财富与权力：中国的21世纪长征

Most Helpful Customer Reviews  

【书评一 评分：五星】

"When the country is humiliated, its spirit will be aroused." Wei Yuan, 1842

“国难当头，国民精神雄起” （此为个人翻译，原话不知在哪）。魏源，1842

"From 'Our technology is not as good as other people's,' to 'Our political system is not as good as other people's,' and on to 'Our culture is not as good as other people's,' Chinese reflections on our own defects probed ever deeper. But the primary mind-set that guided the probing was neither 'liberation of humanity,' nor even 'enriching people,' but rather a sense of shame at China's loss of sovereignty and other national humiliations."

“从‘技不如人’到‘政治体制不如人’再到‘文化不如人’，中国对自身缺陷的探究前所未有地深入了，但主导这种深究的主要心态，既不是出于“人性解放”也不是“致富百姓”，而是羞耻于国家主权沦丧，被别国欺侮。

These words of Nobel Prize winning dissident, Liu Xiaobo, give a rather neat summary of the arguments put forward in this fascinating and thought-provoking study of the Chinese psyche over the last 150 years or so, as evidenced and influenced by its greatest intellectuals, writers and leaders. The aim of the authors is to shed some light on how, in the last three decades, China has risen out of the poverty and political turmoil of the preceding century to become one of the richest and most powerful nations in the world.

上述的内容来自诺贝尔和平奖获得者LXB的简要总结，中国近150年来的国民心态被国家最伟大的知识分子、作家和领导人阐述和影响，而刘的总结来源于这些对国民心态的引人入胜而发人深省的研究中。近30年里，中国摆脱了前100年的贫困状态和动荡局势，成为了世界上最富裕强大的国家之一，而本书作者意在阐述中国是如何办到这一点的。

The authors show how the encroachment of the Western empires and defeats at the hands of enemies within and without led, not just to the fall of the empire at the beginning of the twentieth century, but to the creation of a national mind-set that has kept the aim of achieving 'wealth and power' at the heart of Chinese politics ever since. The succession of military defeats and subsequent 'unequal treaties', which forced China to pay punitive reparations and give territory and access to foreign states, led to a spirit of 'national humiliation'. Far from allowing this to become a negative factor, however, successive intellectuals and leaders used it as a spur to galvanise China into a process of 'self-strengthening'. At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, the main thrust was to borrow what was needed from the West in terms of technical and scientific knowledge, while maintaining the existing Confucian culture. But the authors show how, as that failed to make China strong enough to defy the many circling predators, gradually some intellectuals began to believe that there must be a period of 'destruction' of cultural sacred cows before 'construction' of a new and stronger state could begin.

作者展示了西方列强的侵略和来自内患外敌的失败是如何不仅导致了在二十世纪初时帝国的倒塌，而且从那以后在中国政治家的心中产生了一种以争取富强为目标的心态。接连不断的军事失败以及随后的被迫让中国支付惩罚性赔偿和给外国土地和使用权的“不平等条约”导致了一种“民族耻辱”的情绪。然而接下来的知识分子和领导人完全没有让这成为一个消极的因素，而将它作为一个刺激来激励中国进入一个“自强”的进程。在十九世纪末二十世纪初，主要的推动是在维持儒家文化的同时向西方借用所需的在科学技术知识方面的东西。但是作者展示了由于那改革未能使中国足够强壮到对抗周围的掠夺者，渐渐地一些知识分子开始认为在建立一个崭新的更强大的国家之前一定要有一段摧毁文化上神圣不可侵犯的东西的时期。

Each chapter focuses on one man, a leading intellectual or politician, taking us gradually through the decades from the end of the Opium wars to the present day. The emphasis is not on the events of any given period, although of course they are referenced and highlighted. Rather, the authors concentrate on the writings and speeches of each man, showing how each generation of political thought adopted, rejected or built on the ideas of the one before. Many of the people who are discussed were entirely unknown to me, especially those prior to WW2, but the authors create a continuous chain of intellectual development, clearly showing how and why ideas were influenced by, and adjusted in reaction to, events at home or abroad.

每章都重点讲述一个人，一位智者领袖或者政治家，讲述他们如何带领我们从鸦片战争后期逐步走向今天。讲述的重点不是特定时期内的特定事件，虽然他们总涉及其中或者还可能是主角；讲述的重点是他们的文章或者演讲，因为这显示了他们对前代政治家观点的继承、否定或者开创。被讨论的许多人对作者而言是完全陌生的，尤其是那些二战以前的人们，但是本书作者厘清了他们的观点传承脉络，清楚地显示了这些观点是如何被国内外事件影响的，以及他们是如何嬗变的.

The authors take a sympathetic approach to their subject - in the afterword they tell us that the book is part of a project undertaken by the Center on US-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York to examine China's reform movement and transition to modernity. They attempt, successfully in my view, to explain to a Western audience the cultural differences that have enabled China to follow a path that seems, to our eyes, doomed to fail - to build a society that values the acquisition of 'wealth and power' above things that we see as essential for progress: intellectual freedom, human rights, democracy.

作者对该课题采用了同情的视角——在后记中他们告诉我们此书是纽约亚洲协会美中关系中心的一个在研项目，用来考察中国进行现代化的改革和过渡历程。他们尝试——在我看来是成功的——对西方观众宣扬中国那种为获取“财富和权力”而不惜践踏思想自由、人权和民主的价值观将注定走向灭亡，因为后者对我们来说是文明进展中极其重要的部分.

While in no way condoning the horrors of the era of Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution, they suggest that this period of destructiveness may in fact have cleared the way, culturally, for the creation under Deng Xiaoping of the 'Leninist capitalist' system that has enabled China to become the powerhouse it is today. An unequal society, yes, and with repression still at its core, but a country governed largely with the consent of its people nonetheless.

较之于对毛氏恐怖和文革影响的绝不宽容的态度，他们指出，这阶段的破坏性历程也许实际上已经为邓小平创造性的“列宁式资本主义”系统在文化上荡清了道路，而后者正使中国成为今天这样的强国。这是一个不平等的社会吗？显实是的，而且它还仍然伴随着以镇压为核心的统治手段，但是这同样是一个在很大程度上有民众支持的国家。

They end with some informed speculation about where next for China - having gained 'wealth and power' will they use that power to bully other nations as they were bullied in their nineteenth century weakness? Or will they, from a position of strength, continue to open up their society and perhaps gradually move towards an intellectual position and political system more closely aligned with the West?

作者们以一些有依据的推测结尾：中国的下一步在哪里？在拥有了“财富与权利”之后，他们会用这些力量去欺负其他国家吗，就像他们在十九世纪被欺负的那样？或者他们在有了力量以后，继续保持社会的开放，也许逐渐走向一个理性的状态和政治制度，向西方看齐？

I found this a lengthier read than its size would necessarily suggest, since after every few pages I would discover that I was staring at a wall and thinking. It has challenged and changed my pre-existing assumptions, certainly about China's culture and system of government but perhaps also about our own. It has gone a long way towards answering the question why China, alone of all the major states that adopted authoritarian non-democratic systems during the twentieth century, seems eventually to have made a relative success of it while retaining the support of the majority of its citizens.

我发现与这本书看起来的厚度相比，它读起来耗时更多。因为每读几页，我就会发现自己在对着一面墙思考。它挑战了我之前的设想，关于中国的文化和政府系统的设想，可能还包括关于我们自己的。它有益于回答这个问题：为什么在二十世纪，中国采取了与大多数主流国家不同的、独裁的体制，似乎最终做到了相对于它自己的成功，并且保持了它的大多数人民的支持。

Apologies for the length of this review, but I still feel I've given the merest glimpse into this highly illuminating and thought-provoking read. I can't recommend it highly enough to anyone who is interested in understanding the psyche of a nation that seems destined soon to be the wealthiest and most powerful of all.

不好意思写了这么长的评论，但是我还是觉得对于这样一本启发性的、引人深思的书，我仅仅给出了一点感受。我强烈推荐它给任何有兴趣了解一个注定将很快成为最富有和最强大国家的精神的人。

NB This book was provided for review by the publisher.

注意：这本书由出版商提供，以供评论。

对此评论的回复：

Excellent review. I'm a third of the way through reading this for a second time. The best book I've read assessing the emerging history of China since the first Opium War. The authors descriptions of Empress Dowager Cixi are diametrically opposite those of Jung Chang, and in my opinion, much more objective. Both of Jung Chang's books on (Cixi and Mao) portray a prejudice which she is incapable of hiding through her writings.

非常棒，我已经读了两遍了，依我看来这是自鸦片战争以来中国历史最好的书评，作者对慈禧描述与张戎相反，并且更加客观，张戎关于慈禧和毛的书有一种无法隐藏的偏见。
评论者回应：

Thanks! This is the only book I've read about this period of history and, as you'll know from my review, I found it fascinating. And while I can't comment on its accuracy, I can certainly say I found the arguments very convincing. It seemed to me the authors were sympathetic rather than biased towards the Chinese viewpoint, if that makes sense.


谢谢，这是我读过关于这段历史唯一的书,你会从我的评论中了解,我觉得这很有趣。虽然我不知道它的准确性,但我可以肯定的说,其中的说法非常令人信服。在我看来,作者是同情中国而不是偏向中国的观点，那是可以理解的。

【书评二 评分：五星】

An Intellectual History of Modern China

现代中国知识分子的历史

Wealth and Power follows Chinese history from the Opium Wars to today. Modern Chinese history is generally considered to have begun with the Treaty of Nanjing at the close of the first Opium War. Schell and Delury see special significance is using that first great humiliation of China at the hands of the modern world as the starting point, central to a thesis they use to explore Chinese history through its intellectual history. Roughly, that thesis is that modern Chinese history is best understood as a reaction to its modern humiliation, the desire to strengthen itself and overcome that humiliation by achieving "wealth and power," and the tension that created with traditional Confucianism. The underlying intellectual tension in modern Chinese history then, is between conservative family-centric thinking and conservative state-centric thinking. It's thinking that dates back to the old conflict between Confucians and the Legalists, philosophical adversaries to the Confucians whose mantra was Wealth and Power. It's a conflict that predates and leaves precious little room for classical liberalism or even Marxism.

财富和权力 讲述了自鸦片战争至今的中国历史。现代中国史通常认为是始于 南京条约，终于第一次鸦片战争。Schell 和 Delury 看到了用中国在现代世界第一次巨大的耻辱做为起点的重要意义。文章的重点是 他们 通过知识分子的历史 去探索中国历史。总体上，从现代中国耻辱的角度， 此文是最容易理解的现代中国历史，通过自强的渴望和战胜羞辱 实现“财富和权力”，这种紧张源于传统的儒家学说。在现代中国历史 这种潜在的知识分子的紧张，介于 保守的家族中心思想和 保守的国家中心思想。这种思想可以追溯到旧有的儒家思想和法家思想 的冲突上，儒家哲学对手的宝典“财富和权力” 。这种冲突早于有一席之地的传统自由主义 甚至 马克思主义。

In service of this thesis, Schell and Delury dispense with a traditional narrative history in favor of focusing on 11 "iconic intellectuals and leaders, reformers and revolutionaries." The 11 are: Wei Yuan (born in 1794, died in 1857), Feng Guifen (1809-1874), the Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908), Liang Qichao (1873-1929), Sun Yat-Sen (1866-1925), Chen Duxiu (1879-1942), Chiang Kai-Shek (1887-1975), Mao Zedong (1893-1976), Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997), Zhu Rongji (1928-), and Liu Xiaobo (1955-). They are a mix of scholar-official civil servants (sharing the experience of failing at least one examination), writers, dissidents, and leaders of the Republic of China and in the Nationalist and Communist parties, as well as one (and, tellingly, only one) member of the royal family. They share much in common. Each argued that China needed to seriously change in some way. Most reverted to less radical and more Confucian positions in their later years. Their arguments tended to be utilitarian rather than rooted in natural rights (of the 11, only Liu can fairly be said to be a true proponent of natural rights and liberal democracy). When liberalism or democracy are advocated for, it tends to be not as an end but as a means to the end of Wealth and Power (the same could probably be said for Marxism). Unsurprisingly then, the need for an authoritarian prelude to self-government is common. Little if any respect is shown toward the Chinese people, even while the Chinese nation is viewed worshipfully.

在本文中，Schell和Delury分别叙述了传统叙事历史中赞同的集中于十一个“标志性的知识分子和领导人，改革家和革命家”。这十一个人是：魏源(1794-1857)，冯桂芬(1809-1874)，慈禧太后(1835-1908)，梁启超(1873-1929)，孙中山(1866-1925)，陈独秀(1879-1942)，常凯申别名蒋介石(1887-1975)，毛泽东(1893-1976)，邓小平(1904-1997)，朱镕基(1928-)，和刘晓波(1955-)。他们是由士大夫官员（分享至少一次在考试中落榜的经验这是什么鬼），作家，持不同政见者，中华民国的领导人，民族主义者，GCD员，也有一个（显著地只有一个）皇室成员。他们有许多共同点。人人都主张中国需要在某些方面认真地改变。他们中的大多数在晚年时回归到更不激进和更儒家的立场。他们的主张更趋向于功利性而不是根本的自然权利（这11人中，只有刘晓波能被公平地说是一个真正的自然权利和自由民主的支持者）。当自由主义和民主主义被提倡时，这不是结束而意味着富强（同样可能可以说是马克思主义）的结束。然后毫无意外地，对独裁的需要又会导致自治。虽然中国这个国家受人尊崇，但中国的人民却享受不到多少尊敬。

As is to be expected, Communist China gets a great deal of attention. Mao and Deng are the only 2 of the 11 to get double chapters. It's interesting to both see how traditional Chinese culture and philosophy influenced the Chinese brand of Marxism and how the Chinese Communist Party differed from its counterpart in Moscow, both favorite topics of Schell and Delury. Mao had a belief in the power of the Great Man, influenced by the great Chinese classical novels, that was at odds with Marxism's economic determinism. He also recognized that rural China was better primed for a Communist revolution than urban China. We hear about the Long March, the Hundred Flowers Movement, and the Great Leap Forward, among others. The authors are perhaps too kind in dealing with Mao's commitment to disruptive change and cultural destruction.

和预想的一样，共产主义中国备受关注。毛和邓是11个人中仅有的2个在多个章节被提到的人。研究传统中国文化和哲学是如何影响中国特色的马克思主义以及研究中国GCD与他们在莫斯科的同志的区别是非常有趣的，这也是Schell 和 Delury最喜欢的话题。毛坚信自己会成为一代伟人，中国史书对他影响很大，也与马克思主义经济决定论不一致。他也认识到相比较于在城市，在中国农村地区更适用开展共产主义革命。我们都听说过长征、双百方针运动和大跃进等等。或许作者过于弱化了毛对破坏和毁灭改革与文化方面所应承担的责任。

Early on the authors describe their works as a "historical reflection on China's `economic miracle.'" I think the scare quotes are fairer than the authors probably do: I'm not convinced there is any economic miracle. In the final chapter they suggest that the incredible destruction wrought under Mao weakened traditional Confucianism--a force against progress--sufficient such that true reform was possible. I think the basic logic of that is fine, but what results at what cost? Tens of millions died, and the "economic miracle" looks like a miracle in large part because Mao's policies led to such incredible poverty. Yes, China now has the second largest economy in the world by GDP, but its per capita income still lags the US, Japan, Taiwan, and even the world average. Dramatic growth is easy when the simplest reforms are available because a country is doing virtually everything wrong. And this growth has come without any attendant real political freedom. Asia for whatever reason has produced several success stories of moving from authoritarianism to constitutionalism, but the intellectual history that Schell and Delury so richly illustrate, China has a deep, deep tradition of nationalistic utilitarianism and no serious tradition of classical liberalism.

作者之前形容他们的书是“中国经济奇迹的历史性的反映”，我觉得给作者所说的”奇迹“加个引号更合适：我不相信任何经济奇迹的存在。在最后一章中作者暗示，正是毛削弱了传统的儒家思想---一种阻碍进步的思想---才使得真正的改革得以充分实行。我认为，作者的基本逻辑是正确的，但是这一切都付出怎样的代价呢？上千万人死了！而这所谓的”经济奇迹“看上去像是个奇迹很大程度上是因为毛的政策导致了惊人的贫困。不错，中国现在有世界第二的GDP,但他的人均资本收入仍然落后于美国、日本、台湾甚至世界平均水平。当一个国家原本政策一塌糊涂的时候，即使是最最简单的改革，也可能让经济戏剧性的增长。况且这经济增长也没有伴随着政治自由！出于种种原因，亚洲有不少由独裁转为民主的成功案例，但Schell和Delury所列举大量史料表明，中国有着非常非常深的国家功利主义的传统却没真正有过古典自由主义的传统。

（译者注：改革开放前毛爷爷还在的那30年中国经济平均发展速度实际并不比改革开发后的慢，毛爷爷绝对是中国到目前为止最伟大的人没有之一。）

I was initially put off by the authors' sometimes tortured metaphors and the format, which is difficult to follow without a good base in Chinese history, but by the end of the book I felt I had an understanding of the "mind of China" I never had before and, more importantly, a grasp on what I still don't know (more known unknowns and fewer unknown knowns). The centrality of national humiliation and the tension between Confucianism and the Legalists is pretty straightforward, albeit necessary to any real understanding of China. More nuanced, and so well explained by Schell and Delury, are the differences between Russia's brand of Marxism and that of China, and differences between party-founder Chen, Mao, and later party leaders. It's also enlightening to see how readily Chinese leaders--including Nationalist leaders--were to adopt Marxist-Leninist principles where they thought useful while discarding others.

刚开始我读的进展很慢，因为作者时不时运用的难以理解的隐喻和文章格式，而如果没有深厚的中国历史文化的底子是很难理解这些的。但是到最后我发现我对于“中国思想”有了一个前所未有的深刻的理解，并且更重要的是，我对于自己目前还不知道的事情有了一个了解（自己更多的知道了自己在哪方面还有所欠缺，而自己完全不知道的事情变少了）。民族耻辱的中心点以及儒家与法家之间的紧张关系是相当明确的，尽管了解这些知识对真正的了解中国是必要的。正如两位作者所清楚解释的那样，更加微妙的地方在于俄罗斯的马克思主义与中国的马克思主义之间的不同，以及中共创建人陈独秀，毛泽东以及后来中共领导人之间的不同。同时我还发现中国的领导人——包括国民党领导人——在他们认为马克思-列宁主义很有用时就会轻易的采用这种主义，同时抛弃其他理念。

Disclosure: I received a complimentary advance e-copy of Wealth and Power via NetGalley.

大揭秘：通过NetGalley，我收到了一份免费的《权利与财富》的首印版的电子副本，还不错哦！

对此评论的回复：
Good review, excellent. I would, however, suggest that the economic miracle is still in its emergent form. Though the national income levels are still well behind other Asian cultures, I would hypothesize that within the next two decades we will see a consolidated economic miracle that will result in an economy that will outshine the economies of every other country in the world.

对此评论的回复：
很好的评论，非常棒。但是我想补充一点，中国的经济奇迹仍然处于起步阶段，虽然中国人的收入水平仍然落后一些亚洲国家，但是我敢打赌在接下来的二十年里，我们会看到真正的中国的经济奇迹，中国的经济水平会超过世界上任何一个国家。

【书评三 评分：五星】

Good Understanding -

非常棒的理解力

In the 19th century, efforts to efface national humiliation (until then, China had one of the world's largest economies) and restore China to wealth and power had largely focused on how the West's military technology and economic techniques might be harnessed by China. The early 20th century brought questioning of the wisdom of maintaining its traditional Confucian culture. Mao then pursued destroying China's old core with violent and total resolve (his Cultural Revolution), but also stubbornly squelched anything resembling the practice of capitalism. Nonetheless, the authors contend he may have helped prepare the way for successor Deng Xiaoping to usher in a spectacular new kind of economic growth. The authors also tell us China's leaders were totally pragmatic (it was not ideology driven) about choosing their way, and democracy has not appeared to be the most effective route forward.

19世纪，在人们努力抹除民族耻辱（直到那时，中国还是世界上最大的经济体之一）以及恢复中国的财富和国力时，人们主要的着眼点是是否能将西方的军事技术和经济方法变为已用。20世纪初期，人们对继续维持传统儒家文化的智慧进行了质问。于是毛开始了文化大革命，但同时也顽固的消灭了任何与资本主义相关的事物。然而，作者认为毛的这些举动可能恰好为继任者邓小平采用新的经济增长模式扫清了一定的障碍。作者还告诉我们中国领导人在选择道路时是完全实用主义的（这并非受意识形态驱使），而民主在他们看来并非最有效的前进道路。

Now, after weathering a century and a half of domestic rebellion and foreign aggression, China has learned how to borrow effectively from the West. Deng Xiaoping struck the spark that lit China's rejuvenation by telling his people in the 1980s that it 'to get rich is glorious' and it was 'all right for some people to get rich first.' Hu Jintao (handpicked by Deng, among others) reinforced that progress when he told visitors from Taiwan in 2005 that 'Backwardness incurs beatings by others,' and 'the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has become the unswerving goal that each Chinese generation has striven to realize.' More recently, President Xi Jinping's first speeches as General Secretary in 2013 once again referred to this period of Chinese history.

如今，在经历了一个半世纪的国内战争和外国侵略后，现在的中国已经学会了如何有效地从西方借鉴。  
邓小平在20世纪80年代告诉他的人民致富是光荣的还说允许一部分人先富起来，邓小平点燃了中国复兴的火焰。Hu（邓精心挑选的）继续推动了改革，在2005年他告诉来自台湾的游客“落后就要挨打”和“中国民族的伟大复兴已经成为每一代中国人努力实现的奋斗目标。最近，在2013年首次作为总书记的Xi的讲话再次提到这一段中国历史。

The authors address the question of why China's economic dynamist began when it did, and has been as successful and durable as it has. They accomplish this by examining the lives of eleven influential officials, activists, and leaders who helped create modern China, beginning with the first Opium War. Why start there? Many Chinese date the start of their modern history to the date when the Qing Dynasty signed the Treaty of Nanjing and capitulated to Great Britain to end the disastrous First Opium War (1839-42). Every Chinese high-school student is expected the know the official narrative dividing Chinese history neatly into pre-Opium War and post-Opium War periods, China's counterpart to Americans learning the preamble of the Declaration of Independence. That began China's questioning the fundamental assumptions of their culture and governance.

作者致力于研究中国经济是如何起步、发展与成功的。他们通过对11位第一次鸦片战争以来对中国现代化进程有重要影响力的政府官员、社会活动家、民间领袖的调查来完成这项研究。为什么（中国的现代化进程）始于那时（第一次鸦片战争）呢？许多中国人将中国的近代史开端设定在1839年4月2日清政府因灾难性的第一次鸦片战争结果而与英国签订《南京条约》的这一天。每一个中国高校学生都被教育官方将中国历史清楚地划分为前鸦片战争时期和后鸦片战争时期这样两个阶段的观点，就像美国人都学习《独立宣言序言》（在美国历史中的作用）一样。鸦片战争的失败导致了中国开始思考他们的文化和治理理论的基础假设是否合理这样的问题。

Paradoxically, the authors find that one of the most interesting and paradoxical explanations originates with the person deemed to have had such a destructive effect on China's earlier progress - Mao Zedong. His movement to standardize oral language and simplify written language helped unify the nation, while his Cultural Revolution was so great a disaster that it provoked an even more profound cultural revolution - institutionalizing a key element Mao intended to stamp out.

矛盾的是，作者发现最有趣、也是最荒谬的解释之一源于毛泽东，一个对中国早期进步过程有着巨大破坏作用的人。他关于规范普通话、简化文字的运动帮助统一了这个国家，而他发动的文化大革命也造成了巨大的影响以至于引发了更为深刻的文化革命——制度化，一个毛旨在杜绝的关键因素。

Westerners need to rethink whether democratization was always an essential partner to market-driven growth and national development. Turns out China's painful historical experience has made nationalism a stronger sentiment than democracy or constitutionalism. Many Chinese have made an implicit bargain with the party - as long as they are allowed to enjoy growing wealthier and to pursue a better life, and as long as their country edges closer towards a modicum of world greatness, they will not seek to challenge authoritarian rule.

西方需要反思民主是否是市场导向的增长和国家发展的必要条件。事实证明，中国惨痛的历史经历使得民族主义比民主和宪政更加有效。许多中国人与党完成了一项隐性的交易：只要他们能够继续享受经济增长、追求更好的生活，只要国家还能继续一点点地走向强盛，他们将不寻求挑战当局权威。

Yet, the confidence levels of many Chinese lag behind actual achievements in curing the nation's recent historical sense of inferiority. This is perhaps partly because the CCP finds perpetuating the victim culture to be in its interest. Another reason is that the West still regularly criticizes its fundamental values and does not emulate its example; the Chinese are learning that to win that outside respect they first have to treat their own people with respect. Nearby Asian, post-Confucian, and post-colonial societies such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea have all moved from authoritarianism to constitutionalism, while new leader Xi Jinping recently warned party leaders about the dangers of following the dreaded footsteps of the former Soviet Union. Perhaps instead China will begin enforcing its own constitution.
然而，许多中国人的自信心等级却落后于他们实际取得成就，这源于他们对近代以来历史的自卑感。其中一部分原因或许是因为中共发现延续受害者文化符合他们的利益。另一个原因是西方仍然经常批评他们的基本价值并且也不视他们为榜样；中国人必须明白，如想获得外界尊重，首先得要善待本国人民。亚洲邻国、汉文化圈、后殖民地社会，比如台湾、香港、韩国，均从权威体制过渡到了民主宪政，而新一代领导人Xi最近也警告党内领导勿步苏联后尘。也许中国也将实施他们自己的宪法。

Meanwhile, there is also increasing worry that the country will flex its new economic and military muscles. Schell et al see its various South China Sea territory disputes as another dimension of nationalism, of 'payback time.' U.S. presence in the area (including spy flights along its coast) don't help either. And it does have legitimate security concerns about protecting access to various raw materials and trade outlets around the world.

与此同时增长的还有对该国展示自身经济和军事实力的担忧。Schell等人视南海诸多的领土纠纷为另一种民族主义的回归。即使是美国“回归亚洲”的政策（包括沿海岸线的间谍飞行侦查）也对此没有任何帮助。而且它也的确有保护其与全世界原材料和贸易网点通道安全的合理关切。


I most enjoyed the section on Deng Xiaoping, the man who led China's turnaround after Mao. He'd seen how Mao's idealism had driven China to the brink of civil war and weakened its economy, as well as how other nations were far ahead of China (Deng admitted in 1973 that China was 40 years behind - both in economic and technology terms. He worked for economic development, undistorted by either Maoist mass politics or individualistic liberal democracy. His writing and speeches largely ignored the subject of traditional Chinese culture and Confucian ideology (Mao's last focus), seeing those topics as distractions from what really was needed - improving material conditions and making China a global powerhouse, while preserving the Party's monopoly on power. Looking at the U.S., Deng saw democracy as creating indecisiveness, inefficiency, instability (one branch of government holding back another; politicians constantly changing positions), and unable to deal with serious problems in a timely manner.

我最欣赏关于邓小平的部分，他是在毛之后领导着中国彻底改变的人。他看到了毛的理想主义是怎样把中国带到内战边缘并使经济衰弱，也看到了其他国家是怎样远远超过中国。邓在1973年承认在经济和科技方面中国落后了四十年。他致力于经济发展，不被毛主义的群众政治或者个人主义的自由民主主义所扭曲。他的文章和演讲在很大程度上无视了中国传统文化的内容和儒家思想（这是毛最后关注的东西），并把这些当做分散注意力，事实上不被需要的事物。中国需要的·是提高物质水平，成为世界工厂，同时保持党的绝对领导。看着美国，邓认为民主政体是无决断的，低效的，不稳定的（政府的一个部门反对另一个，政治家不停地换职位），并且不能及时处理严重的问题。

Deftly expressing criticism of the past w/o risking totally rejecting a former leader and the resentment that would create, he said 'Mao was 70% correct and 30% wrong' - the same rating Mao had given himself. Deng also did not suffer from Mao's insecurity vs. intellectual, and one of his first acts was to reverse the political verdicts on nearly 3 million party cadre and intellectuals branded 'class enemies' and persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. This won him many friends among the elite and provided the government with a vast new reservoir of well-educated individuals with technical skills. 'Pragmatism' was Deng's focus - 'From this day forward, we renounce class struggle as the central focus, and instead take up economic development as our central focus' (1978, upon taking the reins), 'Practice is the sole determinant of truth,' 'Seek truth from facts,' 'Poverty is not socialism,' 'The Purpose of socialism is to make a country rich and strong.' Deng himself traveled to the U.S. and Europe, and regularly pumped foreign visitors for their ideas on improvement; one of his most effective techniques was sending officials abroad to look and study, reversing a century of Chinese resistance to and ambivalence about learning from the West. ('Only when we recognize that we are backward will we progress.') Upon return, they were looked upon as valuable assets - eg. Xi Jinping, now president, was a staff member on a military delegation to the Pentagon in 1980 and member of an agricultural delegation to Iowa in 1985. Supported incentivizing productivity, private entrepreneurialism, and decentralized economic decision-making, and hired as his architects Zhao Ziyang and Zhu Rongi who later became premiers.

熟练地对过去表达批评而没有完全否定一个前任领导人因而也没有承受这样的否定将带来的愤怒的风险，他说“毛泽东70%是对的而30%是错的”——同毛对自己的评价一样。邓小平也未继续毛因自身的不安而与知识分子的斗争，他首先的行动之一就是为在文革期间将近三百万的被打上“阶级敌人”烙印和迫害的党员干部与知识分子政治上平反。这为他在精英分子中赢得了许多朋友并给政府提供了一个巨大的拥有技术的受过良好教育的知识分子的人才库。邓的焦点是实用主义——“从今天开始，我们放弃以阶级斗争为纲，转变为以经济发展为中心。”（1978，此后邓掌权），“时间是检验真理的唯一标准”，“实事求是”，“贫穷不是社会主义”，“社会主义的目的是使国家富强”。邓他自己去过美国和欧洲，并定期从国外来访者那汲取他们发展的理念;他最有效率的技巧之一是颠覆一个世纪以来中国人对于向西方学习的阻力和矛盾心理将官员送到国外观察学习。（“只有我们意识到我们的落后我们才能进步”）回来之后，他们被作为珍贵的人才来看待——例如，Xi，现在的国家主席，曾是1980年派往五角大楼的军事代表团中的一员和1985年去往爱荷华州的农业代表团中的一员。邓支持以物质激励的生产，私人企业，分散的经济决策，同时雇佣赵紫阳和后来称为总理的朱镕基作为建筑师。（好难啊。。。）

Demanded local officials boldly experiment, sometimes there experiments were illegal but Deng let them proceed and succeed/fail on their own merits. One of the first, and most important, was the de-communalization of agriculture. Another was 'town and village enterprises' (TVEs) that were local public-private joint ventures allowed to side-step existing limits on the number of employees. A third was Special Economic Zones (SEZs) piloted near Hong Kong and Taiwan. The first proposal came from Guangdong Province governor Xi Zhongxun, father the current president. Xi also had hero status from the 1930s anti-Japanese resistance. Overseeing this new project was Sichuan party secretary Zhao Ziyang who had earlier encouraged marketization reform and separating party management from industrial management. He too later became premier.

邓小平要求当地官员大胆试验，虽然有时候这些试验是非法的，但是邓小平鼓励他们在自己擅长的领域去探索、成功与失败。第一类，也是最重要的试验，是农业去公社化。第二类是乡镇企业（TVEs），它采用公私合营实行双轨制，允许招聘有限数量的员工。第三类是经济特区（SEZs），它们靠近香港和台湾。第一类方案来自广东省委书记习仲勋，他也是现任中国国家主席X的父亲。习仲勋同时是20世纪30年代的抗日战争的战斗英雄。监督该项新项目实施的是时任四川省委书记Zhao ZiYang，他更早地鼓励市场化改革与政企分离。他后来成为国家总理。

1984 brought the peak of Deng's popularity. Then came inflation, party cadres exploiting the difference between state-set and market prices, softening employment, and eventually the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. Deng saw the latter as risking civil war and the CCP's authority and eventually ordered the PLA to restore order. Given Deng's prior reactions to eg. Fang Lizhi (high-level physics professor and official at a leading university - lost his position and was expelled from the CCP) and a much earlier protester (1978 - jailed for 15 years), the wonder is that the protests were allowed to continue as long as they were.

在1984年，邓小平的声望达到巅峰。随后就是通货膨胀，党的干部利用双轨制获利，失业潮，并逐渐发展成80年代最后一年的XXXXX。邓小平从后者中看到了内战和我党权威被挑战的风险，逐渐命令JD重建秩序。鉴于邓小平优先选择与Fang Lizhi（高级物理教授和大学领导，被开除党籍，失去地位）和某位更早的抗议者（1978年，15年入狱）交流，这些抗议者们令人惊奇地被允许继续抗议——只要他们愿意。

Concluding, the authors believe China's new leader is a Deng-type economic reformer, and that stability is much more highly valued in China than most Westerners realize - allowing foundations to become firmer. Thus, a privatized economy would be scary for CCP leadership - it would lose influence and have to contend with too much private power and influence. And the middle and upper classes, while perhaps wanting greater freedom and openness, also want government to protect their interests. As for Taiwan, they believe China would be wise to simply bide its time - Taiwan will voluntarily return when China becomes more democratic. Meanwhile, the U.S. has been unable to act on global warming, a concern that will significantly affect both nations (China probably more), that requires worldwide action that would bring the two nations closer together.
Bottom-Line: 'Wealth and Power' provides excellent insight into why the Chinese behave as they have in recent years.

总而言之，作者相信中国新一代领导人将是一位邓小平式的经济改革者，而稳定，不同于西方人士的理解的那样，将被中国高度重视——因为这将使经济基础更加稳固。因此，对GCD的领导而言，私有经济是可怕的，因为这将导致它对私人领域失去影响力。而且中产阶级和富有阶层可能会要求更大的自由和开放，同时希望政府保护他们的利益。至于台湾，他们相信中国是明智的——他们只是在等待时机，等待台湾在中国更加民主的时候主动统一。与此同时，在全球变暖这个影响两个国家（中国受的影响可能还多一点）的问题上，美国能发挥的作用已经十分有限，而这就要求两个国家更紧密地进行国际合作。写于最后：《财富与权力》一书为观察“中国近年来为何会有这些举动”提供了极好的视角。

转自龙腾 http://www.ltaaa.com/bbs/thread-332484-1-1.html


这篇文我看后感觉很有启发性，对于中国的诠述很好，虽有些内容与我有分岐，但作为外国了解中国是非常透彻的。

Most Helpful Customer Reviews  

【书评一 评分：五星】

"When the country is humiliated, its spirit will be aroused." Wei Yuan, 1842

“国难当头，国民精神雄起” （此为个人翻译，原话不知在哪）。魏源，1842

"From 'Our technology is not as good as other people's,' to 'Our political system is not as good as other people's,' and on to 'Our culture is not as good as other people's,' Chinese reflections on our own defects probed ever deeper. But the primary mind-set that guided the probing was neither 'liberation of humanity,' nor even 'enriching people,' but rather a sense of shame at China's loss of sovereignty and other national humiliations."

“从‘技不如人’到‘政治体制不如人’再到‘文化不如人’，中国对自身缺陷的探究前所未有地深入了，但主导这种深究的主要心态，既不是出于“人性解放”也不是“致富百姓”，而是羞耻于国家主权沦丧，被别国欺侮。

These words of Nobel Prize winning dissident, Liu Xiaobo, give a rather neat summary of the arguments put forward in this fascinating and thought-provoking study of the Chinese psyche over the last 150 years or so, as evidenced and influenced by its greatest intellectuals, writers and leaders. The aim of the authors is to shed some light on how, in the last three decades, China has risen out of the poverty and political turmoil of the preceding century to become one of the richest and most powerful nations in the world.

上述的内容来自诺贝尔和平奖获得者LXB的简要总结，中国近150年来的国民心态被国家最伟大的知识分子、作家和领导人阐述和影响，而刘的总结来源于这些对国民心态的引人入胜而发人深省的研究中。近30年里，中国摆脱了前100年的贫困状态和动荡局势，成为了世界上最富裕强大的国家之一，而本书作者意在阐述中国是如何办到这一点的。

The authors show how the encroachment of the Western empires and defeats at the hands of enemies within and without led, not just to the fall of the empire at the beginning of the twentieth century, but to the creation of a national mind-set that has kept the aim of achieving 'wealth and power' at the heart of Chinese politics ever since. The succession of military defeats and subsequent 'unequal treaties', which forced China to pay punitive reparations and give territory and access to foreign states, led to a spirit of 'national humiliation'. Far from allowing this to become a negative factor, however, successive intellectuals and leaders used it as a spur to galvanise China into a process of 'self-strengthening'. At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, the main thrust was to borrow what was needed from the West in terms of technical and scientific knowledge, while maintaining the existing Confucian culture. But the authors show how, as that failed to make China strong enough to defy the many circling predators, gradually some intellectuals began to believe that there must be a period of 'destruction' of cultural sacred cows before 'construction' of a new and stronger state could begin.

作者展示了西方列强的侵略和来自内患外敌的失败是如何不仅导致了在二十世纪初时帝国的倒塌，而且从那以后在中国政治家的心中产生了一种以争取富强为目标的心态。接连不断的军事失败以及随后的被迫让中国支付惩罚性赔偿和给外国土地和使用权的“不平等条约”导致了一种“民族耻辱”的情绪。然而接下来的知识分子和领导人完全没有让这成为一个消极的因素，而将它作为一个刺激来激励中国进入一个“自强”的进程。在十九世纪末二十世纪初，主要的推动是在维持儒家文化的同时向西方借用所需的在科学技术知识方面的东西。但是作者展示了由于那改革未能使中国足够强壮到对抗周围的掠夺者，渐渐地一些知识分子开始认为在建立一个崭新的更强大的国家之前一定要有一段摧毁文化上神圣不可侵犯的东西的时期。

Each chapter focuses on one man, a leading intellectual or politician, taking us gradually through the decades from the end of the Opium wars to the present day. The emphasis is not on the events of any given period, although of course they are referenced and highlighted. Rather, the authors concentrate on the writings and speeches of each man, showing how each generation of political thought adopted, rejected or built on the ideas of the one before. Many of the people who are discussed were entirely unknown to me, especially those prior to WW2, but the authors create a continuous chain of intellectual development, clearly showing how and why ideas were influenced by, and adjusted in reaction to, events at home or abroad.

每章都重点讲述一个人，一位智者领袖或者政治家，讲述他们如何带领我们从鸦片战争后期逐步走向今天。讲述的重点不是特定时期内的特定事件，虽然他们总涉及其中或者还可能是主角；讲述的重点是他们的文章或者演讲，因为这显示了他们对前代政治家观点的继承、否定或者开创。被讨论的许多人对作者而言是完全陌生的，尤其是那些二战以前的人们，但是本书作者厘清了他们的观点传承脉络，清楚地显示了这些观点是如何被国内外事件影响的，以及他们是如何嬗变的.

The authors take a sympathetic approach to their subject - in the afterword they tell us that the book is part of a project undertaken by the Center on US-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York to examine China's reform movement and transition to modernity. They attempt, successfully in my view, to explain to a Western audience the cultural differences that have enabled China to follow a path that seems, to our eyes, doomed to fail - to build a society that values the acquisition of 'wealth and power' above things that we see as essential for progress: intellectual freedom, human rights, democracy.

作者对该课题采用了同情的视角——在后记中他们告诉我们此书是纽约亚洲协会美中关系中心的一个在研项目，用来考察中国进行现代化的改革和过渡历程。他们尝试——在我看来是成功的——对西方观众宣扬中国那种为获取“财富和权力”而不惜践踏思想自由、人权和民主的价值观将注定走向灭亡，因为后者对我们来说是文明进展中极其重要的部分.

While in no way condoning the horrors of the era of Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution, they suggest that this period of destructiveness may in fact have cleared the way, culturally, for the creation under Deng Xiaoping of the 'Leninist capitalist' system that has enabled China to become the powerhouse it is today. An unequal society, yes, and with repression still at its core, but a country governed largely with the consent of its people nonetheless.

较之于对毛氏恐怖和文革影响的绝不宽容的态度，他们指出，这阶段的破坏性历程也许实际上已经为邓小平创造性的“列宁式资本主义”系统在文化上荡清了道路，而后者正使中国成为今天这样的强国。这是一个不平等的社会吗？显实是的，而且它还仍然伴随着以镇压为核心的统治手段，但是这同样是一个在很大程度上有民众支持的国家。

They end with some informed speculation about where next for China - having gained 'wealth and power' will they use that power to bully other nations as they were bullied in their nineteenth century weakness? Or will they, from a position of strength, continue to open up their society and perhaps gradually move towards an intellectual position and political system more closely aligned with the West?

作者们以一些有依据的推测结尾：中国的下一步在哪里？在拥有了“财富与权利”之后，他们会用这些力量去欺负其他国家吗，就像他们在十九世纪被欺负的那样？或者他们在有了力量以后，继续保持社会的开放，也许逐渐走向一个理性的状态和政治制度，向西方看齐？

I found this a lengthier read than its size would necessarily suggest, since after every few pages I would discover that I was staring at a wall and thinking. It has challenged and changed my pre-existing assumptions, certainly about China's culture and system of government but perhaps also about our own. It has gone a long way towards answering the question why China, alone of all the major states that adopted authoritarian non-democratic systems during the twentieth century, seems eventually to have made a relative success of it while retaining the support of the majority of its citizens.

我发现与这本书看起来的厚度相比，它读起来耗时更多。因为每读几页，我就会发现自己在对着一面墙思考。它挑战了我之前的设想，关于中国的文化和政府系统的设想，可能还包括关于我们自己的。它有益于回答这个问题：为什么在二十世纪，中国采取了与大多数主流国家不同的、独裁的体制，似乎最终做到了相对于它自己的成功，并且保持了它的大多数人民的支持。

Apologies for the length of this review, but I still feel I've given the merest glimpse into this highly illuminating and thought-provoking read. I can't recommend it highly enough to anyone who is interested in understanding the psyche of a nation that seems destined soon to be the wealthiest and most powerful of all.

不好意思写了这么长的评论，但是我还是觉得对于这样一本启发性的、引人深思的书，我仅仅给出了一点感受。我强烈推荐它给任何有兴趣了解一个注定将很快成为最富有和最强大国家的精神的人。

NB This book was provided for review by the publisher.

注意：这本书由出版商提供，以供评论。

对此评论的回复：

Excellent review. I'm a third of the way through reading this for a second time. The best book I've read assessing the emerging history of China since the first Opium War. The authors descriptions of Empress Dowager Cixi are diametrically opposite those of Jung Chang, and in my opinion, much more objective. Both of Jung Chang's books on (Cixi and Mao) portray a prejudice which she is incapable of hiding through her writings.

非常棒，我已经读了两遍了，依我看来这是自鸦片战争以来中国历史最好的书评，作者对慈禧描述与张戎相反，并且更加客观，张戎关于慈禧和毛的书有一种无法隐藏的偏见。
评论者回应：

Thanks! This is the only book I've read about this period of history and, as you'll know from my review, I found it fascinating. And while I can't comment on its accuracy, I can certainly say I found the arguments very convincing. It seemed to me the authors were sympathetic rather than biased towards the Chinese viewpoint, if that makes sense.


谢谢，这是我读过关于这段历史唯一的书,你会从我的评论中了解,我觉得这很有趣。虽然我不知道它的准确性,但我可以肯定的说,其中的说法非常令人信服。在我看来,作者是同情中国而不是偏向中国的观点，那是可以理解的。

【书评二 评分：五星】

An Intellectual History of Modern China

现代中国知识分子的历史

Wealth and Power follows Chinese history from the Opium Wars to today. Modern Chinese history is generally considered to have begun with the Treaty of Nanjing at the close of the first Opium War. Schell and Delury see special significance is using that first great humiliation of China at the hands of the modern world as the starting point, central to a thesis they use to explore Chinese history through its intellectual history. Roughly, that thesis is that modern Chinese history is best understood as a reaction to its modern humiliation, the desire to strengthen itself and overcome that humiliation by achieving "wealth and power," and the tension that created with traditional Confucianism. The underlying intellectual tension in modern Chinese history then, is between conservative family-centric thinking and conservative state-centric thinking. It's thinking that dates back to the old conflict between Confucians and the Legalists, philosophical adversaries to the Confucians whose mantra was Wealth and Power. It's a conflict that predates and leaves precious little room for classical liberalism or even Marxism.

财富和权力 讲述了自鸦片战争至今的中国历史。现代中国史通常认为是始于 南京条约，终于第一次鸦片战争。Schell 和 Delury 看到了用中国在现代世界第一次巨大的耻辱做为起点的重要意义。文章的重点是 他们 通过知识分子的历史 去探索中国历史。总体上，从现代中国耻辱的角度， 此文是最容易理解的现代中国历史，通过自强的渴望和战胜羞辱 实现“财富和权力”，这种紧张源于传统的儒家学说。在现代中国历史 这种潜在的知识分子的紧张，介于 保守的家族中心思想和 保守的国家中心思想。这种思想可以追溯到旧有的儒家思想和法家思想 的冲突上，儒家哲学对手的宝典“财富和权力” 。这种冲突早于有一席之地的传统自由主义 甚至 马克思主义。

In service of this thesis, Schell and Delury dispense with a traditional narrative history in favor of focusing on 11 "iconic intellectuals and leaders, reformers and revolutionaries." The 11 are: Wei Yuan (born in 1794, died in 1857), Feng Guifen (1809-1874), the Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908), Liang Qichao (1873-1929), Sun Yat-Sen (1866-1925), Chen Duxiu (1879-1942), Chiang Kai-Shek (1887-1975), Mao Zedong (1893-1976), Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997), Zhu Rongji (1928-), and Liu Xiaobo (1955-). They are a mix of scholar-official civil servants (sharing the experience of failing at least one examination), writers, dissidents, and leaders of the Republic of China and in the Nationalist and Communist parties, as well as one (and, tellingly, only one) member of the royal family. They share much in common. Each argued that China needed to seriously change in some way. Most reverted to less radical and more Confucian positions in their later years. Their arguments tended to be utilitarian rather than rooted in natural rights (of the 11, only Liu can fairly be said to be a true proponent of natural rights and liberal democracy). When liberalism or democracy are advocated for, it tends to be not as an end but as a means to the end of Wealth and Power (the same could probably be said for Marxism). Unsurprisingly then, the need for an authoritarian prelude to self-government is common. Little if any respect is shown toward the Chinese people, even while the Chinese nation is viewed worshipfully.

在本文中，Schell和Delury分别叙述了传统叙事历史中赞同的集中于十一个“标志性的知识分子和领导人，改革家和革命家”。这十一个人是：魏源(1794-1857)，冯桂芬(1809-1874)，慈禧太后(1835-1908)，梁启超(1873-1929)，孙中山(1866-1925)，陈独秀(1879-1942)，常凯申别名蒋介石(1887-1975)，毛泽东(1893-1976)，邓小平(1904-1997)，朱镕基(1928-)，和刘晓波(1955-)。他们是由士大夫官员（分享至少一次在考试中落榜的经验这是什么鬼），作家，持不同政见者，中华民国的领导人，民族主义者，GCD员，也有一个（显著地只有一个）皇室成员。他们有许多共同点。人人都主张中国需要在某些方面认真地改变。他们中的大多数在晚年时回归到更不激进和更儒家的立场。他们的主张更趋向于功利性而不是根本的自然权利（这11人中，只有刘晓波能被公平地说是一个真正的自然权利和自由民主的支持者）。当自由主义和民主主义被提倡时，这不是结束而意味着富强（同样可能可以说是马克思主义）的结束。然后毫无意外地，对独裁的需要又会导致自治。虽然中国这个国家受人尊崇，但中国的人民却享受不到多少尊敬。

As is to be expected, Communist China gets a great deal of attention. Mao and Deng are the only 2 of the 11 to get double chapters. It's interesting to both see how traditional Chinese culture and philosophy influenced the Chinese brand of Marxism and how the Chinese Communist Party differed from its counterpart in Moscow, both favorite topics of Schell and Delury. Mao had a belief in the power of the Great Man, influenced by the great Chinese classical novels, that was at odds with Marxism's economic determinism. He also recognized that rural China was better primed for a Communist revolution than urban China. We hear about the Long March, the Hundred Flowers Movement, and the Great Leap Forward, among others. The authors are perhaps too kind in dealing with Mao's commitment to disruptive change and cultural destruction.

和预想的一样，共产主义中国备受关注。毛和邓是11个人中仅有的2个在多个章节被提到的人。研究传统中国文化和哲学是如何影响中国特色的马克思主义以及研究中国GCD与他们在莫斯科的同志的区别是非常有趣的，这也是Schell 和 Delury最喜欢的话题。毛坚信自己会成为一代伟人，中国史书对他影响很大，也与马克思主义经济决定论不一致。他也认识到相比较于在城市，在中国农村地区更适用开展共产主义革命。我们都听说过长征、双百方针运动和大跃进等等。或许作者过于弱化了毛对破坏和毁灭改革与文化方面所应承担的责任。

Early on the authors describe their works as a "historical reflection on China's `economic miracle.'" I think the scare quotes are fairer than the authors probably do: I'm not convinced there is any economic miracle. In the final chapter they suggest that the incredible destruction wrought under Mao weakened traditional Confucianism--a force against progress--sufficient such that true reform was possible. I think the basic logic of that is fine, but what results at what cost? Tens of millions died, and the "economic miracle" looks like a miracle in large part because Mao's policies led to such incredible poverty. Yes, China now has the second largest economy in the world by GDP, but its per capita income still lags the US, Japan, Taiwan, and even the world average. Dramatic growth is easy when the simplest reforms are available because a country is doing virtually everything wrong. And this growth has come without any attendant real political freedom. Asia for whatever reason has produced several success stories of moving from authoritarianism to constitutionalism, but the intellectual history that Schell and Delury so richly illustrate, China has a deep, deep tradition of nationalistic utilitarianism and no serious tradition of classical liberalism.

作者之前形容他们的书是“中国经济奇迹的历史性的反映”，我觉得给作者所说的”奇迹“加个引号更合适：我不相信任何经济奇迹的存在。在最后一章中作者暗示，正是毛削弱了传统的儒家思想---一种阻碍进步的思想---才使得真正的改革得以充分实行。我认为，作者的基本逻辑是正确的，但是这一切都付出怎样的代价呢？上千万人死了！而这所谓的”经济奇迹“看上去像是个奇迹很大程度上是因为毛的政策导致了惊人的贫困。不错，中国现在有世界第二的GDP,但他的人均资本收入仍然落后于美国、日本、台湾甚至世界平均水平。当一个国家原本政策一塌糊涂的时候，即使是最最简单的改革，也可能让经济戏剧性的增长。况且这经济增长也没有伴随着政治自由！出于种种原因，亚洲有不少由独裁转为民主的成功案例，但Schell和Delury所列举大量史料表明，中国有着非常非常深的国家功利主义的传统却没真正有过古典自由主义的传统。

（译者注：改革开放前毛爷爷还在的那30年中国经济平均发展速度实际并不比改革开发后的慢，毛爷爷绝对是中国到目前为止最伟大的人没有之一。）

I was initially put off by the authors' sometimes tortured metaphors and the format, which is difficult to follow without a good base in Chinese history, but by the end of the book I felt I had an understanding of the "mind of China" I never had before and, more importantly, a grasp on what I still don't know (more known unknowns and fewer unknown knowns). The centrality of national humiliation and the tension between Confucianism and the Legalists is pretty straightforward, albeit necessary to any real understanding of China. More nuanced, and so well explained by Schell and Delury, are the differences between Russia's brand of Marxism and that of China, and differences between party-founder Chen, Mao, and later party leaders. It's also enlightening to see how readily Chinese leaders--including Nationalist leaders--were to adopt Marxist-Leninist principles where they thought useful while discarding others.

刚开始我读的进展很慢，因为作者时不时运用的难以理解的隐喻和文章格式，而如果没有深厚的中国历史文化的底子是很难理解这些的。但是到最后我发现我对于“中国思想”有了一个前所未有的深刻的理解，并且更重要的是，我对于自己目前还不知道的事情有了一个了解（自己更多的知道了自己在哪方面还有所欠缺，而自己完全不知道的事情变少了）。民族耻辱的中心点以及儒家与法家之间的紧张关系是相当明确的，尽管了解这些知识对真正的了解中国是必要的。正如两位作者所清楚解释的那样，更加微妙的地方在于俄罗斯的马克思主义与中国的马克思主义之间的不同，以及中共创建人陈独秀，毛泽东以及后来中共领导人之间的不同。同时我还发现中国的领导人——包括国民党领导人——在他们认为马克思-列宁主义很有用时就会轻易的采用这种主义，同时抛弃其他理念。

Disclosure: I received a complimentary advance e-copy of Wealth and Power via NetGalley.

大揭秘：通过NetGalley，我收到了一份免费的《权利与财富》的首印版的电子副本，还不错哦！

对此评论的回复：
Good review, excellent. I would, however, suggest that the economic miracle is still in its emergent form. Though the national income levels are still well behind other Asian cultures, I would hypothesize that within the next two decades we will see a consolidated economic miracle that will result in an economy that will outshine the economies of every other country in the world.

对此评论的回复：
很好的评论，非常棒。但是我想补充一点，中国的经济奇迹仍然处于起步阶段，虽然中国人的收入水平仍然落后一些亚洲国家，但是我敢打赌在接下来的二十年里，我们会看到真正的中国的经济奇迹，中国的经济水平会超过世界上任何一个国家。

【书评三 评分：五星】

Good Understanding -

非常棒的理解力

In the 19th century, efforts to efface national humiliation (until then, China had one of the world's largest economies) and restore China to wealth and power had largely focused on how the West's military technology and economic techniques might be harnessed by China. The early 20th century brought questioning of the wisdom of maintaining its traditional Confucian culture. Mao then pursued destroying China's old core with violent and total resolve (his Cultural Revolution), but also stubbornly squelched anything resembling the practice of capitalism. Nonetheless, the authors contend he may have helped prepare the way for successor Deng Xiaoping to usher in a spectacular new kind of economic growth. The authors also tell us China's leaders were totally pragmatic (it was not ideology driven) about choosing their way, and democracy has not appeared to be the most effective route forward.

19世纪，在人们努力抹除民族耻辱（直到那时，中国还是世界上最大的经济体之一）以及恢复中国的财富和国力时，人们主要的着眼点是是否能将西方的军事技术和经济方法变为已用。20世纪初期，人们对继续维持传统儒家文化的智慧进行了质问。于是毛开始了文化大革命，但同时也顽固的消灭了任何与资本主义相关的事物。然而，作者认为毛的这些举动可能恰好为继任者邓小平采用新的经济增长模式扫清了一定的障碍。作者还告诉我们中国领导人在选择道路时是完全实用主义的（这并非受意识形态驱使），而民主在他们看来并非最有效的前进道路。

Now, after weathering a century and a half of domestic rebellion and foreign aggression, China has learned how to borrow effectively from the West. Deng Xiaoping struck the spark that lit China's rejuvenation by telling his people in the 1980s that it 'to get rich is glorious' and it was 'all right for some people to get rich first.' Hu Jintao (handpicked by Deng, among others) reinforced that progress when he told visitors from Taiwan in 2005 that 'Backwardness incurs beatings by others,' and 'the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has become the unswerving goal that each Chinese generation has striven to realize.' More recently, President Xi Jinping's first speeches as General Secretary in 2013 once again referred to this period of Chinese history.

如今，在经历了一个半世纪的国内战争和外国侵略后，现在的中国已经学会了如何有效地从西方借鉴。  
邓小平在20世纪80年代告诉他的人民致富是光荣的还说允许一部分人先富起来，邓小平点燃了中国复兴的火焰。Hu（邓精心挑选的）继续推动了改革，在2005年他告诉来自台湾的游客“落后就要挨打”和“中国民族的伟大复兴已经成为每一代中国人努力实现的奋斗目标。最近，在2013年首次作为总书记的Xi的讲话再次提到这一段中国历史。

The authors address the question of why China's economic dynamist began when it did, and has been as successful and durable as it has. They accomplish this by examining the lives of eleven influential officials, activists, and leaders who helped create modern China, beginning with the first Opium War. Why start there? Many Chinese date the start of their modern history to the date when the Qing Dynasty signed the Treaty of Nanjing and capitulated to Great Britain to end the disastrous First Opium War (1839-42). Every Chinese high-school student is expected the know the official narrative dividing Chinese history neatly into pre-Opium War and post-Opium War periods, China's counterpart to Americans learning the preamble of the Declaration of Independence. That began China's questioning the fundamental assumptions of their culture and governance.

作者致力于研究中国经济是如何起步、发展与成功的。他们通过对11位第一次鸦片战争以来对中国现代化进程有重要影响力的政府官员、社会活动家、民间领袖的调查来完成这项研究。为什么（中国的现代化进程）始于那时（第一次鸦片战争）呢？许多中国人将中国的近代史开端设定在1839年4月2日清政府因灾难性的第一次鸦片战争结果而与英国签订《南京条约》的这一天。每一个中国高校学生都被教育官方将中国历史清楚地划分为前鸦片战争时期和后鸦片战争时期这样两个阶段的观点，就像美国人都学习《独立宣言序言》（在美国历史中的作用）一样。鸦片战争的失败导致了中国开始思考他们的文化和治理理论的基础假设是否合理这样的问题。

Paradoxically, the authors find that one of the most interesting and paradoxical explanations originates with the person deemed to have had such a destructive effect on China's earlier progress - Mao Zedong. His movement to standardize oral language and simplify written language helped unify the nation, while his Cultural Revolution was so great a disaster that it provoked an even more profound cultural revolution - institutionalizing a key element Mao intended to stamp out.

矛盾的是，作者发现最有趣、也是最荒谬的解释之一源于毛泽东，一个对中国早期进步过程有着巨大破坏作用的人。他关于规范普通话、简化文字的运动帮助统一了这个国家，而他发动的文化大革命也造成了巨大的影响以至于引发了更为深刻的文化革命——制度化，一个毛旨在杜绝的关键因素。

Westerners need to rethink whether democratization was always an essential partner to market-driven growth and national development. Turns out China's painful historical experience has made nationalism a stronger sentiment than democracy or constitutionalism. Many Chinese have made an implicit bargain with the party - as long as they are allowed to enjoy growing wealthier and to pursue a better life, and as long as their country edges closer towards a modicum of world greatness, they will not seek to challenge authoritarian rule.

西方需要反思民主是否是市场导向的增长和国家发展的必要条件。事实证明，中国惨痛的历史经历使得民族主义比民主和宪政更加有效。许多中国人与党完成了一项隐性的交易：只要他们能够继续享受经济增长、追求更好的生活，只要国家还能继续一点点地走向强盛，他们将不寻求挑战当局权威。

Yet, the confidence levels of many Chinese lag behind actual achievements in curing the nation's recent historical sense of inferiority. This is perhaps partly because the CCP finds perpetuating the victim culture to be in its interest. Another reason is that the West still regularly criticizes its fundamental values and does not emulate its example; the Chinese are learning that to win that outside respect they first have to treat their own people with respect. Nearby Asian, post-Confucian, and post-colonial societies such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea have all moved from authoritarianism to constitutionalism, while new leader Xi Jinping recently warned party leaders about the dangers of following the dreaded footsteps of the former Soviet Union. Perhaps instead China will begin enforcing its own constitution.
然而，许多中国人的自信心等级却落后于他们实际取得成就，这源于他们对近代以来历史的自卑感。其中一部分原因或许是因为中共发现延续受害者文化符合他们的利益。另一个原因是西方仍然经常批评他们的基本价值并且也不视他们为榜样；中国人必须明白，如想获得外界尊重，首先得要善待本国人民。亚洲邻国、汉文化圈、后殖民地社会，比如台湾、香港、韩国，均从权威体制过渡到了民主宪政，而新一代领导人Xi最近也警告党内领导勿步苏联后尘。也许中国也将实施他们自己的宪法。

Meanwhile, there is also increasing worry that the country will flex its new economic and military muscles. Schell et al see its various South China Sea territory disputes as another dimension of nationalism, of 'payback time.' U.S. presence in the area (including spy flights along its coast) don't help either. And it does have legitimate security concerns about protecting access to various raw materials and trade outlets around the world.

与此同时增长的还有对该国展示自身经济和军事实力的担忧。Schell等人视南海诸多的领土纠纷为另一种民族主义的回归。即使是美国“回归亚洲”的政策（包括沿海岸线的间谍飞行侦查）也对此没有任何帮助。而且它也的确有保护其与全世界原材料和贸易网点通道安全的合理关切。


I most enjoyed the section on Deng Xiaoping, the man who led China's turnaround after Mao. He'd seen how Mao's idealism had driven China to the brink of civil war and weakened its economy, as well as how other nations were far ahead of China (Deng admitted in 1973 that China was 40 years behind - both in economic and technology terms. He worked for economic development, undistorted by either Maoist mass politics or individualistic liberal democracy. His writing and speeches largely ignored the subject of traditional Chinese culture and Confucian ideology (Mao's last focus), seeing those topics as distractions from what really was needed - improving material conditions and making China a global powerhouse, while preserving the Party's monopoly on power. Looking at the U.S., Deng saw democracy as creating indecisiveness, inefficiency, instability (one branch of government holding back another; politicians constantly changing positions), and unable to deal with serious problems in a timely manner.

我最欣赏关于邓小平的部分，他是在毛之后领导着中国彻底改变的人。他看到了毛的理想主义是怎样把中国带到内战边缘并使经济衰弱，也看到了其他国家是怎样远远超过中国。邓在1973年承认在经济和科技方面中国落后了四十年。他致力于经济发展，不被毛主义的群众政治或者个人主义的自由民主主义所扭曲。他的文章和演讲在很大程度上无视了中国传统文化的内容和儒家思想（这是毛最后关注的东西），并把这些当做分散注意力，事实上不被需要的事物。中国需要的·是提高物质水平，成为世界工厂，同时保持党的绝对领导。看着美国，邓认为民主政体是无决断的，低效的，不稳定的（政府的一个部门反对另一个，政治家不停地换职位），并且不能及时处理严重的问题。

Deftly expressing criticism of the past w/o risking totally rejecting a former leader and the resentment that would create, he said 'Mao was 70% correct and 30% wrong' - the same rating Mao had given himself. Deng also did not suffer from Mao's insecurity vs. intellectual, and one of his first acts was to reverse the political verdicts on nearly 3 million party cadre and intellectuals branded 'class enemies' and persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. This won him many friends among the elite and provided the government with a vast new reservoir of well-educated individuals with technical skills. 'Pragmatism' was Deng's focus - 'From this day forward, we renounce class struggle as the central focus, and instead take up economic development as our central focus' (1978, upon taking the reins), 'Practice is the sole determinant of truth,' 'Seek truth from facts,' 'Poverty is not socialism,' 'The Purpose of socialism is to make a country rich and strong.' Deng himself traveled to the U.S. and Europe, and regularly pumped foreign visitors for their ideas on improvement; one of his most effective techniques was sending officials abroad to look and study, reversing a century of Chinese resistance to and ambivalence about learning from the West. ('Only when we recognize that we are backward will we progress.') Upon return, they were looked upon as valuable assets - eg. Xi Jinping, now president, was a staff member on a military delegation to the Pentagon in 1980 and member of an agricultural delegation to Iowa in 1985. Supported incentivizing productivity, private entrepreneurialism, and decentralized economic decision-making, and hired as his architects Zhao Ziyang and Zhu Rongi who later became premiers.

熟练地对过去表达批评而没有完全否定一个前任领导人因而也没有承受这样的否定将带来的愤怒的风险，他说“毛泽东70%是对的而30%是错的”——同毛对自己的评价一样。邓小平也未继续毛因自身的不安而与知识分子的斗争，他首先的行动之一就是为在文革期间将近三百万的被打上“阶级敌人”烙印和迫害的党员干部与知识分子政治上平反。这为他在精英分子中赢得了许多朋友并给政府提供了一个巨大的拥有技术的受过良好教育的知识分子的人才库。邓的焦点是实用主义——“从今天开始，我们放弃以阶级斗争为纲，转变为以经济发展为中心。”（1978，此后邓掌权），“时间是检验真理的唯一标准”，“实事求是”，“贫穷不是社会主义”，“社会主义的目的是使国家富强”。邓他自己去过美国和欧洲，并定期从国外来访者那汲取他们发展的理念;他最有效率的技巧之一是颠覆一个世纪以来中国人对于向西方学习的阻力和矛盾心理将官员送到国外观察学习。（“只有我们意识到我们的落后我们才能进步”）回来之后，他们被作为珍贵的人才来看待——例如，Xi，现在的国家主席，曾是1980年派往五角大楼的军事代表团中的一员和1985年去往爱荷华州的农业代表团中的一员。邓支持以物质激励的生产，私人企业，分散的经济决策，同时雇佣赵紫阳和后来称为总理的朱镕基作为建筑师。（好难啊。。。）

Demanded local officials boldly experiment, sometimes there experiments were illegal but Deng let them proceed and succeed/fail on their own merits. One of the first, and most important, was the de-communalization of agriculture. Another was 'town and village enterprises' (TVEs) that were local public-private joint ventures allowed to side-step existing limits on the number of employees. A third was Special Economic Zones (SEZs) piloted near Hong Kong and Taiwan. The first proposal came from Guangdong Province governor Xi Zhongxun, father the current president. Xi also had hero status from the 1930s anti-Japanese resistance. Overseeing this new project was Sichuan party secretary Zhao Ziyang who had earlier encouraged marketization reform and separating party management from industrial management. He too later became premier.

邓小平要求当地官员大胆试验，虽然有时候这些试验是非法的，但是邓小平鼓励他们在自己擅长的领域去探索、成功与失败。第一类，也是最重要的试验，是农业去公社化。第二类是乡镇企业（TVEs），它采用公私合营实行双轨制，允许招聘有限数量的员工。第三类是经济特区（SEZs），它们靠近香港和台湾。第一类方案来自广东省委书记习仲勋，他也是现任中国国家主席X的父亲。习仲勋同时是20世纪30年代的抗日战争的战斗英雄。监督该项新项目实施的是时任四川省委书记Zhao ZiYang，他更早地鼓励市场化改革与政企分离。他后来成为国家总理。

1984 brought the peak of Deng's popularity. Then came inflation, party cadres exploiting the difference between state-set and market prices, softening employment, and eventually the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. Deng saw the latter as risking civil war and the CCP's authority and eventually ordered the PLA to restore order. Given Deng's prior reactions to eg. Fang Lizhi (high-level physics professor and official at a leading university - lost his position and was expelled from the CCP) and a much earlier protester (1978 - jailed for 15 years), the wonder is that the protests were allowed to continue as long as they were.

在1984年，邓小平的声望达到巅峰。随后就是通货膨胀，党的干部利用双轨制获利，失业潮，并逐渐发展成80年代最后一年的XXXXX。邓小平从后者中看到了内战和我党权威被挑战的风险，逐渐命令JD重建秩序。鉴于邓小平优先选择与Fang Lizhi（高级物理教授和大学领导，被开除党籍，失去地位）和某位更早的抗议者（1978年，15年入狱）交流，这些抗议者们令人惊奇地被允许继续抗议——只要他们愿意。

Concluding, the authors believe China's new leader is a Deng-type economic reformer, and that stability is much more highly valued in China than most Westerners realize - allowing foundations to become firmer. Thus, a privatized economy would be scary for CCP leadership - it would lose influence and have to contend with too much private power and influence. And the middle and upper classes, while perhaps wanting greater freedom and openness, also want government to protect their interests. As for Taiwan, they believe China would be wise to simply bide its time - Taiwan will voluntarily return when China becomes more democratic. Meanwhile, the U.S. has been unable to act on global warming, a concern that will significantly affect both nations (China probably more), that requires worldwide action that would bring the two nations closer together.
Bottom-Line: 'Wealth and Power' provides excellent insight into why the Chinese behave as they have in recent years.

总而言之，作者相信中国新一代领导人将是一位邓小平式的经济改革者，而稳定，不同于西方人士的理解的那样，将被中国高度重视——因为这将使经济基础更加稳固。因此，对GCD的领导而言，私有经济是可怕的，因为这将导致它对私人领域失去影响力。而且中产阶级和富有阶层可能会要求更大的自由和开放，同时希望政府保护他们的利益。至于台湾，他们相信中国是明智的——他们只是在等待时机，等待台湾在中国更加民主的时候主动统一。与此同时，在全球变暖这个影响两个国家（中国受的影响可能还多一点）的问题上，美国能发挥的作用已经十分有限，而这就要求两个国家更紧密地进行国际合作。写于最后：《财富与权力》一书为观察“中国近年来为何会有这些举动”提供了极好的视角。

转自龙腾 http://www.ltaaa.com/bbs/thread-332484-1-1.html


这篇文我看后感觉很有启发性，对于中国的诠述很好，虽有些内容与我有分岐，但作为外国了解中国是非常透彻的。