超级军网美海军情报：2008年中国海军潜艇“Patrol”加倍达12次， ...
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/27 04:20:25
首先，提供2篇类似的文章；
主要内容：
2008年，US Navy Intelligence记录的中国海军的这种“Patrol”达创记录的12次；
这2篇文章中都明确说明，美国海军情报 （US Navy Intelligence）拒绝透露到底潜艇“Patrol”
的定义是什么（除了可以肯定Patrol是比一般训练航行远的航行）；
最后，美国似乎肯定，中国的094肯定没有进行任何这样的“Patrol”
2008年，US Navy Intelligence记录的中国海军的这种“Patrol”达创记录的12次；
第一篇：
Chinese Submarine Patrols Doubled in 2008
By Hans M. Kristensen
Chinese attack submarines sailed on more patrols in 2008 than ever before, according to information obtained by Federation of American Scientists from U.S. naval intelligence.
The information, which was declassified by U.S. naval intelligence in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from the Federation of American Scientists, shows that China’s fleet of more than 50 attack submarines conducted 12 patrols in 2008, twice the number of patrols conducted in 2007.
China’s strategic ballistic missile submarines have never conducted a deterrent patrol.
Highest Patrol Rate Ever
The 12 patrols conducted in 2008 constitute the highest patrol rater ever for the Chinese submarine fleet. They follow six patrols conducted in 2007, two in 2006, and zero in 2005. China has four times refrained from conducting submarine patrols since 1981, and the previous peaks were six patrols conducted in 2000 and 2007 (see Figure 1).
While the increase is submarine patrols is important, it has to be seen in comparison with the size of the Chinese submarine fleet. With approximately 54 submarines, the patrol rate means that each submarine on average goes on patrol once every four and a half years. In reality, the patrols might have been carried out by only a small portion of the fleet, perhaps the most modern and capable types. A new class of nuclear-powered Shang-class (Type-093) attack submarines is replacing the aging Han-class (Type-091).
Few of the details for assessing the implications of the increased patrol rate are known, nor is it known precisely what constitutes a patrol in order for U.S. naval intelligence to count it. A request for the definition has been denied. It is assumed that a patrol in this case involves an extended voyage far enough from the submarine’s base to be different from a brief training exercise.
In comparison with other major navies, twelve patrols are not much. The patrol rate of the U.S. attack submarine fleet, which is focused on long-range patrols and probably operate regularly near the Chinese coast, is much higher with each submarine conducting at least one extended patrol per year. But the Chinese patrol rate is higher than that of the Russian navy, which in 2008 conducted only seven attack submarine patrols, the same as in 2007.
Still no SSBN Patrols
The declassified information also shows that China has yet to send one of its strategic submarines on patrol. The old Xia, China’s first SSBN, completed a multi-year overhaul in late-2007 but did not sail on patrol in 2008.
The first of China’s new Jin-class (Type-094) SSBN was spotted in February 2008 at the relatively new base on Hainan Island, where a new submarine demagnetization facility has been constructed. But the submarine did not conduct a patrol the remainder of the year. A JL-2 missile was test launched Bohai Bay in May 2008, but it is yet unclear from what platform.
Two or three more Jin-class subs are under construction at the Huludao (Bohai) Shipyard, and the Pentagon projects that up to five might be built. How these submarines will be operated as a “counter-attack” deterrent remains to be seen, but they will be starting from scratch.首先，提供2篇类似的文章；
主要内容：
2008年，US Navy Intelligence记录的中国海军的这种“Patrol”达创记录的12次；
这2篇文章中都明确说明，美国海军情报 （US Navy Intelligence）拒绝透露到底潜艇“Patrol”
的定义是什么（除了可以肯定Patrol是比一般训练航行远的航行）；
最后，美国似乎肯定，中国的094肯定没有进行任何这样的“Patrol”
2008年，US Navy Intelligence记录的中国海军的这种“Patrol”达创记录的12次；
第一篇：
Chinese Submarine Patrols Doubled in 2008
By Hans M. Kristensen
Chinese attack submarines sailed on more patrols in 2008 than ever before, according to information obtained by Federation of American Scientists from U.S. naval intelligence.
The information, which was declassified by U.S. naval intelligence in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from the Federation of American Scientists, shows that China’s fleet of more than 50 attack submarines conducted 12 patrols in 2008, twice the number of patrols conducted in 2007.
China’s strategic ballistic missile submarines have never conducted a deterrent patrol.
Highest Patrol Rate Ever
The 12 patrols conducted in 2008 constitute the highest patrol rater ever for the Chinese submarine fleet. They follow six patrols conducted in 2007, two in 2006, and zero in 2005. China has four times refrained from conducting submarine patrols since 1981, and the previous peaks were six patrols conducted in 2000 and 2007 (see Figure 1).
While the increase is submarine patrols is important, it has to be seen in comparison with the size of the Chinese submarine fleet. With approximately 54 submarines, the patrol rate means that each submarine on average goes on patrol once every four and a half years. In reality, the patrols might have been carried out by only a small portion of the fleet, perhaps the most modern and capable types. A new class of nuclear-powered Shang-class (Type-093) attack submarines is replacing the aging Han-class (Type-091).
Few of the details for assessing the implications of the increased patrol rate are known, nor is it known precisely what constitutes a patrol in order for U.S. naval intelligence to count it. A request for the definition has been denied. It is assumed that a patrol in this case involves an extended voyage far enough from the submarine’s base to be different from a brief training exercise.
In comparison with other major navies, twelve patrols are not much. The patrol rate of the U.S. attack submarine fleet, which is focused on long-range patrols and probably operate regularly near the Chinese coast, is much higher with each submarine conducting at least one extended patrol per year. But the Chinese patrol rate is higher than that of the Russian navy, which in 2008 conducted only seven attack submarine patrols, the same as in 2007.
Still no SSBN Patrols
The declassified information also shows that China has yet to send one of its strategic submarines on patrol. The old Xia, China’s first SSBN, completed a multi-year overhaul in late-2007 but did not sail on patrol in 2008.
The first of China’s new Jin-class (Type-094) SSBN was spotted in February 2008 at the relatively new base on Hainan Island, where a new submarine demagnetization facility has been constructed. But the submarine did not conduct a patrol the remainder of the year. A JL-2 missile was test launched Bohai Bay in May 2008, but it is yet unclear from what platform.
Two or three more Jin-class subs are under construction at the Huludao (Bohai) Shipyard, and the Pentagon projects that up to five might be built. How these submarines will be operated as a “counter-attack” deterrent remains to be seen, but they will be starting from scratch.
主要内容：
2008年，US Navy Intelligence记录的中国海军的这种“Patrol”达创记录的12次；
这2篇文章中都明确说明，美国海军情报 （US Navy Intelligence）拒绝透露到底潜艇“Patrol”
的定义是什么（除了可以肯定Patrol是比一般训练航行远的航行）；
最后，美国似乎肯定，中国的094肯定没有进行任何这样的“Patrol”
2008年，US Navy Intelligence记录的中国海军的这种“Patrol”达创记录的12次；
第一篇：
Chinese Submarine Patrols Doubled in 2008
By Hans M. Kristensen
Chinese attack submarines sailed on more patrols in 2008 than ever before, according to information obtained by Federation of American Scientists from U.S. naval intelligence.
The information, which was declassified by U.S. naval intelligence in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from the Federation of American Scientists, shows that China’s fleet of more than 50 attack submarines conducted 12 patrols in 2008, twice the number of patrols conducted in 2007.
China’s strategic ballistic missile submarines have never conducted a deterrent patrol.
Highest Patrol Rate Ever
The 12 patrols conducted in 2008 constitute the highest patrol rater ever for the Chinese submarine fleet. They follow six patrols conducted in 2007, two in 2006, and zero in 2005. China has four times refrained from conducting submarine patrols since 1981, and the previous peaks were six patrols conducted in 2000 and 2007 (see Figure 1).
While the increase is submarine patrols is important, it has to be seen in comparison with the size of the Chinese submarine fleet. With approximately 54 submarines, the patrol rate means that each submarine on average goes on patrol once every four and a half years. In reality, the patrols might have been carried out by only a small portion of the fleet, perhaps the most modern and capable types. A new class of nuclear-powered Shang-class (Type-093) attack submarines is replacing the aging Han-class (Type-091).
Few of the details for assessing the implications of the increased patrol rate are known, nor is it known precisely what constitutes a patrol in order for U.S. naval intelligence to count it. A request for the definition has been denied. It is assumed that a patrol in this case involves an extended voyage far enough from the submarine’s base to be different from a brief training exercise.
In comparison with other major navies, twelve patrols are not much. The patrol rate of the U.S. attack submarine fleet, which is focused on long-range patrols and probably operate regularly near the Chinese coast, is much higher with each submarine conducting at least one extended patrol per year. But the Chinese patrol rate is higher than that of the Russian navy, which in 2008 conducted only seven attack submarine patrols, the same as in 2007.
Still no SSBN Patrols
The declassified information also shows that China has yet to send one of its strategic submarines on patrol. The old Xia, China’s first SSBN, completed a multi-year overhaul in late-2007 but did not sail on patrol in 2008.
The first of China’s new Jin-class (Type-094) SSBN was spotted in February 2008 at the relatively new base on Hainan Island, where a new submarine demagnetization facility has been constructed. But the submarine did not conduct a patrol the remainder of the year. A JL-2 missile was test launched Bohai Bay in May 2008, but it is yet unclear from what platform.
Two or three more Jin-class subs are under construction at the Huludao (Bohai) Shipyard, and the Pentagon projects that up to five might be built. How these submarines will be operated as a “counter-attack” deterrent remains to be seen, but they will be starting from scratch.首先，提供2篇类似的文章；
主要内容：
2008年，US Navy Intelligence记录的中国海军的这种“Patrol”达创记录的12次；
这2篇文章中都明确说明，美国海军情报 （US Navy Intelligence）拒绝透露到底潜艇“Patrol”
的定义是什么（除了可以肯定Patrol是比一般训练航行远的航行）；
最后，美国似乎肯定，中国的094肯定没有进行任何这样的“Patrol”
2008年，US Navy Intelligence记录的中国海军的这种“Patrol”达创记录的12次；
第一篇：
Chinese Submarine Patrols Doubled in 2008
By Hans M. Kristensen
Chinese attack submarines sailed on more patrols in 2008 than ever before, according to information obtained by Federation of American Scientists from U.S. naval intelligence.
The information, which was declassified by U.S. naval intelligence in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from the Federation of American Scientists, shows that China’s fleet of more than 50 attack submarines conducted 12 patrols in 2008, twice the number of patrols conducted in 2007.
China’s strategic ballistic missile submarines have never conducted a deterrent patrol.
Highest Patrol Rate Ever
The 12 patrols conducted in 2008 constitute the highest patrol rater ever for the Chinese submarine fleet. They follow six patrols conducted in 2007, two in 2006, and zero in 2005. China has four times refrained from conducting submarine patrols since 1981, and the previous peaks were six patrols conducted in 2000 and 2007 (see Figure 1).
While the increase is submarine patrols is important, it has to be seen in comparison with the size of the Chinese submarine fleet. With approximately 54 submarines, the patrol rate means that each submarine on average goes on patrol once every four and a half years. In reality, the patrols might have been carried out by only a small portion of the fleet, perhaps the most modern and capable types. A new class of nuclear-powered Shang-class (Type-093) attack submarines is replacing the aging Han-class (Type-091).
Few of the details for assessing the implications of the increased patrol rate are known, nor is it known precisely what constitutes a patrol in order for U.S. naval intelligence to count it. A request for the definition has been denied. It is assumed that a patrol in this case involves an extended voyage far enough from the submarine’s base to be different from a brief training exercise.
In comparison with other major navies, twelve patrols are not much. The patrol rate of the U.S. attack submarine fleet, which is focused on long-range patrols and probably operate regularly near the Chinese coast, is much higher with each submarine conducting at least one extended patrol per year. But the Chinese patrol rate is higher than that of the Russian navy, which in 2008 conducted only seven attack submarine patrols, the same as in 2007.
Still no SSBN Patrols
The declassified information also shows that China has yet to send one of its strategic submarines on patrol. The old Xia, China’s first SSBN, completed a multi-year overhaul in late-2007 but did not sail on patrol in 2008.
The first of China’s new Jin-class (Type-094) SSBN was spotted in February 2008 at the relatively new base on Hainan Island, where a new submarine demagnetization facility has been constructed. But the submarine did not conduct a patrol the remainder of the year. A JL-2 missile was test launched Bohai Bay in May 2008, but it is yet unclear from what platform.
Two or three more Jin-class subs are under construction at the Huludao (Bohai) Shipyard, and the Pentagon projects that up to five might be built. How these submarines will be operated as a “counter-attack” deterrent remains to be seen, but they will be starting from scratch.
类似的第二篇：
China: More Submarine Activity
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted 12 submarine patrols in 2008, according to U.S. Naval Intelligence estimates obtained by the Federation of American Scientists on Feb. 3. This is more than twice as many patrols as in any other year and indicates a potential sustained rise in long-term Chinese naval operations.
“Patrol” is an internal U.S. Naval Intelligence metric that the Pentagon declines to define. It nevertheless almost certainly entails more than a Chinese submarine simply leaving port, suggesting that these 12 patrols signify significant time under way.
Because the numbers do not distinguish among types of submarine patrols, the 12 patrols may have included conventionally-powered patrol submarines and/or nuclear-powered attack submarines. But the Naval Intelligence estimates are clear that the PLAN has still yet to carry out a single strategic deterrence patrol with its ballistic missile submarines. Two or three of the Jin class (Type 094) ballistic missile submarines have been launched, and the first was slated to be commissioned in 2008; indeed, the latest biennial White Paper explicitly acknowledged their existence. Though they did not patrol in 2008, some sea trials were almost certainly conducted, and they may see operational service soon.
STRATFOR has noted increased PLAN attack and patrol submarine activity before, including activity near Japanese waters; however, this latest estimate is noteworthy not simply for its unprecedented nature, but also within the context of broader trends in PLAN deployments.
In short, the Chinese military has been moving toward more active engagement around the world — a path clearly spelled out in its White Paper. This includes a higher operational tempo for the PLAN, which has long spent the vast majority of its time alongside the pier, with little at-sea training and experience. This increased operational tempo comes on the heels of years of effort on the part of Beijing to professionalize and educate the ranks of its military — and is the next logical step in expanding its capability. This step could well begin to have a meaningful impact on Chinese officers’ and sailors’ capability to competently and proficiently employ their submarines.
Though the most overt development has been the deployment of a small but highly-publicized squadron of two guided-missile destroyers and a replenishment ship to the pirate-infested waters off Somalia, the doubling of the submarine patrols from six in 2007 to 12 in 2008 (up from zero patrols in 2006) is clear evidence that the impetus to accelerate deployments extends to the submarine service.
The cramped waters around China are likely to become more crowded, opening up the potential for increased maritime competition and raising the likelihood of military incidents as the U.S. Navy, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and the South Korean navy all try to keep tabs on PLAN activity.
China: More Submarine Activity
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted 12 submarine patrols in 2008, according to U.S. Naval Intelligence estimates obtained by the Federation of American Scientists on Feb. 3. This is more than twice as many patrols as in any other year and indicates a potential sustained rise in long-term Chinese naval operations.
“Patrol” is an internal U.S. Naval Intelligence metric that the Pentagon declines to define. It nevertheless almost certainly entails more than a Chinese submarine simply leaving port, suggesting that these 12 patrols signify significant time under way.
Because the numbers do not distinguish among types of submarine patrols, the 12 patrols may have included conventionally-powered patrol submarines and/or nuclear-powered attack submarines. But the Naval Intelligence estimates are clear that the PLAN has still yet to carry out a single strategic deterrence patrol with its ballistic missile submarines. Two or three of the Jin class (Type 094) ballistic missile submarines have been launched, and the first was slated to be commissioned in 2008; indeed, the latest biennial White Paper explicitly acknowledged their existence. Though they did not patrol in 2008, some sea trials were almost certainly conducted, and they may see operational service soon.
STRATFOR has noted increased PLAN attack and patrol submarine activity before, including activity near Japanese waters; however, this latest estimate is noteworthy not simply for its unprecedented nature, but also within the context of broader trends in PLAN deployments.
In short, the Chinese military has been moving toward more active engagement around the world — a path clearly spelled out in its White Paper. This includes a higher operational tempo for the PLAN, which has long spent the vast majority of its time alongside the pier, with little at-sea training and experience. This increased operational tempo comes on the heels of years of effort on the part of Beijing to professionalize and educate the ranks of its military — and is the next logical step in expanding its capability. This step could well begin to have a meaningful impact on Chinese officers’ and sailors’ capability to competently and proficiently employ their submarines.
Though the most overt development has been the deployment of a small but highly-publicized squadron of two guided-missile destroyers and a replenishment ship to the pirate-infested waters off Somalia, the doubling of the submarine patrols from six in 2007 to 12 in 2008 (up from zero patrols in 2006) is clear evidence that the impetus to accelerate deployments extends to the submarine service.
The cramped waters around China are likely to become more crowded, opening up the potential for increased maritime competition and raising the likelihood of military incidents as the U.S. Navy, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and the South Korean navy all try to keep tabs on PLAN activity.
每次出去他都知道？？？？ 扯
哎。。。出去转转也就算了，还被发现了。。。
半年前的旧文。。。
码头空了就出去了呗，具体到哪里，干什么老美也不都知道。所以就定义为Patrol
LS说的有道理
也许是在远海与美舰遭遇的次数吧，当然是指被美舰发现的次数
美帝也有YY的时候啊！:D