北部湾划界 - 一个老番PhD的个人见解

http://amti.csis.org/the-other-g ... aritime-compromise/

First, the good news:

The Tonkin agreements might have enabled future deals. Leaders in both China and Vietnam authorized their diplomats to negotiate formal boundaries governing about 36,000 square nautical miles of productive fisheries and potentially lucrative hydrocarbons. The deal emerged from three separate rounds of negotiation (1974, 1978-1979, and 1992-2000), with the last being a whole-of-government effort featuring input from senior party leaders, provincial governments, various stakeholder agencies, and technical and scientific experts. Importantly, growing familiarity between negotiators did not breed contempt – rather, it helped establish organizational and individual connections that were indispensable to the final settlement. Wang Yi, the current PRC foreign minister, was China’s lead negotiator and presumably knows what is required, politically and organizationally, to achieve future settlements. Comparable, substantial investment of official time and political energy is possible and necessary for future deals.

China made significant compromises. The 21 geographic points constituting the Sino-Vietnamese boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin divide it into two unequal parts, with 53.23 percent of the water lying on the Vietnamese side of the line. This compromise by China reflects the relative length of the Vietnamese coastline and the position of Bach Long Vi Island. That island was once the subject of a Sino-Vietnamese sovereignty dispute put to rest in 1957 when Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai dropped the Chinese claim. That strong Chinese leaders were once willing to make a deal over sovereignty that later facilitated a boundary resolution is a valuable precedent.

UNCLOS provided guidelines, but was not determinative.

未完，其他的自行到网页查询。
http://amti.csis.org/the-other-g ... aritime-compromise/

First, the good news:

The Tonkin agreements might have enabled future deals. Leaders in both China and Vietnam authorized their diplomats to negotiate formal boundaries governing about 36,000 square nautical miles of productive fisheries and potentially lucrative hydrocarbons. The deal emerged from three separate rounds of negotiation (1974, 1978-1979, and 1992-2000), with the last being a whole-of-government effort featuring input from senior party leaders, provincial governments, various stakeholder agencies, and technical and scientific experts. Importantly, growing familiarity between negotiators did not breed contempt – rather, it helped establish organizational and individual connections that were indispensable to the final settlement. Wang Yi, the current PRC foreign minister, was China’s lead negotiator and presumably knows what is required, politically and organizationally, to achieve future settlements. Comparable, substantial investment of official time and political energy is possible and necessary for future deals.

China made significant compromises. The 21 geographic points constituting the Sino-Vietnamese boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin divide it into two unequal parts, with 53.23 percent of the water lying on the Vietnamese side of the line. This compromise by China reflects the relative length of the Vietnamese coastline and the position of Bach Long Vi Island. That island was once the subject of a Sino-Vietnamese sovereignty dispute put to rest in 1957 when Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai dropped the Chinese claim. That strong Chinese leaders were once willing to make a deal over sovereignty that later facilitated a boundary resolution is a valuable precedent.

UNCLOS provided guidelines, but was not determinative.

未完，其他的自行到网页查询。