hierfür ausreichend darauf vorbereitet ist. Der zweite Beitrag ist das Buch der Brookings-Mitarbeiter Stephen P. Cohen und Sunil Dasgupta „Arming without Aiming“ (Rüsten ohne Zielen), dessen Kurzfassung in dem Artikel „The Drag on India´s Military Growth“ lesbar ist. (http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/09_india_cohen_dasgupta.aspx)
Die 7 Alpträume Indiens
In dem Forbes India-Artikel wird festgestellt, dass sich Indiens Machthaber von dem Atomtest 1998 einen Zugewinn an Sicherheit versprochen hätten, die letzten 12 Jahre aber die Feindseligkeiten gegenüber Indien zugenommen hätten.
Als erste wesentliche zukünftige Gefahr sehen die Autoren, dass Pakistans Nuklearkapazitäten in die Hände von Schurkenstaaten und Terroristen fallen könnten. Schon jetzt sei Pakistan eine prinzipielle Quelle für die Proliferation von Nuklearwaffen an Schurkenstaaten und dies sei erst die Friedenszeit. Bei einem politischen „meltdown“ Pakistans bestünde die Gefahr, dass Atomwaffen auch in die Hände Al Kaidas fallen würden, welches Indien als expliziten Feind ausersehen hat.
“In that event, India’s interests lie in joining international efforts and providing logistics support to secure Pakistan’s nuclear warheads, says an ICRIER paper ‘Conventional Threats to India’s National Security’ authored by Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. A more radical situation could emerge if the US and Israel decide to launch a joint operation to “take out” the nuclear facilities when terrorists begin controlling them. The second situation seems extremely unlikely, though.”
Die zweite wesentliche Gefahr besteht für die Autoren darin, dass der War on Terror verebbt und die Taliban in Afghanistan zurückkehren und die pakistanische Taliban die Macht in Pakistan erlangen, womit Indien eine direkte Grenze zum Terrorismus hätte. Hierfür gelte es ein Netzwerk von Partnern zu entwickeln, das eine integrierte Antwort auf diese Bedrohung biete. Indien könnte einen Botschafter für Counter-terrorism ernennen, der die internationale Debatte zugunsten Indiens beeinflusst. Desweiteren gibt es Vorschläge aus Israel, dass Indien mit Hilfe von Staaten wie Israel seine Counter-terrorism-Fähigkeiten erhöht.
Die dritte wesentliche Gefahr sei, dass China Indien einkreist und einen begrenzten Krieg beginnt. Die ungelösten Grenzfragen mit China und die undemarkierte Line of Actual Control (LAC) an der indisch-tibetischen Grenze seien kein Beitrag für den langfristigen Frieden zwischen Asiens beiden Giganten.
“The next major incident on the LAC could lead to a localised border conflict as either Indian patience with Chinese intransigence wears thin or the Chinese look at Indian attempts to build infrastructure and develop the border areas as the adoption of an aggressive forward posture. Hence, in the foreseeable future, a limited border war between the two cannot be entirely ruled out.”
Auch die sinochinesischen maritime Beziehungen seien nicht frei von Spannungen, vor allem seit China bei seiner “String-of-Pearl”-Strategie nun auch Hafenanlagen rund um Indien herum in Hangyi, Hambantoa, Gwadar und auf den Malediven ersteht. Während schon jetzt chinesische Nuklear-U-Boote im Norden des Indischen Ozeans operieren, würde Indiens Unsicherheit erhöht, sollte China seine maritime Präsenz im Indischen Ozean mittels Militärschiffen und Hafenanlagen ausbauen.
Ebenso sorgten chinesische Aktionen und Forderungen gegenüber der indischen Provinz Arunachal Pradesh für ständige Spannungen. Zwar wäre die bisherige chinesische Strategie, das Boot nicht zu hart zu schaukeln, aber es behalte sich vor, den Zustand jederzeit zu ändern, wenn es ihm genehm sei. Indiens Außenhandel mit China sei keine Gewähr, China hier abzuschrecken, weswegen Indien gleichzeitig seine militärischen Kapazitäten ausbauen müsste.
Das nächste Bedrohungsszenario beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, was passieren würde, wenn Indiens atomare Abschreckungsstrategie nicht wirken sollte. Die Autoren sind der Ansicht, dass Indiens Nuklearabschreckung jegliche Glaubwürdigkeit fehlen würde. Zum einen fehlten interkontinentale Raketen, d.h viele Gebiete der potentiellen Gegner lägen außerhalb der Reichweite einer indischen Abschreckung. Die Agniraketen seien noch nicht wirklich getestet — kurz: Indien besitze nicht einmal die Voraussetzung für eine minimale nukleare Abschreckung:
“At a maximum of 80, the number of warheads available to India does not fulfil even the low-end requirements of minimum deterrence. Add to all this the lingering doubts over the efficacy of the thermonuclear device tested in 1998. The outside world doesn’t believe India is ready to respond to a nuclear conflagration.”
Pakistan sei wesentlich aggressiver, zudem kontrolliere — anders als in Indien — das Militär die Atomwaffen. Pakistan hätte genug spaltbares Material für 70 bis 115 nukleare Sprengköpfe, schließe sehr schnell die mengenmäßige Lücke bei nuklearen Sprengköpfen und könnte Indien in diesem Gebiet sogar überrunden.
China hätte ca. 400 Atomsprengköpfe, die jeden Winkel Indiens erreichen könnten.Zwar halte China an einer „No-first-Use″-Politik fest, aber diese Generosität könnte es möglicherweise im Falle Indiens missen lassen, zumal China Indien auch nicht als Atommacht ansieht und sich kontinuierlich weigert gegenseitige vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen auf dem Gebiet der nuklearen Risikominimierung zu ergreifen.
Nach diesen vor allem außenpolitischen Bedrohungen wenden sich die Autoren den innenpolitischen Gefahren zu. Hier rangiert die maoistische Guerillabewegung der Naxaliten ganz oben auf der Prioritätenliste. 194 Distrike von 22 Staaten seien gegenwärtig von den Naxaliten betroffen — wenngleich in unterschiedlichem Ausmaß. Die Naxaliten seien äußerst erfolgreich, würden unterschätzt und ihr Einfluss beschränke sich — wie fälschlicherweise angenommen — bei weitem nicht nur auf die sichtbare Gewalt, die sie ausüben. Die Zentral- und Provinzregierungen würden bisher unkoordiniert vorgehen und die nachrichtendienstliche Zusammenarbeit sei kläglich. Nötig sei ein umfassender counter-insurgency-Ansatz, der die Wiederherstellung von Staatlichkeit, vor allem des Rechtssystems und auch Sozialprogramme und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung vorsieht:
“The restoration of the authority and functions of governance, including development, health, education and basic social and human security, is imperative, and must constitute an integral part of any comprehensive approach to counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. This can only be done after the restoration of a modicum of law and order, and efficiency in the operation of the justice system.”
Als weitere vor allem innenpolitische Gefahr wird der “home-grown jihadism”genannt. Der islamische Terrorismus habe ein indisches Gesicht, sei es nun in Kaschmir oder aufgrund der Tatsache, dass viele der muslimischen Terroristen eine nennenswerte indische Mitgliederschaft haben. Ebenso seien auf indischen Territorium zahlreichen Terroristengruppen entstanden, die wohl bedeutendste: “Student´s Movemnet of India“ (SIMI).
Pakistan sei Rückzughafen, Trainings- und Ruheraum für terroristische Bewegungen, doch würden diese zunehmend auch ihre Infrastruktur in Indien aufbauen, vor allem in einer kleinen Anzahl der 35 000 indischen Madrassas und Koranschulen, die vom pakistanischen Geheimdienst ISI unterstützt würden.
Diese innenpolitische Bedrohung könne sich auch außenpolitisch auswirken, sollte der Rest Südasiens feindlich werden — gemeint ist hier die behauptete zunehmende operationelle Zusammenarbeit zwischen Pakistans und Bangladeschs Geheimdiensten und islamischen Glaubenskriegern. Die Zweideutigkeit der Grenzziehungen zwischen beiden Ländern fördere terroristischen Tourismus und illegale Migration, daher müssten Profile der Grenzbevölkerung erstellt werden.
Nepal, das traditionellerweise indienfreundlich war, würde sich zunehmend an China anlehnen. China könne die neugebauten Straßen in Nepal nutzen, um einen Angriff auf Indien zu starten, aber dies sei unwahrscheinlich, da man dies auch direkt über die indisch-tibetische Grenze vollführen kann. Bedenklich sei jedoch die steigende Anzahl muslimischer Koranschulen an der indisch-nepalesischen Grenze.
Indien—Rüsten ohne Zielen
Während sich die Autoren des Forbes-India-Artikels mehr mit den außenpolitischen Bedrohungen für die Sicherheit Indiens beschäftigen, zielt das Buch „Arming without aiming“ und der Artikel „The Drag on India´s Military Growth“ mehr auf strukturelle innere Schwächen des indischen Militärs, seiner Rüstungsindustrie, dem zivil-militärischen Verhältnis und der pazifistisch angehauchten Ideologie der militärischen Zurückhaltung Indiens ab. Die Hoffnungen der USA, Indien als neuen strategischen Partner zu haben, der „prospect of a major rearment“ und die „hopes of a military revival“ würden jedoch nicht den Wirklichkeitstest bestehen, weswegen dringend Reformen von Indiens Militär, seiner Rüstungsindustrie und seiner defensiven Ideologie angemahnt werden.
Behauptet wird ein Ungleichgewicht in den zivil-militärischen Beziehungen zuungunsten des Militärs, die zu einem Mangel an politischer Führung, Uneinigkeit bei den Zielen und materielle und intellektuelle Korruption führten und dadurch die geplante militärische Modernisierung behindern würden.
Politik der strategischen Zurückhaltung
Zunächst wird die Ideologie der strategischen Zurückhaltung gegeißelt. Ähnlich wie die Autoren des Forbes-India-Artikels wird auch hier eine zunehmende Raketenlücke gegenüber Pakistan kritisiert, die die Qualität der nuklearen Abschreckung Indiens infrage stelle, die nur Ausdruck der strategischen Zurückhaltung sei. Indiens Wille, militärische Gewalt auch zur Durchsetzung politischer Ziele einzusetzen, sei kaum existent:
“The high point of Indian military history – the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971– therefore, stands in sharp contrast to the persistent inability of the country to raise effective military forces. No factor more accounts for the haphazard nature of Indian military modernization than the lack of political leadership on defense, stemming from the doctrine of strategic restraint. Key political leaders rejected the use of force as an instrument of politics in favor of a policy of strategic restraint that minimized the importance of the military.”
Der starke Antimilitarismus der indischen Regierung hätte zu einer Herabstufung der militärischen Führung geführt, noch entscheidender aber sei, dass militärische Wissenschaften und Forschung über die Köpfe der Militärführung entschieden würden. Ministerpräsident Nehru hätte den Briten Blackett damals eingeladen, die Beziehungen zwischen Wissenschaft und Verteidigung zu analysieren, was zum Blackett-Bericht geführt hätte, der eine Beschränkung von Indiens Verteidigungsausgaben auf 2 % des Bruttosozialproduktes, eine begrenzte militärische Modernisierung und staatliche Finanzierung und Eigentümerschaft der militärischen Forschungslabors vorsah. Blackett hätte dann seinen Protege Dalaut Singh Kothari als Leiter der militärischen Forschungslabors eingesetzt, der diese Linie umsetzte. In den 50er Jahren sanken die Verteidigungsausgaben, engagierte sich Indien in einer freundschaftlichen „Vorwärtspolitik“ gegenüber China, was dazu führte, dass eine unvorbereitete indische Armee im Krieg von 1962 gegen China verlor. Hierauf sei es zu einer nennenswerten militärischen Expansion Indiens gekommen und wurde dem Militär mehr operationale und institutionelle Autonomie zugestanden, was zu den erfolgreichen Kriegen von 1965 und 1971 führte. Die indische politische Führung fühlte sich aber immer noch unwohl angesichts des relativen Machtzuwachs des Militärs, der immer noch sehr beschränkt war aufgrund der Furcht vor Militärputschen und eines möglichen Militarismus.
“The problem, however, was that the political leadership did not suddenly become more comfortable with the military as an institution; they remained wary of the possibility of a coup d’etat and militarism more generally. The Indian civil-military relations landscape has changed marginally since.”
In den 80ern kam es dann zu einer weiteren militärischen Modernisierung und Aufrüstung angesichts Pakistans Rüstungsbestrebungen und Fortschritten auf dem Gebiet der Atomwaffentechnologie, Rajiv Ghandi habe dieses Potential aber 1987 während der Brasstrack-Krise nicht genutzt, die die letzte Chance gewesen sei, ein nichtnukleares Pakistan zu dominieren. Ebenso zögerlich sei Indien schon bei seinem Sieg von 1971 gewesen, als es die Chance nicht nutzte diesen nicht nur nach Osten (Bangladesch), sondern auch nach Westen (Pakistan) zu tragen und stattdessen das Simla-Abkommen unterzeichnete, das eine friedliche Lösung des Konfliktes vorsah. Für die Autoren der Brookings-Institution ist es ebenso „puzzling“, dass Indien zwischen seinem ersten Nukleartest bis 1998 auf einen zweiten wartete, was alles Auswüchse der Ideologie der militärischen Zurückhaltung seien, die zwar als weise eingeschätzt, aber für einer militärischen Planung abträglich angesehen wird.
In Kombination mit anderen Faktoren ignoriere die Politik der Zurückhaltung das zunehmende aggressive Pakistan und unterlaufe die militärische Modernisierung:
“Underlying these puzzles is a remarkable preference for strategic restraint. Indian leaders simply have not seen the use of force as a useful instrument of politics. This foundation of ambivalence informs Indian defense policy, and consequently its military modernization and reform efforts. To be sure, military restraint in a region as volatile as South Asia is wise and has helped persuade the great powers to accommodate India’s rise, but it does not help military planning. Together with the separation of the armed forces from the government, divisions among the services and between the services and other related agencies, and the inability of the military to seek formal support for policies it deems important, India’s strategic restraint has served to deny political guidance to the efforts of the armed forces to modernize. As wise as strategic restraint may be, Pakistan, India’s primary rival, hardly believes it to be true. Islamabad prepares as if India were an aggressive power and this has a real impact on India’s security.”
Ungleichgewichte in den zivil-militärischen Beziehungen
Zwar gebe es eine lange Wunschliste an Waffensystemen im Wert von ca. 100 Milliarden US$, sowie Ankündigungen der Defense Research und Development Organization (DRDO) bezüglich kommender Durchbrüche bei der militärischen Modernisierung, doch sei mit substantiellen Verbesserungen nicht zu rechnen. Zum einen sähen die verschiedenen Teilstreitkräften ihre Aufgaben unterschiedlich und wären diese unkoordiniert. Ebenso gäbe es keine politische Maßnahmen, die Koordination der verschiedenen Waffengattungen zu koordinieren. Zweitens sei das indische Sicherheitsestablishment fragmentiert und ebenso unkoordiniert. Zwar stimme man noch einer Erhöhung des Verteidigungshaushaltes zu, aber versage dabei organisatorische Veränderungen oder Veränderungen der Prioritäten vorzunehmen, vor allem was Veränderungen in den Hierarchien betreffen würde. Wesentlich sei die Institutionalisierung und Ernennung eins Verteidigungsstabschefs, der die unterschiedlichen Prioritäten der 3 verschiedenen Teilstreitkräfte koordinieren und ordnen würde. Doch die Regierung zögert einem Militär zuviel Macht zu geben und hat stattdessen einen integrierten Verteidigungsstab aufgestellt, der jedoch ein zahnloser Körper sei.
Fehlender legitimer Beschaffungsprozess
Das Problem der Korruption bei Waffenbeschaffungsprogrammen sei immanent und würde die Effektivität der Waffenentwicklungen ebenfalls beeinträchtigen. So scheiterten die indischen Kampfflugzeug- und Panzerprogramme und war nur die Raketenentwicklung erfolgreich. Dennoch verfüge Indien 2010 über keinerlei Raketen, die das strategische Gleichgewicht mit China oder Pakistan zugunsten Indiens ändern könnte. Vor allem existiere ein staatliches Monopol bei den militärischen Forschungslaboratorien und sei der indische Privatsektor außerhalb der Verteidigungsindustrie belassen. Während in den USA kleine und mittlere Verteidigungsfirmen das Rückgrat des Forschungskomplexes ausmachten, sei Indien weit von solch einer Entwicklung entfernt. Die Defense Research and Development Organization sei zudem nicht rechnungspfichtig, zudem in einer Doppelfunktion als Zulieferer und Berater, die inhärente Interessenskonflikte mit sich bringe. In Indien bevorzuge man zudem Rüstungsimporte von anderen ausländischen Staatsfirmen, so vor allem aus der Sowjetunion und nun Russland, da die indische Regierung annimmt, dass westliche Rüstungsfirmen korrupt und geldgierig sind und daher intergovermentale Waffenkäufe bevorzugt.
Resumee
Übereinstimmung bei beiden Artikeln herrscht in der Frage der fehlenden nuklearen Abschreckungsfähigkeit Indiens gegenüber Pakistan und China. Die Frage wird sein, wie Indien diese herstellt und herstellen kann, wie aber wohl auch die internationale Staatenwelt auf die eventuelle Aufrüstung Indiens mit Interkontinentalraketen reagieren würde — vielleicht würden die USA dies ja sogar begrüßen (als Gegengewicht zu China). Auch ist die Frage, wodurch die Politik der strategischen Zurückhaltung Indiens ersetzt werden soll. Offensiv- oder Preemptivdoktrinen sind ja nicht weniger ungefährlich als die vermutete Schwächung Indiens durch die strategic restraint. Ob sie einen dritten Weg befürworten, dazu geben die Autoren keine Antwort. Als Mindestkonsens bleibt: Glaubwürdige Abschreckung durch Schließung der Raketenlücke. Zumal stellt sich auch die Frage, was Stephen Cohen und Sunil Dasgupta eigentlich wollen: Zwar stellen sie fest, dass die Politik der Zurückhaltung weise war, aber dennoch impliziert ihr Artikel, Indien hätte in Wirklichkeit 1971 und 1987 Pakistan erobern und dominieren sollen, solange es noch keine Atomwaffen hatte. Das unterschätzt ein wenig, dass China wohl einer solchen Entwicklung bei seinem Hauptverbündeten in Südasien, Pakistan, nicht tatenlos zugesehen hätte und sich daraus leicht ein sino-indischer Krieg entwickeln hätte können (vielleicht mit chinesischer Atomdrohung — China besaß ja schon seit 1964 Atomwaffen und ab den 70er ausreichende Trägersysteme — Gegenargument: Indien war mit der Sowjetunion 1971 verbündet und letztere hätte China vor einem Eingreifen hindern können — dies jedoch möglicherweise mit dem Risiko eines sinosowjetischen Krieges) — gut möglich, dass diese strategische Zurückhaltung weniger dem indischen Pazifismus, sondern eher kühlem realpolitischen Kalkül entsprungen sein könnte. Heute sind solche Vorwärtsstrategien angesichts der nuklearen Potentiale Chinas und Pakistans noch viel unwahrscheinlicher und absurder. Es wäre interessant zu wissen, wie wohl Indien als Militärmacht aussehen würde, wenn man die geforderten Reformen: Zulassung des Privatsektors bei der Rüstungsforschung und Waffenbeschaffung, Einrichtung eines Stabschefs, mehr Autorität für Indiens Militär verwirklicht. Es bleibt zu beobachten, inwieweit sich Indiens politische Führung den Reformvorschlägen öffnen wird. Wie man aber dem Forbes-India-Artikel entnehmen kann, steht Indien nicht nur vor außenpolitischen Herausforderungen, sondern auch vor innenpolitischen:Im speziellen die Frage der maoistischen Naxalitenbewegung. Dieser wird nicht nur mit militärischen Mitteln beizukommen sein, sondern die counter-insurgency erfordert auch Sozialprogramme. Inwieweit die indische Regierung bereit ist, hierfür Gelder aufzubringen wird wohl genauso entscheidend für die Stabilität sein wie die Frage der glaubwürdigen nuklearen Abschreckung.
Zudem: Indien als BRIC-Staat (Brasilien, Rußland, Indien, China), der zudem eine Mitgliedschaft in der Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Bündnis von Rußland, China und zentralasiatischen Staaten) überlegt, wäre falsch beraten, sich eindeutig als Speerspitze der USA und der NATO in Asien festzulegen. Das wollte nicht einmal die sehr proamerikanische indisch-hindu-nationalistische BJP-Regierung unter Vajpayee. Die erhofften „prospect of a major rearment“ und die „hopes of a military revival“, die von Seiten der US-amerikanischen und Obama-nahen Brokkingsinstitution auf Indien projeziert werden, sind nicht unbedingt deckungsgleich mit Indiens sicherheits- und außenpolitischen Interessen. Zwar mag ein Gleichziehen mit Pakistans und Chinas Rüstungsanstrengungen, sowie eine relative Aufwertung des Militärs legitim sein, aber Indien wird genug „strategic restraint“ haben, um sich nicht in eine offene Konfrontation mit China oder Pakistan hineinziehen zu lassen, wie auch keine Lust haben, die weltgrößte Demokratie — ala Pakistan — in eine Abfolge von Militärdiktaturen versinken zu sehen. Mahatma Ghandi und Nehru haben sich schon etwas gedacht bei der Beschränkung ihres Militärs.
(Ralf Ostner/Dipl.-Politologe/staatlichgeprüfter Übersetzer in der chinesischen Sprache)
von Ralf Ostner
Neben China ist Indiens Aufstieg zu einer Großmacht die Perspektive, die Strategen am meisten in Asien beschäftigt hält. In letzter Zeit werden jedoch Bedenken geäußert, ob Indien die militärischen Bedrohungen richtig definiert hat und ob sich das enorme Wirtschaftswachstum, das eine Modernisierung und Aufrüstung des indischen Militärs zur Folge hat, auch effektiv in militärische Macht umsetzt. Vor allem zwei Beiträge beschäftigten sich mit diesen Fragen. Zum einen:
Ein programmatischer Artikel in Forbes India „Seven Security Nightmares India must prepare for“ (http://business.in.com/article/india-and-the-world/seven-security-nightmares-india-must-prepare-for/16512/0),
bei dem es um mögliche Bedrohungsszenarien geht und um die Frage, ob Indien hierfür ausreichend darauf vorbereitet ist. Der zweite Beitrag ist das Buch der Brookings-Mitarbeiter Stephen P. Cohen und Sunil Dasgupta „Arming without Aiming“ (Rüsten ohne Zielen), dessen Kurzfassung in dem Artikel „The Drag on India´s Military Growth“ lesbar ist. (http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/09_india_cohen_dasgupta.aspx)
Die 7 Alpträume Indiens
In dem Forbes India-Artikel wird festgestellt, dass sich Indiens Machthaber von dem Atomtest 1998 einen Zugewinn an Sicherheit versprochen hätten, die letzten 12 Jahre aber die Feindseligkeiten gegenüber Indien zugenommen hätten.
Als erste wesentliche zukünftige Gefahr sehen die Autoren, dass Pakistans Nuklearkapazitäten in die Hände von Schurkenstaaten und Terroristen fallen könnten. Schon jetzt sei Pakistan eine prinzipielle Quelle für die Proliferation von Nuklearwaffen an Schurkenstaaten und dies sei erst die Friedenszeit. Bei einem politischen „meltdown“ Pakistans bestünde die Gefahr, dass Atomwaffen auch in die Hände Al Kaidas fallen würden, welches Indien als expliziten Feind ausersehen hat.
“In that event, India’s interests lie in joining international efforts and providing logistics support to secure Pakistan’s nuclear warheads, says an ICRIER paper ‘Conventional Threats to India’s National Security’ authored by Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. A more radical situation could emerge if the US and Israel decide to launch a joint operation to “take out” the nuclear facilities when terrorists begin controlling them. The second situation seems extremely unlikely, though.”
Die zweite wesentliche Gefahr besteht für die Autoren darin, dass der War on Terror verebbt und die Taliban in Afghanistan zurückkehren und die pakistanische Taliban die Macht in Pakistan erlangen, womit Indien eine direkte Grenze zum Terrorismus hätte. Hierfür gelte es ein Netzwerk von Partnern zu entwickeln, das eine integrierte Antwort auf diese Bedrohung biete. Indien könnte einen Botschafter für Counter-terrorism ernennen, der die internationale Debatte zugunsten Indiens beeinflusst. Desweiteren gibt es Vorschläge aus Israel, dass Indien mit Hilfe von Staaten wie Israel seine Counter-terrorism-Fähigkeiten erhöht.
Die dritte wesentliche Gefahr sei, dass China Indien einkreist und einen begrenzten Krieg beginnt. Die ungelösten Grenzfragen mit China und die undemarkierte Line of Actual Control (LAC) an der indisch-tibetischen Grenze seien kein Beitrag für den langfristigen Frieden zwischen Asiens beiden Giganten.
“The next major incident on the LAC could lead to a localised border conflict as either Indian patience with Chinese intransigence wears thin or the Chinese look at Indian attempts to build infrastructure and develop the border areas as the adoption of an aggressive forward posture. Hence, in the foreseeable future, a limited border war between the two cannot be entirely ruled out.”
Auch die sinochinesischen maritime Beziehungen seien nicht frei von Spannungen, vor allem seit China bei seiner “String-of-Pearl”-Strategie nun auch Hafenanlagen rund um Indien herum in Hangyi, Hambantoa, Gwadar und auf den Malediven ersteht. Während schon jetzt chinesische Nuklear-U-Boote im Norden des Indischen Ozeans operieren, würde Indiens Unsicherheit erhöht, sollte China seine maritime Präsenz im Indischen Ozean mittels Militärschiffen und Hafenanlagen ausbauen.
Ebenso sorgten chinesische Aktionen und Forderungen gegenüber der indischen Provinz Arunachal Pradesh für ständige Spannungen. Zwar wäre die bisherige chinesische Strategie, das Boot nicht zu hart zu schaukeln, aber es behalte sich vor, den Zustand jederzeit zu ändern, wenn es ihm genehm sei. Indiens Außenhandel mit China sei keine Gewähr, China hier abzuschrecken, weswegen Indien gleichzeitig seine militärischen Kapazitäten ausbauen müsste.
Das nächste Bedrohungsszenario beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, was passieren würde, wenn Indiens atomare Abschreckungsstrategie nicht wirken sollte. Die Autoren sind der Ansicht, dass Indiens Nuklearabschreckung jegliche Glaubwürdigkeit fehlen würde. Zum einen fehlten interkontinentale Raketen, d.h viele Gebiete der potentiellen Gegner lägen außerhalb der Reichweite einer indischen Abschreckung. Die Agniraketen seien noch nicht wirklich getestet — kurz: Indien besitze nicht einmal die Voraussetzung für eine minimale nukleare Abschreckung:
“At a maximum of 80, the number of warheads available to India does not fulfil even the low-end requirements of minimum deterrence. Add to all this the lingering doubts over the efficacy of the thermonuclear device tested in 1998. The outside world doesn’t believe India is ready to respond to a nuclear conflagration.”
Pakistan sei wesentlich aggressiver, zudem kontrolliere — anders als in Indien — das Militär die Atomwaffen. Pakistan hätte genug spaltbares Material für 70 bis 115 nukleare Sprengköpfe, schließe sehr schnell die mengenmäßige Lücke bei nuklearen Sprengköpfen und könnte Indien in diesem Gebiet sogar überrunden.
China hätte ca. 400 Atomsprengköpfe, die jeden Winkel Indiens erreichen könnten.Zwar halte China an einer „No-first-Use″-Politik fest, aber diese Generosität könnte es möglicherweise im Falle Indiens missen lassen, zumal China Indien auch nicht als Atommacht ansieht und sich kontinuierlich weigert gegenseitige vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen auf dem Gebiet der nuklearen Risikominimierung zu ergreifen.
Nach diesen vor allem außenpolitischen Bedrohungen wenden sich die Autoren den innenpolitischen Gefahren zu. Hier rangiert die maoistische Guerillabewegung der Naxaliten ganz oben auf der Prioritätenliste. 194 Distrike von 22 Staaten seien gegenwärtig von den Naxaliten betroffen — wenngleich in unterschiedlichem Ausmaß. Die Naxaliten seien äußerst erfolgreich, würden unterschätzt und ihr Einfluss beschränke sich — wie fälschlicherweise angenommen — bei weitem nicht nur auf die sichtbare Gewalt, die sie ausüben. Die Zentral- und Provinzregierungen würden bisher unkoordiniert vorgehen und die nachrichtendienstliche Zusammenarbeit sei kläglich. Nötig sei ein umfassender counter-insurgency-Ansatz, der die Wiederherstellung von Staatlichkeit, vor allem des Rechtssystems und auch Sozialprogramme und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung vorsieht:
“The restoration of the authority and functions of governance, including development, health, education and basic social and human security, is imperative, and must constitute an integral part of any comprehensive approach to counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. This can only be done after the restoration of a modicum of law and order, and efficiency in the operation of the justice system.”
Als weitere vor allem innenpolitische Gefahr wird der “home-grown jihadism”genannt. Der islamische Terrorismus habe ein indisches Gesicht, sei es nun in Kaschmir oder aufgrund der Tatsache, dass viele der muslimischen Terroristen eine nennenswerte indische Mitgliederschaft haben. Ebenso seien auf indischen Territorium zahlreichen Terroristengruppen entstanden, die wohl bedeutendste: “Student´s Movemnet of India“ (SIMI).
Pakistan sei Rückzughafen, Trainings- und Ruheraum für terroristische Bewegungen, doch würden diese zunehmend auch ihre Infrastruktur in Indien aufbauen, vor allem in einer kleinen Anzahl der 35 000 indischen Madrassas und Koranschulen, die vom pakistanischen Geheimdienst ISI unterstützt würden.
Diese innenpolitische Bedrohung könne sich auch außenpolitisch auswirken, sollte der Rest Südasiens feindlich werden — gemeint ist hier die behauptete zunehmende operationelle Zusammenarbeit zwischen Pakistans und Bangladeschs Geheimdiensten und islamischen Glaubenskriegern. Die Zweideutigkeit der Grenzziehungen zwischen beiden Ländern fördere terroristischen Tourismus und illegale Migration, daher müssten Profile der Grenzbevölkerung erstellt werden.
Nepal, das traditionellerweise indienfreundlich war, würde sich zunehmend an China anlehnen. China könne die neugebauten Straßen in Nepal nutzen, um einen Angriff auf Indien zu starten, aber dies sei unwahrscheinlich, da man dies auch direkt über die indisch-tibetische Grenze vollführen kann. Bedenklich sei jedoch die steigende Anzahl muslimischer Koranschulen an der indisch-nepalesischen Grenze.
Indien—Rüsten ohne Zielen
Während sich die Autoren des Forbes-India-Artikels mehr mit den außenpolitischen Bedrohungen für die Sicherheit Indiens beschäftigen, zielt das Buch „Arming without aiming“ und der Artikel „The Drag on India´s Military Growth“ mehr auf strukturelle innere Schwächen des indischen Militärs, seiner Rüstungsindustrie, dem zivil-militärischen Verhältnis und der pazifistisch angehauchten Ideologie der militärischen Zurückhaltung Indiens ab. Die Hoffnungen der USA, Indien als neuen strategischen Partner zu haben, der „prospect of a major rearment“ und die „hopes of a military revival“ würden jedoch nicht den Wirklichkeitstest bestehen, weswegen dringend Reformen von Indiens Militär, seiner Rüstungsindustrie und seiner defensiven Ideologie angemahnt werden.
Behauptet wird ein Ungleichgewicht in den zivil-militärischen Beziehungen zuungunsten des Militärs, die zu einem Mangel an politischer Führung, Uneinigkeit bei den Zielen und materielle und intellektuelle Korruption führten und dadurch die geplante militärische Modernisierung behindern würden.
Politik der strategischen Zurückhaltung
Zunächst wird die Ideologie der strategischen Zurückhaltung gegeißelt. Ähnlich wie die Autoren des Forbes-India-Artikels wird auch hier eine zunehmende Raketenlücke gegenüber Pakistan kritisiert, die die Qualität der nuklearen Abschreckung Indiens infrage stelle, die nur Ausdruck der strategischen Zurückhaltung sei. Indiens Wille, militärische Gewalt auch zur Durchsetzung politischer Ziele einzusetzen, sei kaum existent:
“The high point of Indian military history – the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971– therefore, stands in sharp contrast to the persistent inability of the country to raise effective military forces. No factor more accounts for the haphazard nature of Indian military modernization than the lack of political leadership on defense, stemming from the doctrine of strategic restraint. Key political leaders rejected the use of force as an instrument of politics in favor of a policy of strategic restraint that minimized the importance of the military.”
Der starke Antimilitarismus der indischen Regierung hätte zu einer Herabstufung der militärischen Führung geführt, noch entscheidender aber sei, dass militärische Wissenschaften und Forschung über die Köpfe der Militärführung entschieden würden. Ministerpräsident Nehru hätte den Briten Blackett damals eingeladen, die Beziehungen zwischen Wissenschaft und Verteidigung zu analysieren, was zum Blackett-Bericht geführt hätte, der eine Beschränkung von Indiens Verteidigungsausgaben auf 2 % des Bruttosozialproduktes, eine begrenzte militärische Modernisierung und staatliche Finanzierung und Eigentümerschaft der militärischen Forschungslabors vorsah. Blackett hätte dann seinen Protege Dalaut Singh Kothari als Leiter der militärischen Forschungslabors eingesetzt, der diese Linie umsetzte. In den 50er Jahren sanken die Verteidigungsausgaben, engagierte sich Indien in einer freundschaftlichen „Vorwärtspolitik“ gegenüber China, was dazu führte, dass eine unvorbereitete indische Armee im Krieg von 1962 gegen China verlor. Hierauf sei es zu einer nennenswerten militärischen Expansion Indiens gekommen und wurde dem Militär mehr operationale und institutionelle Autonomie zugestanden, was zu den erfolgreichen Kriegen von 1965 und 1971 führte. Die indische politische Führung fühlte sich aber immer noch unwohl angesichts des relativen Machtzuwachs des Militärs, der immer noch sehr beschränkt war aufgrund der Furcht vor Militärputschen und eines möglichen Militarismus.
“The problem, however, was that the political leadership did not suddenly become more comfortable with the military as an institution; they remained wary of the possibility of a coup d’etat and militarism more generally. The Indian civil-military relations landscape has changed marginally since.”
In den 80ern kam es dann zu einer weiteren militärischen Modernisierung und Aufrüstung angesichts Pakistans Rüstungsbestrebungen und Fortschritten auf dem Gebiet der Atomwaffentechnologie, Rajiv Ghandi habe dieses Potential aber 1987 während der Brasstrack-Krise nicht genutzt, die die letzte Chance gewesen sei, ein nichtnukleares Pakistan zu dominieren. Ebenso zögerlich sei Indien schon bei seinem Sieg von 1971 gewesen, als es die Chance nicht nutzte diesen nicht nur nach Osten (Bangladesch), sondern auch nach Westen (Pakistan) zu tragen und stattdessen das Simla-Abkommen unterzeichnete, das eine friedliche Lösung des Konfliktes vorsah. Für die Autoren der Brookings-Institution ist es ebenso „puzzling“, dass Indien zwischen seinem ersten Nukleartest bis 1998 auf einen zweiten wartete, was alles Auswüchse der Ideologie der militärischen Zurückhaltung seien, die zwar als weise eingeschätzt, aber für einer militärischen Planung abträglich angesehen wird.
In Kombination mit anderen Faktoren ignoriere die Politik der Zurückhaltung das zunehmende aggressive Pakistan und unterlaufe die militärische Modernisierung:
“Underlying these puzzles is a remarkable preference for strategic restraint. Indian leaders simply have not seen the use of force as a useful instrument of politics. This foundation of ambivalence informs Indian defense policy, and consequently its military modernization and reform efforts. To be sure, military restraint in a region as volatile as South Asia is wise and has helped persuade the great powers to accommodate India’s rise, but it does not help military planning. Together with the separation of the armed forces from the government, divisions among the services and between the services and other related agencies, and the inability of the military to seek formal support for policies it deems important, India’s strategic restraint has served to deny political guidance to the efforts of the armed forces to modernize. As wise as strategic restraint may be, Pakistan, India’s primary rival, hardly believes it to be true. Islamabad prepares as if India were an aggressive power and this has a real impact on India’s security.”
Ungleichgewichte in den zivil-militärischen Beziehungen
Zwar gebe es eine lange Wunschliste an Waffensystemen im Wert von ca. 100 Milliarden US$, sowie Ankündigungen der Defense Research und Development Organization (DRDO) bezüglich kommender Durchbrüche bei der militärischen Modernisierung, doch sei mit substantiellen Verbesserungen nicht zu rechnen. Zum einen sähen die verschiedenen Teilstreitkräften ihre Aufgaben unterschiedlich und wären diese unkoordiniert. Ebenso gäbe es keine politische Maßnahmen, die Koordination der verschiedenen Waffengattungen zu koordinieren. Zweitens sei das indische Sicherheitsestablishment fragmentiert und ebenso unkoordiniert. Zwar stimme man noch einer Erhöhung des Verteidigungshaushaltes zu, aber versage dabei organisatorische Veränderungen oder Veränderungen der Prioritäten vorzunehmen, vor allem was Veränderungen in den Hierarchien betreffen würde. Wesentlich sei die Institutionalisierung und Ernennung eins Verteidigungsstabschefs, der die unterschiedlichen Prioritäten der 3 verschiedenen Teilstreitkräfte koordinieren und ordnen würde. Doch die Regierung zögert einem Militär zuviel Macht zu geben und hat stattdessen einen integrierten Verteidigungsstab aufgestellt, der jedoch ein zahnloser Körper sei.
Fehlender legitimer Beschaffungsprozess
Das Problem der Korruption bei Waffenbeschaffungsprogrammen sei immanent und würde die Effektivität der Waffenentwicklungen ebenfalls beeinträchtigen. So scheiterten die indischen Kampfflugzeug- und Panzerprogramme und war nur die Raketenentwicklung erfolgreich. Dennoch verfüge Indien 2010 über keinerlei Raketen, die das strategische Gleichgewicht mit China oder Pakistan zugunsten Indiens ändern könnte. Vor allem existiere ein staatliches Monopol bei den militärischen Forschungslaboratorien und sei der indische Privatsektor außerhalb der Verteidigungsindustrie belassen. Während in den USA kleine und mittlere Verteidigungsfirmen das Rückgrat des Forschungskomplexes ausmachten, sei Indien weit von solch einer Entwicklung entfernt. Die Defense Research and Development Organization sei zudem nicht rechnungspfichtig, zudem in einer Doppelfunktion als Zulieferer und Berater, die inhärente Interessenskonflikte mit sich bringe. In Indien bevorzuge man zudem Rüstungsimporte von anderen ausländischen Staatsfirmen, so vor allem aus der Sowjetunion und nun Russland, da die indische Regierung annimmt, dass westliche Rüstungsfirmen korrupt und geldgierig sind und daher intergovermentale Waffenkäufe bevorzugt.
Resumee
Übereinstimmung bei beiden Artikeln herrscht in der Frage der fehlenden nuklearen Abschreckungsfähigkeit Indiens gegenüber Pakistan und China. Die Frage wird sein, wie Indien diese herstellt und herstellen kann, wie aber wohl auch die internationale Staatenwelt auf die eventuelle Aufrüstung Indiens mit Interkontinentalraketen reagieren würde — vielleicht würden die USA dies ja sogar begrüßen (als Gegengewicht zu China). Auch ist die Frage, wodurch die Politik der strategischen Zurückhaltung Indiens ersetzt werden soll. Offensiv- oder Preemptivdoktrinen sind ja nicht weniger ungefährlich als die vermutete Schwächung Indiens durch die strategic restraint. Ob sie einen dritten Weg befürworten, dazu geben die Autoren keine Antwort. Als Mindestkonsens bleibt: Glaubwürdige Abschreckung durch Schließung der Raketenlücke. Zumal stellt sich auch die Frage, was Stephen Cohen und Sunil Dasgupta eigentlich wollen: Zwar stellen sie fest, dass die Politik der Zurückhaltung weise war, aber dennoch impliziert ihr Artikel, Indien hätte in Wirklichkeit 1971 und 1987 Pakistan erobern und dominieren sollen, solange es noch keine Atomwaffen hatte. Das unterschätzt ein wenig, dass China wohl einer solchen Entwicklung bei seinem Hauptverbündeten in Südasien, Pakistan, nicht tatenlos zugesehen hätte und sich daraus leicht ein sino-indischer Krieg entwickeln hätte können (vielleicht mit chinesischer Atomdrohung — China besaß ja schon seit 1964 Atomwaffen und ab den 70er ausreichende Trägersysteme — Gegenargument: Indien war mit der Sowjetunion 1971 verbündet und letztere hätte China vor einem Eingreifen hindern können — dies jedoch möglicherweise mit dem Risiko eines sinosowjetischen Krieges) — gut möglich, dass diese strategische Zurückhaltung weniger dem indischen Pazifismus, sondern eher kühlem realpolitischen Kalkül entsprungen sein könnte. Heute sind solche Vorwärtsstrategien angesichts der nuklearen Potentiale Chinas und Pakistans noch viel unwahrscheinlicher und absurder. Es wäre interessant zu wissen, wie wohl Indien als Militärmacht aussehen würde, wenn man die geforderten Reformen: Zulassung des Privatsektors bei der Rüstungsforschung und Waffenbeschaffung, Einrichtung eines Stabschefs, mehr Autorität für Indiens Militär verwirklicht. Es bleibt zu beobachten, inwieweit sich Indiens politische Führung den Reformvorschlägen öffnen wird. Wie man aber dem Forbes-India-Artikel entnehmen kann, steht Indien nicht nur vor außenpolitischen Herausforderungen, sondern auch vor innenpolitischen:Im speziellen die Frage der maoistischen Naxalitenbewegung. Dieser wird nicht nur mit militärischen Mitteln beizukommen sein, sondern die counter-insurgency erfordert auch Sozialprogramme. Inwieweit die indische Regierung bereit ist, hierfür Gelder aufzubringen wird wohl genauso entscheidend für die Stabilität sein wie die Frage der glaubwürdigen nuklearen Abschreckung.
Zudem: Indien als BRIC-Staat (Brasilien, Rußland, Indien, China), der zudem eine Mitgliedschaft in der Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Bündnis von Rußland, China und zentralasiatischen Staaten) überlegt, wäre falsch beraten, sich eindeutig als Speerspitze der USA und der NATO in Asien festzulegen. Das wollte nicht einmal die sehr proamerikanische indisch-hindu-nationalistische BJP-Regierung unter Vajpayee. Die erhofften „prospect of a major rearment“ und die „hopes of a military revival“, die von Seiten der US-amerikanischen und Obama-nahen Brokkingsinstitution auf Indien projeziert werden, sind nicht unbedingt deckungsgleich mit Indiens sicherheits- und außenpolitischen Interessen. Zwar mag ein Gleichziehen mit Pakistans und Chinas Rüstungsanstrengungen, sowie eine relative Aufwertung des Militärs legitim sein, aber Indien wird genug „strategic restraint“ haben, um sich nicht in eine offene Konfrontation mit China oder Pakistan hineinziehen zu lassen, wie auch keine Lust haben, die weltgrößte Demokratie — ala Pakistan — in eine Abfolge von Militärdiktaturen versinken zu sehen. Mahatma Ghandi und Nehru haben sich schon etwas gedacht bei der Beschränkung ihres Militärs.
(Ralf Ostner/Dipl.-Politologe/staatlichgeprüfter Übersetzer in der chinesischen Sprache)
Well, dude~！I suggest u'd better add translation later and paste related Indian article's links in ur original posts.
Here's the domestic chinese-language military forum, not most of mates can understand English as well as ur guys.
是一篇介绍印度热核弹的文章，不过这种访谈录式对话看的头都大了。
Well, dude~！I suggest u'd better add translation later and paste related Indian article's links in ur original posts.
Here's the domestic chinese-language military forum, not most of mates can understand English as well as ur guys.
是一篇介绍印度热核弹的文章，不过这种访谈录式对话看的头都大了。
文章太长了
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