超级军网塔利班占领一处美基地 500名美军弃械而逃
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 03:50:48
:D:D
半岛电视台11日报道说，阿富汗塔利班当天攻占了位于阿富汗东北边界地区一美军基地。
据半岛电视台报道，阿富汗塔利班前线指挥官拉赫曼11日发表新闻声明说，位于阿富汗东部的库纳尔省靠近巴基斯坦边界一美军基地已被塔利班武装完全控制。他强调，“在塔利班武装强大攻势下，美军士兵乘多架直升机撤离了该军事基地，在逃跑中美军丢下了许多武器和军事装备。”
报道说，该基地是美军设立在阿富汗东部地区众多军事基地中非常重要的一个，基地内有约500名美军和多架直升机，它负责控制巴基斯坦巴焦尔部落地区，这一地区是巴基斯坦塔利班的老巢之一。
阿拉伯新闻网11日也报道了上述消息，但驻阿富汗美军方面目前没有对此正式表态，既没有否认也没有肯定，一直保持沉默。:D:D
半岛电视台11日报道说，阿富汗塔利班当天攻占了位于阿富汗东北边界地区一美军基地。
据半岛电视台报道，阿富汗塔利班前线指挥官拉赫曼11日发表新闻声明说，位于阿富汗东部的库纳尔省靠近巴基斯坦边界一美军基地已被塔利班武装完全控制。他强调，“在塔利班武装强大攻势下，美军士兵乘多架直升机撤离了该军事基地，在逃跑中美军丢下了许多武器和军事装备。”
报道说，该基地是美军设立在阿富汗东部地区众多军事基地中非常重要的一个，基地内有约500名美军和多架直升机，它负责控制巴基斯坦巴焦尔部落地区，这一地区是巴基斯坦塔利班的老巢之一。
阿拉伯新闻网11日也报道了上述消息，但驻阿富汗美军方面目前没有对此正式表态，既没有否认也没有肯定，一直保持沉默。
半岛电视台11日报道说，阿富汗塔利班当天攻占了位于阿富汗东北边界地区一美军基地。
据半岛电视台报道，阿富汗塔利班前线指挥官拉赫曼11日发表新闻声明说，位于阿富汗东部的库纳尔省靠近巴基斯坦边界一美军基地已被塔利班武装完全控制。他强调，“在塔利班武装强大攻势下，美军士兵乘多架直升机撤离了该军事基地，在逃跑中美军丢下了许多武器和军事装备。”
报道说，该基地是美军设立在阿富汗东部地区众多军事基地中非常重要的一个，基地内有约500名美军和多架直升机，它负责控制巴基斯坦巴焦尔部落地区，这一地区是巴基斯坦塔利班的老巢之一。
阿拉伯新闻网11日也报道了上述消息，但驻阿富汗美军方面目前没有对此正式表态，既没有否认也没有肯定，一直保持沉默。:D:D
半岛电视台11日报道说，阿富汗塔利班当天攻占了位于阿富汗东北边界地区一美军基地。
据半岛电视台报道，阿富汗塔利班前线指挥官拉赫曼11日发表新闻声明说，位于阿富汗东部的库纳尔省靠近巴基斯坦边界一美军基地已被塔利班武装完全控制。他强调，“在塔利班武装强大攻势下，美军士兵乘多架直升机撤离了该军事基地，在逃跑中美军丢下了许多武器和军事装备。”
报道说，该基地是美军设立在阿富汗东部地区众多军事基地中非常重要的一个，基地内有约500名美军和多架直升机，它负责控制巴基斯坦巴焦尔部落地区，这一地区是巴基斯坦塔利班的老巢之一。
阿拉伯新闻网11日也报道了上述消息，但驻阿富汗美军方面目前没有对此正式表态，既没有否认也没有肯定，一直保持沉默。
:D:D
http://www.hamsayeh.net/hamsayeh ... onal%20news1765.htm
October 11, 2010 (Hamsayeh.Net) - Taliban fighters claimed they have forced out remnants of US troops occupying a military outpost located at a strategic cross road in Afghanistan's northeastern province of Kunar, Iran's Press TV reported today.
The base has been the site several fierce battles between Taliban and US forces in the past. Many US soldiers lost their lives trying to defend the outpost before. But today, US forces fled the military outpost after they came under an attack by Taliban fighters. US troops fled the area using helicopters to Marawara district.
Today’s development is another setback for US and NATO war efforts in Afghanistan after a string of devastating strikes on more than 150 of their supply trucks since the beginning of October. Military analysts predict both US and NATO troops would have to face an exceptionally difficult winter this year without sufficient fuel, medicine and other necessary supplies following so many successful blows on their supply convoys by the Taliban.
http://www.hamsayeh.net/hamsayeh ... onal%20news1765.htm
October 11, 2010 (Hamsayeh.Net) - Taliban fighters claimed they have forced out remnants of US troops occupying a military outpost located at a strategic cross road in Afghanistan's northeastern province of Kunar, Iran's Press TV reported today.
The base has been the site several fierce battles between Taliban and US forces in the past. Many US soldiers lost their lives trying to defend the outpost before. But today, US forces fled the military outpost after they came under an attack by Taliban fighters. US troops fled the area using helicopters to Marawara district.
Today’s development is another setback for US and NATO war efforts in Afghanistan after a string of devastating strikes on more than 150 of their supply trucks since the beginning of October. Military analysts predict both US and NATO troops would have to face an exceptionally difficult winter this year without sufficient fuel, medicine and other necessary supplies following so many successful blows on their supply convoys by the Taliban.
(This attack details has not been confirmed by the US military)
不是吧？难道是诱敌深入？
这个新鲜,不知道有多少塔利班进攻?
500人啊……个位数的直升机啊……那只能算个小据点……靠近巴基斯坦？……补给站？……估计这500人里得有不少非战斗人员……不过这批塔利班可发财了……有500人规模的补给基地啊……那么多物资啊……
500人啊……个位数的直升机啊……那只能算个小据点……靠近巴基斯坦？……补给站？……估计这500人里得有不少非战斗人员……不过这批塔利班可发财了……有500人规模的补给基地啊……那么多物资啊……
真的假的......塔利班也有内幕党和真相党？
我要是美军……就在塔利班哄抢物资时用B52投凝固汽油弹来个覆盖……{:jian:}
It costs $400 to put one gallon of gas on the ground in certain places in Afghanistan. In 2009, according to Pentagon estimates, allied forces were consuming over half a million gallons of gasoline per day, a figure that nearly doubled before the new "surge" troops began reaching the country. During the Vietnam war the Pentagon calculated that every soldier in-country represented $7,000 in the war budget. For Afghanistan that figure is $1,000,000.
For years, American logistics experts have been wrestling with this conundrum. They have developed a northern route that accounts for slightly less than a third of deliveries to Afghanistan. There are road connections from Turkmenistan, road and rail through Uzbekistan, and air links that depend on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Of course, goods have to reach the front line countries before they can be transshipped. Those nations have their own economies and needs -- restricting spare capacity -- and the inadequacy of the links into Afghanistan poses another constraint. For example, the sole rail line into the combat zone tops out at 4,000 tons per month of capacity, less than 5 percent of the U.S./NATO requirements before they began to increase in early 2009. At that time, approximately 16,000 tons per month were being delivered by air. Contracts have been let for new rail tracks and more airbases in Afghanistan but the earliest these can be finished is late in 2011. The Pakistani road network accounts for half of logistics throughput. Capacity there cannot be much expanded because the roads enter Afghanistan through difficult mountain passes. Given physical upper limits on transport, tonnage requirements constrain the size of any force that can be sustained in Afghanistan. The troop surge will nearly double NATO tonnage requirements. Thus its net effect will be to put GIs in Afghanistan at the very edge of a red zone of supply failure.
Diplomats naturally had to negotiate deals with the front line countries to permit transit of supplies. Most of those averaged a year in preparation. The arrangements with the "stans" largely restrict transit to non-lethal items. That is also true for air overflight rights, and transport of U.S. supplies across intervening nations like Russia, Georgia, Kazakstan, and Azerbaijan. Pakistan then assumes even greater importance because it has countenanced all manner of deliveries. But the truth is that the United States and its allies are at the mercy of a host of uninvolved nations with their own interests--and a major involved one (Pakistan) that has certain purposes which conflict with the American. Already Kyrgyzstan has terminated an American contract for a key airbase on the supply line, relenting only at the price of new aid offers. Others can play at that game too. And the Pakistani road closure demonstrates just how fragile is this support network.
And then there is the opposition. The Taliban have taken to raising a portion of their war budget by charging "safe passage" fees to the truckers who carry American loads through Pakistan. Or the truckers can hire warlord armies--"private contractors"--(some of whom are Taliban or fellow travelers) to guard their convoys. No pay, no play. Taliban attacks regularly destroy a portion of the trucks on the routes north from Karachi. In a major strike on the logistics net, at the end of 2009 the Taliban wrecked 160 of these trucks--only a few more than were destroyed during the period of road closure just ended. The scope for corruption is virtually unlimited, but imagine the ignominy of the United States paying the Taliban to secure the delivery of supplies, money that fuels the fight against GIs who use those supplies to attack the Taliban.
Decades ago, during the transition to John F. Kennedy's presidency, the United States stood at the brink of military intervention in Laos, a landlocked country in Southeast Asia. Outgoing President Dwight D. Eisenhower took Kennedy aside and told him quite directly that Laos was the biggest conflict on his plate. President Kennedy, who could not see any way to conduct war in Laos, instead encouraged negotiations and became a proponent of agreements reached at Geneva in 1962 that neutralized Laos.
An even more disturbing parallel is that of the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842), which bears many similarities to present circumstances. A British army entered Afghanistan from India and installed a friendly ruler in Kabul, only to be sucked into the political and security commitments required to prop up their puppet. When Afghans rose up against the imposed ruler, the British decided to withdraw from the country. At that point, the inability to supply their forces and the harsh land worked against the British-Indian army, which was almost entirely massacred before they could escape.
In the American military, the saw is that captains and majors study tactics, colonels do strategy, and generals plan logistics. But in Afghanistan, American generals have created a logistics nightmare incapable of solution, and then compounded the dilemma by demanding a surge that pushes the deployed force to the very edge of the abyss. Every indication is that the generals are already laying the groundwork to demand that deteriorating security necessitates that the Afghan withdrawal set for 2011 be cancelled or postponed. The Bush administration was happy to start the Afghan war, then sat complacently as the commitment soured. President Obama trapped himself on this dangerous path. To the recklessness of starting the Afghan war, we are in danger of adding the stupidity of not ending it. This conflict has reached the point where the failure modes are many and obvious, and the path to success obscure, under conditions where Americans are at risk. The handwriting is on the wall. To proceed further under these circumstances is to march into folly.
美军必败！;P:D 塔利班游击队必胜！！:victory::D
For years, American logistics experts have been wrestling with this conundrum. They have developed a northern route that accounts for slightly less than a third of deliveries to Afghanistan. There are road connections from Turkmenistan, road and rail through Uzbekistan, and air links that depend on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Of course, goods have to reach the front line countries before they can be transshipped. Those nations have their own economies and needs -- restricting spare capacity -- and the inadequacy of the links into Afghanistan poses another constraint. For example, the sole rail line into the combat zone tops out at 4,000 tons per month of capacity, less than 5 percent of the U.S./NATO requirements before they began to increase in early 2009. At that time, approximately 16,000 tons per month were being delivered by air. Contracts have been let for new rail tracks and more airbases in Afghanistan but the earliest these can be finished is late in 2011. The Pakistani road network accounts for half of logistics throughput. Capacity there cannot be much expanded because the roads enter Afghanistan through difficult mountain passes. Given physical upper limits on transport, tonnage requirements constrain the size of any force that can be sustained in Afghanistan. The troop surge will nearly double NATO tonnage requirements. Thus its net effect will be to put GIs in Afghanistan at the very edge of a red zone of supply failure.
Diplomats naturally had to negotiate deals with the front line countries to permit transit of supplies. Most of those averaged a year in preparation. The arrangements with the "stans" largely restrict transit to non-lethal items. That is also true for air overflight rights, and transport of U.S. supplies across intervening nations like Russia, Georgia, Kazakstan, and Azerbaijan. Pakistan then assumes even greater importance because it has countenanced all manner of deliveries. But the truth is that the United States and its allies are at the mercy of a host of uninvolved nations with their own interests--and a major involved one (Pakistan) that has certain purposes which conflict with the American. Already Kyrgyzstan has terminated an American contract for a key airbase on the supply line, relenting only at the price of new aid offers. Others can play at that game too. And the Pakistani road closure demonstrates just how fragile is this support network.
And then there is the opposition. The Taliban have taken to raising a portion of their war budget by charging "safe passage" fees to the truckers who carry American loads through Pakistan. Or the truckers can hire warlord armies--"private contractors"--(some of whom are Taliban or fellow travelers) to guard their convoys. No pay, no play. Taliban attacks regularly destroy a portion of the trucks on the routes north from Karachi. In a major strike on the logistics net, at the end of 2009 the Taliban wrecked 160 of these trucks--only a few more than were destroyed during the period of road closure just ended. The scope for corruption is virtually unlimited, but imagine the ignominy of the United States paying the Taliban to secure the delivery of supplies, money that fuels the fight against GIs who use those supplies to attack the Taliban.
Decades ago, during the transition to John F. Kennedy's presidency, the United States stood at the brink of military intervention in Laos, a landlocked country in Southeast Asia. Outgoing President Dwight D. Eisenhower took Kennedy aside and told him quite directly that Laos was the biggest conflict on his plate. President Kennedy, who could not see any way to conduct war in Laos, instead encouraged negotiations and became a proponent of agreements reached at Geneva in 1962 that neutralized Laos.
An even more disturbing parallel is that of the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842), which bears many similarities to present circumstances. A British army entered Afghanistan from India and installed a friendly ruler in Kabul, only to be sucked into the political and security commitments required to prop up their puppet. When Afghans rose up against the imposed ruler, the British decided to withdraw from the country. At that point, the inability to supply their forces and the harsh land worked against the British-Indian army, which was almost entirely massacred before they could escape.
In the American military, the saw is that captains and majors study tactics, colonels do strategy, and generals plan logistics. But in Afghanistan, American generals have created a logistics nightmare incapable of solution, and then compounded the dilemma by demanding a surge that pushes the deployed force to the very edge of the abyss. Every indication is that the generals are already laying the groundwork to demand that deteriorating security necessitates that the Afghan withdrawal set for 2011 be cancelled or postponed. The Bush administration was happy to start the Afghan war, then sat complacently as the commitment soured. President Obama trapped himself on this dangerous path. To the recklessness of starting the Afghan war, we are in danger of adding the stupidity of not ending it. This conflict has reached the point where the failure modes are many and obvious, and the path to success obscure, under conditions where Americans are at risk. The handwriting is on the wall. To proceed further under these circumstances is to march into folly.
美军必败！;P:D 塔利班游击队必胜！！:victory::D
发财啦。 我也想去做塔利班，顺道打劫美军
捞点美帝的装具回国卖，不错啊
almost entirely massacred before they could escape.
据说20,000人活着进去，一人活着出来。;P:D
据说20,000人活着进去，一人活着出来。;P:D
百团大战？战略反击？
To the recklessness of starting the Afghan war, we are in danger of adding the stupidity of not ending it. This conflict has reached the point where the failure modes are many and obvious, and the path to success obscure, under conditions where Americans are at risk. The handwriting is on the wall. To proceed further under these circumstances is to march into folly.
gustov 发表于 2010-10-12 09:47 
《绿色贝蕾帽》中有过北越军攻下美军基地后美军用炮舰机把他们全歼在基地中，不过现实中对手恐怕不会那么蠢。
《绿色贝蕾帽》中有过北越军攻下美军基地后美军用炮舰机把他们全歼在基地中，不过现实中对手恐怕不会那么蠢。
塔利班击退500美军的可能性为0
汝儿乃我 发表于 2010-10-12 10:06
等美军出来证实啦。有点当年西贡的感觉。;P:D
等美军出来证实啦。有点当年西贡的感觉。;P:D
《绿色贝蕾帽》中有过北越军攻下美军基地后美军用炮舰机把他们全歼在基地中，不过现实中对手恐怕不会那 ...
战争狂人萨谢思 发表于 2010-10-12 10:06
为啥不能……如果是补给基地的话就更好办了……在弹药库油料库装好炸药遥控引爆……在空中的直升机上远远地盘旋看着……等TLB一进来……大拇指一动……轰……都上天了……[:a4:]
《绿色贝蕾帽》中有过北越军攻下美军基地后美军用炮舰机把他们全歼在基地中，不过现实中对手恐怕不会那 ...
战争狂人萨谢思 发表于 2010-10-12 10:06
为啥不能……如果是补给基地的话就更好办了……在弹药库油料库装好炸药遥控引爆……在空中的直升机上远远地盘旋看着……等TLB一进来……大拇指一动……轰……都上天了……[:a4:]
gustov 发表于 2010-10-12 10:11
对手不会真把所有人都拉进去抢物资，这种事找部分人去做就行了。
对手不会真把所有人都拉进去抢物资，这种事找部分人去做就行了。
以前有过多次了，美军进行基地调整，放弃的基地塔利班进入后就宣称是自己占领了， 无聊
土鸡8：0土鳖，塔利班大胜500米军，上帝也疯狂.....真相内幕V5
不知道会不会有人说这是MD的战略转移{:cha:}{:cha:}{:cha:}
一切不利MD的消息都是本小菜喜闻乐见的
一切不利MD的消息都是本小菜喜闻乐见的
对手不会真把所有人都拉进去抢物资，这种事找部分人去做就行了。
战争狂人萨谢思 发表于 2010-10-12 10:15
能炸多少是多少……没进去的周边其他进攻部队……轰炸机常规航弹覆盖……反正要尽量多的杀伤……物资一星半点也不能资敌……{:jian:}
再说塔利班的进攻集群一般都是好几个组织、部族组成的……胜利后哄抢的可能性不是没有……解放军纪律那么严明……解放战争时不也出现过部队间抢战利品的事么……{:qiliang:}
对手不会真把所有人都拉进去抢物资，这种事找部分人去做就行了。
战争狂人萨谢思 发表于 2010-10-12 10:15
能炸多少是多少……没进去的周边其他进攻部队……轰炸机常规航弹覆盖……反正要尽量多的杀伤……物资一星半点也不能资敌……{:jian:}
再说塔利班的进攻集群一般都是好几个组织、部族组成的……胜利后哄抢的可能性不是没有……解放军纪律那么严明……解放战争时不也出现过部队间抢战利品的事么……{:qiliang:}
内外开花，美国人已然是惊弓之鸟 :D:D
Tangled Tale on American Found in Afghanistan
By ALISSA J. RUBIN
Published: October 11, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/1 ... gewanted=1&_r=1
KABUL, Afghanistan — As an American military patrol walked through a rural, Taliban-dominated district of Kandahar Province recently, a man wearing local clothes came toward them shouting, “Don’t shoot, I am an American!”
He asked for their protection, saying that he had been abducted by the Taliban and held for months but had finally managed to escape, according to Western officials in Kabul.
That is one version of his story.
It is not the one told by local villagers, elders and Taliban in the Zheri District of Kandahar. They say that he sought out the Taliban and was treated less as a hostage than as a supporter, and that he openly traveled with them on motorcycles around the district. A tall African-American, he cut an unmistakable figure, they said.
Much remains mysterious about the man, identified as Takuma Owuo-Hagood, not least his motivations for going to Afghanistan. The Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Mr. Owuo-Hagood entered the country June 23, a little more than three months before he surfaced.
He is now back home, in the Atlanta area. Family members reached there said Mr. Owuo-Hagood, a 25-year-old husband and father, was a baggage handler for Delta with business aspirations. They said that he had tried to make money traveling to China and Turkey to buy clothes for resale back home, and that he had been drawn to Afghanistan by revelations of its untapped mineral wealth.
“He thought that might be a good place to seek out business opportunities,” said his father, Mikell Hagood, asserting in a telephone interview that his son had not been a willing guest of the Taliban.
“I am just happy that he is back home and praying that he got some valuable lessons from this,” Mr. Hagood added. “And praying there will be good coming out of it.”
Western officials in Kabul say they remain uncertain of Mr. Owuo-Hagood’s motivations. An internal memorandum circulating among Western officials cautiously says that Mr. Owuo-Hagood “traveled to Kandahar and was then ‘abducted’ and held for several weeks.”
“On Oct. 2,” it continues, “he ‘escaped’ and flagged down U.S. forces in RC-South.”
The American Embassy would say little other than to confirm that a private American citizen sought assistance from United States forces on Oct. 2 in southern Afghanistan and that the embassy flew him to Kabul and returned him to the United States.
“We are pleased that this individual has been safely reunited with his family,” said Caitlin Hayden, the embassy spokeswoman. “We do not feel it is appropriate to provide further details.”
Ms. Hayden said she could not say whether he had been in custody.
After arriving in Kabul, Mr. Owuo-Hagood made a call to his family. But after weeks without any further word, the family contacted the State Department, his father said.
“They said they would look for him,” he said. “I was praying for the best and fearing the worst.”
Mr. Owuo-Hagood apparently went to Kandahar in late June or early July and found his way to a bazaar held each week on the outer perimeter of Kandahar airbase. He befriended a merchant from the Taliban-held districts west of Kandahar city, according to both a local government official and a Taliban commander. It is unclear whether he actually went into the bazaar, which is within the base’s perimeter or met the merchant just outside.
He asked the merchant to take him to the Taliban and the merchant hid him under a burqa and then put him in a vehicle with at least two burqa-clad women and drove away.
“We heard from elders and villagers that he left the airport with an Afghan colleague from Pashmoul in Zheri District,” said Haji Agha Lalai, a member of the Kandahar provincial council who is from Panjwaj District, adjacent to Zheri. “The American went in a burqa with women so that he could not be seen.”
“First they went to the colleague’s house in Pashmoul and then they went into the Taliban,” he said.
Mr. Owuo-Hagood’s rationale for seeking out the Taliban is hard to gauge; it is also unclear whether he was motivated by ideological or other reasons.
The Taliban were excited and even boastful about his arrival in their midst in Zheri District, an area that Gen. David H. Petraeus described recently as an entrenched Taliban safe haven.
A Taliban commander from the area, who is related to several of the Taliban who lived with Mr. Owuo-Hagood, said that the visitor said he was a convert to Islam.
“He said to them, ‘I am very much interested in learning about Islam and I want to live side by side with Muslims,’ ” said a Taliban commander from Zheri, who goes by the name Mullah Basir.
“This black American was telling the Taliban, ‘We were told untrue information about the Taliban and the Muslims and now that I have come to you, I see that the reality is different,’ ” said Mullah Basir, adding that the Taliban appeared to believe him.
They also believed he had military knowledge that could help them — although whether he actually did is unclear. The information the villagers and the Taliban commander said he gave did not seem particularly insightful.
“He was giving the Taliban a lot of information on a military level,” Mullah Basir said. “For example, where you have to shoot the American.”
“Like they wear bullet-proof vests,” he said, “so you have to shoot a part that is exposed, that your bullet can penetrate and the other thing was how to shoot on a helicopter, you should shoot on the front, not the back, and he was helpful in explaining maps and directions.”
A landowner named Mohammed from the Sang-i-Sar area of Zheri described seeing him in the villages dressed in Afghan garb.
“I saw him on a motorbike with other Taliban, wearing a turban and shaalwar kameez,” said Mohammed, referring to the Afghan tunic. “Other villagers told me he was American.” He said Mr. that Owuo-Hagood had an American gun that fired “big bullets with flames,” and that “the villagers were saying he was teaching the Taliban how to fire rockets into the American base.”
Mr. Owuo-Hagood’s father said that sometime in August, he received an e-mail supposedly from his son, but written by someone whose first language was clearly not English, saying he was “under control of the Taliban.”
The Hagoods wrote back that he was “a family man and that he had wife and daughter,” said the father. “We told them it was Ramadan to please be forgiving and emancipate him.”
A few days later, a brief message arrived, this one apparently written by Mr. Owuo-Hagood. It said that he was “learning the language” and memorizing chapters of the Koran. He said that the Taliban suspected him of being an American soldier and planned to detain him until they could verify that he was not, his father said.
Then, a few weeks ago, Mr. Owuo-Hagood phoned to say he would be released soon, and asked his father to explain his absence to Delta.
Tangled Tale on American Found in Afghanistan
By ALISSA J. RUBIN
Published: October 11, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/1 ... gewanted=1&_r=1
KABUL, Afghanistan — As an American military patrol walked through a rural, Taliban-dominated district of Kandahar Province recently, a man wearing local clothes came toward them shouting, “Don’t shoot, I am an American!”
He asked for their protection, saying that he had been abducted by the Taliban and held for months but had finally managed to escape, according to Western officials in Kabul.
That is one version of his story.
It is not the one told by local villagers, elders and Taliban in the Zheri District of Kandahar. They say that he sought out the Taliban and was treated less as a hostage than as a supporter, and that he openly traveled with them on motorcycles around the district. A tall African-American, he cut an unmistakable figure, they said.
Much remains mysterious about the man, identified as Takuma Owuo-Hagood, not least his motivations for going to Afghanistan. The Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Mr. Owuo-Hagood entered the country June 23, a little more than three months before he surfaced.
He is now back home, in the Atlanta area. Family members reached there said Mr. Owuo-Hagood, a 25-year-old husband and father, was a baggage handler for Delta with business aspirations. They said that he had tried to make money traveling to China and Turkey to buy clothes for resale back home, and that he had been drawn to Afghanistan by revelations of its untapped mineral wealth.
“He thought that might be a good place to seek out business opportunities,” said his father, Mikell Hagood, asserting in a telephone interview that his son had not been a willing guest of the Taliban.
“I am just happy that he is back home and praying that he got some valuable lessons from this,” Mr. Hagood added. “And praying there will be good coming out of it.”
Western officials in Kabul say they remain uncertain of Mr. Owuo-Hagood’s motivations. An internal memorandum circulating among Western officials cautiously says that Mr. Owuo-Hagood “traveled to Kandahar and was then ‘abducted’ and held for several weeks.”
“On Oct. 2,” it continues, “he ‘escaped’ and flagged down U.S. forces in RC-South.”
The American Embassy would say little other than to confirm that a private American citizen sought assistance from United States forces on Oct. 2 in southern Afghanistan and that the embassy flew him to Kabul and returned him to the United States.
“We are pleased that this individual has been safely reunited with his family,” said Caitlin Hayden, the embassy spokeswoman. “We do not feel it is appropriate to provide further details.”
Ms. Hayden said she could not say whether he had been in custody.
After arriving in Kabul, Mr. Owuo-Hagood made a call to his family. But after weeks without any further word, the family contacted the State Department, his father said.
“They said they would look for him,” he said. “I was praying for the best and fearing the worst.”
Mr. Owuo-Hagood apparently went to Kandahar in late June or early July and found his way to a bazaar held each week on the outer perimeter of Kandahar airbase. He befriended a merchant from the Taliban-held districts west of Kandahar city, according to both a local government official and a Taliban commander. It is unclear whether he actually went into the bazaar, which is within the base’s perimeter or met the merchant just outside.
He asked the merchant to take him to the Taliban and the merchant hid him under a burqa and then put him in a vehicle with at least two burqa-clad women and drove away.
“We heard from elders and villagers that he left the airport with an Afghan colleague from Pashmoul in Zheri District,” said Haji Agha Lalai, a member of the Kandahar provincial council who is from Panjwaj District, adjacent to Zheri. “The American went in a burqa with women so that he could not be seen.”
“First they went to the colleague’s house in Pashmoul and then they went into the Taliban,” he said.
Mr. Owuo-Hagood’s rationale for seeking out the Taliban is hard to gauge; it is also unclear whether he was motivated by ideological or other reasons.
The Taliban were excited and even boastful about his arrival in their midst in Zheri District, an area that Gen. David H. Petraeus described recently as an entrenched Taliban safe haven.
A Taliban commander from the area, who is related to several of the Taliban who lived with Mr. Owuo-Hagood, said that the visitor said he was a convert to Islam.
“He said to them, ‘I am very much interested in learning about Islam and I want to live side by side with Muslims,’ ” said a Taliban commander from Zheri, who goes by the name Mullah Basir.
“This black American was telling the Taliban, ‘We were told untrue information about the Taliban and the Muslims and now that I have come to you, I see that the reality is different,’ ” said Mullah Basir, adding that the Taliban appeared to believe him.
They also believed he had military knowledge that could help them — although whether he actually did is unclear. The information the villagers and the Taliban commander said he gave did not seem particularly insightful.
“He was giving the Taliban a lot of information on a military level,” Mullah Basir said. “For example, where you have to shoot the American.”
“Like they wear bullet-proof vests,” he said, “so you have to shoot a part that is exposed, that your bullet can penetrate and the other thing was how to shoot on a helicopter, you should shoot on the front, not the back, and he was helpful in explaining maps and directions.”
A landowner named Mohammed from the Sang-i-Sar area of Zheri described seeing him in the villages dressed in Afghan garb.
“I saw him on a motorbike with other Taliban, wearing a turban and shaalwar kameez,” said Mohammed, referring to the Afghan tunic. “Other villagers told me he was American.” He said Mr. that Owuo-Hagood had an American gun that fired “big bullets with flames,” and that “the villagers were saying he was teaching the Taliban how to fire rockets into the American base.”
Mr. Owuo-Hagood’s father said that sometime in August, he received an e-mail supposedly from his son, but written by someone whose first language was clearly not English, saying he was “under control of the Taliban.”
The Hagoods wrote back that he was “a family man and that he had wife and daughter,” said the father. “We told them it was Ramadan to please be forgiving and emancipate him.”
A few days later, a brief message arrived, this one apparently written by Mr. Owuo-Hagood. It said that he was “learning the language” and memorizing chapters of the Koran. He said that the Taliban suspected him of being an American soldier and planned to detain him until they could verify that he was not, his father said.
Then, a few weeks ago, Mr. Owuo-Hagood phoned to say he would be released soon, and asked his father to explain his absence to Delta.
主动放弃的可能性更大！
Dick112 发表于 2010-10-12 10:32
那就要看TLB之后在半岛公布的视频资料里……收获是否丰厚了……{:jian:}
那就要看TLB之后在半岛公布的视频资料里……收获是否丰厚了……{:jian:}
小美的炮火支援涅?要不来个B52临空轰炸嘛
越战的时候不就是
被攻克一个高地
就炸平 机降一队士兵重新占领
再被攻克 再炸平
被攻克一个高地
就炸平 机降一队士兵重新占领
再被攻克 再炸平
Hephaistion 发表于 2010-10-12 10:22
这么一个美国籍人士的冒险故事能说明什么呢，我有点费解
这么一个美国籍人士的冒险故事能说明什么呢，我有点费解
回复 26# gustov
主要问题在于，如果报道这个事情发生在南部坎大哈或者海尔曼，精锐的塔利班攻下美军据点还是有那么一点可能的。但是报道是在东北部，哪个地方塔利班势力虽然强盛，但是没有达到那种水平。
主要问题在于，如果报道这个事情发生在南部坎大哈或者海尔曼，精锐的塔利班攻下美军据点还是有那么一点可能的。但是报道是在东北部，哪个地方塔利班势力虽然强盛，但是没有达到那种水平。
到对是怎么回事，你只要留意一下是不是发生激战，美军有没有派出空中支援之类的信息就很清楚了。
所以很显然的，这只是美军基地调整的一部分， 可怜的塔利班，战场上连一个美军的小哨所都没能力攻打，只好去到美军基地的废墟上打滚。
所以很显然的，这只是美军基地调整的一部分， 可怜的塔利班，战场上连一个美军的小哨所都没能力攻打，只好去到美军基地的废墟上打滚。
汝儿乃我 发表于 2010-10-12 10:47
游击战还分区划片？……TLB不是一直在到处跑么？……
游击战还分区划片？……TLB不是一直在到处跑么？……
gustov 发表于 2010-10-12 10:52
你练这点基本常识都没有，还谈什么阿富汗战争
塔利班在2001年被击败后，就是靠着跑到阿富汗南部山区投靠盘踞在阿富汗和巴基斯坦交界山区的武装部族才得以苟延残喘。以后他们也是依靠这里作为出击的前进基地和逃命的场所，战局不利就逃到巴基斯坦边界一侧的山区。
你还真以为塔利班是依靠什么群众基础游击于阿富汗国境各处的么？ 别天真了。
你练这点基本常识都没有，还谈什么阿富汗战争
塔利班在2001年被击败后，就是靠着跑到阿富汗南部山区投靠盘踞在阿富汗和巴基斯坦交界山区的武装部族才得以苟延残喘。以后他们也是依靠这里作为出击的前进基地和逃命的场所，战局不利就逃到巴基斯坦边界一侧的山区。
你还真以为塔利班是依靠什么群众基础游击于阿富汗国境各处的么？ 别天真了。
隔夜茶 发表于 2010-10-12 10:55
这次发生的事不正好发生在你说的地区？……我就是说TLB在部族地区被追得到处跑有啥不对的……事实如此啊……我也没提群众基础……根据地啥的……
这次发生的事不正好发生在你说的地区？……我就是说TLB在部族地区被追得到处跑有啥不对的……事实如此啊……我也没提群众基础……根据地啥的……
我要看洗地的来洗地了，土耳其狂扁TG0：8一定是真的，TLB占领MD基地一定是假的，一定是人家不要的。真有喜感呀，人和人的差别咋就这么大呢？
当然我也不信TLB这么厉害，不过皆有可能，不是吗？何必急的汗流一地的来洗地，累不？
当然我也不信TLB这么厉害，不过皆有可能，不是吗？何必急的汗流一地的来洗地，累不？gustov 发表于 2010-10-12 10:52
塔利班主力一般都呆在离巴基斯坦比较近的地方，MD进攻，他们大不了就扯到巴基斯坦那边。一般来讲这些主力都是所谓的骨干，并非整个游击队。都是说这些骨干从巴基斯坦潜入阿富汗，然后找农民加入。打仗的时候打仗，不打仗的时候，农民把武器藏起来回家种田，骨干撤回巴基斯坦。就这样下来三四年老美愣是拿他们没办法。所以说阿富汗战争有一半要看小巴的脸色。
塔利班主力一般都呆在离巴基斯坦比较近的地方，MD进攻，他们大不了就扯到巴基斯坦那边。一般来讲这些主力都是所谓的骨干，并非整个游击队。都是说这些骨干从巴基斯坦潜入阿富汗，然后找农民加入。打仗的时候打仗，不打仗的时候，农民把武器藏起来回家种田，骨干撤回巴基斯坦。就这样下来三四年老美愣是拿他们没办法。所以说阿富汗战争有一半要看小巴的脸色。
一生无悔 发表于 2010-10-12 11:00
你说的什么土耳其狂扁TG0：8我不知道是什么事情，你和谁讨论过你去找谁继续讨论去。
你说的什么土耳其狂扁TG0：8我不知道是什么事情，你和谁讨论过你去找谁继续讨论去。
隔夜茶 发表于 2010-10-12 10:47
其实MD更可怜，面对一群连端他岗哨的能力都没有的废物愣是被拖了10年还得增兵。这就是非对称战争的美妙之处
其实MD更可怜，面对一群连端他岗哨的能力都没有的废物愣是被拖了10年还得增兵。这就是非对称战争的美妙之处
回复 37# 隔夜茶
你确定你不知道，那在空版和畅谈是另外的马甲发言的
你确定你不知道，那在空版和畅谈是另外的马甲发言的
莫非只是忽然发现了一个MD放弃的营地而已？
或者，是一个5人哨所，放大100倍，用于宣传？
或者，是一个5人哨所，放大100倍，用于宣传？