米军电磁弹射器项目面临基本失败

http://informationdissemination. ... eally-bad-news.html

星期五， 2009年2月20日并且现在为真正地坏消息… 基因泰勒在听力谈论了EMALS上3月与提出的FY2009预算有关。 “另一个非常危险的节目是新的航空母舰。没有海军和纽波特新闻造船厂不会修造航空母舰，他们。然而，其中一种主要新技术，电磁式发射系统或者EMALS，在舰上配置甚而未被测试，并且船已经建设中。最后星期海军请求另外的$40百万美元EMALS，因为和我引述， `承包商被低估的设计和生产成本的持续的发展。‘我的讽世者说承包商有目的地虚报低价出价得到很清楚知道的合同海军会被迫支付什么系统的实际费用结果是。或许我们应该修造了另一个Nimitz类载体，直到EMALS的研究和设计是完全的”。他isn' 去的t是愉快的，当他听见最新信息从纽波特新闻。 EMALS是失败，并且没人是真正地肯定的要做什么。 修造另一Nimitz ？重新设计蒸汽的福特类？ 投更加金钱在他们可以固定它的问题和希望？新的管理不建立超级航空母舰，当一个关键部件，一平台依靠时是非常容易的，完全doesn'新的类; t工作。造船仍然是一次有趣的交谈。 我们只有2艘船一个LCS节目，没有更多根据合同。 我们有2艘船一个DDG-1000节目，部分地只被资助的三。没有主要水面战舰的清楚的图片。 海军设法去年关闭LPD-17线，唯一的水上潜艇节目现在实际上运作没名为作为的其中一个。现在我们听见福特类CVN节目是陷进在岩石和坚硬地方之间，并且它花些不少时间推测何处连同这个问题。象I' 说的ve， FY 2010年是疯狂驾驶。

Friday, February 20, 2009
And Now For the Really Bad News...

Gene Taylor discussed EMALS last March in a hearing related to the proposed FY2009 budget.

    “Another very risky program is the new aircraft carrier. Not that the Navy and Newport News Shipyard don’t know how to build aircraft carriers, they do. However, one of the major new technologies, the electro-magnetic launch system, or EMALS, has not even been tested in a shipboard configuration and the ship is already under construction. Just this last week the Navy requested an additional $40 million dollars for continued development of EMALS because, and I quote, ‘the contractor underestimated design and production cost.’ The cynic in me would say the contractor purposefully low-balled the bid to get the contract knowing full well the Navy would be forced to pay whatever the true costs of the system turned out to be. Perhaps we should have built another Nimitz class carrier until the research and design for EMALS was complete.”

He isn't going to be happy when he hears the latest from Newport News. EMALS is a failure, and nobody is really sure what to do. Build another Nimitz? Redesign the Ford class for steam? Throw even more money at the problem and hope they can fix it?

It is very easy for the new administration to not build a new class of super aircraft carriers when a key component, one the platform depends on, simply doesn't work.

Shipbuilding is still an interesting conversation. We have a LCS program of only 2 ships, with no more under contract. We have a DDG-1000 program of 2 ships, the third only partially funded. There is no clear picture for major surface combatants yet. The Navy tried to close the LPD-17 line last year, one of the only surface vessel programs actually working right now not named the T-AKE. Now we are hearing the Ford class CVN program is stuck between a rock and hard place, and it is going to take some time to figure out where to go with this problem.

Like I've been saying, FY 2010 is going to be a wild ride.


http://blog.usni.org/?p=1460

有一些猜想那里关于电磁式航空器发射系统，或者EMALS，美国海军设法投入福特类载体的变形弹射器系统。 bloggers那里要求EMALS的我的一个海军是“失败，并且没人是真正地肯定的要做什么“。那说不定是实际情形，但是，因为有珍贵从RUMINT将凝聚的小的事实现在飞行在blogosphere (读评论)，我计算发现正式或半官方也许显示主题的一些清楚的声明任何好的。它如此发生那VADM托马斯J. Kilcline， Jr.，力量，演讲的EMALS司令员，海军航空兵几天前，并且他的意图是…有趣。 读它! 这仓促抄本(错误是我自己) VADM Kilcline在西部2009年： “… CVN 78的变形方面和那类航空母舰，其中一那变革的大部分是我们的能力引起出击大数出击和我们发现我们有今天的我们的弹射器系统是有些有限的，在他们射击之后并且射击并且射击。 特别是高能的射击。 高能的射击是更大量要求在甲板的在他们之后的风或更大量力量的重量级的航空器。因此EMALS是自然变形移动对“下件事”除象雷达系统的SPY-1在航空母舰的塔，许多电梯之外移动事，一个更小的海岛有飞机的更多空间，并且加油和重整军备，它是打算得到我们前端的那些弹射器。 EMALS当前在Lakehurst，它在地面，我们带来了一束对它在一大型sim和此的装载wor-not模拟器，但是实际上跑我们放它到地面对的装载现在的发电器它怎样运作那里。 我与某人及早谈了话关于此，并且看见您是否能跟我学。我们有97艘航空母舰在第二次世界大战以后，并且在那些97艘航空母舰之一中我们决定切开低谷和投入一只水力猫，因此我们在fightdeck上还可能把 6架飞机放。 我们因为我们没有必须做跑对移动飞机的甲板一少许更远向前，那准许。我们抽了夫妇，并且我肯定采取第一水力射击的第一个人有点儿想知道什么打算发生，但是他做了它前端。 仅一艘航空母舰必须被测试一97。十分简单的变动，我们然后有一个弹射器系统。 来了蒸汽神的时刻保佑小温他们告诉了我们蒸汽也许运作，他们工作了对此。 他们做了R& 我们的D。 我们当时有20-30艘航空母舰，因此我们在它上带来了离线的航空母舰，把一层斜角甲板放，并且说， ahh…蒸汽。第一个人采取了被射击的蒸汽猫大概去“圣洁抽烟”，但是他做了它前端。 但是我设法提出的观点是我们能投入S& T美元R& D到载体里，因为我们有很多他们或，因为某人帮助了我们 我们有十一艘航空母舰。 我们的S& T航空母舰(微笑)我使用S& 而不是R&的T; D. 我们的S& T航空母舰是下艘航空母舰。 它是一个充分的圆。时间从，当它被委任时，直到时间它在部署去是相同的作为的布什(口吃)被委任。 但是它第一在与很多变形能力和它的等级使人紧张。并且采取射击那个弹射器的第一个人是某人为部署做准备。 因此您跟您考虑载体被带来的蒸汽和动水学入系统必须有点不同地考虑CVN 78。鉴于此，它是在帐篷的一根长的杆。 我们在飞行STOVL航空器不计划对整个风车叶片。 我们不出去是STOVL E-2s那里，因此我们必须推测它运作，那第一次工作，并且我们必须确信，当齿轮， Lakehurst一个变形片断运作，我们了解发电器，我们了解鞭子，移动很多电，因此您会惊奇在进入确定这个设计是不错的工作量。但是，因为您会期待，包括我，越接近我变得越多我意识到直到那个弹射器在航空母舰，并且那些发电器排队，并且它解雇第一个人我们是去的全部是一少许紧张的是它去工作。 我给了答复由于仍有不稳定在科学技术的您。 并且有风险与前进交往。 在变换在您的前线船，当它出来是使大家一点antsy的事。我是否认为它工作？ 我被说服它工作。 并且我被说服它产生在我们怎样上的操作的变化使用我们的航空母舰。 我是否认为我们必须通过问题工作到那里？您是我们是的织补权利。 象在是新的象那样的任何。因此我给了您有点儿一个长的答复，并且我为那道歉，但是它比我认为复杂问题由于“怎么做l做这工作”。 有没有支付能力问题？ (点头)全新的系统，以前从未完成。 估计过程，它得到您什么您需要？ 有没有费用问题？ 肯定，估计收效行程安排和费用问题。因此他们看上去什么象？ 我不知道什么他们看上去象，我甚而不知道什么巨大将是。 秘书订婚， CNO允诺，并且我保证您我订婚。我对那个系统关心很多”。如果有将杀害EMALS的事，它是，依我所见，修造这个载体的极大的潜在的风险，在EMALS技术是成熟的之前。投资亿万的远景在可能不运转…的船是可怕的。 投入直言地，在福特中，一切(从工程学到战略辩解)在新的弹射器或补救系统附近被包裹。它真正地将是，困难如果不灾难对容忍象重调载体的重心的事”整修蒸”在事件EMALS证明无用。我们在未成熟的平台附近建立了未来战略前面，并且它没有很好运作。 我们不应该重复过程。 VADM Kilcline提醒了他的观众在CVN-68载体节目狼吞虎咽仅仅$40百万在R&的西部2009年; D美元为我们的整个10 Nimitz类载体生产运行。 福特类是一只完全不同的鸟。 并且我在当前预算环境里将打赌，有有些预算猎人那里谁是热切击落它。但是，如果EMALS跑入严肃延迟或得到取消什么是后果？ 如果没人是肯定对要做什么，能我们推测？ EMALS失败是否将促进F-35 STOVL的时运？ 除金钱之外通过减慢载体生产？ 我dunno。 但是您想法均匀您联合国来源猜想是多数欢迎。 假使风险，什么是计划B ？

There’s been some speculation out there about the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, or EMALS, the transformational catapult system the U.S. Navy is trying to put on the Ford Class Carrier.  One of my fellow Navy bloggers is out there claiming EMALS is “a failure, and nobody is really sure what to do“.  

That may well be the case, but since there’s precious little fact to be condensed from the RUMINT now flying around out in the blogosphere (read the comments), I figured it’d be nice to find some kind of official/semi-official statement–anything that might shed some light on the subject.

It just so happens that VADM Thomas J. Kilcline, Jr., Commander, Naval Air Forces, addressed EMALS a few days ago, and his view was…interesting.  Read it!  Here’s a rush transcript (errors are my own) of VADM Kilcline at WEST 2009:

    “…The transformational aspects of CVN 78 and that class of aircraft carrier, one of the major parts of that transformation is our ability to generate sorties–a large number of sorties–and we find our catapult systems we have today are somewhat limited after they fire and fire and fire.  Especially high-energy shots.  High-energy shots are heavyweight aircraft that require either a lot more wind over the deck or a lot more power behind them.

    So EMALS was a natural transformational move to “the next thing” in addition to the SPY-1 like radar system in the tower of the aircraft carrier, many more elevators to move things around, a smaller island to have more space for airplanes and to refuel and rearm, it was those catapults that were going to get us off the front end.

    EMALS is currently in Lakehurst, it’s in the ground, we brought a bunch of loads on it in a full-sized sim and it wor–not simulator but actually a generator running a load–now we’re putting it into the ground to how it’s going to work there.

    I talked to somebody about this earlier, and see if you can follow me.  We had 97 aircraft carriers after World War II, and in one of those 97 aircraft carriers we decided to cut a trough and put a hydraulic cat in so we could put 6 more airplanes on the fightdeck. That allowed us–because we didn’t have to do deck runs–to move airplanes a little farther forward.

    We pumped a couple off and I’m sure the first guy who took the first hydraulic shot was kinda wondering what was going to happen, but he made it off the front end.  Only one aircraft carrier had to be tested–one of 97.  Fairly simple change, and then we have a catapult system.  Came time for steam–God bless the Brits–they told us steam might work, they worked on it.  They did the R&D for us.  We had 20-30 aircraft carriers at the time, so we brought an aircraft carrier off-line, put an angled deck on it, and said, ahh…steam.  First guy took a steam cat shot probably went “holy smokes,” but he made it off the front end.  But the point I’m trying to make is that we were able to put S&T dollars–R&D into carriers because we had a lot of them or because somebody helped us

    We have eleven aircraft carriers.  Our S&T aircraft carrier (chuckles) I’m using S&T instead of R&D. Our S&T aircraft carrier is the next aircraft carrier.  It’s a full-up round.  The time from when it is commissioned until the time it goes on deployment is the same as the Bush which was just (stutters) commissioned. But its first in class with a lot of transformational capability and it makes people nervous.  And the first person that takes a shot off that catapult is going to be somebody preparing for a deployment.

    So you have to think about CVN 78 a little differently than you thought about the carrier that brought steam and hydraulics into the system.  With that in mind, it’s a long pole in the tent.  We’re not planning on flying STOVL aircraft for the entire airwing.  We’re not going to be STOVL E-2s out there so we’re going to have to figure out that it’s going to work, that’s going to work the first time and we have to make sure that as a transformational piece of gear, Lakehurst works, we understand the generators, we understand the lash-up, moving a lot of electricity around, so you’d be amazed at the amount of work that’s gone into making sure this design is right.

    But, as you would expect, including me, the closer I get the more I realize that until that catapult is in an aircraft carrier and those generators are lined up and it fires the first guy we’re all going to be a little nervous about is it going to work or not.  I’ve given you the answer in that there’s still instability in the science and technology.  And there’s a risk associated with moving forward. In transforming on your front line ship as it comes out is something that makes everybody a little antsy.

    Do I think it’s going to work?  I am convinced it’s going to work.  And I’m convinced it’s going to make an operational difference in how we employ our aircraft carriers.  Do I think we’re going to have to work through issues to get there?  You’re darn right we are.  Just like in anything that’s new like that.  So I’ve given you kind of a long answer and I apologize for that but it’s a little more complicated than I think the question in that “how do l make this work.”  Are there affordability issues?  (Nods) Brand new system, never done before.  The estimate process, is it going to get you what you need?  Are there cost issues?  Sure, estimates result in scheduling and cost issues. So what do they look like?  I don’t know what they look like, I don’t even know what the magnitude will be.

    The Secretary is engaged, the CNO is engaged, and I guarantee you I’m engaged. I care a lot about that system.”

If there’s something that will kill EMALS, it is, in my mind, the enormous potential risk of building this carrier before EMALS tech is mature.  The prospect of investing billions in a vessel that may not work…is scary.  Put bluntly, in the Ford, everything (from the engineering to the strategic justification) is wrapped around the new catapult/recovery system.  It will be really difficult–if not catastrophic–to tolerate things like readjusting the carrier’s center of gravity to ”refit to steam” in the event EMALS proves useless. We’ve built future strategy around immature platforms before, and it didn’t work well.  We shouldn’t repeat the process.

VADM Kilcline reminded his audience at WEST 2009 that the CVN-68 carrier program gobbled up a mere $40 million in R&D dollars–for our entire 10 Nimitz Class carrier production run.  The Ford Class is a totally different bird.  And I’ll bet, in the present budget environment, that there are some budget-hunters out there who are eager to shoot it down.

But if EMALS runs into serious delays–or gets canceled–what are the consequences?  If nobody is sure about what to do, can we speculate?  Will an EMALS failure boost the fortunes of the F-35 STOVL?  Save money by slowing carrier production?   I dunno.  But your ideas–even your un-sourced speculation–are most welcome.  Given the risk, what is plan B?http://informationdissemination. ... eally-bad-news.html

星期五， 2009年2月20日并且现在为真正地坏消息… 基因泰勒在听力谈论了EMALS上3月与提出的FY2009预算有关。 “另一个非常危险的节目是新的航空母舰。没有海军和纽波特新闻造船厂不会修造航空母舰，他们。然而，其中一种主要新技术，电磁式发射系统或者EMALS，在舰上配置甚而未被测试，并且船已经建设中。最后星期海军请求另外的$40百万美元EMALS，因为和我引述， `承包商被低估的设计和生产成本的持续的发展。‘我的讽世者说承包商有目的地虚报低价出价得到很清楚知道的合同海军会被迫支付什么系统的实际费用结果是。或许我们应该修造了另一个Nimitz类载体，直到EMALS的研究和设计是完全的”。他isn' 去的t是愉快的，当他听见最新信息从纽波特新闻。 EMALS是失败，并且没人是真正地肯定的要做什么。 修造另一Nimitz ？重新设计蒸汽的福特类？ 投更加金钱在他们可以固定它的问题和希望？新的管理不建立超级航空母舰，当一个关键部件，一平台依靠时是非常容易的，完全doesn'新的类; t工作。造船仍然是一次有趣的交谈。 我们只有2艘船一个LCS节目，没有更多根据合同。 我们有2艘船一个DDG-1000节目，部分地只被资助的三。没有主要水面战舰的清楚的图片。 海军设法去年关闭LPD-17线，唯一的水上潜艇节目现在实际上运作没名为作为的其中一个。现在我们听见福特类CVN节目是陷进在岩石和坚硬地方之间，并且它花些不少时间推测何处连同这个问题。象I' 说的ve， FY 2010年是疯狂驾驶。

Friday, February 20, 2009
And Now For the Really Bad News...

Gene Taylor discussed EMALS last March in a hearing related to the proposed FY2009 budget.

    “Another very risky program is the new aircraft carrier. Not that the Navy and Newport News Shipyard don’t know how to build aircraft carriers, they do. However, one of the major new technologies, the electro-magnetic launch system, or EMALS, has not even been tested in a shipboard configuration and the ship is already under construction. Just this last week the Navy requested an additional $40 million dollars for continued development of EMALS because, and I quote, ‘the contractor underestimated design and production cost.’ The cynic in me would say the contractor purposefully low-balled the bid to get the contract knowing full well the Navy would be forced to pay whatever the true costs of the system turned out to be. Perhaps we should have built another Nimitz class carrier until the research and design for EMALS was complete.”

He isn't going to be happy when he hears the latest from Newport News. EMALS is a failure, and nobody is really sure what to do. Build another Nimitz? Redesign the Ford class for steam? Throw even more money at the problem and hope they can fix it?

It is very easy for the new administration to not build a new class of super aircraft carriers when a key component, one the platform depends on, simply doesn't work.

Shipbuilding is still an interesting conversation. We have a LCS program of only 2 ships, with no more under contract. We have a DDG-1000 program of 2 ships, the third only partially funded. There is no clear picture for major surface combatants yet. The Navy tried to close the LPD-17 line last year, one of the only surface vessel programs actually working right now not named the T-AKE. Now we are hearing the Ford class CVN program is stuck between a rock and hard place, and it is going to take some time to figure out where to go with this problem.

Like I've been saying, FY 2010 is going to be a wild ride.


http://blog.usni.org/?p=1460

有一些猜想那里关于电磁式航空器发射系统，或者EMALS，美国海军设法投入福特类载体的变形弹射器系统。 bloggers那里要求EMALS的我的一个海军是“失败，并且没人是真正地肯定的要做什么“。那说不定是实际情形，但是，因为有珍贵从RUMINT将凝聚的小的事实现在飞行在blogosphere (读评论)，我计算发现正式或半官方也许显示主题的一些清楚的声明任何好的。它如此发生那VADM托马斯J. Kilcline， Jr.，力量，演讲的EMALS司令员，海军航空兵几天前，并且他的意图是…有趣。 读它! 这仓促抄本(错误是我自己) VADM Kilcline在西部2009年： “… CVN 78的变形方面和那类航空母舰，其中一那变革的大部分是我们的能力引起出击大数出击和我们发现我们有今天的我们的弹射器系统是有些有限的，在他们射击之后并且射击并且射击。 特别是高能的射击。 高能的射击是更大量要求在甲板的在他们之后的风或更大量力量的重量级的航空器。因此EMALS是自然变形移动对“下件事”除象雷达系统的SPY-1在航空母舰的塔，许多电梯之外移动事，一个更小的海岛有飞机的更多空间，并且加油和重整军备，它是打算得到我们前端的那些弹射器。 EMALS当前在Lakehurst，它在地面，我们带来了一束对它在一大型sim和此的装载wor-not模拟器，但是实际上跑我们放它到地面对的装载现在的发电器它怎样运作那里。 我与某人及早谈了话关于此，并且看见您是否能跟我学。我们有97艘航空母舰在第二次世界大战以后，并且在那些97艘航空母舰之一中我们决定切开低谷和投入一只水力猫，因此我们在fightdeck上还可能把 6架飞机放。 我们因为我们没有必须做跑对移动飞机的甲板一少许更远向前，那准许。我们抽了夫妇，并且我肯定采取第一水力射击的第一个人有点儿想知道什么打算发生，但是他做了它前端。 仅一艘航空母舰必须被测试一97。十分简单的变动，我们然后有一个弹射器系统。 来了蒸汽神的时刻保佑小温他们告诉了我们蒸汽也许运作，他们工作了对此。 他们做了R& 我们的D。 我们当时有20-30艘航空母舰，因此我们在它上带来了离线的航空母舰，把一层斜角甲板放，并且说， ahh…蒸汽。第一个人采取了被射击的蒸汽猫大概去“圣洁抽烟”，但是他做了它前端。 但是我设法提出的观点是我们能投入S& T美元R& D到载体里，因为我们有很多他们或，因为某人帮助了我们 我们有十一艘航空母舰。 我们的S& T航空母舰(微笑)我使用S& 而不是R&的T; D. 我们的S& T航空母舰是下艘航空母舰。 它是一个充分的圆。时间从，当它被委任时，直到时间它在部署去是相同的作为的布什(口吃)被委任。 但是它第一在与很多变形能力和它的等级使人紧张。并且采取射击那个弹射器的第一个人是某人为部署做准备。 因此您跟您考虑载体被带来的蒸汽和动水学入系统必须有点不同地考虑CVN 78。鉴于此，它是在帐篷的一根长的杆。 我们在飞行STOVL航空器不计划对整个风车叶片。 我们不出去是STOVL E-2s那里，因此我们必须推测它运作，那第一次工作，并且我们必须确信，当齿轮， Lakehurst一个变形片断运作，我们了解发电器，我们了解鞭子，移动很多电，因此您会惊奇在进入确定这个设计是不错的工作量。但是，因为您会期待，包括我，越接近我变得越多我意识到直到那个弹射器在航空母舰，并且那些发电器排队，并且它解雇第一个人我们是去的全部是一少许紧张的是它去工作。 我给了答复由于仍有不稳定在科学技术的您。 并且有风险与前进交往。 在变换在您的前线船，当它出来是使大家一点antsy的事。我是否认为它工作？ 我被说服它工作。 并且我被说服它产生在我们怎样上的操作的变化使用我们的航空母舰。 我是否认为我们必须通过问题工作到那里？您是我们是的织补权利。 象在是新的象那样的任何。因此我给了您有点儿一个长的答复，并且我为那道歉，但是它比我认为复杂问题由于“怎么做l做这工作”。 有没有支付能力问题？ (点头)全新的系统，以前从未完成。 估计过程，它得到您什么您需要？ 有没有费用问题？ 肯定，估计收效行程安排和费用问题。因此他们看上去什么象？ 我不知道什么他们看上去象，我甚而不知道什么巨大将是。 秘书订婚， CNO允诺，并且我保证您我订婚。我对那个系统关心很多”。如果有将杀害EMALS的事，它是，依我所见，修造这个载体的极大的潜在的风险，在EMALS技术是成熟的之前。投资亿万的远景在可能不运转…的船是可怕的。 投入直言地，在福特中，一切(从工程学到战略辩解)在新的弹射器或补救系统附近被包裹。它真正地将是，困难如果不灾难对容忍象重调载体的重心的事”整修蒸”在事件EMALS证明无用。我们在未成熟的平台附近建立了未来战略前面，并且它没有很好运作。 我们不应该重复过程。 VADM Kilcline提醒了他的观众在CVN-68载体节目狼吞虎咽仅仅$40百万在R&的西部2009年; D美元为我们的整个10 Nimitz类载体生产运行。 福特类是一只完全不同的鸟。 并且我在当前预算环境里将打赌，有有些预算猎人那里谁是热切击落它。但是，如果EMALS跑入严肃延迟或得到取消什么是后果？ 如果没人是肯定对要做什么，能我们推测？ EMALS失败是否将促进F-35 STOVL的时运？ 除金钱之外通过减慢载体生产？ 我dunno。 但是您想法均匀您联合国来源猜想是多数欢迎。 假使风险，什么是计划B ？

There’s been some speculation out there about the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, or EMALS, the transformational catapult system the U.S. Navy is trying to put on the Ford Class Carrier.  One of my fellow Navy bloggers is out there claiming EMALS is “a failure, and nobody is really sure what to do“.  

That may well be the case, but since there’s precious little fact to be condensed from the RUMINT now flying around out in the blogosphere (read the comments), I figured it’d be nice to find some kind of official/semi-official statement–anything that might shed some light on the subject.

It just so happens that VADM Thomas J. Kilcline, Jr., Commander, Naval Air Forces, addressed EMALS a few days ago, and his view was…interesting.  Read it!  Here’s a rush transcript (errors are my own) of VADM Kilcline at WEST 2009:

    “…The transformational aspects of CVN 78 and that class of aircraft carrier, one of the major parts of that transformation is our ability to generate sorties–a large number of sorties–and we find our catapult systems we have today are somewhat limited after they fire and fire and fire.  Especially high-energy shots.  High-energy shots are heavyweight aircraft that require either a lot more wind over the deck or a lot more power behind them.

    So EMALS was a natural transformational move to “the next thing” in addition to the SPY-1 like radar system in the tower of the aircraft carrier, many more elevators to move things around, a smaller island to have more space for airplanes and to refuel and rearm, it was those catapults that were going to get us off the front end.

    EMALS is currently in Lakehurst, it’s in the ground, we brought a bunch of loads on it in a full-sized sim and it wor–not simulator but actually a generator running a load–now we’re putting it into the ground to how it’s going to work there.

    I talked to somebody about this earlier, and see if you can follow me.  We had 97 aircraft carriers after World War II, and in one of those 97 aircraft carriers we decided to cut a trough and put a hydraulic cat in so we could put 6 more airplanes on the fightdeck. That allowed us–because we didn’t have to do deck runs–to move airplanes a little farther forward.

    We pumped a couple off and I’m sure the first guy who took the first hydraulic shot was kinda wondering what was going to happen, but he made it off the front end.  Only one aircraft carrier had to be tested–one of 97.  Fairly simple change, and then we have a catapult system.  Came time for steam–God bless the Brits–they told us steam might work, they worked on it.  They did the R&D for us.  We had 20-30 aircraft carriers at the time, so we brought an aircraft carrier off-line, put an angled deck on it, and said, ahh…steam.  First guy took a steam cat shot probably went “holy smokes,” but he made it off the front end.  But the point I’m trying to make is that we were able to put S&T dollars–R&D into carriers because we had a lot of them or because somebody helped us

    We have eleven aircraft carriers.  Our S&T aircraft carrier (chuckles) I’m using S&T instead of R&D. Our S&T aircraft carrier is the next aircraft carrier.  It’s a full-up round.  The time from when it is commissioned until the time it goes on deployment is the same as the Bush which was just (stutters) commissioned. But its first in class with a lot of transformational capability and it makes people nervous.  And the first person that takes a shot off that catapult is going to be somebody preparing for a deployment.

    So you have to think about CVN 78 a little differently than you thought about the carrier that brought steam and hydraulics into the system.  With that in mind, it’s a long pole in the tent.  We’re not planning on flying STOVL aircraft for the entire airwing.  We’re not going to be STOVL E-2s out there so we’re going to have to figure out that it’s going to work, that’s going to work the first time and we have to make sure that as a transformational piece of gear, Lakehurst works, we understand the generators, we understand the lash-up, moving a lot of electricity around, so you’d be amazed at the amount of work that’s gone into making sure this design is right.

    But, as you would expect, including me, the closer I get the more I realize that until that catapult is in an aircraft carrier and those generators are lined up and it fires the first guy we’re all going to be a little nervous about is it going to work or not.  I’ve given you the answer in that there’s still instability in the science and technology.  And there’s a risk associated with moving forward. In transforming on your front line ship as it comes out is something that makes everybody a little antsy.

    Do I think it’s going to work?  I am convinced it’s going to work.  And I’m convinced it’s going to make an operational difference in how we employ our aircraft carriers.  Do I think we’re going to have to work through issues to get there?  You’re darn right we are.  Just like in anything that’s new like that.  So I’ve given you kind of a long answer and I apologize for that but it’s a little more complicated than I think the question in that “how do l make this work.”  Are there affordability issues?  (Nods) Brand new system, never done before.  The estimate process, is it going to get you what you need?  Are there cost issues?  Sure, estimates result in scheduling and cost issues. So what do they look like?  I don’t know what they look like, I don’t even know what the magnitude will be.

    The Secretary is engaged, the CNO is engaged, and I guarantee you I’m engaged. I care a lot about that system.”

If there’s something that will kill EMALS, it is, in my mind, the enormous potential risk of building this carrier before EMALS tech is mature.  The prospect of investing billions in a vessel that may not work…is scary.  Put bluntly, in the Ford, everything (from the engineering to the strategic justification) is wrapped around the new catapult/recovery system.  It will be really difficult–if not catastrophic–to tolerate things like readjusting the carrier’s center of gravity to ”refit to steam” in the event EMALS proves useless. We’ve built future strategy around immature platforms before, and it didn’t work well.  We shouldn’t repeat the process.

VADM Kilcline reminded his audience at WEST 2009 that the CVN-68 carrier program gobbled up a mere $40 million in R&D dollars–for our entire 10 Nimitz Class carrier production run.  The Ford Class is a totally different bird.  And I’ll bet, in the present budget environment, that there are some budget-hunters out there who are eager to shoot it down.

But if EMALS runs into serious delays–or gets canceled–what are the consequences?  If nobody is sure about what to do, can we speculate?  Will an EMALS failure boost the fortunes of the F-35 STOVL?  Save money by slowing carrier production?   I dunno.  But your ideas–even your un-sourced speculation–are most welcome.  Given the risk, what is plan B?