LCS密尔瓦基号推进系统故障原因基本判明──齿轮箱控制 ...

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根据2月7日美国防务新闻,去年底(2015/12/11)推进系统故障的密尔瓦基号,故障经过与原因已经基本判明。

故障发生前,密尔瓦基号以燃柴联合驱动模式高速运转(航速38节);此时一个燃油阀故障,触发燃气涡轮紧急关闭的安全程序。

然而在燃气涡轮关机程序中,计算机控制系统控制的离合器工作却出现问题,原本应该要逐步降档、分离,使得燃气涡轮与传动装置脱离(只剩柴油机驱动),然而燃气涡轮关闭时离合器却没有正常分离,庞大的扭力立刻损害了离合器盘等组件,导致密尔瓦基号全停,只能靠拖船拖回。

虽然燃油阀故障触发了后续问题,然而真正的问题是离合器的紧急停止程序。

美国海军与洛马详细研究传动系统,认为齿轮箱等机械本身没有大问题,问题在于控制系统软件,关于紧急停止的控制编程存在缺陷。

事实上,LCS的验收(含厂方与海军)都不包括紧急停止项目,传动系统测试聚焦在不同模式的切换。

密尔瓦基号的推进控制系统与前两艘自由级(自由号与沃兹堡号)不太一样,前两艘目前还没发生过类似问题。

美国海军表示会重新检查LCS的紧急停止项目,包括已经服役与将来的舰艇。在这个问题解决前,今年预定交舰的底特律号(USS Detroit LCS-7)就不会通过验收。

密尔瓦基号的修理工作目前大部分已经完成,受损的离合器组件已经更换,还需要更换一些关于大轴或轴承的组件

http://www.defensenews.com/story ... breakdown/79870610/



WASHINGTON — An investigation into what caused the breakdown of one of the US Navy’s newest ships is nearing completion, sources said, and it’s hoped the fixes will be less extensive than once feared.

“Right now the root cause points to a timing issue,” said a source familiar with the investigation. “The sequence of stopping engines in emergency stops, and software telling the system how to declutch.”

It was early in December when the littoral combat ship (LCS) Milwaukee, commissioned on Nov. 21 in her namesake city, left the Canadian port of Halifax bound for Virginia. Pushing 38 knots according to a witness on board on Dec. 6, the ship engaged both its diesels and gas turbines in a high-speed run for photographers when a fuel valve problem initiated an automatic shutdown of both main propulsion gas turbines. The Milwaukee’s speed dropped quickly, “to bare steerageway,” the witness said.

But the timing was off for the programmed sequence of events to disengage and re-engage the complex gearing that combined the diesel and gas engines driving the main power shafts – enough, in essence, to severely grind the clutch.

“Basically it burned up the clutch plates,” the source said.

The ship had been running in full CODAG mode — combined diesels and gas turbines — and the gearing was supposed to step down as the turbines shut off, leaving only the diesels running.

“When the gas turbine shut down that clutch should have disengaged,” said a Navy official familiar with the investigation. “It didn’t, it stayed engaged, creating a high-torque event.” The gears remained engaged “for several seconds,” the official said, long enough “so that the clutch failed and basically broke apart.”

The improperly functioning fuel valves that caused the gas turbines to shut down aren’t the real problem, the Navy official said.

“Things fail on ships all the time,” said the Navy official. “It was not a completely new design. It failed because there was a defect” in the valves – a problem, the official added, “of adequacy.”

The real problem, both sources agreed, is the failure of the gearing system.

“There are all kinds of reasons why you’d want to stop,” the Navy official said. “But the gear system ought to be able to handle the emergency stop scenario.

“The hard issue here was getting to the root cause of causing a ship to be towed into port because she destroyed the clutch. If the system had worked as designed we wouldn’t be having this discussion. Everything would have disengaged correctly. It would have come to a stop. It would have come back up on diesels only and she would have gone into port on her own power.”

The Navy and prime contractor Lockheed Martin each set up review boards after the failure. Teams visited the makers of the gearing, the clutch and the clutch plates. Engineers pored over the propulsion plant design — and found no serious flaws.

“We’re not touching the design,” the source familiar with the investigation said. “It’s right to carry the loads. The gear design is not the root cause at all.”

Instead, the fix may be tweaks to the system’s software.

“What we’re looking at,” said the Navy official, “is a software control issue problem.”

The failure review boards are nearly finished with their work, the Navy official said Feb. 3.

“What they’re pointing to is a control system issue associated with the machinery control system software,” the Navy official said. “The software needs to send a signal to the clutch to disengage without creating any other downstream problems within the propulsion plant. That’s the focus on the root cause.”

The emergency stop evolution is not part of sea trials run by the builder and the Navy before the ship enters service. “To my knowledge it’s not a normal evolution conducted during acceptance trials,” the Navy official said.

“During acceptance trials there was the normal shifting of modes between CODAG and other propulsion modes, and diesel or gas turbine propulsion. What was different about this was the emergency stop of the gas turbine because of the loss of fuel coming in the front end of the gas turbine.”

The control system on the Milwaukee is slightly different from systems installed on the first two ships of the Freedom class, the Freedom (LCS 1) and the Fort Worth (LCS 3). Both of those ships will be examined, “although we haven’t experienced that problem on 1 and 3,” the Navy official said.

“Whatever we decide whatever the fix is, it will cross the entire class, including 1 and 3,” said the Navy official. “Until the root cause is identified and the fix is identified we will not accept LCS 7 [the Detroit, scheduled to be delivered later this year]. We will make sure the ship will operate as it's supposed to when it’s delivered.”

Repairs on the Milwaukee are essentially complete.

“Clutch discs and components have been replaced,” the Navy official said. “There are still some repairs to be done on ancillary systems — high-speed shaft components — that are still operational but need to be replaced. That and some of the hard-to-get-to bearings will need to be replaced.”

The Milwaukee is expected to get underway on her own power from Little Creek and head to Mayport, Florida, where the ship will be drydocked and readied for shock trials to be carried out later this year in the Atlantic.

After that, the Milwaukee will move to her home port of San Diego and prepare for operational service.

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根据2月7日美国防务新闻,去年底(2015/12/11)推进系统故障的密尔瓦基号,故障经过与原因已经基本判明。

故障发生前,密尔瓦基号以燃柴联合驱动模式高速运转(航速38节);此时一个燃油阀故障,触发燃气涡轮紧急关闭的安全程序。

然而在燃气涡轮关机程序中,计算机控制系统控制的离合器工作却出现问题,原本应该要逐步降档、分离,使得燃气涡轮与传动装置脱离(只剩柴油机驱动),然而燃气涡轮关闭时离合器却没有正常分离,庞大的扭力立刻损害了离合器盘等组件,导致密尔瓦基号全停,只能靠拖船拖回。

虽然燃油阀故障触发了后续问题,然而真正的问题是离合器的紧急停止程序。

美国海军与洛马详细研究传动系统,认为齿轮箱等机械本身没有大问题,问题在于控制系统软件,关于紧急停止的控制编程存在缺陷。

事实上,LCS的验收(含厂方与海军)都不包括紧急停止项目,传动系统测试聚焦在不同模式的切换。

密尔瓦基号的推进控制系统与前两艘自由级(自由号与沃兹堡号)不太一样,前两艘目前还没发生过类似问题。

美国海军表示会重新检查LCS的紧急停止项目,包括已经服役与将来的舰艇。在这个问题解决前,今年预定交舰的底特律号(USS Detroit LCS-7)就不会通过验收。

密尔瓦基号的修理工作目前大部分已经完成,受损的离合器组件已经更换,还需要更换一些关于大轴或轴承的组件

http://www.defensenews.com/story ... breakdown/79870610/



WASHINGTON — An investigation into what caused the breakdown of one of the US Navy’s newest ships is nearing completion, sources said, and it’s hoped the fixes will be less extensive than once feared.

“Right now the root cause points to a timing issue,” said a source familiar with the investigation. “The sequence of stopping engines in emergency stops, and software telling the system how to declutch.”

It was early in December when the littoral combat ship (LCS) Milwaukee, commissioned on Nov. 21 in her namesake city, left the Canadian port of Halifax bound for Virginia. Pushing 38 knots according to a witness on board on Dec. 6, the ship engaged both its diesels and gas turbines in a high-speed run for photographers when a fuel valve problem initiated an automatic shutdown of both main propulsion gas turbines. The Milwaukee’s speed dropped quickly, “to bare steerageway,” the witness said.

But the timing was off for the programmed sequence of events to disengage and re-engage the complex gearing that combined the diesel and gas engines driving the main power shafts – enough, in essence, to severely grind the clutch.

“Basically it burned up the clutch plates,” the source said.

The ship had been running in full CODAG mode — combined diesels and gas turbines — and the gearing was supposed to step down as the turbines shut off, leaving only the diesels running.

“When the gas turbine shut down that clutch should have disengaged,” said a Navy official familiar with the investigation. “It didn’t, it stayed engaged, creating a high-torque event.” The gears remained engaged “for several seconds,” the official said, long enough “so that the clutch failed and basically broke apart.”

The improperly functioning fuel valves that caused the gas turbines to shut down aren’t the real problem, the Navy official said.

“Things fail on ships all the time,” said the Navy official. “It was not a completely new design. It failed because there was a defect” in the valves – a problem, the official added, “of adequacy.”

The real problem, both sources agreed, is the failure of the gearing system.

“There are all kinds of reasons why you’d want to stop,” the Navy official said. “But the gear system ought to be able to handle the emergency stop scenario.

“The hard issue here was getting to the root cause of causing a ship to be towed into port because she destroyed the clutch. If the system had worked as designed we wouldn’t be having this discussion. Everything would have disengaged correctly. It would have come to a stop. It would have come back up on diesels only and she would have gone into port on her own power.”

The Navy and prime contractor Lockheed Martin each set up review boards after the failure. Teams visited the makers of the gearing, the clutch and the clutch plates. Engineers pored over the propulsion plant design — and found no serious flaws.

“We’re not touching the design,” the source familiar with the investigation said. “It’s right to carry the loads. The gear design is not the root cause at all.”

Instead, the fix may be tweaks to the system’s software.

“What we’re looking at,” said the Navy official, “is a software control issue problem.”

The failure review boards are nearly finished with their work, the Navy official said Feb. 3.

“What they’re pointing to is a control system issue associated with the machinery control system software,” the Navy official said. “The software needs to send a signal to the clutch to disengage without creating any other downstream problems within the propulsion plant. That’s the focus on the root cause.”

The emergency stop evolution is not part of sea trials run by the builder and the Navy before the ship enters service. “To my knowledge it’s not a normal evolution conducted during acceptance trials,” the Navy official said.

“During acceptance trials there was the normal shifting of modes between CODAG and other propulsion modes, and diesel or gas turbine propulsion. What was different about this was the emergency stop of the gas turbine because of the loss of fuel coming in the front end of the gas turbine.”

The control system on the Milwaukee is slightly different from systems installed on the first two ships of the Freedom class, the Freedom (LCS 1) and the Fort Worth (LCS 3). Both of those ships will be examined, “although we haven’t experienced that problem on 1 and 3,” the Navy official said.

“Whatever we decide whatever the fix is, it will cross the entire class, including 1 and 3,” said the Navy official. “Until the root cause is identified and the fix is identified we will not accept LCS 7 [the Detroit, scheduled to be delivered later this year]. We will make sure the ship will operate as it's supposed to when it’s delivered.”

Repairs on the Milwaukee are essentially complete.

“Clutch discs and components have been replaced,” the Navy official said. “There are still some repairs to be done on ancillary systems — high-speed shaft components — that are still operational but need to be replaced. That and some of the hard-to-get-to bearings will need to be replaced.”

The Milwaukee is expected to get underway on her own power from Little Creek and head to Mayport, Florida, where the ship will be drydocked and readied for shock trials to be carried out later this year in the Atlantic.

After that, the Milwaukee will move to her home port of San Diego and prepare for operational service.
是柴燃联合还是交替?MS搞联合的效果都不理想。
a2free 发表于 2016-2-10 00:13
是柴燃联合还是交替?MS搞联合的效果都不理想。
是联合(CODAG),看起来一开始密尔瓦基号是燃柴联合运作,燃气涡轮离线时减速程序控制不良导致离合器受损。
是联合(CODAG),看起来一开始密尔瓦基号是燃柴联合运作,燃气涡轮离线时减速程序控制不良导致离合器受 ...
真正CODAG的船很少啊!大家都搞不定变速箱。
问题就谈问题本身,挺清楚
确认不是新型喷水推进器的问题,这是个好消息
跟大众的干式双离合器故障类似。只要不是电力系统故障,就不能成为反对电力驱动的人的口实。
绝代佳人 发表于 2016-2-10 13:02
跟大众的干式双离合器故障类似。只要不是电力系统故障,就不能成为反对电力驱动的人的口实。
可惜,这个LCS还真不是电力驱动的
柴燃联合是用的德国的齿轮箱吗?
对“事实上,LCS的验收(含厂方与海军)都不包括紧急停止项目”  感到不可思议。故障急停 难道不该是传动系统基本测试项目吗?
老爷爷的棉袄 发表于 2016-2-10 13:57
对“事实上,LCS的验收(含厂方与海军)都不包括紧急停止项目”  感到不可思议。故障急停 难道不该是传动系 ...
看来是海军太胸有成竹了,认为变速箱毫无挑战
大众DSG既视感,娘胎里带的没法改,只好通过软件升级解决。
看来是海军太胸有成竹了,认为变速箱毫无挑战

那是公开的说法而已,全信你就输了。
做部件交付自测有自测用例列表,集成测试的有集成测试用例列表,验收也有验收检验列表,过了n关说有个交付功能从来没测过,真以为全世界是2 13?
Depyuka 发表于 2016-2-10 14:42
那是公开的说法而已,全信你就输了。
做部件交付自测有自测用例列表,集成测试的有集成测试用例列表, ...
你有详细的美国采购测试流程是怎么的?当然认为是技术挑战的才会去测试
看来是海军太胸有成竹了,认为变速箱毫无挑战
似乎只有德国人搞过柴燃联合吧?
说之前没设想到这种场境,没测试到还令人信服。说船用发动机紧急停止这种大项目都没测试过就像飞机发动空中停车重启没测试过一样荒谬。
a2free 发表于 2016-2-10 15:01
似乎只有德国人搞过柴燃联合吧?
军舰用变速箱美国人可是很牛逼的
Depyuka 发表于 2016-2-10 15:04
说之前没设想到这种场境,没测试到还令人信服。说船用发动机紧急停止这种大项目都没测试过就像飞机发动空中 ...
你这么说还靠点谱
居然不追究事故责任?
hase_back 发表于 2016-2-10 13:04
可惜,这个LCS还真不是电力驱动的
LCS几次故障累及电力系统,有的人觉得跟电有关系就有话说。
这么明显的问题竟然没有考虑到,必须要追查责任人,并进行处罚!!!!!!
老爷爷的棉袄 发表于 2016-2-10 13:57
对“事实上,LCS的验收(含厂方与海军)都不包括紧急停止项目”  感到不可思议。故障急停 难道不该是传动系 ...
的确不可思议,但这则新闻就是这样写.

“There are all kinds of reasons why you’d want to stop,” the Navy official said. “But the gear system ought to be able to handle the emergency stop scenario.

紧急停止的情境也不只有一种,可以是舰上人员控制的紧急停止,或者是这次意外的情况──其他次要机械故障触发自动系统的紧急停止。「传动系统应该能处理任何紧急停止的情境」,报导中的官员说,但显然密尔瓦基号的传动系统没能做到。

.....

紧急停止的确不在厂试与海军验收测试中,而到底是漏了这种情境想定抑或没有任何紧急停止测试,不知道。

The emergency stop evolution is not part of sea trials run by the builder and the Navy before the ship enters service. “To my knowledge it’s not a normal evolution conducted during acceptance trials,” the Navy official said.

验收测试包括在不同的模式(燃气涡轮单独、柴油机单独或二者联动)之间切换。然而这次的紧急停止情境并不在验收的范围,这次发生的情况是燃气涡轮前部燃油阀故障,无法正常进油,触发紧急停止,燃气涡轮离线;然而传动系统在这种情况(从燃柴联动自动切换到单独柴油机驱动,让燃气涡轮离线)没有正确控制离合器。

“During acceptance trials there was the normal shifting of modes between CODAG and other propulsion modes, and diesel or gas turbine propulsion. What was different about this was the emergency stop of the gas turbine because of the loss of fuel coming in the front end of the gas turbine.”
紧急停止的sanerio(不管是人为控制或像这次,部分次系统失效引发的停止)不应该是想不到的情境,这应该都是fail safe的一部分。很难相信美国海军与船厂是真的「没想到」这种问题,难道是觉得不会发生这种情况,或者是时程太紧就没有做太进阶的测试?

程序猿可能都有类似经验,也许你觉得已经「想过」某些情境,然而没有详细的测试,结果还是发生了始料未及的情况导致程序运作出问题(当然,完全出乎意料的bug就更不在话下)
燃机和齿轮箱之间的离合器连接,怎么能完全靠软件,而没有硬件安全措施呢?
用的什么离合器结构


原来就是个控制软件的低级问题,原来还以为是与发动机,或与齿轮箱、或与电有关的大问题。。。

PS,确实应该检讨一下编程、测试的程序问题,应该属于不应该发生的低级错误。。。

原来就是个控制软件的低级问题,原来还以为是与发动机,或与齿轮箱、或与电有关的大问题。。。

PS,确实应该检讨一下编程、测试的程序问题,应该属于不应该发生的低级错误。。。
兼职特工 发表于 2016-2-10 19:32
燃机和齿轮箱之间的离合器连接,怎么能完全靠软件,而没有硬件安全措施呢?
用的什么离合器结构
照理说应该如此。或者为了降低复杂度纯靠软件?