美国国防部发布的中国人民解放军2009年度军力报告原文， ...

你的翻译呢

我靠，标题党啊，严重鄙视！

嗯
不错
上面的字全认识

原帖由 cjp324 于 2009-3-27 13:34 发表
嗯
不错
上面的字全认识

嗯
不错
上面的字母全认识

原帖由 racher 于 2009-3-27 14:58 发表


嗯
不错
上面的字母全认识

嗯
不错
上面的老鹰我认识

原帖由 seeyou 于 2009-3-27 15:00 发表


嗯
不错
上面的老鹰我认识

嗯
不错
上面的星星我认识

原帖由 浙南山人 于 2009-3-27 15:12 发表

嗯
不错
上面的星星我认识

嗯
不错
上面的树枝我认识

嗯
不错
上面的我认识

除了中国军力报告之外，美国还关注哪些其他国家呢？俄罗斯的报告有不啦？

现在沦落到一个封面有7个单词不认识的地步了。

恩
不错
上面的俄文我全认识:D

恩
不错
上面的拼音我全认识

原帖由 光荣的寒假党 于 2009-3-27 16:50 发表
现在沦落到一个封面有7个单词不认识的地步了。

这个冷笑话不咋的哦～

]]

恩
不错
上面的颜色我认识

这么多字母，每一个我都认识！

恩
不错
上面封皮的形状我认识

LS的都认识～～LZ别翻译了～～块贴原文～～～～～:call: :call:

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
A Report to Congress
Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act
Fiscal Year 2000
Section 1202, “Annual Report on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and unclassified form, on the current and future military strategy of the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development on the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts, through the next 20 years.”

　　中华人民共和国军事力量
　　给国会的报告
　　根据2000年年度国防财政授权法案 ，
　　1202部分，2000年年度国防财政授权法案的公法106-65条规定，国防部长应提交一份，“中华人民共和国军事力量年度报告”。“在这两个分类和非机密的形式，对当前和未来的中华人民共和国军事战略。该报告应解决目前和将来的解放军可能的军事技术发展和原则以及可能发展的大战略，安全战略和军事战略，以及军事组织和经营理念，在未来20年里。”

Executive Summary
China’s rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with growing global influence has significant implications for the Asia-Pacific region and the world. The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China, and encourages China to participate responsibly in world affairs by taking on a greater share of the burden for the stability, resilience, and growth of the international system. The United States has done much over the last 30 years to encourage and facilitate China’s national development and its integration into the international system. However, much uncertainty surrounds China’s future course, particularly regarding how its expanding military power might be used.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery against high-tech adversaries – an approach that China refers to as preparing for “local wars under conditions of informatization.” The pace and scope of China’s military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces. China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance remains limited, but its armed forces continue to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare, that are changing regional military balances and that have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region.
The PLA’s modernization vis-à-vis Taiwan has continued over the past year, including its build-up of short-range missiles opposite the island. In the near-term, China’s armed forces are rapidly developing coercive capabilities for the purpose of deterring Taiwan’s pursuit of de jure independence. These same capabilities could in the future be used to pressure Taiwan toward a settlement of the cross-Strait dispute on Beijing’s terms while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or deny any possible U.S. support for the island in case of conflict. This modernization and the threat to Taiwan continue despite significant reduction in cross-Strait tension over the last year since Taiwan elected a new president.
The PLA is also developing longer range capabilities that have implications beyond Taiwan. Some of these capabilities have allowed it to contribute cooperatively to the international community’s responsibilities in areas such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counter-piracy. However, some of these capabilities, as well as other, more disruptive ones, could allow China to project power to ensure access to resources or enforce claims to disputed territories.
Beijing publicly asserts that China’s military modernization is “purely defensive in nature,” and aimed solely at protecting China’s security and interests. Over the past several years, China has begun a new phase of military development by beginning to articulate roles and missions for the PLA that go beyond China’s immediate territorial interests, but has left unclear to the international community the purposes and objectives of the PLA’s evolving doctrine and capabilities. Moreover, China continues to promulgate incomplete defense expenditure figures and engage in actions that appear inconsistent with its declaratory policies. The limited transparency in China’s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by creating uncertainty and increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. The United States continues to work with our allies and friends in the region to monitor these developments and adjust our policies accordingly.
　　主要内容摘要
　　中国在区域政治和经济力量以及全球影响力不断增长，迅速崛起成为具有重要影响的亚太地区和世界的（力量）。美国欢迎一个稳定，和平，繁荣的中国的崛起，并鼓励中国参与世界事务，负责任的承担更大份额维护稳定，弹性，与增长的国际制度的负担。在过去30年里，美国已经做了很多工作，以鼓励和促进（中国）国家发展和融入国际体系。然而，还有许多不确定因素围绕中国未来的道路上，特别是在关于扩大使用军事力量的可能。
　　解放军正在推行全面改革，以满足军队设计的大规模长期战争的消耗及其在其领土上的能够打赢局部战场上短期，高强度，高技术的战争的要求。“信息化条件下的局部战争。”军事变革的速度和范围已经在最近几年有所增加，由于收购了国外的先进武器，在其国内国防和科学技术产业继续高投资率，武装部队意义深远的组织和理论改革。中国有能力维持的军事实力在近期仍然很有限，但其武装部队继续发展和外地破坏性军事技术，包括那些anti-access/area-denial ，以及核，太空，网络战，正在产生影响改变地区军事平衡，并影响到整个亚太地区。
　　解放军在过去一年中相对于台湾继续在军队现代化，包括其发展短程导弹针对对面的岛屿。在短期内，中国的武装部队正在迅速发展威胁的能力，目的是遏制台湾的追求法理台独。这些相同的功能，北京的职权可以在将来用来向台湾施加压力解决两岸争端，同时试图阻止，延迟或拒绝任何可能的美国支持的台海冲突。因为台湾选出新总统，这种态势有所缓和，但是中国部署在台海地区的军事力量仍在增加。
　　解放军还正在研制射程更远超越台湾地区的（导弹）。中国在国际社会上的责任的国际合作作出贡献，包括维护和平，人道主义援助和救灾援助，并反盗版。然而，在另一方面，中国也发展其他更破坏性的项目，以确保获得资源或有争议的领土。
　　北京公开声称，中国的军事现代化是“纯粹的防御性质” ，并只为了保护中国的安全和利益。在过去几年里，中国已经开始了一个新阶段的军事发展，开始阐明解放军超越国土的利益的作用。此外，中国继续公布不完全统计国防支出的数字，似乎不符合其宣示的政策。中国的军事和安全事务有限的透明度给稳定带来了风险，不确定性，并增加了可能的误解和误算。美国继续与盟国和朋友在该地区，监测这些事态发展和调整相应的政策。

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• Regional Conventional Strike. Since 2000, China has continued its build-up of conventional
ballistic missiles, building a nascent capacity for conventional short-range ballistic missile (SRBM)
strikes against Taiwan into what has become one of China’s primary instruments of coercion, not
only of Taiwan but of other regional neighbors. In 2000, China’s SRBM force was limited to one
“regimental-sized unit” in southeastern China. China has expanded the force opposite Taiwan to
seven brigades with a total of 1,050-1,150 missiles, and is augmenting these forces with conventional
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) systems, such as the anti-ship ballistic missile, and at least
two land attack cruise missile (LACM) variants capable of ground or air launch. Advanced fighters
and bombers, combined with enhanced training for nighttime and overwater flights, provide the PLA
with additional capabilities for regional strike or maritime interdiction operations.
• Competing for Dominance of the Electromagnetic Spectrum. The 2000 edition of this report
observed that China is “working to ameliorate weaknesses in C4I training and plac[e] increased
emphasis on ‘electromagnetic warfare’ to degrade or destroy enemy operational systems.” At that time,
the PLA’s electronic warfare (EW) systems were derived mostly from a combination of “1950s-1980s
technologies.” By the 2006 edition of this report, China’s investments in advanced EW programs had
given the PLA Air Force “technological parity with or superiority over most potential adversaries.”
By improving space-based and terrestrial C4ISR and by moving communications infrastructure to
fiber, China is hardening its own capabilities while making gains in developing weapon systems (e.g.,
counterspace, computer network operations, and anti-radiation systems) to deny these capabilities to
others. The 2004 introduction of the PLA concept of “local wars under conditions of informatization”
has guided development in this area, positioning the PLA to contest electromagnetic dominance in the
early phases of future campaigns.
• Persistent Limitations. As China’s capabilities for local and regional operations have increased in
certain areas since 2000, a number of limitations appear to have persisted. The PLA has developed
new doctrine for joint warfighting and implemented organizational changes, such as including service
commanders on the Central Military Commission, to facilitate the transition to a more “joint” force.
However, joint integration still lags. Similarly, PLA air and amphibious lift capacity has not improved
appreciably since 2000 when the Department of Defense assessed the PLA as capable of sealift of one
infantry division. Likewise, China’s current ability to deliver about 5,000 parachutists in a single
lift (less if equipment is carried at the same time) is similar to previous assessments. China’s at-sea
replenishment has improved with experience since 2000, but the PLA Navy today remains limited
by a small number of support vessels – much as it did then. In 2000, the Department of Defense
projected aerial refueling as an operational capability by 2005. Today, while China has a few aerial
refueling aircraft, it does not have the number of tankers, properly equipped combat aircraft, or
sufficient training to employ this capability for power projection.
• Shifting Dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. Since 2000, there have been two peaceful political
transitions on Taiwan and a gradual and steady maturation of Taiwan democracy. While Beijing’s
strategy toward Taiwan appears to have shifted from seeking an early resolution of the Taiwan issue to
one of preventing Taiwan’s de jure independence, by force if necessary, Beijing’s objective of unifying
Taiwan with the Mainland has not changed. Since 2000, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait
has continued to shift in Beijing’s favor, marked by the sustained deployment of advanced military
equipment to the Military Regions opposite Taiwan. In the 2002 report, the Department of Defense
assessed that Taiwan “has enjoyed dominance of the airspace over the Taiwan Strait for many years.”
This conclusion no longer holds true. With this reversal, China has been able to develop a range of
limited military options to attempt to coerce Taipei.

Chapter One
Understanding China’s Strategy
“China has become an important member of the international system, and the future and destiny of China have
become increasingly closely connected with the international community. China cannot develop in isolation
from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China.”
“World peace and development are faced with multiple difficulties and challenges. Struggles for strategic
resources, strategic locations and strategic dominance have intensified.”
– China’s National Defense in 2008
Overview
People’s Republic of China (PRC) leaders have
outlined national strategic objectives in a series
of “white papers” on China’s foreign policy,
national defense, and arms control. However,
such documents offer only limited insights on the
motivations behind the objectives, or the specific
strategies to achieve them. The linkages between
the occasional strategic pronouncement and
actual policy decisions in China are not apparent,
especially during periods of crisis. As a result, the
study of PLA views on grand strategy remains an
inexact science. Still, it is possible to make some
generalizations about China’s strategy based on
tradition, historical pattern, official statements and
papers, and emphasis on certain military capabilities
and diplomatic initiatives.
Strategy with Chinese Characteristics
PRC strategy is one of maintaining balance
among competing priorities for national economic
development and sustaining the type of security
environment within which such development
can occur. China’s leaders describe the initial
decades of the 21st Century as a “20-year
period of opportunity,” meaning that regional
and international conditions will generally be
peaceful and conducive to China’s rise to regional
preeminence and global influence.
Leadership Guidance on Foreign and Security Policy
When analyzing China’s foreign and security policy, Chinese strategists and analysts occasionally cite guidance
from former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s: “observe calmly; secure our position; cope
with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim
leadership.” This guidance reflected Deng’s belief that China’s foreign policy and security strategy had to reinforce
its core national interest of promoting domestic development by avoiding foreign risk, high-profile international
engagement or provocations, or pretenses of international leadership. Some analysts see Deng’s guidance as
prescribing deliberate efforts to conceal intentions and capabilities.
As China’s global interests and influence have expanded in recent years, its diplomatic and military presence
and engagement have become more visible and active to the world. PRC President Hu Jintao’s own ideological
formulation – “Harmonious World,” which emphasizes “diversity” and “equality” in international relations
along with traditional PRC foreign policy dictums of “noninterference” and the “democratization of international
relations” – was endorsed at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007. Hu’s “Harmonious World” formulation
reflects an evolution in the general tone and conduct of China’s foreign and security affairs in recent years, but likely
has not completely superseded Deng’s thinking.

PLA leaders and strategists often discuss China’s strategy in terms of building “comprehensive national power” (zonghe guoli - 综合国力). Comprehensive national power (CNP) is the concept by which China’s strategic planners use qualitative and quantitative variables to evaluate and measure China’s standing in relation to other nations. CNP incorporates both soft, internally oriented indicators of strength (e.g., economic prosperity, domestic cohesion, and cultural influence) and hard, externally oriented measures (e.g., the size of a state’s nuclear arsenal, territory, military capability, diplomatic influence, economic influence, and international prestige). As evidenced by the composition of CNP, there is a tendency among China’s strategists to perceive a link between the internal and external dimensions of strength and weakness. This indicates that China’s decision-makers might see internal turmoil as an invitation to hostile external forces or possibly as the work of such forces. China’s leaders may also perceive external challenges as connected to domestic enemies.
I
nsights on China’s Strategy and Priorities
China’s leaders appear to have adopted a set of enduring strategic priorities, which include perpetuating Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule, sustaining economic growth and development, maintaining domestic political stability, defending China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and securing China’s status as a great power. Less clear are the specific strategies and plans Beijing has developed to achieve these objectives, the decision-making structures that guide strategy development and execution, and the manner and direction in which these priorities may adjust in response to changes in the security environment.
Regime survival and the perpetuation of CCP rule shape the strategic outlook for China’s leaders and drive many of their choices. As a substitute for the failure of communist ideology to unify the population and mobilize political support, Party leaders have relied on economic performance and nationalism as the basis for regime legitimacy. However, each contains risks that may undermine political control. For example, while China’s leaders have stoked nationalist sentiment to manipulate public opinion, deflect domestic criticism, or bolster diplomacy, they are aware that protests can be difficult to control once begun and could easily turn against the state itself. Similarly, China’s rapid economic growth – vital to the success of the CCP strategy – has led to increased economic inequality and dislocation, official corruption, and environmental degradation. The ongoing impact of the international financial downturn may provide an opportunity to gauge more clearly China’s strategy and priorities, and to see if and how each is modified by this event.
China’s leaders have reaffirmed and continue to support “reform and opening,” which began in 1978 as the fundamental basis for China’s overall strategy and policy. However, two central perceptions increasingly appear in senior PRC leadership statements and commentary, suggesting a growing recognition that the process of “reform and opening” has engendered several contradictions and challenges:
First, reforms have enabled China to experience • rapid growth in economic, political, and military power, but have also led to significant new challenges to internal stability. Official commentary on the 6th Plenum of the 16th CCP Party Congress in October 2006 stated that “economic restructuring and social transformation” produced a corresponding increase in “factors of uncertainty” in China’s domestic stability.

Second, reforms have increasingly propelled • China into a global security environment in which external events can no longer be isolated from their effects on China’s internal situation, and vice versa. Official PRC media and policy documents continue to assess that “peace, development, and cooperation have become the trend of the contemporary era… making the external environment generally favorable to our country’s development.” However, there is growing acknowledgement that external challenges, including regional and great power relations, cross-Strait relations, and non-traditional security threats have the potential to influence the Mainland’s future.
These dual perceptions have led Party leaders to conclude that, through 2020, they should focus on managing or exploiting external tensions, especially with the great powers, to maintain an environment conducive to China’s development. As former State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan explained in November 2005:
“It is necessary to exert the greatest efforts to avoid becoming the focal point of major international conflict, reduce external pressures and obstructions to the development of our country, [and] create favorable external conditions for China to achieve its planned development goals.”
This does not mean that China’s leaders are exclusively inward-focused. Beijing’s growing regional and, to a lesser extent, global economic stature partly drive a more active external posture in which it demonstrates a willingness to assert its interests while taking on a more active role in resolving disputes and promoting regional cooperation. Beijing continues to threaten the use of military force to compel settlement of the Taiwan dispute if force is deemed necessary, and to take steps to assert rights in the South China Sea that other regional countries do not accept. China has increased the scope of its participation in United Nations (UN) peace operations and continues to expand foreign military sales and training of foreign officers. These trends indicate that Beijing’s methods of asserting and protecting its interests are increasingly diverse and that it is prepared to employ a variety of cooperative and coercive approaches to achieve its objectives.
Resource Needs as a Factor in China’s Strategy.
As China’s economy grows, dependence on secure access to markets and natural resources, particularly metals and fossil fuels, has become an increasingly significant factor shaping China’s strategic behavior.
Although China is expected to continue to rely on coal as its primary fuel source, consumption of petroleum and other liquid fuels will likely grow significantly, due in large part to growth in the transportation sector. China plans to increase natural gas utilization from three percent to eight percent of total consumption by 2010. Similarly, China plans to build some 40 1,000-megawatt nuclear power reactors by 2020, increasing nuclear power from two to six percent of total electricity output.
China currently consumes approximately 7.85 million barrels of oil per day. By 2015, China’s oil consumption could rise to 10-12 million barrels per day. In May 2008, China became the world’s second-largest importer of crude oil, surpassing Japan. China currently imports over 53 percent of its oil (around 4.04 million barrels per day in 2007). China imports about 46 percent of its imports from the Middle East, 32 percent from Africa, and 5 percent from East Asia. In 2008, Saudi Arabia was China’s largest supplier at about 725,000 barrels of oil per day. Saudi Arabia is followed

by Angola at about 596,000 barrels of oil per day, and Iran at about 425,000 barrels of oil per day. The vast majority of its imported oil is carried on ships transiting through the Malacca or Lombok/Makkasar Straits.
In 2004, China began building a strategic petroleum reserve. It completed the construction of the first phase in 2008, which provides a capacity of 100 million barrels—the equivalent of 25 days of China’s current annual net oil imports. The second phase is planned to add 200 million barrels, for a total of around 42 days of net oil imports projected for 2015. After 2010, work on the third phase may increase net storage capacity to approximately 500 million barrels. But, without significant improvements to China’s transportation and distribution networks, gross storage capacity may prove insufficient to cushion severe disruptions.
In the last decade, China has pursued long-term supply contracts with a diverse range of supplier nations including Chad, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Oman, Russia, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Venezuela. In 2006, China’s top three suppliers were: Angola (16 percent), Saudi Arabia (16 percent), and Iran (12 percent). In 2007, six percent of China’s crude oil

China’s Territorial Disputes
China’s use of force in territorial disputes has varied widely throughout history. Some disputes led to
war, such as China’s border conflicts with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. A contested border with
the former Soviet Union during the 1960s raised the possibility of nuclear war. In more recent cases,
China has been willing to compromise with and even offer concessions to its neighbors. Since 1998,
China has settled eleven land territorial disputes with six of its neighbors. Several disputes continue over
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and ownership of potentially rich, off-shore oil and gas deposits.
The East China Sea contains approximately 7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and up to 100 billion
barrels of oil. Japan maintains that an equidistant line from each country involved should separate the
EEZs, while China claims an Extended Continental Shelf beyond the equidistant line to the Okinawa
Trench (which almost reaches Japan’s shore). In June 2008, China and Japan signed an agreement to
temporarily shelve the EEZ dispute and develop jointly the Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas field. China and
Japan continue to dispute possession of the nearby Senkaku Islands. In December 2008, two PRC surface
ships intruded on waters surrounding the islands, but withdrew after Tokyo lodged an official protest with
Beijing.
On December 31, China and Vietnam signed a treaty demarcating their land borders. The treaty followed
a ten-year process of implementing a 1999 agreement. However, the treaty did not address the sea border,
which remains disputed.
The South China Sea plays an important role in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia security
considerations. Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil through South China Sea shipping lanes,
which provide 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. China claims sovereignty
over the Spratly and Paracel island groups – claims disputed in whole or part by Brunei, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba in the Spratly Islands, also claims all
four island groups in the South China Sea. In December 2007, China announced the establishment of a
city administration, “Sansha City,” to assert “indisputable sovereignty” and jurisdiction over the islands
of the South China Sea “and the adjacent waterways,” prompting street protests in Vietnam. In October
2008, China and Vietnam released a joint statement that pledged to “gradually advance the negotiations
on demarcation of these maritime zones and … jointly exploit the zones.”
While China and India have improved bilateral relations, tensions remain along their shared 4,057 km
border, most notably over Arunachal Pradesh. In June 2008, PRC troops entered more than a kilometer
into the northernmost point of India’s Sikkim state. PRC soldiers, in May, had threatened to demolish
stone structures in the area. In May 2008, India’s Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee
visited the PRC and signed a Memorandum of Understanding to expand bilateral military cooperation.
Following local elections in November 2008, Mukherjee stated that Arunachal Pradesh is “an integral
part of India.” A spokesman for the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the statement.

imports came from Sudan. Currently, slightly over half of China’s imported oil comes from the Middle East and almost a quarter is imported from Africa.
China has also pursued equity positions in a variety of overseas energy assets and investments, although these remain small compared to PRC demand and investments by the international oil majors. China’s national oil companies have invested in oil ventures (oilfield development, and pipeline and refinery projects) in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Nigeria, Sudan, and in over 20 other countries in North Africa, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and North America.
Factors Shaping Pathways to China’s Future
Since initiating “reform and opening” in 1978, China has made tremendous economic progress and has overcome many developmental challenges. In 30 years, these reforms have lifted hundreds of millions of its citizens out of poverty, improved domestic stability, expanded China’s interconnections with the rest of the world, and increased China’s influence in international affairs. China continues to face many problems, but the accomplishments of China’s leaders in these areas are impressive. The United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China.

There are forces – some beyond the control of China’s leaders – that could reinforce a relatively inward focus on national strategy, but could also divert China from a peaceful pathway. Which pathway China pursues, or finds itself upon, will be determined in large part by the choices China’s leaders make. These choices are influenced by a set of drivers and inhibitors that will both enable and constrain their ability to achieve their objectives.
Economics. Continued economic development, central to China’s emergence as a regional and global power, remains the foundation of the Party’s popular legitimacy and underwrites its military power. Since 1978, China’s economic growth has improved the quality of life of its citizens, has garnered support for the Party, and has contributed to regional and global economic growth. In contrast, economic shocks, like the current global financial crisis, might place political stress on the Chinese system. As many China analysts have noted, underlying weaknesses (e.g., undervalued currency, non-performing loans, inefficient state-owned enterprises, and economic disparity between urban and rural areas) threaten continued economic growth. Economic shocks, setbacks, or even modestly slower growth could lead to higher unemployment, inflation, and significant unrest, potentially giving rise to greater reliance on nationalism to maintain popular support for the Party. Unexpected increases in resource demand, global resource shortages or price shocks, restricted access to resources, or shrinking demand for labor and manufacturing, could also impact China’s strategic outlook and behavior, and might force China’s leadership to re-examine its resource allocation priorities, including those for the military.
Demographic Pressures. Demographic stresses will increase in the future, creating a structural constraint on China’s ability to sustain high growth rates. Between 2000 and 2030, over 400 million people – a population greater than the entire United States – will transition from the countryside into urban areas. As a result of this shift, China’s leaders will face challenges in terms of job creation as well as satisfying housing and infrastructure needs. Some estimates suggest that China is expected to account for half of global building construction during that period. China’s population is also aging rapidly; China’s population of 146 million senior citizens will increase to an estimated 290 million by 2025. Accommodating the needs of a large senior citizen population will present challenges to the CCP’s ability to maintain economic growth, growing defense budgets, and perhaps domestic stability.
Domestic Political Pressures. A successful Beijing Olympics and perceptions of a competent PLA response to the Sichuan earthquake gave Party leaders and the PLA a boost in the eyes of the public. China’s state-run media, for example, popularized images of Premier Wen Jiabao’s trip to Sichuan to survey the damage and console the victims. However, reports of shoddy construction and corruption related to schools that collapsed in Sichuan as a result of the earthquake soon elicited an outpouring of popular criticism. The Party’s decision to suppress reports of melamine in China’s milk during the Olympics produced additional public condemnation. More broadly, Party leaders are increasingly confronted with popular demands for improved government responsiveness and accountability. The public debate, including in online forums, regarding the melamine issue and the government’s delay in publicizing it are some evidence of greater public space for discussion of such issues. However, the government continues to limit sharply the scope of such debates. How China’s leaders choose to address these challenges will affect their ability to maintain domestic stability and their monopoly on political power.

While preserving one-party rule, Beijing has enacted administrative reforms and expanded avenues for expert – and occasionally public – input as evidenced by the emergence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) throughout China focused on addressing the concerns of the population. China’s leaders have also launched a major personnel reform program aimed at improving communication between central leaders, local cadres, and urban and rural workers with grievances. A stated primary objective of this program is to defuse “inner contradictions among the people.”
However, overt acts of dissent remain criminalized, media and the internet are tightly controlled, independent trade and labor unions are suppressed, ethnic Tibetan and Uighur minorities are repressed, and religious groups not recognized by the regime continue to be harassed. The Party is wary of unsanctioned organizations in China, even if non-political, fearing these organizations could facilitate organized opposition.
Corruption. Despite efforts to curb official corruption in China, it remains pervasive, structural, and persistent due, in part, to the high degree of state involvement in the economy and the weakness of the rule of law.
In June 2008, the CCP Central Committee announced a 5-year anti-corruption campaign. Several procuratorates used mass text messaging with reward offers starting at $440 for tips leading to a conviction, which led to a doubling of corruption investigations within weeks. Also in 2008, dozens of officials were removed from their posts for misconduct associated with earthquake relief efforts.
In 2001, 65 percent of embezzlement cases involved multiple officials, indicating the activity of independent networks of elites colluding at the expense of the state. China’s National Audit Agency uncovered $170 billion of misappropriated and misspent public funds between 1996 and 2005, and academic research estimates that the direct costs of corruption in 2003 amounted to as much as $86 billion (three percent of GDP), an amount that was more than double China’s announced defense budget for that year. Corruption directly affects the PLA; bribery for advancement and promotion, unauthorized contracts and projects, and weapons procurement are all identified by the PLA as corruption problems.
Beijing’s response has focused on the use of criminal prosecution to deter illicit behavior. Half of provincial transportation chiefs in China have been sentenced to jail terms (some have been executed) for corruption. In July 2007, the Director of China’s Food and Drug Administration was executed for taking bribes to approve fake drugs.
Environment. China’s economic development has come at a significant environmental cost. Acceptable air quality for the Beijing Olympics could only be achieved by shutting down much of nearby industry and local traffic. A 2007 World Bank report estimated that air and water pollution costs China almost six percent of its GDP annually, and contributes to increasing levels of cancer, lung disease, and other ailments. China’s leaders are concerned that these environmental problems could undermine regime legitimacy by threatening China’s economic development, public health, social stability, and international image. In 2006, China’s top environmental official, Zhou Shengxian, announced that there had been 51,000 pollution-related protests in 2005 (almost 1,000 per week). Pollution and deforestation in China have worldwide implications. China may have overtaken the United States as the world’s largest emitter of atmospheric carbon dioxide. Japan and South Korea both suffer from acid rain produced

by China’s coal-fired power plants and yellow dust storms that originate in the Gobi desert.
Cross-Strait Dynamics. Despite a reduction in tensions following the March 2008 election and May 2008 inauguration of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, a potential military confrontation with Taiwan and the prospect of U.S. military intervention remain the PLA’s most immediate military concerns. China’s current strategy toward Taiwan appears to be one of preventing any moves by Taipei toward de jure independence, rather than seeking near-term resolution. A perceived shift in military capabilities or political will on either side, or a change in the internal political landscape on Mainland China or Taiwan, could cause Beijing to calculate its interests, and its preferred course of action differently.
Regional Concerns. With China close to, or an interested party in, many of the world’s “flashpoints” (e.g., Taiwan, North Korea, the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku Islands, Afghanistan, and Pakistan), China’s leaders hope to avoid regional instability spilling across China’s borders and thereby interfering with economic development or domestic stability. Changes in regional security dynamics could lead to shifts in China’s military development and deployment patterns, likely with consequences for neighboring states. Examples of such changes from Beijing’s perspective include disruptions on the Korean Peninsula (e.g., a North Korean collapse); democratic revolutions in Central Asia, which Beijing would perceive as posing near-term and long-term security challenges; a downturn in relations with Japan; and perceived threats to China’s ability to access foreign resources and transport them back to China.
Looooking to the Future
China’s current strategy is to manage external tensions to assure an environment that is conducive to economic development. This strategy appears to be accepted widely by Beijing’s foreign and security policy establishment. However, differences of opinion within China occasionally surface, particularly in academic circles, about how China can achieve these goals and how it can best prevent conflict with its neighbors and the United States over time. Some prefer the traditional strategy of Deng Xiaoping: avoid leadership roles and seek to avoid having China being burdened with excessive international responsibilities by those who are trying to encourage China to play a more active and constructive role in addressing regional and international problems. Another group believes that such passivity is untenable as China’s power grows. This group asserts that China should work actively to cooperate with regional actors and the United States not only to increase Chinese influence, but also to reassure neighbors and more distant great powers that China’s rise will not pose a destabilizing threat to their security. Still others believe that China needs to be tougher and more assertive in protecting its interests by countering perceived efforts by the United States to bully China or constrain its influence in relation to actors such as Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia.
These discussions, however, appear to remain largely on the margins. Absent a perceived challenge to the legitimacy and authority of the CCP, a fundamental shift in China’s strategy is unlikely to occur prior to the 2012 18th Party Congress, which should install the next, and fifth, generation of Party leaders.

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军事力量中华人民共和国七中不断发展的军事能力，由于美国国防部（ DoD ）提交了第一份报告根据科1202年的国防授权法案2000财年中取得了很大的进展对建设和菲尔丁可信和有能力的军事实力。该部的了解中国的军事实力已经有所改善报告期内，但仍需了解中国的国家和军事战略，进展和趋势，其军事现代化，以及相关的影响地区的安全与稳定。我国已略有改善的透明度，军事和安全事务，但直到它开始认为透明度不足的交易进行谈判，更是责任，伴随着国家的积聚力量，深入反映在这份报告将是不完整的，桥接只有通过评估和判断。其中一些突出的见解如下：

国防预算超过了经济增长。我国经济持续增长，从国内生产总值（ GDP ）的一万九千五点零零零亿美元在2000年预计四万一千九百点零亿美元在2008年（ 2008年美元） ，使我国更多的资源向重点建设，装备和训练解放军没有压倒经济。一项措施提高资源对解放军的官方预算，增加了一倍以上来自二百七十九点〇亿美元在2000年六百零一点零亿美元在2008年（ 2008年美元） 。预算，但是，并没有捕获的全部军事开支。尽管持续的努力，美国和其他国家获得更清晰的中国，或改善估计如果没有这样明确，国防部的认识，资源，资金流，和会计机制用来指导投资解放军没有改善适当地

会计机制，用来指导投资解放军没有改善适当地。 •加强威慑和加强战略打击。自2000年以来，中国已从一个基本上脆弱，战略威慑的基础上液体燃料推进的洲际远程弹道导弹（洲际导弹）发射的固定地点，以更灵活的生存和战略核力量。引进的两个新类别的洲际弹道导弹，在东风-31和东风31A条，道路移动，固体推进剂系统（后者能够针对任何地点在美国大陆）反映了这一转变。尽管没有证据表明我国学说“不首先使用”改变了，但是，这些部队的派遣，同时预计新的核动力弹道导弹潜艇（ SSBN ） /潜艇发射弹道导弹（潜射弹道导弹）在2009-2010年使一个可靠的海基威慑作用，将给予中共领导人有更大的灵活性和选择战略打击比以前提供。虽然美国的战略力量仍然远远多于这些，我国将能够造成重大损害的美国最大型的城市，这些生存系统

•改进Anti-Access/Area-Denial能力。自2000年以来，我国已扩大其核武库的反准入和地区拒绝武器，介绍和预测越来越可靠，层次进攻作战力量跨越边界，进入西太平洋。我国已经或正在获得的能力： 1 ）举办大型水面舰艇，包括航空母舰，风险（通过安静的潜艇，先进的反舰巡航导弹（ ASCMs ） ，有线制导和唤醒寻鱼雷或反舰弹道导弹） ; 2 ）否认使用岸基机场，安全堡垒和区域物流中心（通过常规弹道导弹更大范围和准确性，土地攻击巡航导弹） ，以及3 ）持有航空器处于危险或近中华领土或部队（通过进口和国内的第四代飞机，先进的远程地对空导弹，导弹系统，空气监测系统，和舰载防空系统） 。进展中的天基侦察和定位，导航和时间，以及生存地面超视距目标，是缩小差距的建立精确打击能力

翻译器翻的!好累

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我要看下面！！！