日本对俄国,1939

The cry before destroying the colors and committing suicide: "Tenno Heika Banzai!" three times.
在烧毁军旗和自杀前高呼“天皇万岁！”，三遍

Duty is weightier than a mountain / Death is lighter than a feather. -- Imperial Precepts to Soldiers and Sailors, 1882
责任重于泰山/死亡轻于鸿毛——军人敕谕

Summary of JAAF air
The air force involved was the 2nd Hikoshidan, commanded by General GIGA Tetsuji. At the time of the August offensive it consisted of 4 scout planes attached to air force headquarters, 15 scout planes serving with the ground troops, and two combat wings with 125 aircraft:
12th Hikodan with 88 fighters, commander unidentified. Three fighter groups took part in the offensive, all of which later saw combat against the American Volunteer Group in Burma: 1st Sentai commanded first by Maj HARADA Fumio and later by Maj YOSHIDA Tadashi; 11th Sentai; and 64th Sentai commanded by Cap KATO Tateo. A fourth group, the 24th Sentai, evidently did not take part in the offensive.
日军空战摘要
     空军力量包括第2航空集团，由GIGA Tetsuji将军指挥。在8月攻势发动时，它包括直属于空军指挥部的4架侦察机，为地面部队服务的15架侦察机，和两支战斗部队,这两支部队拥有125架飞机.
第十二航空队拥有88架战斗机,指挥官不详。三个战队参加了攻势,这些部队后来都参加了在缅甸与美国志愿航空队的作战: 第一战队，首任指挥官原田郁男少佐，后任吉田正也少佐；第11战队；第64战队，指挥官加藤建夫。第四个战队，第24战队，显然并未参加攻势。
（注：以上以下日本人名均翻译不确）

9th Hikodan with 24 light bombers and 13 heavies, commanded by Maj Gen SHIMONO Ikkaku. The combat units included one squadron of the 10th Sentai (light bombers plus 2 scouts), three squadrons of the 16th Sentai (light), and one squadron of the 61st Sentai heavy commanded by Col MIKAMI Kiso
     第九航空队拥有24架轻轰炸机和14架重轰炸机,指挥官是下浓一角少将.这个战斗单位包括第十战队的一个中队(轻轰炸机外加两架侦察机),第16战队的三个中队(轻轰炸机),及第61战队,指挥官三上木曾大佐,的一个中队(重轰炸机).

Japanese ground commanders tended to discount verbal reports of air recon. Photos were rare because cameras difficult to operate.
     日本地面部队指挥官注意到空中侦察的口头报告多有不确.照片也非常稀少,因为照相机难于运作.
The 2nd Hikoshidan was worn down by August. In July, the Japanese had claimed 481 Russian planes while losing 14 of their own. In August they claimed 134 while losing 23. On the Russian side, Soviet AF officer A. B. Vorozheikin says the loss ratio was 4 Russ to 1 Jap in May but improved to 1:3 in June, 1:4 in July, and 1:10 in August.
     第二航空队在8月实力下降.在7月,日军声称战果为俄机481架,同时己方损失14架.在8月,他们声称战果为134架,同时己方损失23架.俄军方面,苏联空军军官A. B. Vorozheikin说,在5月,损失比为4架俄机换一架日机,但是在6月,是1:3,在7月,是1:4,在8月,是1:10.
Nomonhan got most of Nakajima's production of Ki-27 fighters. The crews were exhausted and replacement pilots untrained. Flying up to 6 hrs daily. "An air staff officer remembers the drawn faces, glazed eyes, and hollow cheeks of Japanese aviators. Scout pilots . . . were having difficulty with their respiratory systems."
     诺门罕聚集了大批的中岛生产的KI27战斗机.乘员消耗严重,而替补飞行员缺乏训练.每天要飞行6小时,“一个空军参谋军官回忆到日本飞行员那憔悴的脸，无神的眼睛，和深陷的双颊。侦察机飞机员。。。。。。感到呼吸困难。”

Prior to the August offensive, 52 airmen were killed and 24 wounded, including Col ABE Katsumi c/o 15th Sentai killed by Russian strafing Aug 2. Lt Col MATSUMURA Korjiro c/o 24th Sentai shot down Aug 4 in fight with Russian veterans of Spanish Civil War, undersides of their wings painted violet. He was pinned by the tail of his own plane, his flight suit set afire, and lost all the fingers on one hand, but was rescued by another pilot who landed, pulled him free, and bundled him into his one-seater fighter. In all 80 percent of squadron commanders killed or wounded since fighting began. 70 percent of JAAF pilots had upwards of 1,000 hrs flight time.
     在8月攻势前，有52名行员阵亡，24人受伤，包括从第15战队借调的阿部克己大佐，8月2日，他被俄军机枪打死。从24战队借调的松村神代中佐，在8月4日，在与俄国西班牙内战老兵们的战斗中被击落，在他们的机翼下画着紫罗兰。他被他自己飞机的尾翼绊住了，飞行服着火了，失去了一只手的全部手指，但是被另一名着陆的飞行员所营救，将他解脱出来，并将他塞进了单座战斗机。自开战以来，80%的中队指挥官伤亡了。70%的日军飞机员飞行时间超过1000小时。

The big push, 21 August 1939
大进攻,1931年8月21日
In July, Kwantung Army hq at Hsinking urged Imperial Army High Command for permission to launch an air offensive against Soviet- Mongol strongpoint at Tamsag. This was approved on Aug 7.
     在7月，关东军司令部强烈要求军部允许发动一场空中攻势，打击苏蒙军在塔木察格的战略要点。这个要求在8月7日被批准。
"Operation S" set for dawn Aug 21. Estimated Soviet air strength 80-90 fighters, 30-40 larger planes. Says Giga had eight groups with 88 fighters, 24 light bombers, 13 heavy bombers, 21 scouts.
     “S作战”于8月21日拂晓时分发起.据估计,苏联空军有80—90架战斗机,30—40架大型飞机.(注:实际则远远不止这些)据称,GIGA有八个战队,共计88架战斗机,24架轻轰炸机,13架重轰炸机,21架侦察机.
16th Sentai light bmr: 6-plane sq took off at 4:20 a.m. Bmrs in two tiers escorted by 50 ftrs flew across Halha for Tamsag airfield 60 km SW Higashi-watashi crossing. First squadron bombed at 6 a.m., still dark but could see outline of airfield, encountered flak returning. Second squadron (?) saw 16 large planes on field, encountered 20 I-16s (Polikarpov single-wing open cockpit fighter) when returning and took some hits. Third squadron could not find target and instead bombed tank formation. From 10th Sentai lt bmr 6 planes saw 10 Tupelov SB twin-engined bombers on airfield NE Tamsang, bombed them and claimed 2 destroyed. Escorting 12th Fighter Wing met no planes.
     第16轻轰炸机战队:6机编队于凌晨4时20分起飞.轰炸机两侧有50架战斗机护航,越过哈拉哈河到达敌我分界线西南60公里处的塔木察格机场.第一编队于凌晨6时开始轰炸,天空仍然黑暗,但能看见机场的轮廓,遭到到高射炮火的还击.第二编队看见了停在地面的16架大型飞机,在返航时,遭遇了20架I16S(波利卡尔波夫单翼敞舱战斗机),受到了一些攻击.第三编队未发现目标,转而轰炸了坦克编队.第10战队的6架轻轰炸机看见了10架图波列夫SB双发轰炸机停在塔木察格西北方,轰炸它们并声称击毁2架.护航的第12战斗机队没有遇到敌机.

Second wave attacked 11 a.m. Squadron from 16th Sentai bombed southern airstrip, claimed five of eight large planes. Another squadron same group intercepted by fighters so turned for home and attacked ground installations; lost one plane and claimed 3 fighters. 61st Sentai heavy bomber with 12 planes met eight fighters at southern airstrip and claimed two; on way home claimed three more. 12th Ftr Wing? met 50-60 enemy planes, claimed 27 ftrs and 1 SB bomber, lost 3 own.
     第二波攻击于11时发起.第16战队的一个中队轰炸了南部的跑道,声称击毁了8架大型飞机中的5架.另一个同样的中队遭到了战斗机拦截,遂返回基地,并攻击了地面目标;损失了一架飞机,并声称击落3架战斗机. 由12架战斗机掩护的第61重轰炸机战队,在南部的跑道上发现了8架战斗机并声称击毁2架;在返航途中声称又有3架战果.第12战斗机中队遇到了50—60架敌机,声称击落了27架战斗机和1架SB轰炸机,己方损失3架.

In afternoon, supported Jap ground forces by bombing tanks and vehicles near Fui Heights; met enemy planes. 16th lt bmr claimed 6 of 30 I-16s, losing one man killed and two wounded. Escorting 11th Sentai fighters claimed 11 of 40-50 I-15s (Polikarpov biplane fighter) and I-16s. Evening: 10th Sentai squadron bombed 3 ftrs taking off from concealed airstrip west of Hara Heights. Escorting fighters engaged 50 enemy fighters, claimed 9, lost 1 from 64th Sentai. Still, had failed to neutralize enemy air so scheduled followup for next day.
     下午,在弗伊高地附近轰炸敌坦克和车辆以支援日军地面部队;遇到了敌机.第16轻轰炸机战队声称击落了30架I16S中的6架,己方死一人伤两人.护航的第11战斗机战队声称击落了40—50架I15S(波利卡尔波夫双翼战斗机)和I16S中的11架.傍晚:第10战队的编队轰炸了从哈拉高地西边的伪装跑道中移出的3架战斗机.护航的战斗与50架敌战斗机交手,声称击落9架,损失1架,该损失飞机来自第64战队.但是,仍未能阻止敌人的空袭,遂决定第二天继续行动.

AUG 22: 61st Sentai heavies attacked by 30 I-16s, claimed 6 but lost 1 with entire crew of 5. Fighters met 30 enemy, claimed 3, lost 1 from 1st Sentai to AA. Scouts attached to 23rd Div reported that Soviet armor was endangering Jap positions, so Giga called off the air offensive to support the ground forces. AA shot down scout from 10th Sentai. Capt MOTOMURA Koji, 11th Sentai sq ldr, shot down while single-handedly battling 30 I-16s strafing ground forces north of 23rd Div hq. Though claimed 109 Russ planes in two days, had actually lost air supremacy. Worst losses since outbreak of Nomonhan fighting, say 8 planes first day, 6 the second. Plus 22-24 killed or wounded. Jap airmen exhausted but ordered to keep flying. Soviets reinforced air.
     8月22日,第61重轰炸机战队被30架I16S攻击,声称击落了6架.但是损失了1架飞机和机上的全部5名乘员.战斗机遇到了30架敌机,声称击落3架,因空空火箭损失了一架来自第1战队的飞机.(注:AA,什么意思?是不是空空火箭的意思?)配属给第23师团的侦察机报告,苏军装甲部队正威胁着日军阵地,于是GIGA中止了空袭,转而支援地面作战.空空火箭击落了第10战队的一架侦察机. 本村虎见上尉,第11战队的一个中队长,在与30架I16S格斗时被击落,当时,这些飞机正在扫射第23师团指挥部以北的日军地面部队.日军尽管声称在两天内落了109架俄机,实际上还是失去了制空权.自诺门坎之战爆发以来,损失严重,据称,第一天损失8架,第2天损失6架.再加上22-24人的人员伤亡.日军空勤人员疲惫不堪,但仍被要求继续飞行.苏军仍在加强空中力量.(注:联系上下文, Nomonhan fighting应是指8月20日苏军发起的攻势)

Climax battle 28-31 Aug. Soviet AF reported four encounters with JAAF, downing 4 bombers and 45 fighters. Major battle 31 Aug, when 126 Soviet fighters bounced 27 Jap bombers and 70 fighters, shooting down 22. Japs claimed 20 Russ planes that day, losing 3 planes and 4 men. Altogether, Japs claimed 108 Soviet a/c shot down while losing 29 (and 20 airmen killed and 32 wounded) from 23 thru 31 Aug.
     8月28日到31日,作战达到顶峰.苏联空军报告四次遭遇日本陆航,击落四架轰炸机和45架战斗机.主要战斗发生在8月31日,当时,126架苏军战斗机拦截了27架日军轰炸机和70架战斗机,击落了22架.日军声称当日击落了20架俄机,己方损失3架飞机和4名乘员.总计,从8月23日到31日,日军声称击落了108架苏机,同时己方损失29架(并有20名空勤人员阵亡,32人受伤).(注: a/c是什么意思?)
After 5 Sept, major changes in JAAF. Operational strength down from 160 planes on 29 Aug to 141 planes on 5 Sept. The 31st Sentai and 64th Sentai had come up from China in July and August. More reinforcements began to move on 1 Sep.
     9月5日后,日本陆航力量变化巨大.作战力量从8月29日的160架飞机降低到9月5日的141架飞机.第31战队和第64战队在7,8月份从中国战场转移至此.从9月1日起,援兵开始增加.
Giga's 2nd Hikoshidan absorbed by EBASHIT Eijiro's XXXX, increasing air strength at Nomonhan by 50% with 9 new squadrons -- 6 fighter, 1 recon, 2 light bomber -- to a total of four wings (hikodan?) with 34-37 squadrons and up to 325 planes. [Later: my guess is that only three hikodan were deployed at Nomonhan.]
     GIGA的第2航空集团,为江桥栄次郎的XXXX所重视,在诺门坎的空中力量增加了50%, 9个新的中队—6个战斗机中队,1个侦察机中队,2个轻轰炸机中队—全部四支部队(航空队?)总共有了34-37个中队,飞机总数达到了325架.[后记:我猜测只有3个航空队布署在诺门坎.]

Russians likewise reinforced air units at the front. On 13 Sep, Ebashi gave go-ahead. 225 planes airworthy; fighters and some light bombers deployed to forward bases. Weather improved on 14 Sep.
     俄国人同样向前线增援航空单位.在9月13日, 江桥到达前线.(注:此译不确,请高手指正).可用飞机总数为225架;战斗机和轻轰炸机布署在前进机场.自9月14日起,天气转好.

Maj YOSHIDA Tadashi's 1st Sentai (Ki-27) bounced about 28 Soviet I-15 and I-16 fighters in afternoon, claiming 3. Weather still fair on 15 Sep, and Ebashi sent all Ki-27s and two light bombers groups plus scouts -- total 200 planes -- to hit enemy airfields. 20 Nates from Lt Col IMAGAWA Issaku's 59th Sentai engaged 50 Russ fighters, claimed 11. But one squadron followed Russ to south, was ambushed, and lost six Nates and their pilots, inc. s/l YAMAMOTO Mitsugu. 24th Sentai under newly arrived Capt SAKAGAWA Toshio claimed 13 Russ fighters; Sakagawa wounded but lost ndot planes. Total Jap claims: 39 in air, 4-5 on ground; lost 9, with 8 pilots killed incl 2 squadron leaders, plus three lt bombers damaged.
     吉田正也少佐的第1战队(KI27)在下午拦截了28架苏联I15和I16战斗机,声称击落3架.天气晴朗至9月15日,江桥派遣了所有KI27战机和两支轻轰炸机部队外加侦察机—总计200架飞机—去打击敌机场. 今川一策的第59战队的20架飞机遭遇了50架俄机,声称击落了20架.但是,一个中队向南追击俄机,中了埋伏,损失了6架飞机和飞行员,其中包括中队长山本松具.第24战队在新来的中队长坂川逸雄的带领下,声称击落了13架俄机;坂川受伤,但没有失去飞机.总计日军声称:空战中击落39架,地面击毁4-5架;己方损失9架,8名飞行员阵亡,包括2名中队长,外加损毁3架轻轰炸机.
Russ say six air battles: 1, 2, 4, 5, 14, and 15 Sept, the last being the biggest, with 102 Jap planes engaging 207 Russ. Russ claimed 20, lost 6. Altogether for Sept, Russ claimed 70, lost 14; Japs claimed 121, lost 24.
     俄方声称在6次空战中:9月1日,2日,4日,5日,14日和15日,最后也是最大的一次空战,102架日机对阵207架俄机.俄军声称击落20架,损失6架.整个9月,俄方声称击落70架,损失14架.日军声称击落121架,损失24架.

The aftermath
JAAF casualties 141 killed, including 17 officers squadron leader or higher, w/ highest ranking being Col ABE Katsumi, c/o 15th Sentai. One-third of losses were over enemy lines. Plus 89 wounded. 10% of casualties in May and June, 26 percent in July, 50 percent in August, 14 percent in September.
结果
     日本陆航伤亡,141人阵亡,包括17名军官,中队长或更高,军衔最高的是从第15战队抽调的阿部克己大佐.三分之一的损失发生在敌方控制区.另有89人受伤.10%的伤亡发在生5月到6月,26%发生在7月,50%发生在8月,14%发生在9月.
Russ returned bodies of 55 JAAF airmen from west side of the Halha. In one PW compound, the Russians held 500-600 Japanese prisoners, including a JAAF colonel.
     俄方从哈拉哈河西岸归还了55具日军空勤人员的尸体.在一个混合战俘营中,俄军关押了500到600名日本俘虏,其中包括一个日本空军大佐.
The released [bodies?] included Maj HARADA Fumio, 1st Sentai c/o shot down 29 July, possibly by Senior Lt V. G. Rakhov, who claimed to have shot down a Jap "ace" that day, who bailed out, tried to commit suicide, but was captured alive. As Rakhov told the story, the Japanese prisoner asked to meet the Russ pilot who defeated him, then bowed "in tribute to the victor" (quoting Georgi Zhukov THE MEMOIRS OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV, New York: Delacorte, 1971, p 164).
释放者中[尸体?]包括原田郁男少佐，自第1航空队借调,7月29日被击落，可能是被V. G. Rakhov上尉击落的.此人声称在那一天击落了一位日本王牌飞行员，该飞行员跳伞后企图自杀，但被俘并活了下来. Rakhov还讲了一个故事，这名日本俘虏要求面见击败他的俄国飞行员，并且鞠躬“表达对胜利者的敬意”（引朱可夫回忆录，New York: Delacorte, 1971, p 164）。

Also [the body of?] 1st Lt DAITOKU Naoyuki of 11th Sentai. The Russians sent him to Shintan hospital at Kirin, with MPs guarding the train and toilet doors always kept open, to prevent suicide attempts. Tight security also at hospital, where most of the orderlies were actually MPs.
     同样的事情也发生在第11战队的大徳尚之少尉身上。俄国人把他送到吉林的Shintan医院，宪兵们守卫着火车，厕所的门一直敞开着，以防止自杀企图。在医院，安全措施也很严密，在那儿，大部分勤务兵其实都是宪兵。（注：MPs是什么意思？是否是指内务部队？）

As the story was told, two coffins were carried into the hospital the day before a six-hour "trial," after which guards were forbidden to go into the officers' rooms. They duly shot themselves, Harada supposedly after being given a loaded pistol and a Japanese publication describing his "heroic death in action" (quoting Japanese sources).
     在这个故事中，在经过6个小时的“审讯”前，两具棺材被抬进了医院，随后，卫兵们被禁止进入军官的房间。他们适时的自杀了，据推测，原田被塞给了一把装满子弹的手枪，一本日本出版物描述了他“英勇战死”（引自日本资料）。
JAAF Master Sgt MIYAJIMA SHIKO, Ki-27 pilot of 24th Sentai, bellied in 22 June, wandered 4 days without food or water, captured by a Mongol patrol and imprisoned under harsh conditions for 10 months, returned to Japanese forces in 1940, tried, and sentenced to two years and 10 months for "desertion under enemy fire." Released 31 Dec 1942. (quotes Hata Ikuhiko, interview and article)
     日本陆航宫岛志向军士长，第24战队的KI27飞机员，6月22日被迫以机腹着陆，无粮无水跋涉了四天，被蒙古巡逻队俘虏，在恶劣的环境下被关押了10个月，于1940年回到日本军队，经考验后，被宣判2年零10个月，理由是“临阵脱逃”。1942年12月31日释放。（引自：<波田郁彦访谈录>）

Gen Giga in August 1940 made commander of a bomber basic training school, then retired in Oct 1941 at age of 56 and spent most of WWII as a farmer.
     GIGA将军在1940年成为一个轰炸机基础训练学校的校长，随后于1941年10月退役，是年56岁，并以一个农夫的身份度过了二次大战。
unit citations to Col Noguchi's 11th Sentai for air battles in May, Lt Col Matsumura's 24th Sentai for combat in June. Also to all three wings and to a squadron of 16th Sentai.
     野口大佐的第11战队因为在五月空战中的表现而得到表彰，松村少佐的第24战队因在6月空战中的表现而得到表彰。全面三个战队及第16战队的一个中队也得到了了表彰.(鸟注:这一段译的不准确, all three wings可能是指第十二航空队的三个战队.)

Russ I-16 fighters used 82 mm rockets to attack Jap ground positions, and some claim of using air-to-air missiles against Jap planes. I-16 saw service on Western front until 1943, and in Spanish service under 1952. Says it was replaced at Nomonhan by the retractable-gear I-153 Chaika fighter-bomber, much more powerful than the I-15.
     俄国I16战斗机用82MM火箭攻击了日军地面阵地,并声称使用空空火箭打击了日本飞机.I16在西线服役直到1943年,在西班牙服役到1952年.据称,它在诺门坎被起落架可收放的I153 Chaika战斗轰炸机所取代,这是一种比I15强大的多的飞机.(注: I-16 saw service on Western front until 1943.saw在这里是什么意思?)

JAAF had trained only 1,700 pilots in 30 years; losses at Nomonhan crippled it. By December 1941, army flight schools graduating 750 pilots a year.
     日本陆航在30年间只培训了1700名飞行员,诺门坎的损失使它遭受重创.到1941年12月,陆军战斗机学校1年有750名飞行员毕业.

Nomonhan (part 2)

continued from part 1

Alexei Stepanov on the Annals of Military Aviation message board:
Apparently, [a fourth wing, or hikodan] was formed in the end of the actions.... Therefore, one can assume that the fourth wing (if existed) might contain 11 Sentai, 64 Sentai and the newly arrived 59 Sentai.
阿列克塞.斯捷潘诺夫在“军事航空史”网站的留言板上的发言：
显然地，[第四支队，或航空队]是在行动末期形成的....此外，可以猜测，第四支队（如果存在的话）可能包括了第11战队，第64战队和新到的第59战队。

My special thanks for the information about claims of 64 Sentai at Nomonhan. Surely, the victory claims of both sides (JAAF and VVS) were enourmously exaggerated. According to official Soviet data, VVS claimed more then 650 enemy a/c; the VVS losses were stated as 143 a/c. Later, in 1980-ies, this estiamtion of own Soviet losses was revised upwards: 207 a/c (including 160 fighter planes). So it is interesting to compare this data with the JAAF victory claims (1000+) and real losses of the Japanese a/c....
我要特别感谢第64战队所声称的在诺门坎的战果中所包含的信息。事实上，双方宣称的战果都是非常夸大的。根据苏联官方纪录，苏联空军声称击落了650架以上的敌机；苏联空军损失纪录为143架。后来，在1980年代，这个苏军损失的估计被修改为：207架（包括160架战斗机）。因此，把这个数字和日本陆航宣称的战果（1000架以上）和日本人的真实损失相比较，是非常有意思的。
[About Russian pilots using a "boom & zoom" tactic to counter the more-maneuverable Japanese fighters in China:] According to information from the Soviet pilots, Nakajima Ki-27 had a serious weakness: the wing-tips of the plane had insufficient strength. If a Japanese would choose to dive away, the wings could have desintegrated during the sharp pulling-down. So the Japanese had neither possibility to break away by diving, nor the way to follow the Soviet "boomers".
[关于俄国飞行员在中国使用“一击脱离”战术来对付机动性更好的日本战机：]根据苏军飞行员的信息，中岛KI27有一个严重的缺陷：翼尖强度不足。如果一架日本飞机决心俯冲的话，机翼就会在急速下降中解体。所以日本人既不可以俯冲脱离，也不可能追击苏联攻击者。


Sander Kingsepp comments further:
Dear Sir,
I read your account about Coox's book (air battles during the Nomonhan conflict) and found it very interesting. I am an aviation fan from Estonia aged 36 and have researched this campaign myself. Besides reading Russian memoirs dealing with the conflict I also had a chance to discuss it with two veterans from Soviet side. From Coox's excerpts I somehow got the impression that the Japanese were the only ones who took a beating. This is certainly not true. Soviet losses in air were at least as appalling and all survivors still consider themselves members of a chosen (and lucky) club.

First some comments on planes involved in this conflict. The main Soviet fighters in Mongolia were Polikarpov I-152 biplane (I-15bis in Russian parlance) and Polikarpov I-16 Type 10 monoplane (better known as the Rata). According to "mutual support" doctrine the more agile biplanes had to engage enemy fighters so that monoplanes could simultaneously bust the bombers. You certainly wonder why it wasn't the other way round. The cause was in unstable flying characteristics of I-16--it simply could not hit anything smaller than a decent two-engined bomber. I'd like to quote the book Fighters of WW II edited by David Donald (Grange Books 1998, p 132): "Trying to bring guns to bear on another aircraft needed great skill and concentration... Any prolonged air combat, or tight turns, needed great skill and experience if the aircraft (I-16) was not to flick and spin." Such teamwork between mono- and biplanes had functioned in Spain and (not so well) in China, where biplane losses were already higher.

It should be added that Soviet pilots of that time preferred dogfighting as a rule. The Polikarpov fighters had a good turn rate (I-152 could master a full circle in some 11 seconds) and the Russians were confident to out-turn every other plane on earth. We should also remember that the only thing that was known about the Japanese that time was that they "could not take high Gs because of their fragile stature".

Another important factor to be considered is the difference in training. While JAAF pilots had "upwards of 1,000hrs flight time", the bulk of Soviet V-VS pilots of that time usually flew 100-120hrs yearly. Of course there were some exceptions, such like the veterans who had fought in Spain and China.

Already on May 29 the first replacement consisting of Spain and China vets was sent from Moscow to Mongolia (they were flying on brand-new DC-3s, by the way). Among 48 pilots 22 had the coveted title of the Hero of the Soviet Union (the equivalent of the Congressional Medal of Honor). At the end of June the Soviets had at least 150 fighters and 116 bombers ready (according to the official Soviet history of the conflict entitled 20 August 1939, by Yevgeni Gorbunov, Moscow 1986).

At the first briefing after arrival the pilots were told that their main opponent was "I-97 (Ki-27 Type 97) fighter, an inferior development of I-96" (A5M2--an opinion that still regularly appears in Russian publications). According to Soviet intelligence data, the I-97 had two Vickers machine guns (most Soviets fighters were having four) and a "major design flaw--oil cooler located before the engine that could be hit easily". Thus it was advised to attack Ki-27 head-on. No word was said about Ki-27's advantages, such as all-metal construction, radio equipment and closed cockpit or its range (which was at least 565 ms longer than that of the newest I-16).

Contrary to what Mr Stepanov said, diving with Japanese fighters was prohibited because already in China many I-16s had been lost while following their counterparts. I-16's mixed structure enabled no sharp pullouts: so the Japanese usually waited until the "boomer" had passed and then downed it while the Russian pilot was struggling with G-forces. Any talk about "boom & zoom" tactics applied at that time is sheer nonsense. Remember, we are talking about all-metal fighters vs. mixed structure Polikarpovs that had only a marginal strip of metal in order to keep their engines in place.

I-153 Chaika mentioned by Coox was intended to replace the I-152 biplanes and retractable gear was the main difference between the two modifications. Contrary to what was said, it had the same (and rather unreliable) 750hp M-25V engine like old I-152 and I-16 and its performance was disappointing. Structural integrity once again presented the main problem of the new version and Vorozheikin mentioned in your account personally saw one of them "folding its wings like a butterfly" in combat.

Many Soviet memoirs grudgingly admit that Japanese tactics and logistics at Nomonhan were superior in many ways and better adapted to local conditions. On June 27, for example, two Type 97 scouts (Mitsubishi Ki-15-I Babs?) crossed the front-line, acting as "battle managers"--they instructed large groups of bombers which targets to attack while Jap agents in Soviet rear severed all radio telephone lines leading from HQ to fighter bases. During great battles in June and August the Japanese used to sent a few fighters over enemy airfields in order to bounce the returning and crippled a/c. Already then Soviet airfields were often attacked simultaneously by several groups of bombers that emerged from different directions, confusing Russian ground observers. In August the HQ of General Zhukov himself was bombed so often and so heavily that the Soviets had to deploy all their cannon-equipped I-16P fighters to this area. On downed Japanese planes survival kits and provision for up to 3 days were found while nothing like this existed on Russian side.

Finally it must be said that the result of the battle was decided by regular reinforcements from the Soviet heartland. Anyway, in Mongolia the tanks (not to mention the up-to-the-minute information provided by Richard Sorge's spy ring) and not planes had the final word. To quote Alan Lothian: "Stalin knew that Soviet international prestige was at stake and his new negotiations with Hitler, no respecter of weakness, had reached a critical juncture. Neither blood nor treasure would be spared."

The revelation that the Japanese fighters were more than a match for their own was a major shock for Soviet top brass. In order to save his face Polikarpov (the Soviet "Fighter King") organized a fancy mock combat with a captured Kawasaki Ki-10 biplane against I-16 monoplane before the members of the Soviet government, including Stalin. It's not hard to guess which fighter won. Stalin was not to be fooled so easily, however. Polikarpov soon fell into disfavour and was replaced with younger designers like Mikoyan or Yakovlev. After Nomonhan bloodletting the "mutual support" doctrine was finally abandoned but meanwhile the Soviets had produced so many biplanes that they simply could not replace them before the next war began.

Speaking of Soviet losses. . . A source from long-forgotten glasnost time (Grif sekretnosti snyat, Moscow 1993) admits already a still higher number than 207. I would also advise to check up Lt.Gen. Krivosheev's book.

About Japanese casualties. . . According to Russian sources the "ace" shot down on 29 July by Lt. Victor G. Rakhov (not Pakhov) was Takeo Fuchida. The photo of his downed Ki-27 with white "Ru" Hiragana letter on its tail rudder can be found in almost all Russian publications. [I've corrected Rakhov's name above--DF]

With best season greetings Your
Sander Kingsepp

... which brought this reply from Alexei:
Dear Mr. Kingsepp,
I thank you for your attention to my remark. I read your viewpoints of the Nomonhan events with great interest.

It is very interesting that you collected stories and memoirs of the Nomonhan veterans. I hope that you will publish this narrates someday. Maybe, meanwhile you will post pieces from the stories at Dan's site?

I had also interviewed such people. One was a member of tank crew, three others were airmen. One of them flew missions to escort the fighters of special unit of Capt. Zvonarev, which was equipped by air-to-air rockets. The paper about it was published by me in the journal "Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtica" (Aviation and Cosmonautics), 1996, No.12.

Not so far ago I published brief paper about Nomonhan at the site by D.Sribniy www.airforce.ru and invite you to read it. (It is in Russian).

I can agree with some of your statements, while the others seem to me at least questionable. I decided to comment the latter.

Sander Kingsepp (S.K.) > First some comments on planes involved in this conflict. The main Soviet fighters in Mongolia were Polikarpov I-152 biplane (I-15bis in Russian parlance) and Polikarpov I-16 Type 10 monoplane (better known as the Rata).

I'd like to clarify this statements: the main Soviet fighter of Nomonhan conflict was monoplane I-16, which was known in USSR as 'Ishachok' (i.e. 'Little Donkey'). In Spain Civil War the Nationalists named it 'Rata' and the Republicans called it 'Moskas'. The Japanese dubbed it as 'Abu' (i.e. 'Gadfly')

There were 76 I-16s in Mongolia in May 1939. They were mainly I-16 Type 5, which were equipped with the engine M-25 of 710 hp and armed with two 7.62 mm machineguns ShKAS. It were they who engaged the first air-battles. In the progress of the conflict the other modifications of I-16 were deployed. They were I-16s Type 10 and Type 17: either had the engine M-25B (750 hp). Several aircraft of Type 18 with the engine M-62 (830 hp) arrived in the second half of the summer. A handful of I-16 Type 24, which had the engine M-63 (930 hp), were used in the end of the war. The latter types had already four ShKAS, and the I-16s Type 17 were armed with two 20 mm ShVAK cannons and two ShKASs. In all, 313 I-16s of different types were deployed during the war.

13 of 49 engaged I-15bis fighters were lost in the hot combat on 22 June 1939 and after that these biplanes were not used as fighters anymore (with rare exceptions). They were used mainly for attacks of the ground targets. Note that in this very air-combat I-16s proved themselves: only 1 of 56 I-16s was lost. S.K>The cause was in unstable flying characteristics of I-16--it simply could not hit anything smaller than a decent two-engined bomber.

It sounds really interesting, but according to the official Japanese data, 90 Japanese a/c were lost in combat. 62 of them were Nakajima Ki.27. It is nearly impossible that all these fighters were lost due to Soviet AAA, or shot down by a few I-153. But I can tip you the real culprits - they were Polikarpov's I-16s.

Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939(英语)精装– 1985年6月1日

出版社: Stanford University Press (1985年6月1日)
精装: 1276页
语种： 英语
ISBN: 0804711607
条形码: 9780804711609
商品尺寸: 16.3 x 7.6 x 23.6 cm
商品重量: 2.1 Kg
ASIN: 0804711607

                                                                                                                                 

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