台湾与中国的军事专业化与备战度之对比

台湾与中国的军事专业化与备战度之对比
Comparison between Taiwan and China's military professionalism and readiness

原文地址：http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/ ... readiness-6543.html

翻译：龙腾

China, Taiwan volunteer armies part ways

中国，台湾，志愿兵制分道扬镳

Recent developments have shown the volunteer recruitment systems in Taiwan and China moving on decidedly different trajectories. The Taiwan military’s attempt to implement a volunteer transition fully by the end of 2015, which already faced serious problems, appears to be in jeopardy after the death of 24-year-old Army Corporal Hung Chung-chiu from a heatstroke following extensive drills while in disciplinary detention.

最近的发展迹象表明台湾和中国的志愿兵招募体制朝向不同的轨迹而去。自从24岁的陆军下士 Hung Chung-chiu 在纪律拘留中高强度运动而中暑死亡以来，台湾业已面对严重问题的期望在2015年底以前完成面向全面志愿兵招募体制转变的举措，看来很悬。

In addition, a short training period for new conscripts will contribute, along with limited joint and combined arms training, to declining operational readiness. A military with decreasing operational readiness and capabilities will be unable to execute a deterrence or defense strategy, weaken Taipei's position in dealing with Beijing and force a reliance on the US military for the defense of Taiwan.

除此之外，新募兵（义务兵）的训练时间的缩短，同时还有很有限的联合军兵种的训练因素，将降低（国军的）战备完好性。一支降低了战备完好性和能力性的部队将无法实现军事遏制与防务战略使命，使得台北在与北京打交道时处境微弱，并将依赖于美国军事对台湾的保护。

Meanwhile, the PLA has taken an incremental approach to the transition to an all-volunteer force. Noncommissioned officer (NCO) reform, resulting in the expansion and qualitative improvement of the NCO force, combined with an active program to recruit qualified personnel, with an emphasis on college students and graduates, has increased the quantity and quality of volunteer personnel in the PLA. These programs to enhance military talent are important to PLA modernization efforts to build a high-tech force, which in turn would support a coercive strategy or diverse military operations in a crisis.

与此同时，PLA (People's Liberation Army）人民解放军显示了对一支 全志愿兵部队 的转型的持续升高的热情。 Noncommissioned officer (NCO) 士官 改制，使得士官的人员和质量水平扩张与提高，与对于强调大学生与毕业生的高级人才的积极项目一起，使得解放军中的志愿兵从数量到质量都得到了提高。

Taiwan's volunteer program

台湾的志愿兵制

Public recriminations continue against the military over Hung's death, placing Taiwan's ability to recruit a volunteer force in doubt. A crowd of 30,000 in Taipei on July 20 protested outside of the Ministry of National Defense (MND), while a larger protest held on August 3 in Taipei drew a crowd variously estimated at 100-250,000.

公众因为 Hung 氏死亡案持续对军方指责，使得台湾招募志愿兵部队的能力遭受质疑。（2013年）7月20日在台北国防部外有3万民众散步，而在8月3日兴起的另一次更大的散步运动招来了大约有10～25万的人群。

Furthermore, 18 officers and noncommissioned officers have been indicted and defense minister Kao Hua-chu resigned over the case.

此外，18名军官和士官被控告，国防部长 Kao Hua-chu 因此案辞职。

The results of a Taiwan public opinion poll released in late July showed that respondents did not trust the military judiciary to investigate and prosecute military personnel in the Hung case. The poll also showed that 74.7% of respondents viewed the Taiwanese military as "unfit to fight a war," providing evidence of the military's low credibility among Taiwanese civilians.

一项7月末公布的民测结果显示公众不相信在 Hung 氏案中调查和起诉军事人员的军事司法系统。民测同时也显示出 74.7% 的受访者认为 Taiwanese military 台湾人的军队 “不适合作战”，提供了军方在台湾民间的低口碑的证据。

This widespread lack of confidence in the military does not bode well for the future of a force whose capabilities appeared to be in decline even before the uproar over Hung's death.

此一广为散布的人们对于军方的信心缺失使得早在 Hung 氏案的喧嚣以前就已经显示出能力低下的部队，前景更加不看好。

While military reforms are occurring, it is not likely that indictments of a number of officers or military reforms can easily counter the impact of Hung's death on public opinion. Colonel Hu Zhong-shi, director of the Recruitment Center of the National Armed Forces, admitted at a press conference that "the Hung case will surely have negative impacts on the plan".

值此军事改革正在进行时，很难说一票军官的受控或者军事改革可以轻易抵消因为 Hung 氏案对公众的影响。Hu Zhong-shi 上校， National Armed Forces 国家武装部队（译注：不适宜翻译成“国军”）招兵中心的主任，在一场媒体会上承认“Hung氏案肯定对计划（前述军事改革计划）带来负面影响”。

Even before the uproar over Hung's death, the volunteer plan appeared to be having serious trouble with both the quantity and the quality of its recruits. Colonel Hu reported on August 19 that only 72% of the 2012 recruitment goal had been met, and that only 4,290 personnel had been recruited out of the 2013 goal of 28,531.

即使在 Hung 氏之死以前，志愿制计划就已经显示出在兵员的数量和质量上的问题。Hu 上校在8月19日说到2012年的招兵计划只达到了72%，而2013年计划目标 28，531 的新兵员额中现在仅仅招得 4290 人。（微软计算器显示：15.04%）

The MND announced on August 19 that it will loosen requirements, place greater emphasis on recruiting women and work to promote recruitment (Central News Agency, August 20). It is doubtful these measures will fill the recruitment gap without an increased defense budget to provide improve pay and benefits.

国防部在8月19日宣部其将降低（征召）标准，更加强调征召女子和促进招兵的工作（中央社，8月20日）。这些举措在不增加防务预算提高薪资和福利下能否填补招兵空缺值得怀疑。

The PLA's move to a volunteer force

解放军的志愿兵之路

The PLA has taken a slower, steadier approach to its move towards a volunteer force. It has recently placed greater emphasis on recruiting college students and graduates, and has initiated links with civilian universities and military educational institutes to train select students for eventual service in the PLA. These efforts, along with NCO reforms and expansion, are furthering the transition to a volunteer force.

人民解放军选择了更慢、更扎实的步伐向一支志愿兵部队进军。它最近极其强调征召大学生和毕业生，并且启动了与民间大学和军事教育机构的联接，以训练最终将于军中服役的学生。这些工作，与士官改革一起，进一步深化了向一支志愿兵部队的转化。

Historically, conscription was the mainstay of PLA recruitment. Conscription began on November 1 each year, preceded by registration starting on September 30. Demobilization of soldiers would often occur in December, with transportation of some demobilized soldiers beginning in late November. The influx of untrained new conscripts and release of soldiers would result in a sharp decrease in unit operational readiness and impact training.

历史上，义务兵一直是解放军的中流砥柱。征召于每年11月1日开始，早在9月30日开始进行登记。退伍经常在12月进行，从11月末开始对一些退伍兵进行运送。没有受训的新兵和老兵退伍的汇流一起使得部队的战备程度锐减并影响训练。

The PLA began transitioning away from compulsory service in 1998 with the recognition that high quality personnel were required to support modernization. A key component in the move to a volunteer force has been the reform and expansion of the NCO corps, begun in 1999 to provide greater stability to the military with long-term skilled personnel.

解放军于1998年开始随着对于高质量人才对于现代化进程的认识，开始从义务役转型开去。其中关键的一项旨在面向志愿制的进步就是始于1999年的对于士官团队的改制和扩张，以对军方提供长期稳定的高素质人才。

Conscription reform

动员改制

The PLA began to move away from compulsory service in 1998, when the words "based on the compulsory service system as the main body" were deleted from the Military Service Law. The compulsory service period was shortened to two years, and the active service system for voluntary servicemen and the reserve service system were reformed.

以1998年“基于义务役制为主体”从军事服役法律条文中删除始，解放军开始从义务役制转型开去。义务役时间缩短到2年，同时现役志愿兵和预备役系统都被进行了改革。

（译注：条款原文请自行查找新、旧版国防服役法条文，此处及以下关于相关法律法规条文的翻译为根据英语原文直译，不承担具有法律责任和效力的解释权。）

Additional changes have included the following:

其他改变还包括如下：

In 2009, recruitment standards for women were changed to include raising the maximum age requirements for various categories in order to recruit more highly qualified and educated women.

在2009年，女子征召标准被进一步放宽了包括最高年龄在内的一系列要求，以征召更多更高学历和标准的女子。

In 2011, physical restrictions were relaxed on tattoos and pierced ears, and height requirements for women were lowered, aided by the development of standardized medical and psychological screening system for the PLA.

在2011年，随着更进步的医学和心理检测系统的全军普及，一些身体素质要求比如纹身和耳穿孔等限制都被放宽了（译注：是放宽，不是取消），对女子征召的高标准也被降低了。

Also in 2011, an online registration and pre-recruiting system aimed at high school graduates and college students was established, and inducements for students were strengthened, including tuition compensation, payments of government subsidized student loans and compensatory payments for qualified college graduates.

同样在2011年，一项面向高中毕业生和大学生的在线注册和征召前注册系统建立了起来，同时利诱学生的一整套体系也被加强了，包括学费报销，政府补贴学生贷款，给合格大学生的津贴等。

The National People's Congress in 2011 also removed limits on the registration of urban youth, abolished recruitment deferrals for full-time students was abolished, and allowed college graduates with excellent military service to be promoted directly to serve as active-duty officers. Furthermore, college students enlisting for active duty could resume their studies within two years of demobilization, the recruitment age for college graduates was raised to 24 years, and the registration period (but not the conscription period) was moved from September 30 to June 30.

National People's Congress (NPC) 全国人民代表大会于2011年取消了对于城市年轻人注册的限制，对全日制学生的延期服役制也被取消了，使得拥有优良服役经历的大学毕业生可以直接晋升为现役军官。此外，在读大学生招入现役以后可以在退役两年以内重新复读，对于大学毕业生的征召年龄限制也提升到了24岁，同时志愿兵注册时间（不是义务兵）从9月30日移到了6月30日。

Recruiting quality students

征召高质量学生

The PLA began recruiting college graduates in 2001, with more than 130,000 college graduates serving as soldiers at the end of 2009. From 2009 to 2012, approximately 100,000 college students joined the military each year. This represents perhaps a quarter to a third of all recruits, by this author's rough estimate.

解放军从2001年开始征召大学毕业生，到2009年有超过 13万 大学毕业生在军中以普通士兵身份服役。从2009年到2012年，大约每年有 10万 大学生参军。本文作者估算，这个数字大约是 1/4 到 1/3 的总新兵数。

The current emphasis is on increasing quality personnel by focusing on recruitment of college students and graduates. The State Council and CMC recently moved the start of the intake period to August 1, synchronizing it with the graduation period in order to attract qualified graduates, while limiting the numbers of secondary school students recruited.

现阶段的重点就是强调对于大学生和毕业生的征召。国务院和 CMC （Central Military Commission) 中央军委最近把征召起始日期移到了8月1日，与毕业时期同步，就是为了吸引有资质的毕业生，同时限制中学生的征召人数。

The previous November 1 start date resulted in missed opportunities to recruit the most qualified college graduates, due to the time lag. For example, one survey showed that in 2012 approximately 90% of university graduates had found work before the winter intake period, limiting the number of quality personnel available for PLA recruitment. The change to an earlier recruitment period will also lessen the drop in PLA unit combat readiness, as it allows for basic training of new recruits before the annual demobilization of personnel at the end of the year.

之前的11月1日征召起始日期因为时间区间的延迟，使得军方错过了最优质大学毕业生的时期。比如，一份调查显示在2012年大约 90% 的大学毕业生在冬季征兵期开始以前就找到了工作，限制了解放军征召优质兵员的数量。把征召日期的提前也能减小对于解放军现役部队的战备度的下降压力，使得新兵能在年底的老兵退伍期以前完成基本训练。

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) began receiving applications in June through an online website. Major cities focused on recruiting college students employing mobilization and propaganda campaigns. MND officials stated that college students will enjoy advantages in registration, admission and recruitment.

国防部从6月就开始接受在线申请。大城市利用各种动员和 铣脑宣传 手段重点关注对于大学毕业生的征召。国防部官员声称大学生将享受注册、准入和征召的各种优势。

（译注：Propaganda 这个词自古以来就是个贬义词，龙腾其他翻译有必要在各自作品中体现出这个词的词性出来。）

The PLA Daily reports active recruitment drives throughout China, with various locations reporting increased college applicants over previous years. For example, Shanghai began military service registration on June 1, with over 300 military service registration stations set up at colleges and universities, while Beijing began recruiting college students on June 15, including activities with China's first female astronaut, Liu Yang, to attract prospects.

解放军日报报道说这种主动性地征召红遍了全国，各地喜报大学生申请人数比上一年度大幅增加。比如，上海的军人征召注册始于6月1日，设立了超过 300 家招兵注册点横跨全市院校，而北京从6月15日开始征召大学生，包括找来中国的第一位女航天员 刘洋，来吸引人气。

The PLA has enhanced its propaganda and mobilization campaign this year, including online social networking programs, aimed at attracting college students and graduates away from potential business recruiters .The Ministry of Education (MOE) announced on August 21 that over 200,000 college students had taken part in pre-conscription registration in large and medium cities.

解放军今年进一步加强了其动员和铣脑宣传的攻势，包括网络社交项目，旨在把大学生和毕业生从潜在的商业聘用机会中诱走。教育部在8月21日宣部在大中城市有超过 20万 大学生参加了征兵前期注册。

College students and graduates can receive preferential treatment as an inducement to volunteer, including admission advantages, tuition payments, one time recruitment payments, preferential employment opportunities in state-owned enterprises and the civil service upon decommissioning, three years of free administrative charges for decommissioned college students starting their own business, and possible Beijing household registration permits for non-local college students recruited from Beijing universities and colleges.

大学生和毕业生志愿入役能享受各种待遇，包括准入优势，学费支付，一次性征召费用支付，退役后在国营企业和民事单位的优先录取机会，退役后自创业享受3年免行政费用优待，以及外地户口就读北京本地大学的大学生的落户北京的 可能性。

Unemployment and underemployment among college graduates could benefit the PLA's recruitment efforts. The expansion of higher education since 1999 has increased the number of college graduates entering the job market, with college graduates numbering 6.99 million in 2013, 190,000 more than in 2012. The MyCOS Institute, a Beijing-based education research company, tracks college employment: a 2012 report indicated an employment rate of approximately 90.2% for 2011 graduates, and 89.6% for 2010 graduates.

大学毕业生的失业率和低就业率帮了解放军的忙，自从1999年的大学扩招以来，更多大学毕业生进入就业市场打拼，在2013年达到了 699万，比2012年多了 19万。MyCOS Institute，一家基于北京的教育研究公司，跟踪着大学就业数据：一份2012年的报告显示有 90.2% 的2011年毕业生，89.6% 的2010年毕业生就职。

May 2013 statistics released by the Beijing Municipal Commission of Education reported that only 33.6% of college graduates in Beijing had signed employment contracts, reflecting continuing poor job opportunities.

2013年北京市教育厅的数据显示北京只有大约 33.6% 的应届大学毕业生得到了就职合同，反映了就职机会的持续惨淡。

The decline in students' physical condition, however, has hurt recruiting, with the PLA finding since at least 1995 that sedentary life styles have resulted in weight, strength and vision problems. The Beijing recruiting office reported that approximately 60% of college students failed the physical fitness exam, 23% failed the eye exam, and 19% were either obese or underweight.

然而学生的身体素质的下降，也伤及了征兵。解放军当局发现久坐的生活方式引起了体重、力量、视力等方面的一系列问题。北京征兵办报道说大约 60% 的大学生挂掉了体能测试，23%的挂掉了眼科测试，还有19%的不是肥胖就是体重过轻。

Even with physical standards reduced in 2008 and 2011, the physical condition of students is adversely affecting student recruitment. The 60% failure rate would indicate that of the 200,000 college students reported registering for military service this year, perhaps only 80,000 are fit for service, barring any other disqualifications. This is less than the reported 100,000 college students recruited each year between 2009 and 2012.

即使在2008年和2011年一降再降体质标准，当代学生的身体素质已经极大的影响了学生征兵情况。60%的淘汰率表明今年的据报道的 20万 大学生注册征召兵中，即使不算其他的不合格标准，大约只有 8万 能入役。这比据报道的从2009年到2012年每年 10万 大学生的征召数字要低。

It is not clear whether the PLA has met past recruitment goals for college students and graduates. While the PLA published the goal of recruiting some 150,000 college graduates in 2010, only 100,000 were recruited that year. The PLA has not announced recruiting goals for college graduates since then, which could mean that goals are not being met even with the incentives and poor employment environment.

事实上我们并不清楚解放军是否达到了设立的征召大学生和毕业生的目标线。2010年解放军发布了其 15万 大学生征召兵的征召计划目标，当年只达到了 10万。解放军从那以后就没有再公布过每年的大学生征兵计划目标，也就可能说明，即使在优秀的奖励政策和糟糕的就业市场环境下，他们依然达不到征兵计划目标。

Leveraging civilian and military educational institutions

民事和军事教育院校的杠杆

The PLA is recruiting college students and graduates in greater numbers than before, but possibly still not enough to meet their requirements. Other PLA programs may be providing additional talent. While the PLA is primarily targeting students in higher education, some programs select highly qualified candidates to receive higher education through joint civilian-military programs.

解放军在比以前更大规模的征召大学生和毕业生，但可能依然无法满足他们的要求。其他一些解放军开展的项目也许可以提供额外的人才。当解放军主要目标是接受了高等教育的学生时，一些项目选择高度合格的候选人来接受由民事和军事合办的高等教育课程项目。

The PLA is using educational opportunities as an inducement to attract qualified male and female high school graduates. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) took the lead in 2011 to partner with Tsinghua University to train qualified students to become pilots. The "3+1" [1] training model includes three years at a civilian college followed by a year at a military educational institute.

解放军正在利用高等教育机会作为诱饵来吸引合格的男女高中毕业生。解放军空军在2011年率先领跑一项与清华大学合作的训练合格飞行员的项目。“3+1项目”，包括3年在民事学院的学习然后转而1年在军事院校的学习。

For example, the class of 32 "3+1" students at Tsinghua University will study at its School of Aerospace and Aviation for three years and then spend a year at the Air Force Aviation University (AFAU), followed up a year of advanced flight training. The PLA has also partnered with 19 civilian colleges and universities to train national defense students.

比如，32名 “3+1项目”的学生在清华大学的航空航天学院学习3年，然后在空军航空大学学习1年，接下来接受1年的高级飞行训练。解放军同时还与19所民事院校合作训练国防生。

In 2012, Beijing University and the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA) began a program to train national defense students. These students reportedly will spend four years at the civilian universities and then two years at AFAU for flight and command training.

在2012年，北京大学和北京航空航太大学开始了一项训练国防生的项目。据信这些学生将在民事院校学习4年，然后到空军航空大学接受2年的航空和指挥训练。

Building on the PLAAF plan, the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), and the MOE expanded the effort this year by initiating a joint pilot training program to allow high school graduates to study in both military educational institutes and civilian universities. The program seeks an innovative military-civilian integration model in order to maximize resources to optimize training of student pilots.

为了打造空军的计划，总参谋部、总政治部，以及教育部一起于今年扩展了他们的合作，开启了一项接受高中毕业生在军事和民事院校接受学习的项目。这项项目寻求一种创新的军民契合模式，以最大程度优化训练学生为飞行员的资源。

The first 87 candidates will train in military educational institutes such as the Naval Aviation College and AFAU, and Beijing University (25 students), Tsinghua University (32 students) and BUAA (30 students). The civilian universities will provide a basic education with the military educational institutes providing specialized education and flight training. Qualified graduates will be sent to aviation units in the ground forces, PLAAF and PLA Navy (PLAN).

首批87名候选者将在类似于海军航空学院和空军航空大学这样的军事院校以及北京大学（25名学生），清华大学（32名）和北航（30名）接受训练。民事大学提供基础教育，军事院校提供专职教育和飞行训练。合格的毕业生将被派往解放军陆军航空兵部队，空军，和海航。

This year the MOE and the four General Departments (Staff, Political, Logistics and Armaments) began targeting juniors from top universities to join the military upon graduation to become military engineers as part of the "3+1" program. Select students undergo a 6-12 month study in military academies and schools, research institutes, high-tech units and armament production enterprises.

今年教育部将和四大总部（总参总政总后总装）一起开始一项面向顶尖大学的新生的旨在毕业后成为军事工程兵的项目，作为“3+1项目”的一个新的部分。被选上的学生将在军事院校、科研机构、高科技部队和军工单位进行 6～12 个月的学习。

The program will provide military and academic education and training, as well as possible eligibility for post-graduate study. The government notice stated that over 300 students will be selected this year for the new engineering program.

此项目将提供军事和学术教育与训练，以及可能的继续接受研究生教育的资格的机会。政府通告声明今年超过300名学生将被选入这一新的工程兵项目。

Conclusion

总结

Taiwan and China represent two volunteer recruitment programs moving along opposite trajectories. The Taiwanese volunteer force program has been launched with a shorter preparation and implementation period, and a lack of funding to increase pay and other benefits for servicemen, combined with a general disregard for military service by civilians, resulted in failures to achieve recruitment goals even before the current uproar over Corporal Hung's death.

台湾和中国代表着两种朝向截然不同轨迹运行的志愿兵征召项目。台湾人的志愿兵部队项目发起于不足的准备和实施时间之下，缺少对服役人员提薪和提高待遇的资金，与大众基本上对军事服役的冷漠态度一起，形成了即使在 Hung 氏之死以前就无法达到征兵目标的现实。

Hung's death in detention is further souring public opinion regarding military service and the competence of the armed forces. This inability to reach recruitment goals leaves the status of the volunteer program in doubt, and operational readiness will continue to decline as active duty authorized strength cannot be met.

Hung氏之死于拘禁，更加加剧了大众对于军事服役与部队能力的冷眼。这一无法完成征兵目标的局面使得志愿兵项目现状存疑，而战备状态也将因现役部队人员不足而持续恶化。

Not all of the fault lies with the Taiwanese military for the, as legislators have failed to meet the military's stated minimum budgetary requirements. It is difficult to envision how the volunteer system can be saved without significant increases to volunteer pay and benefits and a successful public relations campaign.

并不是所有错误都是台湾人的军队自身的，立法委们无法达到军方提出的最低预算要求。在没有大手笔增加志愿兵薪资和福利以及成功的公关战以前，很难预期志愿兵制度能如何被挽救。

A return to the old conscription system would appear equally difficult, considering the current state of public opinion regarding military service. Declining operational readiness and an increasingly hollow military will make it difficult for Taiwan to execute its stated defense strategy, will place Taipei in a position of weakness in its dealings with Beijing, and could leave Taiwan's defense reliant on the US military.

回归到老的征召制也会同样困难，如果考虑到现在的公众对军事服役的态度的话。滑坡的战备状态和持续空心的军事能力将使得台湾在行使其声称的防御战略时困难重重，至台北在与北京打交道时于微弱地位，可使台湾的防务依赖于美军。

Moving in the opposite direction, the PLA has chosen a gradual, multipronged approach to attract high quality volunteers. The slower approach, supported by adequate funding for increased pay, benefits and other inducements, also allows for reassessments and readjustments to improve the initiatives. The recent moves to recruit highly qualified students, with an emphasis on college students and graduates, appear to be achieving some success.

朝向相反的方向进发，解放军选择了一条渐进、多方面多要素之路来吸引高质量的志愿兵。缓慢的由足够资金支持高薪高福利的诱惑之路，同时也能使其能重新评估和重新调整以占尽先机。最近的趋向于强调征召大学生和毕业生的高规格生源的动作，看上去也取得了一些成绩。

Limited employment opportunities combined with inducements should allow the PLA to recruit better-qualified talent to support a growing high-tech force and complex operational theories. Increasing PLA capabilities will provide a greater range of options against Taiwan, whether coercive or direct military actions.

有限的就业机会与各种征召诱惑一起，使得解放军得以征召更好的人才用以支援一支不断进化的高科技部队和更加复杂的作战理论。提高解放军的能力将能使得对抗台湾是拥有更多选项，无论是胁迫还是直接的军事行动。

It is not clear whether recruitment goals for college students and graduates are being met, and poor student physical fitness is hurting recruitment, but it does appear that the PLA is moving forward as it relies to a greater extent on volunteers to man high-tech units, while the Taiwanese program appears to be in deep trouble.

无法确定（解放军的）征召大学生与毕业生的指标是否有达到，以及劣质的生源身体素质标准是否伤及征兵，但是确实可以看得出的是解放军正在朝向一支越来越依赖志愿兵来行使高科技部队职能的方向，而同时台外的（志愿兵征召）计划则深陷泥潭里。

(This article first appeared in The Jamestown Foundation. Used with permission.)
(Copyright 2013 The Jamestown Foundation.)

文章受权引用自 詹姆斯敦基金会。


评论

#1 08-27-2013
Player 0
Member
Join Date Mar 2006
Location Sydney
Posts 324
Asia Times Online :: China, Taiwan volunteer armies part ways （链接见本帖前部引用链接）
This was posted just recently, though it was something people here would like to check out.

亚洲时报在线《中国，逗号，台湾，志愿兵制分道扬镳》
这是最近发布的，觉得应该是SDF这里的各位会赶兴趣的。

#2 08-27-2013
Franklin 富兰克林
Junior Member
Join Date Mar 2012
Posts 888
I wanted to post this article but you beat me to it. China has been moving away from conscription since 1998. Does anyone know if there are still any conscripts left in the PLA today. And why is a promotional campaign to recruit more highly educated volunteers called a "propoganda campaign" ?

我准备发布这篇文章的但是你抢先我一步了。中国从1998年开始从义务兵制转型开去。有任何人知道如今解放军内是否仍有义务兵吗？还有为什么一场促进征招更高受教志愿兵的活动会被称为“铣脑宣传”呢？

#3 08-28-2013
solarz 太阳能
Senior Member
Join Date Oct 2009
Posts 2,215
The PRC has never had compulsory military service, so I don't know what that article is referring to when it said "The compulsory service period was shortened to two years".

PRC (People's Republic of China) 人民共和国从来就没有一套义务兵役制度啊，所以当文章提到“义务兵役制缩短到两年”的时候，我完全不清楚它在说什么啊。

#4 08-28-2013
PanAsian 亚洲潘
Junior Member
Join Date Oct 2005
Posts 509

I thought the PRC did have compulsory service but also a quota, it was just that there used to be usually more than enough people to fill the quota. Nowadays there are fewer young people to begin with, who are also less physically capable, at the same time the PLA is raising the bar, and more young people are using all sorts of excuses to avoid military service to try for other better opportunities.

全文引用 #3 楼：
人民共和国从来就没有一套义务兵役制度啊，所以当文章提到“义务兵役制缩短到两年”的时候，我完全不清楚它在说什么啊。
我认为人民共和国是有义务兵役制的，但同时也有一个征兵指标，只是基本上每次都有足够的人来填补这个指标。现在年轻人越来越少了，而且他们身体素质也更不行了，而同时解放军在抬高（征召）标准，更多的年轻人在试着找各种各样的借口来逃避兵役以寻找更好的（就业）机会。

#5 08-28-2013
no_name 无_名
Senior Member
Join Date Aug 2010
Location Auckland, NZ
Posts 2,110
In the even that soldiers lost their lives in the line of duty whether in combat or not, the government should have the duty to take care of their parents.

如果士兵在勤时，无论是否是在战斗中丢的命，政府都应该有责任来照顾他们的家人（家长）。

#6 08-28-2013
Player 0
Member
Death of a conscript highlights Taiwan
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/28/author-sheryn-lee-u-penn/
Somewhat related, an article related to the dead Taiwanese soldier mentioned at the beginning of the previous article.

义务兵之死点亮台湾
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/28/author-sheryn-lee-u-penn/
也还相关的，前面文章开头提到的那个死掉的台湾人士兵。

#7 08-28-2013
solarz
Senior Member
Compulsory service means every male of a certain age has to go to the military. South Korea has a compulsory military service.
I can't see how a quote is supposed to work, but China doesn't have anything like what SK has.

全文引用 #4 楼：
我认为人民共和国是有义务兵役制的，但同时也有一个征兵指标，只是基本上每次都有足够的人来填补这个指标。现在年轻人越来越少了，而且他们身体素质也更不行了，而同时解放军在抬高（征召）标准，更多的年轻人在试着找各种各样的借口来逃避兵役以寻找更好的（就业）机会。
义务兵役制意味着每一个男子到了一定年龄都必须去服役。南炒藓就有义务兵役制。
我看不出“指标”怎么能运作的，但是中国与南炒藓完全不一样。

#8 08-28-2013
s002wjh
Member
Join Date May 2006
Posts 364
i read somewhere, that taiwan air force from refuel/arm/fly is within 10min while china take much longer time for its plane to get its plane ready to fly, something like 40-50mins. not sure true or not, anyone knows?

我从哪里读到过，说台湾的空军战机 重新加油/武装/起飞 是在10分钟以内，而中国则需要长得多的时间来备飞，大约在 40～50 分钟。不知道是不是真的，有人知道吗？

#9 08-29-2013
Lion 狮子
Senior Member
Join Date Apr 2009
Posts 2,086
Nonsense. Where you heard that crap from?

全文引用 #8 楼：
我从哪里读到过，说台湾的空军战机 重新加油/武装/起飞 是在10分钟以内，而中国则需要长得多的时间来备飞，大约在 40～50 分钟。不知道是不是真的，有人知道吗？
荒谬，这些垃圾你从哪里得来的？

#10 08-30-2013
s002wjh
Member
i forgot either from military tv channel in taiwan or some article. but if you said tis nonsense, do you have any actual/crediable article on how fast PLA can get tis jet ready for re-sorty/combat operation?

全文引用 #9 楼：
荒谬，这些垃圾你从哪里得来的？
我忘了是从 台湾的军事电视频道还是书刊上看来的了，但是如果你说这是荒谬的，你有任何实际/可信的文章来说明解放军能多快完成其战斗机的重新出动吗？

#11 08-30-2013
Skywatcher 望空者
Junior Member
Join Date Jun 2007
Posts 778
Which aircraft?
It might be easier and quicker to flight prep a F-16 compared to a H-6K.

哪一型飞机？
也许重装一架 F-16 比 一架 H-6K 要简单和快捷一点呢。

#12 08-31-2013
s002wjh
Member
generally speaking fighter jet/interceptor

就通常而言战斗机/截击机。

#13 08-31-2013
Skywatcher
Junior Member
Even then, there would obviously be a big difference between the prep time for a F-5, vs. a J-11B.

全文引用 #12 楼：
就通常而言战斗机/截击机。
即使那样，整装时间 F-5 vs. J-11B 也显然完全极其不一样啊。

#14 08-31-2013
rhino123 犀牛123 （犀牛通常也是美军重型装备比如主战坦克、轰炸机的呼叫代号）
Pencil Pusher （头衔：）秘书、办公文员、轰炸机领航员
Join Date Apr 2006
Location Somewhere out there.
Posts 1,843
Actually you have to see what is the status of those aircraft. Some of them are already readied for flight, all countries had this system whereby they would allocate some squadrons of fighters and interceptors (rotatable shift) for emergency deployment.
If you count these squadrons that are already at the readied state to those that are not, then of course you will see a big difference.
I never believe that the Chinese reactions are that slow to begin with. Plus you need to know where the news came from... from Taiwan boasting about their capability (for political or otherwise usage), it might just be a ruse to tell their people that they have nothing to worry about, then yeah... they can said that.
But common sense has it that it cannot be the case. And unless China had officially told the world how fast they can react, it would be up to everyone's guess... but a simple example would be, during the time when US spy plane was intercepted by two J-8... we all know the rest of the story, my point is... if the Chinese are as slow as was stated... wouldn't that spy plane already left the location before the J-8 even arrive?

事实上你必须看看那些飞机的状态是什么，有些是已经准备好起飞了的。所有的国家都有这样的体系来分配一部分战斗机和截击机中队（轮流值班）来应对紧急部署任务。
如果你把这些已经处在预备起飞状态的飞机来与那些不是这样状态的飞机比，那么当然你会发现巨大的不同。
我从来不相信中国的反应时间那么慢。另外你要看看这消息是从哪儿冒出来的……从台湾宣扬他们能力的媒体来（出于症治或其他目的），也许仅仅只不过是个告诉他们自己的民众我们很强什么都不用担心的诡计……那么是的，他们确实会那么说。
但是常识告诉我们不是那样的。除非中国官方正式的告诉全世界他们的重整时间多快，否则大家都只能猜测……但是一个简单的例子是，在美国间谍机被两架 J-8 拦截的案例……我们都知道故事余下的部分了，我的意思是……如果中国人真的如（台媒）所称那么慢的话，那么不是应该间谍机早在 J-8 来到它们的位置的时候就应该早就跑了吗？
台湾与中国的军事专业化与备战度之对比
Comparison between Taiwan and China's military professionalism and readiness

原文地址：http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/ ... readiness-6543.html

翻译：龙腾

China, Taiwan volunteer armies part ways

中国，台湾，志愿兵制分道扬镳

Recent developments have shown the volunteer recruitment systems in Taiwan and China moving on decidedly different trajectories. The Taiwan military’s attempt to implement a volunteer transition fully by the end of 2015, which already faced serious problems, appears to be in jeopardy after the death of 24-year-old Army Corporal Hung Chung-chiu from a heatstroke following extensive drills while in disciplinary detention.

最近的发展迹象表明台湾和中国的志愿兵招募体制朝向不同的轨迹而去。自从24岁的陆军下士 Hung Chung-chiu 在纪律拘留中高强度运动而中暑死亡以来，台湾业已面对严重问题的期望在2015年底以前完成面向全面志愿兵招募体制转变的举措，看来很悬。

In addition, a short training period for new conscripts will contribute, along with limited joint and combined arms training, to declining operational readiness. A military with decreasing operational readiness and capabilities will be unable to execute a deterrence or defense strategy, weaken Taipei's position in dealing with Beijing and force a reliance on the US military for the defense of Taiwan.

除此之外，新募兵（义务兵）的训练时间的缩短，同时还有很有限的联合军兵种的训练因素，将降低（国军的）战备完好性。一支降低了战备完好性和能力性的部队将无法实现军事遏制与防务战略使命，使得台北在与北京打交道时处境微弱，并将依赖于美国军事对台湾的保护。

Meanwhile, the PLA has taken an incremental approach to the transition to an all-volunteer force. Noncommissioned officer (NCO) reform, resulting in the expansion and qualitative improvement of the NCO force, combined with an active program to recruit qualified personnel, with an emphasis on college students and graduates, has increased the quantity and quality of volunteer personnel in the PLA. These programs to enhance military talent are important to PLA modernization efforts to build a high-tech force, which in turn would support a coercive strategy or diverse military operations in a crisis.

与此同时，PLA (People's Liberation Army）人民解放军显示了对一支 全志愿兵部队 的转型的持续升高的热情。 Noncommissioned officer (NCO) 士官 改制，使得士官的人员和质量水平扩张与提高，与对于强调大学生与毕业生的高级人才的积极项目一起，使得解放军中的志愿兵从数量到质量都得到了提高。

Taiwan's volunteer program

台湾的志愿兵制

Public recriminations continue against the military over Hung's death, placing Taiwan's ability to recruit a volunteer force in doubt. A crowd of 30,000 in Taipei on July 20 protested outside of the Ministry of National Defense (MND), while a larger protest held on August 3 in Taipei drew a crowd variously estimated at 100-250,000.

公众因为 Hung 氏死亡案持续对军方指责，使得台湾招募志愿兵部队的能力遭受质疑。（2013年）7月20日在台北国防部外有3万民众散步，而在8月3日兴起的另一次更大的散步运动招来了大约有10～25万的人群。

Furthermore, 18 officers and noncommissioned officers have been indicted and defense minister Kao Hua-chu resigned over the case.

此外，18名军官和士官被控告，国防部长 Kao Hua-chu 因此案辞职。

The results of a Taiwan public opinion poll released in late July showed that respondents did not trust the military judiciary to investigate and prosecute military personnel in the Hung case. The poll also showed that 74.7% of respondents viewed the Taiwanese military as "unfit to fight a war," providing evidence of the military's low credibility among Taiwanese civilians.

一项7月末公布的民测结果显示公众不相信在 Hung 氏案中调查和起诉军事人员的军事司法系统。民测同时也显示出 74.7% 的受访者认为 Taiwanese military 台湾人的军队 “不适合作战”，提供了军方在台湾民间的低口碑的证据。

This widespread lack of confidence in the military does not bode well for the future of a force whose capabilities appeared to be in decline even before the uproar over Hung's death.

此一广为散布的人们对于军方的信心缺失使得早在 Hung 氏案的喧嚣以前就已经显示出能力低下的部队，前景更加不看好。

While military reforms are occurring, it is not likely that indictments of a number of officers or military reforms can easily counter the impact of Hung's death on public opinion. Colonel Hu Zhong-shi, director of the Recruitment Center of the National Armed Forces, admitted at a press conference that "the Hung case will surely have negative impacts on the plan".

值此军事改革正在进行时，很难说一票军官的受控或者军事改革可以轻易抵消因为 Hung 氏案对公众的影响。Hu Zhong-shi 上校， National Armed Forces 国家武装部队（译注：不适宜翻译成“国军”）招兵中心的主任，在一场媒体会上承认“Hung氏案肯定对计划（前述军事改革计划）带来负面影响”。

Even before the uproar over Hung's death, the volunteer plan appeared to be having serious trouble with both the quantity and the quality of its recruits. Colonel Hu reported on August 19 that only 72% of the 2012 recruitment goal had been met, and that only 4,290 personnel had been recruited out of the 2013 goal of 28,531.

即使在 Hung 氏之死以前，志愿制计划就已经显示出在兵员的数量和质量上的问题。Hu 上校在8月19日说到2012年的招兵计划只达到了72%，而2013年计划目标 28，531 的新兵员额中现在仅仅招得 4290 人。（微软计算器显示：15.04%）

The MND announced on August 19 that it will loosen requirements, place greater emphasis on recruiting women and work to promote recruitment (Central News Agency, August 20). It is doubtful these measures will fill the recruitment gap without an increased defense budget to provide improve pay and benefits.

国防部在8月19日宣部其将降低（征召）标准，更加强调征召女子和促进招兵的工作（中央社，8月20日）。这些举措在不增加防务预算提高薪资和福利下能否填补招兵空缺值得怀疑。

The PLA's move to a volunteer force

解放军的志愿兵之路

The PLA has taken a slower, steadier approach to its move towards a volunteer force. It has recently placed greater emphasis on recruiting college students and graduates, and has initiated links with civilian universities and military educational institutes to train select students for eventual service in the PLA. These efforts, along with NCO reforms and expansion, are furthering the transition to a volunteer force.

人民解放军选择了更慢、更扎实的步伐向一支志愿兵部队进军。它最近极其强调征召大学生和毕业生，并且启动了与民间大学和军事教育机构的联接，以训练最终将于军中服役的学生。这些工作，与士官改革一起，进一步深化了向一支志愿兵部队的转化。

Historically, conscription was the mainstay of PLA recruitment. Conscription began on November 1 each year, preceded by registration starting on September 30. Demobilization of soldiers would often occur in December, with transportation of some demobilized soldiers beginning in late November. The influx of untrained new conscripts and release of soldiers would result in a sharp decrease in unit operational readiness and impact training.

历史上，义务兵一直是解放军的中流砥柱。征召于每年11月1日开始，早在9月30日开始进行登记。退伍经常在12月进行，从11月末开始对一些退伍兵进行运送。没有受训的新兵和老兵退伍的汇流一起使得部队的战备程度锐减并影响训练。

The PLA began transitioning away from compulsory service in 1998 with the recognition that high quality personnel were required to support modernization. A key component in the move to a volunteer force has been the reform and expansion of the NCO corps, begun in 1999 to provide greater stability to the military with long-term skilled personnel.

解放军于1998年开始随着对于高质量人才对于现代化进程的认识，开始从义务役转型开去。其中关键的一项旨在面向志愿制的进步就是始于1999年的对于士官团队的改制和扩张，以对军方提供长期稳定的高素质人才。

Conscription reform

动员改制

The PLA began to move away from compulsory service in 1998, when the words "based on the compulsory service system as the main body" were deleted from the Military Service Law. The compulsory service period was shortened to two years, and the active service system for voluntary servicemen and the reserve service system were reformed.

以1998年“基于义务役制为主体”从军事服役法律条文中删除始，解放军开始从义务役制转型开去。义务役时间缩短到2年，同时现役志愿兵和预备役系统都被进行了改革。

（译注：条款原文请自行查找新、旧版国防服役法条文，此处及以下关于相关法律法规条文的翻译为根据英语原文直译，不承担具有法律责任和效力的解释权。）

Additional changes have included the following:

其他改变还包括如下：

In 2009, recruitment standards for women were changed to include raising the maximum age requirements for various categories in order to recruit more highly qualified and educated women.

在2009年，女子征召标准被进一步放宽了包括最高年龄在内的一系列要求，以征召更多更高学历和标准的女子。

In 2011, physical restrictions were relaxed on tattoos and pierced ears, and height requirements for women were lowered, aided by the development of standardized medical and psychological screening system for the PLA.

在2011年，随着更进步的医学和心理检测系统的全军普及，一些身体素质要求比如纹身和耳穿孔等限制都被放宽了（译注：是放宽，不是取消），对女子征召的高标准也被降低了。

Also in 2011, an online registration and pre-recruiting system aimed at high school graduates and college students was established, and inducements for students were strengthened, including tuition compensation, payments of government subsidized student loans and compensatory payments for qualified college graduates.

同样在2011年，一项面向高中毕业生和大学生的在线注册和征召前注册系统建立了起来，同时利诱学生的一整套体系也被加强了，包括学费报销，政府补贴学生贷款，给合格大学生的津贴等。

The National People's Congress in 2011 also removed limits on the registration of urban youth, abolished recruitment deferrals for full-time students was abolished, and allowed college graduates with excellent military service to be promoted directly to serve as active-duty officers. Furthermore, college students enlisting for active duty could resume their studies within two years of demobilization, the recruitment age for college graduates was raised to 24 years, and the registration period (but not the conscription period) was moved from September 30 to June 30.

National People's Congress (NPC) 全国人民代表大会于2011年取消了对于城市年轻人注册的限制，对全日制学生的延期服役制也被取消了，使得拥有优良服役经历的大学毕业生可以直接晋升为现役军官。此外，在读大学生招入现役以后可以在退役两年以内重新复读，对于大学毕业生的征召年龄限制也提升到了24岁，同时志愿兵注册时间（不是义务兵）从9月30日移到了6月30日。

Recruiting quality students

征召高质量学生

The PLA began recruiting college graduates in 2001, with more than 130,000 college graduates serving as soldiers at the end of 2009. From 2009 to 2012, approximately 100,000 college students joined the military each year. This represents perhaps a quarter to a third of all recruits, by this author's rough estimate.

解放军从2001年开始征召大学毕业生，到2009年有超过 13万 大学毕业生在军中以普通士兵身份服役。从2009年到2012年，大约每年有 10万 大学生参军。本文作者估算，这个数字大约是 1/4 到 1/3 的总新兵数。

The current emphasis is on increasing quality personnel by focusing on recruitment of college students and graduates. The State Council and CMC recently moved the start of the intake period to August 1, synchronizing it with the graduation period in order to attract qualified graduates, while limiting the numbers of secondary school students recruited.

现阶段的重点就是强调对于大学生和毕业生的征召。国务院和 CMC （Central Military Commission) 中央军委最近把征召起始日期移到了8月1日，与毕业时期同步，就是为了吸引有资质的毕业生，同时限制中学生的征召人数。

The previous November 1 start date resulted in missed opportunities to recruit the most qualified college graduates, due to the time lag. For example, one survey showed that in 2012 approximately 90% of university graduates had found work before the winter intake period, limiting the number of quality personnel available for PLA recruitment. The change to an earlier recruitment period will also lessen the drop in PLA unit combat readiness, as it allows for basic training of new recruits before the annual demobilization of personnel at the end of the year.

之前的11月1日征召起始日期因为时间区间的延迟，使得军方错过了最优质大学毕业生的时期。比如，一份调查显示在2012年大约 90% 的大学毕业生在冬季征兵期开始以前就找到了工作，限制了解放军征召优质兵员的数量。把征召日期的提前也能减小对于解放军现役部队的战备度的下降压力，使得新兵能在年底的老兵退伍期以前完成基本训练。

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) began receiving applications in June through an online website. Major cities focused on recruiting college students employing mobilization and propaganda campaigns. MND officials stated that college students will enjoy advantages in registration, admission and recruitment.

国防部从6月就开始接受在线申请。大城市利用各种动员和 铣脑宣传 手段重点关注对于大学毕业生的征召。国防部官员声称大学生将享受注册、准入和征召的各种优势。

（译注：Propaganda 这个词自古以来就是个贬义词，龙腾其他翻译有必要在各自作品中体现出这个词的词性出来。）

The PLA Daily reports active recruitment drives throughout China, with various locations reporting increased college applicants over previous years. For example, Shanghai began military service registration on June 1, with over 300 military service registration stations set up at colleges and universities, while Beijing began recruiting college students on June 15, including activities with China's first female astronaut, Liu Yang, to attract prospects.

解放军日报报道说这种主动性地征召红遍了全国，各地喜报大学生申请人数比上一年度大幅增加。比如，上海的军人征召注册始于6月1日，设立了超过 300 家招兵注册点横跨全市院校，而北京从6月15日开始征召大学生，包括找来中国的第一位女航天员 刘洋，来吸引人气。

The PLA has enhanced its propaganda and mobilization campaign this year, including online social networking programs, aimed at attracting college students and graduates away from potential business recruiters .The Ministry of Education (MOE) announced on August 21 that over 200,000 college students had taken part in pre-conscription registration in large and medium cities.

解放军今年进一步加强了其动员和铣脑宣传的攻势，包括网络社交项目，旨在把大学生和毕业生从潜在的商业聘用机会中诱走。教育部在8月21日宣部在大中城市有超过 20万 大学生参加了征兵前期注册。

College students and graduates can receive preferential treatment as an inducement to volunteer, including admission advantages, tuition payments, one time recruitment payments, preferential employment opportunities in state-owned enterprises and the civil service upon decommissioning, three years of free administrative charges for decommissioned college students starting their own business, and possible Beijing household registration permits for non-local college students recruited from Beijing universities and colleges.

大学生和毕业生志愿入役能享受各种待遇，包括准入优势，学费支付，一次性征召费用支付，退役后在国营企业和民事单位的优先录取机会，退役后自创业享受3年免行政费用优待，以及外地户口就读北京本地大学的大学生的落户北京的 可能性。

Unemployment and underemployment among college graduates could benefit the PLA's recruitment efforts. The expansion of higher education since 1999 has increased the number of college graduates entering the job market, with college graduates numbering 6.99 million in 2013, 190,000 more than in 2012. The MyCOS Institute, a Beijing-based education research company, tracks college employment: a 2012 report indicated an employment rate of approximately 90.2% for 2011 graduates, and 89.6% for 2010 graduates.

大学毕业生的失业率和低就业率帮了解放军的忙，自从1999年的大学扩招以来，更多大学毕业生进入就业市场打拼，在2013年达到了 699万，比2012年多了 19万。MyCOS Institute，一家基于北京的教育研究公司，跟踪着大学就业数据：一份2012年的报告显示有 90.2% 的2011年毕业生，89.6% 的2010年毕业生就职。

May 2013 statistics released by the Beijing Municipal Commission of Education reported that only 33.6% of college graduates in Beijing had signed employment contracts, reflecting continuing poor job opportunities.

2013年北京市教育厅的数据显示北京只有大约 33.6% 的应届大学毕业生得到了就职合同，反映了就职机会的持续惨淡。

The decline in students' physical condition, however, has hurt recruiting, with the PLA finding since at least 1995 that sedentary life styles have resulted in weight, strength and vision problems. The Beijing recruiting office reported that approximately 60% of college students failed the physical fitness exam, 23% failed the eye exam, and 19% were either obese or underweight.

然而学生的身体素质的下降，也伤及了征兵。解放军当局发现久坐的生活方式引起了体重、力量、视力等方面的一系列问题。北京征兵办报道说大约 60% 的大学生挂掉了体能测试，23%的挂掉了眼科测试，还有19%的不是肥胖就是体重过轻。

Even with physical standards reduced in 2008 and 2011, the physical condition of students is adversely affecting student recruitment. The 60% failure rate would indicate that of the 200,000 college students reported registering for military service this year, perhaps only 80,000 are fit for service, barring any other disqualifications. This is less than the reported 100,000 college students recruited each year between 2009 and 2012.

即使在2008年和2011年一降再降体质标准，当代学生的身体素质已经极大的影响了学生征兵情况。60%的淘汰率表明今年的据报道的 20万 大学生注册征召兵中，即使不算其他的不合格标准，大约只有 8万 能入役。这比据报道的从2009年到2012年每年 10万 大学生的征召数字要低。

It is not clear whether the PLA has met past recruitment goals for college students and graduates. While the PLA published the goal of recruiting some 150,000 college graduates in 2010, only 100,000 were recruited that year. The PLA has not announced recruiting goals for college graduates since then, which could mean that goals are not being met even with the incentives and poor employment environment.

事实上我们并不清楚解放军是否达到了设立的征召大学生和毕业生的目标线。2010年解放军发布了其 15万 大学生征召兵的征召计划目标，当年只达到了 10万。解放军从那以后就没有再公布过每年的大学生征兵计划目标，也就可能说明，即使在优秀的奖励政策和糟糕的就业市场环境下，他们依然达不到征兵计划目标。

Leveraging civilian and military educational institutions

民事和军事教育院校的杠杆

The PLA is recruiting college students and graduates in greater numbers than before, but possibly still not enough to meet their requirements. Other PLA programs may be providing additional talent. While the PLA is primarily targeting students in higher education, some programs select highly qualified candidates to receive higher education through joint civilian-military programs.

解放军在比以前更大规模的征召大学生和毕业生，但可能依然无法满足他们的要求。其他一些解放军开展的项目也许可以提供额外的人才。当解放军主要目标是接受了高等教育的学生时，一些项目选择高度合格的候选人来接受由民事和军事合办的高等教育课程项目。

The PLA is using educational opportunities as an inducement to attract qualified male and female high school graduates. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) took the lead in 2011 to partner with Tsinghua University to train qualified students to become pilots. The "3+1" [1] training model includes three years at a civilian college followed by a year at a military educational institute.

解放军正在利用高等教育机会作为诱饵来吸引合格的男女高中毕业生。解放军空军在2011年率先领跑一项与清华大学合作的训练合格飞行员的项目。“3+1项目”，包括3年在民事学院的学习然后转而1年在军事院校的学习。

For example, the class of 32 "3+1" students at Tsinghua University will study at its School of Aerospace and Aviation for three years and then spend a year at the Air Force Aviation University (AFAU), followed up a year of advanced flight training. The PLA has also partnered with 19 civilian colleges and universities to train national defense students.

比如，32名 “3+1项目”的学生在清华大学的航空航天学院学习3年，然后在空军航空大学学习1年，接下来接受1年的高级飞行训练。解放军同时还与19所民事院校合作训练国防生。

In 2012, Beijing University and the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA) began a program to train national defense students. These students reportedly will spend four years at the civilian universities and then two years at AFAU for flight and command training.

在2012年，北京大学和北京航空航太大学开始了一项训练国防生的项目。据信这些学生将在民事院校学习4年，然后到空军航空大学接受2年的航空和指挥训练。

Building on the PLAAF plan, the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), and the MOE expanded the effort this year by initiating a joint pilot training program to allow high school graduates to study in both military educational institutes and civilian universities. The program seeks an innovative military-civilian integration model in order to maximize resources to optimize training of student pilots.

为了打造空军的计划，总参谋部、总政治部，以及教育部一起于今年扩展了他们的合作，开启了一项接受高中毕业生在军事和民事院校接受学习的项目。这项项目寻求一种创新的军民契合模式，以最大程度优化训练学生为飞行员的资源。

The first 87 candidates will train in military educational institutes such as the Naval Aviation College and AFAU, and Beijing University (25 students), Tsinghua University (32 students) and BUAA (30 students). The civilian universities will provide a basic education with the military educational institutes providing specialized education and flight training. Qualified graduates will be sent to aviation units in the ground forces, PLAAF and PLA Navy (PLAN).

首批87名候选者将在类似于海军航空学院和空军航空大学这样的军事院校以及北京大学（25名学生），清华大学（32名）和北航（30名）接受训练。民事大学提供基础教育，军事院校提供专职教育和飞行训练。合格的毕业生将被派往解放军陆军航空兵部队，空军，和海航。

This year the MOE and the four General Departments (Staff, Political, Logistics and Armaments) began targeting juniors from top universities to join the military upon graduation to become military engineers as part of the "3+1" program. Select students undergo a 6-12 month study in military academies and schools, research institutes, high-tech units and armament production enterprises.

今年教育部将和四大总部（总参总政总后总装）一起开始一项面向顶尖大学的新生的旨在毕业后成为军事工程兵的项目，作为“3+1项目”的一个新的部分。被选上的学生将在军事院校、科研机构、高科技部队和军工单位进行 6～12 个月的学习。

The program will provide military and academic education and training, as well as possible eligibility for post-graduate study. The government notice stated that over 300 students will be selected this year for the new engineering program.

此项目将提供军事和学术教育与训练，以及可能的继续接受研究生教育的资格的机会。政府通告声明今年超过300名学生将被选入这一新的工程兵项目。

Conclusion

总结

Taiwan and China represent two volunteer recruitment programs moving along opposite trajectories. The Taiwanese volunteer force program has been launched with a shorter preparation and implementation period, and a lack of funding to increase pay and other benefits for servicemen, combined with a general disregard for military service by civilians, resulted in failures to achieve recruitment goals even before the current uproar over Corporal Hung's death.

台湾和中国代表着两种朝向截然不同轨迹运行的志愿兵征召项目。台湾人的志愿兵部队项目发起于不足的准备和实施时间之下，缺少对服役人员提薪和提高待遇的资金，与大众基本上对军事服役的冷漠态度一起，形成了即使在 Hung 氏之死以前就无法达到征兵目标的现实。

Hung's death in detention is further souring public opinion regarding military service and the competence of the armed forces. This inability to reach recruitment goals leaves the status of the volunteer program in doubt, and operational readiness will continue to decline as active duty authorized strength cannot be met.

Hung氏之死于拘禁，更加加剧了大众对于军事服役与部队能力的冷眼。这一无法完成征兵目标的局面使得志愿兵项目现状存疑，而战备状态也将因现役部队人员不足而持续恶化。

Not all of the fault lies with the Taiwanese military for the, as legislators have failed to meet the military's stated minimum budgetary requirements. It is difficult to envision how the volunteer system can be saved without significant increases to volunteer pay and benefits and a successful public relations campaign.

并不是所有错误都是台湾人的军队自身的，立法委们无法达到军方提出的最低预算要求。在没有大手笔增加志愿兵薪资和福利以及成功的公关战以前，很难预期志愿兵制度能如何被挽救。

A return to the old conscription system would appear equally difficult, considering the current state of public opinion regarding military service. Declining operational readiness and an increasingly hollow military will make it difficult for Taiwan to execute its stated defense strategy, will place Taipei in a position of weakness in its dealings with Beijing, and could leave Taiwan's defense reliant on the US military.

回归到老的征召制也会同样困难，如果考虑到现在的公众对军事服役的态度的话。滑坡的战备状态和持续空心的军事能力将使得台湾在行使其声称的防御战略时困难重重，至台北在与北京打交道时于微弱地位，可使台湾的防务依赖于美军。

Moving in the opposite direction, the PLA has chosen a gradual, multipronged approach to attract high quality volunteers. The slower approach, supported by adequate funding for increased pay, benefits and other inducements, also allows for reassessments and readjustments to improve the initiatives. The recent moves to recruit highly qualified students, with an emphasis on college students and graduates, appear to be achieving some success.

朝向相反的方向进发，解放军选择了一条渐进、多方面多要素之路来吸引高质量的志愿兵。缓慢的由足够资金支持高薪高福利的诱惑之路，同时也能使其能重新评估和重新调整以占尽先机。最近的趋向于强调征召大学生和毕业生的高规格生源的动作，看上去也取得了一些成绩。

Limited employment opportunities combined with inducements should allow the PLA to recruit better-qualified talent to support a growing high-tech force and complex operational theories. Increasing PLA capabilities will provide a greater range of options against Taiwan, whether coercive or direct military actions.

有限的就业机会与各种征召诱惑一起，使得解放军得以征召更好的人才用以支援一支不断进化的高科技部队和更加复杂的作战理论。提高解放军的能力将能使得对抗台湾是拥有更多选项，无论是胁迫还是直接的军事行动。

It is not clear whether recruitment goals for college students and graduates are being met, and poor student physical fitness is hurting recruitment, but it does appear that the PLA is moving forward as it relies to a greater extent on volunteers to man high-tech units, while the Taiwanese program appears to be in deep trouble.

无法确定（解放军的）征召大学生与毕业生的指标是否有达到，以及劣质的生源身体素质标准是否伤及征兵，但是确实可以看得出的是解放军正在朝向一支越来越依赖志愿兵来行使高科技部队职能的方向，而同时台外的（志愿兵征召）计划则深陷泥潭里。

(This article first appeared in The Jamestown Foundation. Used with permission.)
(Copyright 2013 The Jamestown Foundation.)

文章受权引用自 詹姆斯敦基金会。


评论

#1 08-27-2013
Player 0
Member
Join Date Mar 2006
Location Sydney
Posts 324
Asia Times Online :: China, Taiwan volunteer armies part ways （链接见本帖前部引用链接）
This was posted just recently, though it was something people here would like to check out.

亚洲时报在线《中国，逗号，台湾，志愿兵制分道扬镳》
这是最近发布的，觉得应该是SDF这里的各位会赶兴趣的。

#2 08-27-2013
Franklin 富兰克林
Junior Member
Join Date Mar 2012
Posts 888
I wanted to post this article but you beat me to it. China has been moving away from conscription since 1998. Does anyone know if there are still any conscripts left in the PLA today. And why is a promotional campaign to recruit more highly educated volunteers called a "propoganda campaign" ?

我准备发布这篇文章的但是你抢先我一步了。中国从1998年开始从义务兵制转型开去。有任何人知道如今解放军内是否仍有义务兵吗？还有为什么一场促进征招更高受教志愿兵的活动会被称为“铣脑宣传”呢？

#3 08-28-2013
solarz 太阳能
Senior Member
Join Date Oct 2009
Posts 2,215
The PRC has never had compulsory military service, so I don't know what that article is referring to when it said "The compulsory service period was shortened to two years".

PRC (People's Republic of China) 人民共和国从来就没有一套义务兵役制度啊，所以当文章提到“义务兵役制缩短到两年”的时候，我完全不清楚它在说什么啊。

#4 08-28-2013
PanAsian 亚洲潘
Junior Member
Join Date Oct 2005
Posts 509

I thought the PRC did have compulsory service but also a quota, it was just that there used to be usually more than enough people to fill the quota. Nowadays there are fewer young people to begin with, who are also less physically capable, at the same time the PLA is raising the bar, and more young people are using all sorts of excuses to avoid military service to try for other better opportunities.

全文引用 #3 楼：
人民共和国从来就没有一套义务兵役制度啊，所以当文章提到“义务兵役制缩短到两年”的时候，我完全不清楚它在说什么啊。
我认为人民共和国是有义务兵役制的，但同时也有一个征兵指标，只是基本上每次都有足够的人来填补这个指标。现在年轻人越来越少了，而且他们身体素质也更不行了，而同时解放军在抬高（征召）标准，更多的年轻人在试着找各种各样的借口来逃避兵役以寻找更好的（就业）机会。

#5 08-28-2013
no_name 无_名
Senior Member
Join Date Aug 2010
Location Auckland, NZ
Posts 2,110
In the even that soldiers lost their lives in the line of duty whether in combat or not, the government should have the duty to take care of their parents.

如果士兵在勤时，无论是否是在战斗中丢的命，政府都应该有责任来照顾他们的家人（家长）。

#6 08-28-2013
Player 0
Member
Death of a conscript highlights Taiwan
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/28/author-sheryn-lee-u-penn/
Somewhat related, an article related to the dead Taiwanese soldier mentioned at the beginning of the previous article.

义务兵之死点亮台湾
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/28/author-sheryn-lee-u-penn/
也还相关的，前面文章开头提到的那个死掉的台湾人士兵。

#7 08-28-2013
solarz
Senior Member
Compulsory service means every male of a certain age has to go to the military. South Korea has a compulsory military service.
I can't see how a quote is supposed to work, but China doesn't have anything like what SK has.

全文引用 #4 楼：
我认为人民共和国是有义务兵役制的，但同时也有一个征兵指标，只是基本上每次都有足够的人来填补这个指标。现在年轻人越来越少了，而且他们身体素质也更不行了，而同时解放军在抬高（征召）标准，更多的年轻人在试着找各种各样的借口来逃避兵役以寻找更好的（就业）机会。
义务兵役制意味着每一个男子到了一定年龄都必须去服役。南炒藓就有义务兵役制。
我看不出“指标”怎么能运作的，但是中国与南炒藓完全不一样。

#8 08-28-2013
s002wjh
Member
Join Date May 2006
Posts 364
i read somewhere, that taiwan air force from refuel/arm/fly is within 10min while china take much longer time for its plane to get its plane ready to fly, something like 40-50mins. not sure true or not, anyone knows?

我从哪里读到过，说台湾的空军战机 重新加油/武装/起飞 是在10分钟以内，而中国则需要长得多的时间来备飞，大约在 40～50 分钟。不知道是不是真的，有人知道吗？

#9 08-29-2013
Lion 狮子
Senior Member
Join Date Apr 2009
Posts 2,086
Nonsense. Where you heard that crap from?

全文引用 #8 楼：
我从哪里读到过，说台湾的空军战机 重新加油/武装/起飞 是在10分钟以内，而中国则需要长得多的时间来备飞，大约在 40～50 分钟。不知道是不是真的，有人知道吗？
荒谬，这些垃圾你从哪里得来的？

#10 08-30-2013
s002wjh
Member
i forgot either from military tv channel in taiwan or some article. but if you said tis nonsense, do you have any actual/crediable article on how fast PLA can get tis jet ready for re-sorty/combat operation?

全文引用 #9 楼：
荒谬，这些垃圾你从哪里得来的？
我忘了是从 台湾的军事电视频道还是书刊上看来的了，但是如果你说这是荒谬的，你有任何实际/可信的文章来说明解放军能多快完成其战斗机的重新出动吗？

#11 08-30-2013
Skywatcher 望空者
Junior Member
Join Date Jun 2007
Posts 778
Which aircraft?
It might be easier and quicker to flight prep a F-16 compared to a H-6K.

哪一型飞机？
也许重装一架 F-16 比 一架 H-6K 要简单和快捷一点呢。

#12 08-31-2013
s002wjh
Member
generally speaking fighter jet/interceptor

就通常而言战斗机/截击机。

#13 08-31-2013
Skywatcher
Junior Member
Even then, there would obviously be a big difference between the prep time for a F-5, vs. a J-11B.

全文引用 #12 楼：
就通常而言战斗机/截击机。
即使那样，整装时间 F-5 vs. J-11B 也显然完全极其不一样啊。

#14 08-31-2013
rhino123 犀牛123 （犀牛通常也是美军重型装备比如主战坦克、轰炸机的呼叫代号）
Pencil Pusher （头衔：）秘书、办公文员、轰炸机领航员
Join Date Apr 2006
Location Somewhere out there.
Posts 1,843
Actually you have to see what is the status of those aircraft. Some of them are already readied for flight, all countries had this system whereby they would allocate some squadrons of fighters and interceptors (rotatable shift) for emergency deployment.
If you count these squadrons that are already at the readied state to those that are not, then of course you will see a big difference.
I never believe that the Chinese reactions are that slow to begin with. Plus you need to know where the news came from... from Taiwan boasting about their capability (for political or otherwise usage), it might just be a ruse to tell their people that they have nothing to worry about, then yeah... they can said that.
But common sense has it that it cannot be the case. And unless China had officially told the world how fast they can react, it would be up to everyone's guess... but a simple example would be, during the time when US spy plane was intercepted by two J-8... we all know the rest of the story, my point is... if the Chinese are as slow as was stated... wouldn't that spy plane already left the location before the J-8 even arrive?

事实上你必须看看那些飞机的状态是什么，有些是已经准备好起飞了的。所有的国家都有这样的体系来分配一部分战斗机和截击机中队（轮流值班）来应对紧急部署任务。
如果你把这些已经处在预备起飞状态的飞机来与那些不是这样状态的飞机比，那么当然你会发现巨大的不同。
我从来不相信中国的反应时间那么慢。另外你要看看这消息是从哪儿冒出来的……从台湾宣扬他们能力的媒体来（出于症治或其他目的），也许仅仅只不过是个告诉他们自己的民众我们很强什么都不用担心的诡计……那么是的，他们确实会那么说。
但是常识告诉我们不是那样的。除非中国官方正式的告诉全世界他们的重整时间多快，否则大家都只能猜测……但是一个简单的例子是，在美国间谍机被两架 J-8 拦截的案例……我们都知道故事余下的部分了，我的意思是……如果中国人真的如（台媒）所称那么慢的话，那么不是应该间谍机早在 J-8 来到它们的位置的时候就应该早就跑了吗？