超级军网谁是网络自由的真正敌人—中国、俄罗斯或美国？
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/27 18:25:18
原创翻译：龙腾网
Who’s the true enemy of internet freedom - China, Russia, or the US?
译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
谁才是网络自由的真正敌人——中国、俄罗斯或美国？
Beijing and Moscow are rightly chastised for restricting their citizens’ online access – but it’s the US that is now even more aggressive in asserting its digital sovereignty
中国和俄罗斯因为限制公民的网络访问而遭指责已无异议，但美国对数字主权的维护也愈发咄咄逼人
Beijing has restricted Gmail's reach in China. Photograph: Sinopix/Rex Features
中国政府限制境内用户登陆使用Gmail邮箱。
译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
Recent reports that China has imposed further restrictions on Gmail, Google’s flagship email service, should not really come as much of a surprise. While Chinese users have been unable to access Gmail’s site for several years now, they were still able to use much of its functionality, thanks to third-party services such as Outlook or Apple Mail.
最近有报道称，中国政府加强了对Google旗舰品牌 Gmail邮箱的使用限制，这个消息已经不会再让人感到意外了。几年前中国用户就无法登陆Gmail网页，但仍能使用它的大部分功能，多亏了像Outlook或苹果邮件这样的第三方服务。
This loophole has now been closed (albeit temporarily – some of the new restrictions seem to have been mysteriously lifted already), which means determined Chinese users have had to turn to more advanced circumvention tools. Those unable or unwilling to perform any such acrobatics can simply switch to a service run by a domestic Chinese company – which is precisely what the Chinese government wants them to do.
现在漏洞已经被补上（尽管只是暂时的——但一些新的限制已悄然出现），中国用户只有重新寻找更先进的翻墙工具了。那些不会或者不愿意翻墙的只能选择使用中国本土的电邮服务——这也正是政府所希望看到的。
Such short-term and long-term disruptions of Gmail connections are part of China’s long-running efforts to protect its technological sovereignty by reducing its citizens’ reliance on American-run communication services. After North Korea saw its internet access blacked out temporarily in the Interview brouhaha – with little evidence that the country actually had anything to do with the massive hacking of Sony – the concept of technological sovereignty is poised to emerge as one of the most important and contentious doctrines of 2015.
屏蔽Gmail邮箱是中国长久以来为保护自己的信息主权所采取的其中一项措施，有时只是短期内而有时则是长期的，为的是削弱其公民对于美国公司提供的通讯服务的依赖。在朝鲜因网络被临时切断引起舆论哗然后（尽管没有足够的证据证明朝鲜与骇客入侵索尼公司一事有关），一个新的概念——信息主权，将在2015年这一年成为最重要也是最有争议的一个议题。
And it’s not just the Chinese: the Russian government is pursuing a similar agenda. A new law that came into effect last summer obliges all internet companies to store Russian citizens’ data on servers inside the country. This has already prompted Google to close down its engineering operations in Moscow. The Kremlin’s recent success in getting Facebook to block a page calling for protests in solidarity with the charged activist Alexey Navalny indicates that the government is rapidly re-establishing control over its citizens’ digital activities.
不只是中国，现在俄罗斯政府也开始跟随中国（对网络监管）的做法。去年一项新法开始实行，规定所有网络公司必须将俄网民的个人数据保存在俄罗斯本土的服务器上。这一规定迫使Google停止了该公司在莫斯科的工程运营。最近，俄当局成功关停了一个Facebook主页，该主页呼吁人们抗议对激进分子阿里克谢•纳瓦林的指控。该做法表明俄政府正迅速地恢复对俄公民网络活动的监控。
But it’s hardly a global defeat for Google: the company is still expanding elsewhere, building communications infrastructure that extends far beyond simple email services. Thus, as South American countries began exploring plans to counter NSA surveillance with a fibre optic network of their own that would reduce their reliance on the US, Google opened its coffers to fund a $60m undersea cable connecting Brazil to Florida.
但这并不意味着Google在全球的溃败，该公司在其他地方仍在不断扩张，修建通讯基础设施而不仅仅只是提供电邮服务。因此，为摆脱美国国家安全局（NSA）的网络监控，南美国家正计划着开发自己的光纤网络以减少对美国的依赖。Google公司花费6000万美元重金打造的海底电缆把巴西和佛罗里达联在了一起。
The aim was to ensure that Google’s own services run better for users in Brazil, but it is a potent reminder that extricating oneself from the grasp of America’s tech empire requires a multidimensional strategy attuned to the fact that Google today is not a mere search and email company – it also runs devices, operating systems, and even connectivity itself.
该项目的本意是为巴西的Google用户提供更好的服务，但同时也是个有力的提醒：想要摆脱美科技帝国的控制，需要制订多元化战略。要知道，如今Google不仅仅只是一个提供搜索引擎和电子邮件服务的公司，它的经营范围还包括设备、操作系统和数据连接。
Given that Russia and China are not known for their commitment to freedoms of expression and assembly, it is tempting to view their quest for information sovereignty as yet another stab at censorship and control. In fact, even when the far more benign government of Brazil toyed with the idea of forcing American companies to store user data locally – an idea it eventually abandoned – it was widely accused of draconian overreach.
众所周知，中俄从未对公民的言论和集会自由做出过承诺，因此他们对信息主权的追求可以看做是（巩固）网络审查与监管的又一次尝试。其实（形象）更温和一些的巴西政府也曾动过强制美国公司将用户数据保存在本地服务器的念头，但因为管得太宽而遭到广泛批评，最终不得不放弃。
However, Russia, China and Brazil are simply responding to the extremely aggressive tactics adopted by none other than the US. In typical fashion, though, America is completely oblivious to its own actions, believing that there is such a thing as a neutral, cosmopolitan internet and that any efforts to move away from it would result in its “Balkanisation”. But for many countries, this is not Balkanisation at all, merely de-Americanisation.
不管怎样，中俄和巴西的行动是在回应美国的网络霸权。还是典型的美国方式，美国总是完全无视自己的行为，认为一个中立、大一统的网络世界是可行的，任何试图摆脱它的尝试将会导致这个大一统网络世界的“巴尔干化”。但对许多国家来说，这根本不是巴尔干化的问题，仅仅只是为了去美国化。
US companies have been playing an ambiguous role in this project. On the one hand, they build efficient and highly functional infrastructure that locks in other countries, creating long-term dependencies that are very messy and costly to undo. They are the true vehicles for whatever is left of America’s global modernisation agenda. On the other hand, the companies cannot be seen as mere proxies for the American empire. Especially after the Edward Snowden revelations clearly demonstrated the cosy alliances between America’s business and state interests, these companies need to constantly assert their independence – occasionally by taking their own government to court – even if, in reality, most of their interests perfectly align with those of Washington.
美国公司在这一项目[注：译者的理解是“建立一个中立、大一统的网络世界”]中扮演着极富争议的角色。一方面，他们建在其他国家里高效且功能强大的基础设施，使当地形成了强大的依赖性，如果要撤走这些基建，不仅麻烦还花费不菲。它们将美国的全球现代化议程输送至所到之处。而另一方面，这些企业不该只被视为美帝国的代理人。尤其是在斯诺登泄密事件发生后，美国商业与国家利益的愉快合作开始浮出水面。在这之后这些企业就要时不时的强调自己的独立性，有时候还会将自己的政府推到被告席，即便是这样，实际上它们的大多数利益还是与国家利益保持高度一致的。
This explains why Silicon Valley has been so vocal in demanding that the Obama administration do something about internet privacy and surveillance: if internet companies were seen as compromised parties here, their business would collapse. Just look at the misfortunes of Verizon in 2014: uncertain of the extent of data-sharing between Verizon and the NSA, the German government ditched its contract with the US company in favour of Deutsche Telekom. A German government spokesman said at the time: “The federal government wants to win back more technological sovereignty, and therefore prefers to work with German companies.”
这就能解释了为什么硅谷曾直言不讳地要求奥巴马政府在网络隐私保护与监管上要有所作为：如果互联网公司在（网络隐私保护与监管方面）做出让步，它们的生意就完蛋了。看看威瑞森无线通讯倒霉的2014年：因为不确定威瑞森无线通讯与美国国家安全局（NSA）的数据共享已经达到何种程度，德当局终止了与美国公司的合同，选择与德国电信进行合作。德政府发言人对此事的解释是：“联邦政府要收回更多信息主权，因此选择与德国本土公司进行合作。”
However, to grasp the full extent of America’s hypocrisy on the issue of information sovereignty, one needs to look no further than the ongoing squabble between Microsoft and the US government. It concerns some email content – relevant to an investigation – stored on Microsoft’s servers in Ireland. American prosecutors insist that they can obtain such content from Microsoft simply by serving it a warrant – as if it makes no difference that the email is stored in a foreign country.
然而，如果想全面的了解美国在信息主权上的虚伪，只需要看看微软与美国政府之间还没有停下的争吵就知道了。这次争吵和一些爱尔兰微软用户的电子邮件内容被卷入了一项调查有关。美国检察官坚持认为只要出示了搜查令就可以从微软获取这些电子邮件内容，即便这些数据是保存在国外的服务器上。
In order to obtain it, Washington would normally need to go through a complex legal process involving bilateral treaties between the governments involved. But now it wants to sidestep that completely and treat the handling of such data as a purely local issue with no international implications. The data resides in cyberspace – and cyberspace knows no borders!
为了获取这些邮件内容，正常情况下美国政府应该通过复杂的诉讼程序，还会涉及到政府之间签订的双边条约。但现在美国却想直接跳过这一步，彻底将这当成一个国内事务来处理，避开因此事造成的国际影响。这些数据被保存在网络空间——而网络空间是不分国界的！
The government’s reasoning here is that the storage issue is irrelevant; what is relevant is where the content is accessed – and it can be accessed by Microsoft’s employees in the US. Microsoft and other tech giants are now fighting the US government in courts, with little success so far, while the Irish government and a handful of European politicians are backing Microsoft.
美政府给的理由是这事与数据保存在哪无关，真正有关的是在哪儿能要到这些内容，而微软的员工在美国本土就能获取到这些邮件内容。微软和其他科技巨头联手与美国政府对簿公堂，并得到了爱尔兰政府和一小撮欧洲政客的支持，但至今看来收效甚微。
In short, the US government insists that it should have access to data regardless of where it is stored as long as it is handled by US companies. Just imagine the outcry if the Chinese government were to demand access to any data that passes through devices manufactured by Chinese companies – Xiaomi, say, or Lenovo – regardless of whether their users are in London or New York or Tokyo. Note the crucial difference: Russia and China want to be able to access data generated by their citizens on their own soil, whereas the US wants to access data generated by anybody anywhere as long as American companies handle it.
总之，美政府坚持认为，只要是美国公司的数据，不管保存在哪里（美政府）都有权拿到它。如果是中国政府要求从小米或者联想的设备上获取那些伦敦、纽约或是东京用户的数据，不妨想象一下，此举将会给中国招来多强烈的抗议？记住（两边）最主要的差异：中俄想要的是由境内居民产生的数据；而美国想要的是美国公司所掌握的全部数据，不论何人何地。
In opposing the efforts of other countries to reclaim a modicum of technological sovereignty, Washington is likely to run into a problem it has already encountered while promoting its nebulous “internet freedom” agenda: its actions speak louder than its words. Rhetorically, it is very hard to oppose government-run digital surveillance and online spin in Russia, China or Iran, when the US government probably does more of it than all of these countries combined.
在反对其他国家为收回部分信息主权所作的努力时，美政府有可能遇到和它在推行模糊的“互联网自由”议程时一样的问题：事实胜于雄辩。在俄罗斯、中国或者伊朗，想要反对政府运作的数字监控和网络带倾向的报道确实很困难，但在美国（政府运作的数字监控和网络带倾向的报道）可能比上述三个国家加起来还要多。
Whatever motivates the desire of Russia and China to exert more control over their digital properties – and only the naive would believe that they are not motivated by concerns over domestic unrest – their actions are proportional to the aggressive efforts of Washington to exploit the fact that so much of the world’s communications infrastructure is run by Silicon Valley. One’s man internet freedom is another man’s internet imperialism.
不管是什么激起了俄罗斯和中国对其数字产业加强控制的想法（只有天真的人才会相信他们加强网络控制并不是因为担心国内骚乱），他们的行为是与美国的咄咄逼人成正比的，同时也揭示了一个事实，即世界上竟然有这么多的通讯基础设施都是由硅谷运营的。一方所号称的网络自由，对另一方来说就是网络霸权主义。原创翻译：龙腾网
Who’s the true enemy of internet freedom - China, Russia, or the US?
译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
谁才是网络自由的真正敌人——中国、俄罗斯或美国？
Beijing and Moscow are rightly chastised for restricting their citizens’ online access – but it’s the US that is now even more aggressive in asserting its digital sovereignty
中国和俄罗斯因为限制公民的网络访问而遭指责已无异议，但美国对数字主权的维护也愈发咄咄逼人
Beijing has restricted Gmail's reach in China. Photograph: Sinopix/Rex Features
中国政府限制境内用户登陆使用Gmail邮箱。
译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
Recent reports that China has imposed further restrictions on Gmail, Google’s flagship email service, should not really come as much of a surprise. While Chinese users have been unable to access Gmail’s site for several years now, they were still able to use much of its functionality, thanks to third-party services such as Outlook or Apple Mail.
最近有报道称，中国政府加强了对Google旗舰品牌 Gmail邮箱的使用限制，这个消息已经不会再让人感到意外了。几年前中国用户就无法登陆Gmail网页，但仍能使用它的大部分功能，多亏了像Outlook或苹果邮件这样的第三方服务。
This loophole has now been closed (albeit temporarily – some of the new restrictions seem to have been mysteriously lifted already), which means determined Chinese users have had to turn to more advanced circumvention tools. Those unable or unwilling to perform any such acrobatics can simply switch to a service run by a domestic Chinese company – which is precisely what the Chinese government wants them to do.
现在漏洞已经被补上（尽管只是暂时的——但一些新的限制已悄然出现），中国用户只有重新寻找更先进的翻墙工具了。那些不会或者不愿意翻墙的只能选择使用中国本土的电邮服务——这也正是政府所希望看到的。
Such short-term and long-term disruptions of Gmail connections are part of China’s long-running efforts to protect its technological sovereignty by reducing its citizens’ reliance on American-run communication services. After North Korea saw its internet access blacked out temporarily in the Interview brouhaha – with little evidence that the country actually had anything to do with the massive hacking of Sony – the concept of technological sovereignty is poised to emerge as one of the most important and contentious doctrines of 2015.
屏蔽Gmail邮箱是中国长久以来为保护自己的信息主权所采取的其中一项措施，有时只是短期内而有时则是长期的，为的是削弱其公民对于美国公司提供的通讯服务的依赖。在朝鲜因网络被临时切断引起舆论哗然后（尽管没有足够的证据证明朝鲜与骇客入侵索尼公司一事有关），一个新的概念——信息主权，将在2015年这一年成为最重要也是最有争议的一个议题。
And it’s not just the Chinese: the Russian government is pursuing a similar agenda. A new law that came into effect last summer obliges all internet companies to store Russian citizens’ data on servers inside the country. This has already prompted Google to close down its engineering operations in Moscow. The Kremlin’s recent success in getting Facebook to block a page calling for protests in solidarity with the charged activist Alexey Navalny indicates that the government is rapidly re-establishing control over its citizens’ digital activities.
不只是中国，现在俄罗斯政府也开始跟随中国（对网络监管）的做法。去年一项新法开始实行，规定所有网络公司必须将俄网民的个人数据保存在俄罗斯本土的服务器上。这一规定迫使Google停止了该公司在莫斯科的工程运营。最近，俄当局成功关停了一个Facebook主页，该主页呼吁人们抗议对激进分子阿里克谢•纳瓦林的指控。该做法表明俄政府正迅速地恢复对俄公民网络活动的监控。
But it’s hardly a global defeat for Google: the company is still expanding elsewhere, building communications infrastructure that extends far beyond simple email services. Thus, as South American countries began exploring plans to counter NSA surveillance with a fibre optic network of their own that would reduce their reliance on the US, Google opened its coffers to fund a $60m undersea cable connecting Brazil to Florida.
但这并不意味着Google在全球的溃败，该公司在其他地方仍在不断扩张，修建通讯基础设施而不仅仅只是提供电邮服务。因此，为摆脱美国国家安全局（NSA）的网络监控，南美国家正计划着开发自己的光纤网络以减少对美国的依赖。Google公司花费6000万美元重金打造的海底电缆把巴西和佛罗里达联在了一起。
The aim was to ensure that Google’s own services run better for users in Brazil, but it is a potent reminder that extricating oneself from the grasp of America’s tech empire requires a multidimensional strategy attuned to the fact that Google today is not a mere search and email company – it also runs devices, operating systems, and even connectivity itself.
该项目的本意是为巴西的Google用户提供更好的服务，但同时也是个有力的提醒：想要摆脱美科技帝国的控制，需要制订多元化战略。要知道，如今Google不仅仅只是一个提供搜索引擎和电子邮件服务的公司，它的经营范围还包括设备、操作系统和数据连接。
Given that Russia and China are not known for their commitment to freedoms of expression and assembly, it is tempting to view their quest for information sovereignty as yet another stab at censorship and control. In fact, even when the far more benign government of Brazil toyed with the idea of forcing American companies to store user data locally – an idea it eventually abandoned – it was widely accused of draconian overreach.
众所周知，中俄从未对公民的言论和集会自由做出过承诺，因此他们对信息主权的追求可以看做是（巩固）网络审查与监管的又一次尝试。其实（形象）更温和一些的巴西政府也曾动过强制美国公司将用户数据保存在本地服务器的念头，但因为管得太宽而遭到广泛批评，最终不得不放弃。
However, Russia, China and Brazil are simply responding to the extremely aggressive tactics adopted by none other than the US. In typical fashion, though, America is completely oblivious to its own actions, believing that there is such a thing as a neutral, cosmopolitan internet and that any efforts to move away from it would result in its “Balkanisation”. But for many countries, this is not Balkanisation at all, merely de-Americanisation.
不管怎样，中俄和巴西的行动是在回应美国的网络霸权。还是典型的美国方式，美国总是完全无视自己的行为，认为一个中立、大一统的网络世界是可行的，任何试图摆脱它的尝试将会导致这个大一统网络世界的“巴尔干化”。但对许多国家来说，这根本不是巴尔干化的问题，仅仅只是为了去美国化。
US companies have been playing an ambiguous role in this project. On the one hand, they build efficient and highly functional infrastructure that locks in other countries, creating long-term dependencies that are very messy and costly to undo. They are the true vehicles for whatever is left of America’s global modernisation agenda. On the other hand, the companies cannot be seen as mere proxies for the American empire. Especially after the Edward Snowden revelations clearly demonstrated the cosy alliances between America’s business and state interests, these companies need to constantly assert their independence – occasionally by taking their own government to court – even if, in reality, most of their interests perfectly align with those of Washington.
美国公司在这一项目[注：译者的理解是“建立一个中立、大一统的网络世界”]中扮演着极富争议的角色。一方面，他们建在其他国家里高效且功能强大的基础设施，使当地形成了强大的依赖性，如果要撤走这些基建，不仅麻烦还花费不菲。它们将美国的全球现代化议程输送至所到之处。而另一方面，这些企业不该只被视为美帝国的代理人。尤其是在斯诺登泄密事件发生后，美国商业与国家利益的愉快合作开始浮出水面。在这之后这些企业就要时不时的强调自己的独立性，有时候还会将自己的政府推到被告席，即便是这样，实际上它们的大多数利益还是与国家利益保持高度一致的。
This explains why Silicon Valley has been so vocal in demanding that the Obama administration do something about internet privacy and surveillance: if internet companies were seen as compromised parties here, their business would collapse. Just look at the misfortunes of Verizon in 2014: uncertain of the extent of data-sharing between Verizon and the NSA, the German government ditched its contract with the US company in favour of Deutsche Telekom. A German government spokesman said at the time: “The federal government wants to win back more technological sovereignty, and therefore prefers to work with German companies.”
这就能解释了为什么硅谷曾直言不讳地要求奥巴马政府在网络隐私保护与监管上要有所作为：如果互联网公司在（网络隐私保护与监管方面）做出让步，它们的生意就完蛋了。看看威瑞森无线通讯倒霉的2014年：因为不确定威瑞森无线通讯与美国国家安全局（NSA）的数据共享已经达到何种程度，德当局终止了与美国公司的合同，选择与德国电信进行合作。德政府发言人对此事的解释是：“联邦政府要收回更多信息主权，因此选择与德国本土公司进行合作。”
However, to grasp the full extent of America’s hypocrisy on the issue of information sovereignty, one needs to look no further than the ongoing squabble between Microsoft and the US government. It concerns some email content – relevant to an investigation – stored on Microsoft’s servers in Ireland. American prosecutors insist that they can obtain such content from Microsoft simply by serving it a warrant – as if it makes no difference that the email is stored in a foreign country.
然而，如果想全面的了解美国在信息主权上的虚伪，只需要看看微软与美国政府之间还没有停下的争吵就知道了。这次争吵和一些爱尔兰微软用户的电子邮件内容被卷入了一项调查有关。美国检察官坚持认为只要出示了搜查令就可以从微软获取这些电子邮件内容，即便这些数据是保存在国外的服务器上。
In order to obtain it, Washington would normally need to go through a complex legal process involving bilateral treaties between the governments involved. But now it wants to sidestep that completely and treat the handling of such data as a purely local issue with no international implications. The data resides in cyberspace – and cyberspace knows no borders!
为了获取这些邮件内容，正常情况下美国政府应该通过复杂的诉讼程序，还会涉及到政府之间签订的双边条约。但现在美国却想直接跳过这一步，彻底将这当成一个国内事务来处理，避开因此事造成的国际影响。这些数据被保存在网络空间——而网络空间是不分国界的！
The government’s reasoning here is that the storage issue is irrelevant; what is relevant is where the content is accessed – and it can be accessed by Microsoft’s employees in the US. Microsoft and other tech giants are now fighting the US government in courts, with little success so far, while the Irish government and a handful of European politicians are backing Microsoft.
美政府给的理由是这事与数据保存在哪无关，真正有关的是在哪儿能要到这些内容，而微软的员工在美国本土就能获取到这些邮件内容。微软和其他科技巨头联手与美国政府对簿公堂，并得到了爱尔兰政府和一小撮欧洲政客的支持，但至今看来收效甚微。
In short, the US government insists that it should have access to data regardless of where it is stored as long as it is handled by US companies. Just imagine the outcry if the Chinese government were to demand access to any data that passes through devices manufactured by Chinese companies – Xiaomi, say, or Lenovo – regardless of whether their users are in London or New York or Tokyo. Note the crucial difference: Russia and China want to be able to access data generated by their citizens on their own soil, whereas the US wants to access data generated by anybody anywhere as long as American companies handle it.
总之，美政府坚持认为，只要是美国公司的数据，不管保存在哪里（美政府）都有权拿到它。如果是中国政府要求从小米或者联想的设备上获取那些伦敦、纽约或是东京用户的数据，不妨想象一下，此举将会给中国招来多强烈的抗议？记住（两边）最主要的差异：中俄想要的是由境内居民产生的数据；而美国想要的是美国公司所掌握的全部数据，不论何人何地。
In opposing the efforts of other countries to reclaim a modicum of technological sovereignty, Washington is likely to run into a problem it has already encountered while promoting its nebulous “internet freedom” agenda: its actions speak louder than its words. Rhetorically, it is very hard to oppose government-run digital surveillance and online spin in Russia, China or Iran, when the US government probably does more of it than all of these countries combined.
在反对其他国家为收回部分信息主权所作的努力时，美政府有可能遇到和它在推行模糊的“互联网自由”议程时一样的问题：事实胜于雄辩。在俄罗斯、中国或者伊朗，想要反对政府运作的数字监控和网络带倾向的报道确实很困难，但在美国（政府运作的数字监控和网络带倾向的报道）可能比上述三个国家加起来还要多。
Whatever motivates the desire of Russia and China to exert more control over their digital properties – and only the naive would believe that they are not motivated by concerns over domestic unrest – their actions are proportional to the aggressive efforts of Washington to exploit the fact that so much of the world’s communications infrastructure is run by Silicon Valley. One’s man internet freedom is another man’s internet imperialism.
不管是什么激起了俄罗斯和中国对其数字产业加强控制的想法（只有天真的人才会相信他们加强网络控制并不是因为担心国内骚乱），他们的行为是与美国的咄咄逼人成正比的，同时也揭示了一个事实，即世界上竟然有这么多的通讯基础设施都是由硅谷运营的。一方所号称的网络自由，对另一方来说就是网络霸权主义。
Who’s the true enemy of internet freedom - China, Russia, or the US?
译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
谁才是网络自由的真正敌人——中国、俄罗斯或美国？
Beijing and Moscow are rightly chastised for restricting their citizens’ online access – but it’s the US that is now even more aggressive in asserting its digital sovereignty
中国和俄罗斯因为限制公民的网络访问而遭指责已无异议，但美国对数字主权的维护也愈发咄咄逼人
Beijing has restricted Gmail's reach in China. Photograph: Sinopix/Rex Features
中国政府限制境内用户登陆使用Gmail邮箱。
译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
Recent reports that China has imposed further restrictions on Gmail, Google’s flagship email service, should not really come as much of a surprise. While Chinese users have been unable to access Gmail’s site for several years now, they were still able to use much of its functionality, thanks to third-party services such as Outlook or Apple Mail.
最近有报道称，中国政府加强了对Google旗舰品牌 Gmail邮箱的使用限制，这个消息已经不会再让人感到意外了。几年前中国用户就无法登陆Gmail网页，但仍能使用它的大部分功能，多亏了像Outlook或苹果邮件这样的第三方服务。
This loophole has now been closed (albeit temporarily – some of the new restrictions seem to have been mysteriously lifted already), which means determined Chinese users have had to turn to more advanced circumvention tools. Those unable or unwilling to perform any such acrobatics can simply switch to a service run by a domestic Chinese company – which is precisely what the Chinese government wants them to do.
现在漏洞已经被补上（尽管只是暂时的——但一些新的限制已悄然出现），中国用户只有重新寻找更先进的翻墙工具了。那些不会或者不愿意翻墙的只能选择使用中国本土的电邮服务——这也正是政府所希望看到的。
Such short-term and long-term disruptions of Gmail connections are part of China’s long-running efforts to protect its technological sovereignty by reducing its citizens’ reliance on American-run communication services. After North Korea saw its internet access blacked out temporarily in the Interview brouhaha – with little evidence that the country actually had anything to do with the massive hacking of Sony – the concept of technological sovereignty is poised to emerge as one of the most important and contentious doctrines of 2015.
屏蔽Gmail邮箱是中国长久以来为保护自己的信息主权所采取的其中一项措施，有时只是短期内而有时则是长期的，为的是削弱其公民对于美国公司提供的通讯服务的依赖。在朝鲜因网络被临时切断引起舆论哗然后（尽管没有足够的证据证明朝鲜与骇客入侵索尼公司一事有关），一个新的概念——信息主权，将在2015年这一年成为最重要也是最有争议的一个议题。
And it’s not just the Chinese: the Russian government is pursuing a similar agenda. A new law that came into effect last summer obliges all internet companies to store Russian citizens’ data on servers inside the country. This has already prompted Google to close down its engineering operations in Moscow. The Kremlin’s recent success in getting Facebook to block a page calling for protests in solidarity with the charged activist Alexey Navalny indicates that the government is rapidly re-establishing control over its citizens’ digital activities.
不只是中国，现在俄罗斯政府也开始跟随中国（对网络监管）的做法。去年一项新法开始实行，规定所有网络公司必须将俄网民的个人数据保存在俄罗斯本土的服务器上。这一规定迫使Google停止了该公司在莫斯科的工程运营。最近，俄当局成功关停了一个Facebook主页，该主页呼吁人们抗议对激进分子阿里克谢•纳瓦林的指控。该做法表明俄政府正迅速地恢复对俄公民网络活动的监控。
But it’s hardly a global defeat for Google: the company is still expanding elsewhere, building communications infrastructure that extends far beyond simple email services. Thus, as South American countries began exploring plans to counter NSA surveillance with a fibre optic network of their own that would reduce their reliance on the US, Google opened its coffers to fund a $60m undersea cable connecting Brazil to Florida.
但这并不意味着Google在全球的溃败，该公司在其他地方仍在不断扩张，修建通讯基础设施而不仅仅只是提供电邮服务。因此，为摆脱美国国家安全局（NSA）的网络监控，南美国家正计划着开发自己的光纤网络以减少对美国的依赖。Google公司花费6000万美元重金打造的海底电缆把巴西和佛罗里达联在了一起。
The aim was to ensure that Google’s own services run better for users in Brazil, but it is a potent reminder that extricating oneself from the grasp of America’s tech empire requires a multidimensional strategy attuned to the fact that Google today is not a mere search and email company – it also runs devices, operating systems, and even connectivity itself.
该项目的本意是为巴西的Google用户提供更好的服务，但同时也是个有力的提醒：想要摆脱美科技帝国的控制，需要制订多元化战略。要知道，如今Google不仅仅只是一个提供搜索引擎和电子邮件服务的公司，它的经营范围还包括设备、操作系统和数据连接。
Given that Russia and China are not known for their commitment to freedoms of expression and assembly, it is tempting to view their quest for information sovereignty as yet another stab at censorship and control. In fact, even when the far more benign government of Brazil toyed with the idea of forcing American companies to store user data locally – an idea it eventually abandoned – it was widely accused of draconian overreach.
众所周知，中俄从未对公民的言论和集会自由做出过承诺，因此他们对信息主权的追求可以看做是（巩固）网络审查与监管的又一次尝试。其实（形象）更温和一些的巴西政府也曾动过强制美国公司将用户数据保存在本地服务器的念头，但因为管得太宽而遭到广泛批评，最终不得不放弃。
However, Russia, China and Brazil are simply responding to the extremely aggressive tactics adopted by none other than the US. In typical fashion, though, America is completely oblivious to its own actions, believing that there is such a thing as a neutral, cosmopolitan internet and that any efforts to move away from it would result in its “Balkanisation”. But for many countries, this is not Balkanisation at all, merely de-Americanisation.
不管怎样，中俄和巴西的行动是在回应美国的网络霸权。还是典型的美国方式，美国总是完全无视自己的行为，认为一个中立、大一统的网络世界是可行的，任何试图摆脱它的尝试将会导致这个大一统网络世界的“巴尔干化”。但对许多国家来说，这根本不是巴尔干化的问题，仅仅只是为了去美国化。
US companies have been playing an ambiguous role in this project. On the one hand, they build efficient and highly functional infrastructure that locks in other countries, creating long-term dependencies that are very messy and costly to undo. They are the true vehicles for whatever is left of America’s global modernisation agenda. On the other hand, the companies cannot be seen as mere proxies for the American empire. Especially after the Edward Snowden revelations clearly demonstrated the cosy alliances between America’s business and state interests, these companies need to constantly assert their independence – occasionally by taking their own government to court – even if, in reality, most of their interests perfectly align with those of Washington.
美国公司在这一项目[注：译者的理解是“建立一个中立、大一统的网络世界”]中扮演着极富争议的角色。一方面，他们建在其他国家里高效且功能强大的基础设施，使当地形成了强大的依赖性，如果要撤走这些基建，不仅麻烦还花费不菲。它们将美国的全球现代化议程输送至所到之处。而另一方面，这些企业不该只被视为美帝国的代理人。尤其是在斯诺登泄密事件发生后，美国商业与国家利益的愉快合作开始浮出水面。在这之后这些企业就要时不时的强调自己的独立性，有时候还会将自己的政府推到被告席，即便是这样，实际上它们的大多数利益还是与国家利益保持高度一致的。
This explains why Silicon Valley has been so vocal in demanding that the Obama administration do something about internet privacy and surveillance: if internet companies were seen as compromised parties here, their business would collapse. Just look at the misfortunes of Verizon in 2014: uncertain of the extent of data-sharing between Verizon and the NSA, the German government ditched its contract with the US company in favour of Deutsche Telekom. A German government spokesman said at the time: “The federal government wants to win back more technological sovereignty, and therefore prefers to work with German companies.”
这就能解释了为什么硅谷曾直言不讳地要求奥巴马政府在网络隐私保护与监管上要有所作为：如果互联网公司在（网络隐私保护与监管方面）做出让步，它们的生意就完蛋了。看看威瑞森无线通讯倒霉的2014年：因为不确定威瑞森无线通讯与美国国家安全局（NSA）的数据共享已经达到何种程度，德当局终止了与美国公司的合同，选择与德国电信进行合作。德政府发言人对此事的解释是：“联邦政府要收回更多信息主权，因此选择与德国本土公司进行合作。”
However, to grasp the full extent of America’s hypocrisy on the issue of information sovereignty, one needs to look no further than the ongoing squabble between Microsoft and the US government. It concerns some email content – relevant to an investigation – stored on Microsoft’s servers in Ireland. American prosecutors insist that they can obtain such content from Microsoft simply by serving it a warrant – as if it makes no difference that the email is stored in a foreign country.
然而，如果想全面的了解美国在信息主权上的虚伪，只需要看看微软与美国政府之间还没有停下的争吵就知道了。这次争吵和一些爱尔兰微软用户的电子邮件内容被卷入了一项调查有关。美国检察官坚持认为只要出示了搜查令就可以从微软获取这些电子邮件内容，即便这些数据是保存在国外的服务器上。
In order to obtain it, Washington would normally need to go through a complex legal process involving bilateral treaties between the governments involved. But now it wants to sidestep that completely and treat the handling of such data as a purely local issue with no international implications. The data resides in cyberspace – and cyberspace knows no borders!
为了获取这些邮件内容，正常情况下美国政府应该通过复杂的诉讼程序，还会涉及到政府之间签订的双边条约。但现在美国却想直接跳过这一步，彻底将这当成一个国内事务来处理，避开因此事造成的国际影响。这些数据被保存在网络空间——而网络空间是不分国界的！
The government’s reasoning here is that the storage issue is irrelevant; what is relevant is where the content is accessed – and it can be accessed by Microsoft’s employees in the US. Microsoft and other tech giants are now fighting the US government in courts, with little success so far, while the Irish government and a handful of European politicians are backing Microsoft.
美政府给的理由是这事与数据保存在哪无关，真正有关的是在哪儿能要到这些内容，而微软的员工在美国本土就能获取到这些邮件内容。微软和其他科技巨头联手与美国政府对簿公堂，并得到了爱尔兰政府和一小撮欧洲政客的支持，但至今看来收效甚微。
In short, the US government insists that it should have access to data regardless of where it is stored as long as it is handled by US companies. Just imagine the outcry if the Chinese government were to demand access to any data that passes through devices manufactured by Chinese companies – Xiaomi, say, or Lenovo – regardless of whether their users are in London or New York or Tokyo. Note the crucial difference: Russia and China want to be able to access data generated by their citizens on their own soil, whereas the US wants to access data generated by anybody anywhere as long as American companies handle it.
总之，美政府坚持认为，只要是美国公司的数据，不管保存在哪里（美政府）都有权拿到它。如果是中国政府要求从小米或者联想的设备上获取那些伦敦、纽约或是东京用户的数据，不妨想象一下，此举将会给中国招来多强烈的抗议？记住（两边）最主要的差异：中俄想要的是由境内居民产生的数据；而美国想要的是美国公司所掌握的全部数据，不论何人何地。
In opposing the efforts of other countries to reclaim a modicum of technological sovereignty, Washington is likely to run into a problem it has already encountered while promoting its nebulous “internet freedom” agenda: its actions speak louder than its words. Rhetorically, it is very hard to oppose government-run digital surveillance and online spin in Russia, China or Iran, when the US government probably does more of it than all of these countries combined.
在反对其他国家为收回部分信息主权所作的努力时，美政府有可能遇到和它在推行模糊的“互联网自由”议程时一样的问题：事实胜于雄辩。在俄罗斯、中国或者伊朗，想要反对政府运作的数字监控和网络带倾向的报道确实很困难，但在美国（政府运作的数字监控和网络带倾向的报道）可能比上述三个国家加起来还要多。
Whatever motivates the desire of Russia and China to exert more control over their digital properties – and only the naive would believe that they are not motivated by concerns over domestic unrest – their actions are proportional to the aggressive efforts of Washington to exploit the fact that so much of the world’s communications infrastructure is run by Silicon Valley. One’s man internet freedom is another man’s internet imperialism.
不管是什么激起了俄罗斯和中国对其数字产业加强控制的想法（只有天真的人才会相信他们加强网络控制并不是因为担心国内骚乱），他们的行为是与美国的咄咄逼人成正比的，同时也揭示了一个事实，即世界上竟然有这么多的通讯基础设施都是由硅谷运营的。一方所号称的网络自由，对另一方来说就是网络霸权主义。原创翻译：龙腾网
Who’s the true enemy of internet freedom - China, Russia, or the US?
译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
谁才是网络自由的真正敌人——中国、俄罗斯或美国？
Beijing and Moscow are rightly chastised for restricting their citizens’ online access – but it’s the US that is now even more aggressive in asserting its digital sovereignty
中国和俄罗斯因为限制公民的网络访问而遭指责已无异议，但美国对数字主权的维护也愈发咄咄逼人
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Beijing has restricted Gmail's reach in China. Photograph: Sinopix/Rex Features
中国政府限制境内用户登陆使用Gmail邮箱。
译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
Recent reports that China has imposed further restrictions on Gmail, Google’s flagship email service, should not really come as much of a surprise. While Chinese users have been unable to access Gmail’s site for several years now, they were still able to use much of its functionality, thanks to third-party services such as Outlook or Apple Mail.
最近有报道称，中国政府加强了对Google旗舰品牌 Gmail邮箱的使用限制，这个消息已经不会再让人感到意外了。几年前中国用户就无法登陆Gmail网页，但仍能使用它的大部分功能，多亏了像Outlook或苹果邮件这样的第三方服务。
This loophole has now been closed (albeit temporarily – some of the new restrictions seem to have been mysteriously lifted already), which means determined Chinese users have had to turn to more advanced circumvention tools. Those unable or unwilling to perform any such acrobatics can simply switch to a service run by a domestic Chinese company – which is precisely what the Chinese government wants them to do.
现在漏洞已经被补上（尽管只是暂时的——但一些新的限制已悄然出现），中国用户只有重新寻找更先进的翻墙工具了。那些不会或者不愿意翻墙的只能选择使用中国本土的电邮服务——这也正是政府所希望看到的。
Such short-term and long-term disruptions of Gmail connections are part of China’s long-running efforts to protect its technological sovereignty by reducing its citizens’ reliance on American-run communication services. After North Korea saw its internet access blacked out temporarily in the Interview brouhaha – with little evidence that the country actually had anything to do with the massive hacking of Sony – the concept of technological sovereignty is poised to emerge as one of the most important and contentious doctrines of 2015.
屏蔽Gmail邮箱是中国长久以来为保护自己的信息主权所采取的其中一项措施，有时只是短期内而有时则是长期的，为的是削弱其公民对于美国公司提供的通讯服务的依赖。在朝鲜因网络被临时切断引起舆论哗然后（尽管没有足够的证据证明朝鲜与骇客入侵索尼公司一事有关），一个新的概念——信息主权，将在2015年这一年成为最重要也是最有争议的一个议题。
And it’s not just the Chinese: the Russian government is pursuing a similar agenda. A new law that came into effect last summer obliges all internet companies to store Russian citizens’ data on servers inside the country. This has already prompted Google to close down its engineering operations in Moscow. The Kremlin’s recent success in getting Facebook to block a page calling for protests in solidarity with the charged activist Alexey Navalny indicates that the government is rapidly re-establishing control over its citizens’ digital activities.
不只是中国，现在俄罗斯政府也开始跟随中国（对网络监管）的做法。去年一项新法开始实行，规定所有网络公司必须将俄网民的个人数据保存在俄罗斯本土的服务器上。这一规定迫使Google停止了该公司在莫斯科的工程运营。最近，俄当局成功关停了一个Facebook主页，该主页呼吁人们抗议对激进分子阿里克谢•纳瓦林的指控。该做法表明俄政府正迅速地恢复对俄公民网络活动的监控。
But it’s hardly a global defeat for Google: the company is still expanding elsewhere, building communications infrastructure that extends far beyond simple email services. Thus, as South American countries began exploring plans to counter NSA surveillance with a fibre optic network of their own that would reduce their reliance on the US, Google opened its coffers to fund a $60m undersea cable connecting Brazil to Florida.
但这并不意味着Google在全球的溃败，该公司在其他地方仍在不断扩张，修建通讯基础设施而不仅仅只是提供电邮服务。因此，为摆脱美国国家安全局（NSA）的网络监控，南美国家正计划着开发自己的光纤网络以减少对美国的依赖。Google公司花费6000万美元重金打造的海底电缆把巴西和佛罗里达联在了一起。
The aim was to ensure that Google’s own services run better for users in Brazil, but it is a potent reminder that extricating oneself from the grasp of America’s tech empire requires a multidimensional strategy attuned to the fact that Google today is not a mere search and email company – it also runs devices, operating systems, and even connectivity itself.
该项目的本意是为巴西的Google用户提供更好的服务，但同时也是个有力的提醒：想要摆脱美科技帝国的控制，需要制订多元化战略。要知道，如今Google不仅仅只是一个提供搜索引擎和电子邮件服务的公司，它的经营范围还包括设备、操作系统和数据连接。
Given that Russia and China are not known for their commitment to freedoms of expression and assembly, it is tempting to view their quest for information sovereignty as yet another stab at censorship and control. In fact, even when the far more benign government of Brazil toyed with the idea of forcing American companies to store user data locally – an idea it eventually abandoned – it was widely accused of draconian overreach.
众所周知，中俄从未对公民的言论和集会自由做出过承诺，因此他们对信息主权的追求可以看做是（巩固）网络审查与监管的又一次尝试。其实（形象）更温和一些的巴西政府也曾动过强制美国公司将用户数据保存在本地服务器的念头，但因为管得太宽而遭到广泛批评，最终不得不放弃。
However, Russia, China and Brazil are simply responding to the extremely aggressive tactics adopted by none other than the US. In typical fashion, though, America is completely oblivious to its own actions, believing that there is such a thing as a neutral, cosmopolitan internet and that any efforts to move away from it would result in its “Balkanisation”. But for many countries, this is not Balkanisation at all, merely de-Americanisation.
不管怎样，中俄和巴西的行动是在回应美国的网络霸权。还是典型的美国方式，美国总是完全无视自己的行为，认为一个中立、大一统的网络世界是可行的，任何试图摆脱它的尝试将会导致这个大一统网络世界的“巴尔干化”。但对许多国家来说，这根本不是巴尔干化的问题，仅仅只是为了去美国化。
US companies have been playing an ambiguous role in this project. On the one hand, they build efficient and highly functional infrastructure that locks in other countries, creating long-term dependencies that are very messy and costly to undo. They are the true vehicles for whatever is left of America’s global modernisation agenda. On the other hand, the companies cannot be seen as mere proxies for the American empire. Especially after the Edward Snowden revelations clearly demonstrated the cosy alliances between America’s business and state interests, these companies need to constantly assert their independence – occasionally by taking their own government to court – even if, in reality, most of their interests perfectly align with those of Washington.
美国公司在这一项目[注：译者的理解是“建立一个中立、大一统的网络世界”]中扮演着极富争议的角色。一方面，他们建在其他国家里高效且功能强大的基础设施，使当地形成了强大的依赖性，如果要撤走这些基建，不仅麻烦还花费不菲。它们将美国的全球现代化议程输送至所到之处。而另一方面，这些企业不该只被视为美帝国的代理人。尤其是在斯诺登泄密事件发生后，美国商业与国家利益的愉快合作开始浮出水面。在这之后这些企业就要时不时的强调自己的独立性，有时候还会将自己的政府推到被告席，即便是这样，实际上它们的大多数利益还是与国家利益保持高度一致的。
This explains why Silicon Valley has been so vocal in demanding that the Obama administration do something about internet privacy and surveillance: if internet companies were seen as compromised parties here, their business would collapse. Just look at the misfortunes of Verizon in 2014: uncertain of the extent of data-sharing between Verizon and the NSA, the German government ditched its contract with the US company in favour of Deutsche Telekom. A German government spokesman said at the time: “The federal government wants to win back more technological sovereignty, and therefore prefers to work with German companies.”
这就能解释了为什么硅谷曾直言不讳地要求奥巴马政府在网络隐私保护与监管上要有所作为：如果互联网公司在（网络隐私保护与监管方面）做出让步，它们的生意就完蛋了。看看威瑞森无线通讯倒霉的2014年：因为不确定威瑞森无线通讯与美国国家安全局（NSA）的数据共享已经达到何种程度，德当局终止了与美国公司的合同，选择与德国电信进行合作。德政府发言人对此事的解释是：“联邦政府要收回更多信息主权，因此选择与德国本土公司进行合作。”
However, to grasp the full extent of America’s hypocrisy on the issue of information sovereignty, one needs to look no further than the ongoing squabble between Microsoft and the US government. It concerns some email content – relevant to an investigation – stored on Microsoft’s servers in Ireland. American prosecutors insist that they can obtain such content from Microsoft simply by serving it a warrant – as if it makes no difference that the email is stored in a foreign country.
然而，如果想全面的了解美国在信息主权上的虚伪，只需要看看微软与美国政府之间还没有停下的争吵就知道了。这次争吵和一些爱尔兰微软用户的电子邮件内容被卷入了一项调查有关。美国检察官坚持认为只要出示了搜查令就可以从微软获取这些电子邮件内容，即便这些数据是保存在国外的服务器上。
In order to obtain it, Washington would normally need to go through a complex legal process involving bilateral treaties between the governments involved. But now it wants to sidestep that completely and treat the handling of such data as a purely local issue with no international implications. The data resides in cyberspace – and cyberspace knows no borders!
为了获取这些邮件内容，正常情况下美国政府应该通过复杂的诉讼程序，还会涉及到政府之间签订的双边条约。但现在美国却想直接跳过这一步，彻底将这当成一个国内事务来处理，避开因此事造成的国际影响。这些数据被保存在网络空间——而网络空间是不分国界的！
The government’s reasoning here is that the storage issue is irrelevant; what is relevant is where the content is accessed – and it can be accessed by Microsoft’s employees in the US. Microsoft and other tech giants are now fighting the US government in courts, with little success so far, while the Irish government and a handful of European politicians are backing Microsoft.
美政府给的理由是这事与数据保存在哪无关，真正有关的是在哪儿能要到这些内容，而微软的员工在美国本土就能获取到这些邮件内容。微软和其他科技巨头联手与美国政府对簿公堂，并得到了爱尔兰政府和一小撮欧洲政客的支持，但至今看来收效甚微。
In short, the US government insists that it should have access to data regardless of where it is stored as long as it is handled by US companies. Just imagine the outcry if the Chinese government were to demand access to any data that passes through devices manufactured by Chinese companies – Xiaomi, say, or Lenovo – regardless of whether their users are in London or New York or Tokyo. Note the crucial difference: Russia and China want to be able to access data generated by their citizens on their own soil, whereas the US wants to access data generated by anybody anywhere as long as American companies handle it.
总之，美政府坚持认为，只要是美国公司的数据，不管保存在哪里（美政府）都有权拿到它。如果是中国政府要求从小米或者联想的设备上获取那些伦敦、纽约或是东京用户的数据，不妨想象一下，此举将会给中国招来多强烈的抗议？记住（两边）最主要的差异：中俄想要的是由境内居民产生的数据；而美国想要的是美国公司所掌握的全部数据，不论何人何地。
In opposing the efforts of other countries to reclaim a modicum of technological sovereignty, Washington is likely to run into a problem it has already encountered while promoting its nebulous “internet freedom” agenda: its actions speak louder than its words. Rhetorically, it is very hard to oppose government-run digital surveillance and online spin in Russia, China or Iran, when the US government probably does more of it than all of these countries combined.
在反对其他国家为收回部分信息主权所作的努力时，美政府有可能遇到和它在推行模糊的“互联网自由”议程时一样的问题：事实胜于雄辩。在俄罗斯、中国或者伊朗，想要反对政府运作的数字监控和网络带倾向的报道确实很困难，但在美国（政府运作的数字监控和网络带倾向的报道）可能比上述三个国家加起来还要多。
Whatever motivates the desire of Russia and China to exert more control over their digital properties – and only the naive would believe that they are not motivated by concerns over domestic unrest – their actions are proportional to the aggressive efforts of Washington to exploit the fact that so much of the world’s communications infrastructure is run by Silicon Valley. One’s man internet freedom is another man’s internet imperialism.
不管是什么激起了俄罗斯和中国对其数字产业加强控制的想法（只有天真的人才会相信他们加强网络控制并不是因为担心国内骚乱），他们的行为是与美国的咄咄逼人成正比的，同时也揭示了一个事实，即世界上竟然有这么多的通讯基础设施都是由硅谷运营的。一方所号称的网络自由，对另一方来说就是网络霸权主义。
一个的根本目的是监控，一个的根本目的隔绝、封闭，都是网络自由的敌人。对于使用网络的我来说，两害相权取起轻，隔绝和封闭更加侵害人的自由。
这篇文章是从网络霸权来探讨互联网自由啊。正如古代对于还没有成型的国家而言只有都邑而没有边界，如果非要考察那时期的自由的话，迁徙自由权名义上确实是更加充分的。对于互联网主权愈加清晰的今天，互联网世界也正经历类似边界疆域形成的过程，只是美国的网络霸权行径加速了人们对于互联网主权的认识。
我想说有很多人只看到了GFW的隔绝，却没看到美国网络霸权的骄横跋扈吗？
朝鲜是网络自由真正的敌人，
那里既上不了脸书，又看不见推特。
一个赚钱的互联网天天高唱自由。
三者都有成为“敌人”的潜力和可能性，但目前真正的敌人只有一个“美国”没有之一！二楼最后一句话暴露了你的真实目的！
这最多只是商业保护而已，只有美国B才会认为GOOGLE这样的美国公司代表着互联网的全部，
中国人如果禁止苹果，就是反对手机通讯吗
中国人如果禁止苹果，就是反对手机通讯吗
网络技术掌握在谁手中，谁就是网络自由的敌人。
对了 毛子可以上youtube跟facebook的