超级军网核武库和武器研制项目中国对美国政府是出奇地开放
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 06:20:24
环球时报
香港《南华早报》11月20日文章，原题：美国在保守中国的核“秘密” 五角大楼和美国政界的高官经常毫无证据地声称中国武器开发过于保密。媒体随后会适时地把他们的不满作为事实来报道。不过，眼下尚不清楚中国军方是不是要比美国国防部更加保密。可以保险地认为，一个国家的核武库和武器研制项目属于保守最严密的军事机密。但在这方面，中国对美国政府是出奇地开放。
笔者注意到，9月份一期的《今日物理》杂志刊登了一篇讲中国核武器计划的文章，作者是美国前空军部长里德。他之所以了解这些，是因为他的同事斯蒂尔曼博士1990年获准两次将中国关键的热核武器研发和试验基地看了个遍。斯蒂尔曼还于1991年到1999年期间先后参观7次。斯蒂尔曼博士当时是洛斯·阿拉莫斯国家实验室技术情报部主任。世界第一颗原子弹就是该实验室研制的。中国人清楚地知道斯蒂尔曼博士是谁以及他想要什么。他提出参观，很快就获准了。他参观了作为中国核武器综合体的主要部分以及几个偏远的试验场。他还看到了武器设计、试验设备以及当时为止中国核试验的记录。
为什么中国人要这样做？里德先生在文章中写道：“或许中国人是想威慑。倘若美国了解中国的核能力，它在台湾周边和太平洋应该会保持更谨慎的军事姿态。”北京把国家利益定位为建设，其国内事务要求有一个和平的国际环境。中国的军队在政策和设计上都是防御性的。相比之下，美国将国家利益定位为全球，这经常要求出动军队保卫。从军事上来说，美国是所有国家中最具进攻性的。
但为什么里德先生现在发表这篇文章呢？笔者怀疑，这是因为他的朋友斯蒂尔曼博士在出版《中国核武器计划揭秘》一书时遇到了麻烦。该书是斯蒂尔曼博士根据本人在华经历写成的。美国政府在2000年禁止该书出版，认为它包含了机密材料。几年来他徒劳地为此打了几场官司。
可以说，中情局和五角大楼成功地阻止了公众从美国最前沿科学家那里获取中国核武器研制的信息。美国正在为中国人保守后者十分乐意泄露的军事机密。环球时报
香港《南华早报》11月20日文章，原题：美国在保守中国的核“秘密” 五角大楼和美国政界的高官经常毫无证据地声称中国武器开发过于保密。媒体随后会适时地把他们的不满作为事实来报道。不过，眼下尚不清楚中国军方是不是要比美国国防部更加保密。可以保险地认为，一个国家的核武库和武器研制项目属于保守最严密的军事机密。但在这方面，中国对美国政府是出奇地开放。
笔者注意到，9月份一期的《今日物理》杂志刊登了一篇讲中国核武器计划的文章，作者是美国前空军部长里德。他之所以了解这些，是因为他的同事斯蒂尔曼博士1990年获准两次将中国关键的热核武器研发和试验基地看了个遍。斯蒂尔曼还于1991年到1999年期间先后参观7次。斯蒂尔曼博士当时是洛斯·阿拉莫斯国家实验室技术情报部主任。世界第一颗原子弹就是该实验室研制的。中国人清楚地知道斯蒂尔曼博士是谁以及他想要什么。他提出参观，很快就获准了。他参观了作为中国核武器综合体的主要部分以及几个偏远的试验场。他还看到了武器设计、试验设备以及当时为止中国核试验的记录。
为什么中国人要这样做？里德先生在文章中写道：“或许中国人是想威慑。倘若美国了解中国的核能力，它在台湾周边和太平洋应该会保持更谨慎的军事姿态。”北京把国家利益定位为建设，其国内事务要求有一个和平的国际环境。中国的军队在政策和设计上都是防御性的。相比之下，美国将国家利益定位为全球，这经常要求出动军队保卫。从军事上来说，美国是所有国家中最具进攻性的。
但为什么里德先生现在发表这篇文章呢？笔者怀疑，这是因为他的朋友斯蒂尔曼博士在出版《中国核武器计划揭秘》一书时遇到了麻烦。该书是斯蒂尔曼博士根据本人在华经历写成的。美国政府在2000年禁止该书出版，认为它包含了机密材料。几年来他徒劳地为此打了几场官司。
可以说，中情局和五角大楼成功地阻止了公众从美国最前沿科学家那里获取中国核武器研制的信息。美国正在为中国人保守后者十分乐意泄露的军事机密。
香港《南华早报》11月20日文章，原题：美国在保守中国的核“秘密” 五角大楼和美国政界的高官经常毫无证据地声称中国武器开发过于保密。媒体随后会适时地把他们的不满作为事实来报道。不过，眼下尚不清楚中国军方是不是要比美国国防部更加保密。可以保险地认为，一个国家的核武库和武器研制项目属于保守最严密的军事机密。但在这方面，中国对美国政府是出奇地开放。
笔者注意到，9月份一期的《今日物理》杂志刊登了一篇讲中国核武器计划的文章，作者是美国前空军部长里德。他之所以了解这些，是因为他的同事斯蒂尔曼博士1990年获准两次将中国关键的热核武器研发和试验基地看了个遍。斯蒂尔曼还于1991年到1999年期间先后参观7次。斯蒂尔曼博士当时是洛斯·阿拉莫斯国家实验室技术情报部主任。世界第一颗原子弹就是该实验室研制的。中国人清楚地知道斯蒂尔曼博士是谁以及他想要什么。他提出参观，很快就获准了。他参观了作为中国核武器综合体的主要部分以及几个偏远的试验场。他还看到了武器设计、试验设备以及当时为止中国核试验的记录。
为什么中国人要这样做？里德先生在文章中写道：“或许中国人是想威慑。倘若美国了解中国的核能力，它在台湾周边和太平洋应该会保持更谨慎的军事姿态。”北京把国家利益定位为建设，其国内事务要求有一个和平的国际环境。中国的军队在政策和设计上都是防御性的。相比之下，美国将国家利益定位为全球，这经常要求出动军队保卫。从军事上来说，美国是所有国家中最具进攻性的。
但为什么里德先生现在发表这篇文章呢？笔者怀疑，这是因为他的朋友斯蒂尔曼博士在出版《中国核武器计划揭秘》一书时遇到了麻烦。该书是斯蒂尔曼博士根据本人在华经历写成的。美国政府在2000年禁止该书出版，认为它包含了机密材料。几年来他徒劳地为此打了几场官司。
可以说，中情局和五角大楼成功地阻止了公众从美国最前沿科学家那里获取中国核武器研制的信息。美国正在为中国人保守后者十分乐意泄露的军事机密。环球时报
香港《南华早报》11月20日文章，原题：美国在保守中国的核“秘密” 五角大楼和美国政界的高官经常毫无证据地声称中国武器开发过于保密。媒体随后会适时地把他们的不满作为事实来报道。不过，眼下尚不清楚中国军方是不是要比美国国防部更加保密。可以保险地认为，一个国家的核武库和武器研制项目属于保守最严密的军事机密。但在这方面，中国对美国政府是出奇地开放。
笔者注意到，9月份一期的《今日物理》杂志刊登了一篇讲中国核武器计划的文章，作者是美国前空军部长里德。他之所以了解这些，是因为他的同事斯蒂尔曼博士1990年获准两次将中国关键的热核武器研发和试验基地看了个遍。斯蒂尔曼还于1991年到1999年期间先后参观7次。斯蒂尔曼博士当时是洛斯·阿拉莫斯国家实验室技术情报部主任。世界第一颗原子弹就是该实验室研制的。中国人清楚地知道斯蒂尔曼博士是谁以及他想要什么。他提出参观，很快就获准了。他参观了作为中国核武器综合体的主要部分以及几个偏远的试验场。他还看到了武器设计、试验设备以及当时为止中国核试验的记录。
为什么中国人要这样做？里德先生在文章中写道：“或许中国人是想威慑。倘若美国了解中国的核能力，它在台湾周边和太平洋应该会保持更谨慎的军事姿态。”北京把国家利益定位为建设，其国内事务要求有一个和平的国际环境。中国的军队在政策和设计上都是防御性的。相比之下，美国将国家利益定位为全球，这经常要求出动军队保卫。从军事上来说，美国是所有国家中最具进攻性的。
但为什么里德先生现在发表这篇文章呢？笔者怀疑，这是因为他的朋友斯蒂尔曼博士在出版《中国核武器计划揭秘》一书时遇到了麻烦。该书是斯蒂尔曼博士根据本人在华经历写成的。美国政府在2000年禁止该书出版，认为它包含了机密材料。几年来他徒劳地为此打了几场官司。
可以说，中情局和五角大楼成功地阻止了公众从美国最前沿科学家那里获取中国核武器研制的信息。美国正在为中国人保守后者十分乐意泄露的军事机密。
《中国核武器计划揭秘》 包含了机密材料
原来中米邪恶轴心是真的！！！！
原来中米邪恶轴心是真的！！！！
原来是老美帮中国保密这么多年啊
1990年获准两次将中国关键的热核武器研发和试验基地看了个遍
看这个就知道不靠谱
看这个就知道不靠谱
这个 Stillman 90年来中国,两次探访中国的核设施,也不是都给他看,但也确实看了一些很牛的东西,他写的这篇纪实文章还要感谢国内的朋友给翻译过来了.
http://bbs.scol.com.cn/dispbbs.asp?boardid=41&Id=426611
有兴趣的可以看下,其中有三个技术让我感觉很好很强大,甚至出乎意料的暴力!
转贴一段:"随后他们重新访问了科学城，在那里Stillman学到远远比他第一次到来时多的多的东西。举个例子，他能仔细的检查高爆炸药测试设施。在和那些测试容器接近的地方是令人印象深刻的快X-射线机器，被设计来用以研究内爆发生时的情况。附近的高速照像机能在一秒内完成100万张的拍摄。在内爆球内的探测钉子给出了进一步有关于内爆对称性的信息。整套技术装备，从任何一个标准来看都是“艺术级”的。
中国的核测试如果没有比美国的核探测技术更好的话那也是在每一点上都和那些在美国使用的测试技术是一样好的。举个例子，西北核所的科学家给 Stillman显示过了好几个中国造的5M赫兹的示波器，但其最大探测范围却可以记录到1.5G赫兹的信号，这样的技术已比所有的同时代的西方所能造出的最好的示波器要好得多了。
西北核所的科学家也已经发展出了一种叫做双轴PINEX(小孔中子实验)“照相机”用以提供一种双重照片，这样的双重照片能够反应在氢弹内爆（ＰＳ：氢弹的爆炸是先引爆里面的“原子弹”来实现的）期间，热核装置的裂变部分所引起的氘氚燃烧区域的情况。（ＰＳ：不知道大家看明白了没有？其实就是说先用原子弹来极大的压缩氘氚使其达到聚变的临界密度，而这个临界密度是有氘氚核之间的量子势垒所决定，有兴趣的同学可以自己做一个估算，这里不在赘述。那么这样特殊制造的照相机就可以让我们观察到在那一瞬间的情况，其实如果同学们对中子衍射还熟悉的话，也是自己可以想象的，这样的装置也是自然而然就应运而一了）这台独一无二的双轴中子成像仪允许中国的核武器研究者可以对核装置内部一个专门的燃烧区域进行任意两个时间序列事件的成像或者或者在同一时刻同时记录核装置内部不同区域发生的事件！"
http://bbs.scol.com.cn/dispbbs.asp?boardid=41&Id=426611
有兴趣的可以看下,其中有三个技术让我感觉很好很强大,甚至出乎意料的暴力!
转贴一段:"随后他们重新访问了科学城，在那里Stillman学到远远比他第一次到来时多的多的东西。举个例子，他能仔细的检查高爆炸药测试设施。在和那些测试容器接近的地方是令人印象深刻的快X-射线机器，被设计来用以研究内爆发生时的情况。附近的高速照像机能在一秒内完成100万张的拍摄。在内爆球内的探测钉子给出了进一步有关于内爆对称性的信息。整套技术装备，从任何一个标准来看都是“艺术级”的。
中国的核测试如果没有比美国的核探测技术更好的话那也是在每一点上都和那些在美国使用的测试技术是一样好的。举个例子，西北核所的科学家给 Stillman显示过了好几个中国造的5M赫兹的示波器，但其最大探测范围却可以记录到1.5G赫兹的信号，这样的技术已比所有的同时代的西方所能造出的最好的示波器要好得多了。
西北核所的科学家也已经发展出了一种叫做双轴PINEX(小孔中子实验)“照相机”用以提供一种双重照片，这样的双重照片能够反应在氢弹内爆（ＰＳ：氢弹的爆炸是先引爆里面的“原子弹”来实现的）期间，热核装置的裂变部分所引起的氘氚燃烧区域的情况。（ＰＳ：不知道大家看明白了没有？其实就是说先用原子弹来极大的压缩氘氚使其达到聚变的临界密度，而这个临界密度是有氘氚核之间的量子势垒所决定，有兴趣的同学可以自己做一个估算，这里不在赘述。那么这样特殊制造的照相机就可以让我们观察到在那一瞬间的情况，其实如果同学们对中子衍射还熟悉的话，也是自己可以想象的，这样的装置也是自然而然就应运而一了）这台独一无二的双轴中子成像仪允许中国的核武器研究者可以对核装置内部一个专门的燃烧区域进行任意两个时间序列事件的成像或者或者在同一时刻同时记录核装置内部不同区域发生的事件！"
在飞扬那看过部分,感觉不假
Stillman显示过了好几个中国造的5M赫兹的示波器，但其最大探测范围却可以记录到1.5G赫兹的信号，这样的技术已比所有的同时代的西方所能造出的最好的示波器要好得多了。
================
一听这句话就是假的, 80年代早有了
================
一听这句话就是假的, 80年代早有了
这老兄是美国拉莫斯退休的核物专家, 到90年代一共去过9次中国, 确实2001年就说要出书, 到现在也没出版, 估计真被美国政府否决了
按照他本人说法, 他自称去了中国每个核武研究试验室.
这人就他这段经历, 退休后在哈佛和MIT都做过报告,比如这段应该是他去MIT的2001年报告的前瞻:
http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives_01fall/stillman.htm
06年他还去过哈佛做过类似报告:http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard. ... eapons_program.html
估计在那的留学生应该了解报告具体内容吧, 呵呵, 先贴段MIT的2001年报告的前言:
Inside China's Nuclear Weapons Program
Dan Stillman
Retired from Los Alamos National Laboratory
October 10, 2001
This presentation is based on nine trips to nuclear weapon facilities in China during the 1990s that are described in a book currently undergoing security review by the government. The purpose of the book is to record for historical purposes my unique travels and experiences in China during the last few years of China's underground nuclear weapons testing, China's entry into a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, the aftermath of the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the release of the Cox Committee report on Chinese nuclear weapons espionage.
On my visits to China, I gathered information on the names and locations of Chinese nuclear weapon facilities, descriptions of the main activities at these facilities, and the known interactions between facilities. I was hosted by the director of the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), China's main nuclear weapon organization, and visited all of China's nuclear weapons laboratories with the exception of their equivalent of PANTEX, the US facility that assembles US nuclear weapons.
My first introduction to Chinese nuclear weapon scientists was in June 1988 when I met Professor Yang Fujia then director of the Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research. I expressed an interest in whether China had a Prompt Burst Reactor (PRB), a reactor of the type that I had helped design for the United States. After he showed me the location of the Chinese PRB on a map I asked if I could visit the facility. He replied "sure" and told me to send a resume and a list of other facilities that I would want to visit. The trip was scheduled for September and October of 1989 but was canceled following the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. In 1990, Yang Fujia renewed the invitation for a visit in April.
I visited China with my deputy and we were the first American visitors to these nuclear weapon facilities. The visit provided a unique opportunity to gather insights into the Chinese nuclear weapons complex. The Chinese inquired about nuclear verification measures, nuclear effects data, diagnostic techniques, and arms control issues but did not inquire about specific American nuclear weapons, components or materials. All of the information we provided our Chinese hosts was based on public information in the form of brochures, press releases, or technical reports.
On this trip and subsequent visits, I visited virtually all of China's nuclear weapons laboratories. In Shanghai, I visited Fudan University and the Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research, where work was conducted on neutron initiators and sources. In Mianyang, near Chengdu, I visited the headquarters of the CAEP, which is China's equivalent to our Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore nuclear laboratories and is composed (at that time) of twelve institutes. These institutes are responsible for research on applied electronics, nuclear physics and chemistry, fluid physics, structural mechanics, chemical materials, electronic engineering, and computing applications.
I also visited the Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology (NINT), which designed and produced diagnostic equipment to monitor nuclear weapon tests, assembled the instrumentation trailers used in each test, and conducted radiochemical analysis after the test to determine the yield of the explosion. I also traveled to Malan in northwest China, where their nuclear weapon tests were conducted. China's nuclear weapons test site is seven times bigger than the Nevada Test Site and was manned by 2,000 Chinese military and 8,000 civilian personnel. The Chinese provided me with a tour of several vertical hole test sites and I was able to walk into a tunnel that they had previously used for a horizontal test. I was told that China's first seven nuclear weapon tests all used highly enriched uranium (93.5% U-235) as primaries because the Soviets had pulled their support for China's plutonium production reactor. China's third test was China's first use of thermonuclear material. By the sixth test, China had developed a thermonuclear weapon with a yield of 3.3 megatons. My trip to this facility was unique: more Americans have walked on the Moon than on China's nuclear weapons test site.
In Beijing, I met with Chinese nuclear weapon designers who worked for the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics. China's nuclear weapons are not designed to be one-point safe like American weapons. (One-point safe means there is only one in a million chances of exceeding greater than four pounds of high explosive equivalent yield.) Since their nuclear weapons are not one-point safe, excess amounts of fissile material can be used in the weapon to ensure that they will work properly.
My visits to China allowed me to be an eyewitness to the Chinese nuclear weapon establishment from its original concept to its final test. The information I received was remarkably detailed and it was provided without any apparent reservations. My hosts told me of their methods, achievements, failures, and future plans. China's nuclear weapon scientists are eager to cooperate with their American colleagues, but the China Lab-to-Lab program was halted by the Department of Energy after the Cox report and the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. In my opinion, the failure to cultivate relations with these Chinese scientists is a mistake. The information the Chinese scientists willingly gave to me and my fellow travelers would have cost the government several millions of dollars to collect by traditional intelligence methods. There is no substitute for having been there, seen it and touched it.
Dan B. Stillman worked for 32 years at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, and the Nevada Test Site. Since April 1990, he has made ten extended trips to China to visit nuclear weapons laboratories in Beijing, Shanghai, Xi'an, and Mianyang, as well as the Chinese nuclear test site near Malan.
按照他本人说法, 他自称去了中国每个核武研究试验室.
这人就他这段经历, 退休后在哈佛和MIT都做过报告,比如这段应该是他去MIT的2001年报告的前瞻:
http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives_01fall/stillman.htm
06年他还去过哈佛做过类似报告:http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard. ... eapons_program.html
估计在那的留学生应该了解报告具体内容吧, 呵呵, 先贴段MIT的2001年报告的前言:
Inside China's Nuclear Weapons Program
Dan Stillman
Retired from Los Alamos National Laboratory
October 10, 2001
This presentation is based on nine trips to nuclear weapon facilities in China during the 1990s that are described in a book currently undergoing security review by the government. The purpose of the book is to record for historical purposes my unique travels and experiences in China during the last few years of China's underground nuclear weapons testing, China's entry into a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, the aftermath of the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the release of the Cox Committee report on Chinese nuclear weapons espionage.
On my visits to China, I gathered information on the names and locations of Chinese nuclear weapon facilities, descriptions of the main activities at these facilities, and the known interactions between facilities. I was hosted by the director of the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), China's main nuclear weapon organization, and visited all of China's nuclear weapons laboratories with the exception of their equivalent of PANTEX, the US facility that assembles US nuclear weapons.
My first introduction to Chinese nuclear weapon scientists was in June 1988 when I met Professor Yang Fujia then director of the Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research. I expressed an interest in whether China had a Prompt Burst Reactor (PRB), a reactor of the type that I had helped design for the United States. After he showed me the location of the Chinese PRB on a map I asked if I could visit the facility. He replied "sure" and told me to send a resume and a list of other facilities that I would want to visit. The trip was scheduled for September and October of 1989 but was canceled following the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. In 1990, Yang Fujia renewed the invitation for a visit in April.
I visited China with my deputy and we were the first American visitors to these nuclear weapon facilities. The visit provided a unique opportunity to gather insights into the Chinese nuclear weapons complex. The Chinese inquired about nuclear verification measures, nuclear effects data, diagnostic techniques, and arms control issues but did not inquire about specific American nuclear weapons, components or materials. All of the information we provided our Chinese hosts was based on public information in the form of brochures, press releases, or technical reports.
On this trip and subsequent visits, I visited virtually all of China's nuclear weapons laboratories. In Shanghai, I visited Fudan University and the Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research, where work was conducted on neutron initiators and sources. In Mianyang, near Chengdu, I visited the headquarters of the CAEP, which is China's equivalent to our Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore nuclear laboratories and is composed (at that time) of twelve institutes. These institutes are responsible for research on applied electronics, nuclear physics and chemistry, fluid physics, structural mechanics, chemical materials, electronic engineering, and computing applications.
I also visited the Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology (NINT), which designed and produced diagnostic equipment to monitor nuclear weapon tests, assembled the instrumentation trailers used in each test, and conducted radiochemical analysis after the test to determine the yield of the explosion. I also traveled to Malan in northwest China, where their nuclear weapon tests were conducted. China's nuclear weapons test site is seven times bigger than the Nevada Test Site and was manned by 2,000 Chinese military and 8,000 civilian personnel. The Chinese provided me with a tour of several vertical hole test sites and I was able to walk into a tunnel that they had previously used for a horizontal test. I was told that China's first seven nuclear weapon tests all used highly enriched uranium (93.5% U-235) as primaries because the Soviets had pulled their support for China's plutonium production reactor. China's third test was China's first use of thermonuclear material. By the sixth test, China had developed a thermonuclear weapon with a yield of 3.3 megatons. My trip to this facility was unique: more Americans have walked on the Moon than on China's nuclear weapons test site.
In Beijing, I met with Chinese nuclear weapon designers who worked for the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics. China's nuclear weapons are not designed to be one-point safe like American weapons. (One-point safe means there is only one in a million chances of exceeding greater than four pounds of high explosive equivalent yield.) Since their nuclear weapons are not one-point safe, excess amounts of fissile material can be used in the weapon to ensure that they will work properly.
My visits to China allowed me to be an eyewitness to the Chinese nuclear weapon establishment from its original concept to its final test. The information I received was remarkably detailed and it was provided without any apparent reservations. My hosts told me of their methods, achievements, failures, and future plans. China's nuclear weapon scientists are eager to cooperate with their American colleagues, but the China Lab-to-Lab program was halted by the Department of Energy after the Cox report and the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. In my opinion, the failure to cultivate relations with these Chinese scientists is a mistake. The information the Chinese scientists willingly gave to me and my fellow travelers would have cost the government several millions of dollars to collect by traditional intelligence methods. There is no substitute for having been there, seen it and touched it.
Dan B. Stillman worked for 32 years at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, and the Nevada Test Site. Since April 1990, he has made ten extended trips to China to visit nuclear weapons laboratories in Beijing, Shanghai, Xi'an, and Mianyang, as well as the Chinese nuclear test site near Malan.
看了原文英文版, 结合STILLMAN的情况, 应该讲没什么前后矛盾之处, 所以BKC们先别急着裸奔;P
好像老邓当年就反复强调解决台湾问题不排除可能要动用核力量。
谁证实一下？
谁证实一下？