《2015年日本军力评估报告》英文版（全文）

　Chapter II Military Strength

　According to the statistics of both FY 2015 and FY 2016 budget plans released by Japanese Ministry of Defense website, by the end of the 2015, the JSDF has an authorized strength of 255,229 personnel （including 8,075 ready reserve personnel）. Among them, The JGSDF has an authorized strength of 150,863 personnel with an effective strength of 139,853； the JMSDF has an authorized strength of 45,364 personnel with an effective strength of 42,015； the JASDF has an authorized strength of 46,940 personnel with an effective strength of 43,259； the Combined Task Force has an authorized strength of 1,253 personnel, and the authorized number of personnel of the Joint Staff and the Intelligence Headquarters is respectively 368 and 1,911. In October, 2015, the newly established Defense Equipment Department integrated the Equipment and Facility Headquarters of the Defense Department and the Equipment Procurement Sectors of the JGSDF, JMSDF and JASDF, and the authorized number of personnel is 407 （the expected number is
1,800）. The establishment of the Reserve is 47,900.

　In 2015, certain　element of Japan’s military strength　development remains unchanged. According to the principles, orientation and objectives of the enhancement of Japan’s defense strength outlined　in the National　Defense Strategy, the　new National Defense　Programme Guidelines and the new Mid-term Defense Programme, the Abe Administration continued with its all-rounded buildup of military strength, that is, striving to construct a highly-efficient joint defense force and a flexible, rapid-response joint operation system, to build a joint response system to seamlessly respond to a wide range of scenarios from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters； to fully ensure both the quality and quantity of Japan’s defense force and to improve deterrence and responsiveness so as to construct a “joint mobile defense force” that is rapid, flexible, tenacious,　and interconnected； to　attach much importance to　capabilities of warning and surveillance, intelligence, power projection, command and control, communications as well as to capabilities to respond to island invasion, ballistic missile attacks, space and cyber threats, massive catastrophes　and participating in　international peace co-operations； to　give priority to the development of the capabilities to ensure maritime and air supremacy and to put importance to the improvement of the capability of rapid deployment in order to strengthen defense posture in the southwestern areas. The enhancement of the military strength of 2015 focused on the renewal and transformation of weaponry and equipment, the elevation of overall mobile defense capability not only in Asia-Pacific but around the world, and the increase of operational efficiency of the JSDF system.

　At the　same　time, 2015　was also　a year　of　“ground-breaking” significance　for the development of the JSDF. The revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in April as well as the Diet’s approval of the new Security Bills in the second half of the year meant that the functional and operational scopes of the JSDF, in terms of legislation, had been expanded worldwide. Such breakthroughs would provide legal grounds and expansion space for improving the JSDF operation capabilities. Specific details include：

　The new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation expanded the JSDF’s backup for the US forces by lifting the regional restriction of the “regions behind the battle front” which were peripheral or far away from the battle field, thus enabling the JSDF to engage in worldwide collaboration with the US forces. According to the new guidelines, the JSDF could provide the US forces with ammunition and supply fuel for the US fighters for takeoff. The U.S. and Japan also strengthened the coordination mechanism of the alliance, and negotiated about the establishment of a joint command office, which would contribute to the realization of the military integration （The “alliance coordination group” was set up in November, 2015, and the “Joint US-Japan Office” was planned to be established in 2017 as the joint operational command）.

　The implementation of the new Security Bills in March, 2016 made the JSDF engagement in overseas operations more legitimate. This would propel the JSDF to speed up its improvement of operation capabilities, development of weapons and　equipment, and proper augmentation of defense budget. After the approval of the new Security Bills, the new missions of the JSDF included sending armed units overseas to protect forces and civilians of other countries under attacks, escorting American warships, participating in warning and surveillance operations in South China Sea； providing forces of other countries with such supports as supplies, transportation and the like whenever　and wherever possible； carrying out collective defense,　etc.. As the above-mentioned new missions may evolve into armed conflicts under certain circumstances, the JSDF Joint Chief Department, as early as May of 2015, laid down the internal documents akin to “military operation plans”, aimed at establish the system of carrying out immediate military
operations at the stage of the　approval and implementation of the new Security Bills. The documents not only addressed the measures the JSDF took to engage in “the East Sea” and “the South Sea” but recorded the “military-to-military coordination office” which the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and Security Bills even fail to mention. It is apparent that the JSDF has defined itself as a “force” in parallel with the U.S. force.

Chapter III Defense Budget

　With the worldwide expansion of the functional and operational ranges of the JSDF, the defense budget of 2015 had a sharp rise. Since Mr. Abe formed the cabinet for the second time, he has increased the defense budget for three consecutive years. According to the Defense of Japan of 2015 and the statistics released in the defense budgets of 2016 and 2015, the defense budget of FY 2015 is 4.98 trillion yen, an increase of 953 billion yen （2%） when compared with that of FY 2013.

　If the 2,110 billion yen supplementary budget of FY 2014 （mainly the expenditure of coping with disaster, maintaining bases and equipment, and activities） included, the defense budget of FY2015 amounts to 5.19 trillion yen, creating a new historical record.

　The main features of the defense budget of FY 2015 are：

　Continuing to reinforcing the defense capabilities of the southwestern islands. For weaponry and equipment, 516 billion yen was spent on procuring 5 vertical takeoff-and-landing Osprey transport helicopter；203billion yen was spent on purchasing 30 US AAV7s used in offshore island landing operations； 3,504 billion yen was spent on acquiring 20 Japan-made P-1 anti-submarine aircraft, exceeding the total number procured from 2008 to 2014； 232 billion yen was spent on purchasing a new E2-D warning aircraft； 3 Global Hawks were bought in order to improve warning and surveillance　capabilities. The expenditure on military deployment　includes the creation of the 9　Air Division at Naha and construction of barracks and infrastructure for the deployment of a coastal surveillance unit and the creation of an amphibious unit in Yonaguni.
  
　Focusing on enhancing the JMSDF and JASDF capabilities of attacks and operations. For the procurement and upgrade of weaponry and equipment, 1,032 billion yen was spent on procuring 6 US-made F-35A fighters； 1,680 billion yen was spent on purchasing the Zeus cruiser and on upgrading two other cruisers at current service.　As to the expenditure on development and research of weaponry and equipment, it concludes 3 major areas. Firstly, the budget for “project related to the　new generation of fighters”,　about 342 billion yen,　is mainly committed to developing and researching new fighters when the F-2 fighters retire in future. This indicates that Japan has set up the project of the next generation of fighters and has begun to seek overseas collaborators. The second area is the “research on large anti-heavy-warship and anti-surface missile heads”, mainly the heads that is capable of penetrating the exterior hull of heavy warships of the aircraft carrier class. The intension is targeted at the aircraft carrier of China. The third area is the “research on electromagnetic guns installed on warships”. The guns will be used in air defense and anti-warship operations, even in surface attacks.

　Increasing the budget for the expansion of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. For weaponry and equipment, 94 billion yen was spent on enhancing capabilities of joint R＆D in the missile defense system. The newly built and upgraded Aegis cruiser will be equipped with new systems of
sharing positioning information of cruise missiles among friendly aircraft and vessels and rapid interception, aimed at improving US-Japan joint operation capabilities and interception precision.

　With regard to the consolidation of US-Japan alliances, 3,127 billion yen was committed to the realignment of US military bases in Japan, including redeployment of US forces from Okinawa to Guam and shifting of the US base from Futenma to Henoko.

  
　Chapter IV Military Deployment

　In 2015, according to the principles, goals and the overall redeployment plan of operational units proposed by the “three arrows of security and defense policies”, Japan made significant adjustments to JSDF deployment on the basis of NDPG and MDP. The overall goals of military
deployment adjustments focus on the enhancement of defense posture in the southwestern area and give priority to the development of capabilities to ensure maritime and air supremacy for thepurpose of deterring and responding to various scenarios. The goal of JGSDF adjustment is to promote efficient command and management of the sector headquarters to ensure rapid and flexible actions with the borders so as to respond effectively and rapidly to such scenarios as island invasions. The goal of JMSDF is to carry out intelligence gathering, monitoring and surveillance, anti-submarine operations on regular basis so as to ensure effective defense in the surrounding　waters,　safety　of　maritime　transportation,　and　participation　in　international peacekeeping operations. In order to improve air defense capabilities in the southwestern area of Japan and to enhance air surveillance units, the goal of JASDF adjustment is to construct an integrated air defense system of fighters and support units, a critical area air defense system that includes surface-to-air missile units from JASDF, and　a multi-layer anti-missile system that includes the Aegis destroyers from JMSDF.

　More specifically, the main measures of the military deployment of 2015 include：

　For JGSDF, in order to strength warning and surveillance capabilities in the southwestern islands, the surveillance and monitoring unit will obtain the land for construction of barracks on ground of the lease contract formally signed by the Defense Ministry and the local government of Yonaguni. Preparation offices are set up in charge of the establishment of the headquarters of the Ground Central Command in FY 2017 to unify the command of the existing five armies）.

　For JASDF, in order to maintain and enhance the airborne combat capabilities, the 304 Tactical Fighter Squadron（equipped with F-15 fighters） deployed at Tsuiki will be shifted to the Naha Air Base, Okinawa and will be combined with the 204　Tactical Fighter Squadron based
there to form the 9　Air Division as a substitute for the 83　Tactical Fighter Squadron stationed at Okinawa, thus doubling Japan’s fighter capabilities in this area.

　For JMSDF, in order to strengthen its close links with JGSDF, JASDF, the US forces and the concerned ministries and agencies and to improve its capabilities to respond to various matters, Japan intends to establish, at Funakoshicho, Yokosuka, the Maritime Operation Center, of which the first construction phase will be mainly set about in 2015. As to the buildup of the amphibious unit, the fundamental and auxiliary facilities are being under construction. For example, Japan plans to transform the well-deck of Osumi-class LST, thus enabling it to carry amphibious combat vehicles. It also prepares to construct a base for the amphibious operation brigade to provide maintenance facilities for AVV-7 armored vehicles, and　another one for the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.

　In 2015, Japan’s military deployment that most clearly denotes its strategic intention is to reinforce its surveillance and containment of China in the areas of the southwestern islands and the First Island Chain. In 2015, with strategic competitions and military tensions between China and the U.S. in the region, in order to answer America’s request to contain China’s military activities in the East Sea and the South Sea, Japan accelerates its paces to help the U.S. to contain China’s military development. For example, in February, the Japanese authorities, for the first time, confirmed that the construction of a large intelligence monitoring base has begun in the island of Yanaguni. In November, the Japanese defense minister, on behalf of the Defense Ministry, held meetings with the municipal government of Ishigaki,announcing the Japanese government plansto deploy JGSDF units at Ishigaki so as to enhance the defense capabilities in the southwestern islands and formally appealing to the local government to accept the plan. The Japanese Defense Ministry states that, according to the plan, warning and surveillance units, surface-to-air and surface-to-ship missile units will be deployed there, and the number of personnel will be about 500. In addition, a coastal surveillance unit is to be deployed at Naha Island in March, 2016, and a coastal surveillance unit of 700 personnel and a missile unit of 500 personnel will be deployed respectively at the island of Miyako and Amami-Oshima Island in 2018. By all the steps, Japan plans to enhance the defense of the East Sea Island Chain--deploying a series of sophisticated radars, air defense missiles and anti-ship missiles on more than 200 islands in the area extending as long as 1,400 kilometers from the Japanese mainland to Taiwan.

　Chapter V Weaponry and Equipment

　In 2015, aimed at responding to the so-called “manifold security threats” and enhancing military　deterrence and　strike　capability, Japan　continued　with stepping　up the　research, development and procurement of new weapons and equipment. Step by step Japan was about to equip its field units with new weapons so as to promote the upgrade of main combat equipment and to improve the overall “capability buildup”. According to FY 2015 defense budget, Japan was to spend 5234 billion yen on procurement of weapons and equipment, 6455 billion yen on acquisition of aircraft, 1571 billion yen on purchase of vessels and 1420 billion yen on research and development of weapons and equipment （all in reference to the sums of the newly signed contracts）. It can be found there was a significant rise in the spending on aircraft procurement and a certain increase in the spending on other conventional weapons and research and development.

　In contrast to its previous stress on domestic manufacture of weapons and equipment, Japan is now inclined towards direct and selective imports of foreign cutting-edge weapons （especially from the U.S.） and field them as soon as possible.

　In 2015, the main trends of Japan’s military buildup in terms of military equipment are：

　Firstly, steady buildup of conventional maritime operation capabilities. For ships and vessels, Japan was proactively committed to building maritime operation groups both of larger dimension and of great strategic deterrence. The largest Japanese warship after WWII, the Isumo-class helicopter destroyer, which is actually a “para-aircraft-carrier” operation platform, now　became the core for the maritime operation groups. In March, 2015, JS Isumo （DDH-183）, the lead ship of its class, was commissioned into service. The use of the straight-deck of the aircraft carrier, of which the length is 1.25 times that of DDH Hyuga, not only enables it to carry 9 helicopters instead of 4 but allows 5 helicopters to land or take off at the same time. In August, the 2
nd Izumo-class ship---DDH-184 set about its first voyage. In order to improve the anti-missile air-defense capability, Japan,in addition to transforming the Aegis destroyer, launched the project of building new ships by starting to build a new Aegis 8200-ton destroyer and importing from the U.S. two sets of anti-missile operation systems. Meanwhile, Japan continued to expand the scale of submarine fleet by stepping up the construction of new AIP submarines while decommissioning old ones. In March, 2015, the 6 service. In November, the 8 submarine had been commissioned into service in October, 2014）. And the 11th of the Soryu-class submarines, SS-506, was commissioned into submarine, SS-508, was commissioned into　service （the 7the of the Soryu-class submarines was included in the defense budget of FY2015. As to the research and development of shipboard equipment technology, laying stress on the promotion of independent research and development of　such projects as　the new　radar system installed　on destroyers, submarine variable-depth sonar system, long-range missile for　shipboard guns, Japan went on with its cooperation with the U.S. on the joint R＆D of SM-3 Block II A.

　Secondly, concentrating on capability building for air operations, surveillance and power projection. For fighters, Japan proceeded　with the procurement of the US F-35 fighters by including it in the budget （1032 billion yen for 6 such fighters）, meanwhile an enormous funding was spent on the transformation of the F-15 and F-2 fighters in active service and on the upgrade of airborne operation and communications systems. As to carrier aircraft, JSDF not only procured and fielded SH-60K armed helicopters but made great efforts to develop new carrier helicopters （in 2015 the research and development budget was 70 billion yen and in 2016 it was increased to 295 billion yen）. Meanwhile, JSDF decided to introduce new multi-functional armed helicopters to reinforce the capability of carrier aircraft. In order to rapidly improve the reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities in peripheral maritime and air areas, JSDF procured and fielded the Japan-made P-1 anti-submarine patrol aircraft （20 in 2015）, with which JSDF was to replace the P-3C in service gradually. In 2015, Japan made the formal decision to export from the U.S. the RQ-4 “Global Hawks”, the High Altitude unmanned reconnaissance aircraft　and planned to procure 3 in 2016. At the same time, Japan went on exporting the E-2D early warning aircraft from the U.S. and conducted transformations to the electronic systems of the E-767 warning aircraft in service with the support of the Bowing Corporation. Apart from exporting from the US the MV-22 Osprey transport helicopter, Japan also considered the introduction of new tanker aircraft and transport aircraft so as to enhance the capabilities of projecting forces far afield and logistic support.

　Thirdly, while driving the transformation of military powers through upgrading equipment, promoting the capabilities of rapid response and amphibious operations. Apart from the enhancing the buildup of airborne projection and transforming the Osumi-class landing craft, Japan spent
massively on procuring the US AVV-7 armored combat amphibious vehicle （30 in 2015, and 11 as planned in 2016）, which was the main equipment for the new amphibious operation unit or the “amphibious mobile regiment” being created. In order to improve the mobility of the armore forces, JSDF increased the procurement of the mobile armored vehicles, and continued to field the new model-10 tanks and model-96 light armored vehicles. In 2015, JSDF spent 344 billion yen on upgrading transport vehicles, communications systems　and logistic equipment, especially on
procuring the　integrated　systems of　commands and　communications for　amphibious　field operations. Japan put large investment on constructing new Tactical Data Links for JGSDF for the purpose of the collaborative operations between JGSDF and other forces and the US forces.

　Moreover, in order to strengthen the Army Airborne Forces, Japan pondered on the introduction of new rescue and search helicopters. In　short, the JSDF focuses on developing weapons and equipment that are　light and integrated with　multi-functions and connected by　information networks.

　Fourthly, investing in space military technology and information　warfare so as to gain strategic advantages. At the beginning of 2015, Japan’s budgets for space military equipment technology and military network technology were respectively 340 billion yen and 90 billion yen.

　Japan’s new version of the Basic Plan for Space Policy emphasized the establishment, based on the current　reconnaissance satellite　system, of　“Quazi-Zenith Satellite　System” capable　of all-weather coverage （including 7 satellites and expected to have been completely deployed by 2014） so as to enhance the application of satellites in security defense especially in intelligence reconnaissance. JSDF　went on constructing　JSDF automated command　system （C ISR）　by harnessing space military technology to get ready for the transformation and upgrade of X-band satellites and to carry out joint research programmes with Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency （JAXA）. As regards to cyber warfare, with “cyber defense forces” as the pivot, JSDF proceeded with enhancing cyber warfare system, improving “defense intelligence infrastructure”,　upgrading hardware, training personnel, improving cyber warfare exercise and strengthening JSDF real combat capabilities for cyber warfare.

　Chapter VI Organizational Reforms

　In 2015, Japan spared no effort to put forward its institutional and organizational reforms.

　The pivotal point　of the reforms　is strengthening the　systems of military decision-making command, operation and command, intelligence and communications, logistic support and foreign co-operations, which sustain the Abe administration’s “new military buildup programme”. Based on this, Japan went on with the organizational adjustment by focusing on gearing up overall reforms of the Defense Ministry and integrating the Joint Staff Office and the command systems of the forces for the purpose of enhancing the planning and execution capabilities of military policies, of elevating the status and authority of professional servicemen,　and of improving decision-making efficiency. Meanwhile, guided the principle of enhancing “southwestern defense” and containing　the so-called “China　threat”, JSDF　proceeded with the　adjustments of the organization of the forces concerned so as to reinforce the forward deployment and improve the capabilities of rapid response and direct engagement.

　In 2015, Japan’s main military reforms and adjustments include：

　Firstly, centralizing the management of JSDF. According to the amendment to the Act for Establishment of Ministry　of Defense approved by the　Diet in June, 2015,　Japan formally abolished civilian control, which actually eliminated the advantage　of civilian officials over uniformed officers, enabled the Joint Staff Office to centralize the command and control of JSDF, and valued professional input from the Joint Staff Office and service staff offices. This meant that the “uniformed officer corps” was about to play a pivotal role in JSDF operations. As a result, the Bureau of Operational Policy was removed, with the task of operational planning being transferred to the Joint Staff Office and that of doctrine-making and training management being handed over to the Bureau of Defense Policy of the Joint Staff Office. Besides, a civilian position of defense review officer, as spokesman for the military, was created, responsible for parliament defense, public statements, policy implementation and collaboration between the concerned ministries and
agencies. The series of reforms further strengthened the power of the Joint Staff Office. As a result, the uniformed officer corps, rather than civilian officials, plays an increasingly dominant role in managing and commanding military operations, which, in essence, weakened the fundamental defense principle of civilian control which Japan had claimed to adhere to. As JSDF military officers played an increasingly influential role in the Abe administration, high-ranking officers o JSDF frequented the Prime Minister’s official residence.

　Secondly, optimizing the command and intelligence systems of the front-line units. Japan proactively planned to establish　the headquarters of the Ground Central　Command through integrating the operational forces of JGSDF and units directly subject to its command to centralize command and control of the ground forces. At present, preparations for establishing the Ground Defense Command have almost been completed. Its headquarters was to be set up at JGSDF Camp Asaka in Tokyo, where the headquarters of the Central Rapid Response Regiment was located. In 2016, the Japanese government will set aside 92 billion yen for the construction of the base and preparation work. In order to enhance maritime operation capability, especially the
collaboration capabilities between the branches of the forces, and to seek command coordination and intelligence sharing between JGSDF, JMSDF, JASDF, the related ministry and agency and the US forces based in Japan, Japan planned to establish “Maritime Operation Center” at Yokosuka base on the basis of the existing headquarters of the self-defense fleet. In addition, Japan sought to change the separate command and intelligence systems by establishing, on the basis of shared data base and network platform, the synchronized command system not only shared by the army, navy and air force, but connected with the US forces in Japan.

　Thirdly, establishing Defense Equipment Agency. With the new “three principles for defense equipment transfer” replacing the “three principles for　weaponry export”, Japan viewed the establishment of Defense Equipment Agency as one of the most important programmes of system reforms. After long-term consideration and planning, in October, 2015, the Defense Equipment Agency, responsible for procurement, research and development of JSDF weaponry and the export of weapons and equipment of Japan’s military enterprises. With an authorized strength of about 1800 personnel, the Defense Equipment Agency comprised of Secretariat, the Bureau of Defense Policy, Bureau of Programme Management, Bureau of Technology and Strategy and Bureau of Adjustment Management, was in charge of about 2 billion yen of procurement budget. The aim of establishing the Defense Equipment Agency was to integrate the related functions of the existing Management Equipment Bureau, Equipment and Facility Office, Technical Research Office and offices of the three offices responsible for equipment management, to improve the efficiency of weapon procurement and research and development, to tap into and release Japan’s defense industrial potential and to promote national strategy.

　Fourthly, gearing up reforms of the Defense Ministry and optimizing institutional functions. Apart from reorganizing and integrating of the agencies of the Defense Ministry, enhancing the “unified” command　of the　forces and　establishing the　Defense Equipment Agency,　Japan established, abolished and combined defense offices, and strengthened the capabilities of policy plan and　implementation according to specific　requirements. For example,　by reorganizing Management Equipment Bureau, Japan created “Equipment Planning Bureau” responsible for the construction of the intelligence network and infrastructure related to the buildup of defense capabilities； added the position of Chief Councilor for Minister, specializing in media affairs to promote propaganda capabilities；　planned to set up the position of Global Strategy Planning Officer in the Defense Policy Agency responsible for organizing related panels and making long-term military strategies and conducting policy research on space and cyber warfare, and so on. Meanwhile, Japan adjusted the internal organization of the Defense Research Institute and the Defense College for the purpose of strengthening professional education and research and the offices of policy research and international exchanges.

　Fifthly, reorganization and redeployment of the forces to contain the so-called “China threat”.

　For the enhancement of the airborne operational capabilities in the “southwestern island” area, Japan transferred the 304 combined it with the 204th Tactical Fighter Squadron of the 8 th Air Division to Okinawa and Air Division by Tactical Fighter Squadron based there to form the 9 th the end　of January of 2016.　Besides, based at　Kyushu Island, Japan　established the new “amphibious mobile unit”, built battalions and bases for armored vehicles and “Osprey” transport helicopters （the related budget for 2015 was 179 billion yen）, getting prepared for “towards southwest” combat. At the end of March, 2016, Japan deployed “Coastal Surveillance Unit” and set up radar stations at Yanaguni Island 150kilometers away from Diaoyu Islands. At the end of
2015, JMSDF　reorganized　the　“Oceanographic　Command”　into　“Oceanographic　and anti-submarine Command” for the purpose of improving capabilities of anti-submarine detection and analysis. In order to step up the training of special personnel for off-island landing and capture, in September, 2015, Japan decided to have established, by the end of 2016, the “amphibious mobile training squadron” of about 90 personnel, in charge of training of amphibious mobile units.

　VII. Military Training Exercises

　In 2015, JSDF maintained and enhanced the training of its field forces, especially the training of such special forces as the rapid response units, amphibious operation units for the purpose of improving the capability of mobile operations as well as the capability of joint operations. The military exercises featured real combat, clear target, real scenarios and definite assumed enemy.

　Meanwhile, Japan,　through　joint military　exercises, continued　to　improve its　bilateral　or multilateral military cooperation with the US or its “security partners” and to promote JSDF participation in　international military　cooperation in　an attempt　to construct　the so-called “Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation Web” with Japan playing a leading role.  

　In 2015, JSDF military exercises fell into the following three categories：

　Firstly, military exercises conducted by the JSDF alone. In 2015, the JSDF conducted series of large-scale joint real combat exercises, real combat exercises and coordinated transfer drills.

　From late October of 2015 to the middle of November of 2016, the JGSDF, JMSDF and JASDF conducted large-scale joint real combat exercises, involving over 25,000 personnel of the JSDF.

　The exercises,　including the　large-scale transfer　of the　tank units　from Hokkaido　to the southwestern islands （for the first time in history）, the rapid deployment of the surface-to-ship missile unit from Kyusu to Okinawa, electronic warfare and cyber warfare and so on, reflected definite　defense　focus　and　assumed　enemy　orientation.　In　the　annual　Fuji　Firepower Demonstration held in August, the JGSDF, with subject of “island defense”, conducted island capturing exercises once again. As to the real combat exercises at the army level, the Northern, the Western and the Eastern Army carried out army exercises respectively in early October, late October and mid-November, involving 24,000 personnel and more than 5000 tanks, guns and armored vehicles. Among　them, the one　that involved the Western　Army and the Central Rapid-Response Force was of the largest scale and included such subjects as “island defense” and landing operation. From June to July, and from September to November, the Eastern, the Central and the Northern Army　conducted respectively coordinated transfer exercises,　long-distance mobile and　tactic drills, involving　thousands of personnel.　In late November,　the JMSDF conducted the annual real combat exercises and joint drills with the US 7　Fleet with the focus on anti-submarine combat and maritime operations, involving about 25 Japanese ships and 60 aircraft.  

　Moreover, the JMSDF maintained highly intensified off-shore and blue-sea tactic drills. As to the JASDF, the focus of drills was on the backbone airborne squadron. In addition, the JMSDF conducted joint exercises with the Maritime Security Bureau. In June, they carried out joint exercises of tracking foreign suspicious vehicles and long-distance escort of foreign crews； in July, the two sides held the first joint exercise dealing with scenario of “grey belt off the Izu Islands, involving two frigates from the JMSDF and two large patrol ships from the Maritime Security Bureau.

　Secondly, joint military exercises between Japan and the US. In 2015, against the backdrop of the release of the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, the US and Japan enhanced the institutional cooperation in military exercises with the US forces intensifying the JSDF training in island attack and defense and amphibious operations. In addition to the series of annual routine real combat exercises conducted by the JSDF and the US army and Marine Corps garrisoning in Japan, at the beginning of 2015, Japan went on dispatching main forces related to the “amphibious mobile unit” being under construction to participate in the “Iron Fist” joint military exercise with the US at Pendleton Camp in California, receiving “special training” from the US Marine Corps. In February, Japan and the US held the “North Wind” joint military drills in Hokkaido, in which the 1 st Airborne Regiment of the JGSDF carried out joint airborne landing Infantry Division for the first time. Also in February, with the 4　Airborne Regiment of the 25 th SS-503, the most advanced of the Soryu-class submarines, visited Pearl Harbour for joint drills with the US Navy. In September, Japan sent not only the “elite forces” of the Western Army and the Central Rapid-Response Force but also some ships and aircraft to Pendleton as part of the US-Japan “Dawn Bliz” joint military exercise, carrying out island capture drills. This was the first massive US-Japan joint military exercise since the release of the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S.

　Defense Cooperation. Meanwhile, Japan sent troops to　the state of Washington for “Rising Thunder” real combat exercises with the US forces. At the end of 2015, the JGSDF and the US forces held the annual routine Yamazakura Command Post Map Exercise in Tokyo, involving 6,500 personnel from Japan and the US（5 additional military observers from Australia）, carrying out coordination drills such as offshore island defense, anti-missile and cyber operations. As regard to maritime and air powers, from March to April, three destroyers of the JMSDF including JS Atago （DDG-177） sailed for the Guam for joint anti-submarine, anti-missile drills as part of the “Multi-sail” military exercise organized by the US forces. From September to October, JS Hyuga （DDH-181） and　JS　Ashigara （DDG-178）　and the　airborne squadron　equipped　with P-3C anti-submarine fighters, having participated in the “Dawn Bliz” joint military exercise, made for Hawaii for US-Japan joint drills. Apart from conducting joint drills with the US forces garrisoningin Japan, the JASDF dispatched fighters to the US for training and large-scale military exercises,
for example, the annual routine Exercise Red Flag Alaska.

　Thirdly, Bilateral and multilateral　exercises involving Japan. In 2015,　Japan put much importance on bolstering cooperation of military exercises with its main “security partners” in Asia-Pacific areas, attempting to construct a “small NATO of Asia-Pacific”. In July, for the first time, Japan took part in the biennial Exercise TALISMAN SABRE held by the US and Australia, joint landing operation, shooting and the like with forces from the two countries. In October, after an interval of 6 years, with the JMSDF sending JS Fuyuzuki （DD-118） for a joint drill with USS Theodore Roosevelt （CVN-71） and Indian warships, Japan participated in Exercise Malabar held by the US and India. Also in October, the JMSDF and Australian navy and air force held Exercise Trident, a joint military exercise involving JS Kirisame （DD-104） and P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft from Escort Flotilla 4. In October, JS Onami （DD-111） and DDH-977 （ROK Daejoyoung） took part in an annual joint SAREX in the Pacific.

　As for regional security cooperation, Japan continued to bolster its cooperation with ASEAN.

　In February, JSDF sent personnel to Thailand for joint exercise Cobra Gold hosted by Thailand, which involved the US, China and ASEAN member nations. About 100 personnel from JGSDF and JASDF attended the exercise for evacuation of overseas Japanese nationals after assumed
accident or disaster. Japan also sent military personnel for joint disaster rescue drills of ASEAN Rescue Forum hosted by Malaysia, joint drills of UN peace-keeping operations and joint exercise Pacific Partnership hosted by the Philippines and Fiji. Meanwhile, Japan, through the engagement in the disputes over South China Sea, enhanced military cooperation with ASEAN countries. In April, JS Kirisame （DD-104） and JS Asayuki （DD-132） with about 400 personnel on board arrived at Da Nang in central Vietnam after visiting Indonesia. In May, JMSDF sent ships and vessels for anti-pirate and communication exercises with Philippine Coast Guard and Navy ships in the Manila Bay. The JMSDF P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft landed and stayed at Da Nang in the north of　Cam　Ranh Bay　during the　visit to　Vietnam.　Late in　June, JMSDF　sent P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft to the Philippines for Japan-Philippine joint maritime exercise, carrying out joint training for S＆R and disaster relief. In addition, Japan bolstered its cooperation with the island countries of the Indian Ocean in South Asia. In April, JS Murasame （DD-101） and JS Ikazuchi （DD-107） headed for the Indian Ocean for a joint tactical drill with the navy of Sri Lanka. And in May, JS Suzunami （DD-114） was sent for a joint exercise with Maldivian navy. In November, JS Suzunami （DD-114） and JS Makinami （DD-112） attended another joint exercise with the navy of Sri Lanka.

　Besides, Japan conducted a series of joint exercises with　the European countries, with cooperation between Japan and France being the most frequent. Late in May, the JDS Osumi （LST-4001） and the 22　Airborne Squadron were involved in a joint military exercise conducted by the navies of Japan, the US and France in the western waters of Kyushu, and in late October, the JS Abukuma （DE-229） and French ships carried out another military exercise in the waters around Okinawa. JSDF sent personnel to French New Caledonia for a multi-national exercise of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief hosted by France. In addition, taking the chance of sending ships to the Gulf of Aden, Japan conducted maritime exercises with the member nations of NATO. For example, in early March, the JS Harusame （DD-102） had a joint drill with a German destroyer at the Gulf of Aden, with the subject being mainly on helicopter take-off and landing and tactic training. In the middle of June, JS Ikazuchi （DD-107） and French naval ships conducted a joint exercise of anti-terrorist and communications, and in December, JS Suzunami （DD-114） held joint exercises with ships from the Turkish navy.

  
　Chapter VIII Military and Security Exchange and Cooperation with Other Countries

　In 2015, Japan’s military and security cooperation　has two tendencies：further fostering Japan-US alliance through revising Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation； bolsteringmilitary cooperation between Japan and its Asia-Pacific “para-allies” and its key partner　through assisting the US with its engagement in South China Sea.

　A.ﻩFurther fostering Japan-US alliance.

　a.Revising Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation

　Unlike the previous revisions, in which the US played the leading role, Japan took the initiative and had been proactive from the beginning in this round of revision. One of the Japan’s goals was to realize JSDF’s role of “offering worldwide support to US forces” as a major military power through adapting to the US strategic demand against the backdrop of promoting collective self-defense. The specific goals include：

　1）Further defining the responsibilities and tasks each country should assume so as to enhancethe capabilities of cooperation and inter operability. The Guidelines emphasized that the future Japan-US defense cooperation should reach as far as the following：seamless, powerful, flexible and effective Japan-US collaborative engagement； worldwide cooperation tendencies of Japan-US alliance； cooperation with other regional partners； coordinated effect of national security policies of the US and Japanese governments； the alliance mechanism of government integration. As such, the Guidelines put forward the roles and tasks of the US and Japan, the general framework of cooperation and coordination and the orientation of policies.

　2） Consolidating seamless cooperation, expanding Japan-US alliance and elevating the roles Japan played in order to seek a mightier military power. The Guidelines listed the measures of the Japan-US cooperation：intelligence　collecting； warning and surveillance　and reconnaissance； training and exercises； sharing facilities and regions； rear backup； defense of resources （equipment etc.）； air defense and anti-missile； defense of facilities and regions； search and rescue； evacuation of non-combatants； coping with refugees； maritime security guarantee and so on.

　3） Expanding engagement in regional and global security affairs. The Guidelines ascertained the promotion of trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation between Japan and the US and those partners inside and outside the region. The scope of cooperation included：peace-keeping operations； international humanitarian relief and disaster rescue； maritime security guarantee；　supporting　partners’　capability　buildup；　intelligence　gathering；　warning　and surveillance and reconnaissance； rear backup and evacuation of non-combatants.

　4） Planning to meet challenging coming from the new fields. In view of　the increasing risks of the breach of free availability and access to the space and cyber, Japan and the US reach a consensus on coping with these new subjects of security and guarantee seamlessly and effectively so as to promote space and cyber stability and security. Both sides agreed that JSDF and the US forces were in need of improvement for the purpose of completing these tasks and tackling cyber security　which　was　of　fundamental significance　and　that　cooperation　between　the　two governments should be bolstered so as to ensure space and cyber security and stability and to improve the survivability and recovery of the space system.

　b. Further enhancing military cooperation of the Japan-US alliance.

　According to the new Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation and the new security defense bills, the US and Japan set out to establish new mechanism of deepening cooperation of the alliance. In October, Japan held the triennial JMSDF maritime “fleet review”, inviting 18 countries including　the US　and India.　In　order to　stress Japan-US　alliance and　promote cooperation, Mr. Abe embarked on “Reagan” nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in October, making himself the first incumbent Prime Minister on board. In November Defense Ministers of the US and Japan held talks, set about the “alliance coordination mechanism” , a new consultation mechanism, which could carry out unified transfer of the JSDF and the US forces at peacetime.

　（As such, there　were corresponding consultation mechanism between　the US and Japanese governments, the Defense Ministers and the JSDF and the US forces.） Japan held that, according to the Treaty of Security between the US and Japan, if no armed attacks were identified in the grey situations, defense of Japan would not fall within the range of the US obligations. So, if the alliance coordination mechanism could function at peacetime, Japan and the US would have seamless consultation and cooperation even in situations of “grey area”, for example, laying out joint plans and measures to cope with the unpredictable matters emerging at the Diaoyu Islands.

　In addition, Japan and the US further expanded the scope of the engagement of their alliance, especially started consolidating their cooperation at the South China Sea. Since 2015, the US military　influential officers　have　continuously expressed　welcome　to the　JSDF　for　their participation in the maritime and aerial patrol in the South China Sea. For example, from January, Admiral Thomas, commander of the US 7　Fleet, has expressed repeatedly that US applauded Japan’s decision to expand its aerial patrol area to the South China Sea. In February, Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani remarked at a press conference that Japan would discuss the issue and claimed that the range of the JSDF warning and surveillance was not geographically confined and that the policy not to send patrol fighters to the South China Sea needed reevaluation. In March, David Shear, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, announced that Japan and the US would strengthen the capability buildup and coordination in the South China Sea. In early April, the new US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter held talks with his Japanese counterpart in Japan, the first stop of his first Asia-Pacific visit. The two sides warned against regional militarization resulting from sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, revealing both sides’ intention to enhance cooperation for the US strategic rebalance. At the end of April, Japan and the US exchanged views at the “2＋2” meeting on the situation in the South China Sea. According to Japan’s Defense Minister, “（the situation） is directly related to regional peace and prosperity and is the common concern for the US and Japan.”

　Later, the 1　article of the joint communiqué released after the meeting between US president and Japanese prime minister stated that “any activity aimed to change the status quo by the use of force poses challenges to the existing international system.” In May, at a congressional hearing, Prime Minister Abe did not deny the fact that the South China Sea fell within the range of “situations of significance” when JSDF is allowed to provide support for the US forces. In June, Commander　of the　US Pacific　Command,　Admiral Harry　Harris,　welcomed the　JMSDF participation in patrolling the South China Sea. In July, highest ranking officers from the two countries, namely, Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff of JSDF,and General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff of the US armed forces, held bilateral strategic talks, discussing the JSDF activities in the South China Sea. In November, during his talks with Mr. Obama held at Manila, Mr. Abe announced Japan would support the US Freedom of Navigation Operation according to which US sends its warships to the South China Sea.

　B.　Fostering defense and security cooperation with para-allies and partners

　a. Security and Defense cooperation with the countries of South East Asia

　Apart from frequent military exercises with the countries of South East Asia, JSDF sought to bolster bilateral military cooperation through helping the foreign forces to improve capability. This project named “capability buildup assistance”, which was formally carried out in 2012, was included in the National Security Strategy and the new National Defense Programme Guidelines by the Abe administration. Up to 2015, the JSDF has provided aid to as many as 9 countries, mostly South East Asian countries related to the South China Sea. Japan was stepping up its efforts to return to the South China Sea 70 years after it was expelled out of it. In May, at the “Asia Security Summit” （Shangri-la Dialogue）, Japan’s Defense Minister said that it was　pivotal
to improve the capabilities of warning and surveillance of ASEAN countries for the purpose of protecting regional waters. At the same time, officials of the Japanese Defense Ministry has started to hold talks on joint manufacturing of weapons with Malaysia and Indonesia. After Japan and the Philippines signed the agreement on security cooperation and providing equipment, in April, the Philippine Transportation Ministry and the Japanese Maritime Joint Company signed a contract of customizing 10 patrolling ships, which were to be delivered to the Philippines from 2016 to 2018. The patrolling ships cost PHP 8.808 billion, of which PHP 7.374 billion came from Japan’s ODA loans, and the rest PHP 1.434 billion was on the Philippines. And Japan was about to provide fund for the　transformation of the fundamental　facilities of a military base　at the Philippine Palawan Island. Besides, Japan provided　Vietnam with assistance, offering 6 old patrolling ships and some corresponding training advice for submarine personnel.

　Japan held frequent defense talks or military security forum with ASEAN countries aimed at reaching agreements on maritime security, aerial rules and regional security orders. For example, in January, Japan’s Defense Minister Gen Nakatani held talks with the visiting Philippine Defense Minister Gazmin. At the talks they reached an agreement on further enhancing maritime security cooperation and signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange. In April, when visiting Da Nang with JS Kirisame （DD-104） and JS Asayuki （DD-132）, the Commander of Escort Division 12, Captain Masaharu Sugimoto announced that “South China Sea was also of great significance to Japan”, stressing the necessity of enhancing cooperation between the JMSDF and the Vietnamese navy. In May, in his address delivered at the Asia Security Summit hosted by Singapore, the Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani put forward that ASEAN countries enhance the surveillance over the South China Sea and appealed to all the parties concerned for cooperation to lay down common rules to ensure free and safe flight and sailing in the area. In September, the 7th Japan-ASEAN defense-ministerial talks,　which were held in Japan,　also
addressed the issue of the South China Sea. In November, the Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani held talks with his Vietnamese counterpart Phung Quang Thanh in Hanoi, reaching an agreement on permitting the JMSDF ships to stop at the Vietnamese naval base of Cam Ranh Bay.

　In December, Japan and Indonesia held their first “2＋2” talk on cooperation in the South ChinaSea.

　b.Security and defense cooperation with NATO and Australia, India and South Korea

　In order to further promote foreign military security cooperation, an organic part of “Abe’sNational Defense”, Japan went on with expanding security cooperation with the main memberstates of NATO, enhancing defense cooperation with Australia and India in the India-Asian areaand seeking to resume high-level liaison and negotiations with South Korea. In January, Japan andBritain held the first “two plus two” negotiations, discussing issues of accelerating joint researchof missile technology and reaching the “Accords of Communication of Services and Articles” （ACSA）. In February, a captain-level officer from the British navy was sent to the headquarters ofthe JMSDF as British navy liaison officer. This was the first time that Japan accepted a liaison officer from foreign militaries other than the US, indicating close cooperation between Japan and Britain. In March, in the “2＋2” negotiations held in Tokyo between Japan and France, the two sides signed the accord of defense equipment and released a statement on the dispute of the South China Sea. Also in March, Prime Minister Abe and his visiting Portuguese counterpart held talks and reached a consensus as to JSDF’s participation as an observer in the maritime training of NATO.

　In March, in the talks held in Tokyo between Japan’s Defense Minister and his Indian counterpart Manohar Parrikar, the issue of exporting to India US-2 relief airship was discussed.

　The two sides also agreed to enhance cooperation in maritime security and that JMSDF will continue to take part in the maritime joint drills held by the US and India. Mr. Parrikar later headed for Yokosuka to visit the largest JMSDF helicopter destroyer Izumo （DDH-183） which was commissioned into service in March. In December, Mr. Abe visited India and both sides came to a series of cooperation agreements, signed two accords of Japan’s transfer of its defense equipment and　technology to　India and　of sharing　classified intelligence　in defense,　and acknowledged to enhance security cooperation. According to the accords, India was about to purchase JMSDF U-2 amphibious aircraft, which was very likely to be the first transfer of large military equipment to foreign countries since the Japanese government passed “Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment”.

　In October, after an interval of over 4years, Japan’s Defense Minister visited ROK to enhance Japan-ROK and Japan-US-ROK defense cooperation to tackle regional security issues including the North Korean nuclear crisis.

　In November, in the “2＋2” negotiations held between Japan and Australia in Sydney, a consensus was reached for the two sides to work out policies for cooperation in the Pacific, which was viewed by Yomiuri Shimbun as aiming at China’s further maritime activities. In December, Mr. Abe held talks with visiting Australian Prime Minister and both sides agreed to work out a new pact including joint training. Meanwhile, the two countries held intensive talks on Japan’s export of submarines to Australia.

  
　Chapter IX Military Security Ties with China

　In 2015, Japan’s military security policies and ties against China featured the following four aspects：firstly,　building　up　atmosphere　and　inventing　excuses　for　domestic　legislation breakthroughs of the security and defense bills and for military cooperation with foreign forces through overstating “　threats from China”；　secondly, speeding up military　deployment and anti-China preparation at the Southwestern Islands　and the First Islands Chain, shaping the “islands fortification” situation； thirdly, by taking advantage of the US open engagement in the disputes of South China Sea, realizing a “military return” to South East Asian and strengthening cooperation with the concerned countries so as to muddy the water and contain China； taking minimum but necessary measures to maintain communications and to strive to gain control to some extent in case of abrupt emergency and crisis in the East Sea and the West Pacific.

　In 2015, it　could be said that　the Japanese government would　directly and indirectly exaggerate the “threat from China” as long as it involved national defense. In January, when the Abe cabinet approved of the defense budget of 420 billion yen, the main excuse that the Defense Minister offered was the “continually deteriorating peripheral situations”. In February, the Defense Ministry and the Joint Staff Office released and hyped the normal exercise and training of China’s ships　and aircraft　in　the West　Pacific area.　In　March, Gen　Nakatani　announced at　the commencement ceremony of the Defense University that China’s continuous and fast increase in defense spending as well as the acceleration of military buildup was due to lead to unpredictable
situations. In April, according to the statistics released by the JSDF Joint Staff Office, fighters of the JASDF had 943 urgent take-offs in 2014, with 464　targeted on China and the fighters responsible for the Diaoyu Islands had 468 urgent take-offs. In May, at the Asia Security Summit, Gen Nakatani overstated the tense situation and called for the relevant countries to strengthen cooperation, with the obvious intension being to contain China’s land reclamation activities in the Nansha Islands. In June, according to Japanese media, Abe remarked that “the new security defense bills were in fact targeted on China—exercise of collective self-defense is a warning sent by Japan and the US to China.” In December, Japan and Australia held “2＋2” negotiations, releasing joint documents and expressing “strong concerns” about China’s move in the South China Sea. On December 11 , during his visit to India, Mr. Abe emphasized that shipping lanes in the South China Sea are of great significance to regional commerce and trade and security. He also appealed to the relevant countries not to take unilateral actions that might result in escalation of tensions.

　In response to Japan’s intentional exaggeration of the so-called “China threat” and its moves, the Chinese government made formal representation with Japan and lodged protests. At high-level meetings between Japan and China, Chinese leaders repeatedly pointed out the problem and warned against Japanese moves. When meeting with Mr. Abe in Djakarta, President Xi Jinping pointed out that China firmly adheres to peaceful development and hopes that Japan will work together with China to contribute to international and regional peace, stability and prosperity. In July, in his meeting with Shotaro Yachi, Japan’s National Security Bureau Director, Premier Li Keqiang suggested that Japan should continue the policies of peaceful development and work together with other countries in promoting permanent regional peace, prosperity and development.

　In November, during the ADMM-Plus, China’s Defense Minister Chang Wanquan held talks with his Japanese counterpart Gen Nakatani, urging Japan to learn from lessons from history, respect neighboring countries’ concerns, take cautious actions in military security and do nothing to the detriment of both China’s sovereignty and security and regional peace and stability. Spokesmen of China’s Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry stated again and again that neighboring countries and international community had always been highly concerned about Japan’s policy moves in the field of military security. China hoped Japan, rather than exaggerating regional tensions, would take lessons from history, pay high attention to its Asian neighbors’ security concerns, take cautious actions in the field of military security, stick to peaceful development and make every effort to contribute to promoting mutual trust between neighboring countries for regional peace and prosperity. When asked to comment on Japan’s efforts to enhance defense cooperation and its participation in joint military exercises, the above-mentioned spokesmen warned that it should not
stir up potential disputes or conflicts so as to play up existing tensions.  

　Japan adopted a double-faced policy towards China （quoted from Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s speech at the news conference of National People’s Congress in March）. On the one hand, Japan never fails to play up the so-called “China Threat” or to promote measures to contain China； on
the other hand, it adopts necessary stance to discuss the issue of crisis management so as to ease tension. Taking into consideration bilateral relations and regional peace, China made reasonable, restrained and necessary response to Japan’s attitude which is lacking in honesty and sincerity. For example, in January, in the 4　round negotiations on maritime liaison mechanism held between the Defense Ministry of Japan and China in Tokyo, both sides acknowledged the consensus that had been reached on establishing the mechanism. They held discussions not only on details about maritime and aerial liaison mechanism but on relevant technical issues.  

　In March, a delegation led by Liu Jianchao, China’s Assistant Foreign Minister, paid a visit to Japan. During the visit, high-level officials from the defense and foreign ministries held“ Sino-Japan security dialogues” revolving around the security and defense policies and exchanged views on bilateral relations, defense and security policies and regional and international issues of shared concerns. In June, the Defense Ministries of Japan and China carried out director-level negotiations on signing the accord of maritime liaison mechanism. In late July, Defense Minister Chang Wanquan said that Japan’s dramatic adjustment of military security and its Diet’s approval of the new security defense bills would exert complex influence　on regional security environment and strategic stability when he met with Shotaro Yachi, the head of the secretariat of Japan’s National Security Council, in Beijing. In November, in their first talks in the past four years, Defense Ministers of China and Japan agreed on the importance of initiating maritime liaison mechanism to avoid accidents and the significance of defense exchanges.

　Conclusion：Where is Japan Heading for？

　In summary, in 2015, Japan’s three main moves in the field of military security have drawn worldwide attention：Firstly, approving the new security bills mainly focusing on lifting the ban collective self-defense, sending forces overseas at any time and providing logistic support for other countries, and almost abolishing the conventional control for the purpose of elevating professional servicemen’s status and power； secondly, revising Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, enhancing Japan-US joint engagement in regional, global and “global commons” security affairs； reinforcing　military deployment and defense　measures in the Southwestern Islands and the First Islands Chain--China’s territory, assisting the US with its engagement in the
disputes in the South China Sea in an attempt to achieve the goal of military return to South East Asia.

　The most conspicuous one amongst the three moves is the breakthrough Japan made in security and defense legislation. For Japan, the approval of the new security bills that all but amounts a “constitutional coup”. Article 9 of Japan’s “pacifist constitution” stipulates that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes”, and “land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be　maintained. The right of belligerency of the　state will not be recognized.”　Yet, the new security bills allow the JSDF to carry out collective self-defense right, to send troops overseas, thus making Japan a “country capable of war”. As a result, the pacifist constitution has become hollow, and its exclusively defense-oriented strategy has been derailed.

　The course of　peaceful development that Japan has　enjoyed for the past 70　years is now experiencing great turbulences. In view of this, the spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said, “This is the unprecedented move Japan has taken in the field of military security after the Second World　War. Recently,　Japan has been　stepping up　enhancing military capabilities, drastically adjusting military security policies, which runs counter to the general trend of peace, development and　cooperation of our　times. The　move has given　rise to doubts　from the international community as to whether Japan will give up its exclusively defense-oriented strategy and the post-war course of peaceful development.” Chinese Defense Ministry also stated that “Japan’s Diet insisted on approving the new security bills regardless of international and domestic opposition, causing unprecedented changes to Japan’s military security policies and breaking through the restrictions of the pacifist constitution. Opposing to the dominant trend of peace, development and cooperation of our times, and sticking to the Cold War thinking, Japans seeks to enhance military alliances and send forces overseas, inviting serious concerns from the Japanese people, its neighboring countries and above all, the international community.
The year of 2015 marked the 70　anniversary of the end of the Second World War. At such a historical moment, Japan, as a defeated nation, instead of reflecting on its history and seeking genuine reconciliation with neighboring countries, has been speeding up its efforts to rise as a
military power and push forward defense normalization. Apparently, what Japan has done causes concerns from neighboring countries and was detrimental to regional peace and stability.

日本《国防白皮书》强调军品优先级


2016-08-16
国外国防科技文献资料快报

[据英国《简氏新闻》2016年8月15日报道]8月12日，日本公布了2016年《国防白皮书》的英文版本，列出了国防采办和生产的优先级。文件强调要继续增强国防项目管理、确保技术优势的措施，以及国防技术合作三个领域。这三个优先领域是对日本近年来防卫省改革的反映，有利于巩固日本在地区军贸市场的地位。

《国防白皮书》推进军事技术的部分中指出，日本将持续加强对军民两用装备与技术的研究与开发。例如，日本在4月份对三菱重工第五代X-2战斗机技术演示样机进行了首次飞行。白皮书中提到另一个重要的事项是鼓励更广泛的机构参与到国防技术的研究与开发中，此前仅准许国防部和少数几个公司参与，但是在国防部新增机构中列出了大学、公共研究机构和商业公司。

白皮书提到，改善项目的管理是日本防卫装备厅的重要职责。日本防卫装备厅建立于2015年10月，文件显示，其负责如大宗采购、长期合同、降低采购成本、确保稳定采购等。白皮书强调，应通过系列举措加强国防生产合作。日本将通过积极促进工业国际生产流程的改革和建立“维护基地”的方式来支持国防合作。例如在2016年5月，向菲律宾海军出租5架比奇TC-90“空中国王”（King Air）教练机。这笔订单被视为日本继放开武器出口禁令之后第一次主要的国防转让。（北方科技信息研究所  李宗晶）