超级军网寒假党想弄个翻译贴。。
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 21:19:59
这就寒假了，做为一个寒假党。。。我想翻译一点文章到CD来。
已经弄好了两篇，经济学人评论TG加入WTO十周年的。。
昨天想发，但是有点担心版权问题。想了想还是发了。。要是有什么问题，BZ删掉我去找别的文章就是了{:soso_e113:} ，我尽量一天翻一篇。。。
好些地方不太懂，翻译的有点捣糨糊，大家轻拍{:soso_e113:}
第一篇，连接： h tt p://ww w.economist.com/node/21541448
原文
China’s economy and the WTO
All change
THE World Trade Organisation (WTO), like many clubs, denies patrons the right of automatic readmission. Having quit the organisation’s predecessor shortly after the Communist revolution of 1949, China had to wait 15 long years to gain entry after reapplying in the 1980s. The doors finally opened on December 11th 2001, ten years ago this week.
The price of re-entry was as steep as the wait was long. China had to relax over 7,000 tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers. Some feared that foreign competition would uproot farmers and upend rusty state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as to some extent it did. But China, overall, has enjoyed one of the best decades in global economic history. Its dollar GDP has quadrupled, its exports almost quintupled.
In this section
»All change
No change
Nuclear winter
Off their trolleys
Hornets’ nest
Reprints
Related topics
China
International relations
Chinese politics
Asia-Pacific politics
Political policy
Many foreigners also prospered. American foreign direct investment reaps returns of 13.5% in China, compared with 9.7% worldwide, according to K.C. Fung of the University of California, Santa Cruz. China imposes lower tariffs on average than Brazil or India. The gap between what it can charge, under WTO rules, and what it does charge is also unusually small. So unlike its peers, China could not raise tariffs much even if it wanted to (see chart).
Yet in America, China’s single biggest trading partner, sentiment towards the country has turned starkly negative. In a recent poll, 61% of Americans said that China’s recent economic expansion had been bad for America; just 15% thought it had been good. This partly reflects China’s controversial currency regime. By keeping the exchange rate down, China’s critics allege, it has gained a substitute for the mercantilist measures it gave up to join the WTO.
Foreign frustration is partly a sign of China’s success. As its economy has grown and matured, the stakes have risen. Foreign firms lament losing trade battles they might not bother to wage in a less lucrative market. They also face competition from local upstarts in markets where no such rivals previously existed.
Electronic payments are one example. China’s first ever payment card was issued in 1986 by MasterCard. Foreign brands remained dominant at the time of China’s WTO entry. But shortly afterwards, China’s central bank established a domestic competitor, China UnionPay, and gave it a de facto monopoly over the handling of local-currency payments between merchants and banks. This setback might have been easier to take for foreign companies had the market not since grown tenfold, to $1.6 trillion, according to The Nilson Report, an industry newsletter.
China’s economy has evolved faster than anyone hoped. But its economic philosophy has not. Long Yongtu, who helped China win admission to the WTO, recently said that China is now moving further away from the organisation’s principles. To modernise its economy, it has remained wedded to industrial policies, state-owned enterprises, and a “techno-nationalism” that protects and promotes home-grown technologies.
Many foreign companies feel they must compete not with Chinese firms but with the Chinese state. Between them, China’s central and local governments own over 100,000 companies and implicitly favour many more. Thanks to the WTO, foreign firms are no longer required to hand over technology in exchange for entry to China’s market. But many still feel an informal pressure to do so. China is also keen to promote its own firms by enforcing its own technological standards, such as for 3G mobile phones.
Many of these interventions violate the spirit, if not always the letter of WTO rules. In response, America often pushes back bilaterally rather than in Geneva, according to a former American trade negotiator. This is partly because companies worry they will face retribution from China’s government if they provide evidence against it in a trade case. It is also because much of what China does falls into a grey area that is not easy for the WTO to police.
China, on the other hand, is growing more comfortable with the WTO machinery. In its early years as a member, it shied away from confrontation, points out Henry Gao of Singapore Management University. In 2006, for example, America threatened to file a complaint over China’s duties on kraft linerboard. China lifted the duties the next working day. But now the Chinese have learned the ropes, they have also become more proactive. “Now they defend themselves,” says Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute, a Washington think-tank. “They initiate cases. And when they lose, they comply.”
In some cases the discrimination is no worse than before, it is simply more visible. As part of its WTO agreement, China now circulates draft laws and regulations for 30 days to collect comments. That has made it easier for foreigners to spot foul play. America recently complained that China had failed to notify the WTO of nearly 200 subsidy programmes, such as those supporting green-energy technology. It knew this in part because China, following its newly transparent practice, had disclosed many such programmes online, the former negotiator said: “Similar policy announcements were neibu (for limited distribution) in the past.”
China’s trade policies may look a little uglier than WTO members had hoped when they opened the club’s doors ten years ago. But that is partly because the lights have been turned on.这就寒假了，做为一个寒假党。。。我想翻译一点文章到CD来。
已经弄好了两篇，经济学人评论TG加入WTO十周年的。。
昨天想发，但是有点担心版权问题。想了想还是发了。。要是有什么问题，BZ删掉我去找别的文章就是了{:soso_e113:} ，我尽量一天翻一篇。。。
好些地方不太懂，翻译的有点捣糨糊，大家轻拍{:soso_e113:}
第一篇，连接： h tt p://ww w.economist.com/node/21541448
原文
China’s economy and the WTO
All change
THE World Trade Organisation (WTO), like many clubs, denies patrons the right of automatic readmission. Having quit the organisation’s predecessor shortly after the Communist revolution of 1949, China had to wait 15 long years to gain entry after reapplying in the 1980s. The doors finally opened on December 11th 2001, ten years ago this week.
The price of re-entry was as steep as the wait was long. China had to relax over 7,000 tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers. Some feared that foreign competition would uproot farmers and upend rusty state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as to some extent it did. But China, overall, has enjoyed one of the best decades in global economic history. Its dollar GDP has quadrupled, its exports almost quintupled.
In this section
»All change
No change
Nuclear winter
Off their trolleys
Hornets’ nest
Reprints
Related topics
China
International relations
Chinese politics
Asia-Pacific politics
Political policy
Many foreigners also prospered. American foreign direct investment reaps returns of 13.5% in China, compared with 9.7% worldwide, according to K.C. Fung of the University of California, Santa Cruz. China imposes lower tariffs on average than Brazil or India. The gap between what it can charge, under WTO rules, and what it does charge is also unusually small. So unlike its peers, China could not raise tariffs much even if it wanted to (see chart).
Yet in America, China’s single biggest trading partner, sentiment towards the country has turned starkly negative. In a recent poll, 61% of Americans said that China’s recent economic expansion had been bad for America; just 15% thought it had been good. This partly reflects China’s controversial currency regime. By keeping the exchange rate down, China’s critics allege, it has gained a substitute for the mercantilist measures it gave up to join the WTO.
Foreign frustration is partly a sign of China’s success. As its economy has grown and matured, the stakes have risen. Foreign firms lament losing trade battles they might not bother to wage in a less lucrative market. They also face competition from local upstarts in markets where no such rivals previously existed.
Electronic payments are one example. China’s first ever payment card was issued in 1986 by MasterCard. Foreign brands remained dominant at the time of China’s WTO entry. But shortly afterwards, China’s central bank established a domestic competitor, China UnionPay, and gave it a de facto monopoly over the handling of local-currency payments between merchants and banks. This setback might have been easier to take for foreign companies had the market not since grown tenfold, to $1.6 trillion, according to The Nilson Report, an industry newsletter.
China’s economy has evolved faster than anyone hoped. But its economic philosophy has not. Long Yongtu, who helped China win admission to the WTO, recently said that China is now moving further away from the organisation’s principles. To modernise its economy, it has remained wedded to industrial policies, state-owned enterprises, and a “techno-nationalism” that protects and promotes home-grown technologies.
Many foreign companies feel they must compete not with Chinese firms but with the Chinese state. Between them, China’s central and local governments own over 100,000 companies and implicitly favour many more. Thanks to the WTO, foreign firms are no longer required to hand over technology in exchange for entry to China’s market. But many still feel an informal pressure to do so. China is also keen to promote its own firms by enforcing its own technological standards, such as for 3G mobile phones.
Many of these interventions violate the spirit, if not always the letter of WTO rules. In response, America often pushes back bilaterally rather than in Geneva, according to a former American trade negotiator. This is partly because companies worry they will face retribution from China’s government if they provide evidence against it in a trade case. It is also because much of what China does falls into a grey area that is not easy for the WTO to police.
China, on the other hand, is growing more comfortable with the WTO machinery. In its early years as a member, it shied away from confrontation, points out Henry Gao of Singapore Management University. In 2006, for example, America threatened to file a complaint over China’s duties on kraft linerboard. China lifted the duties the next working day. But now the Chinese have learned the ropes, they have also become more proactive. “Now they defend themselves,” says Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute, a Washington think-tank. “They initiate cases. And when they lose, they comply.”
In some cases the discrimination is no worse than before, it is simply more visible. As part of its WTO agreement, China now circulates draft laws and regulations for 30 days to collect comments. That has made it easier for foreigners to spot foul play. America recently complained that China had failed to notify the WTO of nearly 200 subsidy programmes, such as those supporting green-energy technology. It knew this in part because China, following its newly transparent practice, had disclosed many such programmes online, the former negotiator said: “Similar policy announcements were neibu (for limited distribution) in the past.”
China’s trade policies may look a little uglier than WTO members had hoped when they opened the club’s doors ten years ago. But that is partly because the lights have been turned on.
已经弄好了两篇，经济学人评论TG加入WTO十周年的。。
昨天想发，但是有点担心版权问题。想了想还是发了。。要是有什么问题，BZ删掉我去找别的文章就是了{:soso_e113:} ，我尽量一天翻一篇。。。
好些地方不太懂，翻译的有点捣糨糊，大家轻拍{:soso_e113:}
第一篇，连接： h tt p://ww w.economist.com/node/21541448
原文
China’s economy and the WTO
All change
THE World Trade Organisation (WTO), like many clubs, denies patrons the right of automatic readmission. Having quit the organisation’s predecessor shortly after the Communist revolution of 1949, China had to wait 15 long years to gain entry after reapplying in the 1980s. The doors finally opened on December 11th 2001, ten years ago this week.
The price of re-entry was as steep as the wait was long. China had to relax over 7,000 tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers. Some feared that foreign competition would uproot farmers and upend rusty state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as to some extent it did. But China, overall, has enjoyed one of the best decades in global economic history. Its dollar GDP has quadrupled, its exports almost quintupled.
In this section
»All change
No change
Nuclear winter
Off their trolleys
Hornets’ nest
Reprints
Related topics
China
International relations
Chinese politics
Asia-Pacific politics
Political policy
Many foreigners also prospered. American foreign direct investment reaps returns of 13.5% in China, compared with 9.7% worldwide, according to K.C. Fung of the University of California, Santa Cruz. China imposes lower tariffs on average than Brazil or India. The gap between what it can charge, under WTO rules, and what it does charge is also unusually small. So unlike its peers, China could not raise tariffs much even if it wanted to (see chart).
Yet in America, China’s single biggest trading partner, sentiment towards the country has turned starkly negative. In a recent poll, 61% of Americans said that China’s recent economic expansion had been bad for America; just 15% thought it had been good. This partly reflects China’s controversial currency regime. By keeping the exchange rate down, China’s critics allege, it has gained a substitute for the mercantilist measures it gave up to join the WTO.
Foreign frustration is partly a sign of China’s success. As its economy has grown and matured, the stakes have risen. Foreign firms lament losing trade battles they might not bother to wage in a less lucrative market. They also face competition from local upstarts in markets where no such rivals previously existed.
Electronic payments are one example. China’s first ever payment card was issued in 1986 by MasterCard. Foreign brands remained dominant at the time of China’s WTO entry. But shortly afterwards, China’s central bank established a domestic competitor, China UnionPay, and gave it a de facto monopoly over the handling of local-currency payments between merchants and banks. This setback might have been easier to take for foreign companies had the market not since grown tenfold, to $1.6 trillion, according to The Nilson Report, an industry newsletter.
China’s economy has evolved faster than anyone hoped. But its economic philosophy has not. Long Yongtu, who helped China win admission to the WTO, recently said that China is now moving further away from the organisation’s principles. To modernise its economy, it has remained wedded to industrial policies, state-owned enterprises, and a “techno-nationalism” that protects and promotes home-grown technologies.
Many foreign companies feel they must compete not with Chinese firms but with the Chinese state. Between them, China’s central and local governments own over 100,000 companies and implicitly favour many more. Thanks to the WTO, foreign firms are no longer required to hand over technology in exchange for entry to China’s market. But many still feel an informal pressure to do so. China is also keen to promote its own firms by enforcing its own technological standards, such as for 3G mobile phones.
Many of these interventions violate the spirit, if not always the letter of WTO rules. In response, America often pushes back bilaterally rather than in Geneva, according to a former American trade negotiator. This is partly because companies worry they will face retribution from China’s government if they provide evidence against it in a trade case. It is also because much of what China does falls into a grey area that is not easy for the WTO to police.
China, on the other hand, is growing more comfortable with the WTO machinery. In its early years as a member, it shied away from confrontation, points out Henry Gao of Singapore Management University. In 2006, for example, America threatened to file a complaint over China’s duties on kraft linerboard. China lifted the duties the next working day. But now the Chinese have learned the ropes, they have also become more proactive. “Now they defend themselves,” says Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute, a Washington think-tank. “They initiate cases. And when they lose, they comply.”
In some cases the discrimination is no worse than before, it is simply more visible. As part of its WTO agreement, China now circulates draft laws and regulations for 30 days to collect comments. That has made it easier for foreigners to spot foul play. America recently complained that China had failed to notify the WTO of nearly 200 subsidy programmes, such as those supporting green-energy technology. It knew this in part because China, following its newly transparent practice, had disclosed many such programmes online, the former negotiator said: “Similar policy announcements were neibu (for limited distribution) in the past.”
China’s trade policies may look a little uglier than WTO members had hoped when they opened the club’s doors ten years ago. But that is partly because the lights have been turned on.这就寒假了，做为一个寒假党。。。我想翻译一点文章到CD来。
已经弄好了两篇，经济学人评论TG加入WTO十周年的。。
昨天想发，但是有点担心版权问题。想了想还是发了。。要是有什么问题，BZ删掉我去找别的文章就是了{:soso_e113:} ，我尽量一天翻一篇。。。
好些地方不太懂，翻译的有点捣糨糊，大家轻拍{:soso_e113:}
第一篇，连接： h tt p://ww w.economist.com/node/21541448
原文
China’s economy and the WTO
All change
THE World Trade Organisation (WTO), like many clubs, denies patrons the right of automatic readmission. Having quit the organisation’s predecessor shortly after the Communist revolution of 1949, China had to wait 15 long years to gain entry after reapplying in the 1980s. The doors finally opened on December 11th 2001, ten years ago this week.
The price of re-entry was as steep as the wait was long. China had to relax over 7,000 tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers. Some feared that foreign competition would uproot farmers and upend rusty state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as to some extent it did. But China, overall, has enjoyed one of the best decades in global economic history. Its dollar GDP has quadrupled, its exports almost quintupled.
In this section
»All change
No change
Nuclear winter
Off their trolleys
Hornets’ nest
Reprints
Related topics
China
International relations
Chinese politics
Asia-Pacific politics
Political policy
Many foreigners also prospered. American foreign direct investment reaps returns of 13.5% in China, compared with 9.7% worldwide, according to K.C. Fung of the University of California, Santa Cruz. China imposes lower tariffs on average than Brazil or India. The gap between what it can charge, under WTO rules, and what it does charge is also unusually small. So unlike its peers, China could not raise tariffs much even if it wanted to (see chart).
Yet in America, China’s single biggest trading partner, sentiment towards the country has turned starkly negative. In a recent poll, 61% of Americans said that China’s recent economic expansion had been bad for America; just 15% thought it had been good. This partly reflects China’s controversial currency regime. By keeping the exchange rate down, China’s critics allege, it has gained a substitute for the mercantilist measures it gave up to join the WTO.
Foreign frustration is partly a sign of China’s success. As its economy has grown and matured, the stakes have risen. Foreign firms lament losing trade battles they might not bother to wage in a less lucrative market. They also face competition from local upstarts in markets where no such rivals previously existed.
Electronic payments are one example. China’s first ever payment card was issued in 1986 by MasterCard. Foreign brands remained dominant at the time of China’s WTO entry. But shortly afterwards, China’s central bank established a domestic competitor, China UnionPay, and gave it a de facto monopoly over the handling of local-currency payments between merchants and banks. This setback might have been easier to take for foreign companies had the market not since grown tenfold, to $1.6 trillion, according to The Nilson Report, an industry newsletter.
China’s economy has evolved faster than anyone hoped. But its economic philosophy has not. Long Yongtu, who helped China win admission to the WTO, recently said that China is now moving further away from the organisation’s principles. To modernise its economy, it has remained wedded to industrial policies, state-owned enterprises, and a “techno-nationalism” that protects and promotes home-grown technologies.
Many foreign companies feel they must compete not with Chinese firms but with the Chinese state. Between them, China’s central and local governments own over 100,000 companies and implicitly favour many more. Thanks to the WTO, foreign firms are no longer required to hand over technology in exchange for entry to China’s market. But many still feel an informal pressure to do so. China is also keen to promote its own firms by enforcing its own technological standards, such as for 3G mobile phones.
Many of these interventions violate the spirit, if not always the letter of WTO rules. In response, America often pushes back bilaterally rather than in Geneva, according to a former American trade negotiator. This is partly because companies worry they will face retribution from China’s government if they provide evidence against it in a trade case. It is also because much of what China does falls into a grey area that is not easy for the WTO to police.
China, on the other hand, is growing more comfortable with the WTO machinery. In its early years as a member, it shied away from confrontation, points out Henry Gao of Singapore Management University. In 2006, for example, America threatened to file a complaint over China’s duties on kraft linerboard. China lifted the duties the next working day. But now the Chinese have learned the ropes, they have also become more proactive. “Now they defend themselves,” says Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute, a Washington think-tank. “They initiate cases. And when they lose, they comply.”
In some cases the discrimination is no worse than before, it is simply more visible. As part of its WTO agreement, China now circulates draft laws and regulations for 30 days to collect comments. That has made it easier for foreigners to spot foul play. America recently complained that China had failed to notify the WTO of nearly 200 subsidy programmes, such as those supporting green-energy technology. It knew this in part because China, following its newly transparent practice, had disclosed many such programmes online, the former negotiator said: “Similar policy announcements were neibu (for limited distribution) in the past.”
China’s trade policies may look a little uglier than WTO members had hoped when they opened the club’s doors ten years ago. But that is partly because the lights have been turned on.
翻译：
世界贸易组织，就像许多其他组织一样，反对会员拥有自动重新加入该组织的权力。 在前任（指民国政府）在1949年社会主义革命只有退出WTO之后，中国在80年代重新申请加入之后，又等了15年。 在2001年12月11日，10年前的这个星期，重新加入WTO。
重新加入的代价就像等待的时间一样大。中国不得不见面了7000项关税，配额和其他贸易障碍。 有些人担心与外国的竞争会使农民流离失所，并且颠覆迟钝的国有企业，在某种程度上这样的事情的确发生了。但是，总体上，中国正在经历全球经济史上最好的十年，美元GDP是过去的4倍，出国几乎是5倍。
许多外国人也准备好了。据加州大学圣克鲁兹分校的K.C. Fung所说，美国海外直接投资在中国获得了13.5%的回报，相比于在世界范围内，这个数字为9.7%。中国相较于巴西和印度，施行更低的关税。 在WTO规则下可以征收的关税和中国实际征收的关税之间的差距额异常的小。 于其他国家不同， 中国即使想提高关税也做不到。（见图）（LZ问个问题：为啥中国可以征收的最高关税那么少。。。）
在美国，中国是最大的贸易伙伴，美国对此的观点表现出了毫无掩饰的悲观。在最近的民意测验中，61%的美国人认为中国最近的经济发展对美国有害；只有15%的认为有利。这也部分反映出了中国富有争议的货币制度。因为保持人了较低的汇率，中国的批评家断言，中国正在用另一种方式进行在加入WTO时放弃的贸易保护主义。
外国遭受的挫折也部分表明了中国的成功。 随着经济的增长和成熟，风险正在上升。外国企业哀叹在并不担心在一个不再那么有利可图的市场上，他们输掉了贸易战争。同时，他们在市场上面临的以前从未有过的当地的新崛起的企业的竞争。
电子支付是一个例子。中国的第一张支付卡又MasterCard在1986年发行。外国品牌在中国刚加入WTO是依旧占据着支配地位。但是很快，中国中央银行，建立的国内的竞争者，银联，并且在处理商人与银行间以当地货币的支付时，给予其实际上的垄断地位。 根据Nilson Report, 外国企业在这个史无前例的增长了10倍，到1.6万亿美元的市场上却更容易退步。
中国的经济发展速度超过了任何人的预期。但是经济哲学却没有相应的发展。龙永图，帮助中国加入WTO的人，最近说中国正在于世贸组织的为了原则渐行渐远。为了现代化经济，中国对产业政策，国有企业和旨在保护并发展本土科技的“科技保护主义”依旧执着。
许多外国企业认为他们不仅要与中国公司竞争还要与中国政府竞争。 在他们之间，中国的中央和地方政府，拥有超过100000家，以及多的多的隐形的国有企业。因为WTO，外国企业在进入中国市场是不在于要以技术作为交换。但是许多企业依然感到无形的压力。中国也热衷于通过强行推广自己的科技标准，如3G手机，来发展自己的企业。
许多措施违背了WTO的精神，如果不是WTO的规则。作为回应，美国经常采用双边的方式，而不是在日内瓦解决问题，一个前任美国贸易官员表示。这部分是因为，企业担心他们一旦提供了证据，他们可能招致中国政府的报复。而且，中国做的许多事情落在一个灰色的区域，WTO并不容易裁决。
中国，在另一方面，在WTO机制发展融洽。在成为会员的早些年里，中国在对抗中退避三舍，新加坡管理大学的Henry Gao指出。例如在2006年，美国威胁对中国在牛皮卡纸上的职责提起投诉。中国在第二个工作日便执行了职责。但是现在中国学会了拉拢，也变得更加具有前瞻性。“现在他们保护自己，”一个华盛顿智库，Peterson Institute的Nicholas Lardy说，“现在他们会发起调查。他们输了，再执行。”
在许多案例中，贸易歧视没有比以前更早，只是更加显而易见。作为WTO共识的一部分，中国现在会传播法律和规范草案30天以收集评论。这使得外国公司更容易现场犯规（为毛。。求解释。。）。美国最近抱怨中国在将近200项补贴项目上没有通知WTO，比如针对绿色能源技术的支持。这些能够被知道部分是以为中国最近在进行透明化尝试，在网上公开了许多这样的项目，以前的官员说道，“相似的政策声明以前只能在较小的范围传播。”
中国的贸易政策也许比WTO会员们在10年前向中国打开大门时所希望的更肮脏一些。但是这部分是因为灯被打开了。。
翻译：
世界贸易组织，就像许多其他组织一样，反对会员拥有自动重新加入该组织的权力。 在前任（指民国政府）在1949年社会主义革命只有退出WTO之后，中国在80年代重新申请加入之后，又等了15年。 在2001年12月11日，10年前的这个星期，重新加入WTO。
重新加入的代价就像等待的时间一样大。中国不得不见面了7000项关税，配额和其他贸易障碍。 有些人担心与外国的竞争会使农民流离失所，并且颠覆迟钝的国有企业，在某种程度上这样的事情的确发生了。但是，总体上，中国正在经历全球经济史上最好的十年，美元GDP是过去的4倍，出国几乎是5倍。
许多外国人也准备好了。据加州大学圣克鲁兹分校的K.C. Fung所说，美国海外直接投资在中国获得了13.5%的回报，相比于在世界范围内，这个数字为9.7%。中国相较于巴西和印度，施行更低的关税。 在WTO规则下可以征收的关税和中国实际征收的关税之间的差距额异常的小。 于其他国家不同， 中国即使想提高关税也做不到。（见图）（LZ问个问题：为啥中国可以征收的最高关税那么少。。。）
在美国，中国是最大的贸易伙伴，美国对此的观点表现出了毫无掩饰的悲观。在最近的民意测验中，61%的美国人认为中国最近的经济发展对美国有害；只有15%的认为有利。这也部分反映出了中国富有争议的货币制度。因为保持人了较低的汇率，中国的批评家断言，中国正在用另一种方式进行在加入WTO时放弃的贸易保护主义。
外国遭受的挫折也部分表明了中国的成功。 随着经济的增长和成熟，风险正在上升。外国企业哀叹在并不担心在一个不再那么有利可图的市场上，他们输掉了贸易战争。同时，他们在市场上面临的以前从未有过的当地的新崛起的企业的竞争。
电子支付是一个例子。中国的第一张支付卡又MasterCard在1986年发行。外国品牌在中国刚加入WTO是依旧占据着支配地位。但是很快，中国中央银行，建立的国内的竞争者，银联，并且在处理商人与银行间以当地货币的支付时，给予其实际上的垄断地位。 根据Nilson Report, 外国企业在这个史无前例的增长了10倍，到1.6万亿美元的市场上却更容易退步。
中国的经济发展速度超过了任何人的预期。但是经济哲学却没有相应的发展。龙永图，帮助中国加入WTO的人，最近说中国正在于世贸组织的为了原则渐行渐远。为了现代化经济，中国对产业政策，国有企业和旨在保护并发展本土科技的“科技保护主义”依旧执着。
许多外国企业认为他们不仅要与中国公司竞争还要与中国政府竞争。 在他们之间，中国的中央和地方政府，拥有超过100000家，以及多的多的隐形的国有企业。因为WTO，外国企业在进入中国市场是不在于要以技术作为交换。但是许多企业依然感到无形的压力。中国也热衷于通过强行推广自己的科技标准，如3G手机，来发展自己的企业。
许多措施违背了WTO的精神，如果不是WTO的规则。作为回应，美国经常采用双边的方式，而不是在日内瓦解决问题，一个前任美国贸易官员表示。这部分是因为，企业担心他们一旦提供了证据，他们可能招致中国政府的报复。而且，中国做的许多事情落在一个灰色的区域，WTO并不容易裁决。
中国，在另一方面，在WTO机制发展融洽。在成为会员的早些年里，中国在对抗中退避三舍，新加坡管理大学的Henry Gao指出。例如在2006年，美国威胁对中国在牛皮卡纸上的职责提起投诉。中国在第二个工作日便执行了职责。但是现在中国学会了拉拢，也变得更加具有前瞻性。“现在他们保护自己，”一个华盛顿智库，Peterson Institute的Nicholas Lardy说，“现在他们会发起调查。他们输了，再执行。”
在许多案例中，贸易歧视没有比以前更早，只是更加显而易见。作为WTO共识的一部分，中国现在会传播法律和规范草案30天以收集评论。这使得外国公司更容易现场犯规（为毛。。求解释。。）。美国最近抱怨中国在将近200项补贴项目上没有通知WTO，比如针对绿色能源技术的支持。这些能够被知道部分是以为中国最近在进行透明化尝试，在网上公开了许多这样的项目，以前的官员说道，“相似的政策声明以前只能在较小的范围传播。”
中国的贸易政策也许比WTO会员们在10年前向中国打开大门时所希望的更肮脏一些。但是这部分是因为灯被打开了。。
擦。。。有一点丢了。。
老腔老调了。要求翻译点像东方那样有深度的，一些老腔老调就算了
这么早就放假…
第二篇，链接：h tt p://w w w.economist.com/node/21541461
原文
WHEN trying to persuade Congress in 2000 that China should be let into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), America’s then president, Bill Clinton, knew how to win over the sceptics. China’s admission, he said, was likely to have “a profound impact on human rights and political liberty”. A decade on, China’s disappointed liberals no longer suggest that freer trade will speed political reform.
China’s media have been trumpeting the tenth anniversary on December 11th of the country’s WTO accession. In China as much as in America, the event was seen as of far greater importance than a mere pledge by China to reduce barriers to its markets (moves towards which had long been under way). For both countries it was a crucial part of restoring calm to a relationship that had been marred by annual fights in Congress over whether to keep granting China most-favoured-nation trading status (as enjoyed by most of America’s other trading partners). Mr Clinton’s remarks preceded bitterly contested votes in Congress in 2000 that ended the annual renewal process and ensured America would share any benefits from the market-opening measures pledged by China on entering the WTO.
In this section
All change
»No change
Nuclear winter
Off their trolleys
Hornets’ nest
Reprints
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United States
Bill Clinton
China
International relations
Chinese politics
Chinese officials did not share Mr Clinton’s belief in what he called the “quite extraordinary” change that the WTO would bring about in China, politically as well as economically. Such views were bolstered in the West by supportive comments from some Chinese dissidents. (“Before, the sky was black; now it is light. This can be a new beginning,” Mr Clinton quoted one of them, Ren Wanding, as saying.)
But even the man seen by many in the West as China’s arch (economic) reformer, the then prime minister Zhu Rongji, had no truck with such views. A recent four-volume set of Mr Zhu’s speeches, including many not previously published, shows him to have shared hardliners’ concerns about perceived Western efforts to undermine Communist Party rule in China. “Western hostile forces are continuing to promote their strategy of Westernising and breaking up our country,” he told provincial officials in one now-declassified speech, four months after China had joined the WTO. He accused such people of conducting “infiltration and sabotage” in an effort to foment instability, pointing to large-scale protests early in 2002 by workers in state-owned enterprises (independent observers detected little if any sign of foreign involvement).
Mr Zhu’s reformist zeal in the economic realm helped to foster the impression of a country willing to take considerable political risks in order to create a more market-driven economy. The then party chief, Jiang Zemin, was also pushing through a controversial revision to the party’s constitution to allow owners of private businesses to become members. But high hopes among some Chinese liberals faded as the decade wore on.
Cao Siyuan, who heads an independent think-tank in Beijing, says he and like-minded intellectuals were “over-optimistic” about the ability of the WTO to promote further change, such as the development of a robust and independent legal system. The last decade has seen huge social changes, but these have been a legacy mainly of pre-WTO membership reforms, such as the privatisation of housing and the loosening of controls on internal migration.
And with the Communist Party again facing a big leadership shuffle next year, few believe that long-neglected political reforms will be revived any time soon. Mr Cao has recently published a call for a “division of powers” within the party as a step towards making China more democratic. He claims many in the party support such a notion, but do not dare say so openly. Mr Cao says police stopped him from leaving his home during the visit to Beijing in August by America’s vice-president, Joseph Biden.
In his speech in 2000, Mr Clinton said that WTO membership would accelerate the shrinkage of the state-owned sector which had been “a big source of the Communist Party’s power”. This, he said, would lead to “profound change”. Many liberals complain, however, that remaining state firms not only still control the commanding heights of the economy but are in some cases stepping up their resistance to encroachment by the private sector. In recent years officials have increased their efforts to ensure that party cells are set up in private firms. Several local governments have started requiring private companies to contribute about 0.5% of their payrolls to sponsor party activities on their premises.
Such was the seeming status symbol of WTO membership a decade ago that few in China openly criticised the decision. A Beijing academic, Han Deqiang, was a rare exception. His book, “Collision: the Globalisation Trap and China’s Real Choice”, gave warning of an American plot to use the WTO to “Westernise” China. He remains a fierce critic. Karl Marx, he says, would have agreed with the view that economic liberalisation leads to political change. “It’s a matter of time,” he says. Perhaps Mr Clinton can draw comfort.
翻译
在2000年说服国会中国应该被允许加入WTO时，当时的总统，拉链哥，知道如何赢得怀疑论这。 他说，中国的加入，将有很能回中国热很全和政治自由产生深远影响。十年过去了，中国令人失望的自由不在说明更自由的贸易会加速政治改革。
中国媒体已经在吹嘘中国加入WTO的十周年。 这件事（入市）不进对中国，也对美国，有这样远比仅仅由中国许诺减少市场阻碍有大的多的重要性。对这两个国家而言，中国入市是使已经因为为是否给予中国最惠国待遇（大多数美国的其他贸易伙伴也喜欢）在国会引发的年复一年的争吵而导致受损的两国关系恢复平静的关键部分。在2000年，拉链哥的言辞终于领先了那些苦涩的国会怀疑者的选票，使得这个每年重申的议题得以终结，也保证了美国得以享受中国承诺开放市场的一切好处。
中国官员并没有让拉链哥关于WTO将给中国经济和政治带来非常非凡的改变的想法实现。这个观点在西方得到了中国是不同证件者的支持。（“之前，天是黑的；现在，天亮了。这可以作为一个新的开始。”拉链哥引用了她们，Ren Wanding 说。）
但是即使是被许多西方人是为中国经济改革者的前总理，朱相，对这些观点也不感冒。最近的朱相的四卷演说，包括许多以前没有出版的，显示他了他的强硬路线对于感知到了西方在中国破坏GCD的努力的担忧。“西方敌对势力在持续发展他们的西方化策略并且在试图分裂我们的国家，”他在一个已经被删除的演说中对省级官员说。四个月之后，中国加入了WTO。针对2002年国有企业员工的大规模抗议，他指责这些人在进行“渗透和破坏”以制造不稳定。
朱相的在经济王国里的改革热潮帮助培养了人们对这个国家愿意冒可观的政治风险以创造一个更加以市场为导向的经济的印象。 当时的党主席，386，也推动了一个富有争议的修正案，允许私人商业的拥有成为党员。（以前不行么。。。？还是我翻译错了）。但是有关中国自由的高度期望在十年间随着时间的流逝而消逝。
曹思源，一个北京独立智库的总裁，他和其他有相似想法的人对WTO带来更深层改变的能力“过于乐观”，比如健康独立的司法系统的发展。最近的时间已经发生了巨大的社会改变，但这是在成为WTO会员前改革的遗产，比如房屋私有化和内部移民的宽松管理。
这些是很少有人公开批评的十年前WTO会员表面地位的象征。一个北京学者，韩德强，是一个很好的例外。他的说，“碰撞--全球化陷阱与中国现实选择”，给出了美国打算利用WTO“西方化”中国的警告。他进行了凶猛的批评。他说，马克思回同意经济开放导致政治变化的观点。“这是时间问题。”他说。也许拉链哥可以感到安慰了。。。。
原文
WHEN trying to persuade Congress in 2000 that China should be let into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), America’s then president, Bill Clinton, knew how to win over the sceptics. China’s admission, he said, was likely to have “a profound impact on human rights and political liberty”. A decade on, China’s disappointed liberals no longer suggest that freer trade will speed political reform.
China’s media have been trumpeting the tenth anniversary on December 11th of the country’s WTO accession. In China as much as in America, the event was seen as of far greater importance than a mere pledge by China to reduce barriers to its markets (moves towards which had long been under way). For both countries it was a crucial part of restoring calm to a relationship that had been marred by annual fights in Congress over whether to keep granting China most-favoured-nation trading status (as enjoyed by most of America’s other trading partners). Mr Clinton’s remarks preceded bitterly contested votes in Congress in 2000 that ended the annual renewal process and ensured America would share any benefits from the market-opening measures pledged by China on entering the WTO.
In this section
All change
»No change
Nuclear winter
Off their trolleys
Hornets’ nest
Reprints
Related topics
United States
Bill Clinton
China
International relations
Chinese politics
Chinese officials did not share Mr Clinton’s belief in what he called the “quite extraordinary” change that the WTO would bring about in China, politically as well as economically. Such views were bolstered in the West by supportive comments from some Chinese dissidents. (“Before, the sky was black; now it is light. This can be a new beginning,” Mr Clinton quoted one of them, Ren Wanding, as saying.)
But even the man seen by many in the West as China’s arch (economic) reformer, the then prime minister Zhu Rongji, had no truck with such views. A recent four-volume set of Mr Zhu’s speeches, including many not previously published, shows him to have shared hardliners’ concerns about perceived Western efforts to undermine Communist Party rule in China. “Western hostile forces are continuing to promote their strategy of Westernising and breaking up our country,” he told provincial officials in one now-declassified speech, four months after China had joined the WTO. He accused such people of conducting “infiltration and sabotage” in an effort to foment instability, pointing to large-scale protests early in 2002 by workers in state-owned enterprises (independent observers detected little if any sign of foreign involvement).
Mr Zhu’s reformist zeal in the economic realm helped to foster the impression of a country willing to take considerable political risks in order to create a more market-driven economy. The then party chief, Jiang Zemin, was also pushing through a controversial revision to the party’s constitution to allow owners of private businesses to become members. But high hopes among some Chinese liberals faded as the decade wore on.
Cao Siyuan, who heads an independent think-tank in Beijing, says he and like-minded intellectuals were “over-optimistic” about the ability of the WTO to promote further change, such as the development of a robust and independent legal system. The last decade has seen huge social changes, but these have been a legacy mainly of pre-WTO membership reforms, such as the privatisation of housing and the loosening of controls on internal migration.
And with the Communist Party again facing a big leadership shuffle next year, few believe that long-neglected political reforms will be revived any time soon. Mr Cao has recently published a call for a “division of powers” within the party as a step towards making China more democratic. He claims many in the party support such a notion, but do not dare say so openly. Mr Cao says police stopped him from leaving his home during the visit to Beijing in August by America’s vice-president, Joseph Biden.
In his speech in 2000, Mr Clinton said that WTO membership would accelerate the shrinkage of the state-owned sector which had been “a big source of the Communist Party’s power”. This, he said, would lead to “profound change”. Many liberals complain, however, that remaining state firms not only still control the commanding heights of the economy but are in some cases stepping up their resistance to encroachment by the private sector. In recent years officials have increased their efforts to ensure that party cells are set up in private firms. Several local governments have started requiring private companies to contribute about 0.5% of their payrolls to sponsor party activities on their premises.
Such was the seeming status symbol of WTO membership a decade ago that few in China openly criticised the decision. A Beijing academic, Han Deqiang, was a rare exception. His book, “Collision: the Globalisation Trap and China’s Real Choice”, gave warning of an American plot to use the WTO to “Westernise” China. He remains a fierce critic. Karl Marx, he says, would have agreed with the view that economic liberalisation leads to political change. “It’s a matter of time,” he says. Perhaps Mr Clinton can draw comfort.
翻译
在2000年说服国会中国应该被允许加入WTO时，当时的总统，拉链哥，知道如何赢得怀疑论这。 他说，中国的加入，将有很能回中国热很全和政治自由产生深远影响。十年过去了，中国令人失望的自由不在说明更自由的贸易会加速政治改革。
中国媒体已经在吹嘘中国加入WTO的十周年。 这件事（入市）不进对中国，也对美国，有这样远比仅仅由中国许诺减少市场阻碍有大的多的重要性。对这两个国家而言，中国入市是使已经因为为是否给予中国最惠国待遇（大多数美国的其他贸易伙伴也喜欢）在国会引发的年复一年的争吵而导致受损的两国关系恢复平静的关键部分。在2000年，拉链哥的言辞终于领先了那些苦涩的国会怀疑者的选票，使得这个每年重申的议题得以终结，也保证了美国得以享受中国承诺开放市场的一切好处。
中国官员并没有让拉链哥关于WTO将给中国经济和政治带来非常非凡的改变的想法实现。这个观点在西方得到了中国是不同证件者的支持。（“之前，天是黑的；现在，天亮了。这可以作为一个新的开始。”拉链哥引用了她们，Ren Wanding 说。）
但是即使是被许多西方人是为中国经济改革者的前总理，朱相，对这些观点也不感冒。最近的朱相的四卷演说，包括许多以前没有出版的，显示他了他的强硬路线对于感知到了西方在中国破坏GCD的努力的担忧。“西方敌对势力在持续发展他们的西方化策略并且在试图分裂我们的国家，”他在一个已经被删除的演说中对省级官员说。四个月之后，中国加入了WTO。针对2002年国有企业员工的大规模抗议，他指责这些人在进行“渗透和破坏”以制造不稳定。
朱相的在经济王国里的改革热潮帮助培养了人们对这个国家愿意冒可观的政治风险以创造一个更加以市场为导向的经济的印象。 当时的党主席，386，也推动了一个富有争议的修正案，允许私人商业的拥有成为党员。（以前不行么。。。？还是我翻译错了）。但是有关中国自由的高度期望在十年间随着时间的流逝而消逝。
曹思源，一个北京独立智库的总裁，他和其他有相似想法的人对WTO带来更深层改变的能力“过于乐观”，比如健康独立的司法系统的发展。最近的时间已经发生了巨大的社会改变，但这是在成为WTO会员前改革的遗产，比如房屋私有化和内部移民的宽松管理。
这些是很少有人公开批评的十年前WTO会员表面地位的象征。一个北京学者，韩德强，是一个很好的例外。他的说，“碰撞--全球化陷阱与中国现实选择”，给出了美国打算利用WTO“西方化”中国的警告。他进行了凶猛的批评。他说，马克思回同意经济开放导致政治变化的观点。“这是时间问题。”他说。也许拉链哥可以感到安慰了。。。。
最近的寒假这么早放 哦，LZ米有忽悠我们吧我觉得英语还好了，高中以上都看得差不多，有点单词看不明白也没有关系
主要是招募一些懂德语，日语，法语，俄语这些中国的贸易伙伴或者关系重要的国家的翻译