超级军网继续翻译-战略之页：中国海军如何变得更可怕
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 09:47:40
昨天翻译的文章反响不错，继续翻译一篇我认为对海军建设更有建设性意见的文章，同样来自战略之页strategyPage，原作者James Dunnigan。
http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/What-China-Needs-To-Become-Scary-8-27-2012.asp
The Chinese Navy is becoming larger, more frequently seen far from China, and scarier. But China still has what is essentially a coastal navy. To become really terrifying, and not just a lot bigger, the Chinese have to do certain things.
中国海军正在扩充军力，也在远离大陆的海域更经常的活动，也更加可怕。然而，目前中国仍然基本上只是一直海岸海军。PLAN需要做许多事情，从而变得更加可怕，而不是只是扩大规模。
Most importantly, Chinese ships must be at sea a lot more. For centuries modern warships have become far more effective (compared to similar ships used by their opponents) if the crews have a lot more time at sea. During the last decade Chines sailors have gone from hardly any time at sea, to some crews spending a lot of time out there. Much of this has come from Chinese participation in the Somalia anti-piracy patrol. China has been participating in this operation since 2008. Each Chinese "naval escort task force" consists of one or two destroyers or frigates and one or two supply ships. A typical task force for the Somali coast contains about 800 sailors. Each task force spends four months off the Somali coast. Only a few task forces have been from the North China Sea fleet. Most have been drawn from the other two fleets (The East Sea and The South Sea).
重中之重的是海军舰艇必须更加频繁的出海。几百年来，如果水兵在海上训练时间更长，他们的舰艇相对于拥有相似舰艇的对手来说往往更有战斗力。过去十年PLAN水兵从几乎没有远洋经验，到现在相当一部分花费很多时间在远洋训练上。很多这方面的训练来自中国参与索马里反海盗的活动。自从08年中国参与这项行动。每一支护航编队拥有一两艘驱逐舰或护卫舰和补给舰。典型的任务需要大概800水兵。每次护航持续4个月左右。只有少部分护航任务交给北海舰队，大部分从东海和南海舰队中抽调。
Service in the Somali task forces is eagerly sought after because it is the most intensive and extensive training available. The task force gets practice in long distance cruises (Somalia is 10,000 kilometers distant and it takes two weeks to get there) and combat operations. Granted, the enemy rarely fires back and is hard to find. But the crews are able to operate for long periods on the high seas and search for an elusive foe.
因为这项行动目前来说是强度和广度最大的训练方式，PLAN很积极在索马里实施护航行动。这项任务可以训练远距离巡航和战斗（索马里离中国大陆有1万公里，需要两周的航程才能到达）。一般来说，敌人很少还击，也很难找到。即使如此，这些水兵通过行动可以训练在远洋长期工作和寻找敌人的能力。
There are 74 destroyers and frigates in the Chinese Navy, and it will take another 4-5 years for all of these ships to have an opportunity to serve off Somalia. But the important thing is that thousands of sailors have served on the task force and they eventually spread throughout the fleet, providing a higher degree of skill and experience at sea they can share. The value of this experience is percolating up the chain of command, where it might help in keeping the admirals and their bean counters willing to support continued sea time for their sailors. This is expensive but it's key to victory in wartime.
PLAN总共有74艘驱逐舰和护卫舰，这需要4-5年才能让所有这项舰只有机会在索马里参与活动。似乎很漫长，然而重要的是通过这项行动数千水兵经受了远洋训练，而且后来会“渗透”到整个舰队而传播学到的技术和训练经验。这经历的价值在于能够连接和熟悉整个命令的流程，这流程能让舰长和管理层更乐于为他们的水兵支持后续的远洋时间。这项活动耗资巨大，却是战争中胜利的关键。
Another thing China has to overcome is the mindset of a coastal navy. For thousands of years China has been content to have little more than a coast guard, mainly to deal with pirates and smugglers. On only a few occasions was there a high seas (or "blue water") fleet. But to protect its growing overseas trade, something China has never had before, China needs a blue water navy. To get one requires not just experienced sailors but support ships. These are the tankers, supply, and maintenance ships that can keep warships operational when they are far from China. When China starts investing in a lot of these you will know the Chinese are getting serious.
另外一件中国需要克服的是近海海军的旧观念。几千年来，中国只满足于近海海军，主要用来对付海盗和走私者。只有少数情况会有蓝海海军。（译者注：是啊，海军孱弱是近代屈辱的很大原因）然而，近年来，为了保护好中国之前从未有过的日益增长的跨洋航线，中国急需一支蓝水海军。这需要不仅仅是有经验的水兵，更需要能胜任的补给舰艇。这些补给舰包括油船，日常补给和修理舰只，在远洋战斗舰艇需要这些补给舰来保持正常工作。当中国开始在这方面加大投资的时候，你就会知道中国对建设远洋海军是认真的。（译者注：相信CDers都知道这是不争的事实和PLAN的发展方向。）
China also has some more fundamental needs. For example, China has never demonstrated any talent or enthusiasm for anti-submarine warfare. Considering the number of nuclear and conventional subs arrayed against it, anti-submarine warfare should have higher priority in China. Another serious shortcoming is mine-clearing capability. The Chinese Navy is well equipped to plant mines off hostile shores and in defense of its own waters but there is not a lot of capability to clear enemy mines. Many navies share this shortcoming but for a major trading nation like China, it would be sad to see all that trade shut down by a few hundred naval mines.
中国仍需要一些基本的需要。比如中国从来没有表现出反潜作战的能力和热情。考虑到我国周边的核潜艇和常规潜艇的分布，反潜舰和装备本应该受到更多的重视。另外很薄弱的环节是排除水雷的能力。PLAN拥有很先进的布雷设备来保卫领海，却没有很强的排雷能力。很多国家的海军在这方面比较薄弱，但对于一个依赖国际贸易的中国来说，看到贸易被几百个水雷中止的情况会很糟糕。
---华丽的分割线---
这篇文章肯定了索马里反海盗行动对于中国海军训练的重要意义，对于目前PLAN的建设也基本上是赞赏的。同时也给出了两个建议：加强反潜作战和排除水雷的能力。我认为还是比较中肯的，希望PLAN尽快成为一支健全的远洋海军，真正进入蓝水。（完整的航母舰队就在眼前）昨天翻译的文章反响不错，继续翻译一篇我认为对海军建设更有建设性意见的文章，同样来自战略之页strategyPage，原作者James Dunnigan。
http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/What-China-Needs-To-Become-Scary-8-27-2012.asp
The Chinese Navy is becoming larger, more frequently seen far from China, and scarier. But China still has what is essentially a coastal navy. To become really terrifying, and not just a lot bigger, the Chinese have to do certain things.
中国海军正在扩充军力，也在远离大陆的海域更经常的活动，也更加可怕。然而，目前中国仍然基本上只是一直海岸海军。PLAN需要做许多事情，从而变得更加可怕，而不是只是扩大规模。
Most importantly, Chinese ships must be at sea a lot more. For centuries modern warships have become far more effective (compared to similar ships used by their opponents) if the crews have a lot more time at sea. During the last decade Chines sailors have gone from hardly any time at sea, to some crews spending a lot of time out there. Much of this has come from Chinese participation in the Somalia anti-piracy patrol. China has been participating in this operation since 2008. Each Chinese "naval escort task force" consists of one or two destroyers or frigates and one or two supply ships. A typical task force for the Somali coast contains about 800 sailors. Each task force spends four months off the Somali coast. Only a few task forces have been from the North China Sea fleet. Most have been drawn from the other two fleets (The East Sea and The South Sea).
重中之重的是海军舰艇必须更加频繁的出海。几百年来，如果水兵在海上训练时间更长，他们的舰艇相对于拥有相似舰艇的对手来说往往更有战斗力。过去十年PLAN水兵从几乎没有远洋经验，到现在相当一部分花费很多时间在远洋训练上。很多这方面的训练来自中国参与索马里反海盗的活动。自从08年中国参与这项行动。每一支护航编队拥有一两艘驱逐舰或护卫舰和补给舰。典型的任务需要大概800水兵。每次护航持续4个月左右。只有少部分护航任务交给北海舰队，大部分从东海和南海舰队中抽调。
Service in the Somali task forces is eagerly sought after because it is the most intensive and extensive training available. The task force gets practice in long distance cruises (Somalia is 10,000 kilometers distant and it takes two weeks to get there) and combat operations. Granted, the enemy rarely fires back and is hard to find. But the crews are able to operate for long periods on the high seas and search for an elusive foe.
因为这项行动目前来说是强度和广度最大的训练方式，PLAN很积极在索马里实施护航行动。这项任务可以训练远距离巡航和战斗（索马里离中国大陆有1万公里，需要两周的航程才能到达）。一般来说，敌人很少还击，也很难找到。即使如此，这些水兵通过行动可以训练在远洋长期工作和寻找敌人的能力。
There are 74 destroyers and frigates in the Chinese Navy, and it will take another 4-5 years for all of these ships to have an opportunity to serve off Somalia. But the important thing is that thousands of sailors have served on the task force and they eventually spread throughout the fleet, providing a higher degree of skill and experience at sea they can share. The value of this experience is percolating up the chain of command, where it might help in keeping the admirals and their bean counters willing to support continued sea time for their sailors. This is expensive but it's key to victory in wartime.
PLAN总共有74艘驱逐舰和护卫舰，这需要4-5年才能让所有这项舰只有机会在索马里参与活动。似乎很漫长，然而重要的是通过这项行动数千水兵经受了远洋训练，而且后来会“渗透”到整个舰队而传播学到的技术和训练经验。这经历的价值在于能够连接和熟悉整个命令的流程，这流程能让舰长和管理层更乐于为他们的水兵支持后续的远洋时间。这项活动耗资巨大，却是战争中胜利的关键。
Another thing China has to overcome is the mindset of a coastal navy. For thousands of years China has been content to have little more than a coast guard, mainly to deal with pirates and smugglers. On only a few occasions was there a high seas (or "blue water") fleet. But to protect its growing overseas trade, something China has never had before, China needs a blue water navy. To get one requires not just experienced sailors but support ships. These are the tankers, supply, and maintenance ships that can keep warships operational when they are far from China. When China starts investing in a lot of these you will know the Chinese are getting serious.
另外一件中国需要克服的是近海海军的旧观念。几千年来，中国只满足于近海海军，主要用来对付海盗和走私者。只有少数情况会有蓝海海军。（译者注：是啊，海军孱弱是近代屈辱的很大原因）然而，近年来，为了保护好中国之前从未有过的日益增长的跨洋航线，中国急需一支蓝水海军。这需要不仅仅是有经验的水兵，更需要能胜任的补给舰艇。这些补给舰包括油船，日常补给和修理舰只，在远洋战斗舰艇需要这些补给舰来保持正常工作。当中国开始在这方面加大投资的时候，你就会知道中国对建设远洋海军是认真的。（译者注：相信CDers都知道这是不争的事实和PLAN的发展方向。）
China also has some more fundamental needs. For example, China has never demonstrated any talent or enthusiasm for anti-submarine warfare. Considering the number of nuclear and conventional subs arrayed against it, anti-submarine warfare should have higher priority in China. Another serious shortcoming is mine-clearing capability. The Chinese Navy is well equipped to plant mines off hostile shores and in defense of its own waters but there is not a lot of capability to clear enemy mines. Many navies share this shortcoming but for a major trading nation like China, it would be sad to see all that trade shut down by a few hundred naval mines.
中国仍需要一些基本的需要。比如中国从来没有表现出反潜作战的能力和热情。考虑到我国周边的核潜艇和常规潜艇的分布，反潜舰和装备本应该受到更多的重视。另外很薄弱的环节是排除水雷的能力。PLAN拥有很先进的布雷设备来保卫领海，却没有很强的排雷能力。很多国家的海军在这方面比较薄弱，但对于一个依赖国际贸易的中国来说，看到贸易被几百个水雷中止的情况会很糟糕。
---华丽的分割线---
这篇文章肯定了索马里反海盗行动对于中国海军训练的重要意义，对于目前PLAN的建设也基本上是赞赏的。同时也给出了两个建议：加强反潜作战和排除水雷的能力。我认为还是比较中肯的，希望PLAN尽快成为一支健全的远洋海军，真正进入蓝水。（完整的航母舰队就在眼前）
http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/What-China-Needs-To-Become-Scary-8-27-2012.asp
The Chinese Navy is becoming larger, more frequently seen far from China, and scarier. But China still has what is essentially a coastal navy. To become really terrifying, and not just a lot bigger, the Chinese have to do certain things.
中国海军正在扩充军力，也在远离大陆的海域更经常的活动，也更加可怕。然而，目前中国仍然基本上只是一直海岸海军。PLAN需要做许多事情，从而变得更加可怕，而不是只是扩大规模。
Most importantly, Chinese ships must be at sea a lot more. For centuries modern warships have become far more effective (compared to similar ships used by their opponents) if the crews have a lot more time at sea. During the last decade Chines sailors have gone from hardly any time at sea, to some crews spending a lot of time out there. Much of this has come from Chinese participation in the Somalia anti-piracy patrol. China has been participating in this operation since 2008. Each Chinese "naval escort task force" consists of one or two destroyers or frigates and one or two supply ships. A typical task force for the Somali coast contains about 800 sailors. Each task force spends four months off the Somali coast. Only a few task forces have been from the North China Sea fleet. Most have been drawn from the other two fleets (The East Sea and The South Sea).
重中之重的是海军舰艇必须更加频繁的出海。几百年来，如果水兵在海上训练时间更长，他们的舰艇相对于拥有相似舰艇的对手来说往往更有战斗力。过去十年PLAN水兵从几乎没有远洋经验，到现在相当一部分花费很多时间在远洋训练上。很多这方面的训练来自中国参与索马里反海盗的活动。自从08年中国参与这项行动。每一支护航编队拥有一两艘驱逐舰或护卫舰和补给舰。典型的任务需要大概800水兵。每次护航持续4个月左右。只有少部分护航任务交给北海舰队，大部分从东海和南海舰队中抽调。
Service in the Somali task forces is eagerly sought after because it is the most intensive and extensive training available. The task force gets practice in long distance cruises (Somalia is 10,000 kilometers distant and it takes two weeks to get there) and combat operations. Granted, the enemy rarely fires back and is hard to find. But the crews are able to operate for long periods on the high seas and search for an elusive foe.
因为这项行动目前来说是强度和广度最大的训练方式，PLAN很积极在索马里实施护航行动。这项任务可以训练远距离巡航和战斗（索马里离中国大陆有1万公里，需要两周的航程才能到达）。一般来说，敌人很少还击，也很难找到。即使如此，这些水兵通过行动可以训练在远洋长期工作和寻找敌人的能力。
There are 74 destroyers and frigates in the Chinese Navy, and it will take another 4-5 years for all of these ships to have an opportunity to serve off Somalia. But the important thing is that thousands of sailors have served on the task force and they eventually spread throughout the fleet, providing a higher degree of skill and experience at sea they can share. The value of this experience is percolating up the chain of command, where it might help in keeping the admirals and their bean counters willing to support continued sea time for their sailors. This is expensive but it's key to victory in wartime.
PLAN总共有74艘驱逐舰和护卫舰，这需要4-5年才能让所有这项舰只有机会在索马里参与活动。似乎很漫长，然而重要的是通过这项行动数千水兵经受了远洋训练，而且后来会“渗透”到整个舰队而传播学到的技术和训练经验。这经历的价值在于能够连接和熟悉整个命令的流程，这流程能让舰长和管理层更乐于为他们的水兵支持后续的远洋时间。这项活动耗资巨大，却是战争中胜利的关键。
Another thing China has to overcome is the mindset of a coastal navy. For thousands of years China has been content to have little more than a coast guard, mainly to deal with pirates and smugglers. On only a few occasions was there a high seas (or "blue water") fleet. But to protect its growing overseas trade, something China has never had before, China needs a blue water navy. To get one requires not just experienced sailors but support ships. These are the tankers, supply, and maintenance ships that can keep warships operational when they are far from China. When China starts investing in a lot of these you will know the Chinese are getting serious.
另外一件中国需要克服的是近海海军的旧观念。几千年来，中国只满足于近海海军，主要用来对付海盗和走私者。只有少数情况会有蓝海海军。（译者注：是啊，海军孱弱是近代屈辱的很大原因）然而，近年来，为了保护好中国之前从未有过的日益增长的跨洋航线，中国急需一支蓝水海军。这需要不仅仅是有经验的水兵，更需要能胜任的补给舰艇。这些补给舰包括油船，日常补给和修理舰只，在远洋战斗舰艇需要这些补给舰来保持正常工作。当中国开始在这方面加大投资的时候，你就会知道中国对建设远洋海军是认真的。（译者注：相信CDers都知道这是不争的事实和PLAN的发展方向。）
China also has some more fundamental needs. For example, China has never demonstrated any talent or enthusiasm for anti-submarine warfare. Considering the number of nuclear and conventional subs arrayed against it, anti-submarine warfare should have higher priority in China. Another serious shortcoming is mine-clearing capability. The Chinese Navy is well equipped to plant mines off hostile shores and in defense of its own waters but there is not a lot of capability to clear enemy mines. Many navies share this shortcoming but for a major trading nation like China, it would be sad to see all that trade shut down by a few hundred naval mines.
中国仍需要一些基本的需要。比如中国从来没有表现出反潜作战的能力和热情。考虑到我国周边的核潜艇和常规潜艇的分布，反潜舰和装备本应该受到更多的重视。另外很薄弱的环节是排除水雷的能力。PLAN拥有很先进的布雷设备来保卫领海，却没有很强的排雷能力。很多国家的海军在这方面比较薄弱，但对于一个依赖国际贸易的中国来说，看到贸易被几百个水雷中止的情况会很糟糕。
---华丽的分割线---
这篇文章肯定了索马里反海盗行动对于中国海军训练的重要意义，对于目前PLAN的建设也基本上是赞赏的。同时也给出了两个建议：加强反潜作战和排除水雷的能力。我认为还是比较中肯的，希望PLAN尽快成为一支健全的远洋海军，真正进入蓝水。（完整的航母舰队就在眼前）昨天翻译的文章反响不错，继续翻译一篇我认为对海军建设更有建设性意见的文章，同样来自战略之页strategyPage，原作者James Dunnigan。
http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/What-China-Needs-To-Become-Scary-8-27-2012.asp
The Chinese Navy is becoming larger, more frequently seen far from China, and scarier. But China still has what is essentially a coastal navy. To become really terrifying, and not just a lot bigger, the Chinese have to do certain things.
中国海军正在扩充军力，也在远离大陆的海域更经常的活动，也更加可怕。然而，目前中国仍然基本上只是一直海岸海军。PLAN需要做许多事情，从而变得更加可怕，而不是只是扩大规模。
Most importantly, Chinese ships must be at sea a lot more. For centuries modern warships have become far more effective (compared to similar ships used by their opponents) if the crews have a lot more time at sea. During the last decade Chines sailors have gone from hardly any time at sea, to some crews spending a lot of time out there. Much of this has come from Chinese participation in the Somalia anti-piracy patrol. China has been participating in this operation since 2008. Each Chinese "naval escort task force" consists of one or two destroyers or frigates and one or two supply ships. A typical task force for the Somali coast contains about 800 sailors. Each task force spends four months off the Somali coast. Only a few task forces have been from the North China Sea fleet. Most have been drawn from the other two fleets (The East Sea and The South Sea).
重中之重的是海军舰艇必须更加频繁的出海。几百年来，如果水兵在海上训练时间更长，他们的舰艇相对于拥有相似舰艇的对手来说往往更有战斗力。过去十年PLAN水兵从几乎没有远洋经验，到现在相当一部分花费很多时间在远洋训练上。很多这方面的训练来自中国参与索马里反海盗的活动。自从08年中国参与这项行动。每一支护航编队拥有一两艘驱逐舰或护卫舰和补给舰。典型的任务需要大概800水兵。每次护航持续4个月左右。只有少部分护航任务交给北海舰队，大部分从东海和南海舰队中抽调。
Service in the Somali task forces is eagerly sought after because it is the most intensive and extensive training available. The task force gets practice in long distance cruises (Somalia is 10,000 kilometers distant and it takes two weeks to get there) and combat operations. Granted, the enemy rarely fires back and is hard to find. But the crews are able to operate for long periods on the high seas and search for an elusive foe.
因为这项行动目前来说是强度和广度最大的训练方式，PLAN很积极在索马里实施护航行动。这项任务可以训练远距离巡航和战斗（索马里离中国大陆有1万公里，需要两周的航程才能到达）。一般来说，敌人很少还击，也很难找到。即使如此，这些水兵通过行动可以训练在远洋长期工作和寻找敌人的能力。
There are 74 destroyers and frigates in the Chinese Navy, and it will take another 4-5 years for all of these ships to have an opportunity to serve off Somalia. But the important thing is that thousands of sailors have served on the task force and they eventually spread throughout the fleet, providing a higher degree of skill and experience at sea they can share. The value of this experience is percolating up the chain of command, where it might help in keeping the admirals and their bean counters willing to support continued sea time for their sailors. This is expensive but it's key to victory in wartime.
PLAN总共有74艘驱逐舰和护卫舰，这需要4-5年才能让所有这项舰只有机会在索马里参与活动。似乎很漫长，然而重要的是通过这项行动数千水兵经受了远洋训练，而且后来会“渗透”到整个舰队而传播学到的技术和训练经验。这经历的价值在于能够连接和熟悉整个命令的流程，这流程能让舰长和管理层更乐于为他们的水兵支持后续的远洋时间。这项活动耗资巨大，却是战争中胜利的关键。
Another thing China has to overcome is the mindset of a coastal navy. For thousands of years China has been content to have little more than a coast guard, mainly to deal with pirates and smugglers. On only a few occasions was there a high seas (or "blue water") fleet. But to protect its growing overseas trade, something China has never had before, China needs a blue water navy. To get one requires not just experienced sailors but support ships. These are the tankers, supply, and maintenance ships that can keep warships operational when they are far from China. When China starts investing in a lot of these you will know the Chinese are getting serious.
另外一件中国需要克服的是近海海军的旧观念。几千年来，中国只满足于近海海军，主要用来对付海盗和走私者。只有少数情况会有蓝海海军。（译者注：是啊，海军孱弱是近代屈辱的很大原因）然而，近年来，为了保护好中国之前从未有过的日益增长的跨洋航线，中国急需一支蓝水海军。这需要不仅仅是有经验的水兵，更需要能胜任的补给舰艇。这些补给舰包括油船，日常补给和修理舰只，在远洋战斗舰艇需要这些补给舰来保持正常工作。当中国开始在这方面加大投资的时候，你就会知道中国对建设远洋海军是认真的。（译者注：相信CDers都知道这是不争的事实和PLAN的发展方向。）
China also has some more fundamental needs. For example, China has never demonstrated any talent or enthusiasm for anti-submarine warfare. Considering the number of nuclear and conventional subs arrayed against it, anti-submarine warfare should have higher priority in China. Another serious shortcoming is mine-clearing capability. The Chinese Navy is well equipped to plant mines off hostile shores and in defense of its own waters but there is not a lot of capability to clear enemy mines. Many navies share this shortcoming but for a major trading nation like China, it would be sad to see all that trade shut down by a few hundred naval mines.
中国仍需要一些基本的需要。比如中国从来没有表现出反潜作战的能力和热情。考虑到我国周边的核潜艇和常规潜艇的分布，反潜舰和装备本应该受到更多的重视。另外很薄弱的环节是排除水雷的能力。PLAN拥有很先进的布雷设备来保卫领海，却没有很强的排雷能力。很多国家的海军在这方面比较薄弱，但对于一个依赖国际贸易的中国来说，看到贸易被几百个水雷中止的情况会很糟糕。
---华丽的分割线---
这篇文章肯定了索马里反海盗行动对于中国海军训练的重要意义，对于目前PLAN的建设也基本上是赞赏的。同时也给出了两个建议：加强反潜作战和排除水雷的能力。我认为还是比较中肯的，希望PLAN尽快成为一支健全的远洋海军，真正进入蓝水。（完整的航母舰队就在眼前）
支持楼主翻译，文章客观公正，但是缺乏深度，阐述的是大家都能看到的事实