面子和里子:中俄外交变迁

来源:百度文库 编辑:超级军网 时间:2024/04/28 01:50:10


龙腾


'Face' and Something 'Delicious'
面子和里子
WhatMao and Stalin’s firstawkward meeting tells us about Xi Jinping’s confident trip to see Vladimir Putin.
毛和斯大林的初次尴尬会面与习此次见普京的信心之旅给我们什么样的启示
SERGEY RADCHENKO
作者:拉钦科

(译注:这是《外交政策》网站主页上的图片,点进去文章正文是下图)

In December 1949, Mao Zedong traveled toMoscow, for his first trip abroad. Three months earlier, perched high above acrowd of thousands in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, Mao had announcedthe founding of the People's Republic of China. The nascent country was yetunformed, and Mao thought it important to ensure that New China would stand onthe right side of history: the Communist side. In this, Mao needed JosephStalin's blessing and Soviet help.
1949年12月毛出访莫斯科,这是他的首次国外访问。三个月前,在数十万人的注目下,毛登上天安门城楼宣布中华人民共和国成立。初生的共和国仍显孱弱,毛认为新中国必须站在历史的正确立场上:共产主义。因此,毛需要斯大林的支持和苏联的帮助。
Back then, Chinawas in ruins after years of war, first with Japan, then with itself: it hadlittle industry and infrastructure, even less science and technology; it had nonavy, no air force but unspeakable poverty and rampant disease. Russia, thoughstill recovering from wartime losses, had a modern industry, atomic weapons,and the ambitions of a superpower.
在此之前,中国连续遭受多年战乱,首先是抗日战争,接着是内战:它的工业和基础设施极少,科技设施则更少;它没有海空军,所拥有的只有赤贫和肆虐的疾病。俄罗斯虽然也还处在战争恢复期,但它拥有现代化工业、核武器和作为一个超级大国的雄心壮志。
Mao wanted a treaty of alliance thatwould give China "face" on the international stage but also providesecurity guarantees against the United States, economic aid to rebuild andmodernize the ruined Chinese economy, and military assistance to"liberate" Taiwan.According to Mao's interpreter,present at the meeting, he told Stalin he wanted something that "lookedgood but also tasted delicious." Stalin was non-committal. He feared thatcloser relations with Mao could jeopardize Moscow's postwar gains in the FarEast and quite possibly lead to a U.S. intervention.
毛希望中苏之间能签订一个同盟条约,这样中国在国际舞台上就有了“面子”,同时苏联为中国提供安全保障以对抗美国、提供经济援助支持重建和进行中国的经济现代化、提供军事援助以“解放台湾”。据当时出席该会议的毛的翻译(译注:师哲吧)说,他(毛)告诉斯大林他想要“既好看又好吃的”,斯大林并没有当场表态。他担心和中国走得太近可能影响苏联在远东地区的战后利益的攫取,同时也有可能招来美国的干涉。
After the opening of the Russianarchives in the early 1990s, the Cold War International History Project at theWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (CWIHP) obtained declassifieddocuments on the meetings between Mao and Stalin, publishing them in translation, with scholarlycommentary, in successive issues of the CWIHP Bulletin toshed light, for the first time, on the making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance. Notall documents were declassified, and key evidence remains locked away ininaccessible archival vaults in Moscow as well as Beijing. This week, CWIHP haspublished additional documents on the Mao-Stalin cat-and-mouse game, and on theups and downs of Sino-Soviet relations in the following years. These documentsoffer an interesting look behind the curtains of foreign policy decision makingin China and Russia and provide clues for understanding where the Sino-Russianrelationship is headed today.
20世纪90年代早期俄罗斯的档案揭秘之后,威尔逊中心国际冷战史项目(华盛顿)得到了毛和斯大林这次会面的解密文档。项目组对文档进行了翻译,并加上必要的说明,以连载的形式在国际冷战史项目期刊发布,这是首次关于中苏同盟关系建立过程的学术探讨。但并非所有资料都已经解密,关键证据仍然尘封在中苏的档案馆里。本周项目组又公开了中苏谈判和此后中苏关系起起伏伏的一些细节。这些资料让我们得以透过历史看到中苏外交政策制定的前后过程,以及更好地理解当然中俄关系的情况。
After their first meeting at theKremlin, Stalin refused to see Mao for days, leaving the Chinese chairman tovent his rage, privately, at a dacha outside Moscow. Mao had few options, buthe did hint to the Soviets that if they did not want an alliance, he would lookfor friends elsewhere, perhaps in the West. Stalin relented at last and signedthe treaty, though with quasi-colonial secretadd-ons that guaranteedSoviet interests in Manchuria. Years later, Mao would complain about the"bitter fruits" he was forced to eat in Moscow.
在克里姆林宫的初次见面后的几天内斯大林都没有再见毛,他把这位中国领导人独自撇在莫斯科郊外的别墅里生闷气。毛手里可打的牌不多,但他确实曾暗示过苏联如果苏联不需要盟友的话,那他将会找其他国家结盟,或许就在西方。斯大林最终签了盟约,但仍然以秘密条款的形式保证了苏联在东北地区的利益。数年后毛就会抱怨他在莫斯科被迫咽下的“苦果”了。
Despite the badtaste left in Mao's mouth, the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty inauguratedtechnology transfer, and economic and military aid from the USSR to China on anunprecedented scale. Thousands of Soviet scientists and engineers came to Chinain the 1950s to help build up its industry, and tens of thousands of Chinesestudents (including future leaders Jiang Zemin and Li Peng) went to the SovietUnion to learn to forge steel and split the atom.
尽管毛觉得有些苦涩,但正因中苏同盟的签订,苏联向中国提供了规模空前的技术转移和经济、军事援助。20世纪50年代,数千名苏联科学家和工程师来到中国帮助它建立起自己的工业,数万名中国学生(包括后来的国家领导人江和李)前往苏联学习炼钢和将原子裂变(译注:核能和核武器开发吧)。
There are echoesof this historic meeting today: Like Mao, Xi Jinping, China's new leader, alsochose Russia as his first overseas destination after officially taking power inmid-March, though under dramatically different circumstances. China's GDPeasily dwarfs Russia's, its industry is the workshop of the world, and itsinfrastructure makes Russia look like a Third World country. Now it is Xi who,this weekend, gave Vladimir Putin "face," praising Russia's economicprogress, Russian literature (of which he claimed to be an avid reader,contrary to Mao who preferred Chinese classics), and even Putin himself, withwhom, Xi said, he shared character traits.
那次历史性的会面和今天有点相似:和毛一样,3月初正式成为国家最高领导人之后,中国的新领导人习选择了俄罗斯作为首次出访的目的地,然而中俄双方的情况和历史相比已经发生了戏剧性的变化。中国国内生产总值让俄罗斯的相形见绌,工业方面中国是世界工厂,而且俄罗斯的基础设施和中国相比就像是第三世界国家。本周是XI给弗拉基米尔普金“面子”,他称赞俄罗斯所取得的经济成就、俄罗斯的文学艺术(他声称自己是俄罗斯文学的爱好者,而毛则更喜欢中国传统名著),甚至对于普金本人,XI也说“我们性格很相似”。
And thistime it was Putin who wanted something "delicious" from this visit.He was only partially successful. Among the 35 agreements signed in Moscow onMarch 22-24 are deals to supply Russian oil, gas, coal, and electricity toChina. This "energy dialogue" has helped boost bilateral trade to $88 billion in 2012 but has also made Russia an appendage ofChina's industrial machine. In the meantime, Sino-Russian military cooperation has become a subject of serious controversy amid fears in Moscowthat, due to China's copying of Russian defense technology, such a program maylead to the loss of Russia's preeminence in the one area it still enjoys aleading edge.
这次是普金想要从这次访问中得到一些“好吃的”了,不过他只部分达成了愿望。本月22-24日在莫斯科签订的35个合同中都是俄罗斯向中国提供油料、天然气、煤炭和电力的。“能源对话”促进了双边的经贸发展,2012年中俄双边经贸额达到了880亿美元,但这也将俄罗斯变成了中国庞大工业体系中的一个小附件。与此同时,中俄军事合作则因为俄罗斯国内的担忧情绪成为争论的焦点,俄方担心因为中国山寨俄罗斯的国防技术,可能危及到俄罗斯依然还处在领先地位的这一领域的利益。
Effortsto go beyond energy and weapons made little progress. For instance, China andRussia agreed toprotect migratory birds andcooperate in rabbit husbandrybut this only serves to emphasize that, in economic terms, theystill need the West much more than they need each other.
Putinand Xi have inherited a complicated relationship. The latest installment ofdocuments releasedbythe CWIHP highlights two legacies that continue to haunt the Sino-Russianrelationship: the resentment of domination of one party by the other, and thepervasive presence of the third player at the table -- the United States."Do not tease the United States too much," Stalin's personal envoyAnastas Mikoyan advised Mao in 1949, a piece of advice Putin and Xi would do well toremember.
能源和武器之外的合作则收效甚微。比如中俄之间的保护迁徙鸟类和兔子养殖合作协议等等,这些合作仅仅只能突出在经济领域两国对与西方的合作需求大于它们两国相互之间的合作需求。
普金和习习面对的是两国延续下来的复杂的关系。国际冷战史项目组最近披露的报告突出了仍然困扰中俄两国关系的两方面问题:对于一党统治的不满和无法绕开的棋局上的第三方——美国。1949年斯大林派私人特使米高扬向毛转达“不要过分挑衅美国”,这个建议普金和习也应该牢记。
And yet the relationship between Chinaand Russia is closer than it has been at any time since the mid-1950s. The twocountries coordinate on key international problems like Syria, Iran, and NorthKorea, and work closely in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization -- a regionalforum long thought to be a paper tiger in the West but one that has provensurprisingly robust. Like in the 1950s, when the Soviet Union and China workedtogether in the hope of steering the Third World onto the socialist path, nowXi and Putin have sought to set the tone for the BRICS summit in South Africa(where they have gone after Moscow) in the spirit of subtly anti-Americanmulti-polarity.
目前中俄关系处在20世纪50年代以来最紧密的时期。两国在国际重大问题如叙利亚、伊朗、朝鲜等问题上协调一致,两国在上海合作组织—长久以来被西方视为是摆设然而已表现出惊人活力的地区性论坛—框架内合作紧密。就像上世纪50年代苏中携手希望带领第三世界走向社会主义道路一样,如今习和普金也试图为在南非(在莫斯科会谈之后)召开的金砖国家会议按照反美多极世界的精神定下调子。
In June1949, Mao famously announced that China would "lean to one side" inthe Cold War -- the Soviet side.Xi is nowhere near so unequivocal today.Marxist-Leninist solidarity is absent from the present-day relationship, andfortunately so, because divergent interpretations of Marxism contributed to theSino-Soviet split in the 1960s. But it would be wrong to overlook theideological element that remains in today's relationship between Beijing andMoscow. Just as in the 1950s, desire for more global influence at America'sexpense and resentment against perceived U.S. meddling in domestic affairs ofChina and the Soviet Union is a cornerstone of the relationship.
1949年6月,毛宣布中国将在冷战中“倒向一边”——苏联一边。今天习的立场则不会这么明显。今天的中俄关系中并没有马列主义团结一致这样的因素存在,这点也有好处,因为正是在对马克思主义理解上的分歧导致了20世纪60年代中苏关系的破裂。但是忽视意识形态对于中俄关系的影响也是错误的。和20世纪50年代一样,抵制美国的扩展并扩大自身影响力、抵制美国对于中苏国内事务的干涉,这仍然是中俄关系的重要基础。
Thisshared worldview is a product of different historical processes. The Communist Party'sclaim to domestic legitimacy under Xi, no less than under Mao, rests on thepromised deliverance of China from the shame of its "100 years ofhumiliation" -- the period stretching from China's 1842 defeatat thehands of the West in the First Opium War, to its struggles against the Japanesein World War II. Russia's humiliation is more recent: born of defeat in theCold War, it has produced a deeply felt resentment of the West. Asbrothers-in-humiliation -- and, as leaders whose political legitimacy dependson the continued maintenance of the victim discourse -- Xi and Putin need eachother's support in rejecting increasingly loud domestic calls for politicalreform, as well as the Western criticism of the two countries' human rightsrecords. If there is any substance to the Sino-Russian strategic partnershiptoday, it is this.
这个共识是不同历史进程中的产物。习和毛时期一样,共产党的政权合法性源自“百年耻辱” —从1842年第一次鸦片战争被西方打败到二战时期的抗日战争—
后许诺的国家的振兴。而俄罗斯遭受耻辱的时间则更近一些:冷战的失败造成了它们对于西方的不满。作为共同遭遇过羞辱的难兄难弟以及政权合法性来自于受害者控诉的领导人,习和普金在面对国内越来越高的政治改革的呼声和西方对于两国人权状况的批评时需要相互间的支持。如果要说什么是如今中俄战略合作的基础,那这就是了。
When Mao met with Stalin in December1949 to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, he hardly had an inklingof what was in store: in 10 years' time, this great alliance would be visiblycrumbling; in another 10 years' time, China and the Soviet Union would befighting an undeclared border war. In the 1970s, the two countries built upmassive military forces along their shared border. Both sought security in abetter relationship with the United States, Mao with better results than theSoviet leader Leonid Brezhnev -- whose efforts to convince U.S. PresidentRichard Nixon of Beijing's "exceptional perfidiousness" fell on deafears.
当1949年12月毛和斯大林会面商讨中苏同盟关系时,他根本想不到接下来会发生什么:10年内这个伟大的同盟关系就瓦解了;而再过10年中苏在边境地区进行了一场未宣战的战争。20世纪70年代两国在接壤的边境地区部署了大量军队。同样是为了和美国缓和关系寻求安全,毛所取得的成果好过苏联领导人勃列日涅夫——他努力说服美国总统尼克松相信中国“背信弃义”却毫无成效。
Then,the Soviets feared Sino-American cooperation but took comfort in the hope that,as the leading Soviet China hand Mikhail Kapitsa put it in 1982 (innewly released documents), "the Chinese never befriend anyone for a longtime." In the early 1980s, Moscow was helped by Deng Xiaoping's growingfrustration with American weapons sales to Taiwan and restrictions on theexport of U.S. technologies to the mainland -- but the road to rapprochementbetween Moscow and Beijing was long and arduous.
When, in1989, Deng Xiaoping met Mikhail Gorbachev to finally normalize relations, thenew archive materials note that he told the Soviet president that the split between their two countriesarose because "the Soviet Union incorrectly perceived China's place in theworld.... The essence of all problems was that we were unequal, that we weresubjected to coercion and pressure."
彼时苏联对中美合作表示担忧,但他们又因苏联的中国研究专家米哈伊尔凯普萨1982年(最近解密的文档)的陈述感到宽慰:“中国不会和任何国家维持长久的盟友关系”。20世纪80年代早期,苏联从邓反对美国对台军售和美国限制对大陆的技术出口中获益,但是中苏关系缓和之路长远而曲折。直到1989年邓会见戈尔巴乔夫两国关系才正常化。最新解密的文档中,邓告诉苏联领导人两国过去的分歧是因为“苏联错误地评估中国在世界的地位……问题的关键是过去我们(两国)之间并不平等,中国受到压制和强迫(做某些事情)”。
Theproblem with the Sino-Russian relationship today is that it is still unequal,though now it is China that has the upper hand. China's interest in Russiantechnology has diminished significantly, and Beijing now sets the terms oftrade -- as Moscow has found out in painful bargaining over the price of gas, a matter Xi'svisit left unresolved. But China's deference to Russia on grand strategicconcepts like multipolarity (and even its readiness to follow Moscow's lead inforums like the U.N. Security Council) has lent the Sino-Russian strategicpartnership a greater degree of cohesion than would otherwise be the case.
中俄今天面临的问题仍然是两国间的不平等,区别只在于如今是中国占上风。中国对俄罗斯的兴趣明显在减少,中国主导制定贸易的条款—俄罗斯已经意识到天然气价格上的谈判非常艰辛—习的此次出访也未能解决该问题。但是中国在宏观战略比如多级世界(包括在联合国安理会上认同俄罗斯的主张等)上对于俄罗斯的倚重,给中俄战略协作伙伴关系提供了前所未有的凝聚力。
In oneof his talks in Moscow during the latest visit, Xi Jinping announced that the"Chinese dream and the Russian dream coincide." Recently, Xi has hada lot to say about this dream of the "great renaissance of the Chinese nation."He has talked about creating a "prosperous" and "powerful"country while maintaining one-party rule under "socialism with Chinesecharacteristics." Xi has also promised that China will not strive towardsinternational hegemony. This will be a hard sell with China's worriedneighbors.
在最近访俄行程中的讲话中,习表示“中国梦和俄罗斯梦有很多共同点”。最近,习对“中华民族伟大复兴”这一理想谈了很多。他谈到了建设在“有中国特色的社会主义”制度下由共产党领导的“繁荣”“富强”的国家。习也承诺中国不谋求世界霸权。这是他对周边不安邻居的努力安抚。
Indeed, with Beijing acting ever moreassertively in international affairs, and Russia losing leverage vis-à-vis itsresurgent neighbor, even Putin will find it increasingly difficult to maintainalignment between his own global ambitions and those of his Chinesecounterpart. Like Mao did in his time, Putin may yet taste the bitter fruits ofleaning to one side.
事实上,随着中国在国际事务上越来越强硬,而俄罗斯则对其复兴的邻居丧失了对等的影响力,普金会发现要在他的抱负和中国的雄心之间保持平衡维持两国关系会变得越来越难。就像毛在那个年代所做的一样,普金可能要尝到苦果并倒向一边。


评论翻译:
Nikolay Ru
В статьепредставлен взгляд дилетанта и американского жополиза, собственно это и неудивительно, если бы ты, сергей писал объективно про Россию то кто дал бы тебевозможность публиковаться на этом сайте. Получай доллары, радуйся жизни, нопомни одно, к предателям везде относятся одинаково, ты предаешь интересы Россиисейчас придет время, предашь интересы Америки, предатель есть предатель.
文章显示了作者研究水平的业务和对美国的献媚。其实这也并不意外,如果你对俄罗斯做出客观公正的描述的话,那你的文章就根本没机会发在这网上。享受美元享受生活,不过记住一件事情,叛徒到了哪都是叛徒。你背叛了俄罗斯的利益,你将来也会背叛美国的利益,叛徒终归是叛徒。
JamesSchumaker
Calling the authoran ass-licking traitor in service to America who will shortly faceretribuion is hardly a convincing intellectual argument. Call meold-fashioned, but if you have a point to make, make it politely, and withoutthe polemics. Insulting Mr. Radchenko in the way you have only underminessupport for your point of view, whatever it may be.
说作者是向美国献媚的叛徒并将遭到报复,这不算是什么有理有据的表论。你可以说是老古董,不过如果你想要表达什么,那礼貌地说出而不是大吵大闹。辱骂作者只会减少对你所持观点的支持(者),无论你的观点是什么。
Nikolay Ru
Dear James, if you do not mind I will speak out, as I see fit. I am a simple man, I can not fight with the American propaganda, which involves including Ukrainian (RADCHENKO) traitors. Why, I thought that this American Ass Kissing Guy from Russia, i dont no.
My position is unambiguous, American propaganda, manipulating opinion of Americans as it is need to the ruling elite. I have long noticed that the Americans openly lie in order to set them against Russia. That is my position.
如果你不介意的话,我就要大声说出我认为应该说的。我是个耿直的人,我无法和包括乌克兰叛徒在内的美国的宣传机器抗衡。……(不懂)
我的观点很明确:为了符合上层统治者的需要,美国宣传在操弄美国的舆论。我很早就发现美国公开撒谎就为了让他们反对俄罗斯,这就是我想说的。



龙腾


'Face' and Something 'Delicious'
面子和里子
WhatMao and Stalin’s firstawkward meeting tells us about Xi Jinping’s confident trip to see Vladimir Putin.
毛和斯大林的初次尴尬会面与习此次见普京的信心之旅给我们什么样的启示
SERGEY RADCHENKO
作者:拉钦科

(译注:这是《外交政策》网站主页上的图片,点进去文章正文是下图)

In December 1949, Mao Zedong traveled toMoscow, for his first trip abroad. Three months earlier, perched high above acrowd of thousands in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, Mao had announcedthe founding of the People's Republic of China. The nascent country was yetunformed, and Mao thought it important to ensure that New China would stand onthe right side of history: the Communist side. In this, Mao needed JosephStalin's blessing and Soviet help.
1949年12月毛出访莫斯科,这是他的首次国外访问。三个月前,在数十万人的注目下,毛登上天安门城楼宣布中华人民共和国成立。初生的共和国仍显孱弱,毛认为新中国必须站在历史的正确立场上:共产主义。因此,毛需要斯大林的支持和苏联的帮助。
Back then, Chinawas in ruins after years of war, first with Japan, then with itself: it hadlittle industry and infrastructure, even less science and technology; it had nonavy, no air force but unspeakable poverty and rampant disease. Russia, thoughstill recovering from wartime losses, had a modern industry, atomic weapons,and the ambitions of a superpower.
在此之前,中国连续遭受多年战乱,首先是抗日战争,接着是内战:它的工业和基础设施极少,科技设施则更少;它没有海空军,所拥有的只有赤贫和肆虐的疾病。俄罗斯虽然也还处在战争恢复期,但它拥有现代化工业、核武器和作为一个超级大国的雄心壮志。
Mao wanted a treaty of alliance thatwould give China "face" on the international stage but also providesecurity guarantees against the United States, economic aid to rebuild andmodernize the ruined Chinese economy, and military assistance to"liberate" Taiwan.According to Mao's interpreter,present at the meeting, he told Stalin he wanted something that "lookedgood but also tasted delicious." Stalin was non-committal. He feared thatcloser relations with Mao could jeopardize Moscow's postwar gains in the FarEast and quite possibly lead to a U.S. intervention.
毛希望中苏之间能签订一个同盟条约,这样中国在国际舞台上就有了“面子”,同时苏联为中国提供安全保障以对抗美国、提供经济援助支持重建和进行中国的经济现代化、提供军事援助以“解放台湾”。据当时出席该会议的毛的翻译(译注:师哲吧)说,他(毛)告诉斯大林他想要“既好看又好吃的”,斯大林并没有当场表态。他担心和中国走得太近可能影响苏联在远东地区的战后利益的攫取,同时也有可能招来美国的干涉。
After the opening of the Russianarchives in the early 1990s, the Cold War International History Project at theWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (CWIHP) obtained declassifieddocuments on the meetings between Mao and Stalin, publishing them in translation, with scholarlycommentary, in successive issues of the CWIHP Bulletin toshed light, for the first time, on the making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance. Notall documents were declassified, and key evidence remains locked away ininaccessible archival vaults in Moscow as well as Beijing. This week, CWIHP haspublished additional documents on the Mao-Stalin cat-and-mouse game, and on theups and downs of Sino-Soviet relations in the following years. These documentsoffer an interesting look behind the curtains of foreign policy decision makingin China and Russia and provide clues for understanding where the Sino-Russianrelationship is headed today.
20世纪90年代早期俄罗斯的档案揭秘之后,威尔逊中心国际冷战史项目(华盛顿)得到了毛和斯大林这次会面的解密文档。项目组对文档进行了翻译,并加上必要的说明,以连载的形式在国际冷战史项目期刊发布,这是首次关于中苏同盟关系建立过程的学术探讨。但并非所有资料都已经解密,关键证据仍然尘封在中苏的档案馆里。本周项目组又公开了中苏谈判和此后中苏关系起起伏伏的一些细节。这些资料让我们得以透过历史看到中苏外交政策制定的前后过程,以及更好地理解当然中俄关系的情况。
After their first meeting at theKremlin, Stalin refused to see Mao for days, leaving the Chinese chairman tovent his rage, privately, at a dacha outside Moscow. Mao had few options, buthe did hint to the Soviets that if they did not want an alliance, he would lookfor friends elsewhere, perhaps in the West. Stalin relented at last and signedthe treaty, though with quasi-colonial secretadd-ons that guaranteedSoviet interests in Manchuria. Years later, Mao would complain about the"bitter fruits" he was forced to eat in Moscow.
在克里姆林宫的初次见面后的几天内斯大林都没有再见毛,他把这位中国领导人独自撇在莫斯科郊外的别墅里生闷气。毛手里可打的牌不多,但他确实曾暗示过苏联如果苏联不需要盟友的话,那他将会找其他国家结盟,或许就在西方。斯大林最终签了盟约,但仍然以秘密条款的形式保证了苏联在东北地区的利益。数年后毛就会抱怨他在莫斯科被迫咽下的“苦果”了。
Despite the badtaste left in Mao's mouth, the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty inauguratedtechnology transfer, and economic and military aid from the USSR to China on anunprecedented scale. Thousands of Soviet scientists and engineers came to Chinain the 1950s to help build up its industry, and tens of thousands of Chinesestudents (including future leaders Jiang Zemin and Li Peng) went to the SovietUnion to learn to forge steel and split the atom.
尽管毛觉得有些苦涩,但正因中苏同盟的签订,苏联向中国提供了规模空前的技术转移和经济、军事援助。20世纪50年代,数千名苏联科学家和工程师来到中国帮助它建立起自己的工业,数万名中国学生(包括后来的国家领导人江和李)前往苏联学习炼钢和将原子裂变(译注:核能和核武器开发吧)。
There are echoesof this historic meeting today: Like Mao, Xi Jinping, China's new leader, alsochose Russia as his first overseas destination after officially taking power inmid-March, though under dramatically different circumstances. China's GDPeasily dwarfs Russia's, its industry is the workshop of the world, and itsinfrastructure makes Russia look like a Third World country. Now it is Xi who,this weekend, gave Vladimir Putin "face," praising Russia's economicprogress, Russian literature (of which he claimed to be an avid reader,contrary to Mao who preferred Chinese classics), and even Putin himself, withwhom, Xi said, he shared character traits.
那次历史性的会面和今天有点相似:和毛一样,3月初正式成为国家最高领导人之后,中国的新领导人习选择了俄罗斯作为首次出访的目的地,然而中俄双方的情况和历史相比已经发生了戏剧性的变化。中国国内生产总值让俄罗斯的相形见绌,工业方面中国是世界工厂,而且俄罗斯的基础设施和中国相比就像是第三世界国家。本周是XI给弗拉基米尔普金“面子”,他称赞俄罗斯所取得的经济成就、俄罗斯的文学艺术(他声称自己是俄罗斯文学的爱好者,而毛则更喜欢中国传统名著),甚至对于普金本人,XI也说“我们性格很相似”。
And thistime it was Putin who wanted something "delicious" from this visit.He was only partially successful. Among the 35 agreements signed in Moscow onMarch 22-24 are deals to supply Russian oil, gas, coal, and electricity toChina. This "energy dialogue" has helped boost bilateral trade to $88 billion in 2012 but has also made Russia an appendage ofChina's industrial machine. In the meantime, Sino-Russian military cooperation has become a subject of serious controversy amid fears in Moscowthat, due to China's copying of Russian defense technology, such a program maylead to the loss of Russia's preeminence in the one area it still enjoys aleading edge.
这次是普金想要从这次访问中得到一些“好吃的”了,不过他只部分达成了愿望。本月22-24日在莫斯科签订的35个合同中都是俄罗斯向中国提供油料、天然气、煤炭和电力的。“能源对话”促进了双边的经贸发展,2012年中俄双边经贸额达到了880亿美元,但这也将俄罗斯变成了中国庞大工业体系中的一个小附件。与此同时,中俄军事合作则因为俄罗斯国内的担忧情绪成为争论的焦点,俄方担心因为中国山寨俄罗斯的国防技术,可能危及到俄罗斯依然还处在领先地位的这一领域的利益。
Effortsto go beyond energy and weapons made little progress. For instance, China andRussia agreed toprotect migratory birds andcooperate in rabbit husbandrybut this only serves to emphasize that, in economic terms, theystill need the West much more than they need each other.
Putinand Xi have inherited a complicated relationship. The latest installment ofdocuments releasedbythe CWIHP highlights two legacies that continue to haunt the Sino-Russianrelationship: the resentment of domination of one party by the other, and thepervasive presence of the third player at the table -- the United States."Do not tease the United States too much," Stalin's personal envoyAnastas Mikoyan advised Mao in 1949, a piece of advice Putin and Xi would do well toremember.
能源和武器之外的合作则收效甚微。比如中俄之间的保护迁徙鸟类和兔子养殖合作协议等等,这些合作仅仅只能突出在经济领域两国对与西方的合作需求大于它们两国相互之间的合作需求。
普金和习习面对的是两国延续下来的复杂的关系。国际冷战史项目组最近披露的报告突出了仍然困扰中俄两国关系的两方面问题:对于一党统治的不满和无法绕开的棋局上的第三方——美国。1949年斯大林派私人特使米高扬向毛转达“不要过分挑衅美国”,这个建议普金和习也应该牢记。
And yet the relationship between Chinaand Russia is closer than it has been at any time since the mid-1950s. The twocountries coordinate on key international problems like Syria, Iran, and NorthKorea, and work closely in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization -- a regionalforum long thought to be a paper tiger in the West but one that has provensurprisingly robust. Like in the 1950s, when the Soviet Union and China workedtogether in the hope of steering the Third World onto the socialist path, nowXi and Putin have sought to set the tone for the BRICS summit in South Africa(where they have gone after Moscow) in the spirit of subtly anti-Americanmulti-polarity.
目前中俄关系处在20世纪50年代以来最紧密的时期。两国在国际重大问题如叙利亚、伊朗、朝鲜等问题上协调一致,两国在上海合作组织—长久以来被西方视为是摆设然而已表现出惊人活力的地区性论坛—框架内合作紧密。就像上世纪50年代苏中携手希望带领第三世界走向社会主义道路一样,如今习和普金也试图为在南非(在莫斯科会谈之后)召开的金砖国家会议按照反美多极世界的精神定下调子。
In June1949, Mao famously announced that China would "lean to one side" inthe Cold War -- the Soviet side.Xi is nowhere near so unequivocal today.Marxist-Leninist solidarity is absent from the present-day relationship, andfortunately so, because divergent interpretations of Marxism contributed to theSino-Soviet split in the 1960s. But it would be wrong to overlook theideological element that remains in today's relationship between Beijing andMoscow. Just as in the 1950s, desire for more global influence at America'sexpense and resentment against perceived U.S. meddling in domestic affairs ofChina and the Soviet Union is a cornerstone of the relationship.
1949年6月,毛宣布中国将在冷战中“倒向一边”——苏联一边。今天习的立场则不会这么明显。今天的中俄关系中并没有马列主义团结一致这样的因素存在,这点也有好处,因为正是在对马克思主义理解上的分歧导致了20世纪60年代中苏关系的破裂。但是忽视意识形态对于中俄关系的影响也是错误的。和20世纪50年代一样,抵制美国的扩展并扩大自身影响力、抵制美国对于中苏国内事务的干涉,这仍然是中俄关系的重要基础。
Thisshared worldview is a product of different historical processes. The Communist Party'sclaim to domestic legitimacy under Xi, no less than under Mao, rests on thepromised deliverance of China from the shame of its "100 years ofhumiliation" -- the period stretching from China's 1842 defeatat thehands of the West in the First Opium War, to its struggles against the Japanesein World War II. Russia's humiliation is more recent: born of defeat in theCold War, it has produced a deeply felt resentment of the West. Asbrothers-in-humiliation -- and, as leaders whose political legitimacy dependson the continued maintenance of the victim discourse -- Xi and Putin need eachother's support in rejecting increasingly loud domestic calls for politicalreform, as well as the Western criticism of the two countries' human rightsrecords. If there is any substance to the Sino-Russian strategic partnershiptoday, it is this.
这个共识是不同历史进程中的产物。习和毛时期一样,共产党的政权合法性源自“百年耻辱” —从1842年第一次鸦片战争被西方打败到二战时期的抗日战争—
后许诺的国家的振兴。而俄罗斯遭受耻辱的时间则更近一些:冷战的失败造成了它们对于西方的不满。作为共同遭遇过羞辱的难兄难弟以及政权合法性来自于受害者控诉的领导人,习和普金在面对国内越来越高的政治改革的呼声和西方对于两国人权状况的批评时需要相互间的支持。如果要说什么是如今中俄战略合作的基础,那这就是了。
When Mao met with Stalin in December1949 to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, he hardly had an inklingof what was in store: in 10 years' time, this great alliance would be visiblycrumbling; in another 10 years' time, China and the Soviet Union would befighting an undeclared border war. In the 1970s, the two countries built upmassive military forces along their shared border. Both sought security in abetter relationship with the United States, Mao with better results than theSoviet leader Leonid Brezhnev -- whose efforts to convince U.S. PresidentRichard Nixon of Beijing's "exceptional perfidiousness" fell on deafears.
当1949年12月毛和斯大林会面商讨中苏同盟关系时,他根本想不到接下来会发生什么:10年内这个伟大的同盟关系就瓦解了;而再过10年中苏在边境地区进行了一场未宣战的战争。20世纪70年代两国在接壤的边境地区部署了大量军队。同样是为了和美国缓和关系寻求安全,毛所取得的成果好过苏联领导人勃列日涅夫——他努力说服美国总统尼克松相信中国“背信弃义”却毫无成效。
Then,the Soviets feared Sino-American cooperation but took comfort in the hope that,as the leading Soviet China hand Mikhail Kapitsa put it in 1982 (innewly released documents), "the Chinese never befriend anyone for a longtime." In the early 1980s, Moscow was helped by Deng Xiaoping's growingfrustration with American weapons sales to Taiwan and restrictions on theexport of U.S. technologies to the mainland -- but the road to rapprochementbetween Moscow and Beijing was long and arduous.
When, in1989, Deng Xiaoping met Mikhail Gorbachev to finally normalize relations, thenew archive materials note that he told the Soviet president that the split between their two countriesarose because "the Soviet Union incorrectly perceived China's place in theworld.... The essence of all problems was that we were unequal, that we weresubjected to coercion and pressure."
彼时苏联对中美合作表示担忧,但他们又因苏联的中国研究专家米哈伊尔凯普萨1982年(最近解密的文档)的陈述感到宽慰:“中国不会和任何国家维持长久的盟友关系”。20世纪80年代早期,苏联从邓反对美国对台军售和美国限制对大陆的技术出口中获益,但是中苏关系缓和之路长远而曲折。直到1989年邓会见戈尔巴乔夫两国关系才正常化。最新解密的文档中,邓告诉苏联领导人两国过去的分歧是因为“苏联错误地评估中国在世界的地位……问题的关键是过去我们(两国)之间并不平等,中国受到压制和强迫(做某些事情)”。
Theproblem with the Sino-Russian relationship today is that it is still unequal,though now it is China that has the upper hand. China's interest in Russiantechnology has diminished significantly, and Beijing now sets the terms oftrade -- as Moscow has found out in painful bargaining over the price of gas, a matter Xi'svisit left unresolved. But China's deference to Russia on grand strategicconcepts like multipolarity (and even its readiness to follow Moscow's lead inforums like the U.N. Security Council) has lent the Sino-Russian strategicpartnership a greater degree of cohesion than would otherwise be the case.
中俄今天面临的问题仍然是两国间的不平等,区别只在于如今是中国占上风。中国对俄罗斯的兴趣明显在减少,中国主导制定贸易的条款—俄罗斯已经意识到天然气价格上的谈判非常艰辛—习的此次出访也未能解决该问题。但是中国在宏观战略比如多级世界(包括在联合国安理会上认同俄罗斯的主张等)上对于俄罗斯的倚重,给中俄战略协作伙伴关系提供了前所未有的凝聚力。
In oneof his talks in Moscow during the latest visit, Xi Jinping announced that the"Chinese dream and the Russian dream coincide." Recently, Xi has hada lot to say about this dream of the "great renaissance of the Chinese nation."He has talked about creating a "prosperous" and "powerful"country while maintaining one-party rule under "socialism with Chinesecharacteristics." Xi has also promised that China will not strive towardsinternational hegemony. This will be a hard sell with China's worriedneighbors.
在最近访俄行程中的讲话中,习表示“中国梦和俄罗斯梦有很多共同点”。最近,习对“中华民族伟大复兴”这一理想谈了很多。他谈到了建设在“有中国特色的社会主义”制度下由共产党领导的“繁荣”“富强”的国家。习也承诺中国不谋求世界霸权。这是他对周边不安邻居的努力安抚。
Indeed, with Beijing acting ever moreassertively in international affairs, and Russia losing leverage vis-à-vis itsresurgent neighbor, even Putin will find it increasingly difficult to maintainalignment between his own global ambitions and those of his Chinesecounterpart. Like Mao did in his time, Putin may yet taste the bitter fruits ofleaning to one side.
事实上,随着中国在国际事务上越来越强硬,而俄罗斯则对其复兴的邻居丧失了对等的影响力,普金会发现要在他的抱负和中国的雄心之间保持平衡维持两国关系会变得越来越难。就像毛在那个年代所做的一样,普金可能要尝到苦果并倒向一边。


评论翻译:
Nikolay Ru
В статьепредставлен взгляд дилетанта и американского жополиза, собственно это и неудивительно, если бы ты, сергей писал объективно про Россию то кто дал бы тебевозможность публиковаться на этом сайте. Получай доллары, радуйся жизни, нопомни одно, к предателям везде относятся одинаково, ты предаешь интересы Россиисейчас придет время, предашь интересы Америки, предатель есть предатель.
文章显示了作者研究水平的业务和对美国的献媚。其实这也并不意外,如果你对俄罗斯做出客观公正的描述的话,那你的文章就根本没机会发在这网上。享受美元享受生活,不过记住一件事情,叛徒到了哪都是叛徒。你背叛了俄罗斯的利益,你将来也会背叛美国的利益,叛徒终归是叛徒。
JamesSchumaker
Calling the authoran ass-licking traitor in service to America who will shortly faceretribuion is hardly a convincing intellectual argument. Call meold-fashioned, but if you have a point to make, make it politely, and withoutthe polemics. Insulting Mr. Radchenko in the way you have only underminessupport for your point of view, whatever it may be.
说作者是向美国献媚的叛徒并将遭到报复,这不算是什么有理有据的表论。你可以说是老古董,不过如果你想要表达什么,那礼貌地说出而不是大吵大闹。辱骂作者只会减少对你所持观点的支持(者),无论你的观点是什么。
Nikolay Ru
Dear James, if you do not mind I will speak out, as I see fit. I am a simple man, I can not fight with the American propaganda, which involves including Ukrainian (RADCHENKO) traitors. Why, I thought that this American Ass Kissing Guy from Russia, i dont no.
My position is unambiguous, American propaganda, manipulating opinion of Americans as it is need to the ruling elite. I have long noticed that the Americans openly lie in order to set them against Russia. That is my position.
如果你不介意的话,我就要大声说出我认为应该说的。我是个耿直的人,我无法和包括乌克兰叛徒在内的美国的宣传机器抗衡。……(不懂)
我的观点很明确:为了符合上层统治者的需要,美国宣传在操弄美国的舆论。我很早就发现美国公开撒谎就为了让他们反对俄罗斯,这就是我想说的。

比如中俄之间的保护迁徙鸟类和兔子养殖合作协议等等,这些合作仅仅只能突出在经济领域两国对与西方的合作需求大于它们两国相互之间的合作需求。
普金和习习面对的是两国延续下来的复杂的关系。国际冷战史项目组最近披露的报告突出了仍然困扰中俄两国关系的两方面问题:对于一党统治的不满和无法绕开的棋局上的第三方——美国。1949年斯大林派私人特使米高扬向毛转达“不要过分挑衅美国”,这个建议普金和习也应该牢记。


兔子养殖合作协议亮了

毛子是要提供优良母兔......
没人回?
这篇是乌克兰研究人员写的,他认为中俄合作正当热切,但是现在中国比以往更为强势。
还判定中俄有着矛盾,
事实上就目前所看,中俄目前解决了主要矛盾,并没有什么是可以影响中俄长期合作的,这属于多虑了。
外交政策还是有不少优秀投稿的,不久前的一篇阿富汗局势,就和我的判断一致。
段干木 发表于 2013-3-30 15:29
这篇是乌克兰研究人员写的,他认为中俄合作正当热切,但是现在中国比以往更为强势。
还判定中俄有着矛盾, ...
说了这么多 原来最后一行最后一句才是重点啊....
这篇是乌克兰研究人员写的,他认为中俄合作正当热切,但是现在中国比以往更为强势。
还判定中俄有着矛盾, ...
麻烦把那篇转来看看
我就认为美国影响力退出阿富汗,而阿富汗国民议会是保障阿富汗各地割据军阀和派系参与阿富汗中央政权政治的路径。
而大支尔格也保障部落长老的权益和诉求得到满足。
人人都有一杯羹,这是保障现在阿富汗中央政权的基本基石。
而现在中俄巴基斯坦伊朗都有需求要求阿富汗保持稳定。
而塔利班的势力和组织不如往昔,寻求参与议会政治分一杯羹,比要推倒所有阿富汗现存势力更靠谱。
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-10/27/c_123874611.htm
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-10/28/c_123875121.htm
这篇深得了解议会政治的内涵,知道议会政治在协调的重要性,我一向认为美国走后,中国在阿富汗议会的平衡局势下,保障中国在阿富汗投资项目,对中国是最为有利的。
所以定义为阿富汗战争的受益者是除了美国之外的中俄伊朗巴基斯坦是毫无问题的。
印度的投资利益也得到现中央政府的保障,伊朗支持的北方联盟仍在喀布尔中央政权中分一杯羹,比塔利班时代获得更多权利。
评论的很深入..
不过里面的观点还是不够客观...
我觉基本上讲出实情。但在中俄当代关系描述上有偏颇,例如中俄关系虽然中国在经济合作和贸易中占据优势,但俄罗斯却在国家核力量上占据优势,整体上讲两国基本平衡的。两国在很多国际问题上是平等协商,在对方国内事务决策时也是呼应相互支持的。不管是否真心实意,在强大竞争对手挤压下,合作是必然,这两国多数政治家有识之士的共识。
习和普金在面对国内越来越高的政治改革的呼声和西方对于两国人权状况的批评时需要相互间的支持。如果要说什么是如今中俄战略合作的基础,那这就是了。

看了这句简直令人发笑,这种东西本来应该放在yahoo上给屁民洗脑,但是要让那些饱受低俗电视节目熏陶的屁民读完这么乏味的文章实在不太现实,结果放到了《外交政策》网站上。

看来美国对中俄的这种靠近还是有一种本能的恐惧。美国人至今还是无法摆脱冷战思维,这其实就是西方人从根子上把世界想成一种零和关系,照着这种逻辑推下去美国就有一种重温1980年代美好时光的感觉了。只不过这一次美国扮演的是苏联的角色。

今后一段时间,国际上各种离间中俄的论调肯定满天飞。国内各大论坛上也会出现大量“爱国JY”,论证中俄永远不可能也不应该友好共处。