中印边境冲突始末（一个老外的研究结果）

India is now the belle of the ball, as most of the world and Asian regional powers make pilgrimages to New Delhi to flatter and flirt with India’s dynamic Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. Modi and India come with a certain amount of unpleasant baggage, which its suitors do their best to ignore. Modi himself is an unrepentant Hindutva cultural chauvinist whose attitudes toward Muslims (and convincing circumstantial evidence of his involvement in an anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat—so convincing, in fact, he was previously banned from the United States) trend toward the fascistic.

印度现在已然成了香饽饽了,亚洲和世界各国都纷纷跑到新德里去巴结印度雄心勃勃的莫迪总理。莫迪和印度其实都有很沉重的精神包袱，而对于这一点，巴结者都尽力去忽视它。莫迪自己是一个虔诚的具有印度教文化特性的沙文主义者，他对于穆斯林的态度和法西斯主义有些接近（有确凿的证据表明他参与制订了古吉拉特邦的一项反穆斯林的法案--证据十分确凿，事实上美国在之前就曾为此谴责过他。）

In regional affairs, India has not been a particularly responsible or constructive actor, having mixed it up with Pakistan (abetted the split-off of East Pakistan a.ka. Bangladesh), Nepal (opened the door to the Nepalese Communists with its inept deposition of the King), and Sikkim (Sikkim, in case you noticed, doesn’t exist anymore; it was annexed by India in 1975) and presided over a bloody insurgency and brutal counterinsurgency in Kashmir that has claimed the lives of at least 60,000 people. India birthed the horrific Tamil Tiger insurgency in Sri Lanka and its intelligence services played what may have been a decisive role in organizing and executing the successful electoral challenge on January 8, 2015,to the rule of the pro-Chinese (now-ex) president of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa.

在地区事务上，印度不是一个特别负责任或者具有建设性作用的国家。它掺和巴基斯坦（教唆了巴基斯坦东部的孟加拉国的分裂）和锡金（为了防止你注意到这个国家，需要指出的是这个国家已经不复存在，在1975年被印度吞并）的事务，并且它在克什米尔地区对于血腥暴乱的残酷镇压中，至少杀死了60000人。印度还是斯里兰卡国内凶残的泰米尔猛虎组织的发源地并且印度的情报机构可能会在2015年1月8日的大选中对击败斯里兰卡亲华总统Mahinda Rajapaksa（现在已经卸任）起到决定性作用。

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And there’s the People’s Republic of China, and the contested issue of the borderlands of Arunachal Pradesh in the northeast and Aksai Chin in the northwest. Japan’s Foreign Minister, Fumio Kishida, got himself tangled up in the Arunachal Pradesh issue during his recent visit to India.译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
印度跟中国还有领土争议，分别在印东北部的阿鲁纳恰尔邦和西北部的阿克赛钦地区。日本外相岸田文雄 在最近的一次对印度的访问中因为关于阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题（中国的藏南地区，以下译者均翻译为阿鲁纳恰尔邦，望读者谅解）的表述而引发了争议。

China today lodged a protest with Tokyo after Japan’s foreign minister was quoted as saying that Arunachal Pradesh was “India’s territory.” Japan’s Sankei Shimbun, a conservative daily, quoted Fumio Kishida as having made the remarks in New Delhi on Saturday. Japan played down the issue today, saying it could not confirm Kishida’s reported remarks. It added that it hoped India and China could resolve their border dispute peacefully. Kishida’s reported remarks drew an angry response from China, which called on Tokyo to “understand the sensitivity of the Sino-India boundary issue.”

媒体报道日外相宣称阿鲁纳恰尔邦是“印度的领土”之后，今天中国向东京提出了抗议。日本的保守派日报产经新闻在周六援引了岸田文雄在新德里的讲话。日方今天对于此事表现得很低调，只是说他们还不能确认关于岸田文雄的报道的（真实性）。中国对于报纸上关于岸田的报道很是愤怒，并且呼吁日本能够“理解中印边界争议的敏感性”。

A Japanese foreign ministry spokesperson said “the statement was made considering the reality that Arunachal Pradesh state is basically in reality controlled by India and that China and India are continuing negotiations over the border dispute.” China disputes the entire territory of Arunachal, calling it south Tibet, especially Tawang, a key site for Tibetan Buddhism. The historic town briefly fell into Chinese hands during their 1962 war before Beijing retreated.

一名日本外交部发言人说“（岸田的）讲话时因为考虑到阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区现在基本上由印方控制并且中印还在对边界问题进行谈判这个事实。”中国声称对于阿鲁纳恰尔邦的全部地区（中方称呼为藏南地区）拥有主权，尤其是达旺，这个对于藏传佛教来说十分重要的地方。这个历史悠久的城市在1962年中印战争期间曾由中方短暂的控制，随后中方又撤离了这个地方。

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The Japanese Foreign Ministry backtracked expeditiously, indicating that Kishida’s remarks were perhaps a slip of the tongue and not meant to inject Japan into the Arunachal Pradesh issue. Ever since Prime Minister Abe returned to office with an India-centric Asian policy, yearnings have been expressed that Japan might openly side with India on the Arunachal Pradesh issue. The PRC, was extremely leery of previous PM Manmohan Singh and his overt diplomatic and emotional tilt toward Japan and, with good reason, has expected the current officeholder, Nadendra Modi, to play off China, Russia, and the United States in a more pragmatic manner.

日本外交部很快又改口说，岸田的讲话可能是由于口误，并且无意让日本卷入阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区领土争议问题。自从安倍重新上任以来，他提出的以印度为中心的亚洲政策已经表明了日本在阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题上支持印度的意向。中国对于印度前任总统辛格在政策和情感上对日本的倾斜已经十分警惕，并且也有足够的理由认为现任总理莫迪会通过更加实用的手段来让中美俄互相竞争，自己从而获利。

This, indeed, was the takeaway from President Obama’s recently concluded trip to India. President Obama’s decision to accept Prime Minister Modhi’s invitation to attend the Republic Day extravaganza further buttressed Modi’s prestige and popularity within India and elicited a wave of “Mobama” triumphalism in the press, much to China’s discomfiture. However, in the end, Modi played true to form by publicly and bluntly rejecting President Obama’s call to limit India’s greenhouse gas emissions.

实际上这是奥巴马结束对印度访问的一个附加礼物。奥巴马总统决定接受莫迪的邀请参加印度的国庆盛典，这使得莫迪在国内的声望和知名度大大增加，同时在报纸上引发了一阵“Mbama”必胜的旋风，这让中国很尴尬。然而最后，莫迪又变了脸，公开的直接拒绝了奥巴马对于印度减少温室气体排放的呼吁。

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For the PRC, an important area of anxiety is Arunachal Pradesh and the threat that India might “internationalize” the bilateral border dispute by canvassing its actual and would-be allies for support on the issue, perhaps even to the extent of going tit-for-tat with Japan i.e. India backing Japan on the issue of Senkaku sovereignty in return for Japanese aid and comfort on AP. However, it looks like Japan—like the Asian Development Bank, which ran into a PRC buzzsaw when it tried to put an Arunachal Pradesh hydropower project on its agenda in 2009—is not quite ready to mix it up on AP.

令中国非常担忧的是阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区以及印度可能通过游说他现有的以及潜在的盟友帮助自己来将双方的领土争端”国际化”,甚至达到与日本针锋相对的地步,也就是说,印度在钓鱼岛问题上支持日本来换取日本对自己的支持。然而日本似乎并没有准备好去掺和阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题（亚洲开发银行曾努力试图在阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区推行的水电项目被中国遏止了。）

Let’s unpack the Arunachal Pradesh issue. I’ve written a lot about Arunachal Pradesh. It’s a complicated situation and I scattered my narrative over a handful of posts: “China ‘pivot’ trips over McMahon Line,” “Charm Offensive: China’s Flank of Discontent,” and “India Places Its Asian Bet on Japan: Roiling the Waters of the Asia-Pacific.”

我们来回顾一下阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题，我曾写过许多关于这方面的东西。这是个复杂的问题，先来看一些报道：“中国在麦克马洪线上的`严重`失误”“魅力攻势—不满的中国侧翼”以及“印度将亚洲政策押宝在日本上：搅浑亚太地区的水”。

To summarize. Arunachal Pradesh is a region controlled by India in its northeast quadrant, between Bhutan and Burma, home to a variety of ethnic groups. One of those groups is Tibetan, centered on the town and district of Tawang in the western end of AP at the border with Bhutan.

总言之，阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区是由印度实际控制的印东北部的一片扇形区域，位于不丹和缅甸之间，许多民族聚居在这里。藏族是其中的一个，集中在达旺的市区和城镇，位于阿鲁纳恰尔邦西部边界并与不丹接壤。

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The Arunachal Pradesh dispute is bookended with Aksai Chin, a blasted desert between India and the PRC in the northwest, and is controlled by the PRC. The Indian claim to Aksai Chin is not terribly robust, since it is based on an internal British Indian survey—the Johnson Line—which was never discussed or agreed with China. The PRC built a strategic road across Aksai Chin in the 1950s, and it took several years for the Indian government to even find out it was there。

阿鲁纳恰尔邦争端是由阿克赛钦问题引发的。阿克赛钦是中印之间西北部的一个荒芜的沙漠地区，由中国实际控制。印度对于阿克赛钦的主权争议理由并不充分，因为它根据的是印度被英国殖民时的勘测结果（约翰逊线），而中国对此根本不予理会。中国20世纪50年代在曾在阿克赛钦地区修建过一条战略性道路，而印度甚至花了几年时间才发现这条路的存在。

There is a third slice of disputed territory, the “Trans-Karakorum Tract” bordering Kashmir, geographically distinct from Aksai Chin, which India claims Pakistan illegally ceded to the PRC in a land swap. For some reason, the PRC and India aren’t arguing about this piece. Both Arunachal Pradesh (AP) and Aksai Chin territories have been openly disputed since before the 1962 Sino-Indian war. The PRC has at times offered a grand bargain in which the two sides acknowledge each other’s regions of effective control, by which India got AP and the PRC gets AC. The official Indian response has been nothing doing and all territory it lost in the 1962 war must be recovered i.e. Aksai Chin is not negotiable. It has decoupled the two issues, and has focused its diplomacy on the insistence that its sovereignty over AP be confirmed. India’s claim to AP is complicated in an interesting way.

中印有争议的第三个地区是与喀什米尔接壤的“跨喀喇昆仑道”，在地理上属于阿克赛钦地区，印度指责巴基斯坦在土地互换中将这片土地违法割让给了中国。 由于某些原因，中印没有就该地区争论。阿鲁纳恰尔邦和阿克赛钦地区问题早在1962年中印战争之前就已经公开了。中方偶尔会提供一些大交易，因此双方都承认彼此的实际控制，印度得到阿鲁纳恰尔邦，中国得到阿克赛钦。印度官方的回应一直很强硬：他们在1962年战争中失去的领土一定要夺回来，也就是说阿克赛钦问题不能通过谈判解决。 这样印度就能集中力量巩固对阿鲁纳恰尔邦的控制，这是首要问题。印度对阿鲁纳恰尔邦的主权宣示是复杂的，方式也比较有趣。

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In 1914, Great Britain was interested in creating an autonomous Tibetan buffer—“Outer Tibet”—between British India and Russia/China. To this end, Sir Henry McMahon, the Foreign Minister of British India, invited Tibetan and Republic of China delegates to the Indian town of Simla. Tibet, eager to be acknowledged as an autonomous power with its own rights to negotiate directly with foreign powers (and not just through China), generously conceded a delineation of Lhasa’s sphere of control—the McMahon Line–that alienated Tawang, a market town that interested the Raj, to British India.

1914年，英国有意在英属印度和俄罗斯/中国之间建立一个独立的西藏缓冲地带—“Quter Tibet”。最后，英属印度外交部长亨利.麦克马洪先生邀请西藏和中国代表前往印度的西姆拉。西藏由于急于独立，拥有自己的外交权利（而不是通过中国来与外国接触），于是便承认对拉萨势力范围的划分—麦克马洪线—把达旺割让给了英属印度，让其获利不少。

However, the Simla Agreement was negotiated between the Tibetan and British representatives in a provisional sort of way after the Chinese representatives had packed up and left. Since Britain’s Foreign Office was protective of its China diplomacy and not interested in encouraging Tibetan pretensions to negotiate as an independent sovereign power, the absence of the Chinese representatives—and a Chinese endorsement of the border arrangement accepted by the Tibetan authorities–was a deal breaker.

但是西姆拉协定是西藏方面和英国在中国代表离开后临时签订的。由于当时英国对中国的保护性政策因此不鼓励西藏寻求独立，中国代表的缺席使这个协定失去意义（西藏接受的边界的划分缺少中国的认可。）

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The Simla Agreement was apparently treated as an aspirational document and was recorded in the most authoritative compendium of British Indian treaties, Sir Charles Umpherston Aitchison’s Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads, with the notation that neither Great Britain nor China had ratified the treaty. Since Tibet wasn’t recognized as a sovereign power, whatever it hoped to achieve with the Simla Accord—and what it had tried to give away, namely Tawang– was, in the eyes of the British, moot.

西姆拉协定貌似是一个雄心勃勃的协定并且会被收录在最权威的英属印度条约纲要—Charles Umpherston Aitchison先生的关于协议，契约，法令的收集—中。但是 Aitchison先生批注道：中英都没有批准这个协议。既然西藏不是一个主权国家，那么无论西藏企图从西姆拉协议中得到什么以及它在协议中割让的达旺地区，在英国看来都是无效的。

Things puttered along until 1935, when the detention of a British spy in Tawang by Tibetan authorities awakened the cupidity of a diplomat in the Foreign Office of British India, Olaf Caroe. Caroe checked the files, found that Great Britain had no ratified claims on Tawang, and decided to amend and improve the record. He arranged for the relevant original volume of the 1929 Aitchison compendium to be withdrawn from the various libraries in which it was filed, discarded, and replaced with a new version—but one that still claimed to be compiled in 1929, thereby removing the need for awkward explanations or documentation concerning why the switch had happened. The spurious version claimed that Tibet and Britain had accepted the treaty.

事情就这样直到1935年，西藏方面在达旺拘留了一名英国的间谍，这激起了一名英属印度外交官Olaf Caroe的贪欲。Olaf Caroe查阅了文件但是发现英国对于达旺地区并不拥有主权，于是他决定篡改纪录文件。他安排撤回与此相关的在各个图书馆里的1929年版的Aitchison纲要，这些文件都被归档或者丢弃，取而代之的是新版本的纲要，但是仍然宣称是1929年编译的。因此毁灭了解释这些交易(西姆拉协定)为什么会发生的相关文件，英国也不必为此解释了。伪造的版本宣称西藏和英国接受了西姆拉协定。

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The deception was only discovered in 1964, when a researcher was able to compare one of the last three surviving copies of the original compendium, at Harvard University, with the spurious replacement. Unfortunately, that was too late for Nehru, who staked his security strategy and his diplomatic exchanges with China to a significant extent on the fallacy that he had inherited from British India a clear and unequivocal claim to its borders.

1964年一名研究者将哈佛大学保存的最后三份1929年原版纲要中的一份与伪造版本的对比时才发现了这个弥天大谎。但不幸的是，这对于尼赫鲁来说为时已晚，因为他的安全和外交政策很大的程度上都建立在错误的基础上—他从英属印度接手的领土是明确没有争议的。

In 1962 Nehru decided to move up military units to assert India’s claim to territory in Ladakh/Aksai Chin and up to the McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh under a gambit optimistically named The Forward Policy. The PRC begged to differ—and Chairman Mao was itching to stick it to India’s patron, Nikita Khrushchev–and attacked. India’s entire strategy had been predicated on the assumption that the PRC would not respond (shades, I think, of Western confidence that Vladimir Putin would stay his hand in eastern Ukraine out of fear of sanctions and the wrath of his impoverished and disgruntled oligarchs) and the Indian Army, outnumbered, undersupplied, and disorganized, was completely unprepared to fight for the high ground in the north.

1962年尼赫鲁乐观地提出了前进政策，他决定升级军事据点来强化自己对拉达克/阿克赛钦地区的主权宣示并且将据点推进到了阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区的麦克马洪线。中国发起了攻击但其实也是另有所图，毛主席一直想给印度的保护人赫鲁晓夫一点颜色看看。印度的增个计划都是建立在中国不会对此作出反应的基础上的（从这可以看出现在俄罗斯与西方对抗的影子。西方一直以为普京由于害怕制裁和得罪因受损失而不满的金融寡头而不会插手乌克兰东部事务）并且印军寡不敌众，装备差又缺乏组织，根本没有准备好在北部高原作战。

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India suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the PLA. After its victory, the PRC decided to take the high ground, diplomatically as well as geographically. It withdrew its forces to behind the McMahon Line and offered a swap of AP for AC. No dice, as we have seen. India clearly does not see any need to credit AP—territory that the PRC abandoned—as any kind of bargaining chip concerning Aksai Chin. This is, perhaps, a cautionary tale to the PRC as to the geostrategic minuses as well as pluses of trying to behave like Mr. Nice Guy.

印度耻辱性的惨败在中国人民解放军手中。中国在胜仗之后决定在政治上和地理上控制这片高地。中方主动将军队撤到麦克马洪线之后并且提出印方用阿鲁纳恰尔邦来交换阿克赛钦地区。但是正如我们看到的，这个提议并没有被采纳。印度丝毫没有把阿鲁纳恰尔邦这片中国放弃的领土作为关于阿克赛钦地区的谈判筹码的意思。这个事情对于中国来说是一个教训，让中国知道了做好好先生要付出的代价。

This history is officially persona non grata in India. The report the Indian government commissioned on the 1962 war—the Henderson Brooks Report–was so devastating to India’s position and its legal, military, and diplomatic pretensions it was promptly banned and publication is forbidden to this day. In an ironic recapitulation of the case of the Atchison compendium, it was assumed that there were only two typewritten copies and they were securely buttoned up in safes in New Delhi. However, the Times of London correspondent, Neville Maxwell, got his hands on a copy and used it to write an expose on the tragedy of errors in 1962, India’s China War, thereby earning himself the fierce hatred of generations of Indian nationalists.

这段历史在印度是不为人所知的。印度政府曾授权发表的关于1962年中印之战的《亨德森布鲁克纪实》，由于该纪实对印方的立场是极其不利的，于是印度的军事，外交和法律部门都要求将该报道迅速封杀并且直到现在都没有公开发行。而历史又讽刺性的重演了Atchison纲要事件，一直以来人们都以为世界上仅存的两份打印版布鲁克纪实都被妥善的保管在新德里。但是伦敦时报通讯社的Neville Maxwell得到了一份复制版本并且由此曝光出了印度在1962年战争中策略上的失误，他由此也招来了印度几代国民的极度仇恨。

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Maxwell tried several times to put the report into the public domain. As quoted in Outlook India, Maxwell provided an interesting account of how the freedom of expression sausage gets made when the information involved is not necessarily a matter of national security (the report is classified Top Secret, but its content—the minutiae of military decisions and movements sixty years ago have no current strategic or tactical significance) but is a matter of supreme political embarrassment (to Nehru, the Congress Party, the Gandhi political dynasty, and to the army).

Neville Maxwell多次想让这份报道进入公有领域（人类一部分作品与知识的总汇），正如《展望印度》中引用的，Maxwell风趣地说到，当一篇报道虽然没有牵扯到国土安全（这份报道被列为绝密，但是它的内容—60年前的军队决策和部署，并没有策略上或者政治上的必要划为绝密文件），但却可能揭露巨大的政治丑闻（针对尼赫鲁，甘地的政治王朝，军队）的时候，言论自由便成了一纸空言。

My first attempt to put the Report itself on the public record was indirect and low-key: after I retired from the University I donated my copy to Oxford’s Bodleian Library, where, I thought, it could be studied in a setting of scholarly calm. The Library initially welcomed it as a valuable contribution in that “grey area” between actions and printed books, in which I had given them material previously. But after some months the librarian to whom I had entrusted it warned me that, under a new regulation, before the Report was put on to the shelves and opened to the public it would have to be cleared by the British government with the government which might be adversely interested! Shocked by that admission of a secret process of censorship to which the Bodleian had supinely acceded I protested to the head Librarian, then an American, but received no response. Fortunately I was able to retrieve my donation before the Indian High Commission in London was alerted in the Bodleian’s procedures and was perhaps given the Report.

我的第一次尝试是间接的并且低调的：退休后我将这份复印本捐赠给了牛津大学的博德利图书馆，我觉得在这里它可以单纯的被用于学术。图书馆刚开始对此很欢迎并将其作为珍品并被划分在发案与印刷作品之间的“灰色区域”。所以我便提前把东西给了他们。但是几个月之后，我委托的那位图书馆工作人员提醒我道，由于一项新的规定，在这篇报道出版或者公开之前必须交由英国政府审查而政府对这篇报道好像并不喜欢。博德利图书馆竟然消极的加入了这项秘密的审查，这让我很是震惊，我向馆长，当时还是个美国人，提出了抗议，但并没有收到答复。虽然当时博德利图书馆程序上已经通知了伦敦的印度高级委员会并且可能交出这份报道，但幸运的是我在此之前取回了我的捐赠品。

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In 2002, noting that all attempts in India to make the government release the Report had failed, I decided on a more direct approach and made the text available to the editors of three of India’s leading publications, asking that they observe the usual journalistic practice of keeping their source to themselves…To my surprise the editors concerned decided, unanimously, not to publish…Later I gave the text to a fourth editor and offered it to a fifth, with the same nil result.

2002年我发现所有的让印度政府公开这份报道的尝试都失败了之后，便决定要用更直接的方式。我找到了印度最知名的三家出版社并且告诉他们希望他们能够遵守新闻工作者的基本原则。。。。但是令人吃惊的是三家出版社的编辑都不约而同地决定拒绝出版。。。。之后我又找了第四家，第五家，结果都失败了。

Narendra Modi, a determined foe of the Congress Party and the Gandhis (I had to chuckle when I read these fawning articles about President Obama bonding with Prime Minister Modi over their shared Gandhi love, despite the awkward fact that Modi’s BJP nationalist party had been and apparently still is the spiritual home of Gandhi’s assassin), came to power promising to release the report, but didn’t. And when Maxwell posted part of the report on his website, the site was symbolically blocked.

莫迪这个国大党和甘地的死敌（当我读到那些关于奥巴马和莫迪由于共同的对甘地的好感会结盟的阿谀奉承的报道时，便会呵呵一笑。他们压根就忽略了一个尴尬的事实，莫迪德人民民族党正是刺杀甘地的刺客的精神家园）执政之后曾说过要公开这篇报道但是却没有。但当Maxwell在他的网站上公开这篇报道的部分内容时，网址便被象征性的封了。

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The Indian army, in particular, is wedded to a creation myth of PRC perfidy that is infinitely more utile than acknowledging that the PLA attack, rather than unprovoked, was a response to a strategically and diplomatically bankrupt Indian border gambit compounded by non-stop miscues by India’s civilian leadership and disastrous defeat for its military forces.

印度军队尤其渴望编造一个虚假的中国方面背信弃义(关于1962年战争)的故事,这比他们承认中国人民解放军的进攻((不是自卫)是由于印度领导人政治上的不断误判而导致印度的边境计划在外交和政策上均遭惨败所引发的或者承认他们惨败在解放军的手里要光彩得多.

In 2005, the PRC and India started negotiations over the borders issue. Here’s a nice explainer from the Daily Mail! in 2013 which signals that Aksai Chin might be on the table, but Tawang is off the table, and unfortunately omits the significant complication of the Caroe forgery.

2005年中印就边界问题开始谈判,这里摘录了<每日邮报>上的一篇精彩的评论.有迹象表明2013年中印谈判将涉及阿克赛钦地区但不会讨论达旺,并且不幸的是也不会涉及到极其重要并且十分复杂的Caroe伪造纲要的事件。

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India’s move into Arunachal Pradesh in the 1950s is less than a slam dunk according to international law, complicated in particular by the issue of Tawang. Not only is there the problem of Olaf Caroe’s bibliographic hijinks, there is the awkward fact that India forcefully displaced Tibetan theocratic rule in Tawang—nominally rule from Lhasa, actually local rule by the immensely powerful monastery.

根据国际法，20世纪50年代印度队阿鲁纳恰尔邦的控制理由并不时十分充分的，因为不仅有Olaf Caroe伪造纲要的问题，还有一个矛盾的事实就是，印度颠覆了西藏在达旺地区的神权统治—达旺名义上是由拉萨统治，但实际上是由当地权利极大的寺院控制。

Lhasa had apparently experienced cartographic remorse over Simla and implored India to recognize Tawang as Tibetan territory in 1947. Instead, India seized the district in 1951 in a quasi-official/quasi-military “liberating the Tibetan serfs” operation rather similar to what the PRC conducted in its part of Tibet.

拉萨方面显然曾经对于边界的划分悔恨不已，并且在1947年还请求印度方面将达旺还给西藏。然而印度在1951年通过准官方/准军事的“解放西藏农奴”运动控制了达旺，这个运动与中国在其控制的西藏地区进行的运动很相似。

In recent years, the Dalai Lama has been forced into the unpleasant position of affirming Indian sovereignty over Tawang, whose great monastery (the second largest in Tibetan Buddhism) first gave him shelter when he fled PRC control in 1959, and which had hosted the reincarnation of the 6th Dalai Lama way back when.

近些年来，达赖喇嘛由于承认印度对达旺地区的主权而处境尴尬，达旺的大寺院在达赖喇嘛与1959年逃离中国时第一个向他提供了庇护，大寺院是藏传佛教的第二大寺院并且主持过第六世达赖喇嘛的晋封仪式。

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The Dalai Lama apparently verbally acknowledged, if not in writing, that AP and Tawang belonged to India on a couple occasions while he still served at the apex of power in the Tibetan government in exile (a position he relinquished in 2011). However, I assume twisting the Dalai Lama’s arm to concede Indian sovereignty over Tawang falls a little bit short, since the Tibetan government-in-exile lacks international recognition (and with it the right to cede territory to India).

达赖喇嘛在他担任西藏流亡政府领导人期间（2011年卸任）确实有几次口头上承认印度对达旺地区和阿鲁纳恰尔邦的主权（不知道有没有在书面上承认）。但我觉得向达赖喇嘛施压来逼迫其承认印度在这两个地方的主权，作用不大。毕竟国际上并不承认西藏流亡政府（也就不承认其割让领土给印度）。

The PRC is happy to harp on Tawang’s role in the AP situation, since it serves as a continual reminder that India is occupying territory in AP that, however you slice it, is a core component of the Tibetan homeland, thereby keeping alive a non-Indian or, if you want, a PRC-cum-Tibet claim to at least part of the region and attempting to balk India’s attempt to claim full sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh under international law.

中方很乐意不断强调达旺在阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题中的位置，因为它可以不断提醒人们，印度占领的阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区，无论你怎样划分，都是西藏领土中的一部分，所以这地区根本不属于印度。如果必要的话，中国西藏至少可以宣称对其中的一部分地区拥有主权，这样，在国际法的框架下可以阻止印度对整个地区的主权声张。

To understand how this relates to the Senkakus requires reflection on another piece of suppressed history—that the United States returned the Senkakus to Japanese administrative control not sovereignty in 1973 as part of the Okinawa package with the stated expectation that the sovereignty of the rocks would be negotiated between China and Japan.

为了理解为什么这能牵扯到钓鱼岛问题，我们需要了解一段惊人的历史——1973年美国将钓鱼岛（作为冲绳的一部分）的监管权（不是主权）交还给了日本，并且声明主权问题由中日两国协商解决。

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My personal opinion is that the PRC is in no hurry to unfreeze the conflict over Arunachal Pradesh, and its insistence on sovereignty over Tawang—a district, I suspect, that has extremely limited interest in reunification with the Chinese motherland—is something of a pretext. With the Simla Agreement tainted and no subsequent cession of Tawang by Tibet or China, the Indian position in Tawang is embarrassingly similar to that of the PRC in the matter of the Spratlys i.e. having expelled the previous rulers by conquest and achieved control of the territory without attaining international recognition of its sovereignty. And it’s somewhat similar to the Senkakus, where the United States effectively surrendered its sovereignty over the islands when it returned Okinawa and the Ryukyus to Japan, but didn’t cede its claim to anybody else.

在我看来中国不用着急去引发阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题，并且中方对于达旺地区的主权声张在我看来好像只是托辞（个人觉得达旺地区对于中国大陆的统一大业来说，价值并不大）。西拉姆协定的不光彩，以及西藏和中国对协定的不承认，使印度在达旺地区的立场很尴尬，有点像中国在南沙的立场—中国战胜并赶走了原来的统治者，控制了该地区但是国际上并未承认中国在该地区的主权。这也有点像钓鱼岛问题，当美国把冲绳和琉球群岛交还给日本时，实际上已经交出了这些岛屿的主权，但是美国并未说明交给谁。

Maybe Arunachal Pradesh is another one of those Mexican-standoff situations like Kashmir vs. Tibet (a.k.a. the Indian temptation to make mischief in the ethnic-Tibetan areas of the PRC is inhibited by concern that the PRC, via Pakistan, might light the fuse in Kashmir). The PRC keeps the Tawang/AP issue alive to forestall thoughts by India of giving aid and comfort to Japan on the Senkakus or, for that matter, Vietnam on the Spratlys.

也许阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题是另一个难分胜负的僵局，就好像西藏vs喀什米尔（印度想在中国西藏地区埋下祸根但是又害怕中国通过巴基斯坦来引发喀什米尔这个火药桶）。中国通过不断提出达旺/阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题来先声夺人，预防印度在钓鱼岛问题上向日本或者在南沙问题上对越南提供支援和帮助。

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Both the PRC and India are bulking up their infrastructure and military on their respective sides of the de facto McMahon-Line-based border, making it a virtual certainty that India will never alienate any part of AP, including Tawang. That’s good news for reduced actual tensions (as opposed to defense ministry posturing) at the shared border, but India’s heightened sense of security concerning Arunachal Pradesh may encourage it to be less tentative vis a vis the PRC in its Japanese and Vietnamese diplomacy.

中印各自都在实际的以麦克马洪线为基础的边境线附近积极建设基础设施并囤积军队，这更加明确了印度不会放弃阿鲁纳恰尔邦任何一片土地（包括达旺）的决心。中印边界目前比较平定的局势是令人欣慰的（尽管这不符合国防部的意愿），可是印度对于阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区安全局势担忧的增加可能会促使其在对日本和越南的政策上与中国直接对抗。


http://www.ltaaa.com/wtfy/15839.htmlIndia is now the belle of the ball, as most of the world and Asian regional powers make pilgrimages to New Delhi to flatter and flirt with India’s dynamic Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. Modi and India come with a certain amount of unpleasant baggage, which its suitors do their best to ignore. Modi himself is an unrepentant Hindutva cultural chauvinist whose attitudes toward Muslims (and convincing circumstantial evidence of his involvement in an anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat—so convincing, in fact, he was previously banned from the United States) trend toward the fascistic.

印度现在已然成了香饽饽了,亚洲和世界各国都纷纷跑到新德里去巴结印度雄心勃勃的莫迪总理。莫迪和印度其实都有很沉重的精神包袱，而对于这一点，巴结者都尽力去忽视它。莫迪自己是一个虔诚的具有印度教文化特性的沙文主义者，他对于穆斯林的态度和法西斯主义有些接近（有确凿的证据表明他参与制订了古吉拉特邦的一项反穆斯林的法案--证据十分确凿，事实上美国在之前就曾为此谴责过他。）

In regional affairs, India has not been a particularly responsible or constructive actor, having mixed it up with Pakistan (abetted the split-off of East Pakistan a.ka. Bangladesh), Nepal (opened the door to the Nepalese Communists with its inept deposition of the King), and Sikkim (Sikkim, in case you noticed, doesn’t exist anymore; it was annexed by India in 1975) and presided over a bloody insurgency and brutal counterinsurgency in Kashmir that has claimed the lives of at least 60,000 people. India birthed the horrific Tamil Tiger insurgency in Sri Lanka and its intelligence services played what may have been a decisive role in organizing and executing the successful electoral challenge on January 8, 2015,to the rule of the pro-Chinese (now-ex) president of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa.

在地区事务上，印度不是一个特别负责任或者具有建设性作用的国家。它掺和巴基斯坦（教唆了巴基斯坦东部的孟加拉国的分裂）和锡金（为了防止你注意到这个国家，需要指出的是这个国家已经不复存在，在1975年被印度吞并）的事务，并且它在克什米尔地区对于血腥暴乱的残酷镇压中，至少杀死了60000人。印度还是斯里兰卡国内凶残的泰米尔猛虎组织的发源地并且印度的情报机构可能会在2015年1月8日的大选中对击败斯里兰卡亲华总统Mahinda Rajapaksa（现在已经卸任）起到决定性作用。

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And there’s the People’s Republic of China, and the contested issue of the borderlands of Arunachal Pradesh in the northeast and Aksai Chin in the northwest. Japan’s Foreign Minister, Fumio Kishida, got himself tangled up in the Arunachal Pradesh issue during his recent visit to India.译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
印度跟中国还有领土争议，分别在印东北部的阿鲁纳恰尔邦和西北部的阿克赛钦地区。日本外相岸田文雄 在最近的一次对印度的访问中因为关于阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题（中国的藏南地区，以下译者均翻译为阿鲁纳恰尔邦，望读者谅解）的表述而引发了争议。

China today lodged a protest with Tokyo after Japan’s foreign minister was quoted as saying that Arunachal Pradesh was “India’s territory.” Japan’s Sankei Shimbun, a conservative daily, quoted Fumio Kishida as having made the remarks in New Delhi on Saturday. Japan played down the issue today, saying it could not confirm Kishida’s reported remarks. It added that it hoped India and China could resolve their border dispute peacefully. Kishida’s reported remarks drew an angry response from China, which called on Tokyo to “understand the sensitivity of the Sino-India boundary issue.”

媒体报道日外相宣称阿鲁纳恰尔邦是“印度的领土”之后，今天中国向东京提出了抗议。日本的保守派日报产经新闻在周六援引了岸田文雄在新德里的讲话。日方今天对于此事表现得很低调，只是说他们还不能确认关于岸田文雄的报道的（真实性）。中国对于报纸上关于岸田的报道很是愤怒，并且呼吁日本能够“理解中印边界争议的敏感性”。

A Japanese foreign ministry spokesperson said “the statement was made considering the reality that Arunachal Pradesh state is basically in reality controlled by India and that China and India are continuing negotiations over the border dispute.” China disputes the entire territory of Arunachal, calling it south Tibet, especially Tawang, a key site for Tibetan Buddhism. The historic town briefly fell into Chinese hands during their 1962 war before Beijing retreated.

一名日本外交部发言人说“（岸田的）讲话时因为考虑到阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区现在基本上由印方控制并且中印还在对边界问题进行谈判这个事实。”中国声称对于阿鲁纳恰尔邦的全部地区（中方称呼为藏南地区）拥有主权，尤其是达旺，这个对于藏传佛教来说十分重要的地方。这个历史悠久的城市在1962年中印战争期间曾由中方短暂的控制，随后中方又撤离了这个地方。

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The Japanese Foreign Ministry backtracked expeditiously, indicating that Kishida’s remarks were perhaps a slip of the tongue and not meant to inject Japan into the Arunachal Pradesh issue. Ever since Prime Minister Abe returned to office with an India-centric Asian policy, yearnings have been expressed that Japan might openly side with India on the Arunachal Pradesh issue. The PRC, was extremely leery of previous PM Manmohan Singh and his overt diplomatic and emotional tilt toward Japan and, with good reason, has expected the current officeholder, Nadendra Modi, to play off China, Russia, and the United States in a more pragmatic manner.

日本外交部很快又改口说，岸田的讲话可能是由于口误，并且无意让日本卷入阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区领土争议问题。自从安倍重新上任以来，他提出的以印度为中心的亚洲政策已经表明了日本在阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题上支持印度的意向。中国对于印度前任总统辛格在政策和情感上对日本的倾斜已经十分警惕，并且也有足够的理由认为现任总理莫迪会通过更加实用的手段来让中美俄互相竞争，自己从而获利。

This, indeed, was the takeaway from President Obama’s recently concluded trip to India. President Obama’s decision to accept Prime Minister Modhi’s invitation to attend the Republic Day extravaganza further buttressed Modi’s prestige and popularity within India and elicited a wave of “Mobama” triumphalism in the press, much to China’s discomfiture. However, in the end, Modi played true to form by publicly and bluntly rejecting President Obama’s call to limit India’s greenhouse gas emissions.

实际上这是奥巴马结束对印度访问的一个附加礼物。奥巴马总统决定接受莫迪的邀请参加印度的国庆盛典，这使得莫迪在国内的声望和知名度大大增加，同时在报纸上引发了一阵“Mbama”必胜的旋风，这让中国很尴尬。然而最后，莫迪又变了脸，公开的直接拒绝了奥巴马对于印度减少温室气体排放的呼吁。

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For the PRC, an important area of anxiety is Arunachal Pradesh and the threat that India might “internationalize” the bilateral border dispute by canvassing its actual and would-be allies for support on the issue, perhaps even to the extent of going tit-for-tat with Japan i.e. India backing Japan on the issue of Senkaku sovereignty in return for Japanese aid and comfort on AP. However, it looks like Japan—like the Asian Development Bank, which ran into a PRC buzzsaw when it tried to put an Arunachal Pradesh hydropower project on its agenda in 2009—is not quite ready to mix it up on AP.

令中国非常担忧的是阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区以及印度可能通过游说他现有的以及潜在的盟友帮助自己来将双方的领土争端”国际化”,甚至达到与日本针锋相对的地步,也就是说,印度在钓鱼岛问题上支持日本来换取日本对自己的支持。然而日本似乎并没有准备好去掺和阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题（亚洲开发银行曾努力试图在阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区推行的水电项目被中国遏止了。）

Let’s unpack the Arunachal Pradesh issue. I’ve written a lot about Arunachal Pradesh. It’s a complicated situation and I scattered my narrative over a handful of posts: “China ‘pivot’ trips over McMahon Line,” “Charm Offensive: China’s Flank of Discontent,” and “India Places Its Asian Bet on Japan: Roiling the Waters of the Asia-Pacific.”

我们来回顾一下阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题，我曾写过许多关于这方面的东西。这是个复杂的问题，先来看一些报道：“中国在麦克马洪线上的`严重`失误”“魅力攻势—不满的中国侧翼”以及“印度将亚洲政策押宝在日本上：搅浑亚太地区的水”。

To summarize. Arunachal Pradesh is a region controlled by India in its northeast quadrant, between Bhutan and Burma, home to a variety of ethnic groups. One of those groups is Tibetan, centered on the town and district of Tawang in the western end of AP at the border with Bhutan.

总言之，阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区是由印度实际控制的印东北部的一片扇形区域，位于不丹和缅甸之间，许多民族聚居在这里。藏族是其中的一个，集中在达旺的市区和城镇，位于阿鲁纳恰尔邦西部边界并与不丹接壤。

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The Arunachal Pradesh dispute is bookended with Aksai Chin, a blasted desert between India and the PRC in the northwest, and is controlled by the PRC. The Indian claim to Aksai Chin is not terribly robust, since it is based on an internal British Indian survey—the Johnson Line—which was never discussed or agreed with China. The PRC built a strategic road across Aksai Chin in the 1950s, and it took several years for the Indian government to even find out it was there。

阿鲁纳恰尔邦争端是由阿克赛钦问题引发的。阿克赛钦是中印之间西北部的一个荒芜的沙漠地区，由中国实际控制。印度对于阿克赛钦的主权争议理由并不充分，因为它根据的是印度被英国殖民时的勘测结果（约翰逊线），而中国对此根本不予理会。中国20世纪50年代在曾在阿克赛钦地区修建过一条战略性道路，而印度甚至花了几年时间才发现这条路的存在。

There is a third slice of disputed territory, the “Trans-Karakorum Tract” bordering Kashmir, geographically distinct from Aksai Chin, which India claims Pakistan illegally ceded to the PRC in a land swap. For some reason, the PRC and India aren’t arguing about this piece. Both Arunachal Pradesh (AP) and Aksai Chin territories have been openly disputed since before the 1962 Sino-Indian war. The PRC has at times offered a grand bargain in which the two sides acknowledge each other’s regions of effective control, by which India got AP and the PRC gets AC. The official Indian response has been nothing doing and all territory it lost in the 1962 war must be recovered i.e. Aksai Chin is not negotiable. It has decoupled the two issues, and has focused its diplomacy on the insistence that its sovereignty over AP be confirmed. India’s claim to AP is complicated in an interesting way.

中印有争议的第三个地区是与喀什米尔接壤的“跨喀喇昆仑道”，在地理上属于阿克赛钦地区，印度指责巴基斯坦在土地互换中将这片土地违法割让给了中国。 由于某些原因，中印没有就该地区争论。阿鲁纳恰尔邦和阿克赛钦地区问题早在1962年中印战争之前就已经公开了。中方偶尔会提供一些大交易，因此双方都承认彼此的实际控制，印度得到阿鲁纳恰尔邦，中国得到阿克赛钦。印度官方的回应一直很强硬：他们在1962年战争中失去的领土一定要夺回来，也就是说阿克赛钦问题不能通过谈判解决。 这样印度就能集中力量巩固对阿鲁纳恰尔邦的控制，这是首要问题。印度对阿鲁纳恰尔邦的主权宣示是复杂的，方式也比较有趣。

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In 1914, Great Britain was interested in creating an autonomous Tibetan buffer—“Outer Tibet”—between British India and Russia/China. To this end, Sir Henry McMahon, the Foreign Minister of British India, invited Tibetan and Republic of China delegates to the Indian town of Simla. Tibet, eager to be acknowledged as an autonomous power with its own rights to negotiate directly with foreign powers (and not just through China), generously conceded a delineation of Lhasa’s sphere of control—the McMahon Line–that alienated Tawang, a market town that interested the Raj, to British India.

1914年，英国有意在英属印度和俄罗斯/中国之间建立一个独立的西藏缓冲地带—“Quter Tibet”。最后，英属印度外交部长亨利.麦克马洪先生邀请西藏和中国代表前往印度的西姆拉。西藏由于急于独立，拥有自己的外交权利（而不是通过中国来与外国接触），于是便承认对拉萨势力范围的划分—麦克马洪线—把达旺割让给了英属印度，让其获利不少。

However, the Simla Agreement was negotiated between the Tibetan and British representatives in a provisional sort of way after the Chinese representatives had packed up and left. Since Britain’s Foreign Office was protective of its China diplomacy and not interested in encouraging Tibetan pretensions to negotiate as an independent sovereign power, the absence of the Chinese representatives—and a Chinese endorsement of the border arrangement accepted by the Tibetan authorities–was a deal breaker.

但是西姆拉协定是西藏方面和英国在中国代表离开后临时签订的。由于当时英国对中国的保护性政策因此不鼓励西藏寻求独立，中国代表的缺席使这个协定失去意义（西藏接受的边界的划分缺少中国的认可。）

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The Simla Agreement was apparently treated as an aspirational document and was recorded in the most authoritative compendium of British Indian treaties, Sir Charles Umpherston Aitchison’s Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads, with the notation that neither Great Britain nor China had ratified the treaty. Since Tibet wasn’t recognized as a sovereign power, whatever it hoped to achieve with the Simla Accord—and what it had tried to give away, namely Tawang– was, in the eyes of the British, moot.

西姆拉协定貌似是一个雄心勃勃的协定并且会被收录在最权威的英属印度条约纲要—Charles Umpherston Aitchison先生的关于协议，契约，法令的收集—中。但是 Aitchison先生批注道：中英都没有批准这个协议。既然西藏不是一个主权国家，那么无论西藏企图从西姆拉协议中得到什么以及它在协议中割让的达旺地区，在英国看来都是无效的。

Things puttered along until 1935, when the detention of a British spy in Tawang by Tibetan authorities awakened the cupidity of a diplomat in the Foreign Office of British India, Olaf Caroe. Caroe checked the files, found that Great Britain had no ratified claims on Tawang, and decided to amend and improve the record. He arranged for the relevant original volume of the 1929 Aitchison compendium to be withdrawn from the various libraries in which it was filed, discarded, and replaced with a new version—but one that still claimed to be compiled in 1929, thereby removing the need for awkward explanations or documentation concerning why the switch had happened. The spurious version claimed that Tibet and Britain had accepted the treaty.

事情就这样直到1935年，西藏方面在达旺拘留了一名英国的间谍，这激起了一名英属印度外交官Olaf Caroe的贪欲。Olaf Caroe查阅了文件但是发现英国对于达旺地区并不拥有主权，于是他决定篡改纪录文件。他安排撤回与此相关的在各个图书馆里的1929年版的Aitchison纲要，这些文件都被归档或者丢弃，取而代之的是新版本的纲要，但是仍然宣称是1929年编译的。因此毁灭了解释这些交易(西姆拉协定)为什么会发生的相关文件，英国也不必为此解释了。伪造的版本宣称西藏和英国接受了西姆拉协定。

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The deception was only discovered in 1964, when a researcher was able to compare one of the last three surviving copies of the original compendium, at Harvard University, with the spurious replacement. Unfortunately, that was too late for Nehru, who staked his security strategy and his diplomatic exchanges with China to a significant extent on the fallacy that he had inherited from British India a clear and unequivocal claim to its borders.

1964年一名研究者将哈佛大学保存的最后三份1929年原版纲要中的一份与伪造版本的对比时才发现了这个弥天大谎。但不幸的是，这对于尼赫鲁来说为时已晚，因为他的安全和外交政策很大的程度上都建立在错误的基础上—他从英属印度接手的领土是明确没有争议的。

In 1962 Nehru decided to move up military units to assert India’s claim to territory in Ladakh/Aksai Chin and up to the McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh under a gambit optimistically named The Forward Policy. The PRC begged to differ—and Chairman Mao was itching to stick it to India’s patron, Nikita Khrushchev–and attacked. India’s entire strategy had been predicated on the assumption that the PRC would not respond (shades, I think, of Western confidence that Vladimir Putin would stay his hand in eastern Ukraine out of fear of sanctions and the wrath of his impoverished and disgruntled oligarchs) and the Indian Army, outnumbered, undersupplied, and disorganized, was completely unprepared to fight for the high ground in the north.

1962年尼赫鲁乐观地提出了前进政策，他决定升级军事据点来强化自己对拉达克/阿克赛钦地区的主权宣示并且将据点推进到了阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区的麦克马洪线。中国发起了攻击但其实也是另有所图，毛主席一直想给印度的保护人赫鲁晓夫一点颜色看看。印度的增个计划都是建立在中国不会对此作出反应的基础上的（从这可以看出现在俄罗斯与西方对抗的影子。西方一直以为普京由于害怕制裁和得罪因受损失而不满的金融寡头而不会插手乌克兰东部事务）并且印军寡不敌众，装备差又缺乏组织，根本没有准备好在北部高原作战。

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India suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the PLA. After its victory, the PRC decided to take the high ground, diplomatically as well as geographically. It withdrew its forces to behind the McMahon Line and offered a swap of AP for AC. No dice, as we have seen. India clearly does not see any need to credit AP—territory that the PRC abandoned—as any kind of bargaining chip concerning Aksai Chin. This is, perhaps, a cautionary tale to the PRC as to the geostrategic minuses as well as pluses of trying to behave like Mr. Nice Guy.

印度耻辱性的惨败在中国人民解放军手中。中国在胜仗之后决定在政治上和地理上控制这片高地。中方主动将军队撤到麦克马洪线之后并且提出印方用阿鲁纳恰尔邦来交换阿克赛钦地区。但是正如我们看到的，这个提议并没有被采纳。印度丝毫没有把阿鲁纳恰尔邦这片中国放弃的领土作为关于阿克赛钦地区的谈判筹码的意思。这个事情对于中国来说是一个教训，让中国知道了做好好先生要付出的代价。

This history is officially persona non grata in India. The report the Indian government commissioned on the 1962 war—the Henderson Brooks Report–was so devastating to India’s position and its legal, military, and diplomatic pretensions it was promptly banned and publication is forbidden to this day. In an ironic recapitulation of the case of the Atchison compendium, it was assumed that there were only two typewritten copies and they were securely buttoned up in safes in New Delhi. However, the Times of London correspondent, Neville Maxwell, got his hands on a copy and used it to write an expose on the tragedy of errors in 1962, India’s China War, thereby earning himself the fierce hatred of generations of Indian nationalists.

这段历史在印度是不为人所知的。印度政府曾授权发表的关于1962年中印之战的《亨德森布鲁克纪实》，由于该纪实对印方的立场是极其不利的，于是印度的军事，外交和法律部门都要求将该报道迅速封杀并且直到现在都没有公开发行。而历史又讽刺性的重演了Atchison纲要事件，一直以来人们都以为世界上仅存的两份打印版布鲁克纪实都被妥善的保管在新德里。但是伦敦时报通讯社的Neville Maxwell得到了一份复制版本并且由此曝光出了印度在1962年战争中策略上的失误，他由此也招来了印度几代国民的极度仇恨。

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Maxwell tried several times to put the report into the public domain. As quoted in Outlook India, Maxwell provided an interesting account of how the freedom of expression sausage gets made when the information involved is not necessarily a matter of national security (the report is classified Top Secret, but its content—the minutiae of military decisions and movements sixty years ago have no current strategic or tactical significance) but is a matter of supreme political embarrassment (to Nehru, the Congress Party, the Gandhi political dynasty, and to the army).

Neville Maxwell多次想让这份报道进入公有领域（人类一部分作品与知识的总汇），正如《展望印度》中引用的，Maxwell风趣地说到，当一篇报道虽然没有牵扯到国土安全（这份报道被列为绝密，但是它的内容—60年前的军队决策和部署，并没有策略上或者政治上的必要划为绝密文件），但却可能揭露巨大的政治丑闻（针对尼赫鲁，甘地的政治王朝，军队）的时候，言论自由便成了一纸空言。

My first attempt to put the Report itself on the public record was indirect and low-key: after I retired from the University I donated my copy to Oxford’s Bodleian Library, where, I thought, it could be studied in a setting of scholarly calm. The Library initially welcomed it as a valuable contribution in that “grey area” between actions and printed books, in which I had given them material previously. But after some months the librarian to whom I had entrusted it warned me that, under a new regulation, before the Report was put on to the shelves and opened to the public it would have to be cleared by the British government with the government which might be adversely interested! Shocked by that admission of a secret process of censorship to which the Bodleian had supinely acceded I protested to the head Librarian, then an American, but received no response. Fortunately I was able to retrieve my donation before the Indian High Commission in London was alerted in the Bodleian’s procedures and was perhaps given the Report.

我的第一次尝试是间接的并且低调的：退休后我将这份复印本捐赠给了牛津大学的博德利图书馆，我觉得在这里它可以单纯的被用于学术。图书馆刚开始对此很欢迎并将其作为珍品并被划分在发案与印刷作品之间的“灰色区域”。所以我便提前把东西给了他们。但是几个月之后，我委托的那位图书馆工作人员提醒我道，由于一项新的规定，在这篇报道出版或者公开之前必须交由英国政府审查而政府对这篇报道好像并不喜欢。博德利图书馆竟然消极的加入了这项秘密的审查，这让我很是震惊，我向馆长，当时还是个美国人，提出了抗议，但并没有收到答复。虽然当时博德利图书馆程序上已经通知了伦敦的印度高级委员会并且可能交出这份报道，但幸运的是我在此之前取回了我的捐赠品。

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In 2002, noting that all attempts in India to make the government release the Report had failed, I decided on a more direct approach and made the text available to the editors of three of India’s leading publications, asking that they observe the usual journalistic practice of keeping their source to themselves…To my surprise the editors concerned decided, unanimously, not to publish…Later I gave the text to a fourth editor and offered it to a fifth, with the same nil result.

2002年我发现所有的让印度政府公开这份报道的尝试都失败了之后，便决定要用更直接的方式。我找到了印度最知名的三家出版社并且告诉他们希望他们能够遵守新闻工作者的基本原则。。。。但是令人吃惊的是三家出版社的编辑都不约而同地决定拒绝出版。。。。之后我又找了第四家，第五家，结果都失败了。

Narendra Modi, a determined foe of the Congress Party and the Gandhis (I had to chuckle when I read these fawning articles about President Obama bonding with Prime Minister Modi over their shared Gandhi love, despite the awkward fact that Modi’s BJP nationalist party had been and apparently still is the spiritual home of Gandhi’s assassin), came to power promising to release the report, but didn’t. And when Maxwell posted part of the report on his website, the site was symbolically blocked.

莫迪这个国大党和甘地的死敌（当我读到那些关于奥巴马和莫迪由于共同的对甘地的好感会结盟的阿谀奉承的报道时，便会呵呵一笑。他们压根就忽略了一个尴尬的事实，莫迪德人民民族党正是刺杀甘地的刺客的精神家园）执政之后曾说过要公开这篇报道但是却没有。但当Maxwell在他的网站上公开这篇报道的部分内容时，网址便被象征性的封了。

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The Indian army, in particular, is wedded to a creation myth of PRC perfidy that is infinitely more utile than acknowledging that the PLA attack, rather than unprovoked, was a response to a strategically and diplomatically bankrupt Indian border gambit compounded by non-stop miscues by India’s civilian leadership and disastrous defeat for its military forces.

印度军队尤其渴望编造一个虚假的中国方面背信弃义(关于1962年战争)的故事,这比他们承认中国人民解放军的进攻((不是自卫)是由于印度领导人政治上的不断误判而导致印度的边境计划在外交和政策上均遭惨败所引发的或者承认他们惨败在解放军的手里要光彩得多.

In 2005, the PRC and India started negotiations over the borders issue. Here’s a nice explainer from the Daily Mail! in 2013 which signals that Aksai Chin might be on the table, but Tawang is off the table, and unfortunately omits the significant complication of the Caroe forgery.

2005年中印就边界问题开始谈判,这里摘录了<每日邮报>上的一篇精彩的评论.有迹象表明2013年中印谈判将涉及阿克赛钦地区但不会讨论达旺,并且不幸的是也不会涉及到极其重要并且十分复杂的Caroe伪造纲要的事件。

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India’s move into Arunachal Pradesh in the 1950s is less than a slam dunk according to international law, complicated in particular by the issue of Tawang. Not only is there the problem of Olaf Caroe’s bibliographic hijinks, there is the awkward fact that India forcefully displaced Tibetan theocratic rule in Tawang—nominally rule from Lhasa, actually local rule by the immensely powerful monastery.

根据国际法，20世纪50年代印度队阿鲁纳恰尔邦的控制理由并不时十分充分的，因为不仅有Olaf Caroe伪造纲要的问题，还有一个矛盾的事实就是，印度颠覆了西藏在达旺地区的神权统治—达旺名义上是由拉萨统治，但实际上是由当地权利极大的寺院控制。

Lhasa had apparently experienced cartographic remorse over Simla and implored India to recognize Tawang as Tibetan territory in 1947. Instead, India seized the district in 1951 in a quasi-official/quasi-military “liberating the Tibetan serfs” operation rather similar to what the PRC conducted in its part of Tibet.

拉萨方面显然曾经对于边界的划分悔恨不已，并且在1947年还请求印度方面将达旺还给西藏。然而印度在1951年通过准官方/准军事的“解放西藏农奴”运动控制了达旺，这个运动与中国在其控制的西藏地区进行的运动很相似。

In recent years, the Dalai Lama has been forced into the unpleasant position of affirming Indian sovereignty over Tawang, whose great monastery (the second largest in Tibetan Buddhism) first gave him shelter when he fled PRC control in 1959, and which had hosted the reincarnation of the 6th Dalai Lama way back when.

近些年来，达赖喇嘛由于承认印度对达旺地区的主权而处境尴尬，达旺的大寺院在达赖喇嘛与1959年逃离中国时第一个向他提供了庇护，大寺院是藏传佛教的第二大寺院并且主持过第六世达赖喇嘛的晋封仪式。

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The Dalai Lama apparently verbally acknowledged, if not in writing, that AP and Tawang belonged to India on a couple occasions while he still served at the apex of power in the Tibetan government in exile (a position he relinquished in 2011). However, I assume twisting the Dalai Lama’s arm to concede Indian sovereignty over Tawang falls a little bit short, since the Tibetan government-in-exile lacks international recognition (and with it the right to cede territory to India).

达赖喇嘛在他担任西藏流亡政府领导人期间（2011年卸任）确实有几次口头上承认印度对达旺地区和阿鲁纳恰尔邦的主权（不知道有没有在书面上承认）。但我觉得向达赖喇嘛施压来逼迫其承认印度在这两个地方的主权，作用不大。毕竟国际上并不承认西藏流亡政府（也就不承认其割让领土给印度）。

The PRC is happy to harp on Tawang’s role in the AP situation, since it serves as a continual reminder that India is occupying territory in AP that, however you slice it, is a core component of the Tibetan homeland, thereby keeping alive a non-Indian or, if you want, a PRC-cum-Tibet claim to at least part of the region and attempting to balk India’s attempt to claim full sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh under international law.

中方很乐意不断强调达旺在阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题中的位置，因为它可以不断提醒人们，印度占领的阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区，无论你怎样划分，都是西藏领土中的一部分，所以这地区根本不属于印度。如果必要的话，中国西藏至少可以宣称对其中的一部分地区拥有主权，这样，在国际法的框架下可以阻止印度对整个地区的主权声张。

To understand how this relates to the Senkakus requires reflection on another piece of suppressed history—that the United States returned the Senkakus to Japanese administrative control not sovereignty in 1973 as part of the Okinawa package with the stated expectation that the sovereignty of the rocks would be negotiated between China and Japan.

为了理解为什么这能牵扯到钓鱼岛问题，我们需要了解一段惊人的历史——1973年美国将钓鱼岛（作为冲绳的一部分）的监管权（不是主权）交还给了日本，并且声明主权问题由中日两国协商解决。

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My personal opinion is that the PRC is in no hurry to unfreeze the conflict over Arunachal Pradesh, and its insistence on sovereignty over Tawang—a district, I suspect, that has extremely limited interest in reunification with the Chinese motherland—is something of a pretext. With the Simla Agreement tainted and no subsequent cession of Tawang by Tibet or China, the Indian position in Tawang is embarrassingly similar to that of the PRC in the matter of the Spratlys i.e. having expelled the previous rulers by conquest and achieved control of the territory without attaining international recognition of its sovereignty. And it’s somewhat similar to the Senkakus, where the United States effectively surrendered its sovereignty over the islands when it returned Okinawa and the Ryukyus to Japan, but didn’t cede its claim to anybody else.

在我看来中国不用着急去引发阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题，并且中方对于达旺地区的主权声张在我看来好像只是托辞（个人觉得达旺地区对于中国大陆的统一大业来说，价值并不大）。西拉姆协定的不光彩，以及西藏和中国对协定的不承认，使印度在达旺地区的立场很尴尬，有点像中国在南沙的立场—中国战胜并赶走了原来的统治者，控制了该地区但是国际上并未承认中国在该地区的主权。这也有点像钓鱼岛问题，当美国把冲绳和琉球群岛交还给日本时，实际上已经交出了这些岛屿的主权，但是美国并未说明交给谁。

Maybe Arunachal Pradesh is another one of those Mexican-standoff situations like Kashmir vs. Tibet (a.k.a. the Indian temptation to make mischief in the ethnic-Tibetan areas of the PRC is inhibited by concern that the PRC, via Pakistan, might light the fuse in Kashmir). The PRC keeps the Tawang/AP issue alive to forestall thoughts by India of giving aid and comfort to Japan on the Senkakus or, for that matter, Vietnam on the Spratlys.

也许阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题是另一个难分胜负的僵局，就好像西藏vs喀什米尔（印度想在中国西藏地区埋下祸根但是又害怕中国通过巴基斯坦来引发喀什米尔这个火药桶）。中国通过不断提出达旺/阿鲁纳恰尔邦问题来先声夺人，预防印度在钓鱼岛问题上向日本或者在南沙问题上对越南提供支援和帮助。

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Both the PRC and India are bulking up their infrastructure and military on their respective sides of the de facto McMahon-Line-based border, making it a virtual certainty that India will never alienate any part of AP, including Tawang. That’s good news for reduced actual tensions (as opposed to defense ministry posturing) at the shared border, but India’s heightened sense of security concerning Arunachal Pradesh may encourage it to be less tentative vis a vis the PRC in its Japanese and Vietnamese diplomacy.

中印各自都在实际的以麦克马洪线为基础的边境线附近积极建设基础设施并囤积军队，这更加明确了印度不会放弃阿鲁纳恰尔邦任何一片土地（包括达旺）的决心。中印边界目前比较平定的局势是令人欣慰的（尽管这不符合国防部的意愿），可是印度对于阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区安全局势担忧的增加可能会促使其在对日本和越南的政策上与中国直接对抗。


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