超级军网老可惜老可惜了．．．．．．
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/05/03 07:55:32
猜飞机:D
爱抚系列的。。 :D :D
这是什么东东？
]]
哪里掉落的?F22A?
是真的，是F22电传故障，整机全烧毁！:L
那图把F－35B的剖视图也加进去了，居然还标明升力风扇
哑然失笑．．．．．．什么玩意～＠！！！:L
原帖由 枢机主教 于 2007-10-27 08:03 发表
这个，我在铁血找到这个图。
图片挺有意思，但分析很傻。
后面半张图明显是台湾的F5E坠毁的照片，中国除了北京、西安那里还有那种老建筑？
谁能介绍一下这图的来历？航模么？
台湾的一个飞机失事。如此简单
原帖由 枢机主教 于 2007-10-27 08:03 发表
这个，我在铁血找到这个图。
图片挺有意思，但分析很傻。
后面半张图明显是台湾的F5E坠毁的照片，中国除了北京、西安那里还有那种老建筑？
谁能介绍一下这图的来历？航模么？
你真以为是“古”建筑么？只怕现代“仿”古建筑吧。:D :D
貌似还没涂装的鸡鸡摔了出来。
就F22在降落时坠毁过，前几年新闻播过，当时飞机都已经到地面了，平尾开始上下剧烈摆动，飞机忽忽悠悠的就摔了，然后就起火了，不过飞行员好像没事！
多摔几架才好
:@ 景添MM就这样被楼主侮辱了;funk
飞行员诱发震荡，YF-22和F-22以同样的方式各坠毁一次
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION, F/A-22 S/N 00-4014
422nd TEST AND EVALUATION SQUADRON
NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE (AFB), NEVADA
20 DECEMBER 2004
On 20 December 2004, at 2340Z/1540 local time, the Mishap Aircraft (MA), F/A-22, Serial Number 00-
4014, crashed on initial takeoff from Nellis AFB. The Mishap Pilot (MP), assigned to the 422nd Test
and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis AFB, ejected safely and sustained only minor injuries. There were no
other casualties. The MA impacted the Nellis AFB airfield and was destroyed. The only other damage
was also to government property including an arresting cable, a runway sign, a runway light, and the
runway surface.
Immediately upon leaving the ground, the MA began a series of un-commanded and progressively
more violent yaw, roll, and pitch transients. Unable to control the aircraft, the MP ejected seconds
before the MA impacted the ground.
The Accident Investigation Board President determined the cause of the mishap, supported by clear
and convincing evidence, was an inoperative Flight Control System, resulting from a power
interruption, which made the MA uncontrollable. The MP was , unaware of this condition because he
did not perform an Initiate Built in Test (IBIT), the only means of detecting the problem. Failure to
perform the IBIT was the result of ambiguous Technical Orders and a mistaken belief in continuous
RSA power availability.
During the mishap sequence, the MP started engines, performed an IBIT, and had a fully functioning
Flight Control System. Subsequently, the MP shut down engines to allow maintenance personnel to
service the Stored Energy System. During engine shut down, the MA’s Auxiliary Power System (APU)
was running. The MP believed the APU provided continuous power to the Flight Control System, and
therefore another IBIT after engine restart was unnecessary. This belief was based on academic
training, technical data system description, and was shared by most F/A-22 personnel interviewed
during the investigation.
In fact, the MA’s Flight Control System did experience a brief power interruption during the engine
shut down sequence. The interruption produced an unforeseen catastrophic Flight Control System
failure that rendered the MA un-flyable.
Under 10 U.S.C. 2254(d), any opinion of the accident investigators as to the cause of, or the factors
contributing to, the accident set forth in the accident investigation report may not be considered as
evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from an aircraft accident, nor may such information
be considered an admission of liability by the United States or by any person referred to in these
conclusions or statements.
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION, F/A-22 S/N 00-4014
422nd TEST AND EVALUATION SQUADRON
NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE (AFB), NEVADA
20 DECEMBER 2004
On 20 December 2004, at 2340Z/1540 local time, the Mishap Aircraft (MA), F/A-22, Serial Number 00-
4014, crashed on initial takeoff from Nellis AFB. The Mishap Pilot (MP), assigned to the 422nd Test
and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis AFB, ejected safely and sustained only minor injuries. There were no
other casualties. The MA impacted the Nellis AFB airfield and was destroyed. The only other damage
was also to government property including an arresting cable, a runway sign, a runway light, and the
runway surface.
Immediately upon leaving the ground, the MA began a series of un-commanded and progressively
more violent yaw, roll, and pitch transients. Unable to control the aircraft, the MP ejected seconds
before the MA impacted the ground.
The Accident Investigation Board President determined the cause of the mishap, supported by clear
and convincing evidence, was an inoperative Flight Control System, resulting from a power
interruption, which made the MA uncontrollable. The MP was , unaware of this condition because he
did not perform an Initiate Built in Test (IBIT), the only means of detecting the problem. Failure to
perform the IBIT was the result of ambiguous Technical Orders and a mistaken belief in continuous
RSA power availability.
During the mishap sequence, the MP started engines, performed an IBIT, and had a fully functioning
Flight Control System. Subsequently, the MP shut down engines to allow maintenance personnel to
service the Stored Energy System. During engine shut down, the MA’s Auxiliary Power System (APU)
was running. The MP believed the APU provided continuous power to the Flight Control System, and
therefore another IBIT after engine restart was unnecessary. This belief was based on academic
training, technical data system description, and was shared by most F/A-22 personnel interviewed
during the investigation.
In fact, the MA’s Flight Control System did experience a brief power interruption during the engine
shut down sequence. The interruption produced an unforeseen catastrophic Flight Control System
failure that rendered the MA un-flyable.
Under 10 U.S.C. 2254(d), any opinion of the accident investigators as to the cause of, or the factors
contributing to, the accident set forth in the accident investigation report may not be considered as
evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from an aircraft accident, nor may such information
be considered an admission of liability by the United States or by any person referred to in these
conclusions or statements.
这个有视频，谁给个链接！
1. AUTHORITY, PURPOSE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES
a. Authority.
On 12 January 2005, Lieutenant General Bruce A. Wright, Commander Air Combat Command (ACC)
appointed Colonel Ted Kresge to conduct an aircraft accident investigation of the 20 December 2004
crash of an F/A-22A aircraft, serial number 00-4014, on Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada. The
investigation took place at Nellis Air Force Base, from 17 January 2005 through 3 February 2005.
Technical advisors were Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey P. Rude (Legal), Lieutenant Colonel Edward J.
Sullivan (Maintenance), Major Michael T. Hoepfner (Pilot), Captain Christopher M. Meyer (Medical)
(Tab Y-2).
b. Purpose.
This aircraft accident investigation was convened under Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-503. The
primary purpose is to gather and preserve evidence for claims, litigation, and disciplinary and
administrative actions. In addition to setting forth factual information concerning the accident, the
board president is also required to state his opinion as to the cause of the accident or the existence of
factors, if any, that substantially contributed to the accident. This investigation is separate and apart
from the safety investigation, which is conducted pursuant to AFI 91-204 for the purpose of mishap
prevention. The report is available for public dissemination under the Freedom of Information Act (5
United States Code (U.S.C.) §552) and AFI 37-131.
c. Circumstances.
The accident board was convened to investigate the Class A accident involving an F/A-22A aircraft,
S/N 00-4014, assigned to the 53rd Wing, 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron (TES), Nellis AFB,
Nevada, which crashed on 20 December 2004.
2. ACCIDENT SUMMARY
Aircraft F/A-22A, S/N 00-4014, crashed on initial takeoff 20 December 2004 at 2340:12Z/1540:12L
(Tab B-3) and impacted the ground at 36 degrees and 14.79 minutes north and 115 degrees and 01.41
minutes west, Nellis AFB, Nevada (Tab C-3). The Mishap Pilot (MP), Major Robert A. Garland, is
assigned to the 422nd TES, 53rd Wing. The pilot ejected safely and sustained only minor injuries. The
aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact with the loss valued at $133,569,918.00 (Tab P-3). In
addition to the loss of the aircraft, other government property that was damaged included a BAK-12
arresting cable, a runway guide sign, a runway light, and runway 03R. The mishap aircraft (MA) broke
into several pieces leaving a debris field scattered over the departure end of runway 03R and the
runway overrun and ground area beyond the departure end. There were no civilian casualties, or
damage to private property. The mishap was reported in the local media at the time it occurred, but
interest in the incident has been minimal since the story was first reported.
3. BACKGROUND
The 422nd TES, located at Nellis AFB, Nevada is composed of aircrew and support personnel
supporting six different flights of fighter and helicopter aircraft: A-10, F-15C, F-15E, F-16C, F/A-22 and
HH-60G. The 422 TES conducts operational tests for ACC on new hardware and upgrades to each of
the six aircraft in a simulated combat environment. The 422 TES also develops and publishes new
tactics for these aircraft. The results of these tests directly benefit aircrews in ACC, Pacific Air Forces
(PACAF) and United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) by providing them with operationally
proved hardware and software systems. Current tests include employment of the AGM-65H missile by
the A-10, developing night vision goggle employment tactics for the F- 16C, helmet-mounted sight
capability for the F-15C, new avionics software updates for the F- 15E, employment tactics and training
for the F/A-22 and improved combat search and rescue tactics for the HH-60G. Detachment l, located at
Holloman AFB, New Mexico, is responsible for conducting operational tests and tactics development for
the F-117A Stealth fighter.
4. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
a. Mission.
The MP was RAPTOR I leading a flight of three, RAPTOR 1&2 and COWBOY 2 (F-15C) on a
transition (TX)-add ride for proficiency. Mission was authorized by the 422 TES (Tab K-3). The sortie
would focus on defensive Basic Fighter Maneuvers (BFM). The MP was still in initial qualification
training, and required one more ride for graduation. RAPTOR 2 was a qualified F/A-22 Instructor Pilot.
COWBOY 2, piloted by an F-15 Instructor Pilot from the USAF Weapons School, was the bandit. Once
in the airspace, RAPTOR 1 and 2 would alternate fighting the F-15 (Tab V-5.4).
b. Planning.
Mission planning/briefing was thorough and complete. All pertinent information was briefed and
understood by all in the flight. Weather, Notices to Airmen, and Emergency Procedure (EP) of the day
were briefed. Excellent detail was provided to the adversary (COWBOY 2) for BFM execution and flight
path de-confliction. All training rules were briefed in accordance with (IAW) Air Force Instruction (AFI)
11-214. The MP covered a1157 WG, 53 WG, 422 TES, and Weapons School Special Interest Items (SIIs)
(Tab V-5.4).
c. Preflight.
RAPTOR 2’s aircraft was not ready at step time. 422 TES supervision elected to launch the MP
without RAPTOR 2. RAPTOR 2 would join the MP and COWBOY 2 in the airspace if able. The MP
received a step brief from 422 TES Operations Officer; and he proceeded to the MA. Aircraft forms were
reviewed via the Portable Maintenance Aid (PMA) with the dedicated crew chief (DCC). Neither the
MP nor the DCC noted any discrepancies. Aircraft preflight was conducted IAW T.O. 1F/A-22-1CL and
was uneventful (Tab V-5.6).
d. Mishap Sequence.
The following summary of events was compiled via a combination of witness testimony, Technical
Order (T.O.) data, technical reports, and Crash Survivable Memory Unit (CSMU) data. This CSMU
data is very complete and covers the entire mishap sortie, along with the entire first sortie of the day,
and approximately the last 20 minutes of a previous flight. There are no indications the data is corrupt.
At 1421:36L the MP began starting engines. Both engine starts were normal. At 1424:08, the MP
performed a Flight Control System (FLCS) sweep (Tab CC-4). This sweep is to ensure that any air in
the hydraulic lines is purged and the hydraulic fluid is warmed up. Large amplitude inputs were
observed in Pitch, Roll, and Rudder commands lasting for 7 seconds. Following the FLCS Sweep, the
MP performed an Initiated FLCS Built-in Test (FLCS IBTT). At 1425:37 the FLCS IBTT passed (Tab
CC-4). All other remaining checklist items in the Before Taxi checklist were accomplished. The only
issue precluding takeoff was that the MA indicated low Stored Energy System (SES) pressure (Tab V-
5.7). This situation is not unusual.
The SES uses fuel and pressurized air to provide starting power for the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU).
The SES will indicate low (<90%) if a large amount of fuel and pressurized air is used during the start
sequence. An “SES LOW” indication appears on the Integrated Caution and Warning (ICAW) display.
The Air Recharge System (ARS) will recharge the SES after an eight minute purge cycle then begin
charging the SES for a 10 minute cycle. Several purge/recharge cycles may be required depending on
the recharge requirements. The MA displayed an
“SES LOW” ICAW immediately after APU start (Tab V-5.6).
IAW local procedures, the MP initiated an APU restart following the second engine start. This restart
interrupts the normal cooldown mode of the APU and prevents APU shutdown
(Tab V-5.6). This is done to preclude another APU start (depleting more SES pressure) if the Thermal
Management Mode (TMM) is required for fuel cooling. In order for TMM to operate, the APU must be
running. Following the eight minute purge cycle, at 1429:01, a Fault Reporting Code (FRC) reported an
ARS failure (Tab CC-4). This FRC is not apparent to the pilot. The only indication to the pilot is the
SES does not recharge. The MP testified that the SES pressure was 75%, well below the 90% required
for takeoff. This would not preclude taxi due to the expected purge/recharge cycle. All Before Taxi
checklist items were accomplished and the MP taxied to runway 03 (Tab V-5.7).
From 1434:06 to 1438:06, the MP taxied to End of Runway (EOR). By this time, the purge/recharge
cycle of the SES should have shown some improvement. However, the MP noted only a small increase
from 75% to 79% (Tab CC-4) (TAB V-5.8). In an attempt to increase the speed/efficiency of the ARS
recharge, the MP selected Air Source-Left at 1441:11. He also began coordinating for maintenance
assistance, called a “redball”, with 422 Operations. RAPTOR 2 was still at the operations desk and
recommended that he select TMM in an attempt to increase the speed/efficiency of the ARS. At 1457:36
TMM was selected (Tab CC-4) (Tab V5.9). Within eight minutes, the MP determined that neither Air
Source-Left nor TMM was having the desired effect and required corrective maintenance. From 1505:36
to 1509:36 the MP taxied back to maintenance for a manual SES recharge using a ground SES cart
(Tab CC-5). The fitting for the SES recharge cart is located in the nose gear wheel well and requires
both engines to be shutdown (Tab CC-5) (Tab V-5.9) The MP elected to leave the APU running during
engine shutdown, which is normal.
Three aspects of APU operation must be understood at this point. While on the ground, the APU will
only shutdown if: 1) the APU is manually turned off by the APU switch, or 2) the APU is turned off via
the APU fire light, or 3) TMM is exited. Normal APU shutdown on the ground consists of two phases,
cooldown followed by spooldown. During cooldown, the APU continues to run and supply power, albeit
in a reduced power mode. Cooldown lasts approximately 20 seconds (Tab BB-3 through BB-7). Finally,
as previously discussed, the pilot can stop APU cooldown by commanding restart.
The following is critical in the mishap sequence. At 1515:05 the left engine was shutdown, and at
1516:16 the right engine was shutdown. The shutdown of the second engine effectively turned TMM off.
Therefore, the APU was commanded to enter cooldown (Tab CC-5). Power to the aircraft was supplied
via the Permanent Magnet Generators (PMG) until engine Revolutions Per Minute (RPM) dropped
from idle (73%) to 53%. Once below 53%, the PMGs no longer supplied power and were removed from
the electrical power system. At this point, the power state of the aircraft was changing.
Once the APU was commanded to begin shutdown (via cooldown then spooldown), the APU run state
changed from 1 (run) to 0 (off). The first stage of APU shutdown is cooldown. During cooldown, the APU
reduces its electrical power output in preparation for the complete removal of power. This reduction in
power reduces the effective APU generator output from 22 kilowatt (kw) to 5 kw. When the APU is
supplying aircraft power in the Skw mode, the aircraft power state is called the “SES power state” (Tab
BB-3 through BB-7). Once the RPM dropped below 53%, main generator output was 0 (off) on the right
engine, the APU RUN light began to flash as an indication of APU cooldown. More importantly, the
aircraft had entered the SES power state. At the first indication of a flashing APU RUN light, the MP
initiated an APU restart (Tab V5.10).
SES power state is apparent on CSMU data. On the last frame of CSMU data, all four converters on
Power Distribution Centers (PDC) 5 and 6 (270 volts DC Buses 3 and 4) indicated “good”. This indicates
good APU generator operation. However, it does not show whether the APU was operating in 22 kw
(run) or 5 kw (SES) mode. The last frame of CSMU data also showed the removal of 115 volts AC
Inverter Signals from PDC 7 and 8. These inverter signals are passed via PDC 5 and 6 (which are
powered regardless of APU run mode) and show the removal of 115 volts AC power. This combination
of converter/inverter signals clearly shows that the APU was operating in the 5 kw SES mode (Tab CC-
5) (Tab BB-3 through BB-7). In the SES power state (ground operations only) the FLCS does not
receive power. The next paragraph describes how electrical power is removed from the FLCS while in
the SES power state.
While the APU is in SES mode (aircraft in SES power state) of operation (5 kw output), both
Generator Distribution Centers (GDC) remain powered. In addition, 28 volts DC Buses 1, 2, and 3
receive power from their associated 28 volts DC converters. Global Management (GM), software control
for all aircraft operations, removes power to the FLCS computers and portions of the Vehicle
Management System (VMS). Each of the three FLCS branches has its own associated VMS. Within
each of the three VMSs, is a Rate Sensor Assembly (RSA). RSAs measure angular acceleration in all
three axes, pitch, roll, and yaw. These RSAs require power to provide a valid output (Tab BB-3 through
BB-7).
Once GM sensed the aircraft was in SES power state (on the ground), power was removed from Power
Supply Modules (PSM) 1&2 in the VMS. Therefore, no power was supplied to the Processor Interface
Controller and Communication (PICC) module, the Analog Digital Input/Output (ADIO), and the
associated RSA in turn. We now know that power was removed from the RSAs. The length of time they
were without power is an important factor.
To avoid another SES discharge for APU start, the MP kept the APU running during the SES
recharge process. As stated earlier, at the first indication of a flashing APU RUN light, the MP
initiated an APU restart (Tab V-5.10). By commanding the APU to run during the cooldown sequence,
several things happened in terms of aircraft power. The APU run state was changed from 0 (off) to 1
(run). The cooldown sequence was cancelled. Finally, the SES mode (5 kw) of operation was upgraded to
the APU run mode (22 kw). Power was immediately restored to the VMS and the FLCS computers.
Based on the fact that the last frame of data showed the first indication of APU cooldown (SES power
state) and the pilot’s testimony of commanding an APU restart at the first indication of a flashing APU
RUN light, the time power was interrupted to the RSAs was less than one second. This less than one
second power interruption to the RSAs was a critical factor in the mishap sequence.
This momentary interruption of power to the RSAs at approximately 1516:20 caused all three to
“latch”. This latched state nullified their output (Tab CC-5). See Section 6a for a description of RSA
latching. CSMU data confirms RSA latching. Prior to the power interruption at approximately 1516:20,
all three RSA outputs were correct (Tab CC-5). At 1522:45 the right engine was commanded to start by
moving the throttle from OFF to Idle. This command restarted CSMU recording. From the first frame
of data at 1522:45 to the last frame of data at aircraft impact, all three RSAs showed a 0.0 output.
Continuous 0.0 output indicates a latched RSA (Tab CC-8). Unfortunately, the MP was unaware of this
condition (Tab V-5.10 through V-5.13).
The FLCS uses data comparison to determine if a component is not working properly. This is called
the Periodic Built in Test (PBIT). Basically, if one value differs significantly from the other two values,
it is considered invalid. After one failure, the two remaining values are checked against expected
output. After two failures there is generally no further fault monitoring. In this case, all three RSAs
showed the same 0.0 output and were accepted as correct. Neither the PBIT nor the Start-up BIT
(SBIT) would have detected this fault. The bottom line is that there is no automatic warning of a triple
RSA failure. The only way to detect this fault is via a pilot initiated FLCS IBTT (Tab J-12, J-30).
At 1522:45 the right engine was started, and at 1523:21 the left engine was started. Engine startup
was normal. Once again, the MP performed an APU restart preventing APU shutdown. At 1524:03 a
short one second cycle of the flight controls was observed similar to a quick “stir the stick” motion.
There was no indication of a pilot initiated FLCS IBIT. With the exception of the FLCS IBIT all
pertinent checklist procedures were accomplished (Tab CC-6) (Tab V-5.10).
T.O. 1F/A-22A-1 requires a FLCS IBIT prior to flight and warns the pilot to re-accomplish a FLCS
IBTT if the aircraft is “shutdown” (Tab BB-2). However, T.O. guidance concerning FLCS IBIT and
aircraft power supply/states is ambiguous and/or incorrect. Therefore, the MP believed another FLCS
IBIT was unnecessary (Tab V-5.10, 18, 19). Refer to Section 13c(1) for an expanded discussion of T.O.
adherence, correctness, and applicability.
At 1531:30 the MP taxied to EOR, arriving at 1535:30. MA appeared normal to the EOR ground crew
(Tab V-1.5). All flight control surfaces were in their normal position (Tab CC-6). At 1537:30 the MP
taxied out of EOR preparing for takeoff. All Before Takeoff checklist items were accomplished (Tab CC-
6) (Tab V-5.11). Nine seconds after departing EOR the MP shutdown the APU. He was cleared “into
position and hold.” The APU shutdown sequence was complete (cooldown and spooldown) at 1537:53. At
1539:26 throttles moved from both idle to Mil power. At 1539:34, MP released brakes (Tab CC-6).
The following description is based on a combination of CSMU data and video recreation derived from
CSMU data. All indications were normal throughout takeoff roll. At 1539:52 the MP initiated rotation
at 140KCAS. Angle of Attack (AOA) was 0.7 degrees and Beta (sideslip) was 1.7degrees nose right. Left
and right weight-off-wheels occurred at 1539:58 (Tab CC-7). The MP stated that the MA “jumped into
air”. This was the result of higher than normal horizontal tail deflection. The MP stated that this was
the first indication of abnormal operation (Tab V-5.13).
Without RSA data, the FLCS computer wasn’t receiving angular acceleration feedback telling the
a. Authority.
On 12 January 2005, Lieutenant General Bruce A. Wright, Commander Air Combat Command (ACC)
appointed Colonel Ted Kresge to conduct an aircraft accident investigation of the 20 December 2004
crash of an F/A-22A aircraft, serial number 00-4014, on Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada. The
investigation took place at Nellis Air Force Base, from 17 January 2005 through 3 February 2005.
Technical advisors were Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey P. Rude (Legal), Lieutenant Colonel Edward J.
Sullivan (Maintenance), Major Michael T. Hoepfner (Pilot), Captain Christopher M. Meyer (Medical)
(Tab Y-2).
b. Purpose.
This aircraft accident investigation was convened under Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-503. The
primary purpose is to gather and preserve evidence for claims, litigation, and disciplinary and
administrative actions. In addition to setting forth factual information concerning the accident, the
board president is also required to state his opinion as to the cause of the accident or the existence of
factors, if any, that substantially contributed to the accident. This investigation is separate and apart
from the safety investigation, which is conducted pursuant to AFI 91-204 for the purpose of mishap
prevention. The report is available for public dissemination under the Freedom of Information Act (5
United States Code (U.S.C.) §552) and AFI 37-131.
c. Circumstances.
The accident board was convened to investigate the Class A accident involving an F/A-22A aircraft,
S/N 00-4014, assigned to the 53rd Wing, 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron (TES), Nellis AFB,
Nevada, which crashed on 20 December 2004.
2. ACCIDENT SUMMARY
Aircraft F/A-22A, S/N 00-4014, crashed on initial takeoff 20 December 2004 at 2340:12Z/1540:12L
(Tab B-3) and impacted the ground at 36 degrees and 14.79 minutes north and 115 degrees and 01.41
minutes west, Nellis AFB, Nevada (Tab C-3). The Mishap Pilot (MP), Major Robert A. Garland, is
assigned to the 422nd TES, 53rd Wing. The pilot ejected safely and sustained only minor injuries. The
aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact with the loss valued at $133,569,918.00 (Tab P-3). In
addition to the loss of the aircraft, other government property that was damaged included a BAK-12
arresting cable, a runway guide sign, a runway light, and runway 03R. The mishap aircraft (MA) broke
into several pieces leaving a debris field scattered over the departure end of runway 03R and the
runway overrun and ground area beyond the departure end. There were no civilian casualties, or
damage to private property. The mishap was reported in the local media at the time it occurred, but
interest in the incident has been minimal since the story was first reported.
3. BACKGROUND
The 422nd TES, located at Nellis AFB, Nevada is composed of aircrew and support personnel
supporting six different flights of fighter and helicopter aircraft: A-10, F-15C, F-15E, F-16C, F/A-22 and
HH-60G. The 422 TES conducts operational tests for ACC on new hardware and upgrades to each of
the six aircraft in a simulated combat environment. The 422 TES also develops and publishes new
tactics for these aircraft. The results of these tests directly benefit aircrews in ACC, Pacific Air Forces
(PACAF) and United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) by providing them with operationally
proved hardware and software systems. Current tests include employment of the AGM-65H missile by
the A-10, developing night vision goggle employment tactics for the F- 16C, helmet-mounted sight
capability for the F-15C, new avionics software updates for the F- 15E, employment tactics and training
for the F/A-22 and improved combat search and rescue tactics for the HH-60G. Detachment l, located at
Holloman AFB, New Mexico, is responsible for conducting operational tests and tactics development for
the F-117A Stealth fighter.
4. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
a. Mission.
The MP was RAPTOR I leading a flight of three, RAPTOR 1&2 and COWBOY 2 (F-15C) on a
transition (TX)-add ride for proficiency. Mission was authorized by the 422 TES (Tab K-3). The sortie
would focus on defensive Basic Fighter Maneuvers (BFM). The MP was still in initial qualification
training, and required one more ride for graduation. RAPTOR 2 was a qualified F/A-22 Instructor Pilot.
COWBOY 2, piloted by an F-15 Instructor Pilot from the USAF Weapons School, was the bandit. Once
in the airspace, RAPTOR 1 and 2 would alternate fighting the F-15 (Tab V-5.4).
b. Planning.
Mission planning/briefing was thorough and complete. All pertinent information was briefed and
understood by all in the flight. Weather, Notices to Airmen, and Emergency Procedure (EP) of the day
were briefed. Excellent detail was provided to the adversary (COWBOY 2) for BFM execution and flight
path de-confliction. All training rules were briefed in accordance with (IAW) Air Force Instruction (AFI)
11-214. The MP covered a1157 WG, 53 WG, 422 TES, and Weapons School Special Interest Items (SIIs)
(Tab V-5.4).
c. Preflight.
RAPTOR 2’s aircraft was not ready at step time. 422 TES supervision elected to launch the MP
without RAPTOR 2. RAPTOR 2 would join the MP and COWBOY 2 in the airspace if able. The MP
received a step brief from 422 TES Operations Officer; and he proceeded to the MA. Aircraft forms were
reviewed via the Portable Maintenance Aid (PMA) with the dedicated crew chief (DCC). Neither the
MP nor the DCC noted any discrepancies. Aircraft preflight was conducted IAW T.O. 1F/A-22-1CL and
was uneventful (Tab V-5.6).
d. Mishap Sequence.
The following summary of events was compiled via a combination of witness testimony, Technical
Order (T.O.) data, technical reports, and Crash Survivable Memory Unit (CSMU) data. This CSMU
data is very complete and covers the entire mishap sortie, along with the entire first sortie of the day,
and approximately the last 20 minutes of a previous flight. There are no indications the data is corrupt.
At 1421:36L the MP began starting engines. Both engine starts were normal. At 1424:08, the MP
performed a Flight Control System (FLCS) sweep (Tab CC-4). This sweep is to ensure that any air in
the hydraulic lines is purged and the hydraulic fluid is warmed up. Large amplitude inputs were
observed in Pitch, Roll, and Rudder commands lasting for 7 seconds. Following the FLCS Sweep, the
MP performed an Initiated FLCS Built-in Test (FLCS IBTT). At 1425:37 the FLCS IBTT passed (Tab
CC-4). All other remaining checklist items in the Before Taxi checklist were accomplished. The only
issue precluding takeoff was that the MA indicated low Stored Energy System (SES) pressure (Tab V-
5.7). This situation is not unusual.
The SES uses fuel and pressurized air to provide starting power for the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU).
The SES will indicate low (<90%) if a large amount of fuel and pressurized air is used during the start
sequence. An “SES LOW” indication appears on the Integrated Caution and Warning (ICAW) display.
The Air Recharge System (ARS) will recharge the SES after an eight minute purge cycle then begin
charging the SES for a 10 minute cycle. Several purge/recharge cycles may be required depending on
the recharge requirements. The MA displayed an
“SES LOW” ICAW immediately after APU start (Tab V-5.6).
IAW local procedures, the MP initiated an APU restart following the second engine start. This restart
interrupts the normal cooldown mode of the APU and prevents APU shutdown
(Tab V-5.6). This is done to preclude another APU start (depleting more SES pressure) if the Thermal
Management Mode (TMM) is required for fuel cooling. In order for TMM to operate, the APU must be
running. Following the eight minute purge cycle, at 1429:01, a Fault Reporting Code (FRC) reported an
ARS failure (Tab CC-4). This FRC is not apparent to the pilot. The only indication to the pilot is the
SES does not recharge. The MP testified that the SES pressure was 75%, well below the 90% required
for takeoff. This would not preclude taxi due to the expected purge/recharge cycle. All Before Taxi
checklist items were accomplished and the MP taxied to runway 03 (Tab V-5.7).
From 1434:06 to 1438:06, the MP taxied to End of Runway (EOR). By this time, the purge/recharge
cycle of the SES should have shown some improvement. However, the MP noted only a small increase
from 75% to 79% (Tab CC-4) (TAB V-5.8). In an attempt to increase the speed/efficiency of the ARS
recharge, the MP selected Air Source-Left at 1441:11. He also began coordinating for maintenance
assistance, called a “redball”, with 422 Operations. RAPTOR 2 was still at the operations desk and
recommended that he select TMM in an attempt to increase the speed/efficiency of the ARS. At 1457:36
TMM was selected (Tab CC-4) (Tab V5.9). Within eight minutes, the MP determined that neither Air
Source-Left nor TMM was having the desired effect and required corrective maintenance. From 1505:36
to 1509:36 the MP taxied back to maintenance for a manual SES recharge using a ground SES cart
(Tab CC-5). The fitting for the SES recharge cart is located in the nose gear wheel well and requires
both engines to be shutdown (Tab CC-5) (Tab V-5.9) The MP elected to leave the APU running during
engine shutdown, which is normal.
Three aspects of APU operation must be understood at this point. While on the ground, the APU will
only shutdown if: 1) the APU is manually turned off by the APU switch, or 2) the APU is turned off via
the APU fire light, or 3) TMM is exited. Normal APU shutdown on the ground consists of two phases,
cooldown followed by spooldown. During cooldown, the APU continues to run and supply power, albeit
in a reduced power mode. Cooldown lasts approximately 20 seconds (Tab BB-3 through BB-7). Finally,
as previously discussed, the pilot can stop APU cooldown by commanding restart.
The following is critical in the mishap sequence. At 1515:05 the left engine was shutdown, and at
1516:16 the right engine was shutdown. The shutdown of the second engine effectively turned TMM off.
Therefore, the APU was commanded to enter cooldown (Tab CC-5). Power to the aircraft was supplied
via the Permanent Magnet Generators (PMG) until engine Revolutions Per Minute (RPM) dropped
from idle (73%) to 53%. Once below 53%, the PMGs no longer supplied power and were removed from
the electrical power system. At this point, the power state of the aircraft was changing.
Once the APU was commanded to begin shutdown (via cooldown then spooldown), the APU run state
changed from 1 (run) to 0 (off). The first stage of APU shutdown is cooldown. During cooldown, the APU
reduces its electrical power output in preparation for the complete removal of power. This reduction in
power reduces the effective APU generator output from 22 kilowatt (kw) to 5 kw. When the APU is
supplying aircraft power in the Skw mode, the aircraft power state is called the “SES power state” (Tab
BB-3 through BB-7). Once the RPM dropped below 53%, main generator output was 0 (off) on the right
engine, the APU RUN light began to flash as an indication of APU cooldown. More importantly, the
aircraft had entered the SES power state. At the first indication of a flashing APU RUN light, the MP
initiated an APU restart (Tab V5.10).
SES power state is apparent on CSMU data. On the last frame of CSMU data, all four converters on
Power Distribution Centers (PDC) 5 and 6 (270 volts DC Buses 3 and 4) indicated “good”. This indicates
good APU generator operation. However, it does not show whether the APU was operating in 22 kw
(run) or 5 kw (SES) mode. The last frame of CSMU data also showed the removal of 115 volts AC
Inverter Signals from PDC 7 and 8. These inverter signals are passed via PDC 5 and 6 (which are
powered regardless of APU run mode) and show the removal of 115 volts AC power. This combination
of converter/inverter signals clearly shows that the APU was operating in the 5 kw SES mode (Tab CC-
5) (Tab BB-3 through BB-7). In the SES power state (ground operations only) the FLCS does not
receive power. The next paragraph describes how electrical power is removed from the FLCS while in
the SES power state.
While the APU is in SES mode (aircraft in SES power state) of operation (5 kw output), both
Generator Distribution Centers (GDC) remain powered. In addition, 28 volts DC Buses 1, 2, and 3
receive power from their associated 28 volts DC converters. Global Management (GM), software control
for all aircraft operations, removes power to the FLCS computers and portions of the Vehicle
Management System (VMS). Each of the three FLCS branches has its own associated VMS. Within
each of the three VMSs, is a Rate Sensor Assembly (RSA). RSAs measure angular acceleration in all
three axes, pitch, roll, and yaw. These RSAs require power to provide a valid output (Tab BB-3 through
BB-7).
Once GM sensed the aircraft was in SES power state (on the ground), power was removed from Power
Supply Modules (PSM) 1&2 in the VMS. Therefore, no power was supplied to the Processor Interface
Controller and Communication (PICC) module, the Analog Digital Input/Output (ADIO), and the
associated RSA in turn. We now know that power was removed from the RSAs. The length of time they
were without power is an important factor.
To avoid another SES discharge for APU start, the MP kept the APU running during the SES
recharge process. As stated earlier, at the first indication of a flashing APU RUN light, the MP
initiated an APU restart (Tab V-5.10). By commanding the APU to run during the cooldown sequence,
several things happened in terms of aircraft power. The APU run state was changed from 0 (off) to 1
(run). The cooldown sequence was cancelled. Finally, the SES mode (5 kw) of operation was upgraded to
the APU run mode (22 kw). Power was immediately restored to the VMS and the FLCS computers.
Based on the fact that the last frame of data showed the first indication of APU cooldown (SES power
state) and the pilot’s testimony of commanding an APU restart at the first indication of a flashing APU
RUN light, the time power was interrupted to the RSAs was less than one second. This less than one
second power interruption to the RSAs was a critical factor in the mishap sequence.
This momentary interruption of power to the RSAs at approximately 1516:20 caused all three to
“latch”. This latched state nullified their output (Tab CC-5). See Section 6a for a description of RSA
latching. CSMU data confirms RSA latching. Prior to the power interruption at approximately 1516:20,
all three RSA outputs were correct (Tab CC-5). At 1522:45 the right engine was commanded to start by
moving the throttle from OFF to Idle. This command restarted CSMU recording. From the first frame
of data at 1522:45 to the last frame of data at aircraft impact, all three RSAs showed a 0.0 output.
Continuous 0.0 output indicates a latched RSA (Tab CC-8). Unfortunately, the MP was unaware of this
condition (Tab V-5.10 through V-5.13).
The FLCS uses data comparison to determine if a component is not working properly. This is called
the Periodic Built in Test (PBIT). Basically, if one value differs significantly from the other two values,
it is considered invalid. After one failure, the two remaining values are checked against expected
output. After two failures there is generally no further fault monitoring. In this case, all three RSAs
showed the same 0.0 output and were accepted as correct. Neither the PBIT nor the Start-up BIT
(SBIT) would have detected this fault. The bottom line is that there is no automatic warning of a triple
RSA failure. The only way to detect this fault is via a pilot initiated FLCS IBTT (Tab J-12, J-30).
At 1522:45 the right engine was started, and at 1523:21 the left engine was started. Engine startup
was normal. Once again, the MP performed an APU restart preventing APU shutdown. At 1524:03 a
short one second cycle of the flight controls was observed similar to a quick “stir the stick” motion.
There was no indication of a pilot initiated FLCS IBIT. With the exception of the FLCS IBIT all
pertinent checklist procedures were accomplished (Tab CC-6) (Tab V-5.10).
T.O. 1F/A-22A-1 requires a FLCS IBIT prior to flight and warns the pilot to re-accomplish a FLCS
IBTT if the aircraft is “shutdown” (Tab BB-2). However, T.O. guidance concerning FLCS IBIT and
aircraft power supply/states is ambiguous and/or incorrect. Therefore, the MP believed another FLCS
IBIT was unnecessary (Tab V-5.10, 18, 19). Refer to Section 13c(1) for an expanded discussion of T.O.
adherence, correctness, and applicability.
At 1531:30 the MP taxied to EOR, arriving at 1535:30. MA appeared normal to the EOR ground crew
(Tab V-1.5). All flight control surfaces were in their normal position (Tab CC-6). At 1537:30 the MP
taxied out of EOR preparing for takeoff. All Before Takeoff checklist items were accomplished (Tab CC-
6) (Tab V-5.11). Nine seconds after departing EOR the MP shutdown the APU. He was cleared “into
position and hold.” The APU shutdown sequence was complete (cooldown and spooldown) at 1537:53. At
1539:26 throttles moved from both idle to Mil power. At 1539:34, MP released brakes (Tab CC-6).
The following description is based on a combination of CSMU data and video recreation derived from
CSMU data. All indications were normal throughout takeoff roll. At 1539:52 the MP initiated rotation
at 140KCAS. Angle of Attack (AOA) was 0.7 degrees and Beta (sideslip) was 1.7degrees nose right. Left
and right weight-off-wheels occurred at 1539:58 (Tab CC-7). The MP stated that the MA “jumped into
air”. This was the result of higher than normal horizontal tail deflection. The MP stated that this was
the first indication of abnormal operation (Tab V-5.13).
Without RSA data, the FLCS computer wasn’t receiving angular acceleration feedback telling the
FLCS computers how the aircraft was reacting to the pilot’s stick/rudder inputs. The only information
fed to the FLCS computers was the position of the flight control surfaces. This situation was recreated
in the handling qualities simulator at Edwards AFB using the highly experienced F/A-22 test pilots.
Without RSA data, all pilots crashed in the first few of seconds of flight. High stick sensitivity/overcontrol
was the norm. The test pilots’ conclusion was “the aircraft is completely uncontrollable without
any angular acceleration/rate feedback to the FLCS” (Tab J-9).
Immediately after the MA became airborne, it yawed into the wind (nose right) with approximately 3
degrees of sideslip. The climb continued to be relatively stable varying between five and eight degrees
of nose-high pitch. Through timely pilot input, the nose right yaw rate was arrested and began to yaw
aggressively left. At the same time, power was reduced to approximately 45% for approximately two
seconds. The MP testified that this was in reaction to the jet not “flying like an airplane.” The MP did
not consider a high speed abort because he believed he could fly the MA out of these yaw transients.
The aircraft continued to yaw left to a sideslip angle 15 degrees. Due to his low altitude, the MP
selected MAX power in an attempi to climb. After another large yaw oscillation to right (22 degrees of
sideslip) MP reduced power back to military (MIL) for the remainder of the flight. The MP still felt he
could fly his way out of this. The MP had not reached his ejection decision-yet (Tab CC-7) (Tab V-5.14).
The MP testified that his ejection decision is based on three criteria: 1) aircraft is not flying in
coordinated flight, 2) the aircraft is not correctly responding to control inputs, and 3) the aircraft is
progressing to a position that is unrecoverable either in pitch or roll (Tab V-5.15). The MP’s well
thought-out ejection decision prevented a probable fatality.
The landing gear was still down. Because the airspeed was continuing to climb and the fact that the
aircraft was not flying well in its current configuration, the MP raised the landing gear. Immediately
after landing gear retraction, the jet started to pitch-up, roll right, and yaw left. Sideslip peaked at 31
degree nose left. The right roll rate could not be arrested by stick and rudder inputs--the MA was no
longer responding to the MP’s flight control inputs. At 1540:09, 11 seconds after becoming airborne, the
CANOPY UNLOCK ICAW asserted indicating ejection (Tab CC-8) (Tab V-5.15).
The MP stated that he was still trying to fly the aircraft with his right hand and pulled the ejection
handle with his left. The MP’s recollection of the events leading up to his ejection decision was
accurate-almost an exact reiteration of CSMU data. Aircraft parameters at the time of the CANOPY
UNLOCK ICAW are as follows (Tab CC-8):
• Angle of Attack: -4.4 degrees
• Sideslip: -39.0 degrees (nose left) • Pitch : 25 degrees nose up
• Roll: 56 degrees ring wing down (continuing to roll more right wing down)
• Magnetic heading: 002
• Airspeed: 210 Knots Calibrated Airspeed (KCAS)
• Altitude: 2360’ (approximately 500 feet above the ground)
The MP suffered minor abrasions to the neck during the ejection (Tab B-3). See section 4f for a
discussion of the ejection seat performance.
Following the MP’s ejection, the MA continued to simultaneously roll right and pitch further nose up.
The MA continued to a near inverted attitude, and pitched nose up, essentially performing a “Split-S”
and impacted the runway going backwards. The last frame of CSMU data recorded the following
parameters (Tab J-23):
• Angle of Attack: 90 degrees
• Sideslip: -45.0 degrees (nose left)
• Pitch : 35 degrees nose up
• Roll: 71 degrees left wing down
• Magnetic heading: 223
fed to the FLCS computers was the position of the flight control surfaces. This situation was recreated
in the handling qualities simulator at Edwards AFB using the highly experienced F/A-22 test pilots.
Without RSA data, all pilots crashed in the first few of seconds of flight. High stick sensitivity/overcontrol
was the norm. The test pilots’ conclusion was “the aircraft is completely uncontrollable without
any angular acceleration/rate feedback to the FLCS” (Tab J-9).
Immediately after the MA became airborne, it yawed into the wind (nose right) with approximately 3
degrees of sideslip. The climb continued to be relatively stable varying between five and eight degrees
of nose-high pitch. Through timely pilot input, the nose right yaw rate was arrested and began to yaw
aggressively left. At the same time, power was reduced to approximately 45% for approximately two
seconds. The MP testified that this was in reaction to the jet not “flying like an airplane.” The MP did
not consider a high speed abort because he believed he could fly the MA out of these yaw transients.
The aircraft continued to yaw left to a sideslip angle 15 degrees. Due to his low altitude, the MP
selected MAX power in an attempi to climb. After another large yaw oscillation to right (22 degrees of
sideslip) MP reduced power back to military (MIL) for the remainder of the flight. The MP still felt he
could fly his way out of this. The MP had not reached his ejection decision-yet (Tab CC-7) (Tab V-5.14).
The MP testified that his ejection decision is based on three criteria: 1) aircraft is not flying in
coordinated flight, 2) the aircraft is not correctly responding to control inputs, and 3) the aircraft is
progressing to a position that is unrecoverable either in pitch or roll (Tab V-5.15). The MP’s well
thought-out ejection decision prevented a probable fatality.
The landing gear was still down. Because the airspeed was continuing to climb and the fact that the
aircraft was not flying well in its current configuration, the MP raised the landing gear. Immediately
after landing gear retraction, the jet started to pitch-up, roll right, and yaw left. Sideslip peaked at 31
degree nose left. The right roll rate could not be arrested by stick and rudder inputs--the MA was no
longer responding to the MP’s flight control inputs. At 1540:09, 11 seconds after becoming airborne, the
CANOPY UNLOCK ICAW asserted indicating ejection (Tab CC-8) (Tab V-5.15).
The MP stated that he was still trying to fly the aircraft with his right hand and pulled the ejection
handle with his left. The MP’s recollection of the events leading up to his ejection decision was
accurate-almost an exact reiteration of CSMU data. Aircraft parameters at the time of the CANOPY
UNLOCK ICAW are as follows (Tab CC-8):
• Angle of Attack: -4.4 degrees
• Sideslip: -39.0 degrees (nose left) • Pitch : 25 degrees nose up
• Roll: 56 degrees ring wing down (continuing to roll more right wing down)
• Magnetic heading: 002
• Airspeed: 210 Knots Calibrated Airspeed (KCAS)
• Altitude: 2360’ (approximately 500 feet above the ground)
The MP suffered minor abrasions to the neck during the ejection (Tab B-3). See section 4f for a
discussion of the ejection seat performance.
Following the MP’s ejection, the MA continued to simultaneously roll right and pitch further nose up.
The MA continued to a near inverted attitude, and pitched nose up, essentially performing a “Split-S”
and impacted the runway going backwards. The last frame of CSMU data recorded the following
parameters (Tab J-23):
• Angle of Attack: 90 degrees
• Sideslip: -45.0 degrees (nose left)
• Pitch : 35 degrees nose up
• Roll: 71 degrees left wing down
• Magnetic heading: 223
F22还有“垂直空调风扇”，后生们太有才了。
]]
原帖由 PRINCEBUSTER 于 2007-10-27 15:18 发表
F-22确实摔过一次,造成停飞...事故原因油料仓过热....由台湾网友抱料.....
""此外老美在上月中旬失事折损一架猛禽，有消息传出是因为内部隔热措施出现问题，导致内载燃料过热引燃所致，目前猛禽战机业已全面停飞，直 ...
;P 你也不看看那是什么年代的假消息了
;P ;P ;P
-- 作者： toga
-- 發表時間： 2005/01/03 00:30pm
http://yam.udn.com/yamnews/daily/2432527.shtml
紐約時報華盛頓三十日訊 12/30 20:21
五角大廈已告知白宮與國會，它計劃大幅削減研發空軍歷來最昂貴的F/A-22「猛禽」(Raptor)隱形戰機的作業。預算分析師指出，此舉目的在於協助縮減日益增長的聯邦赤字，並為伊拉克戰爭開銷加大，撙節開支。
空軍計劃共採購277架「猛禽」隱形戰機，全盤費用為718億元。據此計算，目前每架「猛禽」戰機的造價為2億5800萬元。
五角大廈與空軍高級官員仍在討論削減的細節。業界主要分析師湯普森說，研發及生產「猛禽」戰機的計畫可能在生產大約160架飛機之後終止，或許可以節省150億元，但每架飛機的成本將會大幅提高。空軍官員說，五角大廈已為研發「猛禽」隱形戰機花費將近四百億元，現在剛進入全面生產階段。
A:
若此”瘦身”真的成功的話，F/A-22猛禽戰機的單位總體成本將為：（718億美金 - 150億美金）/160 = 3.55億美金一架。
此外老美在上月中旬失事折損一架猛禽，有消息傳出是因為內部隔熱措施出現問題，導致內載燃料過熱引燃所致，目前猛禽戰機業已全面停飛，直到問題被確定與解決後為止；不過一般相信若要徹底解決此一問題，猛禽戰機的研發成本再上一層樓是在所難免之事。
哈哈,欢迎toga同学进来证实,或证伪...........