超级军网兄弟们又来分赃
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/27 22:51:35
我想我们一次还是不要选太多的内容，不如就先翻译这五段吧。
还是象上次一样，根据自己能抽出的时间选择一部分来翻译，而且，如果工作学习太忙，也可以只选一两句，并不一定要成段翻译。
选好后在下面跟帖申明哪些归自己，以免重复翻译。
Shock and Awe
The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force. War, of course, in the broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects arising from application of military power and were aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, employment of force.
In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will, understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe affect an adversary. One recalls from old photographs and movie or television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant horrors and death of trench warfare. These images and expressions of shock transcend race, culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage of Desert Storm vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of battlefield Shock and Awe.
In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control.
The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order to identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that differentiate each model as unique or important. At this stage, historical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a task will be to identify current and future examples to show the effects of Shock and Awe. From this identification, the next step in this methodology is to develop alternative mission capability packages consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how best each form or variant of Shock and Awe might be achieved. To repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain by the threat of use or by the actual application of our alternative force package. Then the mission capability package is examined in conditions of both MRCs and OOTW.
For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe have been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap exists between and among them. The first example is "Overwhelming Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force structure. The aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as possible. The superiority of American forces, technically and operationally, is crucial to successful application.我想我们一次还是不要选太多的内容，不如就先翻译这五段吧。
还是象上次一样，根据自己能抽出的时间选择一部分来翻译，而且，如果工作学习太忙，也可以只选一两句，并不一定要成段翻译。
选好后在下面跟帖申明哪些归自己，以免重复翻译。
Shock and Awe
The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force. War, of course, in the broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects arising from application of military power and were aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, employment of force.
In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will, understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe affect an adversary. One recalls from old photographs and movie or television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant horrors and death of trench warfare. These images and expressions of shock transcend race, culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage of Desert Storm vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of battlefield Shock and Awe.
In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control.
The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order to identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that differentiate each model as unique or important. At this stage, historical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a task will be to identify current and future examples to show the effects of Shock and Awe. From this identification, the next step in this methodology is to develop alternative mission capability packages consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how best each form or variant of Shock and Awe might be achieved. To repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain by the threat of use or by the actual application of our alternative force package. Then the mission capability package is examined in conditions of both MRCs and OOTW.
For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe have been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap exists between and among them. The first example is "Overwhelming Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force structure. The aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as possible. The superiority of American forces, technically and operationally, is crucial to successful application.
还是象上次一样，根据自己能抽出的时间选择一部分来翻译，而且，如果工作学习太忙，也可以只选一两句，并不一定要成段翻译。
选好后在下面跟帖申明哪些归自己，以免重复翻译。
Shock and Awe
The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force. War, of course, in the broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects arising from application of military power and were aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, employment of force.
In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will, understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe affect an adversary. One recalls from old photographs and movie or television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant horrors and death of trench warfare. These images and expressions of shock transcend race, culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage of Desert Storm vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of battlefield Shock and Awe.
In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control.
The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order to identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that differentiate each model as unique or important. At this stage, historical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a task will be to identify current and future examples to show the effects of Shock and Awe. From this identification, the next step in this methodology is to develop alternative mission capability packages consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how best each form or variant of Shock and Awe might be achieved. To repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain by the threat of use or by the actual application of our alternative force package. Then the mission capability package is examined in conditions of both MRCs and OOTW.
For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe have been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap exists between and among them. The first example is "Overwhelming Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force structure. The aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as possible. The superiority of American forces, technically and operationally, is crucial to successful application.我想我们一次还是不要选太多的内容，不如就先翻译这五段吧。
还是象上次一样，根据自己能抽出的时间选择一部分来翻译，而且，如果工作学习太忙，也可以只选一两句，并不一定要成段翻译。
选好后在下面跟帖申明哪些归自己，以免重复翻译。
Shock and Awe
The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force. War, of course, in the broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects arising from application of military power and were aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, employment of force.
In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will, understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe affect an adversary. One recalls from old photographs and movie or television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant horrors and death of trench warfare. These images and expressions of shock transcend race, culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage of Desert Storm vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of battlefield Shock and Awe.
In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control.
The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order to identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that differentiate each model as unique or important. At this stage, historical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a task will be to identify current and future examples to show the effects of Shock and Awe. From this identification, the next step in this methodology is to develop alternative mission capability packages consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how best each form or variant of Shock and Awe might be achieved. To repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain by the threat of use or by the actual application of our alternative force package. Then the mission capability package is examined in conditions of both MRCs and OOTW.
For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe have been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap exists between and among them. The first example is "Overwhelming Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force structure. The aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as possible. The superiority of American forces, technically and operationally, is crucial to successful application.
这两段备用，如果谁来晚了没抢到，或者翻译的比较顺利，就把下面两段也一起吃了，否则，这两段就留到下周吧。
There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of this approach. The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers of highly capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank, F-14,15, and 18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed principally to be used jointly or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and supporting capability. In other words, this example has principally been derived from force-on-forces attrition relationships even though command and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be disaggregated from this doctrine.
The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will prove more difficult. While it is clear that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the time being, these have not replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition orientation. It should be noted, there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives.
There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of this approach. The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers of highly capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank, F-14,15, and 18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed principally to be used jointly or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and supporting capability. In other words, this example has principally been derived from force-on-forces attrition relationships even though command and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be disaggregated from this doctrine.
The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will prove more difficult. While it is clear that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the time being, these have not replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition orientation. It should be noted, there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives.
这是皮蛋对这篇文章的介绍：“这篇文章是老美对美伊战争的基本看法”。
（也太简单了点 [em10][em10][em10] ）
（也太简单了点 [em10][em10][em10] ）
先下手为强，第一段我先抢了，哈哈。
Shock and Awe
The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force. War, of course, in the broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects arising from application of military power and were aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, employment of force.
Shock and Awe
The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force. War, of course, in the broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects arising from application of military power and were aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, employment of force.
In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will, understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe affect an adversary. One recalls from old photographs and movie or television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant horrors and death of trench warfare. These images and expressions of shock transcend race, culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage of Desert Storm vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of battlefield Shock and Awe.
In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control.
me的.
In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control.
me的.
The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order to identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that differentiate each model as unique or important. At this stage, historical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a task will be to identify current and future examples to show the effects of Shock and Awe. From this identification, the next step in this methodology is to develop alternative mission capability packages consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how best each form or variant of Shock and Awe might be achieved. To repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain by the threat of use or by the actual application of our alternative force package. Then the mission capability package is examined in conditions of both MRCs and OOTW.
For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe have been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap exists between and among them. The first example is "Overwhelming Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force structure. The aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as possible. The superiority of American forces, technically and operationally, is crucial to successful application.
让我来~~~~~~
For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe have been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap exists between and among them. The first example is "Overwhelming Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force structure. The aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as possible. The superiority of American forces, technically and operationally, is crucial to successful application.
让我来~~~~~~
为了把模式和例子要识别主要的机制，以区别每个模式如独特的或重要的方面，这个过程的第一个步骤需要要为震惊和敬畏分类。在现阶段，历史的例子是现成的。 然而，在后来的阶段中，一件工作将会要识别现在的和将来的例子震惊和敬畏的效果。 从这一个确认，这一种方法学的下一个步骤要发展其它可能的任务能力包含了操作手册，手法，权利结构，组织和系统的一项观念所组成分析而且决定震惊的每种形式或变种和敬畏可能是多么的完美。 至于重复，威吓和服从是我们寻求寄予使用的威胁或我们的其它可能的力量包裹的真实申请获得的输出。 然后任务能力包裹在 MRCs 和 OOTW 的情况中被调查。
因为讨论企图, 九个例子表现不一致震惊的历史类型，变种和特性和敬畏已经被体现。这些例子不是单独的种类，而且重叠存在在他们之间。 第一个例子是“压倒性的力量”教义和观念整合在今天的美国军队结构中。 这一则教义的目标要在为了要解除武装一个敌手身上尽快地应用庞大的或压倒性的力量，使其无能力或军事地上无力，这样对我们自己会有很少的意外事件和损失，而且对旁观者当做可以允许的。 美国军队的优越，不仅在技术上而且在实际操作上，对成功的获得是决定性的。
翻译的比较吃力～～～～～～～～～欢迎指正！[em10][em10][em10]
因为讨论企图, 九个例子表现不一致震惊的历史类型，变种和特性和敬畏已经被体现。这些例子不是单独的种类，而且重叠存在在他们之间。 第一个例子是“压倒性的力量”教义和观念整合在今天的美国军队结构中。 这一则教义的目标要在为了要解除武装一个敌手身上尽快地应用庞大的或压倒性的力量，使其无能力或军事地上无力，这样对我们自己会有很少的意外事件和损失，而且对旁观者当做可以允许的。 美国军队的优越，不仅在技术上而且在实际操作上，对成功的获得是决定性的。
翻译的比较吃力～～～～～～～～～欢迎指正！[em10][em10][em10]
幸好还有两段备用的，汗，瀑布汗~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~```
靠，第一个词我就不认识。。。。。
There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of this approach. The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers of highly capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank, F-14,15, and 18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed principally to be used jointly or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and supporting capability. In other words, this example has principally been derived from force-on-forces attrition relationships even though command and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be disaggregated from this doctrine.
The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will prove more difficult. While it is clear that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the time being, these have not replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition orientation. It should be noted, there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives.
There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of this approach. The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers of highly capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank, F-14,15, and 18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed principally to be used jointly or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and supporting capability. In other words, this example has principally been derived from force-on-forces attrition relationships even though command and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be disaggregated from this doctrine.
The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will prove more difficult. While it is clear that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the time being, these have not replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition orientation. It should be noted, there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives.
楼上的三个家伙疯了，紧急追加三段
Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large amounts of force. This requires significant logistical lift and the time to transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not always follow, especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of decisive force to remote or distant regions. Third, the costs of maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces needed. Finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is increasing the performance of its products while also lowering price and cycle time to field newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still endemic in the defense sector. This will compound the tension between quality and quantity already cited. None of these shortcomings is necessarily fatal. However, none should be dismissed without fuller understanding.
Certainly, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve certain objectives that are similar to those of current doctrine. A major distinction is that Rapid Dominance envisages a wider application of force across a broader spectrum of leverage points to impose Shock and Awe. This breadth should lead to a more comprehensive and integrated interaction among all the specific components and units that produce aggregate military capability and must include training and education, as well as new ways to exploit our technical and industrial capacity. It is possible that in these resource, technical, and commercial industrial areas that Rapid Dominance may provide particular utility that otherwise may constrain the effectiveness of Decisive Force.
The second example is "Hiroshima and Nagasaki" noted earlier. The intent here is to impose a regime of Shock and Awe through delivery of instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems. The employment of this capability against society and its values, called "counter-value" in the nuclear deterrent jargon, is massively destructive strikes directly at the public will of the adversary to resist and, ideally or theoretically, would instantly or quickly incapacitate that will over the space of a few hours or days.
Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large amounts of force. This requires significant logistical lift and the time to transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not always follow, especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of decisive force to remote or distant regions. Third, the costs of maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces needed. Finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is increasing the performance of its products while also lowering price and cycle time to field newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still endemic in the defense sector. This will compound the tension between quality and quantity already cited. None of these shortcomings is necessarily fatal. However, none should be dismissed without fuller understanding.
Certainly, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve certain objectives that are similar to those of current doctrine. A major distinction is that Rapid Dominance envisages a wider application of force across a broader spectrum of leverage points to impose Shock and Awe. This breadth should lead to a more comprehensive and integrated interaction among all the specific components and units that produce aggregate military capability and must include training and education, as well as new ways to exploit our technical and industrial capacity. It is possible that in these resource, technical, and commercial industrial areas that Rapid Dominance may provide particular utility that otherwise may constrain the effectiveness of Decisive Force.
The second example is "Hiroshima and Nagasaki" noted earlier. The intent here is to impose a regime of Shock and Awe through delivery of instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems. The employment of this capability against society and its values, called "counter-value" in the nuclear deterrent jargon, is massively destructive strikes directly at the public will of the adversary to resist and, ideally or theoretically, would instantly or quickly incapacitate that will over the space of a few hours or days.
55555,JJDD~被你们瓜分了~~我的呢？~~~
注：10楼的贴子比11楼的发贴时间快了0.00000001秒
我来一段……呵呵，不是偷懒，水平有限……
Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large amounts of force. This requires significant logistical lift and the time to transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not always follow, especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of decisive force to remote or distant regions. Third, the costs of maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces needed. Finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is increasing the performance of its products while also lowering price and cycle time to field newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still endemic in the defense sector. This will compound the tension between quality and quantity already cited. None of these shortcomings is necessarily fatal. However, none should be dismissed without fuller understanding.
我来一段……呵呵，不是偷懒，水平有限……
Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large amounts of force. This requires significant logistical lift and the time to transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not always follow, especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of decisive force to remote or distant regions. Third, the costs of maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces needed. Finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is increasing the performance of its products while also lowering price and cycle time to field newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still endemic in the defense sector. This will compound the tension between quality and quantity already cited. None of these shortcomings is necessarily fatal. However, none should be dismissed without fuller understanding.
差点忘了，leozhou 说的：“Rapid Dominance 是什么意思? 统一一下译法 ”我蒙了半天蒙不出来，大家讨论讨论。
飞飞别急，我不是又追加了三段吗！
飞飞别急，我不是又追加了三段吗！
[此贴子已经被作者于2003-4-3 14:59:31编辑过]
以下是引用虾米在2003-4-2 12:04:48的发言：
差点忘了，leozhou 说的：“Rapid Dominance 是什么意思? 统一一下译法 ”我蒙了半天蒙不出来，大家讨论讨论。
飞飞别急，我不是又追加了三段吗！
是不是翻做: 快速的优势
????
The second example is "Hiroshima and Nagasaki" noted earlier. The intent here is to impose a regime of Shock and Awe through delivery of instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems. The employment of this capability against society and its values, called "counter-value" in the nuclear deterrent jargon, is massively destructive strikes directly at the public will of the adversary to resist and, ideally or theoretically, would instantly or quickly incapacitate that will over the space of a few hours or days.
Me的~~~~~~~
Me的~~~~~~~
以下是引用虾米在2003-4-2 12:04:48的发言：
差点忘了，leozhou 说的：“Rapid Dominance 是什么意思?
快速控制
还有，大家不要用翻译软件阿，实在是惨不忍睹。[em04]
这段说的如何利用强大的军事和其他方面的力量让对方迅速崩溃，目前对伊作战前期就是这样做的。说白了就是不战而曲人之兵[em06]
不战而屈人之兵，我们老祖宗提出很早了。但我们一直只局限于这个话，好像还没有进行可操作性的分析。大家看看美国人的思维和我们的差别吧。
The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force. War, of course, in the broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects arising from application of military power and were aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, employment of force.
快速控制的基础在于我们拥有通过足够的和剧烈的“震动和敬畏”打击，摧毁敌人意志力，感知力和理解力，进而取得我们在这场危机或冲突中所要达到政治，战略和战术目标的能力。从广意上讲，战争包括被Clausewitzian称为“迷惑，摩擦和畏惧”的实际要素。在Clausewitzian 的理论中，从军事力量形成以来(?)，以摧毁敌人抵抗意志为目的的“震动和敬畏”就成为其组成部分。早期版本的类似观点在公元前500年就被中国的军事家 Sun Tzu (孙子？)提出来过。Sun Tzu 指出，不战而屈人之兵是一个指挥官所能达到的最高境界。Sun Tzu 非常明白“震动和敬畏”在战争前，战争中和战争后的重要性。他还提出：战争既谋略的思想，暗示“震动和敬畏”是智慧的杠杆，if not brilliant, employment of force.
if not brilliant, employment of force. 这句实在看不明白，55555
快速控制的基础在于我们拥有通过足够的和剧烈的“震动和敬畏”打击，摧毁敌人意志力，感知力和理解力，进而取得我们在这场危机或冲突中所要达到政治，战略和战术目标的能力。从广意上讲，战争包括被Clausewitzian称为“迷惑，摩擦和畏惧”的实际要素。在Clausewitzian 的理论中，从军事力量形成以来(?)，以摧毁敌人抵抗意志为目的的“震动和敬畏”就成为其组成部分。早期版本的类似观点在公元前500年就被中国的军事家 Sun Tzu (孙子？)提出来过。Sun Tzu 指出，不战而屈人之兵是一个指挥官所能达到的最高境界。Sun Tzu 非常明白“震动和敬畏”在战争前，战争中和战争后的重要性。他还提出：战争既谋略的思想，暗示“震动和敬畏”是智慧的杠杆，if not brilliant, employment of force.
if not brilliant, employment of force. 这句实在看不明白，55555
路过,随便瞅瞅~~~~~发现看不懂~
闪~
闪~
有几个主要的不足和弱点。 第一个是大规模的高稳定平台(编制？)象M-1坦克，F-14，15，18战斗机和CVN/DDG-51/SSN-668舰船是主要设计用于联合或者单独摧毁敌人和支援。例子主要是关于部队对部队作战的关系上，但是指挥和控制，后勤，和支援部队不能奉行这个原则
The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will prove more difficult. While it is clear that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the time being, these have not replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition orientation. It should be noted, there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives.
我可翻译不出来了。。。。。。糊涂了，这是讲的什么啊？武器的还好一些。。。
[em10][em10]
The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will prove more difficult. While it is clear that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the time being, these have not replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition orientation. It should be noted, there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives.
我可翻译不出来了。。。。。。糊涂了，这是讲的什么啊？武器的还好一些。。。
[em10][em10]
以下是引用随缘飞在2003-4-2 12:03:38的发言：
注：10楼的贴子比11楼的发贴时间快了0.00000001秒
我来一段……呵呵，不是偷懒，水平有限……
Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large amounts of force. This requires significant logistical lift and the time to transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not always follow, especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of decisive force to remote or distant regions. Third, the costs of maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces needed. Finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is increasing the performance of its products while also lowering price and cycle time to field newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still endemic in the defense sector. This will compound the tension between quality and quantity already cited. None of these shortcomings is necessarily fatal. However, none should be dismissed without fuller understanding.
第二，这种方法根本是以增加军队人数为基础，这就要求有效的后勤工作并且及时把必要的兵力运送到边远或偏僻的地区。第三，用来维持和保养大量军队的费用可能超出实际需要的部队人数所需的军费。最后，每当商业市场增加它产品的同时也降低价格并且周期接更新代系统的性能，相反的趋势仍然在地方的防御部门这将会把质量与数量的紧张状态累加，这些缺点都不一定致命，但是，再没有完全弄明白之前没有一个应当撤除。
[em06]大家将就着看看……
以下是引用虾米在2003-4-2 16:11:02的发言：
The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force. War, of course, in the broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects arising from application of military power and were aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, employment of force.
快速控制的基础在于我们拥有通过足够的和剧烈的“震动和敬畏”打击，摧毁敌人意志力，感知力和理解力，进而取得我们在这场危机或冲突中所要达到政治，战略和战术目标的能力。从广意上讲，战争包括被Clausewitzian称为“迷惑，摩擦和畏惧”的实际要素。在Clausewitzian 的理论中，从军事力量形成以来(?)，以摧毁敌人抵抗意志为目的的“震动和敬畏”就成为其组成部分。早期版本的类似观点在公元前500年就被中国的军事家 Sun Tzu (孙子？)提出来过。Sun Tzu 指出，不战而屈人之兵是一个指挥官所能达到的最高境界。Sun Tzu 非常明白“震动和敬畏”在战争前，战争中和战争后的重要性。他还提出：战争既谋略的思想，暗示“震动和敬畏”是智慧的杠杆，if not brilliant, employment of force.
if not brilliant, employment of force. 这句实在看不明白，55555
虾米兄弟，翻译得很好。老美对中国古文的翻译通常难懂。
Earlier and similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, employment of force.
大约在公元前500年，伟大的中国军事家孙武就更早地提出了与此相似的观点。孙武指出“不战而屈人之兵”是将帅用兵的最高境界。孙武深刻领悟了在战前、战时、战后实施打击和震慑是至关重要的。（“震慑和敬畏”是老美的行动代号）他还提出“兵不厌诈”，意指凭谋略可以使打击和震慑事半功倍，不能智取时，才以力敌。
虾米兄弟，看看可否？
[em09]
In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will, understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe affect an adversary. One recalls from old photographs and movie or television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant horrors and death of trench warfare. These images and expressions of shock transcend race, culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage of Desert Storm vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of battlefield Shock and Awe.
在快速控制当中，通过“震慑与恐吓”来达到动摇敌人的意志、理解和感知是多方面的。想要辨别和呈现这些方面，我们首先需要考察“震慑与恐吓”的不同面貌和是通过何种机制影响敌人。一个人会从老照片和电影或电视中播放的节目回忆起一战期间猛烈炮战中的生还者呆钝的表情以及参加者恐惧和堑壕战中的屠杀场景。这些震撼的画面和表情远远超越种族、文化和历史。实际上，电视分析和报道伊拉克士兵们在沙漠风暴行动中的举动生动地展示了“震慑和恐吓”战场是有效的。
In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control.
我们寻求决定“震慑与恐吓”是否和如何能成为有效的胁迫和策反因素迫使或使敌人信服地接受我们的观点（in the Clausewitzian sense），例如是次战役的战略目标和军事目标将能达到一种政治成果。然后，“震慑与恐吓”是与快速控制定义中的四个特征紧密相连的：知识，速度，才华和控制。
[em04][em04][em05][em05][em10][em10]
在快速控制当中，通过“震慑与恐吓”来达到动摇敌人的意志、理解和感知是多方面的。想要辨别和呈现这些方面，我们首先需要考察“震慑与恐吓”的不同面貌和是通过何种机制影响敌人。一个人会从老照片和电影或电视中播放的节目回忆起一战期间猛烈炮战中的生还者呆钝的表情以及参加者恐惧和堑壕战中的屠杀场景。这些震撼的画面和表情远远超越种族、文化和历史。实际上，电视分析和报道伊拉克士兵们在沙漠风暴行动中的举动生动地展示了“震慑和恐吓”战场是有效的。
In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control.
我们寻求决定“震慑与恐吓”是否和如何能成为有效的胁迫和策反因素迫使或使敌人信服地接受我们的观点（in the Clausewitzian sense），例如是次战役的战略目标和军事目标将能达到一种政治成果。然后，“震慑与恐吓”是与快速控制定义中的四个特征紧密相连的：知识，速度，才华和控制。
[em04][em04][em05][em05][em10][em10]
[此贴子已经被作者于2003-4-3 20:15:27编辑过]
leozhou翻译的非常到位，鼓掌！
以下是引用虾米在2003-4-2 12:04:48的发言：
差点忘了，leozhou 说的：“Rapid Dominance 是什么意思? 统一一下译法 ”我蒙了半天蒙不出来，大家讨论讨论。
飞飞别急，我不是又追加了三段吗！
虾米兄弟，你做了一件很棒的事情！！！
大家在这里寓学于乐，真的不错！！
我个人观点：阅读和翻译是不同的。阅读——让自己懂；翻译——让别人懂。
所以，有些地方不能直译，适当采取意译，转换成我们都知道的概念能更容易理解。
Rapid Dominance 直译应该是“迅速的优势、快速的占领”。但是，结合文章其他部分，尤其是广岛、长崎的举例。老美的本意应该是想表达我们通常说的“速战速决”，我们可否译为“速决战”，对中国人来说比较容易理解。
There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of this approach. The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers of highly capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank, F-14,15, and 18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed principally to be used jointly or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and supporting capability. In other words, this example has principally been derived from force-on-forces attrition relationships even though command and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be disaggregated from this doctrine.
The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will prove more difficult. While it is clear that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the time being, these have not replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition orientation. It should be noted, there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives
我选了一段自己感兴趣的，没看上下文可能会有偏差，幸亏参考了哈萨克雄鹰兄弟的译文。
这种方案有几个主要的遭受非议之处和隐藏的弱点。首先，它明显依赖于数量庞大的高性能（也是高价）作战平台，例如：M-1主战坦克、F-14/15/18战斗机、CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688舰船 [航空母舰、伯克级驱逐舰、洛杉矶级核潜艇]这些主要设计用途是用来协同或独立摧毁和消耗对方战斗和支援能力的武器。或者说，这个例子只是针对直接作战的消耗关系，即使在指挥控制、后勤补给、战斗支援系统不能通过此方案瓦解的情况下。
这种关于“面-面”或“点-点”直接作战消耗的理论依据有另一个主要缺点是，自身资源的消耗和敌军装备的充足将导致某些人反对这个方案，论证这个方案并质询国会和公众将会更加困难。尽管“体系之体系”概念是清楚的，而且其他的替代军事观念尚在考虑中，但到目前为止，当前的作战平台和直接作战消耗的定位还未被取代。应该注意到，在做出足够努力对可能的替代方案进行全面细致的验证之前，是不会有替代方案出台的。
（补充：如果阅读时把“作战平台”等概念转换成“飞机、大炮、舰船”等形象的概念，就不会感觉太晦涩难懂。但是，翻译时还是遵从点原意吧）。
The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will prove more difficult. While it is clear that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the time being, these have not replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition orientation. It should be noted, there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives
我选了一段自己感兴趣的，没看上下文可能会有偏差，幸亏参考了哈萨克雄鹰兄弟的译文。
这种方案有几个主要的遭受非议之处和隐藏的弱点。首先，它明显依赖于数量庞大的高性能（也是高价）作战平台，例如：M-1主战坦克、F-14/15/18战斗机、CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688舰船 [航空母舰、伯克级驱逐舰、洛杉矶级核潜艇]这些主要设计用途是用来协同或独立摧毁和消耗对方战斗和支援能力的武器。或者说，这个例子只是针对直接作战的消耗关系，即使在指挥控制、后勤补给、战斗支援系统不能通过此方案瓦解的情况下。
这种关于“面-面”或“点-点”直接作战消耗的理论依据有另一个主要缺点是，自身资源的消耗和敌军装备的充足将导致某些人反对这个方案，论证这个方案并质询国会和公众将会更加困难。尽管“体系之体系”概念是清楚的，而且其他的替代军事观念尚在考虑中，但到目前为止，当前的作战平台和直接作战消耗的定位还未被取代。应该注意到，在做出足够努力对可能的替代方案进行全面细致的验证之前，是不会有替代方案出台的。
（补充：如果阅读时把“作战平台”等概念转换成“飞机、大炮、舰船”等形象的概念，就不会感觉太晦涩难懂。但是，翻译时还是遵从点原意吧）。
以下是引用向东流在2003-4-4 13:31:06的发言：
[quote]以下是引用虾米在2003-4-2 12:04:48的发言：
差点忘了，leozhou 说的：“Rapid Dominance 是什么意思? 统一一下译法 ”我蒙了半天蒙不出来，大家讨论讨论。
飞飞别急，我不是又追加了三段吗！
虾米兄弟，你做了一件很棒的事情！！！
大家在这里寓学于乐，真的不错！！
我个人观点：阅读和翻译是不同的。阅读——让自己懂；翻译——让别人懂。
所以，有些地方不能直译，适当采取意译，转换成我们都知道的概念能更容易理解。
Rapid Dominance 直译应该是“迅速的优势、快速的占领”。但是，结合文章其他部分，尤其是广岛、长崎的举例。老美的本意应该是想表达我们通常说的“速战速决”，我们可否译为“速决战”，对中国人来说比较容易理解。
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向东流说的不错！
Rapid Dominance译作速决战固然不错，但在文章里老美也非常强调情况、局势的控制能力，所以Dominance 可以看作是控制。[em12]
想了想，还是速决战好点。
以下是引用风清云淡在2003-4-4 15:14:42的发言：
想了想，还是速决战好点。
兄弟，这其实是中西文化的差异造成的。我们和老美从小到大接受的教育、说话时用到的概念，差别很多。从纯粹的翻译角度来看，遵从原文原意并流畅易懂是较高的境界了，不过在超大，给兄弟们看的文章，我偏向于“易于理解”。呵呵[em01][em00]
以下是引用向东流在2003-4-4 15:31:35的发言：
兄弟，这其实是中西文化的差异造成的。我们和老美从小到大接受的教育、说话时用到的概念，差别很多。从纯粹的翻译角度来看，遵从原文原意并流畅易懂是较高的境界了，不过在超大，给兄弟们看的文章，我偏向于“易于理解”。呵呵[em01][em00]
总感觉速决战没有完整的表达作者的意思，个人觉得还是用迅速控制或快速控制更能表达作者的意思[em08][em07]
风清云淡兄弟，你说的不无道理。
我们一起在这里l学习领会，好吗？
我们一起在这里l学习领会，好吗？
以下是引用向东流在2003-4-4 13:31:06的发言：
我个人观点：阅读和翻译是不同的。阅读——让自己懂；翻译——让别人懂。
所以，有些地方不能直译，适当采取意译，转换成我们都知道的概念能更容易理解。
其实这个问题我一直很疑惑，因为什么地方该直译，什么地方该意译，比较难把握。
[此贴子已经被作者于2004-4-8 16:54:49编辑过]