谁说集群炮火不能干掉坦克？原文+中文翻译

全文，您如果过了4级都看不懂，那么我很为中国的教育感到悲哀。

Who Says Dumb Artillery Rounds Can’t Kill Armor?  November-December 2002 Field Artillery
谁说集群炮火不能干掉坦克？ 野战炮兵 11-12月号

By Major (Retired) George A. Durham
作者：美国陆军退役上校乔治 A. 德尔哈姆

Early in the afternoon of 23 May 1944, the 1st Canadian Division attacked Germans in defensive positions during the battle of Hitler’s Line in Italy. Soon after the battle started, it was apparent the attack had failed. The Canadians had suffered high numbers of casualties; the Germans then counterattacked with tanks. The Canadian Army Group Royal Artillery (equivalent to a US Field Artillery brigade) proceeded to defeat the counterattack.

1944年5月23日的下午，加拿大第一师奉命进攻希特勒在意大利南部战线中的一段德军防御阵地。战役打响后不久，加军的指挥官明显意识到这次进攻似乎已宣告失败，因为加军在进攻中伤亡惨重；最糟糕的是德军在随后用坦克发起了反冲锋。值得庆幸的是，加拿大的皇家炮兵群（规模相当于美国的炮兵旅）用榴弹炮击退了德军的这次装甲冲击。

This was one of many battles in World War II where artillery defeated armor. Has anything changed since these battles to make artillery less effective against armored targets? Not really. Determining the effects of artillery is critical to military planning. The number of weapons and the amount of ammunition required to defeat different types of targets are factors to be considered when determining the composition of ground forces.

这是二战中的许多炮兵击败装甲部队的战例之一。那么，二战舞台上“榴弹炮VS装甲”的大戏已谢幕60年之后，装甲部队在机动力、防护力及火力上已今非夕比。炮兵对装甲目标的有效打击力度真的就下降了吗？事实告诉我们并非如此。确定炮火覆盖范围对军事打击效果来说至关重要；武器弹药的基数也必须能够满足对不同类型目标的打击要求；这两个前提是地面部队确定组成构成时所需详细加以考虑的方面。

As US forces and their allies face contemporary operational environment (COE) threats—such as the al Qaeda during Operation Anaconda in the Shah-e-kot Valley in Afghanistan— there is no question that our Army needs an all-weather organic precision fires capability. Air-delivered precision munitions are limited in their ability to provide close support to a ground force in contact—are most effective against fixed
targets vice the fleeting targets in fast-paced ground combat. (See the interview “Afghanistan: Fire Support for OperationAnaconda” of Major General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, commander of the ground forces during Operation Anaconda, in the September-October edition.) The ground force’s artillery must be capable of responsive, surgical lethality that minimizes collateral damage.

考虑到美军及其盟友目前面临着现代作战环境（COE）（例如在阿富汗沙赫克特山谷打击基地组织的“蟒蛇行动”）的各种威胁。我们的军队毫无疑问需要有全天候高机动高精度火力覆盖能力。虽然现代战争中，空中精确火力支援能为地面部队的行动提供强有力的支持，但它们间又存在沟通能力时限问题——空中精确火力对固定目标最为有效，但对地面作战中高速运动的目标打击则差很多。陆军炮兵必须能够快速做出反应，运用手术刀般的精准杀伤能力，以最大限度地减少附带（例如对平民/民用目标的）损害。

But at the same time, as Lieutenant Colonel Christopher F.Bentley, fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) for the ground forces during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, said, “PGMs [precision-guided munitions] are not ‘silver bullets’ for every target array.” (See Page 5 of his article “Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition Fire Support in Operation Anaconda” in the September-October edition.) In addition, precision munitions are expensive.

但同时，阿富汗“蟒蛇行动”中担任“地面部队火力支援协调员”（FSCOORD）的克里斯托弗F.宾利（Christopher F. Bentley）中校曾表示：“使用精确制导弹药（PGMs）也并不是要把每一个打击目标都列入‘银弹’（指昂贵的精确制导武器）打击范围的。精确制导弹药由于价格高昂，对于地面部队作战难度改变并非如想象中的大。

As Major General Hagenbeck said in the interview, the mix of munitions on future battlefields is mission, enemy, terrain,troops and time available (METT-T)-dependent. Ideally, the options would include precision, but “all that matters is whether or not the munitions are time-on-target and provide the right effects” (Page 8). Artillery area fire (dumb) munitions can have some pretty amazing effects, some of which they have not been given credit for in recent years.

正如哈根贝克少将在接受采访时所说的那样，未来战场弹药组合还是要遵循任务、敌人、地形、军队和时间（METT - T）等主要因素。理想的情况是，各种选择都能十分精确，但“最重要的还是——弹药是否能及时命中目标，并且产生适当的效果。所以，当我们把目光从空中精确打击和精确制导弹药等“现代战争明星”身上移开，认真检视事实后我们会发现，只要有效使用传统炮火，其覆盖范围内的火力打击效果一样会取得非常惊人的战绩，虽然一些效果在近几年还没有获得业界的完全认同。

This article reminds the Army of the lethality of area fire Field Artillery by examining the background of modeling and simulations data used to portray artillery effects in a study beginning in 1988 and reviewing the results of this four-year test of the effects of the basic Soviet 152-mm and US 155-mm rounds.

本文通过检视从1988年开始进行的野战火炮打击效果试验研究，以及相关模型和模拟数据的一些背景，并回顾苏联152毫米和美国的155毫米炮弹这四年里的火炮实验的结果，向读者展示野战炮的被忽视的“惊人”杀伤力。

Background.
背景

In the early 1970s, the Army began developing force-on-force models to work effects issues. An outgrowth of this work has been the development of battle simulations used for training. The realism of these models and simulations depends on the accuracy of the database used to represent the effects of combat on the battlefield.

20世纪70年代初，美国陆军开始引入‘对抗型作战模型’，对推演中所遇到的问题进行影响性分析。这是战斗训练模拟工程发展的产物。不过，这些模型和模拟的对于解释和诠释问题的现实意义，完全取决于它对战场的真实战模拟效果和数据库的准确性。

As force-on-force models were being developed, military analysts noted an interesting dichotomy when comparing US and Soviet estimates of the effectiveness of high-explosive (HE) fragmentation rounds. HE is the basic artillery round used by NATO forces and the former Warsaw Pact.

随着对抗型模拟复杂程度的升级，军事分析家们在比较和分析美国与苏联在高爆弹（HE）碎片杀伤效果的评估时，发现了一个有趣的“思维模式” 的区别。高爆弹的北约和前华沙条约组织均使用的基本炮兵弹药。

Both the US and Soviet estimates on effects against “soft” targets, such as personnel, trucks and radar, were about the same. But there was a significant difference between the amount of HE the Soviets and US estimated it took to defeat or kill armored targets.

在对“软”目标——例如人员、卡车和雷达等无装甲保护的目标时，美国和苏联高爆弹的毁伤效果都大致相同。但苏联和美国在对击溃或击毁装甲目标时，所需的高爆弹数量上则相去甚远。

For example, to achieve 30 percent effects against an armored personnel carrier, the Soviets estimated it would take 2.8 fewer rounds than US estimates. “Thirty percent effects” was defined as damage that would keep the vehicle from continuing the battle, but it wasn’t enough damage to “destroy” it. The number of HE rounds in the Soviet estimates for 30 percent effects against tanks was only slightly higher than the number required for armored personnel carriers.

例如，要对一辆装甲运兵车造成30%的损害，苏联估计需要的高爆弹数量比美国少2.8枚。“30%损害”的定义是指使车辆不能继续参与战斗，但这种损害并不足以“摧毁”车辆。苏联在对坦克造成30%损害的弹药估计量上只略高于其对装甲运兵车造成相同损害所需的数量。

The US database was a result of the modeling data developed in 1972 that required direct hits against tanks to achieve any effects. To ensure a direct hit with area fire munitions, the models required a large number of rounds to be fired. Over a period of time, the large number of rounds fired and the resulting minimum effects caused artillery fires to be downplayed in force-on-force modeling. Military analysts knew
the criteria for HE to achieve effects was inaccurate, but they did not have data upon which to base their corrections of the modeling database.

美国方面的数据库是1972年建立的，都是在对直接命中坦克所达到的损害效果的数据模型发展而来的。为了确保在炮火范围内直接命中目标，建立这些模型需要发射大量的炮弹。不过，在经过一段时期内大量发射炮弹确实能籍以证明由此所能达到的损害程度到底能到什么程度。但评估标准的失实却淡化了抗型模型中关于炮击效果的判断。美国的军事分析家知道模型数据中衡量高爆弹产生的损害影响的标准是不准确的，但他们却没有得到更为详实的数据用来更正这些失实的模型数据库。

Artillery Effect Tests.
炮火损害效果试验

In 1988 the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (Force Development) directed the Soviet Artillery Effects (SAE) Study be conducted to validate the effectiveness data used in models. A literature search conducted before the test found a Soviet report titled “Firing for Effects Against Strongpoints.” This report became the “base case” for comparing US and Soviet effectiveness estimates.

1988年，美国陆军（部队发展）副参谋长命令苏联炮火损害效果（SAE）研究部门验证模型所使用数据的有效性。在进行测试之前的文献检索中，苏联提出了一份题为《对据点射击的损害效果》的报告。这份报告成为比较美国和苏联对损害效果预计差异的“基本案例”。

The Soviets claimed that 122-mm and 120-mm mortars and 152-mm artillery rounds achieved very high levels of damage against tanks and armored personnel carriers. The explanation of the disparity ranged from the Soviets simply overestimating their effectiveness to the difference in the way damage criteria were established. Other possibilities offered were that the database for US models was incorrect or not used properly. Further research revealed the Soviets had a large database developed by an extensive live-fire test program.

苏联的报告称：122毫米、120毫米迫击炮和152毫米炮弹都能对坦克和装甲运兵车造成非常高的损害战果。以前，关于对美苏炮火评估效果差异之所以悬殊，其解释都是苏联在建立损害标准的方式上高估了其炮火损伤效果的有效性。但在现在，能为这种差异给出其他的可能的解释就是美国模型的数据库不正确或没有被正确地使用。进一步的研究揭示了苏联的大型数据库的确是在大量的实弹测试程序与结果上发展而来的。

A basic difference existed in the way damage criteria were used. The Soviets had two criteria: “damaged,” which means unable to continue to fight, and “destroyed.” The US used “estimated time of repair” as the yardstick for damage in models. If damage could be repaired in less than 30 minutes, it was not counted; 30 minutes to one hour was assigned as a value; one hour or more had a value; and so on.

在建立损害标准时存在着一个基本的差异。苏联有两个标准：“损害”——意味着无法继续战斗；另一个是完全被“击毁”。美国则使用“预计维修时间”作为模型的损害标准。如果损害可以在30分钟内的修复，则不记为“损害”，30分钟至1小时可以修复的，列入“损害”，等等依此类推。

While it seemed the US criteria were less realistic than the Soviets’, the analysts conducting the study decided to continue to use the existing US damage criteria in the SAE test.

虽然美式评判标准似乎没有苏式标准更“现实”与简单，但进行研究分析的专家们却固执的决定在炮火损害效果测试中仍然继续使用美国现行的标准。

One significant problem was that the US had limited data on the effects of fragmentation on armored vehicles. The last live-fire test of artillery munitions conducted in 1972 used World War II- and Korea-vintage armored targets. The artillery rounds had not changed significantly since that test, but there had been major changes to armored vehicles.

一个很重要问题是，美国在对装甲车的损害效果上数据有限。最后一次实弹测试还是在1972年所以进行的，使用的炮弹是二战制造，目标装甲是来自朝鲜战争时期的老式装甲目标。自那次试验之后，炮弹并没有明显地改变，但是装甲车辆的却发生了重大变化。

To correct this lack of data, the SAE was designed around four tests. Tests one and three were operational tests comparing model predictions with live-fire results. Tests two and four were technical tests designed to gather data to upgrade or correct the database.

为了解决实弹射击数据缺乏的问题，SAE所进行的新的“炮火对装甲目标的损害效果测试”围绕着四种测试进行的。测试一和测试三是为了比较实弹模型预测的人工操作效率试验。测试之二和之四是旨在收集用以升级或更正数据库的技术试验的数据。

Test Results.

The first test was conducted in 1988. Researchers confirmed that the US 155-mm HE round was a reasonable surrogate for the Soviet 152-mm HE round. An M109 155-mm howitzer battery using Soviet fire direction and gun procedures fired the test. The targets were manikins placed in fighting positions, US trucks, M113 and M557 armored vehicles, and M-48 tanks. Several different computer models were used to predict results. The test was fired three times using 56 HE rounds with point-detonating (PD) and variable-time (VT) fuzes.

新的“炮火对装甲目标的损害效果测试”的首次试验被安排在1988年进行。研究人员证实，美国155毫米高爆弹相与苏联152毫米高爆弹效果相当。试验使用了一辆M109 155毫米自行榴弹炮，采取苏军使用的射击角度和发射程序。目标放置在阵地中，有美军卡车、M113和M557、M-48坦克等。采用几种不同的计算机模型来预测结果。试验中使用56枚各型引信的炮弹，包括瞬发（PD）和延时（VT）引信的高爆弹等，共发射了3轮。

The resulting effects on the trucks and personnel were close to model predictions. However, the effects on the armored vehicles and tanks were significantly higher than model predictions.

对卡车和人员所产生损害效果接近模型的预测效果。但是，对装甲车和坦克的实际损害效果均显著高于以前的模型预测效果。


在M557装甲指挥车附近命中，带有瞬发引信的高爆（HE）弹的碎片击穿了这辆装甲车、摧毁了关键元器件并且杀伤了“车组人员”

The model predicted 30 percent damage to armored vehicles and tanks; however, 67 percent damage was achieved. Fragmentation from the HE rounds penetrated the armored vehicles, destroying critical components and injuring the manikin crews. (See an example of such damage in Figure 1.) In addition, the HE fragmentation damaged tracks, road wheels, and tank main gun sights and set one vehicle on fire.

该模型预测，对装甲车和坦克会造成30%的损害效果；但是，实际的损害效果居然达到；了67%。高爆弹的碎片击穿了装甲车辆，摧毁了关键元器件和伤害了假人。参阅图1中所展示的关于此类损害的实例。此外，高爆弹碎片还破坏了卡车、车轮、坦克的炮塔观测设备，并使其中一辆车着火。

Interestingly enough, none of the damage to the armored vehicles or tanks was the result of direct hits—all the damage was caused by near hits.

有趣的是，对坦克装甲车辆的破坏都不是直接命中所造成的损害，而是在击中目标附近所造成损害。

This test confirmed that US Army models did not accurately portray artillery effectiveness. Direct hits were not required to damage tanks and other armored targets.

试验证实了美军的数据模型的确没有准确地反映野战炮火的效果。对坦克和其它装甲目标造成损害也并非需要直接命中目标。

全文，您如果过了4级都看不懂，那么我很为中国的教育感到悲哀。

Who Says Dumb Artillery Rounds Can’t Kill Armor?  November-December 2002 Field Artillery
谁说集群炮火不能干掉坦克？ 野战炮兵 11-12月号

By Major (Retired) George A. Durham
作者：美国陆军退役上校乔治 A. 德尔哈姆

Early in the afternoon of 23 May 1944, the 1st Canadian Division attacked Germans in defensive positions during the battle of Hitler’s Line in Italy. Soon after the battle started, it was apparent the attack had failed. The Canadians had suffered high numbers of casualties; the Germans then counterattacked with tanks. The Canadian Army Group Royal Artillery (equivalent to a US Field Artillery brigade) proceeded to defeat the counterattack.

1944年5月23日的下午，加拿大第一师奉命进攻希特勒在意大利南部战线中的一段德军防御阵地。战役打响后不久，加军的指挥官明显意识到这次进攻似乎已宣告失败，因为加军在进攻中伤亡惨重；最糟糕的是德军在随后用坦克发起了反冲锋。值得庆幸的是，加拿大的皇家炮兵群（规模相当于美国的炮兵旅）用榴弹炮击退了德军的这次装甲冲击。

This was one of many battles in World War II where artillery defeated armor. Has anything changed since these battles to make artillery less effective against armored targets? Not really. Determining the effects of artillery is critical to military planning. The number of weapons and the amount of ammunition required to defeat different types of targets are factors to be considered when determining the composition of ground forces.

这是二战中的许多炮兵击败装甲部队的战例之一。那么，二战舞台上“榴弹炮VS装甲”的大戏已谢幕60年之后，装甲部队在机动力、防护力及火力上已今非夕比。炮兵对装甲目标的有效打击力度真的就下降了吗？事实告诉我们并非如此。确定炮火覆盖范围对军事打击效果来说至关重要；武器弹药的基数也必须能够满足对不同类型目标的打击要求；这两个前提是地面部队确定组成构成时所需详细加以考虑的方面。

As US forces and their allies face contemporary operational environment (COE) threats—such as the al Qaeda during Operation Anaconda in the Shah-e-kot Valley in Afghanistan— there is no question that our Army needs an all-weather organic precision fires capability. Air-delivered precision munitions are limited in their ability to provide close support to a ground force in contact—are most effective against fixed
targets vice the fleeting targets in fast-paced ground combat. (See the interview “Afghanistan: Fire Support for OperationAnaconda” of Major General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, commander of the ground forces during Operation Anaconda, in the September-October edition.) The ground force’s artillery must be capable of responsive, surgical lethality that minimizes collateral damage.

考虑到美军及其盟友目前面临着现代作战环境（COE）（例如在阿富汗沙赫克特山谷打击基地组织的“蟒蛇行动”）的各种威胁。我们的军队毫无疑问需要有全天候高机动高精度火力覆盖能力。虽然现代战争中，空中精确火力支援能为地面部队的行动提供强有力的支持，但它们间又存在沟通能力时限问题——空中精确火力对固定目标最为有效，但对地面作战中高速运动的目标打击则差很多。陆军炮兵必须能够快速做出反应，运用手术刀般的精准杀伤能力，以最大限度地减少附带（例如对平民/民用目标的）损害。

But at the same time, as Lieutenant Colonel Christopher F.Bentley, fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) for the ground forces during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, said, “PGMs [precision-guided munitions] are not ‘silver bullets’ for every target array.” (See Page 5 of his article “Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition Fire Support in Operation Anaconda” in the September-October edition.) In addition, precision munitions are expensive.

但同时，阿富汗“蟒蛇行动”中担任“地面部队火力支援协调员”（FSCOORD）的克里斯托弗F.宾利（Christopher F. Bentley）中校曾表示：“使用精确制导弹药（PGMs）也并不是要把每一个打击目标都列入‘银弹’（指昂贵的精确制导武器）打击范围的。精确制导弹药由于价格高昂，对于地面部队作战难度改变并非如想象中的大。

As Major General Hagenbeck said in the interview, the mix of munitions on future battlefields is mission, enemy, terrain,troops and time available (METT-T)-dependent. Ideally, the options would include precision, but “all that matters is whether or not the munitions are time-on-target and provide the right effects” (Page 8). Artillery area fire (dumb) munitions can have some pretty amazing effects, some of which they have not been given credit for in recent years.

正如哈根贝克少将在接受采访时所说的那样，未来战场弹药组合还是要遵循任务、敌人、地形、军队和时间（METT - T）等主要因素。理想的情况是，各种选择都能十分精确，但“最重要的还是——弹药是否能及时命中目标，并且产生适当的效果。所以，当我们把目光从空中精确打击和精确制导弹药等“现代战争明星”身上移开，认真检视事实后我们会发现，只要有效使用传统炮火，其覆盖范围内的火力打击效果一样会取得非常惊人的战绩，虽然一些效果在近几年还没有获得业界的完全认同。

This article reminds the Army of the lethality of area fire Field Artillery by examining the background of modeling and simulations data used to portray artillery effects in a study beginning in 1988 and reviewing the results of this four-year test of the effects of the basic Soviet 152-mm and US 155-mm rounds.

本文通过检视从1988年开始进行的野战火炮打击效果试验研究，以及相关模型和模拟数据的一些背景，并回顾苏联152毫米和美国的155毫米炮弹这四年里的火炮实验的结果，向读者展示野战炮的被忽视的“惊人”杀伤力。

Background.
背景

In the early 1970s, the Army began developing force-on-force models to work effects issues. An outgrowth of this work has been the development of battle simulations used for training. The realism of these models and simulations depends on the accuracy of the database used to represent the effects of combat on the battlefield.

20世纪70年代初，美国陆军开始引入‘对抗型作战模型’，对推演中所遇到的问题进行影响性分析。这是战斗训练模拟工程发展的产物。不过，这些模型和模拟的对于解释和诠释问题的现实意义，完全取决于它对战场的真实战模拟效果和数据库的准确性。

As force-on-force models were being developed, military analysts noted an interesting dichotomy when comparing US and Soviet estimates of the effectiveness of high-explosive (HE) fragmentation rounds. HE is the basic artillery round used by NATO forces and the former Warsaw Pact.

随着对抗型模拟复杂程度的升级，军事分析家们在比较和分析美国与苏联在高爆弹（HE）碎片杀伤效果的评估时，发现了一个有趣的“思维模式” 的区别。高爆弹的北约和前华沙条约组织均使用的基本炮兵弹药。

Both the US and Soviet estimates on effects against “soft” targets, such as personnel, trucks and radar, were about the same. But there was a significant difference between the amount of HE the Soviets and US estimated it took to defeat or kill armored targets.

在对“软”目标——例如人员、卡车和雷达等无装甲保护的目标时，美国和苏联高爆弹的毁伤效果都大致相同。但苏联和美国在对击溃或击毁装甲目标时，所需的高爆弹数量上则相去甚远。

For example, to achieve 30 percent effects against an armored personnel carrier, the Soviets estimated it would take 2.8 fewer rounds than US estimates. “Thirty percent effects” was defined as damage that would keep the vehicle from continuing the battle, but it wasn’t enough damage to “destroy” it. The number of HE rounds in the Soviet estimates for 30 percent effects against tanks was only slightly higher than the number required for armored personnel carriers.

例如，要对一辆装甲运兵车造成30%的损害，苏联估计需要的高爆弹数量比美国少2.8枚。“30%损害”的定义是指使车辆不能继续参与战斗，但这种损害并不足以“摧毁”车辆。苏联在对坦克造成30%损害的弹药估计量上只略高于其对装甲运兵车造成相同损害所需的数量。

The US database was a result of the modeling data developed in 1972 that required direct hits against tanks to achieve any effects. To ensure a direct hit with area fire munitions, the models required a large number of rounds to be fired. Over a period of time, the large number of rounds fired and the resulting minimum effects caused artillery fires to be downplayed in force-on-force modeling. Military analysts knew
the criteria for HE to achieve effects was inaccurate, but they did not have data upon which to base their corrections of the modeling database.

美国方面的数据库是1972年建立的，都是在对直接命中坦克所达到的损害效果的数据模型发展而来的。为了确保在炮火范围内直接命中目标，建立这些模型需要发射大量的炮弹。不过，在经过一段时期内大量发射炮弹确实能籍以证明由此所能达到的损害程度到底能到什么程度。但评估标准的失实却淡化了抗型模型中关于炮击效果的判断。美国的军事分析家知道模型数据中衡量高爆弹产生的损害影响的标准是不准确的，但他们却没有得到更为详实的数据用来更正这些失实的模型数据库。

Artillery Effect Tests.
炮火损害效果试验

In 1988 the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (Force Development) directed the Soviet Artillery Effects (SAE) Study be conducted to validate the effectiveness data used in models. A literature search conducted before the test found a Soviet report titled “Firing for Effects Against Strongpoints.” This report became the “base case” for comparing US and Soviet effectiveness estimates.

1988年，美国陆军（部队发展）副参谋长命令苏联炮火损害效果（SAE）研究部门验证模型所使用数据的有效性。在进行测试之前的文献检索中，苏联提出了一份题为《对据点射击的损害效果》的报告。这份报告成为比较美国和苏联对损害效果预计差异的“基本案例”。

The Soviets claimed that 122-mm and 120-mm mortars and 152-mm artillery rounds achieved very high levels of damage against tanks and armored personnel carriers. The explanation of the disparity ranged from the Soviets simply overestimating their effectiveness to the difference in the way damage criteria were established. Other possibilities offered were that the database for US models was incorrect or not used properly. Further research revealed the Soviets had a large database developed by an extensive live-fire test program.

苏联的报告称：122毫米、120毫米迫击炮和152毫米炮弹都能对坦克和装甲运兵车造成非常高的损害战果。以前，关于对美苏炮火评估效果差异之所以悬殊，其解释都是苏联在建立损害标准的方式上高估了其炮火损伤效果的有效性。但在现在，能为这种差异给出其他的可能的解释就是美国模型的数据库不正确或没有被正确地使用。进一步的研究揭示了苏联的大型数据库的确是在大量的实弹测试程序与结果上发展而来的。

A basic difference existed in the way damage criteria were used. The Soviets had two criteria: “damaged,” which means unable to continue to fight, and “destroyed.” The US used “estimated time of repair” as the yardstick for damage in models. If damage could be repaired in less than 30 minutes, it was not counted; 30 minutes to one hour was assigned as a value; one hour or more had a value; and so on.

在建立损害标准时存在着一个基本的差异。苏联有两个标准：“损害”——意味着无法继续战斗；另一个是完全被“击毁”。美国则使用“预计维修时间”作为模型的损害标准。如果损害可以在30分钟内的修复，则不记为“损害”，30分钟至1小时可以修复的，列入“损害”，等等依此类推。

While it seemed the US criteria were less realistic than the Soviets’, the analysts conducting the study decided to continue to use the existing US damage criteria in the SAE test.

虽然美式评判标准似乎没有苏式标准更“现实”与简单，但进行研究分析的专家们却固执的决定在炮火损害效果测试中仍然继续使用美国现行的标准。

One significant problem was that the US had limited data on the effects of fragmentation on armored vehicles. The last live-fire test of artillery munitions conducted in 1972 used World War II- and Korea-vintage armored targets. The artillery rounds had not changed significantly since that test, but there had been major changes to armored vehicles.

一个很重要问题是，美国在对装甲车的损害效果上数据有限。最后一次实弹测试还是在1972年所以进行的，使用的炮弹是二战制造，目标装甲是来自朝鲜战争时期的老式装甲目标。自那次试验之后，炮弹并没有明显地改变，但是装甲车辆的却发生了重大变化。

To correct this lack of data, the SAE was designed around four tests. Tests one and three were operational tests comparing model predictions with live-fire results. Tests two and four were technical tests designed to gather data to upgrade or correct the database.

为了解决实弹射击数据缺乏的问题，SAE所进行的新的“炮火对装甲目标的损害效果测试”围绕着四种测试进行的。测试一和测试三是为了比较实弹模型预测的人工操作效率试验。测试之二和之四是旨在收集用以升级或更正数据库的技术试验的数据。

Test Results.

The first test was conducted in 1988. Researchers confirmed that the US 155-mm HE round was a reasonable surrogate for the Soviet 152-mm HE round. An M109 155-mm howitzer battery using Soviet fire direction and gun procedures fired the test. The targets were manikins placed in fighting positions, US trucks, M113 and M557 armored vehicles, and M-48 tanks. Several different computer models were used to predict results. The test was fired three times using 56 HE rounds with point-detonating (PD) and variable-time (VT) fuzes.

新的“炮火对装甲目标的损害效果测试”的首次试验被安排在1988年进行。研究人员证实，美国155毫米高爆弹相与苏联152毫米高爆弹效果相当。试验使用了一辆M109 155毫米自行榴弹炮，采取苏军使用的射击角度和发射程序。目标放置在阵地中，有美军卡车、M113和M557、M-48坦克等。采用几种不同的计算机模型来预测结果。试验中使用56枚各型引信的炮弹，包括瞬发（PD）和延时（VT）引信的高爆弹等，共发射了3轮。

The resulting effects on the trucks and personnel were close to model predictions. However, the effects on the armored vehicles and tanks were significantly higher than model predictions.

对卡车和人员所产生损害效果接近模型的预测效果。但是，对装甲车和坦克的实际损害效果均显著高于以前的模型预测效果。


在M557装甲指挥车附近命中，带有瞬发引信的高爆（HE）弹的碎片击穿了这辆装甲车、摧毁了关键元器件并且杀伤了“车组人员”

The model predicted 30 percent damage to armored vehicles and tanks; however, 67 percent damage was achieved. Fragmentation from the HE rounds penetrated the armored vehicles, destroying critical components and injuring the manikin crews. (See an example of such damage in Figure 1.) In addition, the HE fragmentation damaged tracks, road wheels, and tank main gun sights and set one vehicle on fire.

该模型预测，对装甲车和坦克会造成30%的损害效果；但是，实际的损害效果居然达到；了67%。高爆弹的碎片击穿了装甲车辆，摧毁了关键元器件和伤害了假人。参阅图1中所展示的关于此类损害的实例。此外，高爆弹碎片还破坏了卡车、车轮、坦克的炮塔观测设备，并使其中一辆车着火。

Interestingly enough, none of the damage to the armored vehicles or tanks was the result of direct hits—all the damage was caused by near hits.

有趣的是，对坦克装甲车辆的破坏都不是直接命中所造成的损害，而是在击中目标附近所造成损害。

This test confirmed that US Army models did not accurately portray artillery effectiveness. Direct hits were not required to damage tanks and other armored targets.

试验证实了美军的数据模型的确没有准确地反映野战炮火的效果。对坦克和其它装甲目标造成损害也并非需要直接命中目标。