F-22真相？MSNBC新闻，搬运自youtube

并不是那样不值一文，毕竟爱抚娘娘是首架隐形战斗机。

并不是那样不值一文，毕竟爱抚娘娘是首架隐形战斗机。

美国小白兔论？

xiao1201 发表于 2011-1-16 10:53


    你没见过就没有了，F22雨天也出勤的

不知道是否是真的

回复 4# 左耳日右耳月

至少视频里的评论员mm是这样说的，感觉kc也太白了。

人云亦云而已吧，老美的数据链有名的好，会不能相互沟通？要有也是防泄密的防火墙吧？数控机床又没禁运，制造精度有这么差么？

唱衰党，是不是后面还带有研制新飞机克制20啊

- 每架F22都是獨立的，無法跟其他戰機溝通

扯什么蛋呐

太白了，不敢相信，个人认为可信度不大。。

每架F22都是獨立的，無法跟其他戰機溝通

太假了，简直就是张局长的美国版~

丝带出来后米帝使着劲的黑自家的两两？当年吹上天的时候去哪了？考虑下人家RAPTOR飞行员心理的自豪感吧。。。

f22只有这个作用

给采购F-35造势的，F-22几百亿美元都嚷嚷，为的是上3000多亿美元的大白象F-35

每架F-22都是独立的是真的，量实在太少了，分包的厂商太多。

给采购F-35造势的，F-22几百亿美元都嚷嚷，为的是上3000多亿美元的大白象F-35

每架F-22都是独立的是真的，量实在太少了，分包的厂商太多。

忽悠的有点儿过了

每架F22都是獨立的，無法跟其他戰機溝通

不写这条多好，还会有人信

美版战忽局

可信度不大

美国的战略忽悠局发话了

zhj02002 发表于 2011-1-16 11:27


    不用奇怪，相互学习么:D

歼—20 发表于 2011-1-16 11:31


    不知道歼20受不受得了双飞。

这个不是新闻了，是一年多以前的一个Rachel Maddow show。不管说得是不是真的，F22都正在走下神坛。
一架3.56亿美元，187架，一共是接近700亿美元。真是天文数字。

左耳日右耳月 发表于 2011-1-16 11:03

你找到一个雨天出动的图片不就可以打脸了吗？

这鸡巴是MD放的烟雾弹吧!估计是吓唬其它国家的,不想让别人搞四代吧?就像以前坑老毛子的航母一样!

米鳖甭想忽悠我们,低估土鳖反忽悠能力的国家是要进垃圾桶的

还是好的，md打自己脸是媒体绝招。何况也许就是武器生产商想拨款了

MD的战悠局过来学习学习先进经验吧，业务水平太低了

美国的战略忽悠局

分离器 发表于 2011-1-16 12:56


    f35和f22一起来

Skin problems -- often requiring re-gluing small surfaces that can take more than a day to dry （需要重新粘黏的小区域需要花费一天以上的时间干燥） -- helped force more frequent and time-consuming repairs, according to the confidential data drawn from tests conducted by the Pentagon's independent Office of Operational Test and Evaluation between 2004 and 2008.

Over the four-year period, the F-22's average maintenance time per hour of flight grew from 20 hours to 34, with skin repairs accounting for more than half of that time -- and more than half the hourly flying costs -- last year, according to the test and evaluation office.

The Air Force says the F-22 cost $44,259 per flying hour in 2008; the Office of the Secretary of Defense said the figure was $49,808. The F-15, the F-22's predecessor, has a fleet average cost of $30,818.

'Compromises'

Darrol Olsen, a specialist in stealth coatings who worked at Lockheed's testing laboratory in Marietta, Ga., from 1995 to 1999, said the current troubles are unsurprising. In a lawsuit filed under seal in 2007, he charged the company with violating the False Claims Act for ordering and using coatings that it knew were defective while hiding the failings from the Air Force.

He has cited a July 1998 report that said test results "yield the same problems as documented previously" in the skin's quality and durability, and another in December that year saying, "Baseline coatings failed." A Lockheed briefing that September assured the Air Force that the effort was "meeting requirements with optimized products."
"When I got into this thing . . . I could not believe the compromises" made by Lockheed to meet the Air Force's request for quick results, said Olsen, who had a top-secret clearance. "I suggested we go to the Air Force and tell them we had some difficulties . . . and they would not do that. I was squashed. I knew from the get-go that this material was bad, that this correcting it in the field was never going to work."
Olsen, who said Lockheed fired him over a medical leave, heard from colleagues as recently as 2005 that problems persisted with coatings and radar absorbing materials in the plane's skin, including what one described as vulnerability to rain. Invited to join his lawsuit, the Justice Department filed a court notice last month saying it was not doing so "at this time" -- a term that means it is still investigating the matter, according to a department spokesman.

Ahern said the Pentagon could not comment on the allegations. Lockheed spokeswoman Mary Jo Polidore said that "the issues raised in the complaint are at least 10 years old," and that the plane meets or exceeds requirements established by the Air Force. "We deny Mr. Olsen's allegations and will vigorously defend this matter."

There have been other legal complications. In late 2005, Boeing learned of defects in titanium booms connecting the wings to the plane （波音了解到连接机翼和机身的钛梁柱存在缺陷）, which the company, in a subsequent lawsuit against its supplier, said posed the risk of "catastrophic loss of the aircraft." But rather than shut down the production line -- an act that would have incurred large Air Force penalties -- Boeing reached an accord with the Air Force to resolve the problem through increased inspections over the life of the fleet, with expenses to be mostly paid by the Air Force.

Sprey said engineers who worked on it told him that because of Lockheed's use of hundreds of subcontractors, quality control was so poor that workers had to create a "shim line" at the Georgia plant where they retooled badly designed or poorly manufactured components. "Each plane wound up with all these hand-fitted parts that caused huge fits in maintenance," he said. "They were not interchangeable."

Polidore confirmed that some early parts required modifications but denied that such a shim line existed and said "our supplier base is the best in the industry."

The plane's million-dollar radar-absorbing canopy has also caused problems, with a stuck hatch imprisoning a pilot for hours in 2006 and engineers unable to extend the canopy's lifespan beyond about 18 months of flying time. It delaminates, "loses its strength and finish," said an official privy to Air Force data.

In the interview, Ahern and Air Force Gen. C.D. Moore confirmed that canopy visibility has been declining more rapidly than expected, with brown spots and peeling forcing $120,000 refurbishments at 331 hours of flying time, on average, instead of the stipulated 800 hours.

There has been some gradual progress. At the plane's first operational flight test in September 2004, it fully met two of 22 key requirements and had a total of 351 deficiencies; in 2006, it fully met five; in 2008, when squadrons were deployed at six U.S. bases, it fully met seven.

"It flunked on suitability measures -- availability, reliability, and maintenance," said Christie about the first of those tests. "There was no consequence. It did not faze anybody who was in the decision loop" for approving the plane's full production. This outcome was hardly unique, Christie adds. During his tenure in the job from 2001 to 2005, "16 or 17 major weapons systems flunked" during initial operational tests, and "not one was stopped as a result."

"I don't accept that this is still early in the program," Christie said, explaining that he does not recall a plane with such a low capability to fulfill its mission due to maintenance problems at this point in its tenure as the F-22. The Pentagon said 64 percent of the fleet is currently "mission capable." After four years of rigorous testing and operations, "the trends are not good," he added.

Pentagon officials respond that measuring hourly flying costs for aircraft fleets that have not reached 100,000 flying hours is problematic, because sorties become more frequent after that point; Ahern also said some improvements have been made since the 2008 testing, and added: "We're going to get better." He said the F-22s are on track to meet all of what the Air Force calls its KPP -- key performance parameters -- by next year.
But last Nov. 20, John J. Young Jr., who was then undersecretary of defense and Ahern's boss, said that officials continue to struggle with the F-22's skin. "There's clearly work that needs to be done there to make that airplane both capable and affordable to operate," he said.

When Gates decided this spring to spend $785 million on four more planes and then end production of the F-22, he also kept alive an $8 billion improvement effort. It will, among other things, give F-22 pilots the ability to communicate with other types of warplanes; it currently is the only such warplane to lack that capability.

The cancellation decision got public support from the Air Force's top two civilian and military leaders, who said the F-22 was not a top priority in a constrained budget. But the leaders' message was muddied in a June 9 letter from Air Combat Cmdr. John D.W. Corley to Chambliss that said halting production would put "execution of our current national military strategy at high risk in the near to mid-term." The right size for the fleet, he said, is 381.

Fatal Test Flight

One of the last four planes Gates supported buying is meant to replace an F-22 that crashed during a test flight north of Los Angeles on March 25, during his review of the program. The Air Force has declined to discuss the cause, but a classified internal accident report completed the following month states that the plane flew into the ground after poorly executing a high-speed run with its weapons-bay doors open, according to three government officials familiar with its contents. The Lockheed test pilot died.

Several sources said the flight was part of a bid to make the F-22 relevant to current conflicts by giving it a capability to conduct precision bombing raids, not just aerial dogfights. The Air Force is still probing who should be held accountable for the accident.

Staff writer Ellen Nakashima contributed to this report.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp ... R2009070903020.html

真相有三种~~~你的真相~~~我的真相~~~事实的真相~~~

不太可信呵呵！！

再补充一句：如果美国人用这种方式去忽悠别国也太愚蠢了。首先大国是无法忽悠的，其次无法生产F22的小国忽悠也没有用。

每架F22都是獨立的，無法跟其他戰機溝通
美国也有战忽局的，至少这条就忽悠过了。没钱没对手才是主要因素。

小心老美自爆F22的无数问题，真假掺杂，就像当初高调鼓吹航母无用论，自爆老美自己使用维护航母的难处一样，只不过是中战略忽悠。

美国的ccav么，还冒出个f-35的生产线

MD的战略忽悠局比我们张局座和秃局副差远了。

美国战略忽悠局 you土比分局的成果？  太可耻了···

我只看到了14楼。。。。。。。。。。。。

MD忽悠局的学习能力有待加强