超级军网【联合国新闻】纳粹的智能炸弹启发了中国的反舰导弹DF21 ...
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 02:35:37
链接：https://medium.com/war-is-boring/f826cfac42b
标题：The Nazi Smart Bombs That Inspired China’s Ship-Killing Missiles -DF21D
纳粹的智能炸弹启发了中国的反舰导弹 DF21D
正文：Germany’s secret weapons threatened warships 70years before China’s carrier-killers
德国能威胁战舰的秘密武器比中国的航母杀手早70年
What is that strange bomb in the sky?
空中那奇怪的炸弹是什么？
That’s what the sailors of the Italian battleship Roma must have wondered inthe final moments before they died.
这一定是意大利罗马号战列舰的船员们临死前的疑问。
Navalwarfare changed on Sept. 9, 1943. Dictator Benito Mussolini had beendeposed, the new Italian government was abandoning a lost war and its doomed Nazially and the Italian fleet was sailing to Malta to surrender. Butthe habitually treacherous Nazis, who had always suspected their Italian alliesof similar trickery, detected the Italian ships leaving port.
1943年9月9日这一天改变了海战。法西斯独裁者墨索里尼宣布新意大利政府放弃这场失败的战争，这昭示了纳粹盟友的覆灭，意大利的舰队开赴马耳他投降。然而生性狡诈的纳粹，总是怀疑，意大利的盟友在耍相似的把戏，侦测到了意大利船舶离港。
The Luftwaffe dispatched a force of Dornier Do-217 bombersto deal with the Italian ships.
纳粹德国空军派遣道尼尔217轰炸机去对付意大利船只。
As the bombers approached, the Italians were unsure whether the Germans meantto attack or just intimidate. They were relieved to see the German aircraftappear to drop their bombs into the ocean. Perhaps with uncharacteristicgentleness, the Germans were just firing warning shots.
当轰炸机飞临时，意大利人不确定德国人是要攻击他们或者只是恐吓。当看到德国飞机向大海里扔炸弹时，就松了一口气。德国人只是在开火警告。
But then something unexpected happened. Instead of plunging straight down intothe sea, the bombs headed toward the Italian ships. One slammed into Roma’shull, exited out the other side and exploded in the water, destroying an engineroom.
但随后，出乎意料的事情发生了。炸弹没有直接冲向大海，而是冲着意大利船只而来。其中一发狠狠命中了罗马号的舰体，从船的另一侧穿出，并在水中爆炸，摧毁了动力室。
A second bomb penetrated the deck into the forward magazine, where shells forthe ship’s big 15-inch guns were stored. The battleship exploded, killing 1,253members of her crew.
第二发炸弹破开甲板钻入舰艏弹仓，那里存有15英寸舰炮炮弹。战列舰爆炸了，杀死了全部1253名船员。
The age of the ship-killing missile had dawned.
对舰导弹的时代到来了。
The first anti-ship smart bombs, invented like so many other weapons by the darkscientists of Nazi Germany, were not just deadly. They seemedinhuman. A “Wellsian weapon from Mars,” was how one newspaper reporterdescribed an early attack.
第一种反舰智能炸弹，由德国纳粹的邪恶科学家们发明，他们还发明了许多类似武器。这种炸弹不仅是致命的，看起来也是不人道的。“来自火星的幻想武器。”
在（这种炸弹）早期的某次袭击时，一位报纸记者如此形容。
Smart bombs have become so common in modern warfare that we take them for granted.Yet 70 years ago, a bomb that could chase a ship seemed as exotic andfrightening as the muskets of the conquistadors must have seemed to the Aztecs.The Germans “made them [the missiles] turn corners,” an Allied sailorcomplained.
智能炸弹在现代战争中是如此普遍，以致于我们习以为常了。但在70年前，一种能够追踪船只的炸弹，看起来是如此的奇异而令人恐惧，就好像阿兹特克人面对征服者的步枪时一样。德国人“让他们（导弹）转弯”一位盟军海员抱怨道。
Anti-ship guided missiles have been used for decades now. Missiles sank theIsraeli destroyer Eilat in 1967 and the British destroyer Sheffield in 1982.Today, China hopes that weapons such as the DF-21D ballistic missile, with arange of a thousand miles, can sink U.S. aircraft carriers and thus neutralizeAmerican naval power in the Pacific.
反舰追踪导弹已被应用数十年了。它们在1967年击沉了以色列艾特拉号驱逐舰，在1982年击沉了英国谢菲尔德号驱逐舰。今天，中国希望射程达到一千英里的 同类武器——东风-21D弹道导弹能击沉美国的航空母舰，以抵销美国在太平洋的海军力量。
But these weapons did not materialize overnight in a Beijing weapons lab. Theyare the fruits of Nazi research from more than 70 years ago.
但这些武器不是一夜之间就出现在北京的武器实验室里的。他们是70年前纳粹的研究成果。
The weapon that sank Roma was known by the very German name Fritz-X. It was nota powered missile but a 3,000-pound armor-piercing gravity bomb meant to bedropped from a bomber at 20,000 feet.
击沉罗马号的武器有个很德国式的名称 弗里茨-X。它不是大威力导弹，而是由轰炸机从20000英尺高度丢下来的3000磅重的重型穿甲弹。
Battleships were armored to survive multiple bomb hits—in 1944, the Japanesesuper-battleship Musashi was hit by 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes before sinking.But a bomb dropped from high enough should have enough kinetic energy, impartedby gravity, to smash through thick deck armor.
战列舰覆有装甲，能在众多炸弹的轰击下存活——1944年，日本的超级战列舰“武藏号”在沉没前经受了17枚炸弹和19发鱼雷的打击。但是，一枚炸弹从足够高的高空坠落，会有足够大的动能，在重力的作用下，就能捣碎厚重的甲板装甲。
The problem was hitting the battleship in the first place. High-flying bombersin the 1940s had scant chance of hitting a warship frantically weaving throughthe water at 30 knots. That meant aircraft had to come in low to attack, whichmade them easier targets for the ship’s antiaircraft guns and also robbed thebombs of kinetic energy.
问题是，命中战列舰最为关键。在1940年代，高速飞行的轰炸机只有很小的几率能击中以三十节的速度在水中疯狂穿梭的军舰。这意味着飞机不得不进行低空轰炸，这使他们更容易成为高射炮的靶子，也剥夺了炸弹的动能。
The 11-foot-long Fritz-X, slung under the wing of a bomber, had radio-controlled fins that could change the munition’sglide path. A tail-mounted flare enabled the operatoron the bomber to track and adjust the weapon’s course. Tests showed that 50percent of bombs would land within five meters of the target—astoundingaccuracy for the 1940s.
11英尺长的弗里茨-X，采用了轰炸机翼下式悬挂，拥有能改变弹体下滑航迹的无线电遥控舵面。尾嵌的照明筒，能让轰炸机上的操作员跟踪并调整炸弹的航向。试验表明 50%的炸弹会在目标5米内着弹——在1940年代，这是骇人听闻的精度。
Does this sound familiar? It should, because the concept endures in modernweapon such as America’s Joint Direct Attack Munition, a kit that makes dumbbombs smart by adding fins and satellite guidance.
这是不是听起来耳熟？是的，因为现代武器也秉持了这种理念，比如 美国的JDAM（联合直接攻击弹药）——一种通过附加弹翼和卫星制导的方式使航空炸弹智能化的装备。
The Fritz-X was an awesome battleship-killer, but only under the rightconditions. A glide bomb has only gravity ratherthan a rocket motor for propulsion. The steerable fins on the Fritz-X couldadjust its trajectory only slightly, meaning the bomb had to be dropped withinthree miles of the target.
弗里茨-X是让人恐惧的军舰杀手，但是，只有在恰当的条件下才是如此。滑翔炸弹只靠重力而没有火箭动力推进。弗里茨-X上的导向弹翼只能轻微地调整航迹，这意味着，炸弹要在目标三海里之内投放。
While deadly to heavily armored warships, the armor-piercing Fritz-X wasactually too much bomb for small ships. It would slice all the way through unarmored destroyers and transportsand explode in the sea.
尽管对重甲舰是致命的，可对小船来说 弗里茨-X 炸弹太大了。它会一路切开遇到的没有装甲的驱逐舰和运输舰，然后在海中爆炸。
The Nazis had another weapon, a genuine anti-ship missile called the Hs 293.The 12-foot-long weapon looked like a miniature airplane with a rocket motorslung underneath.
纳粹分子还有另一种武器，一个名副其实的反舰导弹——亨舍尔293.这个12英尺长的武器看起来像一架微型飞机，腹下悬挂有火箭发动机。
The radio-controlled Hs 293 could be launched from 10 miles away, out of rangeof shipboard anti-aircraft guns. Its 2,300-pound high-explosive warheaddetonated on contact with a lightly armored ship.
用无线电遥控的亨舍尔293 能从10英里外发射——这超出了舰载高射炮的射程。一接触到轻甲舰它那2300磅重的高爆弹头就爆炸。
“In a typical deployment, the attacking aircraft would approachthe target to within 12 kilometers (6 miles), then fly a parallel course in theopposite direction,” writes Martin Bollinger, author of Wizards and Warriors:The Development and Defeat of Radio Controlled Glide Bombs of the Third Reich.
“一种典型的战术部署是，敌机先接近至目标12千米（6英里）内，然后向相反的方向平行飞去，”《巫师与武士：第三帝国无线电遥控滑翔炸弹的发展和失败》一书的作者马丁·博林格写道。
【译注:此处的attacking aircraft 的 用法很少见到，把他翻译成敌机，也很忐忑。个人感觉，如果此处是 attack aircraft 就很顺了，attack aircraft 强击机，用来投空舰导弹也很合适，问题是投掷Hs293的飞机都是除了轰炸机就是侦察机Nazi唯一一款真正（别提斯图卡）意义上的强击机“突爪鹰”还没来得及试飞···，思来想去，或许问题出在attacking aircraft上。 求大神吧】
“When the ship was about 45 degrees off the forward right side, the aircraftlaunched the HS-293,” Bollinger continues. “The Waltherliquid-fueled rocket, running for 10 or 12 seconds, would accelerate toabout 600 kilometers per hour (325 knots), at which point the operator hadturned the missile into the target.”
“当军舰在大约在右前方45°的时候，飞机会发射HS293，”博林格继续说。“瓦尔特液体燃料火箭，在10-12秒间，会把导弹加速到600时速600千米（325节），此时操作员已经把火箭对准了目标。”
“Once the rocket burned out,” Bollinger explains, “the missile continued withits forward momentum, maintaining a glide by virtue of short wings, until theoperator steered it into the target.”
“一旦火箭耗尽，”博林格解释道，“导弹借助它的前冲力借助和弹体上短翅的优势继续滑行，直到操作员把它驶到目标。”
Theelectric razor missile defense
“电动剃须刀导弹防御系统”
The British and Americans were gravely worried. By the fall of 1943, Alliedforces had captured North Africa and Sicily, the U-boat threat was diminishingand the Luftwaffe faded before growing Allied air strength. Now the Brits andAmericans could focus on the dangerous task of landing their armies on the Europeancontinent.
英军和美军很担心。到了1943年，盟军已经占领了北非和西西里岛，U艇的威胁减退，纳粹空军在盟军日渐增长的空中力量面前也黯然失色。现在英军和美军能把精力集中在登陆欧洲大陆的危险任务上了。
【U艇：特指两次世界大战中的德军潜艇。】
First they had to thwart the new German ship-killers. The Allies could mostlyprotect the vulnerable amphibious invasion fleets from regular German airattacks. But if German aircraft could stand off at a distance and lob bombswith pinpoint accuracy onto the soft-skinned transports and their escorts, thenthe Third Reich might stave off invasion.
首先，他们得阻止德军的舰艇杀手。通常，盟军能够在德军的定期空袭下保全脆弱的两栖登陆舰船。但是，如果德国飞机远距离飞行，还能向脆皮的运输舰及其护卫舰精准投掷炸弹的话，那么第三帝国可能会艰难阻止登陆。
Fortunately, a disgruntled German scientist had warned the Allies about thesmart bombs in 1939, and Ultra code-breakers had intercepted Germancommunications regarding the weapons.
幸运地是，在1939年，一个不满的德国科学家 向德军警告了这种智能炸弹，并且，超级破译员截获了关于这种武器的通讯。
The British outfitted the sloop Egret with special equipment to identify theradio frequencies used to control the German munitions. Some 13 days beforeRoma was sunk, Egret joined a convoy sailing within range of German bombersbased in France.
英军在白鹭号护卫舰上装备了特殊设备以找到用来控制德军武器的无线电频率。
大约在罗马号被击沉的13天前，白鹭号参加了一次在部署于法国的德军轰炸机覆盖之下的护航行动。
As hoped, the Germans attacked the convoy with Hs 293 missiles. Unfortunately,one of the ships sunk was Egret.
不出所料，德军用亨舍尔293导弹攻击了船队。不幸地是，白鹭号沉了。
The Allied landing at the southern Italian port of Salernoon Sept. 3, 1943 was a wake-up call for alliance. The Germans counterattackedand almost drove the Anglo-American troops into the sea. Gunfire from Alliedwarships saved the landing force … and the entire operation.
1943年9月3日，盟军于意大利南部港口萨勒诺登陆，这为他的盟国敲响了警钟。德军的反击，几乎把英美联军赶到了海里。来自盟军军舰的炮火保住了登陆部队···和整个行动。
But at a terrible cost. The Luftwaffe launched more than 100 Fritz-X and Hs 293weapons. A Fritz-X struck the famous British battleshipWarspite and put the vessel out of commission for months.
但这建立在可怕的代价上。纳粹空军发射了超过100枚弗里茨-X和亨舍尔293。一枚弗里茨-X重创了著名的英国战列舰厌战号，并让它脱离了战斗序列几个月。
Another Fritz-X hit a gun turret on the U.S. light cruiserSavannah and “penetrated through the two-inch armored surface of theturret, tore through three more decks and exploded in the ammunition handlingroom deep in the bowels of the ship,” Bollinger writes.
另一枚弗里茨-X击中了美国轻型巡洋舰萨凡纳号的炮塔并且“穿透了覆有两英寸装甲的炮塔，撕裂了三层甲板，然后在深藏于船腹的弹药转运室中爆炸”博林格写道。
Miraculously, Savannah survived—but 197 of her crew did not. German guidedweapons sank and badly damaged around a dozen ships off Salerno.
神奇的是，萨凡纳活了下来——但她的197名舰员没有。在萨勒诺，德国的制导武器击沉和重创了十几艘船。
Convoyssailing the Atlantic and Mediterranean also suffered. ConvoyKMF-26, whose escort included included two U.S. destroyers equippedwith the first anti-missile jammers, was attackedoff the Algerian coast on Nov. 26, 1943.
在大西洋和地中海的运输航行也有同样的遭遇。1943年11月26日运送编队KMF-26——护航编队里有装载了首个反导干扰器的两艘美国驱逐舰——在阿尔及利亚海岸被袭击。
An Hs 293 slammed into the troop transport Rohna,carrying U.S. soldiers to India. At least 1,149 passengers and crew died inwhat Bollinger describes as the “greatest loss of life of U.S. service membersat sea in a single ship in the history of the United States.”
一枚亨舍尔293摧毁了载有运往印度的美军士兵的隆那号运输舰。至少1149名乘客和船员葬身于这次被博林格形容为“美国历史上单次事件中海上的最大伤亡”。
It was not until the 1960s that U.S. authorities even admitted that Rohna hadbeen sunk by a guided missile rather than conventional weapons.
直到1960年代，美国当局甚至才承认隆那号是被制导导弹，而非常规武器击沉的。
Rumor spread among desperate sailors that switching on electric razors wouldjam the radio frequencies of the “Chase Me Charlies,” as the British called theguided munitions.
谣言在绝望的水手间散播，有一种说法是，打开电动剃须刀会干扰“追我的查理”（英军这样称呼制导武器）的无线电频率。
An urgent and massive anti-missile effort ensued. Ships were told to lay downsmokescreens so Germans aircrews couldn’t see their targets—and to takehigh-speed evasive action under attack. But how could anchored transportsunloading troops and supplies, or warships providing naval gunfire, maneuver athigh speed?
一场急迫而大规模的反导尝试随之而来。船舶被告知要在烟幕中停泊，这样德军飞行员就看不清他们的目标了；然后在遭到攻击时，要做出高速的规避动作。但是该怎么让抛锚的运输舰卸下军队和补给，或是怎么让军舰在高速机动状态下用舰炮射击呢？
The Allies pinned their hopes on electronic warfare, another class of modern weaponryoriginating in World War II. The British were already dropping aluminum foildecoys to jam German radars. Less well-known are theAllies’ intensive efforts to disrupt German anti-ship missiles.
盟军寄希望于电子对抗——另一种发源于二战的现代武器门类。英军已经用空投铝箔诱饵的方式干扰德军的雷达了。不太为人所知是，盟军加紧努力来干扰德军的反舰导弹。
Allied agents interrogatedcaptured Luftwaffe aircrew. Recovery teams sifted through missile fragmentsfrom damaged ships and examined remnants of bombers left behind on airfields inItaly.
盟军特工审讯被俘的纳粹空军的空勤人员。复原小组从损毁的船只里筛选导弹碎片，并调查被遗留在意大利机场的轰炸机残骸。
The most intensive work took place in labs across Britain and America includingthe U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, where scientists worked feverishly to jamthe radio frequencies used by German missile controllers. operators to controlthe missiles.
最为紧张的工作在遍布英美的实验室里展开，包括美国海军研究实验室，在那里，科学家们发疯似的工作，为了干扰德军导弹控制器、操作员的无线电频率。
The British chose barrage jamming of multiple frequencies, while the Americansopted for what they considered a more efficient technique of jamming onlyspecific frequencies. The U.S. installed the first jammers on two destroyers inSeptember 1943.
英国人选择了对全波段、多重频率进行干扰，而美国人选择了他们认为更有效的技术，只对特殊频率实施干扰。1943年9月美国在两艘驱逐舰上安装了首批干扰器。
The first anti-missile jammers were primitive and cumbersome by today’sstandards. American equipment required multiple operators and devices toidentify the correct frequency and match the jammer to the frequency—and do itall in 10 or 20 seconds before the missile hit its target.
以今天的标准来看，第一种反导干扰器原始而笨重。这种美国设备需要多个操作员和设备来确定正确频率，然后把干扰器校对到这一频率——这一切都要在导弹命中目标前10或20秒内完成。
Early jammers didn’t work. Based on faulty intelligence, the Allies guessedthat the German missiles were controlled by High Frequency signals under 30MHz. The German actually used the Very High Frequency band of around 50 MHz.
早期的干扰器并不起作用。基于错误情报，盟军猜测德军导弹是由低于30兆赫的高频信号控制的。实际上，德军使用的是50MHz左右的甚高频段。
The missiles kept coming.
导弹滚滚来
Yet by August 1944, the Germans missile campaign was over. Some of the last Hs293s were not even launched at ships, but against French bridges used byPatton’s advancing tank columns. Less than a year after its dramatic debut, theGerman smart bomb threat disappeared.
然而，到了1944年8月，德军的导弹战结束了。最后的一些亨舍尔293其实没有发射到舰艇上，而是被巴顿的先遣坦克部队用在了法国大桥上。粉墨登场不到一年，德国的智能炸弹威胁就此绝迹。
It’s hard to estimate losses caused by the guided weapons. German air raidssaturated Allied defenses by combining smart bomb attacks with conventionaldive bomber and torpedo assaults, so it is always not clear which weapon hit aship.
很难估计制导武器造成的损失。德军空袭 用智能炸弹，常规的俯冲轰炸机和鱼雷突袭的方式渗透盟军防线，所以，通常难以弄清是那种武器击中了船只。
The Allies also tried to maintain morale by attributing guided weapon losses toconventional weapons.
盟军也尝试把制导武器造成的损失归因于常规武器来维持士气。
Bollinger counts 903 aircraft sorties that carried around 1,200 guided weapons.Of those 1,200, almost a third were never fired because the launch aircraftaborted or were intercepted.
博林格认为有903架次飞机携带了1200枚左右的制导武器。在这1200枚中，有三分之一从来没有发射过，因为发射它的飞机坠毁或被拦截了。
Of the remaining 700 weapons, another third malfunctioned. Of the approximately470 whose guidance systems worked, at most 51—or just over 10 percent—actuallyhit their targets or landed close enough to damage them.
对于剩下的700枚，另有三分之一因故障失灵了。对于接近470枚制导系统有效的武器来说，最多有51枚——或者说刚刚超过10%——击中了或者掉落得足够近破坏了目标。
Bollinger calculates that just 17 to 24 ships were sunk and 14 to 21 damaged.
博林格 推测 只有17至24艘舰艇被击沉，14-21艘损坏。
“At most, only one weapon in 24 dispatched from a German airfield scored a hitor damage-causing near miss,” Bollinger writes. “Only about one in 14 of themissiles launched achieved similar success, and at most one in nine of thoseknown to respond to operator guidance was able to hit the target or causesignificant damage via a near-miss.”
“从德军机场调配到命中或接近命中引起损伤的武器最多只有二十四分之一。”博林格写道“只有大约十四分之一发射出去的导弹取得了战果，然后最多有九分之一的可以对操作员导航做出反应的武器能够命中，或者通过近似命中造成重大损伤。”
“This is very different from the 50-percent hit rate experienced duringoperational testing,” Bollinger points out.
“这与可操作性测验中得到的50%的命中率有很大差异。”博林格指出。
To be fair, the technology was new. There were no lasers or fire controlcomputers. The Fritz-X and Hs 293 were manually guided all the way. Operatorshad to track both missile and target through cloud, fog and smoke, without thebenefit of modern thermal sights.
说句公道话，那是新技术。那时还没有激光器或火控计算机。弗里茨-X和亨舍尔293全程都靠手动导航。操作员得透过云层、烟雾，在没有现代热视技术的情况下，追踪导弹和目标的轨迹。
“It was virtually impossible to hit a ship that was steaming more than 20 knotsand could fire back,” Bollinger tells War is Boring. “Almost all ofthe hits were against slow and/or defenseless targets.”
“命中一艘以超过20节的速度行驶，而且会还击的船几乎是不可能的。”博林格在《战争是无聊的》中说，“几乎所有的命中都是对缓慢且/或 缺乏防御的目标造成的。”
Bollinger hypothesizes that a phenomenon called “multi-path interference,”unknown at the time, may also have hampered the performance of the Hs 293.Radio command signals sent from the bomber to the missile might have overshotthe weapon, bounced off the ocean surface below and interfered with the missileguidance signal.
博林格假设了一个叫“多径干扰”的现象——在当时并不为人所知——可能也妨碍了亨舍尔293的表现。从轰炸机发向导弹的无线电指令信号，可能已经超过了武器，在洋面上反射回来，并且和武器制导信号发生了干涉。
The early jammers were ineffective, but Bollinger believes that by the time ofthe Normandy assault in June 1944, the equipment had improved enough to offer ameasure of protection—and partly explains why German missiles performed poorlylater in the war.
早期的干扰器是无效的，但是博林格认为，到了1944年6月的诺曼底登陆时，这个装备被证明能够提供一些保护——这也部分地解释了为什么德军导弹在此后的战争中表现得如此糟糕。
Strangely, while the Germans took measures to counteract Allied jamming oftheir air defense radars, they never really addressed the possibility thattheir anti-ship missiles were also being jammed.
奇怪的是，当德军采取措施抵销盟军对他们防空雷达的干扰时，他们从未真正应对他们的反舰导弹也被干扰的可能。
It’s wrong to blame the bomb for the faults of the bomber. The real cause forthe failure of German smart bombs was that by the time they were introduced inlate 1943, the Luftwaffe was almost a spent force.
因轰炸机的错误去责备炸弹是错误的。德军智能炸弹失败的真正原因是他们自己在1943年底引入的，这让纳粹空军几乎成了废柴。
【a spent force 习语 强弩之末，这里按照本意翻译更适当。】
Already thinly spread supporting the hard-pressed armies in Russia and theWest, the German air arm suffered relentless bombardment by U.S. B-17s andB-24s. The Third Reich could never deploy more than six bomber squadrons at atime equipped with the Fritz-X and Hs 293.
已经勉力应付俄罗斯和西方重兵压境的德国空军还遭受美国B17和B24的地毯轰炸。第三帝国再也不能部署超过六架同时携带有弗里茨-X和亨舍尔293的轰炸机编队了。
When the Luftwaffe ruled the skies over Poland and France in 1939, this mighthave been enough. By late 1943, a guided-bomb run was practically suicide.
在1939年，当德国纳粹空军主宰了波兰和法国的天空时，这恐怕就足够了。到了1943年底，一枚制导炸弹飞来，差不多就是在自杀。
German bombers making daylight attacks had to run a gauntlet of fightersprotecting Allied ships in the daytime. Night attacks were marginally safer forthe bombers but still exposed them to radar-equipped British and American nightfighters. The Allies aggressively bombed any airfield suspected of harboringthe smart bombers.
进行日间袭击的德国轰炸机不得不与在白天保护盟军的歼击机对决。夜袭让轰炸机稍微安全些，但是他们仍会暴露在装备有雷达的英美夜间歼击机面前。盟军主动轰炸任何被怀疑泊有智能轰炸机的机场。
“Allied fighter air cover was by far the most important factor,” Bollinger tells War is Boring. “Not only did it lead tolarge numbers of glide-bombing aircraft getting shot down, it also forced theGermans to shift missions from daylight to dusk or nighttime. This in itselflead to a major and measurable reduction in accuracy.”
“盟军歼击机的空中掩护是迄今为止最重要的因素”博林格在《战争是无聊的》里面说。“不仅是因为他导致大量的滑翔炸弹飞机坠毁，它也迫使德军把任务从白天转向黄昏或夜晚。这是导致制导武器精度下降的主要和明显原因。”
Many raids would cost the Germans a few bombers. By the standards of thethousand-bomber raids over Germany, this was trifling. But for the handful ofspecially trained and equipped Luftwaffe squadrons, it was catastrophic.
多次偷袭会让德军损失一些轰炸机。以全德国数以千计的轰炸机突袭来看，这是微不足道的。但是对于一些经过特殊训练、有特殊装备的德国纳粹空军中队来说，这是灾难性的。
Of the 903 aircraft sorties, Bollinger estimates that in 112 of them, thebombers were lost before launching their weapons. Another 21 were shot down orcrashed on the return flight, for an overall loss ratio of 15 percent.
在903架次中，据博林格估测，他们中的112次，轰炸机在投射武器前就损失掉了。另外21次被击落或者在返航途中坠毁，总损失率达到了15%。
“Each time a pilot departed on a glide bomb mission, he had almost aone-in-seven chance of never returning in that aircraft safely,” Bollingersays. “Put another way, the probability that a pilot would return safely aftereach of the first 10 missions was only 20 percent.”
“每次，当一名飞行员去执行一次滑翔炸弹任务，他几乎有七分之一的几率永远不会再开着飞机安全回来，”博林格说，“换句话说，一个飞行员完成头十次任务能安全归来的概率只有20%。”
Learning from history
从历史中学习
The rise and fall of the Nazi anti-ship missiles offers lessons for the U.S.and its opponents in the present day. American planners worry that smartanti-ship weapons in the hands of China, smaller nations like Iran or eveninsurgent groups could threaten U.S. warships and amphibious forces.
纳粹反舰导弹的兴衰给今天的美国和他的对手上了一课。美国的决策者担忧中国手中的只能反舰武器，小一点的国家，如伊朗或者甚至是反美团体 都能威胁美国的军舰和两栖力量。
One lesson from the 1940s is that passive defenses such as jamming have limitedutility against access denial weapons. The best defense is to destroy thelaunch vehicle before it can fire. “Kill the archer” is the term the Pentagonuses.
1940年代的一课就是，消极防御措施，诸如干扰措施，对阻断武器效用有限。最好的防御是在发射载具开火前将其摧毁。“杀死弓箭手”是五角大楼使用的术语。
China stands to learn the most profound lesson. For all the power and terror ofthe German anti-ship weapons, they could not compensate for the inability of theGerman navy and Luftwaffe to confront the Allied navies on the open seas.
中国学习了最深刻的一课。对于德军反舰武器的全部力量和威慑力，他们不能用德国海、空军与盟军在公海上遭遇时的无能表现来抵销。
Smart bombs did worry Allied commanders, but the new munitions couldn’t preventthe amphibious invasions of Italy and France. Chinese missiles might disruptU.S. operations, but they are no substitute for countering a powerful navy withan effective navy of your own.
智能炸弹的确让盟军司令官忧虑，但是新武器不能阻止两栖登陆意大利和法国。中国的导弹可能会扰乱美军的行动，但是他们并不能取代各自拥有的强大且有效的海军的对抗。
Perhaps the biggest lesson of all is that what is new is old. With each passingyear, the weapons of World War II seem closer to the era of Gettysburg andJutland than the high-tech warfare of today. That perception can encourage anunjustified smugness.
或许，所有这一切中最大的一课是：什么是新生的，什么是老旧的。每过一年，二战的武器就更像葛底斯堡和日德兰半岛时代，多过像现代高科技战争。这种看法只会滋生一种不必要的自以为是。
The problems modern navies and air forces struggle with—anti-ship guidedmissiles, jamming, operations in contested airspace—were the same that Germanpilots and Allied sailors faced.
困扰着现代海空军的问题是——反舰制导导弹、干扰、争夺制空权——与德军飞行员和盟军海员所面对的一样。
The terror that the crew of an Italian battleship, British cruiser or Americanmerchant ship felt at the sight of German missiles might not differ from what aU.S. destroyer or carrier crew might feel while being targeted by Chinese ballisticmissiles.
意大利战列舰船员，英国巡洋舰或者美国商船，看到德国导弹时的恐惧或许与一艘美国驱逐舰或航母船员，成为中国弹道导弹的目标时的感受没有什么不同。
链接：https://medium.com/war-is-boring/f826cfac42b
标题：The Nazi Smart Bombs That Inspired China’s Ship-Killing Missiles -DF21D
纳粹的智能炸弹启发了中国的反舰导弹 DF21D
正文：Germany’s secret weapons threatened warships 70years before China’s carrier-killers
德国能威胁战舰的秘密武器比中国的航母杀手早70年
What is that strange bomb in the sky?
空中那奇怪的炸弹是什么？
That’s what the sailors of the Italian battleship Roma must have wondered inthe final moments before they died.
这一定是意大利罗马号战列舰的船员们临死前的疑问。
Navalwarfare changed on Sept. 9, 1943. Dictator Benito Mussolini had beendeposed, the new Italian government was abandoning a lost war and its doomed Nazially and the Italian fleet was sailing to Malta to surrender. Butthe habitually treacherous Nazis, who had always suspected their Italian alliesof similar trickery, detected the Italian ships leaving port.
1943年9月9日这一天改变了海战。法西斯独裁者墨索里尼宣布新意大利政府放弃这场失败的战争，这昭示了纳粹盟友的覆灭，意大利的舰队开赴马耳他投降。然而生性狡诈的纳粹，总是怀疑，意大利的盟友在耍相似的把戏，侦测到了意大利船舶离港。
The Luftwaffe dispatched a force of Dornier Do-217 bombersto deal with the Italian ships.
纳粹德国空军派遣道尼尔217轰炸机去对付意大利船只。
As the bombers approached, the Italians were unsure whether the Germans meantto attack or just intimidate. They were relieved to see the German aircraftappear to drop their bombs into the ocean. Perhaps with uncharacteristicgentleness, the Germans were just firing warning shots.
当轰炸机飞临时，意大利人不确定德国人是要攻击他们或者只是恐吓。当看到德国飞机向大海里扔炸弹时，就松了一口气。德国人只是在开火警告。
But then something unexpected happened. Instead of plunging straight down intothe sea, the bombs headed toward the Italian ships. One slammed into Roma’shull, exited out the other side and exploded in the water, destroying an engineroom.
但随后，出乎意料的事情发生了。炸弹没有直接冲向大海，而是冲着意大利船只而来。其中一发狠狠命中了罗马号的舰体，从船的另一侧穿出，并在水中爆炸，摧毁了动力室。
A second bomb penetrated the deck into the forward magazine, where shells forthe ship’s big 15-inch guns were stored. The battleship exploded, killing 1,253members of her crew.
第二发炸弹破开甲板钻入舰艏弹仓，那里存有15英寸舰炮炮弹。战列舰爆炸了，杀死了全部1253名船员。
The age of the ship-killing missile had dawned.
对舰导弹的时代到来了。
The first anti-ship smart bombs, invented like so many other weapons by the darkscientists of Nazi Germany, were not just deadly. They seemedinhuman. A “Wellsian weapon from Mars,” was how one newspaper reporterdescribed an early attack.
第一种反舰智能炸弹，由德国纳粹的邪恶科学家们发明，他们还发明了许多类似武器。这种炸弹不仅是致命的，看起来也是不人道的。“来自火星的幻想武器。”
在（这种炸弹）早期的某次袭击时，一位报纸记者如此形容。
Smart bombs have become so common in modern warfare that we take them for granted.Yet 70 years ago, a bomb that could chase a ship seemed as exotic andfrightening as the muskets of the conquistadors must have seemed to the Aztecs.The Germans “made them [the missiles] turn corners,” an Allied sailorcomplained.
智能炸弹在现代战争中是如此普遍，以致于我们习以为常了。但在70年前，一种能够追踪船只的炸弹，看起来是如此的奇异而令人恐惧，就好像阿兹特克人面对征服者的步枪时一样。德国人“让他们（导弹）转弯”一位盟军海员抱怨道。
Anti-ship guided missiles have been used for decades now. Missiles sank theIsraeli destroyer Eilat in 1967 and the British destroyer Sheffield in 1982.Today, China hopes that weapons such as the DF-21D ballistic missile, with arange of a thousand miles, can sink U.S. aircraft carriers and thus neutralizeAmerican naval power in the Pacific.
反舰追踪导弹已被应用数十年了。它们在1967年击沉了以色列艾特拉号驱逐舰，在1982年击沉了英国谢菲尔德号驱逐舰。今天，中国希望射程达到一千英里的 同类武器——东风-21D弹道导弹能击沉美国的航空母舰，以抵销美国在太平洋的海军力量。
But these weapons did not materialize overnight in a Beijing weapons lab. Theyare the fruits of Nazi research from more than 70 years ago.
但这些武器不是一夜之间就出现在北京的武器实验室里的。他们是70年前纳粹的研究成果。
The weapon that sank Roma was known by the very German name Fritz-X. It was nota powered missile but a 3,000-pound armor-piercing gravity bomb meant to bedropped from a bomber at 20,000 feet.
击沉罗马号的武器有个很德国式的名称 弗里茨-X。它不是大威力导弹，而是由轰炸机从20000英尺高度丢下来的3000磅重的重型穿甲弹。
Battleships were armored to survive multiple bomb hits—in 1944, the Japanesesuper-battleship Musashi was hit by 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes before sinking.But a bomb dropped from high enough should have enough kinetic energy, impartedby gravity, to smash through thick deck armor.
战列舰覆有装甲，能在众多炸弹的轰击下存活——1944年，日本的超级战列舰“武藏号”在沉没前经受了17枚炸弹和19发鱼雷的打击。但是，一枚炸弹从足够高的高空坠落，会有足够大的动能，在重力的作用下，就能捣碎厚重的甲板装甲。
The problem was hitting the battleship in the first place. High-flying bombersin the 1940s had scant chance of hitting a warship frantically weaving throughthe water at 30 knots. That meant aircraft had to come in low to attack, whichmade them easier targets for the ship’s antiaircraft guns and also robbed thebombs of kinetic energy.
问题是，命中战列舰最为关键。在1940年代，高速飞行的轰炸机只有很小的几率能击中以三十节的速度在水中疯狂穿梭的军舰。这意味着飞机不得不进行低空轰炸，这使他们更容易成为高射炮的靶子，也剥夺了炸弹的动能。
The 11-foot-long Fritz-X, slung under the wing of a bomber, had radio-controlled fins that could change the munition’sglide path. A tail-mounted flare enabled the operatoron the bomber to track and adjust the weapon’s course. Tests showed that 50percent of bombs would land within five meters of the target—astoundingaccuracy for the 1940s.
11英尺长的弗里茨-X，采用了轰炸机翼下式悬挂，拥有能改变弹体下滑航迹的无线电遥控舵面。尾嵌的照明筒，能让轰炸机上的操作员跟踪并调整炸弹的航向。试验表明 50%的炸弹会在目标5米内着弹——在1940年代，这是骇人听闻的精度。
Does this sound familiar? It should, because the concept endures in modernweapon such as America’s Joint Direct Attack Munition, a kit that makes dumbbombs smart by adding fins and satellite guidance.
这是不是听起来耳熟？是的，因为现代武器也秉持了这种理念，比如 美国的JDAM（联合直接攻击弹药）——一种通过附加弹翼和卫星制导的方式使航空炸弹智能化的装备。
The Fritz-X was an awesome battleship-killer, but only under the rightconditions. A glide bomb has only gravity ratherthan a rocket motor for propulsion. The steerable fins on the Fritz-X couldadjust its trajectory only slightly, meaning the bomb had to be dropped withinthree miles of the target.
弗里茨-X是让人恐惧的军舰杀手，但是，只有在恰当的条件下才是如此。滑翔炸弹只靠重力而没有火箭动力推进。弗里茨-X上的导向弹翼只能轻微地调整航迹，这意味着，炸弹要在目标三海里之内投放。
While deadly to heavily armored warships, the armor-piercing Fritz-X wasactually too much bomb for small ships. It would slice all the way through unarmored destroyers and transportsand explode in the sea.
尽管对重甲舰是致命的，可对小船来说 弗里茨-X 炸弹太大了。它会一路切开遇到的没有装甲的驱逐舰和运输舰，然后在海中爆炸。
The Nazis had another weapon, a genuine anti-ship missile called the Hs 293.The 12-foot-long weapon looked like a miniature airplane with a rocket motorslung underneath.
纳粹分子还有另一种武器，一个名副其实的反舰导弹——亨舍尔293.这个12英尺长的武器看起来像一架微型飞机，腹下悬挂有火箭发动机。
The radio-controlled Hs 293 could be launched from 10 miles away, out of rangeof shipboard anti-aircraft guns. Its 2,300-pound high-explosive warheaddetonated on contact with a lightly armored ship.
用无线电遥控的亨舍尔293 能从10英里外发射——这超出了舰载高射炮的射程。一接触到轻甲舰它那2300磅重的高爆弹头就爆炸。
“In a typical deployment, the attacking aircraft would approachthe target to within 12 kilometers (6 miles), then fly a parallel course in theopposite direction,” writes Martin Bollinger, author of Wizards and Warriors:The Development and Defeat of Radio Controlled Glide Bombs of the Third Reich.
“一种典型的战术部署是，敌机先接近至目标12千米（6英里）内，然后向相反的方向平行飞去，”《巫师与武士：第三帝国无线电遥控滑翔炸弹的发展和失败》一书的作者马丁·博林格写道。
【译注:此处的attacking aircraft 的 用法很少见到，把他翻译成敌机，也很忐忑。个人感觉，如果此处是 attack aircraft 就很顺了，attack aircraft 强击机，用来投空舰导弹也很合适，问题是投掷Hs293的飞机都是除了轰炸机就是侦察机Nazi唯一一款真正（别提斯图卡）意义上的强击机“突爪鹰”还没来得及试飞···，思来想去，或许问题出在attacking aircraft上。 求大神吧】
“When the ship was about 45 degrees off the forward right side, the aircraftlaunched the HS-293,” Bollinger continues. “The Waltherliquid-fueled rocket, running for 10 or 12 seconds, would accelerate toabout 600 kilometers per hour (325 knots), at which point the operator hadturned the missile into the target.”
“当军舰在大约在右前方45°的时候，飞机会发射HS293，”博林格继续说。“瓦尔特液体燃料火箭，在10-12秒间，会把导弹加速到600时速600千米（325节），此时操作员已经把火箭对准了目标。”
“Once the rocket burned out,” Bollinger explains, “the missile continued withits forward momentum, maintaining a glide by virtue of short wings, until theoperator steered it into the target.”
“一旦火箭耗尽，”博林格解释道，“导弹借助它的前冲力借助和弹体上短翅的优势继续滑行，直到操作员把它驶到目标。”
Theelectric razor missile defense
“电动剃须刀导弹防御系统”
The British and Americans were gravely worried. By the fall of 1943, Alliedforces had captured North Africa and Sicily, the U-boat threat was diminishingand the Luftwaffe faded before growing Allied air strength. Now the Brits andAmericans could focus on the dangerous task of landing their armies on the Europeancontinent.
英军和美军很担心。到了1943年，盟军已经占领了北非和西西里岛，U艇的威胁减退，纳粹空军在盟军日渐增长的空中力量面前也黯然失色。现在英军和美军能把精力集中在登陆欧洲大陆的危险任务上了。
【U艇：特指两次世界大战中的德军潜艇。】
First they had to thwart the new German ship-killers. The Allies could mostlyprotect the vulnerable amphibious invasion fleets from regular German airattacks. But if German aircraft could stand off at a distance and lob bombswith pinpoint accuracy onto the soft-skinned transports and their escorts, thenthe Third Reich might stave off invasion.
首先，他们得阻止德军的舰艇杀手。通常，盟军能够在德军的定期空袭下保全脆弱的两栖登陆舰船。但是，如果德国飞机远距离飞行，还能向脆皮的运输舰及其护卫舰精准投掷炸弹的话，那么第三帝国可能会艰难阻止登陆。
Fortunately, a disgruntled German scientist had warned the Allies about thesmart bombs in 1939, and Ultra code-breakers had intercepted Germancommunications regarding the weapons.
幸运地是，在1939年，一个不满的德国科学家 向德军警告了这种智能炸弹，并且，超级破译员截获了关于这种武器的通讯。
The British outfitted the sloop Egret with special equipment to identify theradio frequencies used to control the German munitions. Some 13 days beforeRoma was sunk, Egret joined a convoy sailing within range of German bombersbased in France.
英军在白鹭号护卫舰上装备了特殊设备以找到用来控制德军武器的无线电频率。
大约在罗马号被击沉的13天前，白鹭号参加了一次在部署于法国的德军轰炸机覆盖之下的护航行动。
As hoped, the Germans attacked the convoy with Hs 293 missiles. Unfortunately,one of the ships sunk was Egret.
不出所料，德军用亨舍尔293导弹攻击了船队。不幸地是，白鹭号沉了。
The Allied landing at the southern Italian port of Salernoon Sept. 3, 1943 was a wake-up call for alliance. The Germans counterattackedand almost drove the Anglo-American troops into the sea. Gunfire from Alliedwarships saved the landing force … and the entire operation.
1943年9月3日，盟军于意大利南部港口萨勒诺登陆，这为他的盟国敲响了警钟。德军的反击，几乎把英美联军赶到了海里。来自盟军军舰的炮火保住了登陆部队···和整个行动。
But at a terrible cost. The Luftwaffe launched more than 100 Fritz-X and Hs 293weapons. A Fritz-X struck the famous British battleshipWarspite and put the vessel out of commission for months.
但这建立在可怕的代价上。纳粹空军发射了超过100枚弗里茨-X和亨舍尔293。一枚弗里茨-X重创了著名的英国战列舰厌战号，并让它脱离了战斗序列几个月。
Another Fritz-X hit a gun turret on the U.S. light cruiserSavannah and “penetrated through the two-inch armored surface of theturret, tore through three more decks and exploded in the ammunition handlingroom deep in the bowels of the ship,” Bollinger writes.
另一枚弗里茨-X击中了美国轻型巡洋舰萨凡纳号的炮塔并且“穿透了覆有两英寸装甲的炮塔，撕裂了三层甲板，然后在深藏于船腹的弹药转运室中爆炸”博林格写道。
Miraculously, Savannah survived—but 197 of her crew did not. German guidedweapons sank and badly damaged around a dozen ships off Salerno.
神奇的是，萨凡纳活了下来——但她的197名舰员没有。在萨勒诺，德国的制导武器击沉和重创了十几艘船。
Convoyssailing the Atlantic and Mediterranean also suffered. ConvoyKMF-26, whose escort included included two U.S. destroyers equippedwith the first anti-missile jammers, was attackedoff the Algerian coast on Nov. 26, 1943.
在大西洋和地中海的运输航行也有同样的遭遇。1943年11月26日运送编队KMF-26——护航编队里有装载了首个反导干扰器的两艘美国驱逐舰——在阿尔及利亚海岸被袭击。
An Hs 293 slammed into the troop transport Rohna,carrying U.S. soldiers to India. At least 1,149 passengers and crew died inwhat Bollinger describes as the “greatest loss of life of U.S. service membersat sea in a single ship in the history of the United States.”
一枚亨舍尔293摧毁了载有运往印度的美军士兵的隆那号运输舰。至少1149名乘客和船员葬身于这次被博林格形容为“美国历史上单次事件中海上的最大伤亡”。
It was not until the 1960s that U.S. authorities even admitted that Rohna hadbeen sunk by a guided missile rather than conventional weapons.
直到1960年代，美国当局甚至才承认隆那号是被制导导弹，而非常规武器击沉的。
Rumor spread among desperate sailors that switching on electric razors wouldjam the radio frequencies of the “Chase Me Charlies,” as the British called theguided munitions.
谣言在绝望的水手间散播，有一种说法是，打开电动剃须刀会干扰“追我的查理”（英军这样称呼制导武器）的无线电频率。
An urgent and massive anti-missile effort ensued. Ships were told to lay downsmokescreens so Germans aircrews couldn’t see their targets—and to takehigh-speed evasive action under attack. But how could anchored transportsunloading troops and supplies, or warships providing naval gunfire, maneuver athigh speed?
一场急迫而大规模的反导尝试随之而来。船舶被告知要在烟幕中停泊，这样德军飞行员就看不清他们的目标了；然后在遭到攻击时，要做出高速的规避动作。但是该怎么让抛锚的运输舰卸下军队和补给，或是怎么让军舰在高速机动状态下用舰炮射击呢？
The Allies pinned their hopes on electronic warfare, another class of modern weaponryoriginating in World War II. The British were already dropping aluminum foildecoys to jam German radars. Less well-known are theAllies’ intensive efforts to disrupt German anti-ship missiles.
盟军寄希望于电子对抗——另一种发源于二战的现代武器门类。英军已经用空投铝箔诱饵的方式干扰德军的雷达了。不太为人所知是，盟军加紧努力来干扰德军的反舰导弹。
Allied agents interrogatedcaptured Luftwaffe aircrew. Recovery teams sifted through missile fragmentsfrom damaged ships and examined remnants of bombers left behind on airfields inItaly.
盟军特工审讯被俘的纳粹空军的空勤人员。复原小组从损毁的船只里筛选导弹碎片，并调查被遗留在意大利机场的轰炸机残骸。
The most intensive work took place in labs across Britain and America includingthe U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, where scientists worked feverishly to jamthe radio frequencies used by German missile controllers. operators to controlthe missiles.
最为紧张的工作在遍布英美的实验室里展开，包括美国海军研究实验室，在那里，科学家们发疯似的工作，为了干扰德军导弹控制器、操作员的无线电频率。
The British chose barrage jamming of multiple frequencies, while the Americansopted for what they considered a more efficient technique of jamming onlyspecific frequencies. The U.S. installed the first jammers on two destroyers inSeptember 1943.
英国人选择了对全波段、多重频率进行干扰，而美国人选择了他们认为更有效的技术，只对特殊频率实施干扰。1943年9月美国在两艘驱逐舰上安装了首批干扰器。
The first anti-missile jammers were primitive and cumbersome by today’sstandards. American equipment required multiple operators and devices toidentify the correct frequency and match the jammer to the frequency—and do itall in 10 or 20 seconds before the missile hit its target.
以今天的标准来看，第一种反导干扰器原始而笨重。这种美国设备需要多个操作员和设备来确定正确频率，然后把干扰器校对到这一频率——这一切都要在导弹命中目标前10或20秒内完成。
Early jammers didn’t work. Based on faulty intelligence, the Allies guessedthat the German missiles were controlled by High Frequency signals under 30MHz. The German actually used the Very High Frequency band of around 50 MHz.
早期的干扰器并不起作用。基于错误情报，盟军猜测德军导弹是由低于30兆赫的高频信号控制的。实际上，德军使用的是50MHz左右的甚高频段。
The missiles kept coming.
导弹滚滚来
Yet by August 1944, the Germans missile campaign was over. Some of the last Hs293s were not even launched at ships, but against French bridges used byPatton’s advancing tank columns. Less than a year after its dramatic debut, theGerman smart bomb threat disappeared.
然而，到了1944年8月，德军的导弹战结束了。最后的一些亨舍尔293其实没有发射到舰艇上，而是被巴顿的先遣坦克部队用在了法国大桥上。粉墨登场不到一年，德国的智能炸弹威胁就此绝迹。
It’s hard to estimate losses caused by the guided weapons. German air raidssaturated Allied defenses by combining smart bomb attacks with conventionaldive bomber and torpedo assaults, so it is always not clear which weapon hit aship.
很难估计制导武器造成的损失。德军空袭 用智能炸弹，常规的俯冲轰炸机和鱼雷突袭的方式渗透盟军防线，所以，通常难以弄清是那种武器击中了船只。
The Allies also tried to maintain morale by attributing guided weapon losses toconventional weapons.
盟军也尝试把制导武器造成的损失归因于常规武器来维持士气。
Bollinger counts 903 aircraft sorties that carried around 1,200 guided weapons.Of those 1,200, almost a third were never fired because the launch aircraftaborted or were intercepted.
博林格认为有903架次飞机携带了1200枚左右的制导武器。在这1200枚中，有三分之一从来没有发射过，因为发射它的飞机坠毁或被拦截了。
Of the remaining 700 weapons, another third malfunctioned. Of the approximately470 whose guidance systems worked, at most 51—or just over 10 percent—actuallyhit their targets or landed close enough to damage them.
对于剩下的700枚，另有三分之一因故障失灵了。对于接近470枚制导系统有效的武器来说，最多有51枚——或者说刚刚超过10%——击中了或者掉落得足够近破坏了目标。
Bollinger calculates that just 17 to 24 ships were sunk and 14 to 21 damaged.
博林格 推测 只有17至24艘舰艇被击沉，14-21艘损坏。
“At most, only one weapon in 24 dispatched from a German airfield scored a hitor damage-causing near miss,” Bollinger writes. “Only about one in 14 of themissiles launched achieved similar success, and at most one in nine of thoseknown to respond to operator guidance was able to hit the target or causesignificant damage via a near-miss.”
“从德军机场调配到命中或接近命中引起损伤的武器最多只有二十四分之一。”博林格写道“只有大约十四分之一发射出去的导弹取得了战果，然后最多有九分之一的可以对操作员导航做出反应的武器能够命中，或者通过近似命中造成重大损伤。”
“This is very different from the 50-percent hit rate experienced duringoperational testing,” Bollinger points out.
“这与可操作性测验中得到的50%的命中率有很大差异。”博林格指出。
To be fair, the technology was new. There were no lasers or fire controlcomputers. The Fritz-X and Hs 293 were manually guided all the way. Operatorshad to track both missile and target through cloud, fog and smoke, without thebenefit of modern thermal sights.
说句公道话，那是新技术。那时还没有激光器或火控计算机。弗里茨-X和亨舍尔293全程都靠手动导航。操作员得透过云层、烟雾，在没有现代热视技术的情况下，追踪导弹和目标的轨迹。
“It was virtually impossible to hit a ship that was steaming more than 20 knotsand could fire back,” Bollinger tells War is Boring. “Almost all ofthe hits were against slow and/or defenseless targets.”
“命中一艘以超过20节的速度行驶，而且会还击的船几乎是不可能的。”博林格在《战争是无聊的》中说，“几乎所有的命中都是对缓慢且/或 缺乏防御的目标造成的。”
Bollinger hypothesizes that a phenomenon called “multi-path interference,”unknown at the time, may also have hampered the performance of the Hs 293.Radio command signals sent from the bomber to the missile might have overshotthe weapon, bounced off the ocean surface below and interfered with the missileguidance signal.
博林格假设了一个叫“多径干扰”的现象——在当时并不为人所知——可能也妨碍了亨舍尔293的表现。从轰炸机发向导弹的无线电指令信号，可能已经超过了武器，在洋面上反射回来，并且和武器制导信号发生了干涉。
The early jammers were ineffective, but Bollinger believes that by the time ofthe Normandy assault in June 1944, the equipment had improved enough to offer ameasure of protection—and partly explains why German missiles performed poorlylater in the war.
早期的干扰器是无效的，但是博林格认为，到了1944年6月的诺曼底登陆时，这个装备被证明能够提供一些保护——这也部分地解释了为什么德军导弹在此后的战争中表现得如此糟糕。
Strangely, while the Germans took measures to counteract Allied jamming oftheir air defense radars, they never really addressed the possibility thattheir anti-ship missiles were also being jammed.
奇怪的是，当德军采取措施抵销盟军对他们防空雷达的干扰时，他们从未真正应对他们的反舰导弹也被干扰的可能。
It’s wrong to blame the bomb for the faults of the bomber. The real cause forthe failure of German smart bombs was that by the time they were introduced inlate 1943, the Luftwaffe was almost a spent force.
因轰炸机的错误去责备炸弹是错误的。德军智能炸弹失败的真正原因是他们自己在1943年底引入的，这让纳粹空军几乎成了废柴。
【a spent force 习语 强弩之末，这里按照本意翻译更适当。】
Already thinly spread supporting the hard-pressed armies in Russia and theWest, the German air arm suffered relentless bombardment by U.S. B-17s andB-24s. The Third Reich could never deploy more than six bomber squadrons at atime equipped with the Fritz-X and Hs 293.
已经勉力应付俄罗斯和西方重兵压境的德国空军还遭受美国B17和B24的地毯轰炸。第三帝国再也不能部署超过六架同时携带有弗里茨-X和亨舍尔293的轰炸机编队了。
When the Luftwaffe ruled the skies over Poland and France in 1939, this mighthave been enough. By late 1943, a guided-bomb run was practically suicide.
在1939年，当德国纳粹空军主宰了波兰和法国的天空时，这恐怕就足够了。到了1943年底，一枚制导炸弹飞来，差不多就是在自杀。
German bombers making daylight attacks had to run a gauntlet of fightersprotecting Allied ships in the daytime. Night attacks were marginally safer forthe bombers but still exposed them to radar-equipped British and American nightfighters. The Allies aggressively bombed any airfield suspected of harboringthe smart bombers.
进行日间袭击的德国轰炸机不得不与在白天保护盟军的歼击机对决。夜袭让轰炸机稍微安全些，但是他们仍会暴露在装备有雷达的英美夜间歼击机面前。盟军主动轰炸任何被怀疑泊有智能轰炸机的机场。
“Allied fighter air cover was by far the most important factor,” Bollinger tells War is Boring. “Not only did it lead tolarge numbers of glide-bombing aircraft getting shot down, it also forced theGermans to shift missions from daylight to dusk or nighttime. This in itselflead to a major and measurable reduction in accuracy.”
“盟军歼击机的空中掩护是迄今为止最重要的因素”博林格在《战争是无聊的》里面说。“不仅是因为他导致大量的滑翔炸弹飞机坠毁，它也迫使德军把任务从白天转向黄昏或夜晚。这是导致制导武器精度下降的主要和明显原因。”
Many raids would cost the Germans a few bombers. By the standards of thethousand-bomber raids over Germany, this was trifling. But for the handful ofspecially trained and equipped Luftwaffe squadrons, it was catastrophic.
多次偷袭会让德军损失一些轰炸机。以全德国数以千计的轰炸机突袭来看，这是微不足道的。但是对于一些经过特殊训练、有特殊装备的德国纳粹空军中队来说，这是灾难性的。
Of the 903 aircraft sorties, Bollinger estimates that in 112 of them, thebombers were lost before launching their weapons. Another 21 were shot down orcrashed on the return flight, for an overall loss ratio of 15 percent.
在903架次中，据博林格估测，他们中的112次，轰炸机在投射武器前就损失掉了。另外21次被击落或者在返航途中坠毁，总损失率达到了15%。
“Each time a pilot departed on a glide bomb mission, he had almost aone-in-seven chance of never returning in that aircraft safely,” Bollingersays. “Put another way, the probability that a pilot would return safely aftereach of the first 10 missions was only 20 percent.”
“每次，当一名飞行员去执行一次滑翔炸弹任务，他几乎有七分之一的几率永远不会再开着飞机安全回来，”博林格说，“换句话说，一个飞行员完成头十次任务能安全归来的概率只有20%。”
Learning from history
从历史中学习
The rise and fall of the Nazi anti-ship missiles offers lessons for the U.S.and its opponents in the present day. American planners worry that smartanti-ship weapons in the hands of China, smaller nations like Iran or eveninsurgent groups could threaten U.S. warships and amphibious forces.
纳粹反舰导弹的兴衰给今天的美国和他的对手上了一课。美国的决策者担忧中国手中的只能反舰武器，小一点的国家，如伊朗或者甚至是反美团体 都能威胁美国的军舰和两栖力量。
One lesson from the 1940s is that passive defenses such as jamming have limitedutility against access denial weapons. The best defense is to destroy thelaunch vehicle before it can fire. “Kill the archer” is the term the Pentagonuses.
1940年代的一课就是，消极防御措施，诸如干扰措施，对阻断武器效用有限。最好的防御是在发射载具开火前将其摧毁。“杀死弓箭手”是五角大楼使用的术语。
China stands to learn the most profound lesson. For all the power and terror ofthe German anti-ship weapons, they could not compensate for the inability of theGerman navy and Luftwaffe to confront the Allied navies on the open seas.
中国学习了最深刻的一课。对于德军反舰武器的全部力量和威慑力，他们不能用德国海、空军与盟军在公海上遭遇时的无能表现来抵销。
Smart bombs did worry Allied commanders, but the new munitions couldn’t preventthe amphibious invasions of Italy and France. Chinese missiles might disruptU.S. operations, but they are no substitute for countering a powerful navy withan effective navy of your own.
智能炸弹的确让盟军司令官忧虑，但是新武器不能阻止两栖登陆意大利和法国。中国的导弹可能会扰乱美军的行动，但是他们并不能取代各自拥有的强大且有效的海军的对抗。
Perhaps the biggest lesson of all is that what is new is old. With each passingyear, the weapons of World War II seem closer to the era of Gettysburg andJutland than the high-tech warfare of today. That perception can encourage anunjustified smugness.
或许，所有这一切中最大的一课是：什么是新生的，什么是老旧的。每过一年，二战的武器就更像葛底斯堡和日德兰半岛时代，多过像现代高科技战争。这种看法只会滋生一种不必要的自以为是。
The problems modern navies and air forces struggle with—anti-ship guidedmissiles, jamming, operations in contested airspace—were the same that Germanpilots and Allied sailors faced.
困扰着现代海空军的问题是——反舰制导导弹、干扰、争夺制空权——与德军飞行员和盟军海员所面对的一样。
The terror that the crew of an Italian battleship, British cruiser or Americanmerchant ship felt at the sight of German missiles might not differ from what aU.S. destroyer or carrier crew might feel while being targeted by Chinese ballisticmissiles.
意大利战列舰船员，英国巡洋舰或者美国商船，看到德国导弹时的恐惧或许与一艘美国驱逐舰或航母船员，成为中国弹道导弹的目标时的感受没有什么不同。
标题：The Nazi Smart Bombs That Inspired China’s Ship-Killing Missiles -DF21D
纳粹的智能炸弹启发了中国的反舰导弹 DF21D
正文：Germany’s secret weapons threatened warships 70years before China’s carrier-killers
德国能威胁战舰的秘密武器比中国的航母杀手早70年
What is that strange bomb in the sky?
空中那奇怪的炸弹是什么？
That’s what the sailors of the Italian battleship Roma must have wondered inthe final moments before they died.
这一定是意大利罗马号战列舰的船员们临死前的疑问。
Navalwarfare changed on Sept. 9, 1943. Dictator Benito Mussolini had beendeposed, the new Italian government was abandoning a lost war and its doomed Nazially and the Italian fleet was sailing to Malta to surrender. Butthe habitually treacherous Nazis, who had always suspected their Italian alliesof similar trickery, detected the Italian ships leaving port.
1943年9月9日这一天改变了海战。法西斯独裁者墨索里尼宣布新意大利政府放弃这场失败的战争，这昭示了纳粹盟友的覆灭，意大利的舰队开赴马耳他投降。然而生性狡诈的纳粹，总是怀疑，意大利的盟友在耍相似的把戏，侦测到了意大利船舶离港。
The Luftwaffe dispatched a force of Dornier Do-217 bombersto deal with the Italian ships.
纳粹德国空军派遣道尼尔217轰炸机去对付意大利船只。
As the bombers approached, the Italians were unsure whether the Germans meantto attack or just intimidate. They were relieved to see the German aircraftappear to drop their bombs into the ocean. Perhaps with uncharacteristicgentleness, the Germans were just firing warning shots.
当轰炸机飞临时，意大利人不确定德国人是要攻击他们或者只是恐吓。当看到德国飞机向大海里扔炸弹时，就松了一口气。德国人只是在开火警告。
But then something unexpected happened. Instead of plunging straight down intothe sea, the bombs headed toward the Italian ships. One slammed into Roma’shull, exited out the other side and exploded in the water, destroying an engineroom.
但随后，出乎意料的事情发生了。炸弹没有直接冲向大海，而是冲着意大利船只而来。其中一发狠狠命中了罗马号的舰体，从船的另一侧穿出，并在水中爆炸，摧毁了动力室。
A second bomb penetrated the deck into the forward magazine, where shells forthe ship’s big 15-inch guns were stored. The battleship exploded, killing 1,253members of her crew.
第二发炸弹破开甲板钻入舰艏弹仓，那里存有15英寸舰炮炮弹。战列舰爆炸了，杀死了全部1253名船员。
The age of the ship-killing missile had dawned.
对舰导弹的时代到来了。
The first anti-ship smart bombs, invented like so many other weapons by the darkscientists of Nazi Germany, were not just deadly. They seemedinhuman. A “Wellsian weapon from Mars,” was how one newspaper reporterdescribed an early attack.
第一种反舰智能炸弹，由德国纳粹的邪恶科学家们发明，他们还发明了许多类似武器。这种炸弹不仅是致命的，看起来也是不人道的。“来自火星的幻想武器。”
在（这种炸弹）早期的某次袭击时，一位报纸记者如此形容。
Smart bombs have become so common in modern warfare that we take them for granted.Yet 70 years ago, a bomb that could chase a ship seemed as exotic andfrightening as the muskets of the conquistadors must have seemed to the Aztecs.The Germans “made them [the missiles] turn corners,” an Allied sailorcomplained.
智能炸弹在现代战争中是如此普遍，以致于我们习以为常了。但在70年前，一种能够追踪船只的炸弹，看起来是如此的奇异而令人恐惧，就好像阿兹特克人面对征服者的步枪时一样。德国人“让他们（导弹）转弯”一位盟军海员抱怨道。
Anti-ship guided missiles have been used for decades now. Missiles sank theIsraeli destroyer Eilat in 1967 and the British destroyer Sheffield in 1982.Today, China hopes that weapons such as the DF-21D ballistic missile, with arange of a thousand miles, can sink U.S. aircraft carriers and thus neutralizeAmerican naval power in the Pacific.
反舰追踪导弹已被应用数十年了。它们在1967年击沉了以色列艾特拉号驱逐舰，在1982年击沉了英国谢菲尔德号驱逐舰。今天，中国希望射程达到一千英里的 同类武器——东风-21D弹道导弹能击沉美国的航空母舰，以抵销美国在太平洋的海军力量。
But these weapons did not materialize overnight in a Beijing weapons lab. Theyare the fruits of Nazi research from more than 70 years ago.
但这些武器不是一夜之间就出现在北京的武器实验室里的。他们是70年前纳粹的研究成果。
The weapon that sank Roma was known by the very German name Fritz-X. It was nota powered missile but a 3,000-pound armor-piercing gravity bomb meant to bedropped from a bomber at 20,000 feet.
击沉罗马号的武器有个很德国式的名称 弗里茨-X。它不是大威力导弹，而是由轰炸机从20000英尺高度丢下来的3000磅重的重型穿甲弹。
Battleships were armored to survive multiple bomb hits—in 1944, the Japanesesuper-battleship Musashi was hit by 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes before sinking.But a bomb dropped from high enough should have enough kinetic energy, impartedby gravity, to smash through thick deck armor.
战列舰覆有装甲，能在众多炸弹的轰击下存活——1944年，日本的超级战列舰“武藏号”在沉没前经受了17枚炸弹和19发鱼雷的打击。但是，一枚炸弹从足够高的高空坠落，会有足够大的动能，在重力的作用下，就能捣碎厚重的甲板装甲。
The problem was hitting the battleship in the first place. High-flying bombersin the 1940s had scant chance of hitting a warship frantically weaving throughthe water at 30 knots. That meant aircraft had to come in low to attack, whichmade them easier targets for the ship’s antiaircraft guns and also robbed thebombs of kinetic energy.
问题是，命中战列舰最为关键。在1940年代，高速飞行的轰炸机只有很小的几率能击中以三十节的速度在水中疯狂穿梭的军舰。这意味着飞机不得不进行低空轰炸，这使他们更容易成为高射炮的靶子，也剥夺了炸弹的动能。
The 11-foot-long Fritz-X, slung under the wing of a bomber, had radio-controlled fins that could change the munition’sglide path. A tail-mounted flare enabled the operatoron the bomber to track and adjust the weapon’s course. Tests showed that 50percent of bombs would land within five meters of the target—astoundingaccuracy for the 1940s.
11英尺长的弗里茨-X，采用了轰炸机翼下式悬挂，拥有能改变弹体下滑航迹的无线电遥控舵面。尾嵌的照明筒，能让轰炸机上的操作员跟踪并调整炸弹的航向。试验表明 50%的炸弹会在目标5米内着弹——在1940年代，这是骇人听闻的精度。
Does this sound familiar? It should, because the concept endures in modernweapon such as America’s Joint Direct Attack Munition, a kit that makes dumbbombs smart by adding fins and satellite guidance.
这是不是听起来耳熟？是的，因为现代武器也秉持了这种理念，比如 美国的JDAM（联合直接攻击弹药）——一种通过附加弹翼和卫星制导的方式使航空炸弹智能化的装备。
The Fritz-X was an awesome battleship-killer, but only under the rightconditions. A glide bomb has only gravity ratherthan a rocket motor for propulsion. The steerable fins on the Fritz-X couldadjust its trajectory only slightly, meaning the bomb had to be dropped withinthree miles of the target.
弗里茨-X是让人恐惧的军舰杀手，但是，只有在恰当的条件下才是如此。滑翔炸弹只靠重力而没有火箭动力推进。弗里茨-X上的导向弹翼只能轻微地调整航迹，这意味着，炸弹要在目标三海里之内投放。
While deadly to heavily armored warships, the armor-piercing Fritz-X wasactually too much bomb for small ships. It would slice all the way through unarmored destroyers and transportsand explode in the sea.
尽管对重甲舰是致命的，可对小船来说 弗里茨-X 炸弹太大了。它会一路切开遇到的没有装甲的驱逐舰和运输舰，然后在海中爆炸。
The Nazis had another weapon, a genuine anti-ship missile called the Hs 293.The 12-foot-long weapon looked like a miniature airplane with a rocket motorslung underneath.
纳粹分子还有另一种武器，一个名副其实的反舰导弹——亨舍尔293.这个12英尺长的武器看起来像一架微型飞机，腹下悬挂有火箭发动机。
The radio-controlled Hs 293 could be launched from 10 miles away, out of rangeof shipboard anti-aircraft guns. Its 2,300-pound high-explosive warheaddetonated on contact with a lightly armored ship.
用无线电遥控的亨舍尔293 能从10英里外发射——这超出了舰载高射炮的射程。一接触到轻甲舰它那2300磅重的高爆弹头就爆炸。
“In a typical deployment, the attacking aircraft would approachthe target to within 12 kilometers (6 miles), then fly a parallel course in theopposite direction,” writes Martin Bollinger, author of Wizards and Warriors:The Development and Defeat of Radio Controlled Glide Bombs of the Third Reich.
“一种典型的战术部署是，敌机先接近至目标12千米（6英里）内，然后向相反的方向平行飞去，”《巫师与武士：第三帝国无线电遥控滑翔炸弹的发展和失败》一书的作者马丁·博林格写道。
【译注:此处的attacking aircraft 的 用法很少见到，把他翻译成敌机，也很忐忑。个人感觉，如果此处是 attack aircraft 就很顺了，attack aircraft 强击机，用来投空舰导弹也很合适，问题是投掷Hs293的飞机都是除了轰炸机就是侦察机Nazi唯一一款真正（别提斯图卡）意义上的强击机“突爪鹰”还没来得及试飞···，思来想去，或许问题出在attacking aircraft上。 求大神吧】
“When the ship was about 45 degrees off the forward right side, the aircraftlaunched the HS-293,” Bollinger continues. “The Waltherliquid-fueled rocket, running for 10 or 12 seconds, would accelerate toabout 600 kilometers per hour (325 knots), at which point the operator hadturned the missile into the target.”
“当军舰在大约在右前方45°的时候，飞机会发射HS293，”博林格继续说。“瓦尔特液体燃料火箭，在10-12秒间，会把导弹加速到600时速600千米（325节），此时操作员已经把火箭对准了目标。”
“Once the rocket burned out,” Bollinger explains, “the missile continued withits forward momentum, maintaining a glide by virtue of short wings, until theoperator steered it into the target.”
“一旦火箭耗尽，”博林格解释道，“导弹借助它的前冲力借助和弹体上短翅的优势继续滑行，直到操作员把它驶到目标。”
Theelectric razor missile defense
“电动剃须刀导弹防御系统”
The British and Americans were gravely worried. By the fall of 1943, Alliedforces had captured North Africa and Sicily, the U-boat threat was diminishingand the Luftwaffe faded before growing Allied air strength. Now the Brits andAmericans could focus on the dangerous task of landing their armies on the Europeancontinent.
英军和美军很担心。到了1943年，盟军已经占领了北非和西西里岛，U艇的威胁减退，纳粹空军在盟军日渐增长的空中力量面前也黯然失色。现在英军和美军能把精力集中在登陆欧洲大陆的危险任务上了。
【U艇：特指两次世界大战中的德军潜艇。】
First they had to thwart the new German ship-killers. The Allies could mostlyprotect the vulnerable amphibious invasion fleets from regular German airattacks. But if German aircraft could stand off at a distance and lob bombswith pinpoint accuracy onto the soft-skinned transports and their escorts, thenthe Third Reich might stave off invasion.
首先，他们得阻止德军的舰艇杀手。通常，盟军能够在德军的定期空袭下保全脆弱的两栖登陆舰船。但是，如果德国飞机远距离飞行，还能向脆皮的运输舰及其护卫舰精准投掷炸弹的话，那么第三帝国可能会艰难阻止登陆。
Fortunately, a disgruntled German scientist had warned the Allies about thesmart bombs in 1939, and Ultra code-breakers had intercepted Germancommunications regarding the weapons.
幸运地是，在1939年，一个不满的德国科学家 向德军警告了这种智能炸弹，并且，超级破译员截获了关于这种武器的通讯。
The British outfitted the sloop Egret with special equipment to identify theradio frequencies used to control the German munitions. Some 13 days beforeRoma was sunk, Egret joined a convoy sailing within range of German bombersbased in France.
英军在白鹭号护卫舰上装备了特殊设备以找到用来控制德军武器的无线电频率。
大约在罗马号被击沉的13天前，白鹭号参加了一次在部署于法国的德军轰炸机覆盖之下的护航行动。
As hoped, the Germans attacked the convoy with Hs 293 missiles. Unfortunately,one of the ships sunk was Egret.
不出所料，德军用亨舍尔293导弹攻击了船队。不幸地是，白鹭号沉了。
The Allied landing at the southern Italian port of Salernoon Sept. 3, 1943 was a wake-up call for alliance. The Germans counterattackedand almost drove the Anglo-American troops into the sea. Gunfire from Alliedwarships saved the landing force … and the entire operation.
1943年9月3日，盟军于意大利南部港口萨勒诺登陆，这为他的盟国敲响了警钟。德军的反击，几乎把英美联军赶到了海里。来自盟军军舰的炮火保住了登陆部队···和整个行动。
But at a terrible cost. The Luftwaffe launched more than 100 Fritz-X and Hs 293weapons. A Fritz-X struck the famous British battleshipWarspite and put the vessel out of commission for months.
但这建立在可怕的代价上。纳粹空军发射了超过100枚弗里茨-X和亨舍尔293。一枚弗里茨-X重创了著名的英国战列舰厌战号，并让它脱离了战斗序列几个月。
Another Fritz-X hit a gun turret on the U.S. light cruiserSavannah and “penetrated through the two-inch armored surface of theturret, tore through three more decks and exploded in the ammunition handlingroom deep in the bowels of the ship,” Bollinger writes.
另一枚弗里茨-X击中了美国轻型巡洋舰萨凡纳号的炮塔并且“穿透了覆有两英寸装甲的炮塔，撕裂了三层甲板，然后在深藏于船腹的弹药转运室中爆炸”博林格写道。
Miraculously, Savannah survived—but 197 of her crew did not. German guidedweapons sank and badly damaged around a dozen ships off Salerno.
神奇的是，萨凡纳活了下来——但她的197名舰员没有。在萨勒诺，德国的制导武器击沉和重创了十几艘船。
Convoyssailing the Atlantic and Mediterranean also suffered. ConvoyKMF-26, whose escort included included two U.S. destroyers equippedwith the first anti-missile jammers, was attackedoff the Algerian coast on Nov. 26, 1943.
在大西洋和地中海的运输航行也有同样的遭遇。1943年11月26日运送编队KMF-26——护航编队里有装载了首个反导干扰器的两艘美国驱逐舰——在阿尔及利亚海岸被袭击。
An Hs 293 slammed into the troop transport Rohna,carrying U.S. soldiers to India. At least 1,149 passengers and crew died inwhat Bollinger describes as the “greatest loss of life of U.S. service membersat sea in a single ship in the history of the United States.”
一枚亨舍尔293摧毁了载有运往印度的美军士兵的隆那号运输舰。至少1149名乘客和船员葬身于这次被博林格形容为“美国历史上单次事件中海上的最大伤亡”。
It was not until the 1960s that U.S. authorities even admitted that Rohna hadbeen sunk by a guided missile rather than conventional weapons.
直到1960年代，美国当局甚至才承认隆那号是被制导导弹，而非常规武器击沉的。
Rumor spread among desperate sailors that switching on electric razors wouldjam the radio frequencies of the “Chase Me Charlies,” as the British called theguided munitions.
谣言在绝望的水手间散播，有一种说法是，打开电动剃须刀会干扰“追我的查理”（英军这样称呼制导武器）的无线电频率。
An urgent and massive anti-missile effort ensued. Ships were told to lay downsmokescreens so Germans aircrews couldn’t see their targets—and to takehigh-speed evasive action under attack. But how could anchored transportsunloading troops and supplies, or warships providing naval gunfire, maneuver athigh speed?
一场急迫而大规模的反导尝试随之而来。船舶被告知要在烟幕中停泊，这样德军飞行员就看不清他们的目标了；然后在遭到攻击时，要做出高速的规避动作。但是该怎么让抛锚的运输舰卸下军队和补给，或是怎么让军舰在高速机动状态下用舰炮射击呢？
The Allies pinned their hopes on electronic warfare, another class of modern weaponryoriginating in World War II. The British were already dropping aluminum foildecoys to jam German radars. Less well-known are theAllies’ intensive efforts to disrupt German anti-ship missiles.
盟军寄希望于电子对抗——另一种发源于二战的现代武器门类。英军已经用空投铝箔诱饵的方式干扰德军的雷达了。不太为人所知是，盟军加紧努力来干扰德军的反舰导弹。
Allied agents interrogatedcaptured Luftwaffe aircrew. Recovery teams sifted through missile fragmentsfrom damaged ships and examined remnants of bombers left behind on airfields inItaly.
盟军特工审讯被俘的纳粹空军的空勤人员。复原小组从损毁的船只里筛选导弹碎片，并调查被遗留在意大利机场的轰炸机残骸。
The most intensive work took place in labs across Britain and America includingthe U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, where scientists worked feverishly to jamthe radio frequencies used by German missile controllers. operators to controlthe missiles.
最为紧张的工作在遍布英美的实验室里展开，包括美国海军研究实验室，在那里，科学家们发疯似的工作，为了干扰德军导弹控制器、操作员的无线电频率。
The British chose barrage jamming of multiple frequencies, while the Americansopted for what they considered a more efficient technique of jamming onlyspecific frequencies. The U.S. installed the first jammers on two destroyers inSeptember 1943.
英国人选择了对全波段、多重频率进行干扰，而美国人选择了他们认为更有效的技术，只对特殊频率实施干扰。1943年9月美国在两艘驱逐舰上安装了首批干扰器。
The first anti-missile jammers were primitive and cumbersome by today’sstandards. American equipment required multiple operators and devices toidentify the correct frequency and match the jammer to the frequency—and do itall in 10 or 20 seconds before the missile hit its target.
以今天的标准来看，第一种反导干扰器原始而笨重。这种美国设备需要多个操作员和设备来确定正确频率，然后把干扰器校对到这一频率——这一切都要在导弹命中目标前10或20秒内完成。
Early jammers didn’t work. Based on faulty intelligence, the Allies guessedthat the German missiles were controlled by High Frequency signals under 30MHz. The German actually used the Very High Frequency band of around 50 MHz.
早期的干扰器并不起作用。基于错误情报，盟军猜测德军导弹是由低于30兆赫的高频信号控制的。实际上，德军使用的是50MHz左右的甚高频段。
The missiles kept coming.
导弹滚滚来
Yet by August 1944, the Germans missile campaign was over. Some of the last Hs293s were not even launched at ships, but against French bridges used byPatton’s advancing tank columns. Less than a year after its dramatic debut, theGerman smart bomb threat disappeared.
然而，到了1944年8月，德军的导弹战结束了。最后的一些亨舍尔293其实没有发射到舰艇上，而是被巴顿的先遣坦克部队用在了法国大桥上。粉墨登场不到一年，德国的智能炸弹威胁就此绝迹。
It’s hard to estimate losses caused by the guided weapons. German air raidssaturated Allied defenses by combining smart bomb attacks with conventionaldive bomber and torpedo assaults, so it is always not clear which weapon hit aship.
很难估计制导武器造成的损失。德军空袭 用智能炸弹，常规的俯冲轰炸机和鱼雷突袭的方式渗透盟军防线，所以，通常难以弄清是那种武器击中了船只。
The Allies also tried to maintain morale by attributing guided weapon losses toconventional weapons.
盟军也尝试把制导武器造成的损失归因于常规武器来维持士气。
Bollinger counts 903 aircraft sorties that carried around 1,200 guided weapons.Of those 1,200, almost a third were never fired because the launch aircraftaborted or were intercepted.
博林格认为有903架次飞机携带了1200枚左右的制导武器。在这1200枚中，有三分之一从来没有发射过，因为发射它的飞机坠毁或被拦截了。
Of the remaining 700 weapons, another third malfunctioned. Of the approximately470 whose guidance systems worked, at most 51—or just over 10 percent—actuallyhit their targets or landed close enough to damage them.
对于剩下的700枚，另有三分之一因故障失灵了。对于接近470枚制导系统有效的武器来说，最多有51枚——或者说刚刚超过10%——击中了或者掉落得足够近破坏了目标。
Bollinger calculates that just 17 to 24 ships were sunk and 14 to 21 damaged.
博林格 推测 只有17至24艘舰艇被击沉，14-21艘损坏。
“At most, only one weapon in 24 dispatched from a German airfield scored a hitor damage-causing near miss,” Bollinger writes. “Only about one in 14 of themissiles launched achieved similar success, and at most one in nine of thoseknown to respond to operator guidance was able to hit the target or causesignificant damage via a near-miss.”
“从德军机场调配到命中或接近命中引起损伤的武器最多只有二十四分之一。”博林格写道“只有大约十四分之一发射出去的导弹取得了战果，然后最多有九分之一的可以对操作员导航做出反应的武器能够命中，或者通过近似命中造成重大损伤。”
“This is very different from the 50-percent hit rate experienced duringoperational testing,” Bollinger points out.
“这与可操作性测验中得到的50%的命中率有很大差异。”博林格指出。
To be fair, the technology was new. There were no lasers or fire controlcomputers. The Fritz-X and Hs 293 were manually guided all the way. Operatorshad to track both missile and target through cloud, fog and smoke, without thebenefit of modern thermal sights.
说句公道话，那是新技术。那时还没有激光器或火控计算机。弗里茨-X和亨舍尔293全程都靠手动导航。操作员得透过云层、烟雾，在没有现代热视技术的情况下，追踪导弹和目标的轨迹。
“It was virtually impossible to hit a ship that was steaming more than 20 knotsand could fire back,” Bollinger tells War is Boring. “Almost all ofthe hits were against slow and/or defenseless targets.”
“命中一艘以超过20节的速度行驶，而且会还击的船几乎是不可能的。”博林格在《战争是无聊的》中说，“几乎所有的命中都是对缓慢且/或 缺乏防御的目标造成的。”
Bollinger hypothesizes that a phenomenon called “multi-path interference,”unknown at the time, may also have hampered the performance of the Hs 293.Radio command signals sent from the bomber to the missile might have overshotthe weapon, bounced off the ocean surface below and interfered with the missileguidance signal.
博林格假设了一个叫“多径干扰”的现象——在当时并不为人所知——可能也妨碍了亨舍尔293的表现。从轰炸机发向导弹的无线电指令信号，可能已经超过了武器，在洋面上反射回来，并且和武器制导信号发生了干涉。
The early jammers were ineffective, but Bollinger believes that by the time ofthe Normandy assault in June 1944, the equipment had improved enough to offer ameasure of protection—and partly explains why German missiles performed poorlylater in the war.
早期的干扰器是无效的，但是博林格认为，到了1944年6月的诺曼底登陆时，这个装备被证明能够提供一些保护——这也部分地解释了为什么德军导弹在此后的战争中表现得如此糟糕。
Strangely, while the Germans took measures to counteract Allied jamming oftheir air defense radars, they never really addressed the possibility thattheir anti-ship missiles were also being jammed.
奇怪的是，当德军采取措施抵销盟军对他们防空雷达的干扰时，他们从未真正应对他们的反舰导弹也被干扰的可能。
It’s wrong to blame the bomb for the faults of the bomber. The real cause forthe failure of German smart bombs was that by the time they were introduced inlate 1943, the Luftwaffe was almost a spent force.
因轰炸机的错误去责备炸弹是错误的。德军智能炸弹失败的真正原因是他们自己在1943年底引入的，这让纳粹空军几乎成了废柴。
【a spent force 习语 强弩之末，这里按照本意翻译更适当。】
Already thinly spread supporting the hard-pressed armies in Russia and theWest, the German air arm suffered relentless bombardment by U.S. B-17s andB-24s. The Third Reich could never deploy more than six bomber squadrons at atime equipped with the Fritz-X and Hs 293.
已经勉力应付俄罗斯和西方重兵压境的德国空军还遭受美国B17和B24的地毯轰炸。第三帝国再也不能部署超过六架同时携带有弗里茨-X和亨舍尔293的轰炸机编队了。
When the Luftwaffe ruled the skies over Poland and France in 1939, this mighthave been enough. By late 1943, a guided-bomb run was practically suicide.
在1939年，当德国纳粹空军主宰了波兰和法国的天空时，这恐怕就足够了。到了1943年底，一枚制导炸弹飞来，差不多就是在自杀。
German bombers making daylight attacks had to run a gauntlet of fightersprotecting Allied ships in the daytime. Night attacks were marginally safer forthe bombers but still exposed them to radar-equipped British and American nightfighters. The Allies aggressively bombed any airfield suspected of harboringthe smart bombers.
进行日间袭击的德国轰炸机不得不与在白天保护盟军的歼击机对决。夜袭让轰炸机稍微安全些，但是他们仍会暴露在装备有雷达的英美夜间歼击机面前。盟军主动轰炸任何被怀疑泊有智能轰炸机的机场。
“Allied fighter air cover was by far the most important factor,” Bollinger tells War is Boring. “Not only did it lead tolarge numbers of glide-bombing aircraft getting shot down, it also forced theGermans to shift missions from daylight to dusk or nighttime. This in itselflead to a major and measurable reduction in accuracy.”
“盟军歼击机的空中掩护是迄今为止最重要的因素”博林格在《战争是无聊的》里面说。“不仅是因为他导致大量的滑翔炸弹飞机坠毁，它也迫使德军把任务从白天转向黄昏或夜晚。这是导致制导武器精度下降的主要和明显原因。”
Many raids would cost the Germans a few bombers. By the standards of thethousand-bomber raids over Germany, this was trifling. But for the handful ofspecially trained and equipped Luftwaffe squadrons, it was catastrophic.
多次偷袭会让德军损失一些轰炸机。以全德国数以千计的轰炸机突袭来看，这是微不足道的。但是对于一些经过特殊训练、有特殊装备的德国纳粹空军中队来说，这是灾难性的。
Of the 903 aircraft sorties, Bollinger estimates that in 112 of them, thebombers were lost before launching their weapons. Another 21 were shot down orcrashed on the return flight, for an overall loss ratio of 15 percent.
在903架次中，据博林格估测，他们中的112次，轰炸机在投射武器前就损失掉了。另外21次被击落或者在返航途中坠毁，总损失率达到了15%。
“Each time a pilot departed on a glide bomb mission, he had almost aone-in-seven chance of never returning in that aircraft safely,” Bollingersays. “Put another way, the probability that a pilot would return safely aftereach of the first 10 missions was only 20 percent.”
“每次，当一名飞行员去执行一次滑翔炸弹任务，他几乎有七分之一的几率永远不会再开着飞机安全回来，”博林格说，“换句话说，一个飞行员完成头十次任务能安全归来的概率只有20%。”
Learning from history
从历史中学习
The rise and fall of the Nazi anti-ship missiles offers lessons for the U.S.and its opponents in the present day. American planners worry that smartanti-ship weapons in the hands of China, smaller nations like Iran or eveninsurgent groups could threaten U.S. warships and amphibious forces.
纳粹反舰导弹的兴衰给今天的美国和他的对手上了一课。美国的决策者担忧中国手中的只能反舰武器，小一点的国家，如伊朗或者甚至是反美团体 都能威胁美国的军舰和两栖力量。
One lesson from the 1940s is that passive defenses such as jamming have limitedutility against access denial weapons. The best defense is to destroy thelaunch vehicle before it can fire. “Kill the archer” is the term the Pentagonuses.
1940年代的一课就是，消极防御措施，诸如干扰措施，对阻断武器效用有限。最好的防御是在发射载具开火前将其摧毁。“杀死弓箭手”是五角大楼使用的术语。
China stands to learn the most profound lesson. For all the power and terror ofthe German anti-ship weapons, they could not compensate for the inability of theGerman navy and Luftwaffe to confront the Allied navies on the open seas.
中国学习了最深刻的一课。对于德军反舰武器的全部力量和威慑力，他们不能用德国海、空军与盟军在公海上遭遇时的无能表现来抵销。
Smart bombs did worry Allied commanders, but the new munitions couldn’t preventthe amphibious invasions of Italy and France. Chinese missiles might disruptU.S. operations, but they are no substitute for countering a powerful navy withan effective navy of your own.
智能炸弹的确让盟军司令官忧虑，但是新武器不能阻止两栖登陆意大利和法国。中国的导弹可能会扰乱美军的行动，但是他们并不能取代各自拥有的强大且有效的海军的对抗。
Perhaps the biggest lesson of all is that what is new is old. With each passingyear, the weapons of World War II seem closer to the era of Gettysburg andJutland than the high-tech warfare of today. That perception can encourage anunjustified smugness.
或许，所有这一切中最大的一课是：什么是新生的，什么是老旧的。每过一年，二战的武器就更像葛底斯堡和日德兰半岛时代，多过像现代高科技战争。这种看法只会滋生一种不必要的自以为是。
The problems modern navies and air forces struggle with—anti-ship guidedmissiles, jamming, operations in contested airspace—were the same that Germanpilots and Allied sailors faced.
困扰着现代海空军的问题是——反舰制导导弹、干扰、争夺制空权——与德军飞行员和盟军海员所面对的一样。
The terror that the crew of an Italian battleship, British cruiser or Americanmerchant ship felt at the sight of German missiles might not differ from what aU.S. destroyer or carrier crew might feel while being targeted by Chinese ballisticmissiles.
意大利战列舰船员，英国巡洋舰或者美国商船，看到德国导弹时的恐惧或许与一艘美国驱逐舰或航母船员，成为中国弹道导弹的目标时的感受没有什么不同。
链接：https://medium.com/war-is-boring/f826cfac42b
标题：The Nazi Smart Bombs That Inspired China’s Ship-Killing Missiles -DF21D
纳粹的智能炸弹启发了中国的反舰导弹 DF21D
正文：Germany’s secret weapons threatened warships 70years before China’s carrier-killers
德国能威胁战舰的秘密武器比中国的航母杀手早70年
What is that strange bomb in the sky?
空中那奇怪的炸弹是什么？
That’s what the sailors of the Italian battleship Roma must have wondered inthe final moments before they died.
这一定是意大利罗马号战列舰的船员们临死前的疑问。
Navalwarfare changed on Sept. 9, 1943. Dictator Benito Mussolini had beendeposed, the new Italian government was abandoning a lost war and its doomed Nazially and the Italian fleet was sailing to Malta to surrender. Butthe habitually treacherous Nazis, who had always suspected their Italian alliesof similar trickery, detected the Italian ships leaving port.
1943年9月9日这一天改变了海战。法西斯独裁者墨索里尼宣布新意大利政府放弃这场失败的战争，这昭示了纳粹盟友的覆灭，意大利的舰队开赴马耳他投降。然而生性狡诈的纳粹，总是怀疑，意大利的盟友在耍相似的把戏，侦测到了意大利船舶离港。
The Luftwaffe dispatched a force of Dornier Do-217 bombersto deal with the Italian ships.
纳粹德国空军派遣道尼尔217轰炸机去对付意大利船只。
As the bombers approached, the Italians were unsure whether the Germans meantto attack or just intimidate. They were relieved to see the German aircraftappear to drop their bombs into the ocean. Perhaps with uncharacteristicgentleness, the Germans were just firing warning shots.
当轰炸机飞临时，意大利人不确定德国人是要攻击他们或者只是恐吓。当看到德国飞机向大海里扔炸弹时，就松了一口气。德国人只是在开火警告。
But then something unexpected happened. Instead of plunging straight down intothe sea, the bombs headed toward the Italian ships. One slammed into Roma’shull, exited out the other side and exploded in the water, destroying an engineroom.
但随后，出乎意料的事情发生了。炸弹没有直接冲向大海，而是冲着意大利船只而来。其中一发狠狠命中了罗马号的舰体，从船的另一侧穿出，并在水中爆炸，摧毁了动力室。
A second bomb penetrated the deck into the forward magazine, where shells forthe ship’s big 15-inch guns were stored. The battleship exploded, killing 1,253members of her crew.
第二发炸弹破开甲板钻入舰艏弹仓，那里存有15英寸舰炮炮弹。战列舰爆炸了，杀死了全部1253名船员。
The age of the ship-killing missile had dawned.
对舰导弹的时代到来了。
The first anti-ship smart bombs, invented like so many other weapons by the darkscientists of Nazi Germany, were not just deadly. They seemedinhuman. A “Wellsian weapon from Mars,” was how one newspaper reporterdescribed an early attack.
第一种反舰智能炸弹，由德国纳粹的邪恶科学家们发明，他们还发明了许多类似武器。这种炸弹不仅是致命的，看起来也是不人道的。“来自火星的幻想武器。”
在（这种炸弹）早期的某次袭击时，一位报纸记者如此形容。
Smart bombs have become so common in modern warfare that we take them for granted.Yet 70 years ago, a bomb that could chase a ship seemed as exotic andfrightening as the muskets of the conquistadors must have seemed to the Aztecs.The Germans “made them [the missiles] turn corners,” an Allied sailorcomplained.
智能炸弹在现代战争中是如此普遍，以致于我们习以为常了。但在70年前，一种能够追踪船只的炸弹，看起来是如此的奇异而令人恐惧，就好像阿兹特克人面对征服者的步枪时一样。德国人“让他们（导弹）转弯”一位盟军海员抱怨道。
Anti-ship guided missiles have been used for decades now. Missiles sank theIsraeli destroyer Eilat in 1967 and the British destroyer Sheffield in 1982.Today, China hopes that weapons such as the DF-21D ballistic missile, with arange of a thousand miles, can sink U.S. aircraft carriers and thus neutralizeAmerican naval power in the Pacific.
反舰追踪导弹已被应用数十年了。它们在1967年击沉了以色列艾特拉号驱逐舰，在1982年击沉了英国谢菲尔德号驱逐舰。今天，中国希望射程达到一千英里的 同类武器——东风-21D弹道导弹能击沉美国的航空母舰，以抵销美国在太平洋的海军力量。
But these weapons did not materialize overnight in a Beijing weapons lab. Theyare the fruits of Nazi research from more than 70 years ago.
但这些武器不是一夜之间就出现在北京的武器实验室里的。他们是70年前纳粹的研究成果。
The weapon that sank Roma was known by the very German name Fritz-X. It was nota powered missile but a 3,000-pound armor-piercing gravity bomb meant to bedropped from a bomber at 20,000 feet.
击沉罗马号的武器有个很德国式的名称 弗里茨-X。它不是大威力导弹，而是由轰炸机从20000英尺高度丢下来的3000磅重的重型穿甲弹。
Battleships were armored to survive multiple bomb hits—in 1944, the Japanesesuper-battleship Musashi was hit by 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes before sinking.But a bomb dropped from high enough should have enough kinetic energy, impartedby gravity, to smash through thick deck armor.
战列舰覆有装甲，能在众多炸弹的轰击下存活——1944年，日本的超级战列舰“武藏号”在沉没前经受了17枚炸弹和19发鱼雷的打击。但是，一枚炸弹从足够高的高空坠落，会有足够大的动能，在重力的作用下，就能捣碎厚重的甲板装甲。
The problem was hitting the battleship in the first place. High-flying bombersin the 1940s had scant chance of hitting a warship frantically weaving throughthe water at 30 knots. That meant aircraft had to come in low to attack, whichmade them easier targets for the ship’s antiaircraft guns and also robbed thebombs of kinetic energy.
问题是，命中战列舰最为关键。在1940年代，高速飞行的轰炸机只有很小的几率能击中以三十节的速度在水中疯狂穿梭的军舰。这意味着飞机不得不进行低空轰炸，这使他们更容易成为高射炮的靶子，也剥夺了炸弹的动能。
The 11-foot-long Fritz-X, slung under the wing of a bomber, had radio-controlled fins that could change the munition’sglide path. A tail-mounted flare enabled the operatoron the bomber to track and adjust the weapon’s course. Tests showed that 50percent of bombs would land within five meters of the target—astoundingaccuracy for the 1940s.
11英尺长的弗里茨-X，采用了轰炸机翼下式悬挂，拥有能改变弹体下滑航迹的无线电遥控舵面。尾嵌的照明筒，能让轰炸机上的操作员跟踪并调整炸弹的航向。试验表明 50%的炸弹会在目标5米内着弹——在1940年代，这是骇人听闻的精度。
Does this sound familiar? It should, because the concept endures in modernweapon such as America’s Joint Direct Attack Munition, a kit that makes dumbbombs smart by adding fins and satellite guidance.
这是不是听起来耳熟？是的，因为现代武器也秉持了这种理念，比如 美国的JDAM（联合直接攻击弹药）——一种通过附加弹翼和卫星制导的方式使航空炸弹智能化的装备。
The Fritz-X was an awesome battleship-killer, but only under the rightconditions. A glide bomb has only gravity ratherthan a rocket motor for propulsion. The steerable fins on the Fritz-X couldadjust its trajectory only slightly, meaning the bomb had to be dropped withinthree miles of the target.
弗里茨-X是让人恐惧的军舰杀手，但是，只有在恰当的条件下才是如此。滑翔炸弹只靠重力而没有火箭动力推进。弗里茨-X上的导向弹翼只能轻微地调整航迹，这意味着，炸弹要在目标三海里之内投放。
While deadly to heavily armored warships, the armor-piercing Fritz-X wasactually too much bomb for small ships. It would slice all the way through unarmored destroyers and transportsand explode in the sea.
尽管对重甲舰是致命的，可对小船来说 弗里茨-X 炸弹太大了。它会一路切开遇到的没有装甲的驱逐舰和运输舰，然后在海中爆炸。
The Nazis had another weapon, a genuine anti-ship missile called the Hs 293.The 12-foot-long weapon looked like a miniature airplane with a rocket motorslung underneath.
纳粹分子还有另一种武器，一个名副其实的反舰导弹——亨舍尔293.这个12英尺长的武器看起来像一架微型飞机，腹下悬挂有火箭发动机。
The radio-controlled Hs 293 could be launched from 10 miles away, out of rangeof shipboard anti-aircraft guns. Its 2,300-pound high-explosive warheaddetonated on contact with a lightly armored ship.
用无线电遥控的亨舍尔293 能从10英里外发射——这超出了舰载高射炮的射程。一接触到轻甲舰它那2300磅重的高爆弹头就爆炸。
“In a typical deployment, the attacking aircraft would approachthe target to within 12 kilometers (6 miles), then fly a parallel course in theopposite direction,” writes Martin Bollinger, author of Wizards and Warriors:The Development and Defeat of Radio Controlled Glide Bombs of the Third Reich.
“一种典型的战术部署是，敌机先接近至目标12千米（6英里）内，然后向相反的方向平行飞去，”《巫师与武士：第三帝国无线电遥控滑翔炸弹的发展和失败》一书的作者马丁·博林格写道。
【译注:此处的attacking aircraft 的 用法很少见到，把他翻译成敌机，也很忐忑。个人感觉，如果此处是 attack aircraft 就很顺了，attack aircraft 强击机，用来投空舰导弹也很合适，问题是投掷Hs293的飞机都是除了轰炸机就是侦察机Nazi唯一一款真正（别提斯图卡）意义上的强击机“突爪鹰”还没来得及试飞···，思来想去，或许问题出在attacking aircraft上。 求大神吧】
“When the ship was about 45 degrees off the forward right side, the aircraftlaunched the HS-293,” Bollinger continues. “The Waltherliquid-fueled rocket, running for 10 or 12 seconds, would accelerate toabout 600 kilometers per hour (325 knots), at which point the operator hadturned the missile into the target.”
“当军舰在大约在右前方45°的时候，飞机会发射HS293，”博林格继续说。“瓦尔特液体燃料火箭，在10-12秒间，会把导弹加速到600时速600千米（325节），此时操作员已经把火箭对准了目标。”
“Once the rocket burned out,” Bollinger explains, “the missile continued withits forward momentum, maintaining a glide by virtue of short wings, until theoperator steered it into the target.”
“一旦火箭耗尽，”博林格解释道，“导弹借助它的前冲力借助和弹体上短翅的优势继续滑行，直到操作员把它驶到目标。”
Theelectric razor missile defense
“电动剃须刀导弹防御系统”
The British and Americans were gravely worried. By the fall of 1943, Alliedforces had captured North Africa and Sicily, the U-boat threat was diminishingand the Luftwaffe faded before growing Allied air strength. Now the Brits andAmericans could focus on the dangerous task of landing their armies on the Europeancontinent.
英军和美军很担心。到了1943年，盟军已经占领了北非和西西里岛，U艇的威胁减退，纳粹空军在盟军日渐增长的空中力量面前也黯然失色。现在英军和美军能把精力集中在登陆欧洲大陆的危险任务上了。
【U艇：特指两次世界大战中的德军潜艇。】
First they had to thwart the new German ship-killers. The Allies could mostlyprotect the vulnerable amphibious invasion fleets from regular German airattacks. But if German aircraft could stand off at a distance and lob bombswith pinpoint accuracy onto the soft-skinned transports and their escorts, thenthe Third Reich might stave off invasion.
首先，他们得阻止德军的舰艇杀手。通常，盟军能够在德军的定期空袭下保全脆弱的两栖登陆舰船。但是，如果德国飞机远距离飞行，还能向脆皮的运输舰及其护卫舰精准投掷炸弹的话，那么第三帝国可能会艰难阻止登陆。
Fortunately, a disgruntled German scientist had warned the Allies about thesmart bombs in 1939, and Ultra code-breakers had intercepted Germancommunications regarding the weapons.
幸运地是，在1939年，一个不满的德国科学家 向德军警告了这种智能炸弹，并且，超级破译员截获了关于这种武器的通讯。
The British outfitted the sloop Egret with special equipment to identify theradio frequencies used to control the German munitions. Some 13 days beforeRoma was sunk, Egret joined a convoy sailing within range of German bombersbased in France.
英军在白鹭号护卫舰上装备了特殊设备以找到用来控制德军武器的无线电频率。
大约在罗马号被击沉的13天前，白鹭号参加了一次在部署于法国的德军轰炸机覆盖之下的护航行动。
As hoped, the Germans attacked the convoy with Hs 293 missiles. Unfortunately,one of the ships sunk was Egret.
不出所料，德军用亨舍尔293导弹攻击了船队。不幸地是，白鹭号沉了。
The Allied landing at the southern Italian port of Salernoon Sept. 3, 1943 was a wake-up call for alliance. The Germans counterattackedand almost drove the Anglo-American troops into the sea. Gunfire from Alliedwarships saved the landing force … and the entire operation.
1943年9月3日，盟军于意大利南部港口萨勒诺登陆，这为他的盟国敲响了警钟。德军的反击，几乎把英美联军赶到了海里。来自盟军军舰的炮火保住了登陆部队···和整个行动。
But at a terrible cost. The Luftwaffe launched more than 100 Fritz-X and Hs 293weapons. A Fritz-X struck the famous British battleshipWarspite and put the vessel out of commission for months.
但这建立在可怕的代价上。纳粹空军发射了超过100枚弗里茨-X和亨舍尔293。一枚弗里茨-X重创了著名的英国战列舰厌战号，并让它脱离了战斗序列几个月。
Another Fritz-X hit a gun turret on the U.S. light cruiserSavannah and “penetrated through the two-inch armored surface of theturret, tore through three more decks and exploded in the ammunition handlingroom deep in the bowels of the ship,” Bollinger writes.
另一枚弗里茨-X击中了美国轻型巡洋舰萨凡纳号的炮塔并且“穿透了覆有两英寸装甲的炮塔，撕裂了三层甲板，然后在深藏于船腹的弹药转运室中爆炸”博林格写道。
Miraculously, Savannah survived—but 197 of her crew did not. German guidedweapons sank and badly damaged around a dozen ships off Salerno.
神奇的是，萨凡纳活了下来——但她的197名舰员没有。在萨勒诺，德国的制导武器击沉和重创了十几艘船。
Convoyssailing the Atlantic and Mediterranean also suffered. ConvoyKMF-26, whose escort included included two U.S. destroyers equippedwith the first anti-missile jammers, was attackedoff the Algerian coast on Nov. 26, 1943.
在大西洋和地中海的运输航行也有同样的遭遇。1943年11月26日运送编队KMF-26——护航编队里有装载了首个反导干扰器的两艘美国驱逐舰——在阿尔及利亚海岸被袭击。
An Hs 293 slammed into the troop transport Rohna,carrying U.S. soldiers to India. At least 1,149 passengers and crew died inwhat Bollinger describes as the “greatest loss of life of U.S. service membersat sea in a single ship in the history of the United States.”
一枚亨舍尔293摧毁了载有运往印度的美军士兵的隆那号运输舰。至少1149名乘客和船员葬身于这次被博林格形容为“美国历史上单次事件中海上的最大伤亡”。
It was not until the 1960s that U.S. authorities even admitted that Rohna hadbeen sunk by a guided missile rather than conventional weapons.
直到1960年代，美国当局甚至才承认隆那号是被制导导弹，而非常规武器击沉的。
Rumor spread among desperate sailors that switching on electric razors wouldjam the radio frequencies of the “Chase Me Charlies,” as the British called theguided munitions.
谣言在绝望的水手间散播，有一种说法是，打开电动剃须刀会干扰“追我的查理”（英军这样称呼制导武器）的无线电频率。
An urgent and massive anti-missile effort ensued. Ships were told to lay downsmokescreens so Germans aircrews couldn’t see their targets—and to takehigh-speed evasive action under attack. But how could anchored transportsunloading troops and supplies, or warships providing naval gunfire, maneuver athigh speed?
一场急迫而大规模的反导尝试随之而来。船舶被告知要在烟幕中停泊，这样德军飞行员就看不清他们的目标了；然后在遭到攻击时，要做出高速的规避动作。但是该怎么让抛锚的运输舰卸下军队和补给，或是怎么让军舰在高速机动状态下用舰炮射击呢？
The Allies pinned their hopes on electronic warfare, another class of modern weaponryoriginating in World War II. The British were already dropping aluminum foildecoys to jam German radars. Less well-known are theAllies’ intensive efforts to disrupt German anti-ship missiles.
盟军寄希望于电子对抗——另一种发源于二战的现代武器门类。英军已经用空投铝箔诱饵的方式干扰德军的雷达了。不太为人所知是，盟军加紧努力来干扰德军的反舰导弹。
Allied agents interrogatedcaptured Luftwaffe aircrew. Recovery teams sifted through missile fragmentsfrom damaged ships and examined remnants of bombers left behind on airfields inItaly.
盟军特工审讯被俘的纳粹空军的空勤人员。复原小组从损毁的船只里筛选导弹碎片，并调查被遗留在意大利机场的轰炸机残骸。
The most intensive work took place in labs across Britain and America includingthe U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, where scientists worked feverishly to jamthe radio frequencies used by German missile controllers. operators to controlthe missiles.
最为紧张的工作在遍布英美的实验室里展开，包括美国海军研究实验室，在那里，科学家们发疯似的工作，为了干扰德军导弹控制器、操作员的无线电频率。
The British chose barrage jamming of multiple frequencies, while the Americansopted for what they considered a more efficient technique of jamming onlyspecific frequencies. The U.S. installed the first jammers on two destroyers inSeptember 1943.
英国人选择了对全波段、多重频率进行干扰，而美国人选择了他们认为更有效的技术，只对特殊频率实施干扰。1943年9月美国在两艘驱逐舰上安装了首批干扰器。
The first anti-missile jammers were primitive and cumbersome by today’sstandards. American equipment required multiple operators and devices toidentify the correct frequency and match the jammer to the frequency—and do itall in 10 or 20 seconds before the missile hit its target.
以今天的标准来看，第一种反导干扰器原始而笨重。这种美国设备需要多个操作员和设备来确定正确频率，然后把干扰器校对到这一频率——这一切都要在导弹命中目标前10或20秒内完成。
Early jammers didn’t work. Based on faulty intelligence, the Allies guessedthat the German missiles were controlled by High Frequency signals under 30MHz. The German actually used the Very High Frequency band of around 50 MHz.
早期的干扰器并不起作用。基于错误情报，盟军猜测德军导弹是由低于30兆赫的高频信号控制的。实际上，德军使用的是50MHz左右的甚高频段。
The missiles kept coming.
导弹滚滚来
Yet by August 1944, the Germans missile campaign was over. Some of the last Hs293s were not even launched at ships, but against French bridges used byPatton’s advancing tank columns. Less than a year after its dramatic debut, theGerman smart bomb threat disappeared.
然而，到了1944年8月，德军的导弹战结束了。最后的一些亨舍尔293其实没有发射到舰艇上，而是被巴顿的先遣坦克部队用在了法国大桥上。粉墨登场不到一年，德国的智能炸弹威胁就此绝迹。
It’s hard to estimate losses caused by the guided weapons. German air raidssaturated Allied defenses by combining smart bomb attacks with conventionaldive bomber and torpedo assaults, so it is always not clear which weapon hit aship.
很难估计制导武器造成的损失。德军空袭 用智能炸弹，常规的俯冲轰炸机和鱼雷突袭的方式渗透盟军防线，所以，通常难以弄清是那种武器击中了船只。
The Allies also tried to maintain morale by attributing guided weapon losses toconventional weapons.
盟军也尝试把制导武器造成的损失归因于常规武器来维持士气。
Bollinger counts 903 aircraft sorties that carried around 1,200 guided weapons.Of those 1,200, almost a third were never fired because the launch aircraftaborted or were intercepted.
博林格认为有903架次飞机携带了1200枚左右的制导武器。在这1200枚中，有三分之一从来没有发射过，因为发射它的飞机坠毁或被拦截了。
Of the remaining 700 weapons, another third malfunctioned. Of the approximately470 whose guidance systems worked, at most 51—or just over 10 percent—actuallyhit their targets or landed close enough to damage them.
对于剩下的700枚，另有三分之一因故障失灵了。对于接近470枚制导系统有效的武器来说，最多有51枚——或者说刚刚超过10%——击中了或者掉落得足够近破坏了目标。
Bollinger calculates that just 17 to 24 ships were sunk and 14 to 21 damaged.
博林格 推测 只有17至24艘舰艇被击沉，14-21艘损坏。
“At most, only one weapon in 24 dispatched from a German airfield scored a hitor damage-causing near miss,” Bollinger writes. “Only about one in 14 of themissiles launched achieved similar success, and at most one in nine of thoseknown to respond to operator guidance was able to hit the target or causesignificant damage via a near-miss.”
“从德军机场调配到命中或接近命中引起损伤的武器最多只有二十四分之一。”博林格写道“只有大约十四分之一发射出去的导弹取得了战果，然后最多有九分之一的可以对操作员导航做出反应的武器能够命中，或者通过近似命中造成重大损伤。”
“This is very different from the 50-percent hit rate experienced duringoperational testing,” Bollinger points out.
“这与可操作性测验中得到的50%的命中率有很大差异。”博林格指出。
To be fair, the technology was new. There were no lasers or fire controlcomputers. The Fritz-X and Hs 293 were manually guided all the way. Operatorshad to track both missile and target through cloud, fog and smoke, without thebenefit of modern thermal sights.
说句公道话，那是新技术。那时还没有激光器或火控计算机。弗里茨-X和亨舍尔293全程都靠手动导航。操作员得透过云层、烟雾，在没有现代热视技术的情况下，追踪导弹和目标的轨迹。
“It was virtually impossible to hit a ship that was steaming more than 20 knotsand could fire back,” Bollinger tells War is Boring. “Almost all ofthe hits were against slow and/or defenseless targets.”
“命中一艘以超过20节的速度行驶，而且会还击的船几乎是不可能的。”博林格在《战争是无聊的》中说，“几乎所有的命中都是对缓慢且/或 缺乏防御的目标造成的。”
Bollinger hypothesizes that a phenomenon called “multi-path interference,”unknown at the time, may also have hampered the performance of the Hs 293.Radio command signals sent from the bomber to the missile might have overshotthe weapon, bounced off the ocean surface below and interfered with the missileguidance signal.
博林格假设了一个叫“多径干扰”的现象——在当时并不为人所知——可能也妨碍了亨舍尔293的表现。从轰炸机发向导弹的无线电指令信号，可能已经超过了武器，在洋面上反射回来，并且和武器制导信号发生了干涉。
The early jammers were ineffective, but Bollinger believes that by the time ofthe Normandy assault in June 1944, the equipment had improved enough to offer ameasure of protection—and partly explains why German missiles performed poorlylater in the war.
早期的干扰器是无效的，但是博林格认为，到了1944年6月的诺曼底登陆时，这个装备被证明能够提供一些保护——这也部分地解释了为什么德军导弹在此后的战争中表现得如此糟糕。
Strangely, while the Germans took measures to counteract Allied jamming oftheir air defense radars, they never really addressed the possibility thattheir anti-ship missiles were also being jammed.
奇怪的是，当德军采取措施抵销盟军对他们防空雷达的干扰时，他们从未真正应对他们的反舰导弹也被干扰的可能。
It’s wrong to blame the bomb for the faults of the bomber. The real cause forthe failure of German smart bombs was that by the time they were introduced inlate 1943, the Luftwaffe was almost a spent force.
因轰炸机的错误去责备炸弹是错误的。德军智能炸弹失败的真正原因是他们自己在1943年底引入的，这让纳粹空军几乎成了废柴。
【a spent force 习语 强弩之末，这里按照本意翻译更适当。】
Already thinly spread supporting the hard-pressed armies in Russia and theWest, the German air arm suffered relentless bombardment by U.S. B-17s andB-24s. The Third Reich could never deploy more than six bomber squadrons at atime equipped with the Fritz-X and Hs 293.
已经勉力应付俄罗斯和西方重兵压境的德国空军还遭受美国B17和B24的地毯轰炸。第三帝国再也不能部署超过六架同时携带有弗里茨-X和亨舍尔293的轰炸机编队了。
When the Luftwaffe ruled the skies over Poland and France in 1939, this mighthave been enough. By late 1943, a guided-bomb run was practically suicide.
在1939年，当德国纳粹空军主宰了波兰和法国的天空时，这恐怕就足够了。到了1943年底，一枚制导炸弹飞来，差不多就是在自杀。
German bombers making daylight attacks had to run a gauntlet of fightersprotecting Allied ships in the daytime. Night attacks were marginally safer forthe bombers but still exposed them to radar-equipped British and American nightfighters. The Allies aggressively bombed any airfield suspected of harboringthe smart bombers.
进行日间袭击的德国轰炸机不得不与在白天保护盟军的歼击机对决。夜袭让轰炸机稍微安全些，但是他们仍会暴露在装备有雷达的英美夜间歼击机面前。盟军主动轰炸任何被怀疑泊有智能轰炸机的机场。
“Allied fighter air cover was by far the most important factor,” Bollinger tells War is Boring. “Not only did it lead tolarge numbers of glide-bombing aircraft getting shot down, it also forced theGermans to shift missions from daylight to dusk or nighttime. This in itselflead to a major and measurable reduction in accuracy.”
“盟军歼击机的空中掩护是迄今为止最重要的因素”博林格在《战争是无聊的》里面说。“不仅是因为他导致大量的滑翔炸弹飞机坠毁，它也迫使德军把任务从白天转向黄昏或夜晚。这是导致制导武器精度下降的主要和明显原因。”
Many raids would cost the Germans a few bombers. By the standards of thethousand-bomber raids over Germany, this was trifling. But for the handful ofspecially trained and equipped Luftwaffe squadrons, it was catastrophic.
多次偷袭会让德军损失一些轰炸机。以全德国数以千计的轰炸机突袭来看，这是微不足道的。但是对于一些经过特殊训练、有特殊装备的德国纳粹空军中队来说，这是灾难性的。
Of the 903 aircraft sorties, Bollinger estimates that in 112 of them, thebombers were lost before launching their weapons. Another 21 were shot down orcrashed on the return flight, for an overall loss ratio of 15 percent.
在903架次中，据博林格估测，他们中的112次，轰炸机在投射武器前就损失掉了。另外21次被击落或者在返航途中坠毁，总损失率达到了15%。
“Each time a pilot departed on a glide bomb mission, he had almost aone-in-seven chance of never returning in that aircraft safely,” Bollingersays. “Put another way, the probability that a pilot would return safely aftereach of the first 10 missions was only 20 percent.”
“每次，当一名飞行员去执行一次滑翔炸弹任务，他几乎有七分之一的几率永远不会再开着飞机安全回来，”博林格说，“换句话说，一个飞行员完成头十次任务能安全归来的概率只有20%。”
Learning from history
从历史中学习
The rise and fall of the Nazi anti-ship missiles offers lessons for the U.S.and its opponents in the present day. American planners worry that smartanti-ship weapons in the hands of China, smaller nations like Iran or eveninsurgent groups could threaten U.S. warships and amphibious forces.
纳粹反舰导弹的兴衰给今天的美国和他的对手上了一课。美国的决策者担忧中国手中的只能反舰武器，小一点的国家，如伊朗或者甚至是反美团体 都能威胁美国的军舰和两栖力量。
One lesson from the 1940s is that passive defenses such as jamming have limitedutility against access denial weapons. The best defense is to destroy thelaunch vehicle before it can fire. “Kill the archer” is the term the Pentagonuses.
1940年代的一课就是，消极防御措施，诸如干扰措施，对阻断武器效用有限。最好的防御是在发射载具开火前将其摧毁。“杀死弓箭手”是五角大楼使用的术语。
China stands to learn the most profound lesson. For all the power and terror ofthe German anti-ship weapons, they could not compensate for the inability of theGerman navy and Luftwaffe to confront the Allied navies on the open seas.
中国学习了最深刻的一课。对于德军反舰武器的全部力量和威慑力，他们不能用德国海、空军与盟军在公海上遭遇时的无能表现来抵销。
Smart bombs did worry Allied commanders, but the new munitions couldn’t preventthe amphibious invasions of Italy and France. Chinese missiles might disruptU.S. operations, but they are no substitute for countering a powerful navy withan effective navy of your own.
智能炸弹的确让盟军司令官忧虑，但是新武器不能阻止两栖登陆意大利和法国。中国的导弹可能会扰乱美军的行动，但是他们并不能取代各自拥有的强大且有效的海军的对抗。
Perhaps the biggest lesson of all is that what is new is old. With each passingyear, the weapons of World War II seem closer to the era of Gettysburg andJutland than the high-tech warfare of today. That perception can encourage anunjustified smugness.
或许，所有这一切中最大的一课是：什么是新生的，什么是老旧的。每过一年，二战的武器就更像葛底斯堡和日德兰半岛时代，多过像现代高科技战争。这种看法只会滋生一种不必要的自以为是。
The problems modern navies and air forces struggle with—anti-ship guidedmissiles, jamming, operations in contested airspace—were the same that Germanpilots and Allied sailors faced.
困扰着现代海空军的问题是——反舰制导导弹、干扰、争夺制空权——与德军飞行员和盟军海员所面对的一样。
The terror that the crew of an Italian battleship, British cruiser or Americanmerchant ship felt at the sight of German missiles might not differ from what aU.S. destroyer or carrier crew might feel while being targeted by Chinese ballisticmissiles.
意大利战列舰船员，英国巡洋舰或者美国商船，看到德国导弹时的恐惧或许与一艘美国驱逐舰或航母船员，成为中国弹道导弹的目标时的感受没有什么不同。
这个也太搞了吧，还不如说中国的《穿天猴》让纳粹产生灵感，发明了V2
意思是，划时代的武器？
楼主水货二道贩子。。。
确切地说是滑翔炸弹，因为要么没有动力，要么动力只是用于在发射时加速。
墨索里尼没有向盟军投降过吧，是墨索里尼失权后的继任所为。
墨索里尼没有向盟军投降过吧，是墨索里尼失权后的继任所为。
把兔子和纳粹一起说，隐形摸黑。
楼主也蛋疼，有那么大劲干啥不行，还把这一文不值的鸟文翻出来。
楼主也蛋疼，有那么大劲干啥不行，还把这一文不值的鸟文翻出来。
翻点啥不好 跟这么垃圾文较劲
。。。。。。。。。。
党费要是论技术起源也是德国V2吧，还是过了毛子一手的……不过话说白头鹰发展导弹和火箭不也是从V2开始？
这种意识形态领域的抹黑和斗争，玩得多么高超啊！阶级斗争任何时候都是那么尖锐！来自: Android客户端
苏联人最早做的核弹头反舰弹道导弹
这货写了很多，可是太二了
高级黑吗？无所不用其极……
恶心。。美国佬的武器不都是纳粹的产物呢？狗日的，把中国炒纳粹方向靠拢，尼玛中国学苏联的。下作佬。
被发射而制导系统没有失灵的制导炸弹击中率超过百分之10，和那些非制导炸弹相比，还是很不错的吧。只不过到后面制空权都没有了，几枚炸弹也改变不了什么了
如果党费21被发射后能有百分之10的击中或毁伤概率，哇，就已经太成功了啊
为黑而黑，一点水平都没有。
真的假的？第一次听说
和纳粹扯上关系，显得兔子更邪恶一点，是不是这样的意思？
有意思，啧啧，冷战思维阴魂不散啊，拿纳粹来比拟天朝？忘记自己的一屁股历史了吗？——这种洋夷不是一般的NC，试用知音体和之：：
1. 新生和抗争，被纳粹抛弃的核弹鼻祖陷入深深矛盾中
2. 追求永恒的事业的火箭男人啊，纳粹美帝都深爱他
3. 苦命的纳粹啊，善良的IBM为你撑起一片天
1. 新生和抗争，被纳粹抛弃的核弹鼻祖陷入深深矛盾中
2. 追求永恒的事业的火箭男人啊，纳粹美帝都深爱他
3. 苦命的纳粹啊，善良的IBM为你撑起一片天
中国的二战考古学家太厉害了可以研发DF21
非要把兔子和纳粹扯到一起，鹰酱你自己干净么？F86是谁的技术？你的弹道导弹谁的技术？
帖子不错，可以给五美分以示奖励了
黑吧，到时候有横好的东西，别怪我们
圣经病的文章
美国的制导炸弹、导弹就不是纳粹启发的
美国的制导炸弹、导弹就不是纳粹启发的
圣经病恶心。。美国佬的武器不都是纳粹的产物呢？狗日的，把中国炒纳粹方向靠拢，尼玛中国学苏联的。下作佬。
纳粹的V2导弹启发了美国的登月火箭土星5号
纳粹的V2导弹启发了美国的登月火箭土星5号
战狼军团 发表于 2014-2-26 00:17
这个也太搞了吧，还不如说中国的《穿天猴》让纳粹产生灵感，发明了V2
确实，纳粹扔的这个东西顶多就是个制导炸弹的水平。
我朝的ASBM要高大上的多了。
这个也太搞了吧，还不如说中国的《穿天猴》让纳粹产生灵感，发明了V2
确实，纳粹扔的这个东西顶多就是个制导炸弹的水平。
我朝的ASBM要高大上的多了。
被发射而制导系统没有失灵的制导炸弹击中率超过百分之10，和那些非制导炸弹相比，还是很不错的吧。只不过到 ...
已经非常好了，通常非制导武器最多只有1%，已经提高了1个数量级别，像霓虹对竞技神20%的命中率就是逆天
已经非常好了，通常非制导武器最多只有1%，已经提高了1个数量级别，像霓虹对竞技神20%的命中率就是逆天