超级军网《外交家》杂志：当英国皇家海军重返亚太
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 12:09:02
外交家杂志：Navies of the World: The Royal Navy in the Pacific（行驶在太平洋上的英国皇家海军）
作者： James R. Holmes（美国海军学院战略学教授，外交家杂志防务专家，美国中印战略问题专家）
《英国海洋战略白皮书》于上周发布：英国皇家海军将重返印度-太平洋地区
一支规模中上的皇家海军，用有限的资源和力量维系着英帝国的全球利益以及它遍布世界超过 600 万平方公里的海域，除美国之外的世界任何一个国家，仍然没有其他力量可以超越。
直到今天，在这片英国已没有多大利益的印度-太平洋海域，仍然发挥着皇家海军的影响力，遍布诸如波斯湾，阿拉伯海，东南亚，亚丁湾，红海，几内亚湾，苏伊士运河等亚洲重要关口。
http //thediplomat com/2014/05/navies-of-the-world-the-royal-navy-in-the-pacific/
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外交家杂志：Navies of the World: The Royal Navy in the Pacific（行驶在太平洋上的英国皇家海军）
作者： James R. Holmes（美国海军学院战略学教授，外交家杂志防务专家，美国中印战略问题专家）
《英国海洋战略白皮书》于上周发布：英国皇家海军将重返印度-太平洋地区
一支规模中上的皇家海军，用有限的资源和力量维系着英帝国的全球利益以及它遍布世界超过 600 万平方公里的海域，除美国之外的世界任何一个国家，仍然没有其他力量可以超越。
直到今天，在这片英国已没有多大利益的印度-太平洋海域，仍然发挥着皇家海军的影响力，遍布诸如波斯湾，阿拉伯海，东南亚，亚丁湾，红海，几内亚湾，苏伊士运河等亚洲重要关口。
http //thediplomat com/2014/05/navies-of-the-world-the-royal-navy-in-the-pacific/
落日余辉无限好，只是夕阳近黄昏
如果没有美国……
如果没有美国的话英国海军的传统影响力的确无人匹敌...但是实力也就那样了...高不成低不就的...
大阴蒂国也就是怀念一下当年了，就现在这点兵力，还想满世界巡游
欢迎烧钱啊
本子就能把他搞出翔来。
一看这个ID和注册日期，再看又是来吹嘘鸦片贩子的，就长了了心眼。
首先，截屏记录。不要想赖。
一看这个ID和注册日期，再看又是来吹嘘鸦片贩子的，就长了了心眼。
首先，截屏记录。不要想赖。
没有美国撑腰
英国也就二等强国。
海军实力，和我们差不多的
英国也就二等强国。
海军实力，和我们差不多的
真到东亚，中日韩随便哪个都能把它爆出翔来。
吃老本和有英吉列海峡而已
这些话等航母服役了再说吧，现在就6艘45和一些23，能有多少实力？
只不过落日下一抹余辉罢了！
其次，到链接网站找原文，地址如下，http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/n ... avy-in-the-pacific/，原文内容转帖如下，以便辨析：
RESOLVED: that this column shall undertake an occasional series on Asia-Pacific Indo-Pacific Indo-Asia-Pacific sea powers not named China, Japan, or the United States. Starting forthwith.
And why not start with the Royal Navy? The 2013-2014 academic year is drawing to a close, and by happenstance it’s been my year of the British Empire. I served on a panel with the current First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir George Zambellas, last fall in Australia, and on another alongside his predecessor, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, last week in Singapore. Throw in a quick Canadian trip, and that’s a decent grand tour of the erstwhile imperium on which the sun never set.
But, you protest, isn’t today’s Royal Navy the merest shadow of the hegemon that once ruled the waves? Didn’t London throw in the towel on the Indian and Pacific oceans decades ago, withdrawing from east of Suez when it could no longer afford a fleet big enough to concentrate meaningful power along the Eurasian rimlands? Isn’t it starving the surface fleet of shipbuilding funds to bankroll nuclear submarines and a couple of flattops? Hasn’t the gulf separating ends from means — and mismatched priorities within those means — reduced the Royal Navy to a boutique navy composed of a handful of sexy platforms and not much else — a force with little punch outside Europe? All true, arguably. Britain looks like a post-Mahanian sea power.
And yet. Just last week the U.K. government published a National Strategy for Maritime Security worthy of a nation with Great Britain’s seafaring past. Give it a read. Then let’s probe the document to see how a middle power like the United Kingdom means to wring maximum value from sparse assets and manpower. For fun, we might also juxtapose it against the U.S. Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Maybe our Global Force for Good can learn a thing or two about how to make and execute strategy on a shoestring.
Now, in case you haven’t noticed, the Naval Diplomat is a patriot, glad that Washington, Greene & the Boys gave those Redcoats a good thrashing awhile back. (For a scrupulously accurate retelling, look here. But one passage in particular from the National Strategy for Maritime Security should warm the heart of any ‘Mercan sailor. Our European friends are forever clamoring to know how they can support the U.S. pivot to Asia. David Cameron’s government supplies a welcome answer: by “developing the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of allies and partners in areas of political, military, or economic importance, including South-East Asia, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea.” And, potentially, by taking more direct measures to safeguard shipping passing through those waterways.
In short, British mariners will help others help themselves while rendering direct help in times of need. In so doing they will lighten the load on outsiders, who often find themselves policing developing nations’ offshore environs. By helping coastal states become fully sovereign — sovereignty connoting control of territory, first and foremost — European navies can perform yeoman service to the common interest in free navigation. Equipping local coast guards and navies for constabulary duty spares others — the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, even Russia and China — from having to crack down on Captain Jack Sparrow or A. Q. Khan in places like the Gulf of Aden or Gulf of Guinea.
That’s much-needed relief. The British strategy also implies a geographic division of labor whereby middleweight and small sea services take charge of relatively tranquil expanses. Their shouldering constabulary duty frees heavy U.S. Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard forces for action in more menacing waters such as the Persian Gulf, Bay of Bengal, and Western Pacific. (It’s worth noting, moreover, that the French Navy flattop Charles de Gaulle has roamed the Indian Ocean as of late. Paris, it seems, is taking on a share of the load as well. Here’s hoping burden-sharing keeps trending!) From a purely parochial standpoint, what’s not to like?
The coalition, geographic, and functional dimensions of the Maritime Security Strategy are what piqued my interest. But a few other aspects warrant mentioning for the sake of completeness. First, unlike the 2007 U.S. Maritime Strategy, which was signed out by the uniformed service chiefs, the British strategy bears the signatures of civilian political officials. That puts the Cameron government’s stamp of approval on the document. Which is a good and potentially a bad thing: it telegraphs that all agencies responsible for seagoing affairs will pool expertise and resources in a common, government-spanning effort. If and when the Conservative government falls, however, the strategy could find itself discarded along with other policies. The U.S. strategy endured a change of administrations precisely because it was seen as an apolitical document, not an artifact of the Bush administration. The Maritime Security Strategy’s longevity could prove ephemeral.
Second, the strategy’s framers outline an action/reaction cycle for British involvement in high-seas contingencies. Officialdom and mariners, they say, will Understand, Influence, Prevent, Protect, and Respond to events deemed potentially troublesome. The logic is sound. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Two observations about this. One may be trivial. Understanding what’s transpiring in the maritime domain bespeaks a fuller net assessment than the corresponding American jargon, maritime domain awareness. Awareness connotes gathering data, understanding a higher-order grasp of the situation. A linguistic distinction without a difference? Maybe, maybe not.
The other observation: postulating a cycle from understanding the situation to responding to it implies linear, sequential thinking and action. Consequently, one hopes U.K. officials won’t interpret their strategic guidance too literally. Like the intelligence cycle (Planning and Direction, Collection, Processing, Analysis and Production, and Dissemination) or John Boyd’s decision cycle (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act), the British cycle is, or should be, in perpetual motion. It’s not a checklist. And like Boyd’s OODA loop, events could compress the maritime-security cycle into a short time indeed. Dexterity of mind and deed is crucial when you’re a middleweight like Great Britain, with broad national interests and exceedingly finite resources to uphold those interests.
Lastly (for now), and strikingly, the Maritime Security Strategy explicitly endorses conscripting private security firms as an ally in the fight for oceanic law and order. I will never forget spring 2009, when — while briefing the commanders of Operation Atalanta at The Hague — I suggested arming merchantmen to stave off Somali piracy. Hired guns were among my options. The response was something to behold, and not in a congratulatory way. It appears reality has set in since then. What Europeans once saw as trigger-happy cowboy diplomacy has become accepted wisdom — in some pockets of maritime Europe, at any rate. Welcome to the Wild West, folks.
All in all, the National Strategy for Maritime Security is a nifty piece of work. Still, it’s just a piece of parchment. Making strategy is not the same as executing it. As with all great enterprises, then, the devil broods in the details. It will be worth monitoring how the United Kingdom fares in this one in the coming years. London’s strategy could become a template for other middle powers.
RESOLVED: that this column shall undertake an occasional series on Asia-Pacific Indo-Pacific Indo-Asia-Pacific sea powers not named China, Japan, or the United States. Starting forthwith.
And why not start with the Royal Navy? The 2013-2014 academic year is drawing to a close, and by happenstance it’s been my year of the British Empire. I served on a panel with the current First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir George Zambellas, last fall in Australia, and on another alongside his predecessor, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, last week in Singapore. Throw in a quick Canadian trip, and that’s a decent grand tour of the erstwhile imperium on which the sun never set.
But, you protest, isn’t today’s Royal Navy the merest shadow of the hegemon that once ruled the waves? Didn’t London throw in the towel on the Indian and Pacific oceans decades ago, withdrawing from east of Suez when it could no longer afford a fleet big enough to concentrate meaningful power along the Eurasian rimlands? Isn’t it starving the surface fleet of shipbuilding funds to bankroll nuclear submarines and a couple of flattops? Hasn’t the gulf separating ends from means — and mismatched priorities within those means — reduced the Royal Navy to a boutique navy composed of a handful of sexy platforms and not much else — a force with little punch outside Europe? All true, arguably. Britain looks like a post-Mahanian sea power.
And yet. Just last week the U.K. government published a National Strategy for Maritime Security worthy of a nation with Great Britain’s seafaring past. Give it a read. Then let’s probe the document to see how a middle power like the United Kingdom means to wring maximum value from sparse assets and manpower. For fun, we might also juxtapose it against the U.S. Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Maybe our Global Force for Good can learn a thing or two about how to make and execute strategy on a shoestring.
Now, in case you haven’t noticed, the Naval Diplomat is a patriot, glad that Washington, Greene & the Boys gave those Redcoats a good thrashing awhile back. (For a scrupulously accurate retelling, look here. But one passage in particular from the National Strategy for Maritime Security should warm the heart of any ‘Mercan sailor. Our European friends are forever clamoring to know how they can support the U.S. pivot to Asia. David Cameron’s government supplies a welcome answer: by “developing the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of allies and partners in areas of political, military, or economic importance, including South-East Asia, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea.” And, potentially, by taking more direct measures to safeguard shipping passing through those waterways.
In short, British mariners will help others help themselves while rendering direct help in times of need. In so doing they will lighten the load on outsiders, who often find themselves policing developing nations’ offshore environs. By helping coastal states become fully sovereign — sovereignty connoting control of territory, first and foremost — European navies can perform yeoman service to the common interest in free navigation. Equipping local coast guards and navies for constabulary duty spares others — the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, even Russia and China — from having to crack down on Captain Jack Sparrow or A. Q. Khan in places like the Gulf of Aden or Gulf of Guinea.
That’s much-needed relief. The British strategy also implies a geographic division of labor whereby middleweight and small sea services take charge of relatively tranquil expanses. Their shouldering constabulary duty frees heavy U.S. Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard forces for action in more menacing waters such as the Persian Gulf, Bay of Bengal, and Western Pacific. (It’s worth noting, moreover, that the French Navy flattop Charles de Gaulle has roamed the Indian Ocean as of late. Paris, it seems, is taking on a share of the load as well. Here’s hoping burden-sharing keeps trending!) From a purely parochial standpoint, what’s not to like?
The coalition, geographic, and functional dimensions of the Maritime Security Strategy are what piqued my interest. But a few other aspects warrant mentioning for the sake of completeness. First, unlike the 2007 U.S. Maritime Strategy, which was signed out by the uniformed service chiefs, the British strategy bears the signatures of civilian political officials. That puts the Cameron government’s stamp of approval on the document. Which is a good and potentially a bad thing: it telegraphs that all agencies responsible for seagoing affairs will pool expertise and resources in a common, government-spanning effort. If and when the Conservative government falls, however, the strategy could find itself discarded along with other policies. The U.S. strategy endured a change of administrations precisely because it was seen as an apolitical document, not an artifact of the Bush administration. The Maritime Security Strategy’s longevity could prove ephemeral.
Second, the strategy’s framers outline an action/reaction cycle for British involvement in high-seas contingencies. Officialdom and mariners, they say, will Understand, Influence, Prevent, Protect, and Respond to events deemed potentially troublesome. The logic is sound. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Two observations about this. One may be trivial. Understanding what’s transpiring in the maritime domain bespeaks a fuller net assessment than the corresponding American jargon, maritime domain awareness. Awareness connotes gathering data, understanding a higher-order grasp of the situation. A linguistic distinction without a difference? Maybe, maybe not.
The other observation: postulating a cycle from understanding the situation to responding to it implies linear, sequential thinking and action. Consequently, one hopes U.K. officials won’t interpret their strategic guidance too literally. Like the intelligence cycle (Planning and Direction, Collection, Processing, Analysis and Production, and Dissemination) or John Boyd’s decision cycle (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act), the British cycle is, or should be, in perpetual motion. It’s not a checklist. And like Boyd’s OODA loop, events could compress the maritime-security cycle into a short time indeed. Dexterity of mind and deed is crucial when you’re a middleweight like Great Britain, with broad national interests and exceedingly finite resources to uphold those interests.
Lastly (for now), and strikingly, the Maritime Security Strategy explicitly endorses conscripting private security firms as an ally in the fight for oceanic law and order. I will never forget spring 2009, when — while briefing the commanders of Operation Atalanta at The Hague — I suggested arming merchantmen to stave off Somali piracy. Hired guns were among my options. The response was something to behold, and not in a congratulatory way. It appears reality has set in since then. What Europeans once saw as trigger-happy cowboy diplomacy has become accepted wisdom — in some pockets of maritime Europe, at any rate. Welcome to the Wild West, folks.
All in all, the National Strategy for Maritime Security is a nifty piece of work. Still, it’s just a piece of parchment. Making strategy is not the same as executing it. As with all great enterprises, then, the devil broods in the details. It will be worth monitoring how the United Kingdom fares in this one in the coming years. London’s strategy could become a template for other middle powers.
忽悠，接着忽悠。
约翰牛有银子烧吗
牛牛“重返亚太”来旅游吗？
原文中，提到亚丁湾的就2处：
1. Our European friends are forever clamoring to know how they can support the U.S. pivot to Asia.David Cameron’s government supplies a welcome answer: by “developing the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of allies and partners in areas of political, military, or economic importance, including South-East Asia, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea.”
大意：我们的欧洲朋友总是嚷嚷着想知道他们如何才能配合美国的重返亚洲政策。戴维卡梅伦政府提供了一个受欢迎的回答：“发展海事治理能力以及作为盟国和伙伴，发展在政治，军事或经济重要性上的能力，包括东南亚，波斯湾和阿拉伯海，亚丁湾，红海，地中海，加勒比海和几内亚湾的。”
2.In short, British mariners will help others help themselves while rendering direct help in times of need. In so doing they will lighten the load on outsiders, who often find themselves policing developing nations’ offshore environs. By helping coastal states become fully sovereign — sovereignty connoting control of territory, first and foremost — European navies can perform yeoman service to the common interest in free navigation. Equipping local coast guards and navies for constabulary duty spares others — the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, even Russia and China — from having to crack down on Captain Jack Sparrow or A. Q. Khan in places like the Gulf of Aden or Gulf of Guinea.
大意：简总之，当英国水手将通过帮助别人来帮助自己，通过在比别人需要时候提供直接帮助。他们这么做，将减轻外界负载，（所谓外界这个势力）经常发现自己作为“警察”在处理发展中国家海岸事务。通过帮助沿海国家行使完全主权-首先也是最重要的，包括对于主权区域的控制-欧洲海军可以为自由世界的共同利益提供警察服务。包括美国，欧洲，日本，韩国，甚至俄罗斯和中国在内，可以为当地海岸警卫队和海军提供可以履行警察职责的装备，可以在像亚丁和几内亚湾这样的区域来共同打击杰克斯派洛船长（电影《加勒比海盗》的主角，在此喻意海盗行为）或卡迪尔汗。
原文中，提到苏伊士运河仅一处，就是开头，质疑英国现在海洋影响力那段：
Didn’t London throw in the towel on the Indian and Pacific oceans decades ago, withdrawing from east of Suez when it could no longer afford a fleet big enough to concentrate meaningful power along the Eurasian rimlands?
大意：难道伦敦不是已经在几十年前在印度洋和大平洋上认输了，从苏伊士运河以东撤出势力，因为英国已经无力再在欧亚大陆边缘承担起一支强大到有足够意义的舰队了。
以上提到亚丁湾的1,2两点，均无楼主说的“直到今天，在这片英国已没有多大利益的印度-太平洋海域，仍然发挥着皇家海军的影响力，遍布诸如波斯湾，阿拉伯海，东南亚，亚丁湾，红海，几内亚湾，苏伊士运河等亚洲重要关口。”。楼主是在造谣，替鸦片国捧臭脚。
3.更重要的是，全文上下，根本没有一句楼主吹嘘的，“一支规模中上的皇家海军，用有限的资源和力量维系着英帝国的全球利益以及它遍布世界超过 600 万平方公里的海域，除美国之外的世界任何一个国家，仍然没有其他力量可以超越。”更可笑的是，里面连“600”这个数字都没有，造假造谣也要有点职业道德是不是啊。
总而言之，这个ID为：Hermajesty（ID就充满了跪舔鸦片国的味道）发的这篇帖子，是以真实存在的英文网站帖子为幌子，挂羊头，卖狗肉，利用一般网友不愿意看原文，不愿意翻译，这样一个心理，来捏造事实，夹带私货，编造谣言，用来为英国，这个在历史上充满了殖民主义罪恶的夕阳国家来进行无耻吹捧、跪舔。根据当天注册ID，为英国捧臭脚这一系列特点，其不过是CHE在站务版举报的，“[已跟进] 有人批量伪造外电新闻，持续时间长达一年多”http://lt.cjdby.net/thread-1849140-1-1.html，最新的一个马甲罢了。
请大家擦亮眼睛，明辨是非，一起举报，抵制这种为鸦片国吹捧的行为！
原文中，提到亚丁湾的就2处：
1. Our European friends are forever clamoring to know how they can support the U.S. pivot to Asia.David Cameron’s government supplies a welcome answer: by “developing the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of allies and partners in areas of political, military, or economic importance, including South-East Asia, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea.”
大意：我们的欧洲朋友总是嚷嚷着想知道他们如何才能配合美国的重返亚洲政策。戴维卡梅伦政府提供了一个受欢迎的回答：“发展海事治理能力以及作为盟国和伙伴，发展在政治，军事或经济重要性上的能力，包括东南亚，波斯湾和阿拉伯海，亚丁湾，红海，地中海，加勒比海和几内亚湾的。”
2.In short, British mariners will help others help themselves while rendering direct help in times of need. In so doing they will lighten the load on outsiders, who often find themselves policing developing nations’ offshore environs. By helping coastal states become fully sovereign — sovereignty connoting control of territory, first and foremost — European navies can perform yeoman service to the common interest in free navigation. Equipping local coast guards and navies for constabulary duty spares others — the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, even Russia and China — from having to crack down on Captain Jack Sparrow or A. Q. Khan in places like the Gulf of Aden or Gulf of Guinea.
大意：简总之，当英国水手将通过帮助别人来帮助自己，通过在比别人需要时候提供直接帮助。他们这么做，将减轻外界负载，（所谓外界这个势力）经常发现自己作为“警察”在处理发展中国家海岸事务。通过帮助沿海国家行使完全主权-首先也是最重要的，包括对于主权区域的控制-欧洲海军可以为自由世界的共同利益提供警察服务。包括美国，欧洲，日本，韩国，甚至俄罗斯和中国在内，可以为当地海岸警卫队和海军提供可以履行警察职责的装备，可以在像亚丁和几内亚湾这样的区域来共同打击杰克斯派洛船长（电影《加勒比海盗》的主角，在此喻意海盗行为）或卡迪尔汗。
原文中，提到苏伊士运河仅一处，就是开头，质疑英国现在海洋影响力那段：
Didn’t London throw in the towel on the Indian and Pacific oceans decades ago, withdrawing from east of Suez when it could no longer afford a fleet big enough to concentrate meaningful power along the Eurasian rimlands?
大意：难道伦敦不是已经在几十年前在印度洋和大平洋上认输了，从苏伊士运河以东撤出势力，因为英国已经无力再在欧亚大陆边缘承担起一支强大到有足够意义的舰队了。
以上提到亚丁湾的1,2两点，均无楼主说的“直到今天，在这片英国已没有多大利益的印度-太平洋海域，仍然发挥着皇家海军的影响力，遍布诸如波斯湾，阿拉伯海，东南亚，亚丁湾，红海，几内亚湾，苏伊士运河等亚洲重要关口。”。楼主是在造谣，替鸦片国捧臭脚。
3.更重要的是，全文上下，根本没有一句楼主吹嘘的，“一支规模中上的皇家海军，用有限的资源和力量维系着英帝国的全球利益以及它遍布世界超过 600 万平方公里的海域，除美国之外的世界任何一个国家，仍然没有其他力量可以超越。”更可笑的是，里面连“600”这个数字都没有，造假造谣也要有点职业道德是不是啊。
总而言之，这个ID为：Hermajesty（ID就充满了跪舔鸦片国的味道）发的这篇帖子，是以真实存在的英文网站帖子为幌子，挂羊头，卖狗肉，利用一般网友不愿意看原文，不愿意翻译，这样一个心理，来捏造事实，夹带私货，编造谣言，用来为英国，这个在历史上充满了殖民主义罪恶的夕阳国家来进行无耻吹捧、跪舔。根据当天注册ID，为英国捧臭脚这一系列特点，其不过是CHE在站务版举报的，“[已跟进] 有人批量伪造外电新闻，持续时间长达一年多”http://lt.cjdby.net/thread-1849140-1-1.html，最新的一个马甲罢了。
请大家擦亮眼睛，明辨是非，一起举报，抵制这种为鸦片国吹捧的行为！
啊最美不过夕阳红……～～～
其实我还挺想看看未来中国海军在印度洋上将001A 小平顶 055 052C/D 054A/B一字排开围观牛牛舰队的场景。。。
这个世界怎么了，都拿自己挺当回事的
可以来 欢迎跳脚
现在养成了先看注册日期的习惯
楼主是利用英文原文，编造了原文中完全没有的内容。
请大家看我18楼的辨析。
请大家都去http://lt.cjdby.net/forum.php?mo ... ;extra=#pid56765716举报
请大家看我18楼的辨析。
请大家都去http://lt.cjdby.net/forum.php?mo ... ;extra=#pid56765716举报
大阴蒂跟美爹一样
面对盎格鲁全球势力的崩盘，开始老夫聊发少年狂
连苏格兰都要独立了，家门口事情大阴蒂不管，万里之外找存在感
牛牛和美爹疯的一模一样
面对盎格鲁全球势力的崩盘，开始老夫聊发少年狂
连苏格兰都要独立了，家门口事情大阴蒂不管，万里之外找存在感
牛牛和美爹疯的一模一样
鸦片国能实控的地方太少了
现在英国海军实力还剩多少呢？
我爱琪琪 发表于 2014-5-31 16:43
原文中，提到亚丁湾的就2处：
1. Our European friends are forever clamoring to know how they can supp ...
就要这样 不停的扇.
原文中，提到亚丁湾的就2处：
1. Our European friends are forever clamoring to know how they can supp ...
就要这样 不停的扇.
地球够大，啥人都有。
也就欺负欺负西班牙还行
漏斗子 发表于 2014-5-31 16:40
牛牛“重返亚太”来旅游吗？
重返亚太，来考古的。
牛牛“重返亚太”来旅游吗？
重返亚太，来考古的。
凤59天 发表于 2014-5-31 16:45
啊最美不过夕阳红……～～～
还夕阳啊，早就黑夜了。现在牛牛就是白头鹰的跟班。
啊最美不过夕阳红……～～～
还夕阳啊，早就黑夜了。现在牛牛就是白头鹰的跟班。
无可奈何花落去
我爱琪琪 发表于 2014-5-31 16:22
其次，到链接网站找原文，地址如下，http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/navies-of-the-world-the-royal-navy- ...
我正想问你为什么要截屏，现在明白了，支持辟谣打脸。
PS：没看全文，但原文最后一段已经是挖苦和讽刺了。
其次，到链接网站找原文，地址如下，http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/navies-of-the-world-the-royal-navy- ...
我正想问你为什么要截屏，现在明白了，支持辟谣打脸。
PS：没看全文，但原文最后一段已经是挖苦和讽刺了。
老黄瓜刷绿漆
楼主你这个造谣作假的骗子你知道你为什么这么容易被广大网友群众揭穿吗？
很简单，你时时刻刻强调着你那个鸦片国除了美国外它就是第二，无人能及，可这偏偏和广大群众对客观世界的朴素认知背道而驰，所以不管你怎么隐藏，只要你一造谣，大家就会犯嘀咕，这鸦片国真这么好，起了疑心自然就回去核实，假的成不了真，所以你被揭穿那是必然的。
从你那鸦片国的老佛爷无可奈何地将原本应该在斯卡帕湾内进行的登基60周年阅舰式变成了在泰晤士河上“千艘游艇”-其实是包括皮划子在内-闹剧，大家就知道了，无可奈何花落去，这鸦片国是药丸！你啊，随便你再怎么吹捧，捧臭脚，都已经改变不了这药丸的事实了，相反，只能更加反衬出鸦片国的可笑，只能沦落到由你这样的跳梁小丑当吹鼓手了，真所谓的“不怕神一样的对手，就怕猪一样的队友”啊。
楼主你这个造谣作假的骗子你知道你为什么这么容易被广大网友群众揭穿吗？
很简单，你时时刻刻强调着你那个鸦片国除了美国外它就是第二，无人能及，可这偏偏和广大群众对客观世界的朴素认知背道而驰，所以不管你怎么隐藏，只要你一造谣，大家就会犯嘀咕，这鸦片国真这么好，起了疑心自然就回去核实，假的成不了真，所以你被揭穿那是必然的。
从你那鸦片国的老佛爷无可奈何地将原本应该在斯卡帕湾内进行的登基60周年阅舰式变成了在泰晤士河上“千艘游艇”-其实是包括皮划子在内-闹剧，大家就知道了，无可奈何花落去，这鸦片国是药丸！你啊，随便你再怎么吹捧，捧臭脚，都已经改变不了这药丸的事实了，相反，只能更加反衬出鸦片国的可笑，只能沦落到由你这样的跳梁小丑当吹鼓手了，真所谓的“不怕神一样的对手，就怕猪一样的队友”啊。
请大家都来举报楼主这个造谣制作假新闻，为鸦片国当吹鼓手的骗子！
果然欢乐多啊。
又见LZ这个谣B……
欢迎阿猫阿狗回来