超级军网[转]核恐怖问题:如何实现?
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/27 23:51:11
转自美国《华盛顿时报》2007年5月13日版
布赖恩迈克尔詹金斯是一名恐怖主义问题专家,在兰德公司的一个非盈利研究组织
前中央情报局局长特尼特写道,在他的新书,他的最大忧虑是:"一核"
他写道,拉丹和基地"迫切希望"摩的核恐怖袭击,因为"他们明白……如果他们能掀起一股蘑菇云,他们将创造历史."
历史核恐怖主义可以概括:没有--没有.
但它仍然是一个幻想恐怖分子寻求超强破坏力,是一个恶梦一样,定期催有朝一日,它可能会成真.
盖达当然有核野心,但并不认为有核能力,在这个时候.
但由于缺乏核恐怖主义并没有阻止核恐怖.
这就是语言的力量,这仅仅是就业中的"核问题"和"恐怖主义",在近距离产生裂变的恐惧.
可能外人政府可能制造核武器的设想是,在最初的原子时代在20世纪40年代.
核恐怖主义图谋驱车悬念小说在五十年代和六十年代,像詹姆士庞德造物主伊恩弗莱明的
"thunderball."
今天,它是"24"字杰克鲍尔谁捕捉恐怖分子的核弹.
但现实呢?
我发表了第一篇关于核恐怖主义的一次会议上,在洛斯阿拉莫斯,n.m.于1975年.
我们仍然要问这个问题,32年后.
这次辩论中,70年代主要集中在是否恐怖分子可能建立一个炸弹,即使他们有足够的材料.
炸弹设计师倾向于争辩原则的核武器设计是由当时著名的,因此,恐怖分子也许就可以编造一个粗核武器.
但炸弹建设者仍然怀疑:建设一个原子弹涉及多于方程在纸面上.
没有专门设计的核武器问题,我采取了不同的角度看恐怖分子动机和意图.
而核恐怖主义似乎在理论上有吸引力,即使那些我们贴上恐怖分子没有一切,他们能够做的只是在几十年前.
技术限制和运作上的困难之外,恐怖分子似乎运作自我约束的是在1970年代.
他们担心大型红皂白的暴力可能会损害其形象,威胁到社会的凝聚力的团体,让渡知觉成分,并引起反弹,这将威胁到他们的生存.
但这些限制是不具有普遍性或一成不变,而随时间的变化.
在1980年代初,约束开始削弱,而且大规模的恐怖暴力活动有所增加.
到1990年我的同事在兰德公司的人写的"新恐怖主义",指恐怖分子越来越出于宗教狂热并决心要杀人的数量,并可能寻求大规模杀伤性武器(WMD)形成,以扩大其容量混乱.
人们对可能的恐怖情景,也因此改变.
促使患病恐怖分子劫持在七十年代,分析家迈上了当代情景,并怀疑恐怖分子拥有核武器可能有朝一日市举行人质勒索在政治上让步.
至少一些恐怖分子显然是想沿着相同的路线走下去.
这后来又改口担心,如果恐怖分子获得大规模杀伤性,他们将袭击警告.
在苏联解体和日益关切的安全构成了巨大的核武库,加深恐惧核恐怖主义.
探讨如何帮助美国和苏联可能普遍合作打击恐怖主义始于80年代,发展成具体方案,旨在确保俄罗斯武器和寻找就业的俄罗斯武器设计师.
在冷战结束后,还需要彻底反思美国的国家安全政策.
这两种威胁为主注意:升级,恐怖主义和扩散大规模杀伤性武器.
两人很容易混在一起.
分析家担心敌对国家拥有核武器可能试图武装恐怖分子之一.
即使没有国家的批准,无赖分子参与了这些方案的可能,为了金钱利益或意识形态的原因,有利于恐怖主义分子获取.
在2001年9月11日,恐怖袭击重新真实性.
恐怖情景以前认为牵强成了部分假设.
面对现实,大规模的死亡和破坏,美国可能会采取贸易保护措施的机会,恐怖分子可能再次发动进攻,造成更大的破坏?
随后的"全球反恐战争"(用"恐怖"和"恐怖主义"的最初互换使用),不仅包括运动对那些应对9月11日,还开展了打击敌对国家怀疑谋求核武器.
优先购买权成为国策.
猜疑足以和美国入侵伊拉克销毁大规模毁灭性武器,原来就不存在.
有那么明朗北韩的核武,由于北方已经测试了核武器.
有足够的怀疑伊朗的核意图的担心,伊朗和北韩,即使不发动自杀核袭击,将秘密向恐怖分子提供核武器.
如果拆除这些节目保不住,世界正面临着吸引力的替代另一个先发制人的军事攻击或接受的风险.
一些分析家建议,而不是威慑战略,其中工作,在冷战时期,可以修改,并应用于新型核武器的国家--甚至恐怖分子本身.
但是,这一想法往往被拒绝在官场免于恐惧的威慑意味着接受核武器,因此,削弱目前旨在消除.
无论是核恐怖主义将是避免或只是早晚的事情依然在猜测.
尽管如此,它仍将是一个来源市民忧心的一个因素,面对世界各地的政府.转自美国《华盛顿时报》2007年5月13日版
布赖恩迈克尔詹金斯是一名恐怖主义问题专家,在兰德公司的一个非盈利研究组织
前中央情报局局长特尼特写道,在他的新书,他的最大忧虑是:"一核"
He writes that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda "desperately want" to mount a nuclear terrorist attack because "they understand that... if they manage to set off a mushroom cloud, they will make history."
他写道,拉丹和基地"迫切希望"摩的核恐怖袭击,因为"他们明白……如果他们能掀起一股蘑菇云,他们将创造历史."
The history of nuclear terrorism can be summarized: There hasn't been any -- yet.
历史核恐怖主义可以概括:没有--没有.
But it remains a fantasy of terrorists seeking super-destructive power, and a nightmare for everyone else, with periodic reminders some day it may come true.
但它仍然是一个幻想恐怖分子寻求超强破坏力,是一个恶梦一样,定期催有朝一日,它可能会成真.
Al Qaeda certainly has nuclear ambitions, but is not believed to have nuclear capabilities at this time.
盖达当然有核野心,但并不认为有核能力,在这个时候.
But the absence of nuclear terrorism has not prevented nuclear terror.
但由于缺乏核恐怖主义并没有阻止核恐怖.
Such is the power of language, that the mere placement of the words "nuclear" and "terrorism" in close proximity produces a fission of fear.
这就是语言的力量,这仅仅是就业中的"核问题"和"恐怖主义",在近距离产生裂变的恐惧.
The possibility someone outside government might build a nuclear weapon was contemplated at the very beginning of the atomic age in the 1940s.
可能外人政府可能制造核武器的设想是,在最初的原子时代在20世纪40年代.
Nuclear terrorism plots drove suspense novels written in the 1950s and '60s, like James Bond creator Ian Fleming's "Thunderball."
核恐怖主义图谋驱车悬念小说在五十年代和六十年代,像詹姆士庞德造物主伊恩弗莱明的
"thunderball." Today, it is "24" character Jack Bauer who chases terrorists with nuclear bombs.
今天,它是"24"字杰克鲍尔谁捕捉恐怖分子的核弹.
But what about reality?
但现实呢?
I presented my first paper on nuclear terrorism at a conference in Los Alamos, N.M., in 1975.
我发表了第一篇关于核恐怖主义的一次会议上,在洛斯阿拉莫斯,n.m.于1975年.
The title: "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?
"标题:"恐怖分子将进行核试验"?
We still ask that question 32 years later.
我们仍然要问这个问题,32年后.
The debate in the 1970s focused on whether terrorists could build a bomb even if they had the material.
这次辩论中,70年代主要集中在是否恐怖分子可能建立一个炸弹,即使他们有足够的材料.
Bomb designers tended to argue the principles of nuclear weapons design were by then well known, and therefore terrorists probably would be able to fabricate a crude nuclear weapon.
炸弹设计师倾向于争辩原则的核武器设计是由当时著名的,因此,恐怖分子也许就可以编造一个粗核武器.
But bomb builders remained skeptical: Building a nuclear bomb involved more than equations on paper.
但炸弹建设者仍然怀疑:建设一个原子弹涉及多于方程在纸面上.
Having no expertise in design of nuclear weapons, I took a different tack, looking at terrorist motives and intentions.
没有专门设计的核武器问题,我采取了不同的角度看恐怖分子动机和意图.
While nuclear terrorism seemed theoretically attractive, even those we labeled terrorists did not do everything they could have done just a few decades ago.
而核恐怖主义似乎在理论上有吸引力,即使那些我们贴上恐怖分子没有一切,他们能够做的只是在几十年前.
Technological limitations and operational difficulties aside, terrorists seemed to operate within self-imposed constraints in the 1970s.
技术限制和运作上的困难之外,恐怖分子似乎运作自我约束的是在1970年代.
They worried that large-scale indiscriminate violence might tarnish their image, threaten the cohesion of their groups, alienate their perceived constituents, and provoke a backlash that would threaten their survival.
他们担心大型红皂白的暴力可能会损害其形象,威胁到社会的凝聚力的团体,让渡知觉成分,并引起反弹,这将威胁到他们的生存. But these constraints were not universal or immutable and changed over time.
但这些限制是不具有普遍性或一成不变,而随时间的变化.
Beginning in the 1980s, the constraints began to erode and large-scale terrorist violence increased.
在1980年代初,约束开始削弱,而且大规模的恐怖暴力活动有所增加.
By the 1990s, my colleagues at the Rand Corp. were writing about the "new terrorism," referring to terrorists increasingly motivated by religious fanaticism and determined to kill in quantity and likely to seek weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to expand their capacity for mayhem.
到1990年我的同事在兰德公司的人写的"新恐怖主义",指恐怖分子越来越出于宗教狂热并决心要杀人的数量,并可能寻求大规模杀伤性武器(WMD)形成,以扩大其容量混乱.
Perceptions of the likely terrorist scenario also changed.
人们对可能的恐怖情景,也因此改变.
Prompted by the prevalence of terrorist hostage-taking in the 1970s, analysts scaled up contemporary scenarios and wondered whether terrorists with nuclear weapons might some day hold cities hostage to extort political concessions.
促使患病恐怖分子劫持在七十年代,分析家迈上了当代情景,并怀疑恐怖分子拥有核武器可能有朝一日市举行人质勒索在政治上让步.
At least some terrorists apparently thought along the same lines.
至少一些恐怖分子显然是想沿着相同的路线走下去.
This later changed to fears that if terrorists acquired WMD they would attack without warning.
这后来又改口担心,如果恐怖分子获得大规模杀伤性,他们将袭击警告.
The fall of the Soviet Union and growing concerns about the security of its huge nuclear arsenal deepened fears of nuclear terrorism.
在苏联解体和日益关切的安全构成了巨大的核武库,加深恐惧核恐怖主义.
Exploratory discussions about how the United States and the Soviet Union might generally cooperate against terrorism, which began in the 1980s, developed into concrete programs aimed at securing Russian weapons and finding employment for Russian weapons designers.
探讨如何帮助美国和苏联可能普遍合作打击恐怖主义始于80年代,发展成具体方案,旨在确保俄罗斯武器和寻找就业的俄罗斯武器设计师.
The end of the Cold War also required a thorough rethinking of American national security policy.
在冷战结束后,还需要彻底反思美国的国家安全政策.
Two threats dominated attention: escalating terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.
这两种威胁为主注意:升级,恐怖主义和扩散大规模杀伤性武器.
The two were easily conflated.
两人很容易混在一起.
Analysts feared that hostile states with nuclear weapons might be tempted to arm terrorists with one.
分析家担心敌对国家拥有核武器可能试图武装恐怖分子之一.
Even without state approval, rogue elements involved in these programs might, for financial gain or ideological reasons, facilitate terrorist acquisition.
即使没有国家的批准,无赖分子参与了这些方案的可能,为了金钱利益或意识形态的原因,有利于恐怖主义分子获取.
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks redefined plausibility.
在2001年9月11日,恐怖袭击重新真实性.
Terrorist scenarios previously considered far-fetched suddenly became operative presumptions.
恐怖情景以前认为牵强成了部分假设.
Facing the reality of large-scale death and destruction, could America afford to take the chance terrorists might attack again, causing even greater devastation?
面对现实,大规模的死亡和破坏,美国可能会采取贸易保护措施的机会,恐怖分子可能再次发动进攻,造成更大的破坏?
The subsequent "global war on terror" (the terms "terror" and "terrorism" initially were used interchangeably) would include not only a campaign against those responsible for September 11, but also a campaign against hostile states suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons.
随后的"全球反恐战争"(用"恐怖"和"恐怖主义"的最初互换使用),不仅包括运动对那些应对9月11日,还开展了打击敌对国家怀疑谋求核武器.
Pre-emption became national policy.
优先购买权成为国策.
Suspicion sufficed and the U.S. invaded Iraq to destroy WMD that turned out not to exist.
猜疑足以和美国入侵伊拉克销毁大规模毁灭性武器,原来就不存在.
There is less uncertainty about North Korea's nuclear arsenal, since the North has already tested a nuclear weapon.
有那么明朗北韩的核武,由于北方已经测试了核武器.
There is enough suspicion about Iran's nuclear intentions to fear Iran and North Korea, even if they don't launch suicidal nuclear attacks, will clandestinely provide terrorists with nuclear weapons.
有足够的怀疑伊朗的核意图的担心,伊朗和北韩,即使不发动自杀核袭击,将秘密向恐怖分子提供核武器.
If dismantling these programs proves impossible, the world is confronted with the unattractive alternatives of another pre-emptive military attack or accepting the risk.
如果拆除这些节目保不住,世界正面临着吸引力的替代另一个先发制人的军事攻击或接受的风险.
Some analysts have suggested instead that deterrence strategies, which worked during the Cold War, might be modified and applied to new nuclear weapons states -- even to terrorists themselves.
一些分析家建议,而不是威慑战略,其中工作,在冷战时期,可以修改,并应用于新型核武器的国家--甚至恐怖分子本身.
But this idea tends to be rejected in official circles from fear deterrence implies acceptance of nuclear weapons and therefore undercuts current efforts aimed at their elimination.
但是,这一想法往往被拒绝在官场免于恐惧的威慑意味着接受核武器,因此,削弱目前旨在消除.
Whether nuclear terrorism will be avoided or is only a matter of time remains in the realm of speculation.
无论是核恐怖主义将是避免或只是早晚的事情依然在猜测.
Nonetheless, it will continue to be a source of public apprehension and a factor confronting governments around the world.
尽管如此,它仍将是一个来源市民忧心的一个因素,面对世界各地的政府.
布赖恩迈克尔詹金斯是一名恐怖主义问题专家,在兰德公司的一个非盈利研究组织
前中央情报局局长特尼特写道,在他的新书,他的最大忧虑是:"一核"
He writes that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda "desperately want" to mount a nuclear terrorist attack because "they understand that... if they manage to set off a mushroom cloud, they will make history."
他写道,拉丹和基地"迫切希望"摩的核恐怖袭击,因为"他们明白……如果他们能掀起一股蘑菇云,他们将创造历史."
The history of nuclear terrorism can be summarized: There hasn't been any -- yet.
历史核恐怖主义可以概括:没有--没有.
But it remains a fantasy of terrorists seeking super-destructive power, and a nightmare for everyone else, with periodic reminders some day it may come true.
但它仍然是一个幻想恐怖分子寻求超强破坏力,是一个恶梦一样,定期催有朝一日,它可能会成真.
Al Qaeda certainly has nuclear ambitions, but is not believed to have nuclear capabilities at this time.
盖达当然有核野心,但并不认为有核能力,在这个时候.
But the absence of nuclear terrorism has not prevented nuclear terror.
但由于缺乏核恐怖主义并没有阻止核恐怖.
Such is the power of language, that the mere placement of the words "nuclear" and "terrorism" in close proximity produces a fission of fear.
这就是语言的力量,这仅仅是就业中的"核问题"和"恐怖主义",在近距离产生裂变的恐惧.
The possibility someone outside government might build a nuclear weapon was contemplated at the very beginning of the atomic age in the 1940s.
可能外人政府可能制造核武器的设想是,在最初的原子时代在20世纪40年代.
Nuclear terrorism plots drove suspense novels written in the 1950s and '60s, like James Bond creator Ian Fleming's "Thunderball."
核恐怖主义图谋驱车悬念小说在五十年代和六十年代,像詹姆士庞德造物主伊恩弗莱明的
"thunderball."
Today, it is "24" character Jack Bauer who chases terrorists with nuclear bombs.
今天,它是"24"字杰克鲍尔谁捕捉恐怖分子的核弹.
But what about reality?
但现实呢?
I presented my first paper on nuclear terrorism at a conference in Los Alamos, N.M., in 1975.
我发表了第一篇关于核恐怖主义的一次会议上,在洛斯阿拉莫斯,n.m.于1975年.
The title: "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?
"
标题:"恐怖分子将进行核试验"? We still ask that question 32 years later.
我们仍然要问这个问题,32年后.
The debate in the 1970s focused on whether terrorists could build a bomb even if they had the material.
这次辩论中,70年代主要集中在是否恐怖分子可能建立一个炸弹,即使他们有足够的材料.
Bomb designers tended to argue the principles of nuclear weapons design were by then well known, and therefore terrorists probably would be able to fabricate a crude nuclear weapon.
炸弹设计师倾向于争辩原则的核武器设计是由当时著名的,因此,恐怖分子也许就可以编造一个粗核武器.
But bomb builders remained skeptical: Building a nuclear bomb involved more than equations on paper.
但炸弹建设者仍然怀疑:建设一个原子弹涉及多于方程在纸面上.
Having no expertise in design of nuclear weapons, I took a different tack, looking at terrorist motives and intentions.
没有专门设计的核武器问题,我采取了不同的角度看恐怖分子动机和意图.
While nuclear terrorism seemed theoretically attractive, even those we labeled terrorists did not do everything they could have done just a few decades ago.
而核恐怖主义似乎在理论上有吸引力,即使那些我们贴上恐怖分子没有一切,他们能够做的只是在几十年前.
Technological limitations and operational difficulties aside, terrorists seemed to operate within self-imposed constraints in the 1970s.
技术限制和运作上的困难之外,恐怖分子似乎运作自我约束的是在1970年代.
They worried that large-scale indiscriminate violence might tarnish their image, threaten the cohesion of their groups, alienate their perceived constituents, and provoke a backlash that would threaten their survival.
他们担心大型红皂白的暴力可能会损害其形象,威胁到社会的凝聚力的团体,让渡知觉成分,并引起反弹,这将威胁到他们的生存.
But these constraints were not universal or immutable and changed over time.
但这些限制是不具有普遍性或一成不变,而随时间的变化.
Beginning in the 1980s, the constraints began to erode and large-scale terrorist violence increased.
在1980年代初,约束开始削弱,而且大规模的恐怖暴力活动有所增加.
By the 1990s, my colleagues at the Rand Corp. were writing about the "new terrorism," referring to terrorists increasingly motivated by religious fanaticism and determined to kill in quantity and likely to seek weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to expand their capacity for mayhem.
到1990年我的同事在兰德公司的人写的"新恐怖主义",指恐怖分子越来越出于宗教狂热并决心要杀人的数量,并可能寻求大规模杀伤性武器(WMD)形成,以扩大其容量混乱.
Perceptions of the likely terrorist scenario also changed.
人们对可能的恐怖情景,也因此改变.
Prompted by the prevalence of terrorist hostage-taking in the 1970s, analysts scaled up contemporary scenarios and wondered whether terrorists with nuclear weapons might some day hold cities hostage to extort political concessions.
促使患病恐怖分子劫持在七十年代,分析家迈上了当代情景,并怀疑恐怖分子拥有核武器可能有朝一日市举行人质勒索在政治上让步.
At least some terrorists apparently thought along the same lines.
至少一些恐怖分子显然是想沿着相同的路线走下去.
This later changed to fears that if terrorists acquired WMD they would attack without warning.
这后来又改口担心,如果恐怖分子获得大规模杀伤性,他们将袭击警告.
The fall of the Soviet Union and growing concerns about the security of its huge nuclear arsenal deepened fears of nuclear terrorism.
在苏联解体和日益关切的安全构成了巨大的核武库,加深恐惧核恐怖主义.
Exploratory discussions about how the United States and the Soviet Union might generally cooperate against terrorism, which began in the 1980s, developed into concrete programs aimed at securing Russian weapons and finding employment for Russian weapons designers.
探讨如何帮助美国和苏联可能普遍合作打击恐怖主义始于80年代,发展成具体方案,旨在确保俄罗斯武器和寻找就业的俄罗斯武器设计师.
The end of the Cold War also required a thorough rethinking of American national security policy.
在冷战结束后,还需要彻底反思美国的国家安全政策.
Two threats dominated attention: escalating terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.
这两种威胁为主注意:升级,恐怖主义和扩散大规模杀伤性武器.
The two were easily conflated.
两人很容易混在一起.
Analysts feared that hostile states with nuclear weapons might be tempted to arm terrorists with one.
分析家担心敌对国家拥有核武器可能试图武装恐怖分子之一.
Even without state approval, rogue elements involved in these programs might, for financial gain or ideological reasons, facilitate terrorist acquisition.
即使没有国家的批准,无赖分子参与了这些方案的可能,为了金钱利益或意识形态的原因,有利于恐怖主义分子获取.
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks redefined plausibility.
在2001年9月11日,恐怖袭击重新真实性.
Terrorist scenarios previously considered far-fetched suddenly became operative presumptions.
恐怖情景以前认为牵强成了部分假设.
Facing the reality of large-scale death and destruction, could America afford to take the chance terrorists might attack again, causing even greater devastation?
面对现实,大规模的死亡和破坏,美国可能会采取贸易保护措施的机会,恐怖分子可能再次发动进攻,造成更大的破坏?
The subsequent "global war on terror" (the terms "terror" and "terrorism" initially were used interchangeably) would include not only a campaign against those responsible for September 11, but also a campaign against hostile states suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons.
随后的"全球反恐战争"(用"恐怖"和"恐怖主义"的最初互换使用),不仅包括运动对那些应对9月11日,还开展了打击敌对国家怀疑谋求核武器.
Pre-emption became national policy.
优先购买权成为国策.
Suspicion sufficed and the U.S. invaded Iraq to destroy WMD that turned out not to exist.
猜疑足以和美国入侵伊拉克销毁大规模毁灭性武器,原来就不存在.
There is less uncertainty about North Korea's nuclear arsenal, since the North has already tested a nuclear weapon.
有那么明朗北韩的核武,由于北方已经测试了核武器.
There is enough suspicion about Iran's nuclear intentions to fear Iran and North Korea, even if they don't launch suicidal nuclear attacks, will clandestinely provide terrorists with nuclear weapons.
有足够的怀疑伊朗的核意图的担心,伊朗和北韩,即使不发动自杀核袭击,将秘密向恐怖分子提供核武器.
If dismantling these programs proves impossible, the world is confronted with the unattractive alternatives of another pre-emptive military attack or accepting the risk.
如果拆除这些节目保不住,世界正面临着吸引力的替代另一个先发制人的军事攻击或接受的风险.
Some analysts have suggested instead that deterrence strategies, which worked during the Cold War, might be modified and applied to new nuclear weapons states -- even to terrorists themselves.
一些分析家建议,而不是威慑战略,其中工作,在冷战时期,可以修改,并应用于新型核武器的国家--甚至恐怖分子本身.
But this idea tends to be rejected in official circles from fear deterrence implies acceptance of nuclear weapons and therefore undercuts current efforts aimed at their elimination.
但是,这一想法往往被拒绝在官场免于恐惧的威慑意味着接受核武器,因此,削弱目前旨在消除.
Whether nuclear terrorism will be avoided or is only a matter of time remains in the realm of speculation.
无论是核恐怖主义将是避免或只是早晚的事情依然在猜测.
Nonetheless, it will continue to be a source of public apprehension and a factor confronting governments around the world.
尽管如此,它仍将是一个来源市民忧心的一个因素,面对世界各地的政府.转自美国《华盛顿时报》2007年5月13日版
布赖恩迈克尔詹金斯是一名恐怖主义问题专家,在兰德公司的一个非盈利研究组织
前中央情报局局长特尼特写道,在他的新书,他的最大忧虑是:"一核"
He writes that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda "desperately want" to mount a nuclear terrorist attack because "they understand that... if they manage to set off a mushroom cloud, they will make history."
他写道,拉丹和基地"迫切希望"摩的核恐怖袭击,因为"他们明白……如果他们能掀起一股蘑菇云,他们将创造历史."
The history of nuclear terrorism can be summarized: There hasn't been any -- yet.
历史核恐怖主义可以概括:没有--没有.
But it remains a fantasy of terrorists seeking super-destructive power, and a nightmare for everyone else, with periodic reminders some day it may come true.
但它仍然是一个幻想恐怖分子寻求超强破坏力,是一个恶梦一样,定期催有朝一日,它可能会成真.
Al Qaeda certainly has nuclear ambitions, but is not believed to have nuclear capabilities at this time.
盖达当然有核野心,但并不认为有核能力,在这个时候.
But the absence of nuclear terrorism has not prevented nuclear terror.
但由于缺乏核恐怖主义并没有阻止核恐怖.
Such is the power of language, that the mere placement of the words "nuclear" and "terrorism" in close proximity produces a fission of fear.
这就是语言的力量,这仅仅是就业中的"核问题"和"恐怖主义",在近距离产生裂变的恐惧.
The possibility someone outside government might build a nuclear weapon was contemplated at the very beginning of the atomic age in the 1940s.
可能外人政府可能制造核武器的设想是,在最初的原子时代在20世纪40年代.
Nuclear terrorism plots drove suspense novels written in the 1950s and '60s, like James Bond creator Ian Fleming's "Thunderball."
核恐怖主义图谋驱车悬念小说在五十年代和六十年代,像詹姆士庞德造物主伊恩弗莱明的
"thunderball." Today, it is "24" character Jack Bauer who chases terrorists with nuclear bombs.
今天,它是"24"字杰克鲍尔谁捕捉恐怖分子的核弹.
But what about reality?
但现实呢?
I presented my first paper on nuclear terrorism at a conference in Los Alamos, N.M., in 1975.
我发表了第一篇关于核恐怖主义的一次会议上,在洛斯阿拉莫斯,n.m.于1975年.
The title: "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?
"标题:"恐怖分子将进行核试验"?
We still ask that question 32 years later.
我们仍然要问这个问题,32年后.
The debate in the 1970s focused on whether terrorists could build a bomb even if they had the material.
这次辩论中,70年代主要集中在是否恐怖分子可能建立一个炸弹,即使他们有足够的材料.
Bomb designers tended to argue the principles of nuclear weapons design were by then well known, and therefore terrorists probably would be able to fabricate a crude nuclear weapon.
炸弹设计师倾向于争辩原则的核武器设计是由当时著名的,因此,恐怖分子也许就可以编造一个粗核武器.
But bomb builders remained skeptical: Building a nuclear bomb involved more than equations on paper.
但炸弹建设者仍然怀疑:建设一个原子弹涉及多于方程在纸面上.
Having no expertise in design of nuclear weapons, I took a different tack, looking at terrorist motives and intentions.
没有专门设计的核武器问题,我采取了不同的角度看恐怖分子动机和意图.
While nuclear terrorism seemed theoretically attractive, even those we labeled terrorists did not do everything they could have done just a few decades ago.
而核恐怖主义似乎在理论上有吸引力,即使那些我们贴上恐怖分子没有一切,他们能够做的只是在几十年前.
Technological limitations and operational difficulties aside, terrorists seemed to operate within self-imposed constraints in the 1970s.
技术限制和运作上的困难之外,恐怖分子似乎运作自我约束的是在1970年代.
They worried that large-scale indiscriminate violence might tarnish their image, threaten the cohesion of their groups, alienate their perceived constituents, and provoke a backlash that would threaten their survival.
他们担心大型红皂白的暴力可能会损害其形象,威胁到社会的凝聚力的团体,让渡知觉成分,并引起反弹,这将威胁到他们的生存. But these constraints were not universal or immutable and changed over time.
但这些限制是不具有普遍性或一成不变,而随时间的变化.
Beginning in the 1980s, the constraints began to erode and large-scale terrorist violence increased.
在1980年代初,约束开始削弱,而且大规模的恐怖暴力活动有所增加.
By the 1990s, my colleagues at the Rand Corp. were writing about the "new terrorism," referring to terrorists increasingly motivated by religious fanaticism and determined to kill in quantity and likely to seek weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to expand their capacity for mayhem.
到1990年我的同事在兰德公司的人写的"新恐怖主义",指恐怖分子越来越出于宗教狂热并决心要杀人的数量,并可能寻求大规模杀伤性武器(WMD)形成,以扩大其容量混乱.
Perceptions of the likely terrorist scenario also changed.
人们对可能的恐怖情景,也因此改变.
Prompted by the prevalence of terrorist hostage-taking in the 1970s, analysts scaled up contemporary scenarios and wondered whether terrorists with nuclear weapons might some day hold cities hostage to extort political concessions.
促使患病恐怖分子劫持在七十年代,分析家迈上了当代情景,并怀疑恐怖分子拥有核武器可能有朝一日市举行人质勒索在政治上让步.
At least some terrorists apparently thought along the same lines.
至少一些恐怖分子显然是想沿着相同的路线走下去.
This later changed to fears that if terrorists acquired WMD they would attack without warning.
这后来又改口担心,如果恐怖分子获得大规模杀伤性,他们将袭击警告.
The fall of the Soviet Union and growing concerns about the security of its huge nuclear arsenal deepened fears of nuclear terrorism.
在苏联解体和日益关切的安全构成了巨大的核武库,加深恐惧核恐怖主义.
Exploratory discussions about how the United States and the Soviet Union might generally cooperate against terrorism, which began in the 1980s, developed into concrete programs aimed at securing Russian weapons and finding employment for Russian weapons designers.
探讨如何帮助美国和苏联可能普遍合作打击恐怖主义始于80年代,发展成具体方案,旨在确保俄罗斯武器和寻找就业的俄罗斯武器设计师.
The end of the Cold War also required a thorough rethinking of American national security policy.
在冷战结束后,还需要彻底反思美国的国家安全政策.
Two threats dominated attention: escalating terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.
这两种威胁为主注意:升级,恐怖主义和扩散大规模杀伤性武器.
The two were easily conflated.
两人很容易混在一起.
Analysts feared that hostile states with nuclear weapons might be tempted to arm terrorists with one.
分析家担心敌对国家拥有核武器可能试图武装恐怖分子之一.
Even without state approval, rogue elements involved in these programs might, for financial gain or ideological reasons, facilitate terrorist acquisition.
即使没有国家的批准,无赖分子参与了这些方案的可能,为了金钱利益或意识形态的原因,有利于恐怖主义分子获取.
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks redefined plausibility.
在2001年9月11日,恐怖袭击重新真实性.
Terrorist scenarios previously considered far-fetched suddenly became operative presumptions.
恐怖情景以前认为牵强成了部分假设.
Facing the reality of large-scale death and destruction, could America afford to take the chance terrorists might attack again, causing even greater devastation?
面对现实,大规模的死亡和破坏,美国可能会采取贸易保护措施的机会,恐怖分子可能再次发动进攻,造成更大的破坏?
The subsequent "global war on terror" (the terms "terror" and "terrorism" initially were used interchangeably) would include not only a campaign against those responsible for September 11, but also a campaign against hostile states suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons.
随后的"全球反恐战争"(用"恐怖"和"恐怖主义"的最初互换使用),不仅包括运动对那些应对9月11日,还开展了打击敌对国家怀疑谋求核武器.
Pre-emption became national policy.
优先购买权成为国策.
Suspicion sufficed and the U.S. invaded Iraq to destroy WMD that turned out not to exist.
猜疑足以和美国入侵伊拉克销毁大规模毁灭性武器,原来就不存在.
There is less uncertainty about North Korea's nuclear arsenal, since the North has already tested a nuclear weapon.
有那么明朗北韩的核武,由于北方已经测试了核武器.
There is enough suspicion about Iran's nuclear intentions to fear Iran and North Korea, even if they don't launch suicidal nuclear attacks, will clandestinely provide terrorists with nuclear weapons.
有足够的怀疑伊朗的核意图的担心,伊朗和北韩,即使不发动自杀核袭击,将秘密向恐怖分子提供核武器.
If dismantling these programs proves impossible, the world is confronted with the unattractive alternatives of another pre-emptive military attack or accepting the risk.
如果拆除这些节目保不住,世界正面临着吸引力的替代另一个先发制人的军事攻击或接受的风险.
Some analysts have suggested instead that deterrence strategies, which worked during the Cold War, might be modified and applied to new nuclear weapons states -- even to terrorists themselves.
一些分析家建议,而不是威慑战略,其中工作,在冷战时期,可以修改,并应用于新型核武器的国家--甚至恐怖分子本身.
But this idea tends to be rejected in official circles from fear deterrence implies acceptance of nuclear weapons and therefore undercuts current efforts aimed at their elimination.
但是,这一想法往往被拒绝在官场免于恐惧的威慑意味着接受核武器,因此,削弱目前旨在消除.
Whether nuclear terrorism will be avoided or is only a matter of time remains in the realm of speculation.
无论是核恐怖主义将是避免或只是早晚的事情依然在猜测.
Nonetheless, it will continue to be a source of public apprehension and a factor confronting governments around the world.
尽管如此,它仍将是一个来源市民忧心的一个因素,面对世界各地的政府.