国外吵的很凶的维基泄密 19楼起正添加原情报翻译

等着看戏

JY们绝对会无视之

Wikileaks The New Leak is OUT.

2小时前

muenchenstern 发表于 2010-11-29 04:32


这次还真是给JY们打脸呢。

http://cache.gawker.com/assets/i ... /spiegelgoodbig.jpg

LZ快点转过来

US embassy cables leak sparks global diplomacy crisis• More than 250,000 dispatches reveal US foreign strategies
• Diplomats ordered to spy on allies as well as enemies
• Hillary Clinton leads frantic 'damage limitation'


Share7859  Comments (475) David Leigh guardian.co.uk, Sunday 28 November 2010 17.50 GMT Article history
The release of more than 250,000 US embassy cables reveals previously secret information on American intelligence gathering, and political and military strategy. Photograph: Rex Features

The United States was catapulted into a worldwide diplomatic crisis today, with the leaking to the Guardian and other international media of more than 250,000 classified cables from its embassies, many sent as recently as February this year.

At the start of a series of daily extracts from the US embassy cables - many of which are designated "secret" – the Guardian can disclose that Arab leaders are privately urging an air strike on Iran and that US officials have been instructed to spy on the UN's leadership.

These two revelations alone would be likely to reverberate around the world. But the secret dispatches which were obtained by WikiLeaks, the whistlebowers' website, also reveal Washington's evaluation of many other highly sensitive international issues.

These include a major shift in relations between China and North Korea, Pakistan's growing instability and details of clandestine US efforts to combat al-Qaida in Yemen.

Among scores of other disclosures that are likely to cause uproar, the cables detail:

• Grave fears in Washington and London over the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme

• Alleged links between the Russian government and organised crime.

• Devastating criticism of the UK's military operations in Afghanistan.

• Claims of inappropriate behaviour by a member of the British royal family.

The US has particularly intimate dealings with Britain, and some of the dispatches from the London embassy in Grosvenor Square will make uncomfortable reading in Whitehall and Westminster. They range from serious political criticisms of David Cameron to requests for specific intelligence about individual MPs.

The cache of cables contains specific allegations of corruption and against foreign leaders, as well as harsh criticism by US embassy staff of their host governments, from tiny islands in the Caribbean to China and Russia.

The material includes a reference to Vladimir Putin as an "alpha-dog", Hamid Karzai as being "driven by paranoia" and Angela Merkel allegedly "avoids risk and is rarely creative". There is also a comparison between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Adolf Hitler.

The cables name countries involved in financing terror groups, and describe a near "environmental disaster" last year over a rogue shipment of enriched uranium. They disclose technical details of secret US-Russian nuclear missile negotiations in Geneva, and include a profile of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who they say is accompanied everywhere by a "voluptuous blonde" Ukrainian nurse.

The cables cover secretary of state Hillary Clinton's activities under the Obama administration, as well as thousands of files from the George Bush presidency. Clinton personally led frantic damage limitation this weekend as Washington prepared foreign governments for the revelations. She contacted leaders in Germany, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, France and Afghanistan.

US ambassadors in other capitals were instructed to brief their hosts in advance of the release of unflattering pen-portraits or nakedly frank accounts of transactions with the US which they had thought would be kept quiet. Washington now faces a difficult task in convincing contacts around the world that any future conversations will remain confidential.

"We are all bracing for what may be coming and condemn WikiLeaks for the release of classified material," state department spokesman PJ Crowley said. "It will place lives and interests at risk. It is irresponsible."

The state department's legal adviser has written to Wikileaks founder Julian Assange and his London lawyer, warning that the cables were obtained illegally and that publication would place at risk "the lives of countless innocent individuals … ongoing military operations … and cooperation between countries".

The electronic archive of embassy dispatches from around the world was allegedly downloaded by a US soldier earlier this year and passed to WikiLeaks. Assange made them available to the Guardian and four other newspapers: the New York Times, Der Spiegel in Germany, Le Monde in France and El País in Spain. All five plan to publish extracts from the most significant cables, but have decided neither to "dump" the entire dataset into the public domain, nor to publish names that would endanger innocent individuals. WikiLeaks says that, contrary to the state department's fears, it also initially intends to post only limited cable extracts, and to redact identities.

The cables published today reveal how the US uses its embassies as part of a global espionage network, with diplomats tasked to obtain not just information from the people they meet, but personal details, such as frequent flyer numbers, credit card details and even DNA material.

Classified "human intelligence directives" issued in the name of Hillary Clinton or her predecessor, Condoleeza Rice, instruct officials to gather information on military installations, weapons markings, vehicle details of political leaders as well as iris scans, fingerprints and DNA.

The most controversial target was the leadership of the United Nations. That directive requested the specification of telecoms and IT systems used by top UN officials and their staff and details of "private VIP networks used for official communication, to include upgrades, security measures, passwords, personal encryption keys".

When the Guardian put this allegation to Crowley, the state department spokesman said: "Let me assure you: our diplomats are just that, diplomats. They do not engage in intelligence activities. They represent our country around the world, maintain open and transparent contact with other governments as well as public and private figures, and report home. That's what diplomats have done for hundreds of years."

The dispatches also shed light on older diplomatic issues. One cable, for example, reveals, that Nelson Mandela was "furious" when a top adviser stopped him meeting Margaret Thatcher shortly after his release from prison to explain why the ANC objected to her policy of "constructive engagement" with the apartheid regime. "We understand Mandela was keen for a Thatcher meeting but that [appointments secretary Zwelakhe] Sisulu argued successfully against it," according to the cable. It continues: "Mandela has on several occasions expressed his eagerness for an early meeting with Thatcher to express the ANC's objections to her policy. We were consequently surprised when the meeting didn't materialise on his mid-April visit to London and suspected that ANC hardliners had nixed Mandela's plans."

The US embassy cables are marked "Sipdis" – secret internet protocol distribution. They were compiled as part of a programme under which selected dispatches, considered moderately secret but suitable for sharing with other agencies, would be automatically loaded on to secure embassy websites, and linked with the military's Siprnet internet system.

They are classified at various levels up to "SECRET NOFORN" [no foreigners]. More than 11,000 are marked secret, while around 9,000 of the cables are marked noforn. The embassies which sent most cables were Ankara, Baghdad, Amman, Kuwait and Tokyo.

More than 3 million US government personnel and soldiers, many extremely junior, are cleared to have potential access to this material, even though the cables contain the identities of foreign informants, often sensitive contacts in dictatorial regimes. Some are marked "protect" or "strictly protect".

Last spring, 22-year-old intelligence analyst Bradley Manning was charged with leaking many of these cables, along with a gun-camera video of an Apache helicopter crew mistakenly killing two Reuters news agency employees in Baghdad in 2007, which was subsequently posted by WikiLeaks. Manning is facing a court martial.

In July and October WikiLeaks also published thousands of leaked military reports from Afghanistan and Iraq. These were made available for analysis beforehand to the Guardian, along with Der Spiegel and the New York Times.

A former hacker, Adrian Lamo, who reported Manning to the US authorities, said the soldier had told him in chat messages that the cables revealed "how the first world exploits the third, in detail".

He also said, according to Lamo, that Clinton "and several thousand diplomats around the world are going to have a heart attack when they wake up one morning and find an entire repository of classified foreign policy is available in searchable format to the public … everywhere there's a US post … there's a diplomatic scandal that will be revealed".

Asked why such sensitive material was posted on a network accessible to thousands of government employees, the state department spokesman told the Guardian: "The 9/11 attacks and their aftermath revealed gaps in intra-governmental information sharing. Since the attacks of 9/11, the US government has taken significant steps to facilitate information sharing. These efforts were focused on giving diplomatic, military, law enforcement and intelligence specialists quicker and easier access to more data to more effectively do their jobs."

He added: "We have been taking aggressive action in recent weeks and months to enhance the security of our systems and to prevent the leak of information."

因为某些原因，链接大家自己网上搜索。 版主手下留情。

找到了

US embassy cables leak sparks global diplomacy crisis• More than 250,000 dispatches reveal US  ...
muenchenstern 发表于 2010-11-29 04:42

找到了

wikileak微博的最新信息。

Guardian's Cablegate coverage is out http://www.guardian.co.uk/ #cablegate
2 minutes ago via web .Los secretos de la diplomacia de Estados Unidos, al descubierto http://www.elpais.com/documentossecretos/ #cablegate
7 minutes ago via web .Tomorrow's Der Spiegel's cover today:
22 minutes ago via web .Please use #cablegate to discuss the pending US Embassy cables release.
26 minutes ago via web .El Pais, Le Monde, Speigel, Guardian & NYT will publish many US embassy cables tonight, even if WikiLeaks goes down
about 2 hours ago via web .We are currently under a mass distributed denial of service attack.
about 2 hours ago via web .Government of Iceland has been contacted by US officials over Embassy leaks according to MBL.
9:58 PM Nov 26th via web .The D-notice is type 1 and type 5.
6:43 PM Nov 26th via web .UK Government has issued a "D-notice" warning to all UK news editors, asking to be briefed on upcoming WikiLeaks stories.
6:13 PM Nov 26th via web .US briefs Russia over embassy cables according to Moscow press.
6:09 PM Nov 26th via web .US briefs Iraq, Turkey over embassy cables according to AFP, Turkish media
5:41 PM Nov 26th via web .Poster: "One Word of Truth Outweighs the Whole World" http://is.gd/hNNul
6:10 AM Nov 26th via web .Poster: "Intelligence needs Counter-Intelligence" http://is.gd/hNN6x
6:07 AM Nov 26th via web

[:a12:] 怎么什么都要审核？？？？

8.32pm:
US embassy officials in Berlin will have to soothe ruffle feathers of top German officials if they haven't done so already. Der Spiegel highlights the negative American assessments of the German foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle.

The secret reports describe him as incompetent, vain and critical of America. The US diplomats report that they face a challenge in dealing with a politician who is considered an "enigma," who has little foreign policy experience and "remains skeptical about the US." An embassy cable from Berlin from Sept. 22, 2009 describes Westerwelle as having an "exuberant personality." That is why he finds it difficult to take a backseat when it comes to any matters of dispute with Chancellor Angela Merkel," the cable says.

8.20pm:
The Guardian's editor, Alan Rusbridger, will be online tomorrow at 4pm to take questions on the paper's decision to cover this story. Meanwhile, Guardian columnist Simon Jenkins rejects claims by the US and other governments that the stories threaten national security.

The revelations do not have the startling, coldblooded immediacy of the WikiLeaks war logs from Iraq and Afghanistan, with their astonishing insight into the minds of fighting men seemingly detached from the ethics of war. The disclosures are largely of analysis and high-grade gossip. Insofar as they are sensational, it is in showing the corruption and mendacity of those in power, and the mismatch between what they claim and what they do... Clearly, it is for governments, not journalists, to protect public secrets. Were there some overriding national jeopardy in revealing them, greater restraint might be in order. There is no such overriding jeopardy, except from the policies themselves as revealed. Where it is doing the right thing, a great power should be robust against embarrassment.

7.59pm:
Le Monde justifies its decision to cover the classified cables by arguing that to inform does not mean to act irresponsibly. Transparency and judgment (Le Monde uses the word discernement) are not incompatible, the paper says, which is what distinguishes it from WikiLeaks.

7.53pm:
Here is the New York Times laying out some of the topics it will cover in the coming days. They include a dangerous standoff with Pakistan over nuclear fuel, gaming out an eventual collapse of North Korea and allegations against China of global hacking.

7.48pm:
The Democratic chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, John Kerry, rejects comparisons with the leak of the Pentagon papers during the Vietnam war.

This is not an academic exercise about freedom of information and it is not akin to the release of the Pentagon Papers, which involved an analysis aimed at saving American lives and exposing government deception. Instead, these sensitive cables contain candid assessments and analysis of ongoing matters and they should remain confidential to protect the ability of the government to conduct lawful business with the private candor that's vital to effective diplomacy.

7.45pm:
The US ambassador to the UK, Louis Susman, has issued this tough statement.

Releasing documents of this kind place at risk the lives of innocent individuals – from journalists to human rights activists and bloggers to soldiers and diplomats. It is reprehensible for any individual or organization to attempt to gain notoriety at the expense of people who had every expectation of privacy in sharing information.

7.43pm:
Here is a summary of all of today's stories from the Guardian's first day of coverage of this major story:

• The US faces a worldwide diplomatic crisis. More than 250,000 classified cables from American embassies are leaked, many sent as recently as February.
• Saudi Arabia puts pressure on the US to attack Iran. Other Arab allies have secretly agitated for military action against Tehran.
• Washington is running a secret intelligence campaign targeted at the leadership of the United Nations, including the secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, and the permanent security council representatives from China, Russia, France and the UK.
• The round-the-clock offensive by US government officials, politicians, diplomats and military officers to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions and roll back its advance across the Middle East.
• Israel regarded 2010 as a "critical year" for tackling Iran's alleged quest for nuclear weapons and has warned the United States that time is running out to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb.
• The secret EU plot to boycott the inauguration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president after the disputed Iranian election in 2009.
• IAEA officials denied blueprints and told by Iran that evidence of bomb-grade uranium enrichment was forged.
• Saudi Arabia complains directly to the Iranian foreign minister of Iranian "meddling" in the Middle East.
• US accuses Iran of abusing the strict neutrality of the Iranian Red Crescent (IRC) society to smuggle intelligence agents and weapons into other countries, including Lebanon.
• Britain's ambassador to Iran gave the US a private masterclass on how to negotiate with Iran.
• How a 75-year-old American of Iranian descent rode a horse over a freezing mountain range into Turkey after officials confiscated his passport.
• How the 250,000 US embassy cables were leaked.
• Siprnet: where America stores its secret cables.
• Editor's note: publishing the cables.
• Browse the data base.

7.02pm:
The White House has accused WikiLeaks' of "reckless and dangerous action" and says the move endanger lives and risk hurting relations with friendly countries.

6.59pm:
Clinton argues that the disclosures put at risk US diplomats, intelligence professionals and others. This is how the New York Times and the Guardian address the issue.

The Guardian says: "There are some cables the Guardian will not be releasing or reporting owing to the nature of sourcing or subject matter. Our domestic libel laws impose a special burden on British publishers."

The New York Times says it has taken similar precautionary measures and gives this justification for publication of the story.

But the more important reason to publish these articles is that the cables tell the unvarnished story of how the government makes its biggest decisions, the decisions that cost the country most heavily in lives and money. They shed light on the motivations — and, in some cases, duplicity — of allies on the receiving end of American courtship and foreign aid. They illuminate the diplomacy surrounding two current wars and several countries, like Pakistan and Yemen, where American military involvement is growing. As daunting as it is to publish such material over official objections, it would be presumptuous to conclude that Americans have no right to know what is being done in their name.

6.47pm:
Mark Tran taking over from Peter Walker. I'll be following reaction until the early hours so stay with us. Responses are coming in thick and fast. Here is a statement from Hillary Clinton, who ordered a secret intelligence campaign targeting the leadership of the UN, including the secretary general, Ban Ki-moon and the permanent security council representatives from China, Russia, France and the UK.

We anticipate the release of what are claimed to be several hundred thousand classified State department cables on Sunday night that detail private diplomatic discussions with foreign governments. By its very nature, field reporting to Washington is candid and often incomplete information. It is not an expression of policy, nor does it always shape final policy decisions. Nevertheless, these cables could compromise private discussions with foreign governments and opposition leaders, and when the substance of private conversations is printed on the front pages of newspapers across the world, it can deeply impact not only US foreign policy interests, but those of our allies and friends around the world. To be clear - such disclosures put at risk our diplomats, intelligence professionals, and people around the world who come to the United States for assistance in promoting democracy and open government. These documents also may include named individuals who in many cases live and work under oppressive regimes and who are trying to create more open and free societies. President Obama supports responsible, accountable, and open government at home and around the world, but this reckless and dangerous action runs counter to that goal. By releasing stolen and classified documents, Wikileaks has put at risk not only the cause of human rights but also the lives and work of these individuals. We condemn in the strongest terms the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents and sensitive national security information.

6.32pm: It's also worth mentioning, as widely reported elsewhere, that Wikileaks has alleged that its website, which many internet users had not been able to access over the day, had been deliberately targeted. "We are currently under a mass distributed denial of service attack," it said in a tweet.

6.27pm: Here's the cover of Der Spiegel's initial take of the story. Some of the captions attached to luminaries on the cover, taken from US embassy cables, include "Avoids risk, rarely creative" (for Angela Merkel) and, more intrguingly still, "Luxuriant blonde nurse" (Libya's Muammar Gaddafi). The English version of their story is here.

6.24pm: In contrast to the Foreign Office's measured tone, Italy's foreign minister, Franco Frattini, has rather colourfully described the embassy cables as "the September 11th of world diplomacy". Speaking on a visit to Qatar, he was quoted as saying that the information would "blow up the relationship of trust between states".

6.22pm: The Foreign Office has already condemned the release of the information. An FCO spokesman said:

We condemn any unauthorised release of this classified information, just as we condemn leaks of classified material in the UK. They can damage national security, are not in the national interest and, as the US have said, may put lives at risk. We have a very strong relationship with the US government. That will continue.

6.17pm: This is, of course, the latest in a series of revelations published in collaboration with Wikileaks, following on from the Iraq and then Afghanistan war logs. Reaction has already begun ahead of the release of the embassy cables. In an unusual move, the US government has released a letter from the state department to the Wikileaks founder, Julian Assange, warning that making the files public would poison international relations and jeopardise lives.

State department legal adviser Harold Koh said publication will "place at risk the lives of countless innocent individuals" as well as affecting "on-going military operations" and "on-going cooperation between countries".

He wrote:

They were provided in violation of U.S. law and without regard for the grave consequences of this action.

David Cameron is among a series of world leaders already briefed about the likely revelations by state department officials. UK newspaper editors were asked on Friday to inform the government if they planned to publish the files, although the government has no plans to try and formally suppress them.

6.15pm: It is, without a doubt, the biggest leak of secret diplomatic missives in the history of international relations – a total of 251,287 cables from more than 250 US embassies and consulates around the world, many of them frank, a number of them shocking and all of them previously secret.

Over the coming days the Guardian will publish extracts from the cables, obtained by the whistleblowing website Wikileaks, along with its international partners, the New York Times, Le Monde, El País and Der Spiegel.

Even today there's a lot to read through so here's a brief precis of the initial revelations:

• The US is engaged in a spying campaign against the leadership of the United Nations. A directive issued under Hillary Clinton's name last year ordered American diplomats to seek details about both UN communication systems and personal details for top officials.
• Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah has "frequently" urged the US to launch an attack against Iran in order to scupper Tehran's nuclear ambition.
• The US has relentlessly pressured other countries, including close allies such as Italy and France, to distance themselves from Iran and assist American efforts to isolate Tehran
• There's plenty more to come, including "claims of inappropriate behaviour" by a British royal and allegations of links between Russia's government and organised crime

muenchenstern 发表于 2010-11-29 04:45


    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ ... ak-diplomacy-crisis

帮你先补个地址

¶ A global computer hacking effort: China’s Politburo directed the intrusion into Google’s computer systems in that country, a Chinese contact told the American Embassy in Beijing in January, one cable reported. The Google hacking was part of a coordinated campaign of computer sabotage carried out by government operatives, private security experts and Internet outlaws recruited by the Chinese government. They have broken into American government computers and those of Western allies, the Dalai Lama and American businesses since 2002, cables said.

一个中国线人告诉美国北京大使馆，中共的政治局直接指挥了针对谷歌系统的攻击。这次针对google的黑客攻击是由政府招募的政、民间和网络黑客联合执行的。他们从2002年起曾经侵入到美国政府和盟国的政府电脑系统，并且也侵入了达赖和美国商业公司的系统。

¶ A global computer hacking effort: China’s Politburo directed the intrusion into Google’s computer systems in that country, a Chinese contact told the American Embassy in Beijing in January, one cable reported. The Google hacking was part of a coordinated campaign of computer sabotage carried out by government operatives, private security experts and Internet outlaws recruited by the Chinese government. They have broken into American government computers and those of Western allies, the Dalai Lama and American businesses since 2002, cables said.

一个中国线人告诉美国北京大使馆，中共的政治局直接指挥了针对谷歌系统的攻击。这次针对google的黑客攻击是由政府招募的政、民间和网络黑客联合执行的。他们从2002年起曾经侵入到美国政府和盟国的政府电脑系统，并且也侵入了达赖和美国商业公司的系统。

Bargaining to empty the Guantánamo Bay prison: When American diplomats pressed other countries to resettle detainees, they became reluctant players in a State Department version of “Let’s Make a Deal.” Slovenia was told to take a prisoner if it wanted to meet with President Obama, while the island nation of Kiribati was offered incentives worth millions of dollars to take in Chinese Muslim detainees, cables from diplomats recounted. The Americans, meanwhile, suggested that accepting more prisoners would be “a low-cost way for Belgium to attain prominence in Europe.”

Gaming out an eventual collapse of North Korea: American and South Korean officials have discussed the prospects for a unified Korea, should the North’s economic troubles and political transition lead the state to implode. The South Koreans even considered commercial inducements to China, according to the American ambassador to Seoul. She told Washington in February that South Korean officials believe that the right business deals would “help salve” China’s “concerns about living with a reunified Korea” that is in a “benign alliance” with the United States.

量太大，看来不会有人无偿翻了，只能自己去看英文。。

The US insisted that China act "urgently" to halt a transshipment of ballistic missile components from North Korea to Iran via Beijing and complained that at least 10 similar missile-related deliveries had been allowed to proceed unhindered.

The US also accused Chinese firms in May this year of supplying Iran with a key chemical weapons precursor and assistance with operating a chemical manufacturing plant.

An internal cable dated 3 November 2007 and signed by Condoleezza Rice, the then US secretary of state, says a North Korean cargo of missile jet vanes destined for the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, which runs Iran's solid-fuelled ballistic missile programme, was due to be shipped to Iran from Beijing on the following day aboard a scheduled Iran Air flight.

In what is termed an "urgent action request", Rice instructed the US ambassador to raise the issue "at the earliest opportunity" and "at the highest level possible" to persuade the Chinese authorities to halt the delivery. Rice told the envoy to remind the Chinese that George Bush had personally raised the shipment with the Chinese president, Hu Jintao, at a recent meeting – an indication of the importance Washington attached to the issue.

"The [state] department is seeking both immediate action ... and a strategic approach with regards to this critical issue," Rice's cable states. "We now have information that the goods will be shipped on 4 November and insist on a substantive response from China ... We assess that the best way to prevent these shipments in the future is for Chinese authorities to take action ... that will make the Beijing airport a less hospitable transfer point."

Washington's worries about Iran's conventionally armed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles are linked to suspicions that the missiles could be used to deliver a nuclear warhead should Iran develop the capability.

It is not known whether the US demarche induced the Chinese to halt the 4 November 2007 delivery, but regardless of that Iran's missile programme is making rapid advances. In May last year Iran successfully tested the Sejjil-2 two-stage solid fuel missile. Its range of up to 2,500km means it could reach Israel, Arab countries and parts of Europe. Both the Sejjil and the liquid-fuelled Shahab-3 missile, derived from a North Korean design, are theoretically nuclear capable.

Although North Korea continues to resist international anti-proliferation efforts, the US has put pressure on China to curtail its missile-related collaboration with Iran, which dates from the 1980s. The cable refers specifically to Iran's attempts to obtain tungsten-copper alloy plates from China's Dalian Sunny Industries.

In another cable, sent by secretary of state Hillary Clinton in May[205348], the US said it was concerned that exports by named Chinese firms "could be used for or diverted to a CW [chemical weapons] programme". Clinton asks whether the suspect transfers were approved by the Chinese government and warns that sanctions may be imposed.

"We request that the Chinese government take all steps necessary to investigate this matter and to prevent Iran from acquiring dual-use equipment and technology that could be used in its CW program."


Analysis of the Iranian missile threat last month by Arms Control Today suggested US pressure on Beijing has produced mixed results. "In a November 2000 commitment to the US, China pledged that it would not assist 'in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons' ... Nonetheless the US state department assesses that Chinese companies have continued to assist Iran's ballistic missile programme," it said.

In an almost desperate bid to get Beijing's attention the cable contains a so-called non-paper – an unofficial, non-binding message – for presentation to the Chinese. With American frustration barely concealed, the non-paper notes the US has raised its concerns with Chinese officials on numerous occasions and lists at least 10 instances in which it claims North Korean shipments of ballistic missiles parts to Iran passed unimpeded through Beijing.

"We believe that this trade will continue to utilise regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights ... We urge you to prevent such shipments via whatever action you deem appropriate," it says.

Series: US embassy cables: the documentsPrevious | Next | Index  US embassy cables: China urged to stop shipment of missile parts for Iran

Share7  guardian.co.uk, Sunday 28 November 2010 18.13 GMT Article historySaturday, 03 November 2007, 05:03
S E C R E T STATE 152317
EO 12958 DECL: 10/31/2027
TAGS PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: POST REQUESTED TO FOLLOW UP ON ONGOING MATTERS OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN RAISED AT APEC BY PRESIDENT BUSH
REF: (A)STATE 071143, (B)STATE 073601, (C)STATE 72896, (D)BEIJING 5361, (E) STATE 148514
CLASSIFIED BY EAP DAS THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

Summary
Condoleezza Rice instructs the US ambassador in Beijing to raise "at the highest level possible" that Chinese authorities should halt a delivery from North Korea of Iran of missile components that could be used on a nuclear bomb. Key passages highlighted in yellow.
Rice教导北京大使提高与中国当局的接触层次，告诉他们应该阻止北朝鲜发往伊朗的某些可用于核弹的导弹部件。

Read related article 1. (S) URGENT ACTION REQUEST: IN SEPTEMBER DURING THEIR MEETING AT THE APEC SUMMIT IN SYDNEY AUSTRALIA, PRESIDENT BUSH DISCUSSED WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT HU STRONG CONCERNS RELATING TO THE ONGOING TRANSSHIPMENT VIA BEIJING OF KEY BALLISTIC MISSILE PARTS FROM NORTH KOREA TO IRAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM. PRESIDENT BUSH PLEDGED TO RESPOND TO PRESIDENT HU'S REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. EMBASSY SHOULD ON NOVEMBER 3 AT THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEVEL POSSIBLE, DELIVER THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 8 WHICH RELATES TO SPECIFIC, TIME- SENSITIVE INFORMATION ABOUT AN IMMINENT TRANSSHIPMENT. IN ADDITION, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY POST SHOULD DELIVER THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 9 TO MFA AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BY THE AMBASSADOR SINCE THIS IS IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS.
九月份在悉尼的APEC峰会上，布什总统当面和胡总谈到了北朝鲜向伊朗提供弹道导弹的事情，胡总要求布什提供更多的相关信息，布什答应了胡总的要求。北京使馆应该在11月3号，在最有效的级别上，把下面第8条中的有关导弹运送的信息口头通知中方。另外，要尽可能早的把第9条中的信息由最高级别的官员通知给中国外交部，最好是由大使本人亲自来做，因为这是对总统间讨论的回应。

----------

OBJECTIVES

----------

2. (S/REL CHINA) Post should:

--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Request China to stop an imminent shipment to Iran's ballistic missile program. This is the same cargo that the Ambassador shared about on October 25 (ref E). It is now scheduled to leave Beijing airport on November 4.
11月3号: 要求中国阻止有关伊朗弹道导弹项目的发货，货机信息已经在10月25号通知了大使本人，按计划这批货物会在11月4号离开北京。

--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Note the importance of this demarche since it relates to a topic discussed by Presidents Bush and Hu in Sydney. Embassy should further note that the Embassy will be seeking an appointment at the highest level possible to convey a more extensive presentation on this topic of ballistic missile parts from North Korea to Iran.
注意政治手段的重要性，因为这事胡总和布什两人在悉尼讨论过了。大使馆应该促使中方在尽可能高的级别上来讨论北朝鲜向伊朗运送导弹部件这件事。

--Remind Chinese officials that President Bush has been personally engaged on the issue of the transshipment of ballistic missile parts between North Korea and Iran via Beijing and that he raised this issue with President Hu at the APEC Summit.
提醒中方官员，布什总统本人已经亲自就北朝鲜向伊朗运送导弹部件这件事在APEC峰会上和胡总讨论过了。

-- Seek information on the steps China has taken since the APEC discussion to address this issue and impress on them the necessity for China to take immediate strong action.
获取中方目自APEC会面以来已经采取了哪些措，并向中方解释立即采取 强硬措施的必要性。

-- Stress that the credibility of UN Security Council actions must be maintained by vigorous implementation by UN Member States of UNSC resolutions calling for Chapter VII sanctions, particularly 1718, 1737, and 1747.
告诉中方，根据联合国的制裁措施和第*****决议及安理会的权威性，中方必须采取措施（来阻止这次交易）

--Indicate that the U.S. believes that the proliferation of missile technology between North Korea and Iran will increase and that these two countries will attempt to conduct these transfers through Chinese territory.

--Emphasize the need to inspect cargo and personal goods on regularly scheduled flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to Iran in order to detect and deter these shipments.

--Explain to Chinese officials that the U.S. carefully reviews the intelligence material that we have on shipments before we share it, and we ask that Chinese authorities respect this and act on our information accordingly and appropriately.

--Indicate that the United States believes that we can work together cooperatively and effectively on these issues.

--Express our willingness to continue to share as much information as possible to assist China's efforts to uphold these UN Security Council resolutions.

--------------------------------------------- -------------

Background: Ballistic Missile Parts Shipped via Beijing Between North Korea and Iran.

--------------------------------------------- -------------

3. (S/Rel China) Iran and North Korea have continued their longstanding cooperation on ballistic missile technology, via air- shipments of ballistic-missile related items. We assess that some of these shipments consist of ballistic missile jet vanes that frequently transit Beijing on regularly scheduled flights on Air Koryo and Iran Air. We believe that the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is the probable end user for these parts. SBIG is listed in the annex to UNSCR 1737 and these jet vanes are controlled under Item 10.A.2 of the Missile Technology Control Regime and Item 6 of China's missile- related export control regulations. Moreover, UNSCRs 1718 and 1737 prohibit the transfer to or from North Korea or Iran, respectively, of jet vanes and any other item listed in UNSC document S/2006/815. These shipments therefore represent violations of UNSCRs 1718 and 1737.

4. (S/Rel China) The U.S. has raised this issue with China at the highest levels several times in the last few months. In May 2007, the United States informed China of imminent shipments on three separate occasions (Refs A,B and C). Though Chinese officials informed Embassy Beijing that China's investigations have found no evidence of these transfers, it appears that these shipments did occur and are continuing to transit via Beijing. In addition this issue was raised by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney during bilateral nonproliferation talks in August 2007 (Ref D). The Deputy Secretary also raised this issue with Executive Vice Foreign Minister (EVFM) Dai Bingguo via during a telephone conversation in August. Finally, in September 2007, President Bush discussed this issue with Chinese President Hu at the APEC summit in Sydney. The two leaders agreed that the USG would provide the PRC with further information on these transfers.

5. (S/Rel China) On October 25 the U.S. provided PRC officials with detailed information, including the airway bill and flight number, of another imminent shipment of military related goods from North Korea to Iran via Beijing. This shipment was also assessed as destined for Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG). We now have information that the goods will be shipped on November 4 and insist on a substantive response from China to this information.

6. (S/Rel China) Our information indicates that at least 10 air shipments of jet vanes have transited Beijing thus far and that these shipments will not only continue but will also grow in volume. We have encouraged the Chinese to undertake frequent inspections of cargo on Air Koryo or Iran Air flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to both deter and detect these shipments.

7. (S/Rel China) The Department is seeking both immediate action on this new information and a strategic approach with regards to this critical issue. We assess that the best way to prevent these shipments in the future is for Chinese authorities to take action, such as those identified in para 9, that will make the Beijing airport a less hospitable transfer point.

--------------------------------------------- --------

NON-PAPER ON URGENT MATTER TO BE DELIVERED NOVEMBER 3

--------------------------------------------- --------

8. (S/Rel China) Begin points:

-- Last week we raised with you information regarding North Korean plans to send a shipment, probably for Iran's ballistic missile program, to Iran. We believe the cargo is intended for Iran's Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's solid-propellant ballistic missile program. You had requested additional information.

-- We now have reason to believe that the items above will be shipped to Iran via scheduled Iran Air flight on November 4.

--If these goods are missile-related, North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these concerns in mind we are asking that Chinese authorities investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.

------------------------------------------

BEGIN NON-PAPER FOR DELIVERY BY AMBASSADOR

------------------------------------------

9. (S/REL CHINA) Begin Points:

--Over the past several months we have raised with Chinese officials the problem of ballistic missile-related transfers between Iran and North Korea being transshipped through China. President Bush raised U.S. concerns on this matter with President Hu during the APEC summit in Sydney, demonstrating the importance of the issue to the United States. In response to President Hu's request for additional details, we are providing you further information regarding these activities. Specifically, we are urgently providing information regarding an imminent shipment of serious concern.

-- North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile- related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these concerns in mind we are insisting that Chinese authorities urgently investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.

--We are very concerned that North Korean shipments of jet vanes occur on regularly scheduled commercial air flights transiting through Beijing. We believe this has been the case on about 10 flights.

--These items are likely intended for Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG).

--These cargo shipments probably include front companies.

--We have identified a large number of shipments beginning late last year of what are probably ballistic missile-related items that have transited Beijing, and we would like to share further information on these shipments.

--[DETAILS REMOVED] December 2006: A delegation from SBIG returned from Pyongyang probably via Beijing and transported what we assess to be jet vanes for a solid propellant medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) under development in Iran.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] January 2007: North Korea delivered what were probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or around [DETAILS REMOVED] January 2007: North Korea delivered what were probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] May 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] May 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

-- On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of three what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] July 2007: An air shipment composed of ten what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] July 2007: An air shipment possibly composed of an unknown number of jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] August: An air shipment possibly composed of one jet vane from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--We believe that the number of jet vanes sent to Iran will increase dramatically in the future.

--To date we believe that about 40 probable jet vanes have been sent from North Korea to Iran.

--The contract for these components called for a total number of 500 and we assess that shipments of these may increase to a rate of 100- 160 per month.

--In addition, our information indicates that a second order of 1,500 components - possibly additional jet vanes - was agreed to in December of last year.

-- We believe that this trade will continue to utilize regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--As we have discussed on several occasions, Iran also has been seeking probable tungsten-copper alloy plates from China's Dalian Sunny Industries, also known as LIMMT. Dalian Sunny Industries shipped part of an order for this material in September. These plates are suitable for Iranian domestic production of jet vanes or as an insulator for ballistic missile components. Iran could be seeking these plates in case North Korea is unable to provide the quantity or quality of jet vanes required.

--We urge you to prevent such shipments via whatever action you deem appropriate, including frequent inspection of [NAMES REMOVED] flights. The use of regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights indicates that frequent regular inspections of [NAMESREMOVED] flights are in order and would help deter these shipments in the future.

--We will continue to provide you with relevant information to help end this proliferation.

------------------------------

Reporting Requirement and POC

------------------------------

10. (U) Please report delivery of cable and any immediate response by November 8, 2007.

11. (U) Washington point-of-contact for follow-up information is Matthew Zartman (202) 647-7588, zartmanml@state.sgov.gov. Please slug all responses for ISN, T, and EAP. Washington appreciates Post's assistance.

RICE

Series: US embassy cables: the documentsPrevious | Next | Index  US embassy cables: China urged to stop shipment of missile parts for Iran

Share7  guardian.co.uk, Sunday 28 November 2010 18.13 GMT Article historySaturday, 03 November 2007, 05:03
S E C R E T STATE 152317
EO 12958 DECL: 10/31/2027
TAGS PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: POST REQUESTED TO FOLLOW UP ON ONGOING MATTERS OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN RAISED AT APEC BY PRESIDENT BUSH
REF: (A)STATE 071143, (B)STATE 073601, (C)STATE 72896, (D)BEIJING 5361, (E) STATE 148514
CLASSIFIED BY EAP DAS THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

Summary
Condoleezza Rice instructs the US ambassador in Beijing to raise "at the highest level possible" that Chinese authorities should halt a delivery from North Korea of Iran of missile components that could be used on a nuclear bomb. Key passages highlighted in yellow.
Rice教导北京大使提高与中国当局的接触层次，告诉他们应该阻止北朝鲜发往伊朗的某些可用于核弹的导弹部件。

Read related article 1. (S) URGENT ACTION REQUEST: IN SEPTEMBER DURING THEIR MEETING AT THE APEC SUMMIT IN SYDNEY AUSTRALIA, PRESIDENT BUSH DISCUSSED WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT HU STRONG CONCERNS RELATING TO THE ONGOING TRANSSHIPMENT VIA BEIJING OF KEY BALLISTIC MISSILE PARTS FROM NORTH KOREA TO IRAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM. PRESIDENT BUSH PLEDGED TO RESPOND TO PRESIDENT HU'S REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. EMBASSY SHOULD ON NOVEMBER 3 AT THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEVEL POSSIBLE, DELIVER THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 8 WHICH RELATES TO SPECIFIC, TIME- SENSITIVE INFORMATION ABOUT AN IMMINENT TRANSSHIPMENT. IN ADDITION, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY POST SHOULD DELIVER THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 9 TO MFA AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BY THE AMBASSADOR SINCE THIS IS IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS.
九月份在悉尼的APEC峰会上，布什总统当面和胡总谈到了北朝鲜向伊朗提供弹道导弹的事情，胡总要求布什提供更多的相关信息，布什答应了胡总的要求。北京使馆应该在11月3号，在最有效的级别上，把下面第8条中的有关导弹运送的信息口头通知中方。另外，要尽可能早的把第9条中的信息由最高级别的官员通知给中国外交部，最好是由大使本人亲自来做，因为这是对总统间讨论的回应。

----------

OBJECTIVES

----------

2. (S/REL CHINA) Post should:

--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Request China to stop an imminent shipment to Iran's ballistic missile program. This is the same cargo that the Ambassador shared about on October 25 (ref E). It is now scheduled to leave Beijing airport on November 4.
11月3号: 要求中国阻止有关伊朗弹道导弹项目的发货，货机信息已经在10月25号通知了大使本人，按计划这批货物会在11月4号离开北京。

--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Note the importance of this demarche since it relates to a topic discussed by Presidents Bush and Hu in Sydney. Embassy should further note that the Embassy will be seeking an appointment at the highest level possible to convey a more extensive presentation on this topic of ballistic missile parts from North Korea to Iran.
注意政治手段的重要性，因为这事胡总和布什两人在悉尼讨论过了。大使馆应该促使中方在尽可能高的级别上来讨论北朝鲜向伊朗运送导弹部件这件事。

--Remind Chinese officials that President Bush has been personally engaged on the issue of the transshipment of ballistic missile parts between North Korea and Iran via Beijing and that he raised this issue with President Hu at the APEC Summit.
提醒中方官员，布什总统本人已经亲自就北朝鲜向伊朗运送导弹部件这件事在APEC峰会上和胡总讨论过了。

-- Seek information on the steps China has taken since the APEC discussion to address this issue and impress on them the necessity for China to take immediate strong action.
获取中方目自APEC会面以来已经采取了哪些措，并向中方解释立即采取 强硬措施的必要性。

-- Stress that the credibility of UN Security Council actions must be maintained by vigorous implementation by UN Member States of UNSC resolutions calling for Chapter VII sanctions, particularly 1718, 1737, and 1747.
告诉中方，根据联合国的制裁措施和第*****决议及安理会的权威性，中方必须采取措施（来阻止这次交易）

--Indicate that the U.S. believes that the proliferation of missile technology between North Korea and Iran will increase and that these two countries will attempt to conduct these transfers through Chinese territory.

--Emphasize the need to inspect cargo and personal goods on regularly scheduled flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to Iran in order to detect and deter these shipments.

--Explain to Chinese officials that the U.S. carefully reviews the intelligence material that we have on shipments before we share it, and we ask that Chinese authorities respect this and act on our information accordingly and appropriately.

--Indicate that the United States believes that we can work together cooperatively and effectively on these issues.

--Express our willingness to continue to share as much information as possible to assist China's efforts to uphold these UN Security Council resolutions.

--------------------------------------------- -------------

Background: Ballistic Missile Parts Shipped via Beijing Between North Korea and Iran.

--------------------------------------------- -------------

3. (S/Rel China) Iran and North Korea have continued their longstanding cooperation on ballistic missile technology, via air- shipments of ballistic-missile related items. We assess that some of these shipments consist of ballistic missile jet vanes that frequently transit Beijing on regularly scheduled flights on Air Koryo and Iran Air. We believe that the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is the probable end user for these parts. SBIG is listed in the annex to UNSCR 1737 and these jet vanes are controlled under Item 10.A.2 of the Missile Technology Control Regime and Item 6 of China's missile- related export control regulations. Moreover, UNSCRs 1718 and 1737 prohibit the transfer to or from North Korea or Iran, respectively, of jet vanes and any other item listed in UNSC document S/2006/815. These shipments therefore represent violations of UNSCRs 1718 and 1737.

4. (S/Rel China) The U.S. has raised this issue with China at the highest levels several times in the last few months. In May 2007, the United States informed China of imminent shipments on three separate occasions (Refs A,B and C). Though Chinese officials informed Embassy Beijing that China's investigations have found no evidence of these transfers, it appears that these shipments did occur and are continuing to transit via Beijing. In addition this issue was raised by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney during bilateral nonproliferation talks in August 2007 (Ref D). The Deputy Secretary also raised this issue with Executive Vice Foreign Minister (EVFM) Dai Bingguo via during a telephone conversation in August. Finally, in September 2007, President Bush discussed this issue with Chinese President Hu at the APEC summit in Sydney. The two leaders agreed that the USG would provide the PRC with further information on these transfers.

5. (S/Rel China) On October 25 the U.S. provided PRC officials with detailed information, including the airway bill and flight number, of another imminent shipment of military related goods from North Korea to Iran via Beijing. This shipment was also assessed as destined for Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG). We now have information that the goods will be shipped on November 4 and insist on a substantive response from China to this information.

6. (S/Rel China) Our information indicates that at least 10 air shipments of jet vanes have transited Beijing thus far and that these shipments will not only continue but will also grow in volume. We have encouraged the Chinese to undertake frequent inspections of cargo on Air Koryo or Iran Air flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to both deter and detect these shipments.

7. (S/Rel China) The Department is seeking both immediate action on this new information and a strategic approach with regards to this critical issue. We assess that the best way to prevent these shipments in the future is for Chinese authorities to take action, such as those identified in para 9, that will make the Beijing airport a less hospitable transfer point.

--------------------------------------------- --------

NON-PAPER ON URGENT MATTER TO BE DELIVERED NOVEMBER 3

--------------------------------------------- --------

8. (S/Rel China) Begin points:

-- Last week we raised with you information regarding North Korean plans to send a shipment, probably for Iran's ballistic missile program, to Iran. We believe the cargo is intended for Iran's Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's solid-propellant ballistic missile program. You had requested additional information.

-- We now have reason to believe that the items above will be shipped to Iran via scheduled Iran Air flight on November 4.

--If these goods are missile-related, North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these concerns in mind we are asking that Chinese authorities investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.

------------------------------------------

BEGIN NON-PAPER FOR DELIVERY BY AMBASSADOR

------------------------------------------

9. (S/REL CHINA) Begin Points:

--Over the past several months we have raised with Chinese officials the problem of ballistic missile-related transfers between Iran and North Korea being transshipped through China. President Bush raised U.S. concerns on this matter with President Hu during the APEC summit in Sydney, demonstrating the importance of the issue to the United States. In response to President Hu's request for additional details, we are providing you further information regarding these activities. Specifically, we are urgently providing information regarding an imminent shipment of serious concern.

-- North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile- related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these concerns in mind we are insisting that Chinese authorities urgently investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.

--We are very concerned that North Korean shipments of jet vanes occur on regularly scheduled commercial air flights transiting through Beijing. We believe this has been the case on about 10 flights.

--These items are likely intended for Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG).

--These cargo shipments probably include front companies.

--We have identified a large number of shipments beginning late last year of what are probably ballistic missile-related items that have transited Beijing, and we would like to share further information on these shipments.

--[DETAILS REMOVED] December 2006: A delegation from SBIG returned from Pyongyang probably via Beijing and transported what we assess to be jet vanes for a solid propellant medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) under development in Iran.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] January 2007: North Korea delivered what were probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or around [DETAILS REMOVED] January 2007: North Korea delivered what were probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] May 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] May 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

-- On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of three what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] July 2007: An air shipment composed of ten what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] July 2007: An air shipment possibly composed of an unknown number of jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] August: An air shipment possibly composed of one jet vane from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--We believe that the number of jet vanes sent to Iran will increase dramatically in the future.

--To date we believe that about 40 probable jet vanes have been sent from North Korea to Iran.

--The contract for these components called for a total number of 500 and we assess that shipments of these may increase to a rate of 100- 160 per month.

--In addition, our information indicates that a second order of 1,500 components - possibly additional jet vanes - was agreed to in December of last year.

-- We believe that this trade will continue to utilize regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--As we have discussed on several occasions, Iran also has been seeking probable tungsten-copper alloy plates from China's Dalian Sunny Industries, also known as LIMMT. Dalian Sunny Industries shipped part of an order for this material in September. These plates are suitable for Iranian domestic production of jet vanes or as an insulator for ballistic missile components. Iran could be seeking these plates in case North Korea is unable to provide the quantity or quality of jet vanes required.

--We urge you to prevent such shipments via whatever action you deem appropriate, including frequent inspection of [NAMES REMOVED] flights. The use of regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights indicates that frequent regular inspections of [NAMESREMOVED] flights are in order and would help deter these shipments in the future.

--We will continue to provide you with relevant information to help end this proliferation.

------------------------------

Reporting Requirement and POC

------------------------------

10. (U) Please report delivery of cable and any immediate response by November 8, 2007.

11. (U) Washington point-of-contact for follow-up information is Matthew Zartman (202) 647-7588, zartmanml@state.sgov.gov. Please slug all responses for ISN, T, and EAP. Washington appreciates Post's assistance.

RICE

, 02 December 2009, 17:17
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 UNVIE VIENNA 000540
SIPDIS
FOR P, T, H, ISN, S/SANAC, IO, NEA, SCA, EAP
H PLS PASS STAFFDEL AS APPROPRIATE
DOE FOR S2 AND NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, RYU, TALWAR
EO 12958 DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS PREL, KNNP, AORC, IR, SY, KN, IN
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER EXAMINES IRAN, SYRIA, AND
MULTILATERAL VIENNA'S FRUSTRATING NAM DYNAMIC
REF: EMBASSY VIENNA 1450
Classified By: Mark Scheland, Counselor for Nuclear Policy; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
UN nuclear inspectors told US officials in Vienna they were not satisfied with their late 2009 inspection of Iran's Fordow reactor, which is under construction in a mountainside near Qom. During the inspection the Iranian officials were "steered by unseen observers who send notes to the Iranian interlocutors during meetings". Key passage highlighted in yellow.

Read related article 1. (S) Summary: HFAC staffers Richard Kessler and David Fite received from IAEA Secretariat November 10 information on the Iran case that tracked with the tone of the subsequent Director General's reporting on Iran to the Board of Governors. The STAFFDEL heard that contact with Iran over "possible military dimensions" of the nuclear program was at an "absolute stalemate." According to Safeguards regional division director Herman Nackaerts, IAEA inspectors' first visit to the enrichment facility under construction near Qom had run predictably but without extraordinary responsiveness on Iran's part; the Secretariat was still trying to understand the motivation to build the plant as now designed. Nackaerts described the frustrating limitations of Iran's cooperation with the Agency, and the STAFFDEL deduced that Iranian officials held back because they were uncertain about what lines of inquiry the IAEA was best equipped to exploit. Questioning then-DG ElBaradei's remark to media that the Agency had found "nothing to worry about" in Qom, STAFFDEL asked if the Secretariat would report on how it judged the plant did or did not fit into Iran's publicly explained nuclear program. Nackaerts expressed appreciation for the precision and usefulness of U.S.-supplied information in the Qom case and generally.

2. (C) Summary contd.: On Syria, Nackaerts said the Secretariat had told Damascus its first explanation for the presence of anthropogenic uranium at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor was not credible. Further, the Secretariat still could not yet present the case for how what was being built at Dair Alzour fit in as "part of a Syrian program or part of someone else's program." On DPRK, IAEA/EXPO's Tariq Rauf said the IAEA, when it could, would ultimately have to "go back to the early 1990s" to reconstruct accountancy of plutonium and could not accept a "political" compromise setting material "off to the side." To get to a finding of "no diversion" would take several years and extensive resources and forensics.

3. (SBU) Contd.: Treating Technical Cooperation, the STAFFDEL received the same briefing on the Safeguards Department's project review process and internal database that was provided to a GAO review team in 2008. IAEA External Relations Director Rauf asserted, "We are not a denial organization." STAFFDEL related how segments of the GAO report had reduced Congressional confidence in the efficiency of TC. U.S. national labs were afforded too little time to review projects for our national decision-making on their merit and proliferation risk. Secretariat also described hindrances it faces in having UN and national development officials recognize and integrate nuclear applications.

4. (SBU) Contd.: The STAFFDEL also engaged P5-plus-1 heads of mission over lunch on the means to draw or impel Iran to open up on its nuclear program and on dynamics in Vienna between blocs of Member States. End Summary.

Fordow/Qom and Iran PMD: Frustration, but Good Support from the U.S.

-------------------------------------

5. (U) House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Majority Staff Director Richard Kessler and Professional Staff Member David Fite (STAFFDEL) spent ninety minutes with IAEA staff on November 10. Principal issues were safeguards verification in Iran and Syria, the screening of IAEA Technical Cooperation (TC) projects for proliferation risk, and TC Department efforts to improve project design and integration into national and UN development activities. STAFFDEL affirmed to Secretariat officials that the HFAC under Chairman Berman: was strongly supportive of the IAEA; put emphasis on counter-proliferation issues in countries of concern (indeed, was weighing legislation to impose further U.S. sanctions on Iran); had advocated an increase in NADR funding for extrabudgetary contributions to the IAEA, including for the Safeguards Analytical laboratory; and, supported "getting the U.S. up to date" on payment of its assessments to the IAEA's regular budget. Following the meeting at the IAEA, STAFFDEL consulted Ambassador and Mission staff and had a working lunch with P5-plus-1 heads of mission focused on Iran and the dynamics of multilateral

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diplomacy in Vienna. STAFFDEL's UNVIE program followed a day of consultations with Austrian officials (reftel).

6. (SBU) IAEA Safeguards Department Operations B (AOR Mideast, South Asia, parts of Europe, the Americas, and all nuclear weapons states) Director Herman Nackaerts briefed STAFFDEL on the inspection he had led a few weeks before to the recently disclosed Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom in Iran. Nackaerts said Iranian officials had been open to allowing inspectors access. The Secretariat was still trying to understand, he said, why Iran would build this facility, scaled as it was for 3000 centrifuges in contrast to the much large Natanz facility. It was positive, Nackaerts pointed out, that Fordow was now under safeguards. He noted that the IAEA had "at least two" safeguards inspectors at work in Iran "every day of the year" and would henceforth plan to visit Fordow regularly. Asked how "complete" the plant was or when it would be operational, Nackaerts said, "The information we got from Member States proved to be very precise" on this point. Asked about permission to take samples at Fordow, Nackaerts replied that Iranian officials had permitted the inspectors to perform the same safeguards procedures they typically undertook at Natanz.

7. (S) STAFFDEL asked if the Agency enjoyed full access to the Arak IR-40 plant. Nackaerts related there had been no access for a 12-month period but normal access in August and October 2009. However, the Iranians "claim they cannot go back on the decision of their parliament, and hence grant the IAEA a "visit" but do not call it Design Information Verification. On possible military dimensions (PMD), Nackaerts said the Secretariat's approach was to follow lines of inquiry that could involve use of nuclear material, for example, the documents treating uranium metal or green salt. The Iranians, he said in a tone conveying his skepticism, asserted the uranium metal document was "mistakenly" included in a packet of information they received from the AQ Khan network but was nothing Iran had asked for or used. The "green salt" documentation Iran dismissed as a forgery. Indeed, Nackaerts went on, Iran replied basically on the form of documents, not on their substance. The Secretariat had not been "impressed" by the 117-page rejoinder Iran had provided to the initial presentation of PMD documentation. It had told Iran the information hung together too much for it all to have bee fabricated and asked that, if some of the documentation were "doctored," Iranian officials should show the Secretariat "where the truth ends." Since August 2008, (when Ahmadinejad personally shut off Nackaerts's previously approved visit to workshops indicated in the documentation), Nackaerts concluded, there remained a high-level decision not to cooperate. STAFFDEL member Fite took from this that the Iranians were holding back "because they don't know where any opening will lead." Nackaerts agreed, saying they knew that every question they answered would bring another question.

8. (S) Fite alluded to then-DG ElBaradei's remarks of a few days before in U.S. media to the effect that the inspectors had found "nothing to worry about" in Fordow. Acknowledging the practical meaning of this remark -- that there were no centrifuges or nuclear material present -- Fite nevertheless regretted the headline and asked if the DG's formal report to Board members (Note: subsequently released as GOV/2009/74, deresticted by the Board November 27, and available to the public at www.iaea.org) would deal with how Qom fits or does not fit into Iran's explained nuclear program. Nackaerts replied, "We will identify the issues we're working." He went on that understanding the timeline of Fordow's development was hindered by Iran's practice never to involve people who really know the facts or the government's intentions in discussion with the Agency. The officials with whom inspectors meet clearly are "steered" by unseen observers, who send notes to the Iranian interlocutors during meetings. Iran recorded the meetings, he added, but did not permit the IAEA to do so. Further, the Secretariat never received original design documents, but ones produced for the Secretariat that were technically true to the facilities they found upon inspection. Against this Iranian practice, Nackaerts added, the Secretariat received very precise information from Member States that helped inspectors decide what to ask about. The organization of this information was good and, while the Agency was satisfied, it had inquired if more information could be shared with the Agency, "not necessarily for release to Iran," he said.

Syria Stalemate

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9. (SBU) The Syria case, Nackaerts said, was starting to look like Iran in that the government provided "good cooperation" on some areas but presented a "stalemate" on others. The Secretariat challenged Syria's proposed explanation for the presence of uranium at Dair Alzour/Al Kibar (i.e., that Israeli depleted uranium munitions could be the source), but the inquiry was at a roadblock. Syrian officials had been told their first explanation for anthropogenic uranium at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) was not credible, and the Agency had inquired what nuclear material Syria could have had that was not previously declared. Overall, the IAEA still "did not understand" (meaning, it could not yet present the solid case for) how Dair Alzour fit in as part of a Syrian nuclear program "or part of someone else's program."

Return to DPRK? Safeguards in India?

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10. (SBU) Asked how quickly IAEA inspectors could resume work in North Korea if re-admitted by the government, Tariq Rauf of IAEA External Relations and Policy Coordination (EXPO) observed that the last resumption had taken a week (for technical set-up, re-activation of cameras, etc.). Safeguards Operations A division had a program set out for what steps to undertake "under circumstances the DPRK may let us back in." Rauf continued that the Agency would to go back to the early 1990s' plutonium revelation to reconstruct material accountancy. When most recently in the DPRK, the IAEA had been monitoring facility shutdown processes but not implementing NPT safeguards on DPRK material. The Agency could "not accept" political compromises that would set some nuclear material "off to the side". Then-DG ElBaradei had called for implementation of the Additional Protocol in DPRK, but even if Pyongyang cooperated fully it would take several years and much in the way of resources and forensics to be able to get to a finding of "no diversion."

11. (SBU) Asked about progress toward safeguards implementation in India, Rauf confirmed the GOI had submitted a "formal list" of facilities that was not a document the Agency would characterize as a formal declaration under its safeguards agreement. India was under no mandatory timeline to make its declaration as it was not an NPT signatory. (Comment: Rauf's characterization was flat wrong. Mission had learned from the Safeguards Department three weeks before this meeting that India had officially "notified" two new facilities (Raps 5 and 6) under its 2008 safeguards agreement, that surveillance systems had been installed, and the facilities were under safeguards. End Comment.)

Scrutinizing and Promoting IAEA Technical Cooperation

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12. (U) Renaud Chatelus of the Safeguards Division of Information Management (SGIM) acquainted STAFFDEL with IAEA screening of Technical Cooperation (TC) projects for their potential to afford access to sensitive technologies. Grounded in a 1979 Agency Information Circular, INFCIRC/267, the practice is to focus on projects related to enrichment, heavy water production, reprocessing of spent fuel, and plutonium or mixed oxide fuel. Chatelus said SGIM reviewed projects submitted, project approved, individual procurement actions, and overall implementation of projects. Reviews are conducted completely in-house, he said in reply to a question. Using the same PowerPoint slides that were presented to a GAO review team in 2008, Chatelus illustrated with screen shots from the Agency's staff access-only database the system of flagging projects for: compliance with INFCIRC 267, compliance with INFCIRC 540 (Additional Protocol), transfer of "sensitive items" on the Nuclear Suppliers Group or dual-use lists, general interest, or possible relation to a safeguarded facility. In subsequent discussion of the impact of screening and Member States' sense of entitlement to TC, EXPO's Tariq Rauf affirmed, "We are not a denial organization."

13. (U) STAFFDEL member Fite observed that segments of the GAO report treating transfers to state sponsors of terrorism as well as on program management had reduced Congressional confidence about TC. Fite said he had approached Appropriations staff about using a supplemental funding bill

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to resolve slow U.S. payment of assessments and do more for the Agency, but was rebuffed because the GAO report on TC had "poisoned the waters." Apart from political objections to certain TC recipients benefitting from U.S. funding, he added, a persisting "Achilles heel" was that U.S. national labs were afforded too little time to review projects for our national decision-making on their merit and proliferation risk. TC Department representative Johannes Seybold replied that the Agency aimed to provide Member States six weeks time for review, but was also at the mercy of requesting states providing the relevant project information. Just the compendium of project titles and short descriptions became a very thick document in each biennial cycle, Seybold went on, and the Agency was "struggling" with some Member States' national policies to be able to go beyond this level of transparency.

14. (U) STAFFDEL's meeting with Secretariat officials concluded in an exchange with Seybold, TC's section head for strategy and partnerships, about the IAEA's awkward position in development efforts coordinated by the UN or by developing countries' national institutions. Seybold laid out the following. The IAEA's cooperation with TC recipient states occurs through National Liaison Officers, generally in the atomic energy commission or government ministry responsible for nuclear power or radiological sources. Generally, neither the IAEA nor the corresponding national entity is a participant in UN development team or host government deliberations about development in the recipient country. Two-thirds of TC projects address development issues for which the IAEA is not the responsible lead agency in the UN system, e.g., water quality and availability, food security, climate. In many cases, national authorities and the UN team responsible for these areas in a given country lack awareness of IAEA capabilities, and/or they maintain a distance from things "nuclear." Seybold related Agency efforts to integrate with these authorities through the UNDAF (UN Development Assistance Framework) process and other partnering efforts. STAFFDEL expressed encouragement for bringing nuclear applications to greater impact in the development field.

P5-plus-1 Ambassadors Regret Iranian Paralysis on TRR; Depict Grim Dynamic with G-77/NAM

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15. (C) STAFFDEL was the guests of honor at lunch hosted by the Ambassador with his counterparts from China, Germany, Russia, and the UK and the French Charge d'Affaires. Kessler and Fite laid out HFAC's interest and Chairman Berman's supportive posture toward the Agency, as they had for Secretariat staff. Opening discussion of Iran, UK Ambassador Simon Smith said the Iranian answer on the ElBaradei-brokered deal on refueling the Tehran research reactor (TRR) "had to be 'yes' or 'no,' not waffling" as it had been. German Ambassador Ruediger Luedeking posited that the U.S. Administration had confounded Iranian internal processes and the latest EU3 proposal had "cornered" Iran. Agreeing that Iran faced an imperative between "yes" and "no," Luedeking observed, "they can't answer." HFAC Staff Director Kessler noted the committee had tried to follow up a Larijani approach conveyed one year before for a meeting with Chairman Berman, but found that the Iranians backed off.

16. (C) Russian Ambassador Alexander Zmeyevskiy asserted that confidentiality was a major concern for Iran. He noted its TRR counter-proposals, either to keep its LEU on its territory under IAEA safeguards until released in exchange for fuel rods, or to swap outgoing LEU piecemeal for incoming fuel assemblies. Moving beyond the TRR issue, UK Ambassador said he was severely disappointed that Member States had been unable to "apply consequences for the breaking of rules" of the organization. We needed to convince some other Member States, he continued, that tolerating rule breaking as on Qom and Code 3.1 (of the Subsidiary Arrangement of Iran's Safeguards Agreement) risked bringing the organization into discredit. STAFFDEL member Fite asked if Iran's Arab neighbors were among the problem interlocutors in Vienna; he asserted that officials of Arabian Peninsula countries told the Congress they see Iran as an "existential threat." While they may seek the cover of international signals or sanctions imposed by others, they say they do want action against Iran.

17. (C) Segueing from Iran to DPRK, Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi said the main difference between the cases was that progress with DPRK had been achieved when the North Koreans

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wanted something specific, whereas he (Hu) had never heard Iranian officials say that they wanted a settlement, or that they wanted anything specific. Although we did not at present know "how" to reach a deal with Iran, Hu concluded, we were not in the worst situation, in which Iran explicitly does want something -- nuclear weapons. Asked if he genuinely thought the DPRK would give up its weapons program for aid, Hu said "hope" (as opposed to "think.") Ambassador Davies seriously questioned that Pyongyang would give up a weapons capability in exchange for a significant material improvement in our relations, as the government would likely calculate it had been its possession of weapons that won the concessions.

18. (SBU) Ambassador turned the discussion to the dynamic between groups of Member States, as illustrated in the ongoing discussion of a Technical Cooperation project to advance IAEA use of "results based management." The German Ambassador observed that NAM positions on many issues were characterized by "myths" and they were clearly being dictated by Iran and Egypt. Ambassador Davies asked if the dynamic was further charged by states beginning to suspect that the U.S. seriously intends to strengthen the Agency in all its functions -- with the uncertain shifts in practice and distribution of resources and clout that could mean. STAFFDEL lead Kessler said the Congressional perception was one of a "lightning change" from the last Administration to the present one in U.S. approaches to the IAEA, to development assistance globally, and to multilateralism. German Ambassador agreed and said this was a complication for NAM states that know they are the immobile ones now. Yet, TC was a "sacred cow" and the NAM's impulse was to reject "illegitimate intrusion" into its distribution.

19. (SBU) French Charge Philippe Merlin discouraged STAFFDEL from expecting diplomatic gains, say in the NPT review, through greater generosity on IAEA peaceful use programs. "TC is the price we pay," he said, for developing countries' acquiescence toward the safeguards regime, the thing we really want. Fite asked if a reasoned discussion with development officials in capitals about making TC deliver more impact could translate into different instructions to the obstreperous missions in Vienna. German Ambassador took the view that any effort to change TC would be seen in capitals as "per se bad." It was more advisable to advocate to NAM states what their own interests in the safeguards regime were. UK Ambassador agreed there were no points to be scored by asking NAM capitals about TC effectiveness; he added that the UK Government "doesn't give two hoots" about TC, given the small funding level (from the UK Energy Ministry) in comparison to Britain's official development assistance. TC was, also in the UK view, the price we pay for the IAEA we want.

20. (U) STAFFDEL did not review this report.

DAVIES

回复 14# exiaoyu


我就是要发链接，结果系统要审核。。郁闷

ls你转得太快了。。我看得没你转得快。。
这些消息是真的还是假的啊？刚开始一看感觉有点像那么回事，但又觉得如果是假消息跟真消息混在一起出来，那可是个不错的宣传手段。比如如果把“美国在伊拉克的暴行”和“中国放任朝伊导弹交易”放在一起，那对中国在白佬们眼里的形象还真是有杀伤力。

muenchenstern 发表于 2010-11-29 05:04

有时候会莫名其妙的。

中国提供伊朗导弹技术是老新闻了，没啥新意

回复 24# macros

里面有个数据库，可以直接查找和中国相关的信息。后面这几个都是。应该是真消息。

有关中国的还不是特别震撼，看看中东有关伊朗，沙特，以色列等，那才。。。。。。

我不会被请喝茶吧？？？

muenchenstern 发表于 2010-11-29 05:12


你要是这样被请喝茶，也是表功，嘿嘿。

我当一回打脸党，wikileaks在英国打不开，不知道在美国如何。原因，我想大抵跟facebook在中国打不开一样。

微机解密能弄到这些文件,说明老美情报系统漏洞太大

zhystars 发表于 2010-11-29 05:19


    现在打不开是因为太多人上，我这顶上就说too many requests

CNN的新闻上说CNN无法取得查看这些文件的授权，被回复ROFL

泄露的消息也不算太震惊啊

muenchenstern 发表于 2010-11-29 05:11


    求个链接啊……维基解密我这里根本打不开……

汝儿乃我 发表于 2010-11-29 05:25


    你把霉菌想象得过于简单了，说不定是故意泄密呢

美帝又不是铁板一块  看谁从泄密获益了

我看这个网站压根儿就是美国情报部门的一个分支，关键时刻可以用来误导对手

善于撒谎的人，只在关键的地方撒谎，其他地方说的都是真话。

暴风烈火 发表于 2010-11-29 06:24


    到现在为止泄露出去的60余万份文件中，涉及军队，情报，外交，以及各个国家，实在想不出你为什么会认为都是霉菌故意泄露出去的，这里有不少文件霉菌可能都不知道。况且涉及这么多方面的利益和面子，如何磨合，如何沟通，每个文件该不该泄露如何决定，如果真是像你所说下大棋一般的“故意为之”的话，60万份文件挨个甄别估计能先让他们内部吵个天翻地覆。

所以啊，理性思考并不是碰到什么事情就高喊“这背后有文章”“肯定是故意的”。