超级军网[转译]印度人说的62年后的中印冲突
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/28 20:56:56
Sumdorong Cho Valley incident of 1985 <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
1985年桑多容错山谷事件
Six and half years later, Deng decided to flex China’s muscles again with India. In mid-1986, it came to the notice of India that the PLA had built a helipad at Wandung in Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. India reacted swiftly and the PLA had an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the India Army in Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunchal Pradesh in August 1986. After a week of tense moments both sides mutually agreed to withdraw their forces inside their respective territories and create a no man’s land. The Chinese posture at that time clearly indicated that Beijing quickly realised that 1962 cannot be repeated. Afterwards, we saw some writings in the PLA’s official organ, Liberation Army Daily, about the professionalism the Indian armed forces. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
六年半后, 邓小平决定再次对印度采取行动. 1986年中期, 印度注意到解放军在Arunachal Pradesh的桑多容错山谷完当处修建了直升机起降坪. 1986年八月印度迅速反应并和解放军于此地有了针锋相对的对峙. 一个星期的紧张对峙后, 双方同意后撤部队至各自管控区并开辟了一个无人地带. 当时中国的姿态说明北京很快地意识到了1962年的情况不可能重演. 后来, 我们看到解放军喉舌解放军报的关于印度武装力量职业程度的文章.<p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
****
Nathu La of 1967 <p></p></P>
1967年纳述拉<p></p></P>
Three years later, in 1965, two significant events took place on the Sine-Indian border. The first was the warning issued to India about Chinese sheep not being allowed to graze on their side of the border by India. This happened in September 1965 when the Indo-Pak war was simmering on India’s western border. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
三年后的1965年, 中印边界发生了两个重大事件. 第一个是发生在1965年九月当时印度西部边界的印巴战争正倾向全面爆发阶段, 印度发出警告说中国的羊群不能在边界印度一侧吃草.
At the same time, in September-December 1965, the PLA sent probing missions on the entire Sikkim-Tibet border. According to one account, there were seven border intrusions on the Sikkim-Tibet border between September 7 and December 12, 1965, involving the PLA. In all these border incursions, the Indian side responded “firmly” without provoking the other. Though details of casualties of these PLA border incursions are not reported, there were reports indicating that the PLA suffered “heavy” casualties against “moderate” loss by India. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
在同一时期, 1965年的9-12月间, 解放军在整个锡金西藏边界派遣了调查小组. 根据记载, 1965年9月7日至12月12日间, 锡金西藏边界发生了7次边界冲突. 在所有的冲突中, 印度有限度的”坚决”反击. 虽然没有关于解放军伤亡的详细报道, 但有报告称, 解放军受到”沉重”打击, 而印度方面有”部分”损失.
Two years later, in September 1967, in spite of their setbacks in 1965, the PLA launched a direct attack on the lndian armed forces at Nathu La, on the Sikkim-Tibet border. The six-day “border skirmishes” from September 7-6 to 13, 1967, had all the elements of a high drama, including exchange of heavy artillery fire, and the PLA soldiers tried to cross the border in large numbers. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
不顾1965年的挫败, 两年后的1967年, 解放军发动了对锡金西藏边界纳述拉的印度部队的直接进攻. 在从1967年9月6,7号至13号间的六天”边界冲突”中, 发生了包括重炮火力互射和大批中国士兵尝试越界的全面冲突.
The attack was repulsed at all points, According to an account of this incident, from the details of the fighting available, it appeared the Chinese had received a severe mauling in the artillery duels across the barbed wire fence. Indian gunners scored several direct hits on Chinese bunkers, including a command post from where the Chinese operations were being directed. The Chinese were also known to have suffered at least twice as many casualties as the Indians in this encounter between Indian and Chinese armed forces. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
这次袭击受到全面抵抗. 据来自已有的战斗细节记载, 显示出中国人在隔着带刺铁丝网的火炮对射中遭受了沉重打击. 印度炮兵几次直接命中了中国的碉堡,其中还包括一个中国的行动命令指挥部.中国士兵在这次中印军队遭遇战中受到了印度士兵两倍的伤亡.
The important point to be remembered in this context is that the late Chairman Mao launched his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in 1965 and it reached its peak in 1967 to weed out all ‘anti-socialist elements” from the Chinese polity. Though many Sinologists would not like to describe the GPCR in any other manner, for an outsider like me, it was essentially a power struggle between Chairman Mao and his adversaries. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
在这种氛围下有重要的一点应该被记住的是,为了铲除中国体制内的反社会主义元素,现已故的毛主席在1965年发动了他的无产阶级文化大革命并于1967年达到了高峰. 虽然许多中国问题专家不想用任何别的方式来描述无产阶级文化大革命,但对于象我这样的外人而言, 这基本上是一次毛主席和他的对手间的权力斗争.
However, for the purposes of this essay, three significant things emerged from the Nathu La episode on the Sikkim-Tibet border. First, the Indian armed forces demonstrated beyond doubt that the PLA is not as strong and motivated as it was made out to be. In fact, there were rumours, around September 10, 1967, that the PLA was planning to bring in the Air Force to escalate the conflict. Sensing that the Indians were getting ready for such an eventuality, the Chinese official news agency, Xinhua, denied having any such plans. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
然而, 正如本文目的所在, 锡金西藏边界的纳述拉回合反应了三件大事. 首先, 印度武装力量毫无疑问的揭露了解放军并没有象它展示的那么强大且能动. 实际上, 1967年9月10日, 有谣传说解放军正在计划使用空军以升级冲突.由于感受到印度方面对此已有准备, 中国官方新华社否认了这项计划.
Second, the Indian politico-military leadership quickly realised this myth about the PLA. This was clearly reflected in the unconditional ceasefire proposed by India in a note delivered to the Chinese on September 12, 1967, all along the Sikkim-Tibet border from 05.30 hrs on September 13. Though officially, the Chinese rejected this unilateral ceasefire offer by India, except for an occasional salvo by the PLA on September 13, 1967, there was a lull all along the border. Many observers felt India scored a psychological victory over the Chinese for the latter’s unilateral ceasefire in 1962. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
第二, 印度政军领导层很快明白了解放军的迷思. 印度在1967年9月12日提交给中方的文告中提议的在13日5点30起在锡金西藏边界实现无条件停火协议就可清晰反映出来. 虽然中国表面上正式拒绝了印度单方面提议的停火, 解放军只接受于1967年9月13日的一项临时停火协议,但却实际上实现了双方边界的平静.许多观察家感到印度取得了继1962年中方宣布的单方面停火后的一次心理回合的胜利.
Lastly, the Indian political leadership also realised that the PLA’s behavioural pattern on the border had something to do with the domestic turmoil then going on in China.<p></p></P>
<p></p></P>最后是, 印度政治领导层也了解到解放军的边界行为模式也牵涉到中国国内正发生的骚乱.Sumdorong Cho Valley incident of 1985 <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
1985年桑多容错山谷事件
Six and half years later, Deng decided to flex China’s muscles again with India. In mid-1986, it came to the notice of India that the PLA had built a helipad at Wandung in Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. India reacted swiftly and the PLA had an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the India Army in Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunchal Pradesh in August 1986. After a week of tense moments both sides mutually agreed to withdraw their forces inside their respective territories and create a no man’s land. The Chinese posture at that time clearly indicated that Beijing quickly realised that 1962 cannot be repeated. Afterwards, we saw some writings in the PLA’s official organ, Liberation Army Daily, about the professionalism the Indian armed forces. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
六年半后, 邓小平决定再次对印度采取行动. 1986年中期, 印度注意到解放军在Arunachal Pradesh的桑多容错山谷完当处修建了直升机起降坪. 1986年八月印度迅速反应并和解放军于此地有了针锋相对的对峙. 一个星期的紧张对峙后, 双方同意后撤部队至各自管控区并开辟了一个无人地带. 当时中国的姿态说明北京很快地意识到了1962年的情况不可能重演. 后来, 我们看到解放军喉舌解放军报的关于印度武装力量职业程度的文章.<p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
****
Nathu La of 1967 <p></p></P>
1967年纳述拉<p></p></P>
Three years later, in 1965, two significant events took place on the Sine-Indian border. The first was the warning issued to India about Chinese sheep not being allowed to graze on their side of the border by India. This happened in September 1965 when the Indo-Pak war was simmering on India’s western border. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
三年后的1965年, 中印边界发生了两个重大事件. 第一个是发生在1965年九月当时印度西部边界的印巴战争正倾向全面爆发阶段, 印度发出警告说中国的羊群不能在边界印度一侧吃草.
At the same time, in September-December 1965, the PLA sent probing missions on the entire Sikkim-Tibet border. According to one account, there were seven border intrusions on the Sikkim-Tibet border between September 7 and December 12, 1965, involving the PLA. In all these border incursions, the Indian side responded “firmly” without provoking the other. Though details of casualties of these PLA border incursions are not reported, there were reports indicating that the PLA suffered “heavy” casualties against “moderate” loss by India. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
在同一时期, 1965年的9-12月间, 解放军在整个锡金西藏边界派遣了调查小组. 根据记载, 1965年9月7日至12月12日间, 锡金西藏边界发生了7次边界冲突. 在所有的冲突中, 印度有限度的”坚决”反击. 虽然没有关于解放军伤亡的详细报道, 但有报告称, 解放军受到”沉重”打击, 而印度方面有”部分”损失.
Two years later, in September 1967, in spite of their setbacks in 1965, the PLA launched a direct attack on the lndian armed forces at Nathu La, on the Sikkim-Tibet border. The six-day “border skirmishes” from September 7-6 to 13, 1967, had all the elements of a high drama, including exchange of heavy artillery fire, and the PLA soldiers tried to cross the border in large numbers. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
不顾1965年的挫败, 两年后的1967年, 解放军发动了对锡金西藏边界纳述拉的印度部队的直接进攻. 在从1967年9月6,7号至13号间的六天”边界冲突”中, 发生了包括重炮火力互射和大批中国士兵尝试越界的全面冲突.
The attack was repulsed at all points, According to an account of this incident, from the details of the fighting available, it appeared the Chinese had received a severe mauling in the artillery duels across the barbed wire fence. Indian gunners scored several direct hits on Chinese bunkers, including a command post from where the Chinese operations were being directed. The Chinese were also known to have suffered at least twice as many casualties as the Indians in this encounter between Indian and Chinese armed forces. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
这次袭击受到全面抵抗. 据来自已有的战斗细节记载, 显示出中国人在隔着带刺铁丝网的火炮对射中遭受了沉重打击. 印度炮兵几次直接命中了中国的碉堡,其中还包括一个中国的行动命令指挥部.中国士兵在这次中印军队遭遇战中受到了印度士兵两倍的伤亡.
The important point to be remembered in this context is that the late Chairman Mao launched his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in 1965 and it reached its peak in 1967 to weed out all ‘anti-socialist elements” from the Chinese polity. Though many Sinologists would not like to describe the GPCR in any other manner, for an outsider like me, it was essentially a power struggle between Chairman Mao and his adversaries. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
在这种氛围下有重要的一点应该被记住的是,为了铲除中国体制内的反社会主义元素,现已故的毛主席在1965年发动了他的无产阶级文化大革命并于1967年达到了高峰. 虽然许多中国问题专家不想用任何别的方式来描述无产阶级文化大革命,但对于象我这样的外人而言, 这基本上是一次毛主席和他的对手间的权力斗争.
However, for the purposes of this essay, three significant things emerged from the Nathu La episode on the Sikkim-Tibet border. First, the Indian armed forces demonstrated beyond doubt that the PLA is not as strong and motivated as it was made out to be. In fact, there were rumours, around September 10, 1967, that the PLA was planning to bring in the Air Force to escalate the conflict. Sensing that the Indians were getting ready for such an eventuality, the Chinese official news agency, Xinhua, denied having any such plans. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
然而, 正如本文目的所在, 锡金西藏边界的纳述拉回合反应了三件大事. 首先, 印度武装力量毫无疑问的揭露了解放军并没有象它展示的那么强大且能动. 实际上, 1967年9月10日, 有谣传说解放军正在计划使用空军以升级冲突.由于感受到印度方面对此已有准备, 中国官方新华社否认了这项计划.
Second, the Indian politico-military leadership quickly realised this myth about the PLA. This was clearly reflected in the unconditional ceasefire proposed by India in a note delivered to the Chinese on September 12, 1967, all along the Sikkim-Tibet border from 05.30 hrs on September 13. Though officially, the Chinese rejected this unilateral ceasefire offer by India, except for an occasional salvo by the PLA on September 13, 1967, there was a lull all along the border. Many observers felt India scored a psychological victory over the Chinese for the latter’s unilateral ceasefire in 1962. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
第二, 印度政军领导层很快明白了解放军的迷思. 印度在1967年9月12日提交给中方的文告中提议的在13日5点30起在锡金西藏边界实现无条件停火协议就可清晰反映出来. 虽然中国表面上正式拒绝了印度单方面提议的停火, 解放军只接受于1967年9月13日的一项临时停火协议,但却实际上实现了双方边界的平静.许多观察家感到印度取得了继1962年中方宣布的单方面停火后的一次心理回合的胜利.
Lastly, the Indian political leadership also realised that the PLA’s behavioural pattern on the border had something to do with the domestic turmoil then going on in China.<p></p></P>
<p></p></P>最后是, 印度政治领导层也了解到解放军的边界行为模式也牵涉到中国国内正发生的骚乱.
<p></p></P>
1985年桑多容错山谷事件
Six and half years later, Deng decided to flex China’s muscles again with India. In mid-1986, it came to the notice of India that the PLA had built a helipad at Wandung in Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. India reacted swiftly and the PLA had an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the India Army in Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunchal Pradesh in August 1986. After a week of tense moments both sides mutually agreed to withdraw their forces inside their respective territories and create a no man’s land. The Chinese posture at that time clearly indicated that Beijing quickly realised that 1962 cannot be repeated. Afterwards, we saw some writings in the PLA’s official organ, Liberation Army Daily, about the professionalism the Indian armed forces. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
六年半后, 邓小平决定再次对印度采取行动. 1986年中期, 印度注意到解放军在Arunachal Pradesh的桑多容错山谷完当处修建了直升机起降坪. 1986年八月印度迅速反应并和解放军于此地有了针锋相对的对峙. 一个星期的紧张对峙后, 双方同意后撤部队至各自管控区并开辟了一个无人地带. 当时中国的姿态说明北京很快地意识到了1962年的情况不可能重演. 后来, 我们看到解放军喉舌解放军报的关于印度武装力量职业程度的文章.<p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
****
Nathu La of 1967 <p></p></P>
1967年纳述拉<p></p></P>
Three years later, in 1965, two significant events took place on the Sine-Indian border. The first was the warning issued to India about Chinese sheep not being allowed to graze on their side of the border by India. This happened in September 1965 when the Indo-Pak war was simmering on India’s western border. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
三年后的1965年, 中印边界发生了两个重大事件. 第一个是发生在1965年九月当时印度西部边界的印巴战争正倾向全面爆发阶段, 印度发出警告说中国的羊群不能在边界印度一侧吃草.
At the same time, in September-December 1965, the PLA sent probing missions on the entire Sikkim-Tibet border. According to one account, there were seven border intrusions on the Sikkim-Tibet border between September 7 and December 12, 1965, involving the PLA. In all these border incursions, the Indian side responded “firmly” without provoking the other. Though details of casualties of these PLA border incursions are not reported, there were reports indicating that the PLA suffered “heavy” casualties against “moderate” loss by India. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
在同一时期, 1965年的9-12月间, 解放军在整个锡金西藏边界派遣了调查小组. 根据记载, 1965年9月7日至12月12日间, 锡金西藏边界发生了7次边界冲突. 在所有的冲突中, 印度有限度的”坚决”反击. 虽然没有关于解放军伤亡的详细报道, 但有报告称, 解放军受到”沉重”打击, 而印度方面有”部分”损失.
Two years later, in September 1967, in spite of their setbacks in 1965, the PLA launched a direct attack on the lndian armed forces at Nathu La, on the Sikkim-Tibet border. The six-day “border skirmishes” from September 7-6 to 13, 1967, had all the elements of a high drama, including exchange of heavy artillery fire, and the PLA soldiers tried to cross the border in large numbers. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
不顾1965年的挫败, 两年后的1967年, 解放军发动了对锡金西藏边界纳述拉的印度部队的直接进攻. 在从1967年9月6,7号至13号间的六天”边界冲突”中, 发生了包括重炮火力互射和大批中国士兵尝试越界的全面冲突.
The attack was repulsed at all points, According to an account of this incident, from the details of the fighting available, it appeared the Chinese had received a severe mauling in the artillery duels across the barbed wire fence. Indian gunners scored several direct hits on Chinese bunkers, including a command post from where the Chinese operations were being directed. The Chinese were also known to have suffered at least twice as many casualties as the Indians in this encounter between Indian and Chinese armed forces. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
这次袭击受到全面抵抗. 据来自已有的战斗细节记载, 显示出中国人在隔着带刺铁丝网的火炮对射中遭受了沉重打击. 印度炮兵几次直接命中了中国的碉堡,其中还包括一个中国的行动命令指挥部.中国士兵在这次中印军队遭遇战中受到了印度士兵两倍的伤亡.
The important point to be remembered in this context is that the late Chairman Mao launched his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in 1965 and it reached its peak in 1967 to weed out all ‘anti-socialist elements” from the Chinese polity. Though many Sinologists would not like to describe the GPCR in any other manner, for an outsider like me, it was essentially a power struggle between Chairman Mao and his adversaries. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
在这种氛围下有重要的一点应该被记住的是,为了铲除中国体制内的反社会主义元素,现已故的毛主席在1965年发动了他的无产阶级文化大革命并于1967年达到了高峰. 虽然许多中国问题专家不想用任何别的方式来描述无产阶级文化大革命,但对于象我这样的外人而言, 这基本上是一次毛主席和他的对手间的权力斗争.
However, for the purposes of this essay, three significant things emerged from the Nathu La episode on the Sikkim-Tibet border. First, the Indian armed forces demonstrated beyond doubt that the PLA is not as strong and motivated as it was made out to be. In fact, there were rumours, around September 10, 1967, that the PLA was planning to bring in the Air Force to escalate the conflict. Sensing that the Indians were getting ready for such an eventuality, the Chinese official news agency, Xinhua, denied having any such plans. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
然而, 正如本文目的所在, 锡金西藏边界的纳述拉回合反应了三件大事. 首先, 印度武装力量毫无疑问的揭露了解放军并没有象它展示的那么强大且能动. 实际上, 1967年9月10日, 有谣传说解放军正在计划使用空军以升级冲突.由于感受到印度方面对此已有准备, 中国官方新华社否认了这项计划.
Second, the Indian politico-military leadership quickly realised this myth about the PLA. This was clearly reflected in the unconditional ceasefire proposed by India in a note delivered to the Chinese on September 12, 1967, all along the Sikkim-Tibet border from 05.30 hrs on September 13. Though officially, the Chinese rejected this unilateral ceasefire offer by India, except for an occasional salvo by the PLA on September 13, 1967, there was a lull all along the border. Many observers felt India scored a psychological victory over the Chinese for the latter’s unilateral ceasefire in 1962. <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
第二, 印度政军领导层很快明白了解放军的迷思. 印度在1967年9月12日提交给中方的文告中提议的在13日5点30起在锡金西藏边界实现无条件停火协议就可清晰反映出来. 虽然中国表面上正式拒绝了印度单方面提议的停火, 解放军只接受于1967年9月13日的一项临时停火协议,但却实际上实现了双方边界的平静.许多观察家感到印度取得了继1962年中方宣布的单方面停火后的一次心理回合的胜利.
Lastly, the Indian political leadership also realised that the PLA’s behavioural pattern on the border had something to do with the domestic turmoil then going on in China.<p></p></P>
<p></p></P>最后是, 印度政治领导层也了解到解放军的边界行为模式也牵涉到中国国内正发生的骚乱.Sumdorong Cho Valley incident of 1985 <p></p></P>
<p></p></P>
1985年桑多容错山谷事件
Six and half years later, Deng decided to flex China’s muscles again with India. In mid-1986, it came to the notice of India that the PLA had built a helipad at Wandung in Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. India reacted swiftly and the PLA had an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the India Army in Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunchal Pradesh in August 1986. After a week of tense moments both sides mutually agreed to withdraw their forces inside their respective territories and create a no man’s land. The Chinese posture at that time clearly indicated that Beijing quickly realised that 1962 cannot be repeated. Afterwards, we saw some writings in the PLA’s official organ, Liberation Army Daily, about the professionalism the Indian armed forces. <p></p></P>
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六年半后, 邓小平决定再次对印度采取行动. 1986年中期, 印度注意到解放军在Arunachal Pradesh的桑多容错山谷完当处修建了直升机起降坪. 1986年八月印度迅速反应并和解放军于此地有了针锋相对的对峙. 一个星期的紧张对峙后, 双方同意后撤部队至各自管控区并开辟了一个无人地带. 当时中国的姿态说明北京很快地意识到了1962年的情况不可能重演. 后来, 我们看到解放军喉舌解放军报的关于印度武装力量职业程度的文章.<p></p></P>
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Nathu La of 1967 <p></p></P>
1967年纳述拉<p></p></P>
Three years later, in 1965, two significant events took place on the Sine-Indian border. The first was the warning issued to India about Chinese sheep not being allowed to graze on their side of the border by India. This happened in September 1965 when the Indo-Pak war was simmering on India’s western border. <p></p></P>
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三年后的1965年, 中印边界发生了两个重大事件. 第一个是发生在1965年九月当时印度西部边界的印巴战争正倾向全面爆发阶段, 印度发出警告说中国的羊群不能在边界印度一侧吃草.
At the same time, in September-December 1965, the PLA sent probing missions on the entire Sikkim-Tibet border. According to one account, there were seven border intrusions on the Sikkim-Tibet border between September 7 and December 12, 1965, involving the PLA. In all these border incursions, the Indian side responded “firmly” without provoking the other. Though details of casualties of these PLA border incursions are not reported, there were reports indicating that the PLA suffered “heavy” casualties against “moderate” loss by India. <p></p></P>
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在同一时期, 1965年的9-12月间, 解放军在整个锡金西藏边界派遣了调查小组. 根据记载, 1965年9月7日至12月12日间, 锡金西藏边界发生了7次边界冲突. 在所有的冲突中, 印度有限度的”坚决”反击. 虽然没有关于解放军伤亡的详细报道, 但有报告称, 解放军受到”沉重”打击, 而印度方面有”部分”损失.
Two years later, in September 1967, in spite of their setbacks in 1965, the PLA launched a direct attack on the lndian armed forces at Nathu La, on the Sikkim-Tibet border. The six-day “border skirmishes” from September 7-6 to 13, 1967, had all the elements of a high drama, including exchange of heavy artillery fire, and the PLA soldiers tried to cross the border in large numbers. <p></p></P>
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不顾1965年的挫败, 两年后的1967年, 解放军发动了对锡金西藏边界纳述拉的印度部队的直接进攻. 在从1967年9月6,7号至13号间的六天”边界冲突”中, 发生了包括重炮火力互射和大批中国士兵尝试越界的全面冲突.
The attack was repulsed at all points, According to an account of this incident, from the details of the fighting available, it appeared the Chinese had received a severe mauling in the artillery duels across the barbed wire fence. Indian gunners scored several direct hits on Chinese bunkers, including a command post from where the Chinese operations were being directed. The Chinese were also known to have suffered at least twice as many casualties as the Indians in this encounter between Indian and Chinese armed forces. <p></p></P>
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这次袭击受到全面抵抗. 据来自已有的战斗细节记载, 显示出中国人在隔着带刺铁丝网的火炮对射中遭受了沉重打击. 印度炮兵几次直接命中了中国的碉堡,其中还包括一个中国的行动命令指挥部.中国士兵在这次中印军队遭遇战中受到了印度士兵两倍的伤亡.
The important point to be remembered in this context is that the late Chairman Mao launched his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in 1965 and it reached its peak in 1967 to weed out all ‘anti-socialist elements” from the Chinese polity. Though many Sinologists would not like to describe the GPCR in any other manner, for an outsider like me, it was essentially a power struggle between Chairman Mao and his adversaries. <p></p></P>
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在这种氛围下有重要的一点应该被记住的是,为了铲除中国体制内的反社会主义元素,现已故的毛主席在1965年发动了他的无产阶级文化大革命并于1967年达到了高峰. 虽然许多中国问题专家不想用任何别的方式来描述无产阶级文化大革命,但对于象我这样的外人而言, 这基本上是一次毛主席和他的对手间的权力斗争.
However, for the purposes of this essay, three significant things emerged from the Nathu La episode on the Sikkim-Tibet border. First, the Indian armed forces demonstrated beyond doubt that the PLA is not as strong and motivated as it was made out to be. In fact, there were rumours, around September 10, 1967, that the PLA was planning to bring in the Air Force to escalate the conflict. Sensing that the Indians were getting ready for such an eventuality, the Chinese official news agency, Xinhua, denied having any such plans. <p></p></P>
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然而, 正如本文目的所在, 锡金西藏边界的纳述拉回合反应了三件大事. 首先, 印度武装力量毫无疑问的揭露了解放军并没有象它展示的那么强大且能动. 实际上, 1967年9月10日, 有谣传说解放军正在计划使用空军以升级冲突.由于感受到印度方面对此已有准备, 中国官方新华社否认了这项计划.
Second, the Indian politico-military leadership quickly realised this myth about the PLA. This was clearly reflected in the unconditional ceasefire proposed by India in a note delivered to the Chinese on September 12, 1967, all along the Sikkim-Tibet border from 05.30 hrs on September 13. Though officially, the Chinese rejected this unilateral ceasefire offer by India, except for an occasional salvo by the PLA on September 13, 1967, there was a lull all along the border. Many observers felt India scored a psychological victory over the Chinese for the latter’s unilateral ceasefire in 1962. <p></p></P>
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第二, 印度政军领导层很快明白了解放军的迷思. 印度在1967年9月12日提交给中方的文告中提议的在13日5点30起在锡金西藏边界实现无条件停火协议就可清晰反映出来. 虽然中国表面上正式拒绝了印度单方面提议的停火, 解放军只接受于1967年9月13日的一项临时停火协议,但却实际上实现了双方边界的平静.许多观察家感到印度取得了继1962年中方宣布的单方面停火后的一次心理回合的胜利.
Lastly, the Indian political leadership also realised that the PLA’s behavioural pattern on the border had something to do with the domestic turmoil then going on in China.<p></p></P>
<p></p></P>最后是, 印度政治领导层也了解到解放军的边界行为模式也牵涉到中国国内正发生的骚乱.
真的假的阿，所得有鼻有眼的
什么玩意！！！！
<P>67年冲突，印度伤亡五六百人，我们阵亡不过10几个，炮战打倒后来，印度几乎所有炮都被打掉，还好意思吹。</P><P>62年印度还吹我们伤亡上万呢！</P>
[em15][em14]
阅
[em14]阿三又在自慰了
那里的狗屁文章阿~
在中国,什么是真像?有真像吗?我不懂...
<P>希望坛内高手贴出真正的战史!!!!
</P><P>应该不涉及保密把!!!!!</P>
</P><P>应该不涉及保密把!!!!!</P>
我感觉和阿三以后早晚要冲突
那应该是林彪捣的乱.