超级军网转自学霸kktt的帖子：福建雷达干扰台湾铺路爪？
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/28 05:23:52
简氏防务周刊报道说，中国大陆在福建惠安修建了一个大型相控阵雷达，用于干扰台湾的“铺路爪”远程预警雷达。但是笔者经过考察地图，认为这种说法不合常理，缺乏依据。
New Chinese radar may have jammed Taiwan's SRP
Richard D Fisher Jr, Washington, DC and Sean O'Connor, Indiana - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
05 June 2014
Taiwan's new USD1.38 billion long-range radar, the Surveillance Radar Programme (SRP), has been fully operational for about a year. However, China may already have the ability to interfere with its signals, according to sources in Taiwan and Washington.
Development of the SRP, which is intended to provide Taiwan with a form of "strategic depth" by providing very early warning of Chinese long-range air and missile activity, dates back to 2000 when its sale was approved by the Clinton Administration. Following repeated delays and cost overruns, Taiwanese officials revealed that it was operational in February 2013.
Taiwan's SRP is based on the Raytheon AN/FPS-115 Pave Paws large phased array radar (LPAR). Located at Loshan Mountain in Hsinchu County, Taiwan, it is reported to have a range of 5,000 km (3,100 n miles), and it is able to track a golf ball-sized target out to 3,000 km. Taiwanese officials revealed that it was able to track North Korea's 12 December 2013 satellite launch, which was about 1,800 km from Taiwan.
Satellite imagery obtained by IHS Jane's shows that China has built a large phased array radar north of Huian in Fujian Province approximately 240 km northwest of Taiwan's SRP. The Chinese radar array, constructed sometime before 2008, is similar in size to the SRP. It appears to employ a fixed array boresighted along an azimuth of approximately 144 degrees. With an assumed coverage of +/-60 degrees in azimuth, the Chinese LPAR is theoretically capable of monitoring the entire Taiwan Strait region, as well as the southern approaches to the South China Sea.
Like Taiwan's radar, the Chinese radar is located on a hill top. By matching the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) of Taiwan's radar signals the Chinese radar can interfere with the ability of the SRP to track targets. Radar pulses can be made to be very complex to avoid such interference but China can employ electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems to determine the SRP's signals.
According to a US source, the US Navy has to space its large Aegis phased array radars within a naval battlegroup in order to avoid radar interference.
A senior political source in Taiwan confirmed to IHS Jane's that China's radar has "interfered" with the SRP.
This interference is noteworthy given the LPAR's design. Two other LPARs in eastern China feature very different arrays and are believed to serve in a ballistic missile early warning or anti-satellite tracking capacity.
The different design of the LPAR at Huian - and the reports from Taiwan of interference - indicate that electronic interference represents a possible design driver for the new array that could possibly influence its location. The postulated 120 degree coverage arc of the LPAR also means it could interfere with other Taiwanese sensor systems deployed along the island's western side.
Chinese radar coverage of the Taiwan Strait region is robust, with multiple radar complexes monitoring airspace and sea traffic. This eliminates the requirement for an LPAR to solely serve as an additional monitoring station. However, given its ability to monitor far larger regions than any other deployed radar system in the area, airspace monitoring is believed to represent a major portion of the new LPAR's mission.
The LPAR could also be used to monitor air and space activity well beyond Taiwan if the People's Liberation Army attacked the island. Assuming that Chinese forces disable or destroy Taiwan's SRP, the LPAR's role would then be to provide long-range coverage extending north to Japan and to the Philippines.
Lastly, China also has a political motivation to match Taiwan's huge investment in an LPAR. By doing so, Beijing demonstrates that it can win the arms race with Taipei: a move that could be part of a wider propaganda campaign to demoralise Taiwan and increase the pressure for unification.
Jane's的文章自己都说了，福建惠安的雷达朝向方位角是144度（下图中的黄线），与其到台湾铺路爪雷达的连线方向（下图中的红线）有36度的夹角。如果说福建的这个雷达是用于干扰台湾的铺路爪雷达，那么这个夹角是没必要的。况且，铺路爪雷达主要是用来探测弹道导弹目标的，仰角范围是3~85度。福建的雷达距离台湾铺路爪雷达约240 km，地平线高度差加上仰角高度约为240*(240/6370+3/180*pi)=21.6 km。显然，福建的雷达完全不在其观测角度范围内，因此也不可能对其进行干扰。
New Chinese radar may have jammed Taiwan's SRP
Richard D Fisher Jr, Washington, DC and Sean O'Connor, Indiana - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
05 June 2014
Taiwan's new USD1.38 billion long-range radar, the Surveillance Radar Programme (SRP), has been fully operational for about a year. However, China may already have the ability to interfere with its signals, according to sources in Taiwan and Washington.
Development of the SRP, which is intended to provide Taiwan with a form of "strategic depth" by providing very early warning of Chinese long-range air and missile activity, dates back to 2000 when its sale was approved by the Clinton Administration. Following repeated delays and cost overruns, Taiwanese officials revealed that it was operational in February 2013.
Taiwan's SRP is based on the Raytheon AN/FPS-115 Pave Paws large phased array radar (LPAR). Located at Loshan Mountain in Hsinchu County, Taiwan, it is reported to have a range of 5,000 km (3,100 n miles), and it is able to track a golf ball-sized target out to 3,000 km. Taiwanese officials revealed that it was able to track North Korea's 12 December 2013 satellite launch, which was about 1,800 km from Taiwan.
Satellite imagery obtained by IHS Jane's shows that China has built a large phased array radar north of Huian in Fujian Province approximately 240 km northwest of Taiwan's SRP. The Chinese radar array, constructed sometime before 2008, is similar in size to the SRP. It appears to employ a fixed array boresighted along an azimuth of approximately 144 degrees. With an assumed coverage of +/-60 degrees in azimuth, the Chinese LPAR is theoretically capable of monitoring the entire Taiwan Strait region, as well as the southern approaches to the South China Sea.
Like Taiwan's radar, the Chinese radar is located on a hill top. By matching the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) of Taiwan's radar signals the Chinese radar can interfere with the ability of the SRP to track targets. Radar pulses can be made to be very complex to avoid such interference but China can employ electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems to determine the SRP's signals.
According to a US source, the US Navy has to space its large Aegis phased array radars within a naval battlegroup in order to avoid radar interference.
A senior political source in Taiwan confirmed to IHS Jane's that China's radar has "interfered" with the SRP.
This interference is noteworthy given the LPAR's design. Two other LPARs in eastern China feature very different arrays and are believed to serve in a ballistic missile early warning or anti-satellite tracking capacity.
The different design of the LPAR at Huian - and the reports from Taiwan of interference - indicate that electronic interference represents a possible design driver for the new array that could possibly influence its location. The postulated 120 degree coverage arc of the LPAR also means it could interfere with other Taiwanese sensor systems deployed along the island's western side.
Chinese radar coverage of the Taiwan Strait region is robust, with multiple radar complexes monitoring airspace and sea traffic. This eliminates the requirement for an LPAR to solely serve as an additional monitoring station. However, given its ability to monitor far larger regions than any other deployed radar system in the area, airspace monitoring is believed to represent a major portion of the new LPAR's mission.
The LPAR could also be used to monitor air and space activity well beyond Taiwan if the People's Liberation Army attacked the island. Assuming that Chinese forces disable or destroy Taiwan's SRP, the LPAR's role would then be to provide long-range coverage extending north to Japan and to the Philippines.
Lastly, China also has a political motivation to match Taiwan's huge investment in an LPAR. By doing so, Beijing demonstrates that it can win the arms race with Taipei: a move that could be part of a wider propaganda campaign to demoralise Taiwan and increase the pressure for unification.
Jane's的文章自己都说了，福建惠安的雷达朝向方位角是144度（下图中的黄线），与其到台湾铺路爪雷达的连线方向（下图中的红线）有36度的夹角。如果说福建的这个雷达是用于干扰台湾的铺路爪雷达，那么这个夹角是没必要的。况且，铺路爪雷达主要是用来探测弹道导弹目标的，仰角范围是3~85度。福建的雷达距离台湾铺路爪雷达约240 km，地平线高度差加上仰角高度约为240*(240/6370+3/180*pi)=21.6 km。显然，福建的雷达完全不在其观测角度范围内，因此也不可能对其进行干扰。
New Chinese radar may have jammed Taiwan's SRP
Richard D Fisher Jr, Washington, DC and Sean O'Connor, Indiana - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
05 June 2014
Taiwan's new USD1.38 billion long-range radar, the Surveillance Radar Programme (SRP), has been fully operational for about a year. However, China may already have the ability to interfere with its signals, according to sources in Taiwan and Washington.
Development of the SRP, which is intended to provide Taiwan with a form of "strategic depth" by providing very early warning of Chinese long-range air and missile activity, dates back to 2000 when its sale was approved by the Clinton Administration. Following repeated delays and cost overruns, Taiwanese officials revealed that it was operational in February 2013.
Taiwan's SRP is based on the Raytheon AN/FPS-115 Pave Paws large phased array radar (LPAR). Located at Loshan Mountain in Hsinchu County, Taiwan, it is reported to have a range of 5,000 km (3,100 n miles), and it is able to track a golf ball-sized target out to 3,000 km. Taiwanese officials revealed that it was able to track North Korea's 12 December 2013 satellite launch, which was about 1,800 km from Taiwan.
Satellite imagery obtained by IHS Jane's shows that China has built a large phased array radar north of Huian in Fujian Province approximately 240 km northwest of Taiwan's SRP. The Chinese radar array, constructed sometime before 2008, is similar in size to the SRP. It appears to employ a fixed array boresighted along an azimuth of approximately 144 degrees. With an assumed coverage of +/-60 degrees in azimuth, the Chinese LPAR is theoretically capable of monitoring the entire Taiwan Strait region, as well as the southern approaches to the South China Sea.
Like Taiwan's radar, the Chinese radar is located on a hill top. By matching the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) of Taiwan's radar signals the Chinese radar can interfere with the ability of the SRP to track targets. Radar pulses can be made to be very complex to avoid such interference but China can employ electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems to determine the SRP's signals.
According to a US source, the US Navy has to space its large Aegis phased array radars within a naval battlegroup in order to avoid radar interference.
A senior political source in Taiwan confirmed to IHS Jane's that China's radar has "interfered" with the SRP.
This interference is noteworthy given the LPAR's design. Two other LPARs in eastern China feature very different arrays and are believed to serve in a ballistic missile early warning or anti-satellite tracking capacity.
The different design of the LPAR at Huian - and the reports from Taiwan of interference - indicate that electronic interference represents a possible design driver for the new array that could possibly influence its location. The postulated 120 degree coverage arc of the LPAR also means it could interfere with other Taiwanese sensor systems deployed along the island's western side.
Chinese radar coverage of the Taiwan Strait region is robust, with multiple radar complexes monitoring airspace and sea traffic. This eliminates the requirement for an LPAR to solely serve as an additional monitoring station. However, given its ability to monitor far larger regions than any other deployed radar system in the area, airspace monitoring is believed to represent a major portion of the new LPAR's mission.
The LPAR could also be used to monitor air and space activity well beyond Taiwan if the People's Liberation Army attacked the island. Assuming that Chinese forces disable or destroy Taiwan's SRP, the LPAR's role would then be to provide long-range coverage extending north to Japan and to the Philippines.
Lastly, China also has a political motivation to match Taiwan's huge investment in an LPAR. By doing so, Beijing demonstrates that it can win the arms race with Taipei: a move that could be part of a wider propaganda campaign to demoralise Taiwan and increase the pressure for unification.
Jane's的文章自己都说了，福建惠安的雷达朝向方位角是144度（下图中的黄线），与其到台湾铺路爪雷达的连线方向（下图中的红线）有36度的夹角。如果说福建的这个雷达是用于干扰台湾的铺路爪雷达，那么这个夹角是没必要的。况且，铺路爪雷达主要是用来探测弹道导弹目标的，仰角范围是3~85度。福建的雷达距离台湾铺路爪雷达约240 km，地平线高度差加上仰角高度约为240*(240/6370+3/180*pi)=21.6 km。显然，福建的雷达完全不在其观测角度范围内，因此也不可能对其进行干扰。
New Chinese radar may have jammed Taiwan's SRP
Richard D Fisher Jr, Washington, DC and Sean O'Connor, Indiana - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
05 June 2014
Taiwan's new USD1.38 billion long-range radar, the Surveillance Radar Programme (SRP), has been fully operational for about a year. However, China may already have the ability to interfere with its signals, according to sources in Taiwan and Washington.
Development of the SRP, which is intended to provide Taiwan with a form of "strategic depth" by providing very early warning of Chinese long-range air and missile activity, dates back to 2000 when its sale was approved by the Clinton Administration. Following repeated delays and cost overruns, Taiwanese officials revealed that it was operational in February 2013.
Taiwan's SRP is based on the Raytheon AN/FPS-115 Pave Paws large phased array radar (LPAR). Located at Loshan Mountain in Hsinchu County, Taiwan, it is reported to have a range of 5,000 km (3,100 n miles), and it is able to track a golf ball-sized target out to 3,000 km. Taiwanese officials revealed that it was able to track North Korea's 12 December 2013 satellite launch, which was about 1,800 km from Taiwan.
Satellite imagery obtained by IHS Jane's shows that China has built a large phased array radar north of Huian in Fujian Province approximately 240 km northwest of Taiwan's SRP. The Chinese radar array, constructed sometime before 2008, is similar in size to the SRP. It appears to employ a fixed array boresighted along an azimuth of approximately 144 degrees. With an assumed coverage of +/-60 degrees in azimuth, the Chinese LPAR is theoretically capable of monitoring the entire Taiwan Strait region, as well as the southern approaches to the South China Sea.
Like Taiwan's radar, the Chinese radar is located on a hill top. By matching the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) of Taiwan's radar signals the Chinese radar can interfere with the ability of the SRP to track targets. Radar pulses can be made to be very complex to avoid such interference but China can employ electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems to determine the SRP's signals.
According to a US source, the US Navy has to space its large Aegis phased array radars within a naval battlegroup in order to avoid radar interference.
A senior political source in Taiwan confirmed to IHS Jane's that China's radar has "interfered" with the SRP.
This interference is noteworthy given the LPAR's design. Two other LPARs in eastern China feature very different arrays and are believed to serve in a ballistic missile early warning or anti-satellite tracking capacity.
The different design of the LPAR at Huian - and the reports from Taiwan of interference - indicate that electronic interference represents a possible design driver for the new array that could possibly influence its location. The postulated 120 degree coverage arc of the LPAR also means it could interfere with other Taiwanese sensor systems deployed along the island's western side.
Chinese radar coverage of the Taiwan Strait region is robust, with multiple radar complexes monitoring airspace and sea traffic. This eliminates the requirement for an LPAR to solely serve as an additional monitoring station. However, given its ability to monitor far larger regions than any other deployed radar system in the area, airspace monitoring is believed to represent a major portion of the new LPAR's mission.
The LPAR could also be used to monitor air and space activity well beyond Taiwan if the People's Liberation Army attacked the island. Assuming that Chinese forces disable or destroy Taiwan's SRP, the LPAR's role would then be to provide long-range coverage extending north to Japan and to the Philippines.
Lastly, China also has a political motivation to match Taiwan's huge investment in an LPAR. By doing so, Beijing demonstrates that it can win the arms race with Taipei: a move that could be part of a wider propaganda campaign to demoralise Taiwan and increase the pressure for unification.
Jane's的文章自己都说了，福建惠安的雷达朝向方位角是144度（下图中的黄线），与其到台湾铺路爪雷达的连线方向（下图中的红线）有36度的夹角。如果说福建的这个雷达是用于干扰台湾的铺路爪雷达，那么这个夹角是没必要的。况且，铺路爪雷达主要是用来探测弹道导弹目标的，仰角范围是3~85度。福建的雷达距离台湾铺路爪雷达约240 km，地平线高度差加上仰角高度约为240*(240/6370+3/180*pi)=21.6 km。显然，福建的雷达完全不在其观测角度范围内，因此也不可能对其进行干扰。
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副业说不定
南海方向
主要还是作为反航母的一环
南海方向
主要还是作为反航母的一环
福建的雷达真的能干扰爪铺路雷达？{:soso_e140:}
不过台湾这种铺路爪雷达，放到30年前，还是很牛叉的
这是转子鼎盛航天头号大特务kktt的帖子
凤凰竹new 发表于 2014-6-8 11:31
不过台湾这种铺路爪雷达，放到30年前，还是很牛叉的
你太坏了，30年前
不过台湾这种铺路爪雷达，放到30年前，还是很牛叉的
你太坏了，30年前
http://liuqiankktt.blog.163.com/ ... 211201457111959434/原博文地址
猜想应该和新疆库尔勒那种大型相控阵雷达差不多
雷达方向不能转吗？新手觉得好奇
雷达方向不能转吗？新手觉得好奇
相控阵雷达无需转动，也就是相位可控
相控阵雷达无需转动，也就是相位可控
如果这东西不是干扰用的 那他是什么 雷达？
根据一张卫星照片，《简氏防务周刊》称，中国福建省惠安县境内某山顶上的一面巨大的相控阵雷达天线就是干扰的来源。
这一报道引起了许多猜测。有军迷拿出相关教材（可能初版于60年代）援引道：“铺路爪雷达主要是用来探测弹道导弹目标的，仰角范围是3~85度，福建的那个雷达完全不在其观测角度范围内，因此也不可能被其干扰。”据此认为惠安的设施不可能是针对“铺路爪”的对抗措施。
美国部署在本土和欧洲的铺路爪雷达监控范围
台湾乐山上的“铺路爪”雷达天线
笔者采访的几位雷达与信号处理业内人士认为，上面的说法其实没有分清雷达和激光的区别，是典型的外行错误。雷达无线电是一门外人眼中极为神秘复杂的技术，而且发展速度惊人。尤其是在最近的10年内，许多以往的“定论”早已被打破。非专业人士仍按过时的观点来看现代电子技术，自然只能得出异常离谱的结论。
自从相控阵雷达出现以来，对雷达的干扰早已经脱离了60年代那种模式。现代相控阵雷达有敏捷波束指向能力，因为它的波束指向和机械设备没有关系，转向速度非常快，传统的干扰手段作用很有限。旧时代的雷达对抗方式限制已经不具备现实意义。
从根本上来讲，干扰对方雷达，就是一个对它发射信号的过程。只要覆盖对方雷达的收束波段，给它“多余”的信号，使其将虚假的干扰信号当做真实的目标回波，就能干扰。例如美国EF-18G电子战机目前已知的一种工作模式就是录制对方的雷达信号，隔一段时间原样播放，从而使对方雷达无法正常工作。
可见，现代电子战的复杂之处不是信号的接受和发送，而主要是后端对信号的处理能力。换句话来说，干扰现代雷达，只要工作机制合适，其实从地面还是空中发射干扰信号并不是问题，发射的角度如何也并非关键，要紧的是能骗过对方的信号过滤机制。而这就要求在信号处理技术上领先于对方。因此要在对抗中占尽上风，需要技术上有跨代的优势。
美国本土的“铺路爪”雷达天线
《简氏》的报道是在知道“铺路爪”被干扰的情况下，反过来推测大陆有干扰设施，再推及惠安的雷达。可能美国人自己也在揣测我们用了什么技术手段来进行干扰。现在业界技术发展极快，双方都会有对方不清楚的新手段。
笔者采访的专家认为，惠安地区部署的系统不会直接以大型雷达作为干扰信号发射源，这个雷达还是以侦查为主。至于它的天线相对铺路爪更接近垂直，那应该是由于它要探测空中目标，而不是如铺路爪一样，主要探测太空和超高空目标。该雷达系统的指向和波瓣角度明显涵盖了整个台湾地区和南海与东南亚地区，当然并不仅仅针对铺路爪。
电子战对抗领域的技术更新很快，近10年更是突飞猛进，EA-18G可算是现在最好的电子战飞机
如果《简氏》关于干扰信号来源的信息准确，那么照片里标注为“惠安电子战设施”的那几个大型球状天线罩里的设备或许才是干扰机。而雷达除了探测空中目标外，其实也可以作为无线电信号收集装置。可以推断，该电子战系统的运作机制和大型雷达的信号波发射及其方向有一定的联动机制。可以肯定的一点是，惠安电子战系统要比铺路爪领先一代以上。在跨代的情况下，实现单盲干扰是可行的，完全可以在干扰铺路爪的同时确保自己的雷达工作正常。
基于此，我们可以做如下理解：惠安电子战设施与雷达联动，二者构成一个综合运作框架，可以称为“惠安综合电子战设施”。其任务是针对雷达工作范围内的敌对大型雷达系统进行单盲攻击，确保我方雷达正常工作的同时，迷盲对方雷达。而在它的攻击范围内，“铺路爪”很不幸地距离最近，所以首当其冲了。
“铺路爪”雷达设计的时候不可能预见现代的电子对抗技术，有一些硬伤是无法克服的。因此现在它很难摆脱惠安综合电战设施的“纠缠”。
至于美国的“宙斯盾”舰在受到干扰时关闭雷达。专家认为，某种程度上这是为避免采取对抗措施后被中国监控，泄露更多美国雷达信号特征。而另一方面的考虑则是，避免雷达在混杂性干扰源影响下的过度运作损耗。雷达接收大功率多节点的干扰信号时，它的运作负荷很大。同样，如果铺路爪雷达天天遭到拥塞性干扰，它的开机寿命也会受到很大损耗，进而增加其单元维护频率。这可以使其有效性大大降低，同时运作成本大大提高。
不过，铺路爪雷达现在是在美国人手里运行，美国在电子技术方面仍是一个强国，他们无疑会寻求应付的方法。电子战是一个变化很快的领域，双方的对抗这才刚开始。
此外，还有一点要补充，“铺路爪”设计的时候没有考虑过发射干扰信号的问题，所以如果想要和惠安综合电子战设施实现“互盲”，除了要大幅度改进“铺路爪”雷达本身，还要在旁边修建和它规模差不多大的专门干扰发射装置，将简单的预警雷达站也变成一个“综合电子对抗设施”。当然，美国会不会这么干，台湾给不给钱这么干，我们可以等着看。
这一报道引起了许多猜测。有军迷拿出相关教材（可能初版于60年代）援引道：“铺路爪雷达主要是用来探测弹道导弹目标的，仰角范围是3~85度，福建的那个雷达完全不在其观测角度范围内，因此也不可能被其干扰。”据此认为惠安的设施不可能是针对“铺路爪”的对抗措施。
美国部署在本土和欧洲的铺路爪雷达监控范围
台湾乐山上的“铺路爪”雷达天线
笔者采访的几位雷达与信号处理业内人士认为，上面的说法其实没有分清雷达和激光的区别，是典型的外行错误。雷达无线电是一门外人眼中极为神秘复杂的技术，而且发展速度惊人。尤其是在最近的10年内，许多以往的“定论”早已被打破。非专业人士仍按过时的观点来看现代电子技术，自然只能得出异常离谱的结论。
自从相控阵雷达出现以来，对雷达的干扰早已经脱离了60年代那种模式。现代相控阵雷达有敏捷波束指向能力，因为它的波束指向和机械设备没有关系，转向速度非常快，传统的干扰手段作用很有限。旧时代的雷达对抗方式限制已经不具备现实意义。
从根本上来讲，干扰对方雷达，就是一个对它发射信号的过程。只要覆盖对方雷达的收束波段，给它“多余”的信号，使其将虚假的干扰信号当做真实的目标回波，就能干扰。例如美国EF-18G电子战机目前已知的一种工作模式就是录制对方的雷达信号，隔一段时间原样播放，从而使对方雷达无法正常工作。
可见，现代电子战的复杂之处不是信号的接受和发送，而主要是后端对信号的处理能力。换句话来说，干扰现代雷达，只要工作机制合适，其实从地面还是空中发射干扰信号并不是问题，发射的角度如何也并非关键，要紧的是能骗过对方的信号过滤机制。而这就要求在信号处理技术上领先于对方。因此要在对抗中占尽上风，需要技术上有跨代的优势。
美国本土的“铺路爪”雷达天线
《简氏》的报道是在知道“铺路爪”被干扰的情况下，反过来推测大陆有干扰设施，再推及惠安的雷达。可能美国人自己也在揣测我们用了什么技术手段来进行干扰。现在业界技术发展极快，双方都会有对方不清楚的新手段。
笔者采访的专家认为，惠安地区部署的系统不会直接以大型雷达作为干扰信号发射源，这个雷达还是以侦查为主。至于它的天线相对铺路爪更接近垂直，那应该是由于它要探测空中目标，而不是如铺路爪一样，主要探测太空和超高空目标。该雷达系统的指向和波瓣角度明显涵盖了整个台湾地区和南海与东南亚地区，当然并不仅仅针对铺路爪。
电子战对抗领域的技术更新很快，近10年更是突飞猛进，EA-18G可算是现在最好的电子战飞机
如果《简氏》关于干扰信号来源的信息准确，那么照片里标注为“惠安电子战设施”的那几个大型球状天线罩里的设备或许才是干扰机。而雷达除了探测空中目标外，其实也可以作为无线电信号收集装置。可以推断，该电子战系统的运作机制和大型雷达的信号波发射及其方向有一定的联动机制。可以肯定的一点是，惠安电子战系统要比铺路爪领先一代以上。在跨代的情况下，实现单盲干扰是可行的，完全可以在干扰铺路爪的同时确保自己的雷达工作正常。
基于此，我们可以做如下理解：惠安电子战设施与雷达联动，二者构成一个综合运作框架，可以称为“惠安综合电子战设施”。其任务是针对雷达工作范围内的敌对大型雷达系统进行单盲攻击，确保我方雷达正常工作的同时，迷盲对方雷达。而在它的攻击范围内，“铺路爪”很不幸地距离最近，所以首当其冲了。
“铺路爪”雷达设计的时候不可能预见现代的电子对抗技术，有一些硬伤是无法克服的。因此现在它很难摆脱惠安综合电战设施的“纠缠”。
至于美国的“宙斯盾”舰在受到干扰时关闭雷达。专家认为，某种程度上这是为避免采取对抗措施后被中国监控，泄露更多美国雷达信号特征。而另一方面的考虑则是，避免雷达在混杂性干扰源影响下的过度运作损耗。雷达接收大功率多节点的干扰信号时，它的运作负荷很大。同样，如果铺路爪雷达天天遭到拥塞性干扰，它的开机寿命也会受到很大损耗，进而增加其单元维护频率。这可以使其有效性大大降低，同时运作成本大大提高。
不过，铺路爪雷达现在是在美国人手里运行，美国在电子技术方面仍是一个强国，他们无疑会寻求应付的方法。电子战是一个变化很快的领域，双方的对抗这才刚开始。
此外，还有一点要补充，“铺路爪”设计的时候没有考虑过发射干扰信号的问题，所以如果想要和惠安综合电子战设施实现“互盲”，除了要大幅度改进“铺路爪”雷达本身，还要在旁边修建和它规模差不多大的专门干扰发射装置，将简单的预警雷达站也变成一个“综合电子对抗设施”。当然，美国会不会这么干，台湾给不给钱这么干，我们可以等着看。
这2个雷达能直视吗，如果不能直视能绕射吗。雷达波段绕射很小吧
@小飞猪 二师兄 科普下
另外原报道中曾说，台湾用铺路爪曾经获取过朝鲜发射火箭的数据，根据其角度来看，也覆盖不了朝鲜那个方向啊，人家明明就是对着大陆的。。严重怀疑报道水分
现在这么基本的东西都必须要由KKTT这样的大学霸来科普了，可见信这个谬论的真不少。你波束根本进不了人家的主瓣，甚至副瓣都未必能进，干扰个鸡毛啊。
ww取得名字真难听，
本人姓名被抢注 发表于 2014-6-8 11:29
福建的雷达真的能干扰爪铺路雷达？
有同鞋说了 惠安 那个是 渔农处观察 太平洋 侯鸟 飞迁路线的。
工艺粗糙 频率多变分散，无意中 打扰一下也有的。
福建的雷达真的能干扰爪铺路雷达？
有同鞋说了 惠安 那个是 渔农处观察 太平洋 侯鸟 飞迁路线的。
工艺粗糙 频率多变分散，无意中 打扰一下也有的。
福建惠安的雷达站和台湾乐山的雷达站海拔高度分别是730m和2600m，经过计算，在245 km距离上两者刚好能够相互看到。但是乐山雷达的仰角是3度以上，一般雷达主瓣的波束宽度是2~3度，因此惠安的雷达波肯定无法进入其主瓣。相控阵雷达的一大特点就是低副瓣，国外先进的相控阵雷达已经可以做到副瓣电平比主瓣峰值低40~50dB以上，在遇到干扰源时还可以采用特定方向的副瓣调零技术。因此惠安雷达发出的干扰信号即使能够进入乐山雷达的副瓣（还只是某些特定观测角度时），其干扰效果也是令人怀疑的。
那么，应该如何干扰地基预警监视雷达？一般使用空基平台（有人或无人电子战飞机、浮空器等）携带电子干扰机。空基平台的好处是位置高且位置可变。比如铺路爪在200 km距离远处可观测目标最低高度为10480 m（3度仰角），只有飞机或飞艇才能到达。当敌方雷达在低仰角扫描时，我方干扰机可以直接进入敌方雷达的主瓣进行干扰压制，并不断变换位置，极大的限制敌方雷达的可用扫描范围。当敌方雷达在高仰角扫描时，我方干扰机可针对敌方雷达的副瓣方向进行定向压制，以掩护主瓣方向上的我方目标。
福建惠安的雷达站和台湾乐山的雷达站海拔高度分别是730m和2600m，经过计算，在245 km距离上两者刚好能够相互看到。但是乐山雷达的仰角是3度以上，一般雷达主瓣的波束宽度是2~3度，因此惠安的雷达波肯定无法进入其主瓣。相控阵雷达的一大特点就是低副瓣，国外先进的相控阵雷达已经可以做到副瓣电平比主瓣峰值低40~50dB以上，在遇到干扰源时还可以采用特定方向的副瓣调零技术。因此惠安雷达发出的干扰信号即使能够进入乐山雷达的副瓣（还只是某些特定观测角度时），其干扰效果也是令人怀疑的。
那么，应该如何干扰地基预警监视雷达？一般使用空基平台（有人或无人电子战飞机、浮空器等）携带电子干扰机。空基平台的好处是位置高且位置可变。比如铺路爪在200 km距离远处可观测目标最低高度为10480 m（3度仰角），只有飞机或飞艇才能到达。当敌方雷达在低仰角扫描时，我方干扰机可以直接进入敌方雷达的主瓣进行干扰压制，并不断变换位置，极大的限制敌方雷达的可用扫描范围。当敌方雷达在高仰角扫描时，我方干扰机可针对敌方雷达的副瓣方向进行定向压制，以掩护主瓣方向上的我方目标。
如果旁瓣比主瓣低50dB；其实这个参数很值得怀疑，因为铺路爪这个东西我起码30年前就听说过了。能有50dB？
如果对方的雷达是无源相控阵，观测2500公里以外目标，发送的无线信号按照自由空间传播，传输的距离是我方雷达距离铺路爪的20倍，能量相差400倍，换算成对数就是26db。
我方干扰机是主动相控证体制，后研制列装，功率强大，就算功率相同，所有能量集中为一个方向，应该有20db以上的增益。此时对方接收机的信噪比时1:1.对于雷达来说应该不高了。
其实30米的大锅，其增益就是35dB了。
光看方向角和旁瓣，而不关注信噪比是不对的。这是原则性的错误。
如果旁瓣比主瓣低50dB；其实这个参数很值得怀疑，因为铺路爪这个东西我起码30年前就听说过了。能有50dB？
如果对方的雷达是无源相控阵，观测2500公里以外目标，发送的无线信号按照自由空间传播，传输的距离是我方雷达距离铺路爪的20倍，能量相差400倍，换算成对数就是26db。
我方干扰机是主动相控证体制，后研制列装，功率强大，就算功率相同，所有能量集中为一个方向，应该有20db以上的增益。此时对方接收机的信噪比时1:1.对于雷达来说应该不高了。
其实30米的大锅，其增益就是35dB了。
光看方向角和旁瓣，而不关注信噪比是不对的。这是原则性的错误。
zhangee 发表于 2014-6-8 14:47
如果旁瓣比主瓣低50dB；其实这个参数很值得怀疑，因为铺路爪这个东西我起码30年前就听说过了。能有50dB？
...
地基固定干扰源的问题在于，如果对方知道你的位置，可以把你这个方向的副瓣调零（代价是增加其他方向的副瓣），使你根本无法干扰他。所以要么对主瓣干扰，要么用机动式干扰机对副瓣干扰，最合适的平台都是飞机。
如果旁瓣比主瓣低50dB；其实这个参数很值得怀疑，因为铺路爪这个东西我起码30年前就听说过了。能有50dB？
...
地基固定干扰源的问题在于，如果对方知道你的位置，可以把你这个方向的副瓣调零（代价是增加其他方向的副瓣），使你根本无法干扰他。所以要么对主瓣干扰，要么用机动式干扰机对副瓣干扰，最合适的平台都是飞机。
福建惠安的雷达站和台湾乐山的雷达站海拔高度分别是730m和2600m，经过计算，在245 km距离上两者刚好能够相 ...
是旁边的那几个球球启干扰运用吧
是旁边的那几个球球启干扰运用吧
六千 发表于 2014-6-8 14:59
地基固定干扰源的问题在于，如果对方知道你的位置，可以把你这个方向的副瓣调零（代价是增加其他方向的副 ...
只要选择得当，主瓣这边他就瞎了。
另外，我是搞无线的，但不是搞雷达的，对你说调零深表怀疑。器件的不一致性，数字化之后带来的噪声，都会使调零无法真能做到。尤其是大功率的器件，大面积分布的这种东西。
地基固定干扰源的问题在于，如果对方知道你的位置，可以把你这个方向的副瓣调零（代价是增加其他方向的副 ...
只要选择得当，主瓣这边他就瞎了。
另外，我是搞无线的，但不是搞雷达的，对你说调零深表怀疑。器件的不一致性，数字化之后带来的噪声，都会使调零无法真能做到。尤其是大功率的器件，大面积分布的这种东西。
六千 发表于 2014-6-8 14:59
地基固定干扰源的问题在于，如果对方知道你的位置，可以把你这个方向的副瓣调零（代价是增加其他方向的副 ...
这么简单的话，舰载雷达/雷达干扰系统、地基雷达/雷达干扰系统，不是无法对敌雷达实施干扰了？
地基固定干扰源的问题在于，如果对方知道你的位置，可以把你这个方向的副瓣调零（代价是增加其他方向的副 ...
这么简单的话，舰载雷达/雷达干扰系统、地基雷达/雷达干扰系统，不是无法对敌雷达实施干扰了？
我往天上打，利用空气和电离层散射，只要功率足够，主瓣也能覆盖。如果散射不足，我弄几个热气球挂着角反射器可以不可以，我用飞机撒铝箔可不可以
我往天上打，利用空气和电离层散射，只要功率足够，主瓣也能覆盖。如果散射不足，我弄几个热气球挂着角反射器可以不可以，我用飞机撒铝箔可不可以
鹅是进来学习滴，书到用时方很少啊。
这个雷达对付的是300战斧，但是要说干扰，还不如派电子战机去效率来的高
地基固定干扰源的问题在于，如果对方知道你的位置，可以把你这个方向的副瓣调零（代价是增加其他方向的副 ...
是K大吧。佳木斯的大家伙为什么朝北啊。对美国陆基导弹预警？美国洲际导弹打中国也走北极？
是K大吧。佳木斯的大家伙为什么朝北啊。对美国陆基导弹预警？美国洲际导弹打中国也走北极？
干扰是从副瓣进入，铺路爪工作在分米波，他在这个频段做不到超低副瓣，副瓣调零要采用数字波束形成技术与自适应阵列处理，铺路爪还达不到这个技术水平，土共用雷达作干扰机，有很大的功率孔径积，它的干扰能力不是机载干扰机所能比的。
铺路爪用增程WS-2火箭弹能灭掉么？
此帖才是超大的好帖啊，知识库，学习了。
DDG055A 发表于 2014-6-8 21:20
铺路爪用增程WS-2火箭弹能灭掉么？
df15，df11和你有仇吗？
铺路爪用增程WS-2火箭弹能灭掉么？
df15，df11和你有仇吗？
这玩意有没有办法做到 集中大功率干扰 把它零部件烧坏？
uyyyn 发表于 2014-6-8 21:49
df15，df11和你有仇吗？
胸蒂，你这就不懂了
PLA喜欢玩火箭弹，无论是海军空军还是陆军
df15，df11和你有仇吗？
胸蒂，你这就不懂了
PLA喜欢玩火箭弹，无论是海军空军还是陆军
导弹直接搞定的问题，需要这么复杂？