美国的全球军火市场份额

《外交事务》链接http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ar ... outgunned?page=show

Outgunned?
技不如人？
A Debate Over the Shifting Global Arms Market
一场关于全球军火市场转变的辩论

Technology Matters
观点一：技术的重要性
作者：J. Thomas Moriarty，乔治华盛顿大学访问学者

According to Jonathan Caverley and Ethan Kapstein ("Arms Away," September/October 2012), the United States' domination of the global arms market is disappearing, and as a consequence, Washington is squandering an array of economic and political benefits it has enjoyed as the foremost weapons dealer in the world. They argue that although the U.S. defense industry spent the last decade developing expensive, high-tech systems, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, also known as the F-35, foreign customers actually want cheaper, less advanced weapons. For Caverley and Kapstein, simpler is better.

根据Jonathan Caverley和Ethan Kapstein的观点（见发表于《外交事务》2012年9/10月刊的Arms Away一文），美国在全球军火市场上的统治地位正在消失，其结果之一就是，华盛顿正在挥霍着美国作为世界头号军火商而享有的一系列经济、政治利益。二位学者认为，虽然美国军工产业花费了十年时间，研制出诸如F-35联合攻击机等昂贵的高科技系统，但国外客户真正想要的是那些便宜的、并不那么先进的武器。他们认为简单才是王道。

Even if that were true, it would be a secondary concern. First and foremost, U.S. defense firms need to serve their most important client: the Pentagon. The U.S. military should not have to forgo stealth technologies, for instance, which better protect pilots and allow them to attack complex air defense systems, because the rest of the world is supposedly more interested in old airplanes equipped with outdated technology.

就算这些假设成立，这也是次要的问题。对美国军火公司而言，其首要任务是满足最重要的客户：五角大楼。比方说，不能因为其它国家对技术过时的老式飞机感兴趣，就让美军放弃那些可以更好地保护飞行员、能够攻击复杂防空系统的隐形技术。

Moreover, the United States' declining market share in recent years is not a result of the Pentagon's pursuing cutting-edge technology, as Caverley and Kapstein argue. The landscape of global arms sales is shifting because medium-sized powers, such as India, South Korea, and Turkey, have enjoyed robust economic growth lately and are using that growth to reduce their dependence on Washington for military technology. Dozens of countries have built their own weapons-manufacturing industries in order to create high-paying jobs, generate profits, and address domestic security concerns, despite the fact that cheaper, more reliable systems are already for sale on the international market.

此外，不像Caverley和Kapstein声称的那样，近年来美国的市场份额缩小，并非出于五角大楼对先进技术的追求。全球军火销售情况发生转变，系因为印度、韩国、土耳其等中型强国的经济在近年出现强劲增长，这些国家利用经济增长来减少对美国军事技术的依赖。许多国家不顾国际市场上已有更廉价可靠的武器系统的事实，纷纷建立起自己的军工产业，以此创造高薪职位和利润，并解决国内安全问题。

India, for example, has spent billions developing its own light combat aircraft, the Tejas, even though more economical alternatives are available from foreign sources. And Israel is producing its own precision-guided munitions and unmanned aerial vehicles, even though it could buy U.S. systems at discounted rates. Much of the decline in U.S. arms sales is a byproduct of foreign governments' decisions to do more business at home, not the result of misguided strategy in Washington. As a consequence, the United States should keep doing what it does best: building state-of-the-art weapons equipped with the latest technology.

例如，印度已耗资数十亿美元研制本国的轻型战斗机光辉，即使它可以从国外买到更划算的替代型号；以色列正在生产自己的精确制导武器和无人机，即使它能够以折扣价买到美制产品。美国军火销量下降在很大程度上是外国政府自力更生的副产物，而不是由于华盛顿的策略出错。因此，美国应当继续发挥其特长：采用最新科技打造尖端武器。

Caverley and Kapstein point to France's success in selling its Rafale fighter jet in a $11 billion deal with India as proof that states aren't interested in "gold-plated" aircraft. The Rafale is indeed less expensive and less capable than the F-35, but it is by no means simple or cheap. The difference in price is negligible: recent estimates put the flyaway cost of a Rafale at $100 million, whereas the U.S. Government Accountability Office has estimated the F-35's price tag at around $108 million. India's decision to purchase the Rafale over the F-35 had more to do with geo-strategic concerns -- such as a desire to avoid an overreliance on U.S. advanced weaponry -- than financial or technological considerations.

以法国向印度成功售出价值110亿美元的飓风战机为证据，Caverley和Kapstein声称
他国对尖端飞机并不感兴趣。确实，飓风不如F-35昂贵、神勇，但它绝非简单或廉价的战机。两者的价格差距可以忽略不计，据最新估算，每架飓风的出厂价为一亿美元，而美国政府责任办公室估计每架F-35的售价为1.08亿。印度弃用F-35选购飓风更多地与地缘策略有关（比如避免过于依赖美国先进武器），而不是出于财务和技术考虑。

Meanwhile, France has sold Rafales to just one country. Even if it wins pending contracts in Brazil and the United Arab Emirates, Paris will export only about 200 aircraft. By comparison, ten countries have pledged to buy the F-35 from the United States, and it is also expected to win contracts in Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea. If all goes according to plan, Lockheed Martin will export at least 500 F-35s in the coming decades.

此外，法国只向一个国家销售了飓风，即使它在巴西和阿联酋都赢得订单，销量也不过200架。与之相比，已有十个国家承诺购买美国的F-35，此外美国还有望在马来西亚、新加坡和韩国赢得订单。如果一切按计划进行，洛克马丁将在未来数十年内出口至少500架F-35。

More misleading than the Rafale example is Caverley and Kapstein's reference to Sweden's Gripen. The Gripen's flyaway cost is only about $60 million, but the plane lacks the advanced capabilities of both the Rafale and the F-35. In the 1980s, Sweden bet that there would be a healthy market for a simple and cheap aircraft, because the United States and western Europe were focusing on expensive, high-tech models. If the Gripen had managed to capture a substantial part of the global combat-aircraft market, it would serve as conclusive empirical evidence that the "simpler is better" strategy works. But Sweden's projected buyers have not materialized: only three countries have purchased the Gripen, together buying about 60 of the planes from Sweden, and another two countries are leasing about 28 additional planes. In fact, the program has been such a flop that Stockholm is now debating whether it should spend several billion dollars more to upgrade the jet's technology. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin is expected to export more F-35s to more countries and for more profit than sales of the Rafale and the Gripen combined.

Caverley和Kapstein提到瑞典的鹰狮战机，这比飓风战机的例子更加具有误导性。鹰狮的出厂价仅为6千万美元，且该战机并不具备飓风和F-35的先进性能。上世纪八十年代，瑞典打赌简单廉价的战机将会畅销，原因是美国和西欧都在集中精力研发昂贵的尖端型号。如果鹰狮能够在世界战机市场上抢占相当份额，这也许能证实＂越简单越好＂的思路正确。但瑞典预计的买家并未出现：只有三个国家购买了约60架鹰狮，另有两个国家租赁了28架。实际上，鹰狮项目表现如此之差，斯德哥尔摩正在辩论应否再多花几十亿美元升级该战机。与此同时，洛克马丁预计出口的F-35，无论是数量、出口国家总数、利润都要超过飓风和鹰狮之和。

Caverley and Kapstein are wise to caution against overindulgence in technology. Cutting-edge weapons systems are difficult to develop, as the case of the F-35 has shown, and this problem is hardly confined to the last decade. But the real dilemma for U.S. defense firms is that because they have become so adept at innovation, military officials are often overly ambitious in what they ask for. The solution is not to produce simpler weapons systems, as Caverley and Kapstein suggest, but rather to rationalize the procurement process so that it leads to useful innovations. Technology gives the United States its competitive edge today, and it will continue to do so in the future. It would be folly for Washington to relinquish its foremost advantage.

Caverley和Kapstein关于切勿过于追求技术的警告是明智的。正如F-35所示，高尖端武器系统很难开发，而且这个问题并不仅限于过去十年。但是，美国军工企业面对的真正难题在于：他们太善于创新，以致于军方官员往往异想天开。解决之道并不像Caverley和Kapstein所说的那样在于生产较简单的武器系统，而是在于将军事采购过程合理化，由此催生出有用的创新。美国依靠科技获得了今日的竞争优势，并将如此继续下去。如果华盛顿抛弃这个最重要的优势就太蠢了。

Still on Top
观点二：风光依旧
作者Daniel Katz，曾任美国国防部分析员

Recently, the U.S. arms industry has enjoyed a string of banner years. So it was surprising to read Jonathan Caverley and Ethan Kapstein's claim that Washington has lost its dominance in the global arms market. Reports on conventional arms transfers from the Congressional Research Service contain the best public data on this topic, and the numbers reveal that the authors' core assertion is simply not true.

近年来，美国军工产业一直红红火火。因此，看到Caverley和Kapstein声称美国已在全球军火市场上丧失统治地位，当真令人称奇。在这个问题上，国会研究机构的《常规武器转让报告》包含着最准确的公开数据，这些数字揭示出Caverley和Kapstein的核心观点并不成立。

Some history is in order. In the early 1990s, with the Russian economy in disarray and the Gulf states rearming, the United States' share of the global arms market soared, peaking at 60 percent in 1993. Over the next decade, Russia's defense industry recovered, and Moscow ramped up its arms exports to China and India, whose economies were booming. At the same time, falling oil prices and the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 took a toll on U.S. allies, and Washington's market share fell to somewhere between 30 and 50 percent. Finally, by 2005, it hit bottom, at 27 percent.

让我们先回顾历史。上世纪九十年代早期，随着俄罗斯经济行将崩溃、海湾国家加强战备，美国的全球军火市场份额一路走高，并在1993年达到60%的巅峰。在接下来的十年中，俄罗斯军工产业恢复，莫斯科加强了对中国和印度的武器出口，而中、印两国的经济增长强劲；与此同时，油价下跌和97-98年亚洲金融风暴重创美国盟友，美国的市场份额也随之降到30%至50%之间，并于2005年跌至谷底，27%。

But contrary to what Caverley and Kapstein suggest, since 2007, the United States' market share has increased. As Beijing began illegally copying Russian technology and Washington broke into the Indian market, Moscow's exports declined. Meanwhile, U.S. customers in the Middle East and Asia increased their imports. Over the last five years, the U.S. weapons industry has accounted for 52 percent of global sales; in 2011, the U.S. share reached 77 percent, a record high.

但与Caverley和Kapstein的说法相反，美国的市场份额从2007年起已经回升。随着北京开始非法复制俄罗斯技术、华盛顿打入印度市场，莫斯科的出口下降。与此同时，美国在中东和亚洲地区的客户开始增加进口。在过去五年里，美国军工产业占全球销量的52%，在2011年，美国份额更是达到了创纪录的77%。

Caverley and Kapstein see signs of dissatisfaction with U.S. weapons everywhere: Saudi Arabia's purchasing the Eurofighter, Pakistan's importing more arms from China, and India's selecting the Rafale. But in truth, none of these decisions stemmed from displeasure with U.S.-made equipment. Riyadh has long maintained defense ties to Europe, and the Eurofighters it purchased are replacing the Panavia Tornado, which is also European. The rest of Saudi Arabia's arms come almost exclusively from the United States, so the Eurofighter deal hardly threatens Washington's position as the kingdom's top weapons supplier.

在Caverley和Kapstein眼中，对美国武器的不满无处不在：沙特阿拉伯购买欧洲战斗机、巴基斯坦从中国进口更多的武器、印度选用飓风。但实际上，这些采购并不是出于对美国武器不满。利雅德与欧洲有着多年的防务联系，沙特采购的欧洲战斗机将取代同为欧洲生产的旋风战斗机，而沙特其它的武器装备几乎全部来自美国。因此，欧洲战斗机的订单不会威胁到美国作为该国头号军火供应商的地位。

Pakistan, likewise, has long maintained defense ties with China. In light of the recent tensions in U.S.-Pakistani relations, it should come as no surprise that Islamabad is increasing its imports from Beijing. As for India, seven years ago Washington did almost no business with New Delhi, which at the time purchased almost all its materiel from Russia. But since 2006, U.S. contractors have inked more than $8 billion in weapons deals with India, including for major purchases of aircraft, such as the C-17, the C-130, and the Apache.

与此类似，巴基斯坦与中国也有着长期的防务联系。考虑到近年来僵硬的美巴关系，伊斯兰堡从北京增加进口也就不足为奇。至于印度，华盛顿在七年前与新德里几乎没有生意往来，当时该国的物资几乎全部从俄罗斯进口。但在2006年以后，美国承包商与印度签订了价值超过80亿美元的武器合同，其中包括C-17、C-130和阿帕奇等大宗订单。

Caverley and Kapstein concede that Washington dominates the Middle Eastern market, but they do not fully appreciate the region's strategic importance. If the White House decides it must strike Iran, heavily armed allies in the Gulf will help the United States defend its partners against Tehran's retaliation. The same logic holds true with regard to defending U.S. allies against potential aggression in Asia. Malaysia and Indonesia have purchased fighters from Russia, and Singapore imports ships from France, but the authors neglect to mention that during the last 15 years, Malaysia has bought F-18s, Indonesia has bought F-16s, and Singapore has bought F-15s, F-16s, and Apaches from the United States. In fact, according to the Congressional Research Service, during the last several years, Washington has regained its position as the top weapons supplier to developing countries in Asia.

Caverley和Kapstein虽承认华盛顿在中东市场一统天下，但他们没有充分意识到该地区的战略意义。如果白宫认定必须出兵攻打伊朗，海湾地区高度武装的盟友将会帮助美国防范德黑兰的报复。同样的逻辑适用于美国在亚洲的盟友。马来西亚和印度尼西亚均从俄罗斯购买过战斗机，新加坡从法国购买军舰，但Caverley和Kapstein没有提到的是，在过去十五年中，马来西亚购买过F-18、印度尼西亚购买过F-16、而新加坡购买过 F-15、 F-16和阿帕奇。实际上，据国会研究机构称，美国在过去几年里重新坐上了向亚洲发展中国家供应军火的头把交椅。

Controlling 77 percent of the global arms market yields innumerable benefits for the United States: it decreases the costs of equipping American forces, emboldens U.S. allies to stand up to common enemies, and facilitates joint operations. Although the theme of U.S. decline has gained popularity of late, in the case of weapons sales, at least, the facts do not bear it out.

控制全球77%的军火市场为美国创造了难以计数的利益：减少美军装备开支、令美国盟友勇敢面对共同敌人、便于开展联合行动等等。虽然唱衰美国在近几年愈发流行，但至少在武器销售方面不靠谱。

The Less, the Better
观点三：越少越好
作者：Lawrence J. Korb，曾在里根政府担任助理国防部长

Jonathan Caverley and Ethan Kapstein are correct that lax management and shortsighted decisions in the Pentagon have bloated the U.S. defense budget. But their proposed solution is misguided. Contrary to their argument, flooding the world with more weapons would not serve U.S. security interests.

Caverley和Kapstein正确地指出，五角大楼的松懈管理和短视行为让美国的国防开支大增。但他们提出的解决方案是错误的。与他们的观点相反，全球武器泛滥并不符合美国的安全利益。

Caverley and Kapstein fail to note the numerous downsides to Washington's global arms sales. They neglect to mention that the vast majority of the United States' more than 100 customers are developing countries, many of which are headed by authoritarian regimes that are both unpredictable and prone to instability. An unfortunate few, including allies such as Bahrain, are liable to use their American-made weapons against their own people.

Caverley和Kapstein未能注意到华盛顿全球军售不利的一面。他们没有提到美国的一百多位客户绝大多数是发展中国家，其中还有很多是喜怒无常的不稳定专制政权。少数几个不幸的国家曾使用美制武器对付本国国民，其中不乏巴林等盟友。

Moreover, because the United States now leads the world in arms deliveries by such a wide margin, Washington has little credibility when it chides other governments for transferring weapons to U.S. enemies, such as Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. And although many countries buy U.S. arms using their own revenues, about one in every five dollars that Washington earns from arms exports is actually paid for by U.S. taxpayers (via foreign aid programs). That money could be better used to deal with global challenges such as disease, poverty, and malnutrition.

此外，因为美国在世界军火供应上遥遥领先，华盛顿批评他国向叙利亚巴萨尔政权等美国敌人供应武器的说教也就显得苍白无力。虽然许多国家动用本国财政购买美国武器，但有华盛顿销量的五分之一实际上由美国纳税人买单（通过外国援助）。这笔钱本可以更好地用于应对疾病、贫困和营养不良等全球性挑战。

There is a solution on the table. The Arms Sale Responsibility Act, which awaits a vote by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, would prohibit weapons transfers to countries where there is a substantial risk that the arms could facilitate human rights abuses. As the bill's supporters rightly point out, such a policy not only is morally sound but also would enhance long-term U.S. security strategy, which invariably relies on partnerships that can be undermined by resentment and anger born of shortsighted decisions about arms sales. These long-term concerns, not Washington's share of the global arms market, are what Caverley and Kapstein should be most concerned about.

一个可能的解决方案。目前正等候众议院外交事务委员会审批的《武器销售责任法》将禁止销售武器给那些有可能将之用于侵犯人权的国家。该法案的支持者正确地指出，这样的政策不但具有道德性，还可以增强美国的长期安全策略。美国的长期安全绝对依赖于伙伴关系，美国目光短浅的军售引发的不满和愤怒将破坏这些伙伴关系。Caverley和Kapstein应关注这些长期策略，而不是华盛顿的全球军火市场份额。

Caverley and Kapstein Reply
Caverley和Kapstein的回应

We appreciate our critics' feedback, but all three responses are deeply misguided, largely because each fails to understand the available data.

感谢批评家们的意见，但上述三种观点均十分错误的，大体上是出于未能理解现有数据。

J. Thomas Moriarty agrees with our recommendation for a reformed procurement process for U.S.-made weapons systems. But the errors and contradictions underpinning his case make us hesitant to embrace his support. If middle-tier countries are successfully developing indigenous arms industries, why is the sum of global arms transfers increasing? Moriarty's description of India as a success story only underscores the shallowness of his case. New Delhi's light combat aircraft program, begun in 1983 and still under development, has been an unmitigated disaster, marred by cost overruns and performance failures. And India's inability to develop a domestically produced engine means that the plane will be powered by General Electric. Missteps such as this help explain why India is now the world's largest arms importer.

J. Thomas Moriarty赞同我们提出的关于改进美国武器系统采购过程的建议。但其立足点存在错误和矛盾，令我们难以拥抱他的支持。如果中等国家能够成功地发展出本国军工产业，为何全球武器销量反而上升？Moriarty将印度描绘成一个成功案例，更是突出其观点之肤浅。新德里的光辉战斗机计划于1983年启动，时至今日仍在研发当中，备受超支和性能失败困扰，实为一场彻头彻尾的灾难。印度无力开发国产发动机意味着该机型将由通用电气提供动力。诸如此类的失败有助于解释为何印度成为当今世界上最大的武器进口国。

Moreover, Moriarty's use of flyaway costs to compare the French Rafale and the F-35 is grossly misleading. This metric excludes the F-35's development costs, which will keep rising as technicians continue to refine the aircraft. The Rafale, by contrast, is a largely mature jet. Moriarty's low-ball price tag for the F-35 is based on a projected order of 3,159 planes, a number few believe will actually be realized. A more realistic price is therefore the Government Accountability Office's current F-35 flyaway cost estimate of $154 million per jet. As Moriarty himself states, "If all goes according to plan, Lockheed Martin will export at least 500 F-35s." That is a far lower number than the 716 planes slotted for export in the current plan and considerably less than the 2,000-3,000 originally envisioned. And when it comes to the F-35, little has ever gone according to plan.

Moriarty用出厂价来比较法国飓风战机和F-35也极具误导性。这一标尺未考虑F-35的研发费用，随着技术人员继续改进该机型，该费用将持续上升。与之相比，飓风战机已基本成熟。Moriarty对F-35的超低估价乃基于3159架的预期销量，这一数字目前几乎无人认为可以实现。比较现实的估价是政府责任办公室给出的数字，即每架1.54亿美元。正如Moriarty自己指出的：＂如果一切按计划进行，洛克马丁将在未来数十年出口至少500架F-35。"这一数目远低于716架的现有出口计划，更是难以企及2000至3000架的最初计划。对于F-35而言，几乎没有什么是按计划进行的。

Unlike Moriarty, we offer a solid policy recommendation to make the procurement process more efficient. If simply "rationalizing" the process were sufficient, the United States would have fixed its problems decades ago. We do not expect the Pentagon and the defense industry to reform if they do not have to face the competition that comes from a mandate to export and outperform possible imports.

与Moriarty不同，我们就如何提高采购效率这一问题提出了一个完善的政策建议。如果仅仅＂使采购过程合理化＂就足够了，那么美国早该在几十年前就解决了这些问题。我们认为，除非直接面对强制出口和击败进口产品带来的竞争压力，五角大楼和军工企业很难进行改革。

Daniel Katz's mistaken reliance on arms agreements, rather than arms deliveries, reflects the government complacency we are trying to overcome. The eye-popping sums cover varying numbers of years, frequently get revised downward, and are therefore useless for analyzing trends. Statistics about weapons deliveries provide a more accurate picture, because they are based on actual exchanges of goods and cash. Looking at the data on real transfers, there is clear evidence of a steady decline in the U.S. market share over the past decade.

Daniel Katz错误地依赖军售合同而非实际交货量，这也正是我们力图改正的政府自满情绪。令人弹睛落目的合同价款履盖了多个年份，而且还经常出现下调，因此无法用于进行趋势分析。武器实际交付的统计数据则描绘出了一幅更为精确的画面，因为它们基于实际转手的货物和现金。实际交货的数据显示，美国的市场份额在过去十年间稳步下滑。

Furthermore, arms deliveries can be compared with other measures, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's weapons transfer data, to show that over time, U.S. clients have paid increasingly more for the same capability. This finding -- coupled with the fact that, as Katz points out, Washington's share of the global arms market is tightly tied to oil prices -- speaks volumes about the United States' Gulf-dependent export model. The current strategy merely ensures plum profits for major U.S. contractors and allows U.S. allies to recycle petrodollars for jets that, given the historically low levels of Saudi and Emirati participation in U.S. military operations, will do little more than gather dust.

此外，武器交货量可与其它计算方法进行比较，比如斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究中心的武器转让数据。横向比较显示出以下事实：购买性能相当的武器，美国的客户需要付出更多的代价，而这一差价随着时间的推移正变得越来越大。这一现象加上Katz指出的美国市场份额与油价牢牢挂钩的事实，揭示出美国依赖于海湾国家的出口模式。现有策略只不过让美国的大型承包商中饱私囊，同时让盟国们用石油美元兑换毫无用武之地的飞机大炮一一沙特、阿联酋等国历来不大参与美国的军事行动。

If the United States wants to increase its influence in Asia, it should reconsider this approach. In terms of Asian deliveries, U.S. market share has dropped from 27 percent to 24 percent between the periods of 2004-7 and 2008-11. If U.S. grand strategy is really making a "pivot" to Asia, Washington's arms export policy there needs to change.

如果美国希望增加在亚洲的影响力，就应当重新审视其一贯作法。以在亚洲的实际交货量计算，美国的市场份额在2004-7至2008-11年间从27%降至24%。如果美国的重大策略果真是重返亚洲，华盛顿的武器出口政策必须加以改变。

Lawrence Korb's concern about the proliferation of weapons to undesirable regimes is legitimate. Indeed, that danger served as one of the reasons we wrote our original essay. But instead of cutting exports, the policy we recommend is more likely to keep American weaponry out of the wrong hands.

Lawrence Korb对于武器扩散至劣性政权的担心是合理的。诚然，这一危险正是我们撰写原文的原因之一。我们的建议更有可能防止美制武器落入贼手，而不是裁减出口。

The Congressional Research Service's data on both deliveries and agreements contradict Korb's assumptions about what types of states buy weapons. Of the world's top ten importers in 2007-11, five were mature democracies. Four of the remaining states -- Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (with China being the lone outlier) -- are U.S. allies and do not use U.S.-made weapons to wage civil wars. On the contrary, these states' dependence on imports from Washington constrains their ability to resort to such activities.

国会研究机构关于实际交货和签约的数据均反驳了Korb关于哪种国家购买武器的假设。在2007至2011年间，世界十大进口国中，有五个是成熟的民主国家。余下五家有四家是美国的盟友且从未使用美制武器发动内战，它们分别是埃及、巴基斯坦、沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋。中国是唯一的例外。这些国家对美国出口的依赖，制约了它们发动内战的能力。

We never suggested that the United States should sell weapons to a regime such as Bashar al-Assad's in Syria. However, Assad has bought and will continue to buy weapons from suppliers that do not care how those weapons are used. Our policy objective is to ensure that the large importers, such as those listed above, buy products from the United States rather than China, Russia, or even western Europe. If they do so, the United States can prevent competitors from developing and producing top-of-the-line weapons and selling them to smaller, dangerous rogue regimes.

我们从未主张美国应当向叙利亚巴萨尔那样的政权销售武器。但是，巴萨尔曾经向并将继续向那些不管他人死活的军火商购买武器。我们的政策目标是确保上文列出的大宗买家购买美国的武器，而不是俄罗斯、中国、甚至是西欧的产品。如果他们照办，美国就能够阻止竞争者研制出尖端武器并将其销往较小的危险流氓国家。

读者评论：
Andreas Nettmayer
As a US citizen who loves his country, I'm more than happy to see an end to "Made in the USA" being inscribed on the weapons of every dictator and oppressor around the world. Much of the world, right or not, believes the US props up and supports every dictator for our own strategic gain and even prefers human rights abuses (as opposed to merely working with whomever is in charge to promote stability). The goal is our population's security, not the profitability of any one US company. I welcome a world where the US only has the very high end of the defense industry and only sells to itself and a few, if any, select allies. Further, a weaker defense industry means less defense industry pressure on Congress.

作为一个爱国的美国公民，如能眼见世上所有的独裁者和压迫者不再手握美制武器，甚喜！无论正确与否，世上大多数人相信美国为了自身战略利益扶持着天下每一个独裁者，甚至侵犯人权也在所不惜（而不是仅仅与促进稳定的人物合作）。我们的目标是美国国民的安全，而不是某个美国公司的利润。我希望世上只有美国一家拥有尖端军工产业，产品仅供内销，如有必要，向少数几个精选盟友出口。此外，不那么强势的军工产业也意味着它们对国会的压力也少一点。

Andrés Arellano Báez  回楼上
"The goal is our population's security, not the profitability of any one US company". Are you crazy? The war is USA bussiness. You can not be so naive.

＂我们的目标是美国国民的安全，而不是某个美国公司的利润＂
你疯了吗？战争是美国的生意。你不可能这么天真。

varun mohan
its true whatever said here.. but as a citizen of a buyer country from USA we have to look into the maintenance cost also. if the cost of the product is higher sure will be maitenance

说的这些都有理。但作为向美国购买武器的国家的公民，我们还得操心维护费用。武器的售价越高，维护也会越昂贵。

Octopus Dropkick
Maybe the Arms Industry is a huge steaming pile of crap that equates to a giant money pit where a small minority of people at the top of contractor companies actually benefit.
Maybe we should cut defense spending in half at minimal.

也许军工产业就是一堆热气腾腾的翔，一个只有少数承包商高层才能获利的超级大钱坑。或许我们应将军事开支至少砍半。

CharlieSeattle
The US should continue to build a few high tech Tiger tanks while the rest of the world builds many Sherman and T-34 tanks.
The US should continue to build a few high tech ME-262's while the rest of the world builds many Spitfires and Mustang's.
.........WWII analogy about:
"Quantity" being a "Quality" all it's own. Joseph Stalin
美国应继续制造一些高科技虎式坦克，而世界其它国家制造大量的谢尔曼和T-34坦克。
美国应继续制造一些高科技ME-262战斗机，而世界其它国家制造大量的喷火战斗机和P-51战斗机。
......数量就是质量（斯大林语）的各种二战比方。
《外交事务》链接http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ar ... outgunned?page=show

Outgunned?
技不如人？
A Debate Over the Shifting Global Arms Market
一场关于全球军火市场转变的辩论

Technology Matters
观点一：技术的重要性
作者：J. Thomas Moriarty，乔治华盛顿大学访问学者

According to Jonathan Caverley and Ethan Kapstein ("Arms Away," September/October 2012), the United States' domination of the global arms market is disappearing, and as a consequence, Washington is squandering an array of economic and political benefits it has enjoyed as the foremost weapons dealer in the world. They argue that although the U.S. defense industry spent the last decade developing expensive, high-tech systems, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, also known as the F-35, foreign customers actually want cheaper, less advanced weapons. For Caverley and Kapstein, simpler is better.

根据Jonathan Caverley和Ethan Kapstein的观点（见发表于《外交事务》2012年9/10月刊的Arms Away一文），美国在全球军火市场上的统治地位正在消失，其结果之一就是，华盛顿正在挥霍着美国作为世界头号军火商而享有的一系列经济、政治利益。二位学者认为，虽然美国军工产业花费了十年时间，研制出诸如F-35联合攻击机等昂贵的高科技系统，但国外客户真正想要的是那些便宜的、并不那么先进的武器。他们认为简单才是王道。

Even if that were true, it would be a secondary concern. First and foremost, U.S. defense firms need to serve their most important client: the Pentagon. The U.S. military should not have to forgo stealth technologies, for instance, which better protect pilots and allow them to attack complex air defense systems, because the rest of the world is supposedly more interested in old airplanes equipped with outdated technology.

就算这些假设成立，这也是次要的问题。对美国军火公司而言，其首要任务是满足最重要的客户：五角大楼。比方说，不能因为其它国家对技术过时的老式飞机感兴趣，就让美军放弃那些可以更好地保护飞行员、能够攻击复杂防空系统的隐形技术。

Moreover, the United States' declining market share in recent years is not a result of the Pentagon's pursuing cutting-edge technology, as Caverley and Kapstein argue. The landscape of global arms sales is shifting because medium-sized powers, such as India, South Korea, and Turkey, have enjoyed robust economic growth lately and are using that growth to reduce their dependence on Washington for military technology. Dozens of countries have built their own weapons-manufacturing industries in order to create high-paying jobs, generate profits, and address domestic security concerns, despite the fact that cheaper, more reliable systems are already for sale on the international market.

此外，不像Caverley和Kapstein声称的那样，近年来美国的市场份额缩小，并非出于五角大楼对先进技术的追求。全球军火销售情况发生转变，系因为印度、韩国、土耳其等中型强国的经济在近年出现强劲增长，这些国家利用经济增长来减少对美国军事技术的依赖。许多国家不顾国际市场上已有更廉价可靠的武器系统的事实，纷纷建立起自己的军工产业，以此创造高薪职位和利润，并解决国内安全问题。

India, for example, has spent billions developing its own light combat aircraft, the Tejas, even though more economical alternatives are available from foreign sources. And Israel is producing its own precision-guided munitions and unmanned aerial vehicles, even though it could buy U.S. systems at discounted rates. Much of the decline in U.S. arms sales is a byproduct of foreign governments' decisions to do more business at home, not the result of misguided strategy in Washington. As a consequence, the United States should keep doing what it does best: building state-of-the-art weapons equipped with the latest technology.

例如，印度已耗资数十亿美元研制本国的轻型战斗机光辉，即使它可以从国外买到更划算的替代型号；以色列正在生产自己的精确制导武器和无人机，即使它能够以折扣价买到美制产品。美国军火销量下降在很大程度上是外国政府自力更生的副产物，而不是由于华盛顿的策略出错。因此，美国应当继续发挥其特长：采用最新科技打造尖端武器。

Caverley and Kapstein point to France's success in selling its Rafale fighter jet in a $11 billion deal with India as proof that states aren't interested in "gold-plated" aircraft. The Rafale is indeed less expensive and less capable than the F-35, but it is by no means simple or cheap. The difference in price is negligible: recent estimates put the flyaway cost of a Rafale at $100 million, whereas the U.S. Government Accountability Office has estimated the F-35's price tag at around $108 million. India's decision to purchase the Rafale over the F-35 had more to do with geo-strategic concerns -- such as a desire to avoid an overreliance on U.S. advanced weaponry -- than financial or technological considerations.

以法国向印度成功售出价值110亿美元的飓风战机为证据，Caverley和Kapstein声称
他国对尖端飞机并不感兴趣。确实，飓风不如F-35昂贵、神勇，但它绝非简单或廉价的战机。两者的价格差距可以忽略不计，据最新估算，每架飓风的出厂价为一亿美元，而美国政府责任办公室估计每架F-35的售价为1.08亿。印度弃用F-35选购飓风更多地与地缘策略有关（比如避免过于依赖美国先进武器），而不是出于财务和技术考虑。

Meanwhile, France has sold Rafales to just one country. Even if it wins pending contracts in Brazil and the United Arab Emirates, Paris will export only about 200 aircraft. By comparison, ten countries have pledged to buy the F-35 from the United States, and it is also expected to win contracts in Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea. If all goes according to plan, Lockheed Martin will export at least 500 F-35s in the coming decades.

此外，法国只向一个国家销售了飓风，即使它在巴西和阿联酋都赢得订单，销量也不过200架。与之相比，已有十个国家承诺购买美国的F-35，此外美国还有望在马来西亚、新加坡和韩国赢得订单。如果一切按计划进行，洛克马丁将在未来数十年内出口至少500架F-35。

More misleading than the Rafale example is Caverley and Kapstein's reference to Sweden's Gripen. The Gripen's flyaway cost is only about $60 million, but the plane lacks the advanced capabilities of both the Rafale and the F-35. In the 1980s, Sweden bet that there would be a healthy market for a simple and cheap aircraft, because the United States and western Europe were focusing on expensive, high-tech models. If the Gripen had managed to capture a substantial part of the global combat-aircraft market, it would serve as conclusive empirical evidence that the "simpler is better" strategy works. But Sweden's projected buyers have not materialized: only three countries have purchased the Gripen, together buying about 60 of the planes from Sweden, and another two countries are leasing about 28 additional planes. In fact, the program has been such a flop that Stockholm is now debating whether it should spend several billion dollars more to upgrade the jet's technology. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin is expected to export more F-35s to more countries and for more profit than sales of the Rafale and the Gripen combined.

Caverley和Kapstein提到瑞典的鹰狮战机，这比飓风战机的例子更加具有误导性。鹰狮的出厂价仅为6千万美元，且该战机并不具备飓风和F-35的先进性能。上世纪八十年代，瑞典打赌简单廉价的战机将会畅销，原因是美国和西欧都在集中精力研发昂贵的尖端型号。如果鹰狮能够在世界战机市场上抢占相当份额，这也许能证实＂越简单越好＂的思路正确。但瑞典预计的买家并未出现：只有三个国家购买了约60架鹰狮，另有两个国家租赁了28架。实际上，鹰狮项目表现如此之差，斯德哥尔摩正在辩论应否再多花几十亿美元升级该战机。与此同时，洛克马丁预计出口的F-35，无论是数量、出口国家总数、利润都要超过飓风和鹰狮之和。

Caverley and Kapstein are wise to caution against overindulgence in technology. Cutting-edge weapons systems are difficult to develop, as the case of the F-35 has shown, and this problem is hardly confined to the last decade. But the real dilemma for U.S. defense firms is that because they have become so adept at innovation, military officials are often overly ambitious in what they ask for. The solution is not to produce simpler weapons systems, as Caverley and Kapstein suggest, but rather to rationalize the procurement process so that it leads to useful innovations. Technology gives the United States its competitive edge today, and it will continue to do so in the future. It would be folly for Washington to relinquish its foremost advantage.

Caverley和Kapstein关于切勿过于追求技术的警告是明智的。正如F-35所示，高尖端武器系统很难开发，而且这个问题并不仅限于过去十年。但是，美国军工企业面对的真正难题在于：他们太善于创新，以致于军方官员往往异想天开。解决之道并不像Caverley和Kapstein所说的那样在于生产较简单的武器系统，而是在于将军事采购过程合理化，由此催生出有用的创新。美国依靠科技获得了今日的竞争优势，并将如此继续下去。如果华盛顿抛弃这个最重要的优势就太蠢了。

Still on Top
观点二：风光依旧
作者Daniel Katz，曾任美国国防部分析员

Recently, the U.S. arms industry has enjoyed a string of banner years. So it was surprising to read Jonathan Caverley and Ethan Kapstein's claim that Washington has lost its dominance in the global arms market. Reports on conventional arms transfers from the Congressional Research Service contain the best public data on this topic, and the numbers reveal that the authors' core assertion is simply not true.

近年来，美国军工产业一直红红火火。因此，看到Caverley和Kapstein声称美国已在全球军火市场上丧失统治地位，当真令人称奇。在这个问题上，国会研究机构的《常规武器转让报告》包含着最准确的公开数据，这些数字揭示出Caverley和Kapstein的核心观点并不成立。

Some history is in order. In the early 1990s, with the Russian economy in disarray and the Gulf states rearming, the United States' share of the global arms market soared, peaking at 60 percent in 1993. Over the next decade, Russia's defense industry recovered, and Moscow ramped up its arms exports to China and India, whose economies were booming. At the same time, falling oil prices and the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 took a toll on U.S. allies, and Washington's market share fell to somewhere between 30 and 50 percent. Finally, by 2005, it hit bottom, at 27 percent.

让我们先回顾历史。上世纪九十年代早期，随着俄罗斯经济行将崩溃、海湾国家加强战备，美国的全球军火市场份额一路走高，并在1993年达到60%的巅峰。在接下来的十年中，俄罗斯军工产业恢复，莫斯科加强了对中国和印度的武器出口，而中、印两国的经济增长强劲；与此同时，油价下跌和97-98年亚洲金融风暴重创美国盟友，美国的市场份额也随之降到30%至50%之间，并于2005年跌至谷底，27%。

But contrary to what Caverley and Kapstein suggest, since 2007, the United States' market share has increased. As Beijing began illegally copying Russian technology and Washington broke into the Indian market, Moscow's exports declined. Meanwhile, U.S. customers in the Middle East and Asia increased their imports. Over the last five years, the U.S. weapons industry has accounted for 52 percent of global sales; in 2011, the U.S. share reached 77 percent, a record high.

但与Caverley和Kapstein的说法相反，美国的市场份额从2007年起已经回升。随着北京开始非法复制俄罗斯技术、华盛顿打入印度市场，莫斯科的出口下降。与此同时，美国在中东和亚洲地区的客户开始增加进口。在过去五年里，美国军工产业占全球销量的52%，在2011年，美国份额更是达到了创纪录的77%。

Caverley and Kapstein see signs of dissatisfaction with U.S. weapons everywhere: Saudi Arabia's purchasing the Eurofighter, Pakistan's importing more arms from China, and India's selecting the Rafale. But in truth, none of these decisions stemmed from displeasure with U.S.-made equipment. Riyadh has long maintained defense ties to Europe, and the Eurofighters it purchased are replacing the Panavia Tornado, which is also European. The rest of Saudi Arabia's arms come almost exclusively from the United States, so the Eurofighter deal hardly threatens Washington's position as the kingdom's top weapons supplier.

在Caverley和Kapstein眼中，对美国武器的不满无处不在：沙特阿拉伯购买欧洲战斗机、巴基斯坦从中国进口更多的武器、印度选用飓风。但实际上，这些采购并不是出于对美国武器不满。利雅德与欧洲有着多年的防务联系，沙特采购的欧洲战斗机将取代同为欧洲生产的旋风战斗机，而沙特其它的武器装备几乎全部来自美国。因此，欧洲战斗机的订单不会威胁到美国作为该国头号军火供应商的地位。

Pakistan, likewise, has long maintained defense ties with China. In light of the recent tensions in U.S.-Pakistani relations, it should come as no surprise that Islamabad is increasing its imports from Beijing. As for India, seven years ago Washington did almost no business with New Delhi, which at the time purchased almost all its materiel from Russia. But since 2006, U.S. contractors have inked more than $8 billion in weapons deals with India, including for major purchases of aircraft, such as the C-17, the C-130, and the Apache.

与此类似，巴基斯坦与中国也有着长期的防务联系。考虑到近年来僵硬的美巴关系，伊斯兰堡从北京增加进口也就不足为奇。至于印度，华盛顿在七年前与新德里几乎没有生意往来，当时该国的物资几乎全部从俄罗斯进口。但在2006年以后，美国承包商与印度签订了价值超过80亿美元的武器合同，其中包括C-17、C-130和阿帕奇等大宗订单。

Caverley and Kapstein concede that Washington dominates the Middle Eastern market, but they do not fully appreciate the region's strategic importance. If the White House decides it must strike Iran, heavily armed allies in the Gulf will help the United States defend its partners against Tehran's retaliation. The same logic holds true with regard to defending U.S. allies against potential aggression in Asia. Malaysia and Indonesia have purchased fighters from Russia, and Singapore imports ships from France, but the authors neglect to mention that during the last 15 years, Malaysia has bought F-18s, Indonesia has bought F-16s, and Singapore has bought F-15s, F-16s, and Apaches from the United States. In fact, according to the Congressional Research Service, during the last several years, Washington has regained its position as the top weapons supplier to developing countries in Asia.

Caverley和Kapstein虽承认华盛顿在中东市场一统天下，但他们没有充分意识到该地区的战略意义。如果白宫认定必须出兵攻打伊朗，海湾地区高度武装的盟友将会帮助美国防范德黑兰的报复。同样的逻辑适用于美国在亚洲的盟友。马来西亚和印度尼西亚均从俄罗斯购买过战斗机，新加坡从法国购买军舰，但Caverley和Kapstein没有提到的是，在过去十五年中，马来西亚购买过F-18、印度尼西亚购买过F-16、而新加坡购买过 F-15、 F-16和阿帕奇。实际上，据国会研究机构称，美国在过去几年里重新坐上了向亚洲发展中国家供应军火的头把交椅。

Controlling 77 percent of the global arms market yields innumerable benefits for the United States: it decreases the costs of equipping American forces, emboldens U.S. allies to stand up to common enemies, and facilitates joint operations. Although the theme of U.S. decline has gained popularity of late, in the case of weapons sales, at least, the facts do not bear it out.

控制全球77%的军火市场为美国创造了难以计数的利益：减少美军装备开支、令美国盟友勇敢面对共同敌人、便于开展联合行动等等。虽然唱衰美国在近几年愈发流行，但至少在武器销售方面不靠谱。

The Less, the Better
观点三：越少越好
作者：Lawrence J. Korb，曾在里根政府担任助理国防部长

Jonathan Caverley and Ethan Kapstein are correct that lax management and shortsighted decisions in the Pentagon have bloated the U.S. defense budget. But their proposed solution is misguided. Contrary to their argument, flooding the world with more weapons would not serve U.S. security interests.

Caverley和Kapstein正确地指出，五角大楼的松懈管理和短视行为让美国的国防开支大增。但他们提出的解决方案是错误的。与他们的观点相反，全球武器泛滥并不符合美国的安全利益。

Caverley and Kapstein fail to note the numerous downsides to Washington's global arms sales. They neglect to mention that the vast majority of the United States' more than 100 customers are developing countries, many of which are headed by authoritarian regimes that are both unpredictable and prone to instability. An unfortunate few, including allies such as Bahrain, are liable to use their American-made weapons against their own people.

Caverley和Kapstein未能注意到华盛顿全球军售不利的一面。他们没有提到美国的一百多位客户绝大多数是发展中国家，其中还有很多是喜怒无常的不稳定专制政权。少数几个不幸的国家曾使用美制武器对付本国国民，其中不乏巴林等盟友。

Moreover, because the United States now leads the world in arms deliveries by such a wide margin, Washington has little credibility when it chides other governments for transferring weapons to U.S. enemies, such as Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. And although many countries buy U.S. arms using their own revenues, about one in every five dollars that Washington earns from arms exports is actually paid for by U.S. taxpayers (via foreign aid programs). That money could be better used to deal with global challenges such as disease, poverty, and malnutrition.

此外，因为美国在世界军火供应上遥遥领先，华盛顿批评他国向叙利亚巴萨尔政权等美国敌人供应武器的说教也就显得苍白无力。虽然许多国家动用本国财政购买美国武器，但有华盛顿销量的五分之一实际上由美国纳税人买单（通过外国援助）。这笔钱本可以更好地用于应对疾病、贫困和营养不良等全球性挑战。

There is a solution on the table. The Arms Sale Responsibility Act, which awaits a vote by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, would prohibit weapons transfers to countries where there is a substantial risk that the arms could facilitate human rights abuses. As the bill's supporters rightly point out, such a policy not only is morally sound but also would enhance long-term U.S. security strategy, which invariably relies on partnerships that can be undermined by resentment and anger born of shortsighted decisions about arms sales. These long-term concerns, not Washington's share of the global arms market, are what Caverley and Kapstein should be most concerned about.

一个可能的解决方案。目前正等候众议院外交事务委员会审批的《武器销售责任法》将禁止销售武器给那些有可能将之用于侵犯人权的国家。该法案的支持者正确地指出，这样的政策不但具有道德性，还可以增强美国的长期安全策略。美国的长期安全绝对依赖于伙伴关系，美国目光短浅的军售引发的不满和愤怒将破坏这些伙伴关系。Caverley和Kapstein应关注这些长期策略，而不是华盛顿的全球军火市场份额。

Caverley and Kapstein Reply
Caverley和Kapstein的回应

We appreciate our critics' feedback, but all three responses are deeply misguided, largely because each fails to understand the available data.

感谢批评家们的意见，但上述三种观点均十分错误的，大体上是出于未能理解现有数据。

J. Thomas Moriarty agrees with our recommendation for a reformed procurement process for U.S.-made weapons systems. But the errors and contradictions underpinning his case make us hesitant to embrace his support. If middle-tier countries are successfully developing indigenous arms industries, why is the sum of global arms transfers increasing? Moriarty's description of India as a success story only underscores the shallowness of his case. New Delhi's light combat aircraft program, begun in 1983 and still under development, has been an unmitigated disaster, marred by cost overruns and performance failures. And India's inability to develop a domestically produced engine means that the plane will be powered by General Electric. Missteps such as this help explain why India is now the world's largest arms importer.

J. Thomas Moriarty赞同我们提出的关于改进美国武器系统采购过程的建议。但其立足点存在错误和矛盾，令我们难以拥抱他的支持。如果中等国家能够成功地发展出本国军工产业，为何全球武器销量反而上升？Moriarty将印度描绘成一个成功案例，更是突出其观点之肤浅。新德里的光辉战斗机计划于1983年启动，时至今日仍在研发当中，备受超支和性能失败困扰，实为一场彻头彻尾的灾难。印度无力开发国产发动机意味着该机型将由通用电气提供动力。诸如此类的失败有助于解释为何印度成为当今世界上最大的武器进口国。

Moreover, Moriarty's use of flyaway costs to compare the French Rafale and the F-35 is grossly misleading. This metric excludes the F-35's development costs, which will keep rising as technicians continue to refine the aircraft. The Rafale, by contrast, is a largely mature jet. Moriarty's low-ball price tag for the F-35 is based on a projected order of 3,159 planes, a number few believe will actually be realized. A more realistic price is therefore the Government Accountability Office's current F-35 flyaway cost estimate of $154 million per jet. As Moriarty himself states, "If all goes according to plan, Lockheed Martin will export at least 500 F-35s." That is a far lower number than the 716 planes slotted for export in the current plan and considerably less than the 2,000-3,000 originally envisioned. And when it comes to the F-35, little has ever gone according to plan.

Moriarty用出厂价来比较法国飓风战机和F-35也极具误导性。这一标尺未考虑F-35的研发费用，随着技术人员继续改进该机型，该费用将持续上升。与之相比，飓风战机已基本成熟。Moriarty对F-35的超低估价乃基于3159架的预期销量，这一数字目前几乎无人认为可以实现。比较现实的估价是政府责任办公室给出的数字，即每架1.54亿美元。正如Moriarty自己指出的：＂如果一切按计划进行，洛克马丁将在未来数十年出口至少500架F-35。"这一数目远低于716架的现有出口计划，更是难以企及2000至3000架的最初计划。对于F-35而言，几乎没有什么是按计划进行的。

Unlike Moriarty, we offer a solid policy recommendation to make the procurement process more efficient. If simply "rationalizing" the process were sufficient, the United States would have fixed its problems decades ago. We do not expect the Pentagon and the defense industry to reform if they do not have to face the competition that comes from a mandate to export and outperform possible imports.

与Moriarty不同，我们就如何提高采购效率这一问题提出了一个完善的政策建议。如果仅仅＂使采购过程合理化＂就足够了，那么美国早该在几十年前就解决了这些问题。我们认为，除非直接面对强制出口和击败进口产品带来的竞争压力，五角大楼和军工企业很难进行改革。

Daniel Katz's mistaken reliance on arms agreements, rather than arms deliveries, reflects the government complacency we are trying to overcome. The eye-popping sums cover varying numbers of years, frequently get revised downward, and are therefore useless for analyzing trends. Statistics about weapons deliveries provide a more accurate picture, because they are based on actual exchanges of goods and cash. Looking at the data on real transfers, there is clear evidence of a steady decline in the U.S. market share over the past decade.

Daniel Katz错误地依赖军售合同而非实际交货量，这也正是我们力图改正的政府自满情绪。令人弹睛落目的合同价款履盖了多个年份，而且还经常出现下调，因此无法用于进行趋势分析。武器实际交付的统计数据则描绘出了一幅更为精确的画面，因为它们基于实际转手的货物和现金。实际交货的数据显示，美国的市场份额在过去十年间稳步下滑。

Furthermore, arms deliveries can be compared with other measures, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's weapons transfer data, to show that over time, U.S. clients have paid increasingly more for the same capability. This finding -- coupled with the fact that, as Katz points out, Washington's share of the global arms market is tightly tied to oil prices -- speaks volumes about the United States' Gulf-dependent export model. The current strategy merely ensures plum profits for major U.S. contractors and allows U.S. allies to recycle petrodollars for jets that, given the historically low levels of Saudi and Emirati participation in U.S. military operations, will do little more than gather dust.

此外，武器交货量可与其它计算方法进行比较，比如斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究中心的武器转让数据。横向比较显示出以下事实：购买性能相当的武器，美国的客户需要付出更多的代价，而这一差价随着时间的推移正变得越来越大。这一现象加上Katz指出的美国市场份额与油价牢牢挂钩的事实，揭示出美国依赖于海湾国家的出口模式。现有策略只不过让美国的大型承包商中饱私囊，同时让盟国们用石油美元兑换毫无用武之地的飞机大炮一一沙特、阿联酋等国历来不大参与美国的军事行动。

If the United States wants to increase its influence in Asia, it should reconsider this approach. In terms of Asian deliveries, U.S. market share has dropped from 27 percent to 24 percent between the periods of 2004-7 and 2008-11. If U.S. grand strategy is really making a "pivot" to Asia, Washington's arms export policy there needs to change.

如果美国希望增加在亚洲的影响力，就应当重新审视其一贯作法。以在亚洲的实际交货量计算，美国的市场份额在2004-7至2008-11年间从27%降至24%。如果美国的重大策略果真是重返亚洲，华盛顿的武器出口政策必须加以改变。

Lawrence Korb's concern about the proliferation of weapons to undesirable regimes is legitimate. Indeed, that danger served as one of the reasons we wrote our original essay. But instead of cutting exports, the policy we recommend is more likely to keep American weaponry out of the wrong hands.

Lawrence Korb对于武器扩散至劣性政权的担心是合理的。诚然，这一危险正是我们撰写原文的原因之一。我们的建议更有可能防止美制武器落入贼手，而不是裁减出口。

The Congressional Research Service's data on both deliveries and agreements contradict Korb's assumptions about what types of states buy weapons. Of the world's top ten importers in 2007-11, five were mature democracies. Four of the remaining states -- Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (with China being the lone outlier) -- are U.S. allies and do not use U.S.-made weapons to wage civil wars. On the contrary, these states' dependence on imports from Washington constrains their ability to resort to such activities.

国会研究机构关于实际交货和签约的数据均反驳了Korb关于哪种国家购买武器的假设。在2007至2011年间，世界十大进口国中，有五个是成熟的民主国家。余下五家有四家是美国的盟友且从未使用美制武器发动内战，它们分别是埃及、巴基斯坦、沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋。中国是唯一的例外。这些国家对美国出口的依赖，制约了它们发动内战的能力。

We never suggested that the United States should sell weapons to a regime such as Bashar al-Assad's in Syria. However, Assad has bought and will continue to buy weapons from suppliers that do not care how those weapons are used. Our policy objective is to ensure that the large importers, such as those listed above, buy products from the United States rather than China, Russia, or even western Europe. If they do so, the United States can prevent competitors from developing and producing top-of-the-line weapons and selling them to smaller, dangerous rogue regimes.

我们从未主张美国应当向叙利亚巴萨尔那样的政权销售武器。但是，巴萨尔曾经向并将继续向那些不管他人死活的军火商购买武器。我们的政策目标是确保上文列出的大宗买家购买美国的武器，而不是俄罗斯、中国、甚至是西欧的产品。如果他们照办，美国就能够阻止竞争者研制出尖端武器并将其销往较小的危险流氓国家。

读者评论：
Andreas Nettmayer
As a US citizen who loves his country, I'm more than happy to see an end to "Made in the USA" being inscribed on the weapons of every dictator and oppressor around the world. Much of the world, right or not, believes the US props up and supports every dictator for our own strategic gain and even prefers human rights abuses (as opposed to merely working with whomever is in charge to promote stability). The goal is our population's security, not the profitability of any one US company. I welcome a world where the US only has the very high end of the defense industry and only sells to itself and a few, if any, select allies. Further, a weaker defense industry means less defense industry pressure on Congress.

作为一个爱国的美国公民，如能眼见世上所有的独裁者和压迫者不再手握美制武器，甚喜！无论正确与否，世上大多数人相信美国为了自身战略利益扶持着天下每一个独裁者，甚至侵犯人权也在所不惜（而不是仅仅与促进稳定的人物合作）。我们的目标是美国国民的安全，而不是某个美国公司的利润。我希望世上只有美国一家拥有尖端军工产业，产品仅供内销，如有必要，向少数几个精选盟友出口。此外，不那么强势的军工产业也意味着它们对国会的压力也少一点。

Andrés Arellano Báez  回楼上
"The goal is our population's security, not the profitability of any one US company". Are you crazy? The war is USA bussiness. You can not be so naive.

＂我们的目标是美国国民的安全，而不是某个美国公司的利润＂
你疯了吗？战争是美国的生意。你不可能这么天真。

varun mohan
its true whatever said here.. but as a citizen of a buyer country from USA we have to look into the maintenance cost also. if the cost of the product is higher sure will be maitenance

说的这些都有理。但作为向美国购买武器的国家的公民，我们还得操心维护费用。武器的售价越高，维护也会越昂贵。

Octopus Dropkick
Maybe the Arms Industry is a huge steaming pile of crap that equates to a giant money pit where a small minority of people at the top of contractor companies actually benefit.
Maybe we should cut defense spending in half at minimal.

也许军工产业就是一堆热气腾腾的翔，一个只有少数承包商高层才能获利的超级大钱坑。或许我们应将军事开支至少砍半。

CharlieSeattle
The US should continue to build a few high tech Tiger tanks while the rest of the world builds many Sherman and T-34 tanks.
The US should continue to build a few high tech ME-262's while the rest of the world builds many Spitfires and Mustang's.
.........WWII analogy about:
"Quantity" being a "Quality" all it's own. Joseph Stalin
美国应继续制造一些高科技虎式坦克，而世界其它国家制造大量的谢尔曼和T-34坦克。
美国应继续制造一些高科技ME-262战斗机，而世界其它国家制造大量的喷火战斗机和P-51战斗机。
......数量就是质量（斯大林语）的各种二战比方。