超级军网美媒：中国自我为中心~称王称霸~带有帝国时代影子外交政 ...
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 14:35:09
The nation's behavior as a modern superpower is reminiscent of its imperial past.
作为一个现代化的超级大国，中国的行为仍带有其帝国时代的影子。
China's more assertive foreign policy over the last two years has played a key role in getting two arch-conservatives — Japan's Shinzo Abe and South Korea's Park Geun-hye — elected to lead their respective countries. Some Chinese observers believe that Abe and Park will be forced by China's inexorable rise to come to terms with their giant neighbor. Don't count on it. To much of its region, China's behavior as it is coming of age as a modern superpower is eerily reminiscent of its past policy as a regional hegemon.
过去两年来，中国越加强硬的外交政策是导致两个保守派------日本的安倍晋三和韩国的朴槿惠被选为其国家领导人的重要原因。一些中国观察家认为随着中国不可逆转的崛起，安倍晋三和朴槿惠将不得不接受他们有一个巨大的邻居这样的事实。不要挣扎了。随着中国成为现代化超级力量的时代的到来，中国的行为却让人奇异的联想起其过去作为地域霸主时的政策。
For a very long time, imperial China dominated its wider region. The Chinese imperial court considered itself the indispensable center of a regional order in which China had the right and the duty to set international norms and standards, and to intervene if these were broken. It was an ideological system in which Chinese principles had to be the starting point for all things.
在很长一段时间里，帝制中国占据着辽阔的疆土。中国朝廷认为中国是地区秩序里不可缺少的中心，有制定国际标准规范，以及干预那些破坏地区秩序的国家的权利和义务。这是一个思想体系；其中中国的原则是所有事情的开端。
Although the Chinese elites' thinking was driven by ideas and cultural norms, their position came down to size, power and military strategy. And from the 16th to the mid-18th centuries, it worked. But from the 1780s on, China's regional role was in decline, it lost wars and unnecessary military engagements followed.
尽管中国精英是基于思维和文化定势来思考的，这些思考被落实为地域大小、力量和军事战略。从16世纪至18世纪中叶，这些(原则和思考)很管用。但从1780年开始，中国在地区中扮演的角色开始减弱。她输掉了战争，并卷入了随后的军事冲突。
China's current leadership transition is taking place at a point when the country again has to reevaluate its regional and world engagements. The last couple of years have been disastrous in China's foreign policy. Its regional engagements have backfired, one after the other. Some of this comes from what historian Paul Kennedy calls imperial overstretch: to move faster and further than what material resources and political prowess allows for. It is quite possible to believe both that China is a rising power and that it has overstepped the mark on what it's able to achieve through pressure within its own region.
中国目前的领导层权力交接正发生在国家需要再次重新评估其在地区和世界范围内扮演的角色的时刻。过去几年中国在外交政策方面做得很糟糕。在地域战略方面她事与愿违，不断遭受挫折。其中一部分起因于肯尼迪所说的帝国过度扩张：扩张的速度超过了物质资源和政治力量能涵盖的范围。可以确信的是，中国正在成长，并且在有内部压力的情况下，她（的扩张）超过了其能力所能达到的范围。
Look at its relations with Japan. After a series of statements from Beijing, some of them very aggressive, the Japanese have elected an administration that takes a hard line on China. Last fall's barrage of harsh words from China — on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute and other matters — played right into the electoral strategy of Abe and the Liberal Democratic Party.
看下她与日本的关系吧。在北京发表了一系列声明（部分富于侵略性/进攻性）之后，日本人选出了一位对华强硬的领导人。去年秋天中国在钓鱼岛问题及其他一些问题上的言论攻势被安倍晋三和自民党在选战策略中所利用。
History, of course, plays a main role in the Sino-Japanese relationship. But it is hard to see how China's regional strategy — any regional strategy — has much to gain from alienating the one East Asian power that would be able to impede China's position in the region.
显然，历史在中日关系中扮演主要角色。但从中国的地区战略---任何地区战略中很难看出疏远一个可以阻碍中国的东亚重要力量对中国自身有什么好处。
The situation with regard to South Korea is similar, though not identical. Until very recently, there was a reservoir of goodwill toward China in South Korea. China was respected as the fountain for a common culture. Korea, after all, retained its traditional links with China until the early 20th century. In spite of Beijing's long-standing support for the dictatorship in North Korea, most young South Koreans whom I met in the 2000s highly valued their country's ties with China.
中韩关系也与此类似，尽管不完全相同。直到最近，韩国对中国都有很大的善意。中国因其是中韩文化的共同渊源而被尊敬。毕竟，直到20世纪初为止韩国都与中国保有传统联系。尽管北京长期支持北朝鲜的独裁，我在2000年后遇到的大多数年轻一代的韩国人都很重视韩国与中国的关系。
No longer. Recent South Korean opinion polls show that people's views of China have nose-dived since Beijing's failure to condemn the North's sinking of a South Korean naval vessel and its shelling of a South Korean island in 2010, and Pyongyang's recent missile tests. Park's election campaign made good use of the fear of an unruly neighborhood. She seeks to strengthen Seoul's alliance with the U.S., and has said that North Korea will only join the "family of nations if it realizes that assistance from China cannot last forever."
这种善意不再有了。最近韩国的民意调查显示，韩国人对中国的观点改变了，原因是北京未有力谴责2010年北朝鲜击沉韩国海军舰船并炮击韩国岛屿以及最近的北朝鲜导弹试验。朴槿惠的竞选很好的利用了（民众）对一个刁蛮邻居的恐惧。她呼吁加强美韩同盟，并说北朝鲜总会意识到中国的援助不可能无限持续。（最后一句意思不是很清楚）
Personal history, of course, plays a role in these two cases too. Park is the daughter of former South Korean dictator Park Chung-hee, who in the 1960s and '70s saw Chinese communism as the main challenge in the area. And Abe is the grandson of a former Japanese prime minister whom the Chinese 50 years ago considered a major war criminal. Such family ties will not make reconciliation easier.
当然， 上述两件事（2位总统当选）中也有个人经历的原因。朴槿惠是前韩国独裁者朴正熙之女。朴正熙在1960-1970年代视中共为地区内的主要威胁。安倍晋三则是前日本首相岸信介的孙子。岸信介在50年前被中国视为甲级战犯。这样的家庭关系显然无助于国家关系的和解。
Why, then, has the Chinese leadership helped create a situation in which its most eager opponents have triumphed? One reason is historical Chinese attitudes on international affairs. The Chinese Communist Party has always believed that China ought to stand at the center of regional affairs. Recently, the expression of this regional hierarchy has become more shrill.
那么，为什么中国领导层引导了目前这种其最不希望的对手当选的情况呢？原因之一是以往历史中中国对国际事务的态度-----中共总认为中国应该扮演区域事务的中心角色。最近，这种思想的表达越发尖锐。
Perhaps this is a reflection of China's new economic muscle. It could also be that some leaders in Beijing have been so impressed by sweeping Western predictions of China's future predominance that they have started to believe it themselves. The sometimes stunning lack of knowledge of and experience in foreign affairs among the new generation of Chinese leaders have not helped.
或许这正是中国在展示其经济肌肉。也可能是北京的某些领导对过于西方对中国未来经济发展的普遍预测过于惊讶，以至于他们居然相信了。中国领导层对外交事务有时令人惊叹的缺乏知识和经验也是一个因素。（sweeping是颠覆还是普遍？）
Outside its immediate region, China's foreign policy problems are also set to multiply. One is handling of the U.S.. Another is dealing with rising powers elsewhere. I have just spent a month in India, where the leadership has very little faith in China's will or ability to approach other rising powers in a mutually cooperative fashion. "The current Chinese leadership," one top policymaker told me, "… tend to look for what is best for China, in a rather crass and shortsighted manner."
在周边地域之外，中国的外交政策也大有问题。一个是中美关系的处理，另一个是对其他地区崛起力量（看下面的应该是指印度）的关系的处理。我刚在印度花了一个月的时间，其领导层对中国以共同合作的方式改善双边关系的能力和意愿完全不报信心。“现在的中国领导层”， 一个首席政策制定者跟我说, “倾向于以相当粗鲁和短时的方式为中国谋取最大利益。”
Will Beijing find a way to improve its handling of foreign affairs? One inspiration could be the generation of Chinese foreign policy experts who came out of the late 19th and early 20th century. Given a raw deal to begin with because of Western and Japanese aggression, they still managed to advance China's interests considerably. They were able to do so, in the main, because they could report back to Beijing expressing their own views, without always having to reflect official dogma.
北京能找到一种提高外交事务处理能力的方式吗？中国那些19世纪末期到20世纪初的外交政治专家可能会是个很好的灵感。尽管签订了和西方及日本的不平等条约，他们仍然很大程度的维护了中国的利益。他们有能力这么做，主要因为他们能直接向北京汇报他们自己的观点，而不是总要和官方立场一致。
China needs to learn from its past that a good foreign policy must be more than only seeking what is best for one's country to the detriment of others. It is rather to seek to create a region, and eventually a world, where as many as possible believe that China's rise can also be to their own advantage.
中国需要从过去的历史学到，一个好的外交政策不能只是以损害其他国家利益的方式牟取国家最大利益， 而应该是寻找这样一种地区或世界环境：人们认为中国的崛起也能有利于他们自己的利益。
Odd Arne Westad teaches international history at the London School of Economics and Political Science and is the author of, most recently, "Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750."
Odd Arne Westad在伦敦经济与政治科学学校教授世界历史，著作包括最近的《不安的帝国：1750以来的中国和世界》。
转载自：http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-worldlook-671015-1.shtmlThe nation's behavior as a modern superpower is reminiscent of its imperial past.
作为一个现代化的超级大国，中国的行为仍带有其帝国时代的影子。
China's more assertive foreign policy over the last two years has played a key role in getting two arch-conservatives — Japan's Shinzo Abe and South Korea's Park Geun-hye — elected to lead their respective countries. Some Chinese observers believe that Abe and Park will be forced by China's inexorable rise to come to terms with their giant neighbor. Don't count on it. To much of its region, China's behavior as it is coming of age as a modern superpower is eerily reminiscent of its past policy as a regional hegemon.
过去两年来，中国越加强硬的外交政策是导致两个保守派------日本的安倍晋三和韩国的朴槿惠被选为其国家领导人的重要原因。一些中国观察家认为随着中国不可逆转的崛起，安倍晋三和朴槿惠将不得不接受他们有一个巨大的邻居这样的事实。不要挣扎了。随着中国成为现代化超级力量的时代的到来，中国的行为却让人奇异的联想起其过去作为地域霸主时的政策。
For a very long time, imperial China dominated its wider region. The Chinese imperial court considered itself the indispensable center of a regional order in which China had the right and the duty to set international norms and standards, and to intervene if these were broken. It was an ideological system in which Chinese principles had to be the starting point for all things.
在很长一段时间里，帝制中国占据着辽阔的疆土。中国朝廷认为中国是地区秩序里不可缺少的中心，有制定国际标准规范，以及干预那些破坏地区秩序的国家的权利和义务。这是一个思想体系；其中中国的原则是所有事情的开端。
Although the Chinese elites' thinking was driven by ideas and cultural norms, their position came down to size, power and military strategy. And from the 16th to the mid-18th centuries, it worked. But from the 1780s on, China's regional role was in decline, it lost wars and unnecessary military engagements followed.
尽管中国精英是基于思维和文化定势来思考的，这些思考被落实为地域大小、力量和军事战略。从16世纪至18世纪中叶，这些(原则和思考)很管用。但从1780年开始，中国在地区中扮演的角色开始减弱。她输掉了战争，并卷入了随后的军事冲突。
China's current leadership transition is taking place at a point when the country again has to reevaluate its regional and world engagements. The last couple of years have been disastrous in China's foreign policy. Its regional engagements have backfired, one after the other. Some of this comes from what historian Paul Kennedy calls imperial overstretch: to move faster and further than what material resources and political prowess allows for. It is quite possible to believe both that China is a rising power and that it has overstepped the mark on what it's able to achieve through pressure within its own region.
中国目前的领导层权力交接正发生在国家需要再次重新评估其在地区和世界范围内扮演的角色的时刻。过去几年中国在外交政策方面做得很糟糕。在地域战略方面她事与愿违，不断遭受挫折。其中一部分起因于肯尼迪所说的帝国过度扩张：扩张的速度超过了物质资源和政治力量能涵盖的范围。可以确信的是，中国正在成长，并且在有内部压力的情况下，她（的扩张）超过了其能力所能达到的范围。
Look at its relations with Japan. After a series of statements from Beijing, some of them very aggressive, the Japanese have elected an administration that takes a hard line on China. Last fall's barrage of harsh words from China — on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute and other matters — played right into the electoral strategy of Abe and the Liberal Democratic Party.
看下她与日本的关系吧。在北京发表了一系列声明（部分富于侵略性/进攻性）之后，日本人选出了一位对华强硬的领导人。去年秋天中国在钓鱼岛问题及其他一些问题上的言论攻势被安倍晋三和自民党在选战策略中所利用。
History, of course, plays a main role in the Sino-Japanese relationship. But it is hard to see how China's regional strategy — any regional strategy — has much to gain from alienating the one East Asian power that would be able to impede China's position in the region.
显然，历史在中日关系中扮演主要角色。但从中国的地区战略---任何地区战略中很难看出疏远一个可以阻碍中国的东亚重要力量对中国自身有什么好处。
The situation with regard to South Korea is similar, though not identical. Until very recently, there was a reservoir of goodwill toward China in South Korea. China was respected as the fountain for a common culture. Korea, after all, retained its traditional links with China until the early 20th century. In spite of Beijing's long-standing support for the dictatorship in North Korea, most young South Koreans whom I met in the 2000s highly valued their country's ties with China.
中韩关系也与此类似，尽管不完全相同。直到最近，韩国对中国都有很大的善意。中国因其是中韩文化的共同渊源而被尊敬。毕竟，直到20世纪初为止韩国都与中国保有传统联系。尽管北京长期支持北朝鲜的独裁，我在2000年后遇到的大多数年轻一代的韩国人都很重视韩国与中国的关系。
No longer. Recent South Korean opinion polls show that people's views of China have nose-dived since Beijing's failure to condemn the North's sinking of a South Korean naval vessel and its shelling of a South Korean island in 2010, and Pyongyang's recent missile tests. Park's election campaign made good use of the fear of an unruly neighborhood. She seeks to strengthen Seoul's alliance with the U.S., and has said that North Korea will only join the "family of nations if it realizes that assistance from China cannot last forever."
这种善意不再有了。最近韩国的民意调查显示，韩国人对中国的观点改变了，原因是北京未有力谴责2010年北朝鲜击沉韩国海军舰船并炮击韩国岛屿以及最近的北朝鲜导弹试验。朴槿惠的竞选很好的利用了（民众）对一个刁蛮邻居的恐惧。她呼吁加强美韩同盟，并说北朝鲜总会意识到中国的援助不可能无限持续。（最后一句意思不是很清楚）
Personal history, of course, plays a role in these two cases too. Park is the daughter of former South Korean dictator Park Chung-hee, who in the 1960s and '70s saw Chinese communism as the main challenge in the area. And Abe is the grandson of a former Japanese prime minister whom the Chinese 50 years ago considered a major war criminal. Such family ties will not make reconciliation easier.
当然， 上述两件事（2位总统当选）中也有个人经历的原因。朴槿惠是前韩国独裁者朴正熙之女。朴正熙在1960-1970年代视中共为地区内的主要威胁。安倍晋三则是前日本首相岸信介的孙子。岸信介在50年前被中国视为甲级战犯。这样的家庭关系显然无助于国家关系的和解。
Why, then, has the Chinese leadership helped create a situation in which its most eager opponents have triumphed? One reason is historical Chinese attitudes on international affairs. The Chinese Communist Party has always believed that China ought to stand at the center of regional affairs. Recently, the expression of this regional hierarchy has become more shrill.
那么，为什么中国领导层引导了目前这种其最不希望的对手当选的情况呢？原因之一是以往历史中中国对国际事务的态度-----中共总认为中国应该扮演区域事务的中心角色。最近，这种思想的表达越发尖锐。
Perhaps this is a reflection of China's new economic muscle. It could also be that some leaders in Beijing have been so impressed by sweeping Western predictions of China's future predominance that they have started to believe it themselves. The sometimes stunning lack of knowledge of and experience in foreign affairs among the new generation of Chinese leaders have not helped.
或许这正是中国在展示其经济肌肉。也可能是北京的某些领导对过于西方对中国未来经济发展的普遍预测过于惊讶，以至于他们居然相信了。中国领导层对外交事务有时令人惊叹的缺乏知识和经验也是一个因素。（sweeping是颠覆还是普遍？）
Outside its immediate region, China's foreign policy problems are also set to multiply. One is handling of the U.S.. Another is dealing with rising powers elsewhere. I have just spent a month in India, where the leadership has very little faith in China's will or ability to approach other rising powers in a mutually cooperative fashion. "The current Chinese leadership," one top policymaker told me, "… tend to look for what is best for China, in a rather crass and shortsighted manner."
在周边地域之外，中国的外交政策也大有问题。一个是中美关系的处理，另一个是对其他地区崛起力量（看下面的应该是指印度）的关系的处理。我刚在印度花了一个月的时间，其领导层对中国以共同合作的方式改善双边关系的能力和意愿完全不报信心。“现在的中国领导层”， 一个首席政策制定者跟我说, “倾向于以相当粗鲁和短时的方式为中国谋取最大利益。”
Will Beijing find a way to improve its handling of foreign affairs? One inspiration could be the generation of Chinese foreign policy experts who came out of the late 19th and early 20th century. Given a raw deal to begin with because of Western and Japanese aggression, they still managed to advance China's interests considerably. They were able to do so, in the main, because they could report back to Beijing expressing their own views, without always having to reflect official dogma.
北京能找到一种提高外交事务处理能力的方式吗？中国那些19世纪末期到20世纪初的外交政治专家可能会是个很好的灵感。尽管签订了和西方及日本的不平等条约，他们仍然很大程度的维护了中国的利益。他们有能力这么做，主要因为他们能直接向北京汇报他们自己的观点，而不是总要和官方立场一致。
China needs to learn from its past that a good foreign policy must be more than only seeking what is best for one's country to the detriment of others. It is rather to seek to create a region, and eventually a world, where as many as possible believe that China's rise can also be to their own advantage.
中国需要从过去的历史学到，一个好的外交政策不能只是以损害其他国家利益的方式牟取国家最大利益， 而应该是寻找这样一种地区或世界环境：人们认为中国的崛起也能有利于他们自己的利益。
Odd Arne Westad teaches international history at the London School of Economics and Political Science and is the author of, most recently, "Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750."
Odd Arne Westad在伦敦经济与政治科学学校教授世界历史，著作包括最近的《不安的帝国：1750以来的中国和世界》。
转载自：http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-worldlook-671015-1.shtml
作为一个现代化的超级大国，中国的行为仍带有其帝国时代的影子。
China's more assertive foreign policy over the last two years has played a key role in getting two arch-conservatives — Japan's Shinzo Abe and South Korea's Park Geun-hye — elected to lead their respective countries. Some Chinese observers believe that Abe and Park will be forced by China's inexorable rise to come to terms with their giant neighbor. Don't count on it. To much of its region, China's behavior as it is coming of age as a modern superpower is eerily reminiscent of its past policy as a regional hegemon.
过去两年来，中国越加强硬的外交政策是导致两个保守派------日本的安倍晋三和韩国的朴槿惠被选为其国家领导人的重要原因。一些中国观察家认为随着中国不可逆转的崛起，安倍晋三和朴槿惠将不得不接受他们有一个巨大的邻居这样的事实。不要挣扎了。随着中国成为现代化超级力量的时代的到来，中国的行为却让人奇异的联想起其过去作为地域霸主时的政策。
For a very long time, imperial China dominated its wider region. The Chinese imperial court considered itself the indispensable center of a regional order in which China had the right and the duty to set international norms and standards, and to intervene if these were broken. It was an ideological system in which Chinese principles had to be the starting point for all things.
在很长一段时间里，帝制中国占据着辽阔的疆土。中国朝廷认为中国是地区秩序里不可缺少的中心，有制定国际标准规范，以及干预那些破坏地区秩序的国家的权利和义务。这是一个思想体系；其中中国的原则是所有事情的开端。
Although the Chinese elites' thinking was driven by ideas and cultural norms, their position came down to size, power and military strategy. And from the 16th to the mid-18th centuries, it worked. But from the 1780s on, China's regional role was in decline, it lost wars and unnecessary military engagements followed.
尽管中国精英是基于思维和文化定势来思考的，这些思考被落实为地域大小、力量和军事战略。从16世纪至18世纪中叶，这些(原则和思考)很管用。但从1780年开始，中国在地区中扮演的角色开始减弱。她输掉了战争，并卷入了随后的军事冲突。
China's current leadership transition is taking place at a point when the country again has to reevaluate its regional and world engagements. The last couple of years have been disastrous in China's foreign policy. Its regional engagements have backfired, one after the other. Some of this comes from what historian Paul Kennedy calls imperial overstretch: to move faster and further than what material resources and political prowess allows for. It is quite possible to believe both that China is a rising power and that it has overstepped the mark on what it's able to achieve through pressure within its own region.
中国目前的领导层权力交接正发生在国家需要再次重新评估其在地区和世界范围内扮演的角色的时刻。过去几年中国在外交政策方面做得很糟糕。在地域战略方面她事与愿违，不断遭受挫折。其中一部分起因于肯尼迪所说的帝国过度扩张：扩张的速度超过了物质资源和政治力量能涵盖的范围。可以确信的是，中国正在成长，并且在有内部压力的情况下，她（的扩张）超过了其能力所能达到的范围。
Look at its relations with Japan. After a series of statements from Beijing, some of them very aggressive, the Japanese have elected an administration that takes a hard line on China. Last fall's barrage of harsh words from China — on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute and other matters — played right into the electoral strategy of Abe and the Liberal Democratic Party.
看下她与日本的关系吧。在北京发表了一系列声明（部分富于侵略性/进攻性）之后，日本人选出了一位对华强硬的领导人。去年秋天中国在钓鱼岛问题及其他一些问题上的言论攻势被安倍晋三和自民党在选战策略中所利用。
History, of course, plays a main role in the Sino-Japanese relationship. But it is hard to see how China's regional strategy — any regional strategy — has much to gain from alienating the one East Asian power that would be able to impede China's position in the region.
显然，历史在中日关系中扮演主要角色。但从中国的地区战略---任何地区战略中很难看出疏远一个可以阻碍中国的东亚重要力量对中国自身有什么好处。
The situation with regard to South Korea is similar, though not identical. Until very recently, there was a reservoir of goodwill toward China in South Korea. China was respected as the fountain for a common culture. Korea, after all, retained its traditional links with China until the early 20th century. In spite of Beijing's long-standing support for the dictatorship in North Korea, most young South Koreans whom I met in the 2000s highly valued their country's ties with China.
中韩关系也与此类似，尽管不完全相同。直到最近，韩国对中国都有很大的善意。中国因其是中韩文化的共同渊源而被尊敬。毕竟，直到20世纪初为止韩国都与中国保有传统联系。尽管北京长期支持北朝鲜的独裁，我在2000年后遇到的大多数年轻一代的韩国人都很重视韩国与中国的关系。
No longer. Recent South Korean opinion polls show that people's views of China have nose-dived since Beijing's failure to condemn the North's sinking of a South Korean naval vessel and its shelling of a South Korean island in 2010, and Pyongyang's recent missile tests. Park's election campaign made good use of the fear of an unruly neighborhood. She seeks to strengthen Seoul's alliance with the U.S., and has said that North Korea will only join the "family of nations if it realizes that assistance from China cannot last forever."
这种善意不再有了。最近韩国的民意调查显示，韩国人对中国的观点改变了，原因是北京未有力谴责2010年北朝鲜击沉韩国海军舰船并炮击韩国岛屿以及最近的北朝鲜导弹试验。朴槿惠的竞选很好的利用了（民众）对一个刁蛮邻居的恐惧。她呼吁加强美韩同盟，并说北朝鲜总会意识到中国的援助不可能无限持续。（最后一句意思不是很清楚）
Personal history, of course, plays a role in these two cases too. Park is the daughter of former South Korean dictator Park Chung-hee, who in the 1960s and '70s saw Chinese communism as the main challenge in the area. And Abe is the grandson of a former Japanese prime minister whom the Chinese 50 years ago considered a major war criminal. Such family ties will not make reconciliation easier.
当然， 上述两件事（2位总统当选）中也有个人经历的原因。朴槿惠是前韩国独裁者朴正熙之女。朴正熙在1960-1970年代视中共为地区内的主要威胁。安倍晋三则是前日本首相岸信介的孙子。岸信介在50年前被中国视为甲级战犯。这样的家庭关系显然无助于国家关系的和解。
Why, then, has the Chinese leadership helped create a situation in which its most eager opponents have triumphed? One reason is historical Chinese attitudes on international affairs. The Chinese Communist Party has always believed that China ought to stand at the center of regional affairs. Recently, the expression of this regional hierarchy has become more shrill.
那么，为什么中国领导层引导了目前这种其最不希望的对手当选的情况呢？原因之一是以往历史中中国对国际事务的态度-----中共总认为中国应该扮演区域事务的中心角色。最近，这种思想的表达越发尖锐。
Perhaps this is a reflection of China's new economic muscle. It could also be that some leaders in Beijing have been so impressed by sweeping Western predictions of China's future predominance that they have started to believe it themselves. The sometimes stunning lack of knowledge of and experience in foreign affairs among the new generation of Chinese leaders have not helped.
或许这正是中国在展示其经济肌肉。也可能是北京的某些领导对过于西方对中国未来经济发展的普遍预测过于惊讶，以至于他们居然相信了。中国领导层对外交事务有时令人惊叹的缺乏知识和经验也是一个因素。（sweeping是颠覆还是普遍？）
Outside its immediate region, China's foreign policy problems are also set to multiply. One is handling of the U.S.. Another is dealing with rising powers elsewhere. I have just spent a month in India, where the leadership has very little faith in China's will or ability to approach other rising powers in a mutually cooperative fashion. "The current Chinese leadership," one top policymaker told me, "… tend to look for what is best for China, in a rather crass and shortsighted manner."
在周边地域之外，中国的外交政策也大有问题。一个是中美关系的处理，另一个是对其他地区崛起力量（看下面的应该是指印度）的关系的处理。我刚在印度花了一个月的时间，其领导层对中国以共同合作的方式改善双边关系的能力和意愿完全不报信心。“现在的中国领导层”， 一个首席政策制定者跟我说, “倾向于以相当粗鲁和短时的方式为中国谋取最大利益。”
Will Beijing find a way to improve its handling of foreign affairs? One inspiration could be the generation of Chinese foreign policy experts who came out of the late 19th and early 20th century. Given a raw deal to begin with because of Western and Japanese aggression, they still managed to advance China's interests considerably. They were able to do so, in the main, because they could report back to Beijing expressing their own views, without always having to reflect official dogma.
北京能找到一种提高外交事务处理能力的方式吗？中国那些19世纪末期到20世纪初的外交政治专家可能会是个很好的灵感。尽管签订了和西方及日本的不平等条约，他们仍然很大程度的维护了中国的利益。他们有能力这么做，主要因为他们能直接向北京汇报他们自己的观点，而不是总要和官方立场一致。
China needs to learn from its past that a good foreign policy must be more than only seeking what is best for one's country to the detriment of others. It is rather to seek to create a region, and eventually a world, where as many as possible believe that China's rise can also be to their own advantage.
中国需要从过去的历史学到，一个好的外交政策不能只是以损害其他国家利益的方式牟取国家最大利益， 而应该是寻找这样一种地区或世界环境：人们认为中国的崛起也能有利于他们自己的利益。
Odd Arne Westad teaches international history at the London School of Economics and Political Science and is the author of, most recently, "Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750."
Odd Arne Westad在伦敦经济与政治科学学校教授世界历史，著作包括最近的《不安的帝国：1750以来的中国和世界》。
转载自：http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-worldlook-671015-1.shtmlThe nation's behavior as a modern superpower is reminiscent of its imperial past.
作为一个现代化的超级大国，中国的行为仍带有其帝国时代的影子。
China's more assertive foreign policy over the last two years has played a key role in getting two arch-conservatives — Japan's Shinzo Abe and South Korea's Park Geun-hye — elected to lead their respective countries. Some Chinese observers believe that Abe and Park will be forced by China's inexorable rise to come to terms with their giant neighbor. Don't count on it. To much of its region, China's behavior as it is coming of age as a modern superpower is eerily reminiscent of its past policy as a regional hegemon.
过去两年来，中国越加强硬的外交政策是导致两个保守派------日本的安倍晋三和韩国的朴槿惠被选为其国家领导人的重要原因。一些中国观察家认为随着中国不可逆转的崛起，安倍晋三和朴槿惠将不得不接受他们有一个巨大的邻居这样的事实。不要挣扎了。随着中国成为现代化超级力量的时代的到来，中国的行为却让人奇异的联想起其过去作为地域霸主时的政策。
For a very long time, imperial China dominated its wider region. The Chinese imperial court considered itself the indispensable center of a regional order in which China had the right and the duty to set international norms and standards, and to intervene if these were broken. It was an ideological system in which Chinese principles had to be the starting point for all things.
在很长一段时间里，帝制中国占据着辽阔的疆土。中国朝廷认为中国是地区秩序里不可缺少的中心，有制定国际标准规范，以及干预那些破坏地区秩序的国家的权利和义务。这是一个思想体系；其中中国的原则是所有事情的开端。
Although the Chinese elites' thinking was driven by ideas and cultural norms, their position came down to size, power and military strategy. And from the 16th to the mid-18th centuries, it worked. But from the 1780s on, China's regional role was in decline, it lost wars and unnecessary military engagements followed.
尽管中国精英是基于思维和文化定势来思考的，这些思考被落实为地域大小、力量和军事战略。从16世纪至18世纪中叶，这些(原则和思考)很管用。但从1780年开始，中国在地区中扮演的角色开始减弱。她输掉了战争，并卷入了随后的军事冲突。
China's current leadership transition is taking place at a point when the country again has to reevaluate its regional and world engagements. The last couple of years have been disastrous in China's foreign policy. Its regional engagements have backfired, one after the other. Some of this comes from what historian Paul Kennedy calls imperial overstretch: to move faster and further than what material resources and political prowess allows for. It is quite possible to believe both that China is a rising power and that it has overstepped the mark on what it's able to achieve through pressure within its own region.
中国目前的领导层权力交接正发生在国家需要再次重新评估其在地区和世界范围内扮演的角色的时刻。过去几年中国在外交政策方面做得很糟糕。在地域战略方面她事与愿违，不断遭受挫折。其中一部分起因于肯尼迪所说的帝国过度扩张：扩张的速度超过了物质资源和政治力量能涵盖的范围。可以确信的是，中国正在成长，并且在有内部压力的情况下，她（的扩张）超过了其能力所能达到的范围。
Look at its relations with Japan. After a series of statements from Beijing, some of them very aggressive, the Japanese have elected an administration that takes a hard line on China. Last fall's barrage of harsh words from China — on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute and other matters — played right into the electoral strategy of Abe and the Liberal Democratic Party.
看下她与日本的关系吧。在北京发表了一系列声明（部分富于侵略性/进攻性）之后，日本人选出了一位对华强硬的领导人。去年秋天中国在钓鱼岛问题及其他一些问题上的言论攻势被安倍晋三和自民党在选战策略中所利用。
History, of course, plays a main role in the Sino-Japanese relationship. But it is hard to see how China's regional strategy — any regional strategy — has much to gain from alienating the one East Asian power that would be able to impede China's position in the region.
显然，历史在中日关系中扮演主要角色。但从中国的地区战略---任何地区战略中很难看出疏远一个可以阻碍中国的东亚重要力量对中国自身有什么好处。
The situation with regard to South Korea is similar, though not identical. Until very recently, there was a reservoir of goodwill toward China in South Korea. China was respected as the fountain for a common culture. Korea, after all, retained its traditional links with China until the early 20th century. In spite of Beijing's long-standing support for the dictatorship in North Korea, most young South Koreans whom I met in the 2000s highly valued their country's ties with China.
中韩关系也与此类似，尽管不完全相同。直到最近，韩国对中国都有很大的善意。中国因其是中韩文化的共同渊源而被尊敬。毕竟，直到20世纪初为止韩国都与中国保有传统联系。尽管北京长期支持北朝鲜的独裁，我在2000年后遇到的大多数年轻一代的韩国人都很重视韩国与中国的关系。
No longer. Recent South Korean opinion polls show that people's views of China have nose-dived since Beijing's failure to condemn the North's sinking of a South Korean naval vessel and its shelling of a South Korean island in 2010, and Pyongyang's recent missile tests. Park's election campaign made good use of the fear of an unruly neighborhood. She seeks to strengthen Seoul's alliance with the U.S., and has said that North Korea will only join the "family of nations if it realizes that assistance from China cannot last forever."
这种善意不再有了。最近韩国的民意调查显示，韩国人对中国的观点改变了，原因是北京未有力谴责2010年北朝鲜击沉韩国海军舰船并炮击韩国岛屿以及最近的北朝鲜导弹试验。朴槿惠的竞选很好的利用了（民众）对一个刁蛮邻居的恐惧。她呼吁加强美韩同盟，并说北朝鲜总会意识到中国的援助不可能无限持续。（最后一句意思不是很清楚）
Personal history, of course, plays a role in these two cases too. Park is the daughter of former South Korean dictator Park Chung-hee, who in the 1960s and '70s saw Chinese communism as the main challenge in the area. And Abe is the grandson of a former Japanese prime minister whom the Chinese 50 years ago considered a major war criminal. Such family ties will not make reconciliation easier.
当然， 上述两件事（2位总统当选）中也有个人经历的原因。朴槿惠是前韩国独裁者朴正熙之女。朴正熙在1960-1970年代视中共为地区内的主要威胁。安倍晋三则是前日本首相岸信介的孙子。岸信介在50年前被中国视为甲级战犯。这样的家庭关系显然无助于国家关系的和解。
Why, then, has the Chinese leadership helped create a situation in which its most eager opponents have triumphed? One reason is historical Chinese attitudes on international affairs. The Chinese Communist Party has always believed that China ought to stand at the center of regional affairs. Recently, the expression of this regional hierarchy has become more shrill.
那么，为什么中国领导层引导了目前这种其最不希望的对手当选的情况呢？原因之一是以往历史中中国对国际事务的态度-----中共总认为中国应该扮演区域事务的中心角色。最近，这种思想的表达越发尖锐。
Perhaps this is a reflection of China's new economic muscle. It could also be that some leaders in Beijing have been so impressed by sweeping Western predictions of China's future predominance that they have started to believe it themselves. The sometimes stunning lack of knowledge of and experience in foreign affairs among the new generation of Chinese leaders have not helped.
或许这正是中国在展示其经济肌肉。也可能是北京的某些领导对过于西方对中国未来经济发展的普遍预测过于惊讶，以至于他们居然相信了。中国领导层对外交事务有时令人惊叹的缺乏知识和经验也是一个因素。（sweeping是颠覆还是普遍？）
Outside its immediate region, China's foreign policy problems are also set to multiply. One is handling of the U.S.. Another is dealing with rising powers elsewhere. I have just spent a month in India, where the leadership has very little faith in China's will or ability to approach other rising powers in a mutually cooperative fashion. "The current Chinese leadership," one top policymaker told me, "… tend to look for what is best for China, in a rather crass and shortsighted manner."
在周边地域之外，中国的外交政策也大有问题。一个是中美关系的处理，另一个是对其他地区崛起力量（看下面的应该是指印度）的关系的处理。我刚在印度花了一个月的时间，其领导层对中国以共同合作的方式改善双边关系的能力和意愿完全不报信心。“现在的中国领导层”， 一个首席政策制定者跟我说, “倾向于以相当粗鲁和短时的方式为中国谋取最大利益。”
Will Beijing find a way to improve its handling of foreign affairs? One inspiration could be the generation of Chinese foreign policy experts who came out of the late 19th and early 20th century. Given a raw deal to begin with because of Western and Japanese aggression, they still managed to advance China's interests considerably. They were able to do so, in the main, because they could report back to Beijing expressing their own views, without always having to reflect official dogma.
北京能找到一种提高外交事务处理能力的方式吗？中国那些19世纪末期到20世纪初的外交政治专家可能会是个很好的灵感。尽管签订了和西方及日本的不平等条约，他们仍然很大程度的维护了中国的利益。他们有能力这么做，主要因为他们能直接向北京汇报他们自己的观点，而不是总要和官方立场一致。
China needs to learn from its past that a good foreign policy must be more than only seeking what is best for one's country to the detriment of others. It is rather to seek to create a region, and eventually a world, where as many as possible believe that China's rise can also be to their own advantage.
中国需要从过去的历史学到，一个好的外交政策不能只是以损害其他国家利益的方式牟取国家最大利益， 而应该是寻找这样一种地区或世界环境：人们认为中国的崛起也能有利于他们自己的利益。
Odd Arne Westad teaches international history at the London School of Economics and Political Science and is the author of, most recently, "Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750."
Odd Arne Westad在伦敦经济与政治科学学校教授世界历史，著作包括最近的《不安的帝国：1750以来的中国和世界》。
转载自：http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-worldlook-671015-1.shtml
又改标题了。
到底什么人一天到晚借题发挥，唯恐天下不乱？
又改标题了。
到底什么人一天到晚借题发挥，唯恐天下不乱？
什么玩意！活得不耐烦了吧？
标题把我吓一跳~
把中国换成美国，倒还是很靠谱的
中国那些19世纪末期到20世纪初的外交政治专家可能会是个很好的灵感。尽管签订了和西方及日本的不平等条约，他们仍然很大程度的维护了中国的利益。
什么智商才能说出这样的话啊
什么智商才能说出这样的话啊
MD这是肿么了？超级大国？md也有战忽局了！
Will Beijing find a way to improve its handling of foreign affairs? One inspiration could be the generation of Chinese foreign policy experts who came out of the late 19th and early 20th century. Given a raw deal to begin with because of Western and Japanese aggression, they still managed to advance China's interests considerably.
就凭这段，老子要对作者说：C你祖宗八代！
就凭这段，老子要对作者说：C你祖宗八代！
美国的政坛也开始流行僵尸了？
我对这帮西畜的脸皮和无耻程度感到无语。
翻身的咸鱼 发表于 2013-1-29 14:41 
中国那些19世纪末期到20世纪初的外交政治专家可能会是个很好的灵感。尽管签订了和西方及日本的不平等条约， ...
上一个说出几乎同样道理的话的那个中国人获得了诺贝尔和平奖。
中国那些19世纪末期到20世纪初的外交政治专家可能会是个很好的灵感。尽管签订了和西方及日本的不平等条约， ...
上一个说出几乎同样道理的话的那个中国人获得了诺贝尔和平奖。
这文章应该是用屁股写出来的。
这文章恶心的一逼。
在很长一段时间里，帝制中国占据着辽阔的疆土。中国朝廷认为中国是地区秩序里不可缺少的中心，有制定国际标准规范，以及干预那些破坏地区秩序的国家的权利和义务。这是一个思想体系；其中中国的原则是所有事情的开端。
为什么看见这句话我脑子里第一个出现的是美帝？
为什么看见这句话我脑子里第一个出现的是美帝？
fsp552 发表于 2013-1-29 14:47
这文章应该是用屁股写出来的。
用哪个部位执笔？
这文章应该是用屁股写出来的。
用哪个部位执笔？
什么玩意？我也读过基本历史书。
我很意外：美国跟中国说历史！
为什么看见这句话我脑子里第一个出现的是美帝？
=============================
那套讲朝鲜入侵美帝的电影，美国人吐糟入侵的朝鲜人靠高科技武器，就随意入侵美国人的国家，破坏美国人的正常生活。
=============================
那套讲朝鲜入侵美帝的电影，美国人吐糟入侵的朝鲜人靠高科技武器，就随意入侵美国人的国家，破坏美国人的正常生活。
我只能呵呵。。。现在国际环境下，虽然大家都宣称博弈不再是零和博弈，合适的外交政策将使所有人都受益。。。但是实际上各国仍然在奉行着传统的外交政策理念，他国权力的增加必然会损伤本国的利益，所谓和平崛起根本就没人信。。。《大国政治的悲剧》中现实地指出了一个大国为了自己的国家安全考虑，必然会追逐权力，寻求地区性的霸主地位，TG也不会例外的。。
bomboy 发表于 2013-1-29 14:40
把中国换成美国，倒还是很靠谱的
中国换美国，韩日什么的换阿拉伯国家，结论更有说服力，美帝称王称霸，无法无天！
把中国换成美国，倒还是很靠谱的
中国换美国，韩日什么的换阿拉伯国家，结论更有说服力，美帝称王称霸，无法无天！
生活在海盗时代的家伙凭什么指责别人生活在帝国时代？
中国学着点啊！
令人作呕，这个霉媒也被兔子瞪怀孕了么？
吓尿了，别捧得这么高
She seeks to strengthen Seoul's alliance with the U.S., and has said that North Korea will only join the "family of nations if it realizes that assistance from China cannot last forever."
这个意思是她寻求加强美韩同盟，并说北朝鲜有朝一日会清楚不能总靠中国的施舍度日，一定会回到大韩冥国的怀抱。
这个意思是她寻求加强美韩同盟，并说北朝鲜有朝一日会清楚不能总靠中国的施舍度日，一定会回到大韩冥国的怀抱。
白皮猪的脸皮堪比城墙
被作者的观点震惊了。
白皮猪们一直生活在辛丑条约时期！
Will Beijing find a way to improve its handling of foreign affairs? One inspiration could be the generation of Chinese foreign policy experts who came out of the late 19th and early 20th century. Given a raw deal to begin with because of Western and Japanese aggression, they still managed to advance China's interests considerably. They were able to do so, in the main, because they could report back to Beijing expressing their own views, without always having to reflect official dogma.
北京能找到一种提高外交事务处理能力的方式吗？中国那些19世纪末期到20世纪初的外交政治专家可能会是个很好的灵感。尽管签订了和西方及日本的不平等条约，他们仍然很大程度的维护了中国的利益。他们有能力这么做，主要因为他们能直接向北京汇报他们自己的观点，而不是总要和官方立场一致。
Will Beijing find a way to improve its handling of foreign affairs? One inspiration could be the generation of Chinese foreign policy experts who came out of the late 19th and early 20th century. Given a raw deal to begin with because of Western and Japanese aggression, they still managed to advance China's interests considerably. They were able to do so, in the main, because they could report back to Beijing expressing their own views, without always having to reflect official dogma.
北京能找到一种提高外交事务处理能力的方式吗？中国那些19世纪末期到20世纪初的外交政治专家可能会是个很好的灵感。尽管签订了和西方及日本的不平等条约，他们仍然很大程度的维护了中国的利益。他们有能力这么做，主要因为他们能直接向北京汇报他们自己的观点，而不是总要和官方立场一致。
作者一定是搞错国家名字了。
嘿嘿，MD终于肯承认是它们扶植了本子，棒子的两个独裁者。
打算扶植傀儡政权么？？？
打算扶植傀儡政权么？？？
兄弟连在炒作新概念么？前阵子才听了个犹太老师爷 Edward Luttwak 的类似胡侃：中国得摆脱天朝上国的老传统，适应现代平等文明普世（省略XX字）的国际关系。
可笑的是，持这种观点的外国精蝇无一例外是邓粉毛黑。
兄弟连在炒作新概念么？前阵子才听了个犹太老师爷 Edward Luttwak 的类似胡侃：中国得摆脱天朝上国的老传统，适应现代平等文明普世（省略XX字）的国际关系。
可笑的是，持这种观点的外国精蝇无一例外是邓粉毛黑。
作者最大的愿望就是现今的中国还如十九世纪末二十世纪初的中国。卑鄙之心眧然若揭。
Md向来不要脸，话说Md家里的镜子是不是脱销了来自: Android客户端
中国现在是用实力对西方说不，软硬都有，西方自然是各种酸水外冒喽。
国那些19世纪末期到20世纪初的外交政治专家可能会是个很好的灵感。尽管签订了和西方及日本的不平等条约，他们仍然很大程度的维护了中国的利益。
狗日的，操他大爷
狗日的，操他大爷
看清楚是美媒，但不是美国人写的：
文安立（Odd Arne Westad）原籍挪威，现任英国伦敦经济学院（LES)国际关系史教授，冷战研究中心主任。他于1989年在美国北卡罗莱纳大学获博士学位，曾任挪威诺贝尔研究所研究部主任。他是近年来在国际学术界冷战史研究中涌现出的最负盛名的中青年学者之一。
研究半天冷战就研究出这么脑残的东西。在老欧洲人的傲慢的眼里，中国甚至亚洲就应该是游戏规则的接受者，而不是制定者
文安立（Odd Arne Westad）原籍挪威，现任英国伦敦经济学院（LES)国际关系史教授，冷战研究中心主任。他于1989年在美国北卡罗莱纳大学获博士学位，曾任挪威诺贝尔研究所研究部主任。他是近年来在国际学术界冷战史研究中涌现出的最负盛名的中青年学者之一。
研究半天冷战就研究出这么脑残的东西。在老欧洲人的傲慢的眼里，中国甚至亚洲就应该是游戏规则的接受者，而不是制定者
我们只不过是做回历史上的真实自己而已，以前我们就是中央帝国，怎么了？可美国佬是没历史可查羡慕嫉妒恨？
按标题意思 当属美的 作呕
好报，如果美国从亚洲滚回去，滚回到美洲，，那么天下一切都太平了，，连911都不会发生。。美国应该获得一些灵感，和别国签订不平等条约，来维护自己的利益。。我们？？我们是兔子，，不需要。