超级军网美国如何应对中俄的野心
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/29 13:00:33
By Ely Ratner and Thomas Wright November 21 译文来源:龙腾网
By Ely Ratner 和 Thomas Wright 十一月二十一日稿
Ely Ratner is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Thomas Wright is a fellow and director of the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution.
Ely Ratner在新美国安全中心亚太安全计划中担任项目副主任，同时也是一名资深研究员。Thomas Wright则为布鲁金斯学会国际秩序和策略项目主任和研究人员。
The unraveling of the Middle East under the weight of the Sunni-Shiite rivalry and the rise of the Islamic State is enough of a national security challenge to keep the United States busy for a decade or more. But with more and more American advisers on the ground in Iraq — and a steady stream of videotaped atrocities on the Internet — there is a risk that Washington will once again revert to a foreign policy focused disproportionately on that region.
逊尼派和什叶派穆斯林的争斗而导致的中东混乱局面和新伊斯兰国（ISIS）的的兴起，对于美国的国家安全已是巨大挑战，这已经够美国喝一壶的了。往前往伊拉克的美国安全顾问越来越多，但是网上的的暴力冲突视频却仍在源源不断的发布，也许华盛顿的对外政策再次错估了地区重要性
Yes, the United States maintains key interests in the Middle East: Israel’s security, nuclear nonproliferation, stable energy supplies and counterterrorism. But we cannot lose sight of the most significant challenge to American power and leadership in a quarter-century: China and Russia acting like revisionist powers, trying to undermine key elements of the existing international order, including territorial boundaries and long-standing security partnerships. If this challenge is left unchecked, the world could again be divided into spheres of influence, with an ever-present risk of conflict among the major powers.
诚然，美国在中东的核心利益依然需要维持：以色列的安全，防止核扩散，稳定的能源供应和反恐。但我们不能忽视在二十五年内对美国的实力和霸权最大的挑战：中国和俄罗斯正表现为修正主义，试图破坏现有的关键国际秩序，包括边界问题和长期安全伙伴关系。如果放任他们不管，世界又会重新被划分成各个势力范围，届时，大国之间的发生冲突的风险永远无法解决。
-------------译者：时间段基地-审核者：寒灯独夜人------------
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. foreign policy has assumed that major powers largely share common interests and threats — or that they will over time, as emerging powers integrate into the global economy. As a result, policymakers have regarded Asia and Europe as stable and self-sustaining regions relative to the scourge of dictatorship, failed states and transnational threats in the Middle East.
自苏联解体之后，美国外交政策的制定是建立在下列假设上的：各大国在很大程度上享有共同利益并面临同样的风险；亦或者随着时间的推移，他们将作为新兴力量融入全球经济中。因此，政策制定者把亚洲和欧洲视作稳定和独立自主的地区，与此形成对比的是饱受独裁祸害、拥有失败国家及跨国威胁的中东地区。
But the great lesson so far this century is that the U.S.-led order is neither as universally accepted nor as binding as many in Washington have assumed. After the global financial crisis threw American leadership into question, Russia and China have increasingly engaged in actions that reflect an attitude of zero-sum competition with the United States. With a mix of hubris and historical grievance, both are redrawing their regions’ maps by grabbing new territory and bullying their neighbors with calibrated exercises of coercion and force.
但迄今为止最大的教训便是由美国所主导的秩序既没有得到普遍认同，也不像美国政府所设想的那样具有约束力。经历全球经济危机后，美国的领导力受到了质疑，而俄罗斯与中国越来越多的动作也表明了要与美国进行零和竞争的态度。在傲慢的心态与历史屈辱感的共同驱使下，两个国家正通过抢夺新领土来扩张版图，并用显示着压迫与力量的标准化演习来威胁邻国安全。
In Europe, Russia annexed Crimea in the first instance of European irredentism since World War II and invaded eastern Ukraine. The Baltic states are rightly worried that Vladimir Putin may test NATO’s security commitment. In Asia, China has deftly pulled economic, legal and military levers to advance its expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and it has worked to erode U.S. alliances by driving wedges between Japan and South Korea while cozying up to other U.S. allies such as Thailand.
俄罗斯吞并克里米亚并且入侵东乌克兰是二战以来欧洲首个领土收复实例。波罗的海诸国无疑十分担心弗拉基米尔·普京将会检验检验北约对他们的安全承诺是否真的奏效。在亚洲，中国已经巧妙地操纵经济、法律和军事杠杆，推进其在南中国海日益膨胀的海权请求，它在讨好美国其他盟友如泰国的同时，已经通过离间日本和韩国之间关系来削弱美国的军事联盟。
The Economist recently suggested that “fortunately, there is scant evidence to support the idea of a global Chinese effort to upend the international order.” But this should provide little comfort. Historically, most revisionism has begun regionally — including Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries, and even Nazi Germany and imperial Japan in the 1930s. Global consequences came later. Rising powers usually care more about their neighborhoods than far-away continents.
有经济学家最近表示，“幸运的是，全球华人正在试图改变国际秩序观这一说法还没有足够的证据支持。”这只能聊以自慰罢了。从历史来看，大多数修正主义开始时多是区域性质的，包括19和20世纪俄罗斯，20世纪30年代的纳粹德国和日本军国主义，然后才有地区蔓延至全球。正在崛起的大国通常更在意其邻国而不是其他遥远的大陆。
Moreover, there is little solace in arguing that Russian and Chinese revisionism is self-defeating in the long run. From this perspective, the United States should be heartened that Putin’s Russia is in economic and demographic decline and that China’s assertiveness is merely tightening the coalition against it as Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam all seek closer military ties with the United States and one another.
我们有这样一种安慰自己的说法——从长远来看俄罗斯和中国的修正主义是自我毁灭。从这个角度，美国应该感到欣慰的是：普京的俄罗斯在经济和人口都在下降，中国的强硬使得反对他的集团——如澳大利亚，印度，日本，菲律宾和越南——更加团结，更加积极地寻求与美国和彼此之间的军事联合。
But even if such trends continue, isolated and anxious powers can be just as troublesome as confident ones — precisely because they believe time is not on their side. It doesn’t matter that Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping may be pursuing bad grand strategies: The costs of their mistakes will reverberate well beyond their borders, just as the world often paid a price for the follies of revisionists past.
但是即使趋势如此，被孤立的焦虑政权（注：指俄罗斯）和讨人厌的自负政权（注：指中国）只会认为时机不对。这并不干扰普京和中国主席习*近*平继续推行在邪恶的大策略：他们所犯的错误所带来的代价，其影响将将远远超出国界，就像世界以前为修正主义买单一样。
The good news is that, unlike Putin’s Russia, China is not committed or destined to a revisionist path. President Obama’s trip to Beijing this month demonstrated that it is possible to steer the relationship with China toward a more stable course — but it required the full attention of the U.S. government, including months of negotiations and shuttle diplomacy by Secretary of State John Kerry and national security adviser Susan Rice.
好消息是，和俄罗斯不同，中国还没有确定一定会走修正主义道路。奥巴马总统本月访问了北京，此举表明，将中美关系转向更稳定的阶段是有可能的——但是，对于谈判的月数和国务卿John Kerry和国家安全顾问Susan Rice的穿梭外交（注：穿梭外交指，短时间内穿梭于各方寻求达到目标的外交），美国政府应高度谨慎。
This is all the more reason Washington can ill afford another decade narrowly focused on battling insurgents and refereeing sectarian and tribal feuds in the Muslim world. Preventing the rise of revisionism will require different military, diplomatic and economic tools than those honed over 13 years of war and nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan.
这就使得华盛顿更加无法负担起又一个十年来勉强专注于打击穆斯林世界的叛乱分子，宗教裁定和部落纷争。防止修正主义的崛起需要不同的军事、外交和经济手段超过于在伊拉克和阿富汗13年的战争和国家建设。
Russia and China present distinct challenges. Russia is a declining power focused on the acquisition of land on a continent that has left nationalism behind. China is a rising power focused on expanding its maritime territory in a regional cauldron of nationalist sentiments. But in both cases the United States will have to focus its policies on maintaining peaceful competition. Obama’s playbook in China was right: Seek to expand areas of cooperation — such as climate change and trade — while pursuing military and diplomatic means to prevent and manage crises.
俄罗斯和中国呈现出不同的挑战。俄罗斯势力下滑集中于遗留民族主义的大陆所收购的国土上。中国势力的崛起则集中于领海范围扩大和在民族主义情感的大熔炉里。但是在这两种情况下美国不得不专注其政策于维护和平的竞争。奥巴马在中国的做法是正确的：试图扩大合作领域——诸如贸易与气候改变——从事军事和外交手段预防和管理危机。
But equally important will be committing resources to develop new military and economic approaches that better deter and punish revisionist moves. Sanctions have been the weapon of choice against Russia but have not succeeded in altering Putin’s ambitions. In addition to designing more sophisticated economic instruments, the United States must also rethink its approach to military deterrence — including tailoring responses to low-level provocations in the South and East China seas, providing assistance to non-allied governments such as Ukraine and Vietnam if they are excessively coerced, and shoring up U.S. alliances for tests that are surely coming, including deploying NATO troops to the Baltic states and repositioning forces in the Pacific.
但同样重要的是分配更多资源来发展威慑和惩罚的修正主义运动的新军事和经济策略。针对俄罗斯的武器制裁（注：可能指对乌克兰的武器援助）却没有成功地改变普京的野心。除了设计更复杂的经济制裁手段，美国还必须重新考虑它军事威慑策略——包括调整对中国南海和东海小规模挑衅的应对策略，为受压迫的非盟国政府如乌克兰和越南提供援助，当然，前提是它们能支持美国加紧部署军力以应对未来的挑战——包括在波罗的海国家和太平洋地区重新部署北约部队。
Complementing these military relationships, Washington should regard conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and its sister trade agreement in Europe as top priorities in order to renew U.S. economic leadership.
除了这些军事关系，华盛顿应该优先进行跨太平洋伙伴关系协议和它在欧洲的姊妹贸易协定，以恢复美国的经济领导地位。
Finally, rising to the revisionist challenge will require a degree of national strength that can be sustained only through a thriving economy, a powerful military, and a government and society that are admired by much of the world. This places a premium on improving domestic governance; leveraging America’s advantages in technology, immigration and energy; and enacting sustainable fiscal policies on revenue and entitlements.
最后，修正主义挑战的上升将需要一定程度上的国力它只能通过持续繁荣的经济，强有力的军事和一个被大部分世界所推崇的政府与社会。重视提高国内治理，扩充美国技术、移民和能力的优势、颁布税收和福利的可持续的财政政策。
The preservation of vital American interests in Asia and Europe is no longer guaranteed if the United States buries its head in the sands of the Middle East.
如果美国还把头埋在中东的沙漠中，美国在亚欧地区至关重要的利益就无法再得到保障了。By Ely Ratner and Thomas Wright November 21 译文来源:龙腾网
By Ely Ratner 和 Thomas Wright 十一月二十一日稿
Ely Ratner is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Thomas Wright is a fellow and director of the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution.
Ely Ratner在新美国安全中心亚太安全计划中担任项目副主任，同时也是一名资深研究员。Thomas Wright则为布鲁金斯学会国际秩序和策略项目主任和研究人员。
The unraveling of the Middle East under the weight of the Sunni-Shiite rivalry and the rise of the Islamic State is enough of a national security challenge to keep the United States busy for a decade or more. But with more and more American advisers on the ground in Iraq — and a steady stream of videotaped atrocities on the Internet — there is a risk that Washington will once again revert to a foreign policy focused disproportionately on that region.
逊尼派和什叶派穆斯林的争斗而导致的中东混乱局面和新伊斯兰国（ISIS）的的兴起，对于美国的国家安全已是巨大挑战，这已经够美国喝一壶的了。往前往伊拉克的美国安全顾问越来越多，但是网上的的暴力冲突视频却仍在源源不断的发布，也许华盛顿的对外政策再次错估了地区重要性
Yes, the United States maintains key interests in the Middle East: Israel’s security, nuclear nonproliferation, stable energy supplies and counterterrorism. But we cannot lose sight of the most significant challenge to American power and leadership in a quarter-century: China and Russia acting like revisionist powers, trying to undermine key elements of the existing international order, including territorial boundaries and long-standing security partnerships. If this challenge is left unchecked, the world could again be divided into spheres of influence, with an ever-present risk of conflict among the major powers.
诚然，美国在中东的核心利益依然需要维持：以色列的安全，防止核扩散，稳定的能源供应和反恐。但我们不能忽视在二十五年内对美国的实力和霸权最大的挑战：中国和俄罗斯正表现为修正主义，试图破坏现有的关键国际秩序，包括边界问题和长期安全伙伴关系。如果放任他们不管，世界又会重新被划分成各个势力范围，届时，大国之间的发生冲突的风险永远无法解决。
-------------译者：时间段基地-审核者：寒灯独夜人------------
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. foreign policy has assumed that major powers largely share common interests and threats — or that they will over time, as emerging powers integrate into the global economy. As a result, policymakers have regarded Asia and Europe as stable and self-sustaining regions relative to the scourge of dictatorship, failed states and transnational threats in the Middle East.
自苏联解体之后，美国外交政策的制定是建立在下列假设上的：各大国在很大程度上享有共同利益并面临同样的风险；亦或者随着时间的推移，他们将作为新兴力量融入全球经济中。因此，政策制定者把亚洲和欧洲视作稳定和独立自主的地区，与此形成对比的是饱受独裁祸害、拥有失败国家及跨国威胁的中东地区。
But the great lesson so far this century is that the U.S.-led order is neither as universally accepted nor as binding as many in Washington have assumed. After the global financial crisis threw American leadership into question, Russia and China have increasingly engaged in actions that reflect an attitude of zero-sum competition with the United States. With a mix of hubris and historical grievance, both are redrawing their regions’ maps by grabbing new territory and bullying their neighbors with calibrated exercises of coercion and force.
但迄今为止最大的教训便是由美国所主导的秩序既没有得到普遍认同，也不像美国政府所设想的那样具有约束力。经历全球经济危机后，美国的领导力受到了质疑，而俄罗斯与中国越来越多的动作也表明了要与美国进行零和竞争的态度。在傲慢的心态与历史屈辱感的共同驱使下，两个国家正通过抢夺新领土来扩张版图，并用显示着压迫与力量的标准化演习来威胁邻国安全。
In Europe, Russia annexed Crimea in the first instance of European irredentism since World War II and invaded eastern Ukraine. The Baltic states are rightly worried that Vladimir Putin may test NATO’s security commitment. In Asia, China has deftly pulled economic, legal and military levers to advance its expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and it has worked to erode U.S. alliances by driving wedges between Japan and South Korea while cozying up to other U.S. allies such as Thailand.
俄罗斯吞并克里米亚并且入侵东乌克兰是二战以来欧洲首个领土收复实例。波罗的海诸国无疑十分担心弗拉基米尔·普京将会检验检验北约对他们的安全承诺是否真的奏效。在亚洲，中国已经巧妙地操纵经济、法律和军事杠杆，推进其在南中国海日益膨胀的海权请求，它在讨好美国其他盟友如泰国的同时，已经通过离间日本和韩国之间关系来削弱美国的军事联盟。
The Economist recently suggested that “fortunately, there is scant evidence to support the idea of a global Chinese effort to upend the international order.” But this should provide little comfort. Historically, most revisionism has begun regionally — including Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries, and even Nazi Germany and imperial Japan in the 1930s. Global consequences came later. Rising powers usually care more about their neighborhoods than far-away continents.
有经济学家最近表示，“幸运的是，全球华人正在试图改变国际秩序观这一说法还没有足够的证据支持。”这只能聊以自慰罢了。从历史来看，大多数修正主义开始时多是区域性质的，包括19和20世纪俄罗斯，20世纪30年代的纳粹德国和日本军国主义，然后才有地区蔓延至全球。正在崛起的大国通常更在意其邻国而不是其他遥远的大陆。
Moreover, there is little solace in arguing that Russian and Chinese revisionism is self-defeating in the long run. From this perspective, the United States should be heartened that Putin’s Russia is in economic and demographic decline and that China’s assertiveness is merely tightening the coalition against it as Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam all seek closer military ties with the United States and one another.
我们有这样一种安慰自己的说法——从长远来看俄罗斯和中国的修正主义是自我毁灭。从这个角度，美国应该感到欣慰的是：普京的俄罗斯在经济和人口都在下降，中国的强硬使得反对他的集团——如澳大利亚，印度，日本，菲律宾和越南——更加团结，更加积极地寻求与美国和彼此之间的军事联合。
But even if such trends continue, isolated and anxious powers can be just as troublesome as confident ones — precisely because they believe time is not on their side. It doesn’t matter that Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping may be pursuing bad grand strategies: The costs of their mistakes will reverberate well beyond their borders, just as the world often paid a price for the follies of revisionists past.
但是即使趋势如此，被孤立的焦虑政权（注：指俄罗斯）和讨人厌的自负政权（注：指中国）只会认为时机不对。这并不干扰普京和中国主席习*近*平继续推行在邪恶的大策略：他们所犯的错误所带来的代价，其影响将将远远超出国界，就像世界以前为修正主义买单一样。
The good news is that, unlike Putin’s Russia, China is not committed or destined to a revisionist path. President Obama’s trip to Beijing this month demonstrated that it is possible to steer the relationship with China toward a more stable course — but it required the full attention of the U.S. government, including months of negotiations and shuttle diplomacy by Secretary of State John Kerry and national security adviser Susan Rice.
好消息是，和俄罗斯不同，中国还没有确定一定会走修正主义道路。奥巴马总统本月访问了北京，此举表明，将中美关系转向更稳定的阶段是有可能的——但是，对于谈判的月数和国务卿John Kerry和国家安全顾问Susan Rice的穿梭外交（注：穿梭外交指，短时间内穿梭于各方寻求达到目标的外交），美国政府应高度谨慎。
This is all the more reason Washington can ill afford another decade narrowly focused on battling insurgents and refereeing sectarian and tribal feuds in the Muslim world. Preventing the rise of revisionism will require different military, diplomatic and economic tools than those honed over 13 years of war and nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan.
这就使得华盛顿更加无法负担起又一个十年来勉强专注于打击穆斯林世界的叛乱分子，宗教裁定和部落纷争。防止修正主义的崛起需要不同的军事、外交和经济手段超过于在伊拉克和阿富汗13年的战争和国家建设。
Russia and China present distinct challenges. Russia is a declining power focused on the acquisition of land on a continent that has left nationalism behind. China is a rising power focused on expanding its maritime territory in a regional cauldron of nationalist sentiments. But in both cases the United States will have to focus its policies on maintaining peaceful competition. Obama’s playbook in China was right: Seek to expand areas of cooperation — such as climate change and trade — while pursuing military and diplomatic means to prevent and manage crises.
俄罗斯和中国呈现出不同的挑战。俄罗斯势力下滑集中于遗留民族主义的大陆所收购的国土上。中国势力的崛起则集中于领海范围扩大和在民族主义情感的大熔炉里。但是在这两种情况下美国不得不专注其政策于维护和平的竞争。奥巴马在中国的做法是正确的：试图扩大合作领域——诸如贸易与气候改变——从事军事和外交手段预防和管理危机。
But equally important will be committing resources to develop new military and economic approaches that better deter and punish revisionist moves. Sanctions have been the weapon of choice against Russia but have not succeeded in altering Putin’s ambitions. In addition to designing more sophisticated economic instruments, the United States must also rethink its approach to military deterrence — including tailoring responses to low-level provocations in the South and East China seas, providing assistance to non-allied governments such as Ukraine and Vietnam if they are excessively coerced, and shoring up U.S. alliances for tests that are surely coming, including deploying NATO troops to the Baltic states and repositioning forces in the Pacific.
但同样重要的是分配更多资源来发展威慑和惩罚的修正主义运动的新军事和经济策略。针对俄罗斯的武器制裁（注：可能指对乌克兰的武器援助）却没有成功地改变普京的野心。除了设计更复杂的经济制裁手段，美国还必须重新考虑它军事威慑策略——包括调整对中国南海和东海小规模挑衅的应对策略，为受压迫的非盟国政府如乌克兰和越南提供援助，当然，前提是它们能支持美国加紧部署军力以应对未来的挑战——包括在波罗的海国家和太平洋地区重新部署北约部队。
Complementing these military relationships, Washington should regard conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and its sister trade agreement in Europe as top priorities in order to renew U.S. economic leadership.
除了这些军事关系，华盛顿应该优先进行跨太平洋伙伴关系协议和它在欧洲的姊妹贸易协定，以恢复美国的经济领导地位。
Finally, rising to the revisionist challenge will require a degree of national strength that can be sustained only through a thriving economy, a powerful military, and a government and society that are admired by much of the world. This places a premium on improving domestic governance; leveraging America’s advantages in technology, immigration and energy; and enacting sustainable fiscal policies on revenue and entitlements.
最后，修正主义挑战的上升将需要一定程度上的国力它只能通过持续繁荣的经济，强有力的军事和一个被大部分世界所推崇的政府与社会。重视提高国内治理，扩充美国技术、移民和能力的优势、颁布税收和福利的可持续的财政政策。
The preservation of vital American interests in Asia and Europe is no longer guaranteed if the United States buries its head in the sands of the Middle East.
如果美国还把头埋在中东的沙漠中，美国在亚欧地区至关重要的利益就无法再得到保障了。
By Ely Ratner 和 Thomas Wright 十一月二十一日稿
Ely Ratner is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Thomas Wright is a fellow and director of the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution.
Ely Ratner在新美国安全中心亚太安全计划中担任项目副主任，同时也是一名资深研究员。Thomas Wright则为布鲁金斯学会国际秩序和策略项目主任和研究人员。
The unraveling of the Middle East under the weight of the Sunni-Shiite rivalry and the rise of the Islamic State is enough of a national security challenge to keep the United States busy for a decade or more. But with more and more American advisers on the ground in Iraq — and a steady stream of videotaped atrocities on the Internet — there is a risk that Washington will once again revert to a foreign policy focused disproportionately on that region.
逊尼派和什叶派穆斯林的争斗而导致的中东混乱局面和新伊斯兰国（ISIS）的的兴起，对于美国的国家安全已是巨大挑战，这已经够美国喝一壶的了。往前往伊拉克的美国安全顾问越来越多，但是网上的的暴力冲突视频却仍在源源不断的发布，也许华盛顿的对外政策再次错估了地区重要性
Yes, the United States maintains key interests in the Middle East: Israel’s security, nuclear nonproliferation, stable energy supplies and counterterrorism. But we cannot lose sight of the most significant challenge to American power and leadership in a quarter-century: China and Russia acting like revisionist powers, trying to undermine key elements of the existing international order, including territorial boundaries and long-standing security partnerships. If this challenge is left unchecked, the world could again be divided into spheres of influence, with an ever-present risk of conflict among the major powers.
诚然，美国在中东的核心利益依然需要维持：以色列的安全，防止核扩散，稳定的能源供应和反恐。但我们不能忽视在二十五年内对美国的实力和霸权最大的挑战：中国和俄罗斯正表现为修正主义，试图破坏现有的关键国际秩序，包括边界问题和长期安全伙伴关系。如果放任他们不管，世界又会重新被划分成各个势力范围，届时，大国之间的发生冲突的风险永远无法解决。
-------------译者：时间段基地-审核者：寒灯独夜人------------
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. foreign policy has assumed that major powers largely share common interests and threats — or that they will over time, as emerging powers integrate into the global economy. As a result, policymakers have regarded Asia and Europe as stable and self-sustaining regions relative to the scourge of dictatorship, failed states and transnational threats in the Middle East.
自苏联解体之后，美国外交政策的制定是建立在下列假设上的：各大国在很大程度上享有共同利益并面临同样的风险；亦或者随着时间的推移，他们将作为新兴力量融入全球经济中。因此，政策制定者把亚洲和欧洲视作稳定和独立自主的地区，与此形成对比的是饱受独裁祸害、拥有失败国家及跨国威胁的中东地区。
But the great lesson so far this century is that the U.S.-led order is neither as universally accepted nor as binding as many in Washington have assumed. After the global financial crisis threw American leadership into question, Russia and China have increasingly engaged in actions that reflect an attitude of zero-sum competition with the United States. With a mix of hubris and historical grievance, both are redrawing their regions’ maps by grabbing new territory and bullying their neighbors with calibrated exercises of coercion and force.
但迄今为止最大的教训便是由美国所主导的秩序既没有得到普遍认同，也不像美国政府所设想的那样具有约束力。经历全球经济危机后，美国的领导力受到了质疑，而俄罗斯与中国越来越多的动作也表明了要与美国进行零和竞争的态度。在傲慢的心态与历史屈辱感的共同驱使下，两个国家正通过抢夺新领土来扩张版图，并用显示着压迫与力量的标准化演习来威胁邻国安全。
In Europe, Russia annexed Crimea in the first instance of European irredentism since World War II and invaded eastern Ukraine. The Baltic states are rightly worried that Vladimir Putin may test NATO’s security commitment. In Asia, China has deftly pulled economic, legal and military levers to advance its expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and it has worked to erode U.S. alliances by driving wedges between Japan and South Korea while cozying up to other U.S. allies such as Thailand.
俄罗斯吞并克里米亚并且入侵东乌克兰是二战以来欧洲首个领土收复实例。波罗的海诸国无疑十分担心弗拉基米尔·普京将会检验检验北约对他们的安全承诺是否真的奏效。在亚洲，中国已经巧妙地操纵经济、法律和军事杠杆，推进其在南中国海日益膨胀的海权请求，它在讨好美国其他盟友如泰国的同时，已经通过离间日本和韩国之间关系来削弱美国的军事联盟。
The Economist recently suggested that “fortunately, there is scant evidence to support the idea of a global Chinese effort to upend the international order.” But this should provide little comfort. Historically, most revisionism has begun regionally — including Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries, and even Nazi Germany and imperial Japan in the 1930s. Global consequences came later. Rising powers usually care more about their neighborhoods than far-away continents.
有经济学家最近表示，“幸运的是，全球华人正在试图改变国际秩序观这一说法还没有足够的证据支持。”这只能聊以自慰罢了。从历史来看，大多数修正主义开始时多是区域性质的，包括19和20世纪俄罗斯，20世纪30年代的纳粹德国和日本军国主义，然后才有地区蔓延至全球。正在崛起的大国通常更在意其邻国而不是其他遥远的大陆。
Moreover, there is little solace in arguing that Russian and Chinese revisionism is self-defeating in the long run. From this perspective, the United States should be heartened that Putin’s Russia is in economic and demographic decline and that China’s assertiveness is merely tightening the coalition against it as Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam all seek closer military ties with the United States and one another.
我们有这样一种安慰自己的说法——从长远来看俄罗斯和中国的修正主义是自我毁灭。从这个角度，美国应该感到欣慰的是：普京的俄罗斯在经济和人口都在下降，中国的强硬使得反对他的集团——如澳大利亚，印度，日本，菲律宾和越南——更加团结，更加积极地寻求与美国和彼此之间的军事联合。
But even if such trends continue, isolated and anxious powers can be just as troublesome as confident ones — precisely because they believe time is not on their side. It doesn’t matter that Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping may be pursuing bad grand strategies: The costs of their mistakes will reverberate well beyond their borders, just as the world often paid a price for the follies of revisionists past.
但是即使趋势如此，被孤立的焦虑政权（注：指俄罗斯）和讨人厌的自负政权（注：指中国）只会认为时机不对。这并不干扰普京和中国主席习*近*平继续推行在邪恶的大策略：他们所犯的错误所带来的代价，其影响将将远远超出国界，就像世界以前为修正主义买单一样。
The good news is that, unlike Putin’s Russia, China is not committed or destined to a revisionist path. President Obama’s trip to Beijing this month demonstrated that it is possible to steer the relationship with China toward a more stable course — but it required the full attention of the U.S. government, including months of negotiations and shuttle diplomacy by Secretary of State John Kerry and national security adviser Susan Rice.
好消息是，和俄罗斯不同，中国还没有确定一定会走修正主义道路。奥巴马总统本月访问了北京，此举表明，将中美关系转向更稳定的阶段是有可能的——但是，对于谈判的月数和国务卿John Kerry和国家安全顾问Susan Rice的穿梭外交（注：穿梭外交指，短时间内穿梭于各方寻求达到目标的外交），美国政府应高度谨慎。
This is all the more reason Washington can ill afford another decade narrowly focused on battling insurgents and refereeing sectarian and tribal feuds in the Muslim world. Preventing the rise of revisionism will require different military, diplomatic and economic tools than those honed over 13 years of war and nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan.
这就使得华盛顿更加无法负担起又一个十年来勉强专注于打击穆斯林世界的叛乱分子，宗教裁定和部落纷争。防止修正主义的崛起需要不同的军事、外交和经济手段超过于在伊拉克和阿富汗13年的战争和国家建设。
Russia and China present distinct challenges. Russia is a declining power focused on the acquisition of land on a continent that has left nationalism behind. China is a rising power focused on expanding its maritime territory in a regional cauldron of nationalist sentiments. But in both cases the United States will have to focus its policies on maintaining peaceful competition. Obama’s playbook in China was right: Seek to expand areas of cooperation — such as climate change and trade — while pursuing military and diplomatic means to prevent and manage crises.
俄罗斯和中国呈现出不同的挑战。俄罗斯势力下滑集中于遗留民族主义的大陆所收购的国土上。中国势力的崛起则集中于领海范围扩大和在民族主义情感的大熔炉里。但是在这两种情况下美国不得不专注其政策于维护和平的竞争。奥巴马在中国的做法是正确的：试图扩大合作领域——诸如贸易与气候改变——从事军事和外交手段预防和管理危机。
But equally important will be committing resources to develop new military and economic approaches that better deter and punish revisionist moves. Sanctions have been the weapon of choice against Russia but have not succeeded in altering Putin’s ambitions. In addition to designing more sophisticated economic instruments, the United States must also rethink its approach to military deterrence — including tailoring responses to low-level provocations in the South and East China seas, providing assistance to non-allied governments such as Ukraine and Vietnam if they are excessively coerced, and shoring up U.S. alliances for tests that are surely coming, including deploying NATO troops to the Baltic states and repositioning forces in the Pacific.
但同样重要的是分配更多资源来发展威慑和惩罚的修正主义运动的新军事和经济策略。针对俄罗斯的武器制裁（注：可能指对乌克兰的武器援助）却没有成功地改变普京的野心。除了设计更复杂的经济制裁手段，美国还必须重新考虑它军事威慑策略——包括调整对中国南海和东海小规模挑衅的应对策略，为受压迫的非盟国政府如乌克兰和越南提供援助，当然，前提是它们能支持美国加紧部署军力以应对未来的挑战——包括在波罗的海国家和太平洋地区重新部署北约部队。
Complementing these military relationships, Washington should regard conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and its sister trade agreement in Europe as top priorities in order to renew U.S. economic leadership.
除了这些军事关系，华盛顿应该优先进行跨太平洋伙伴关系协议和它在欧洲的姊妹贸易协定，以恢复美国的经济领导地位。
Finally, rising to the revisionist challenge will require a degree of national strength that can be sustained only through a thriving economy, a powerful military, and a government and society that are admired by much of the world. This places a premium on improving domestic governance; leveraging America’s advantages in technology, immigration and energy; and enacting sustainable fiscal policies on revenue and entitlements.
最后，修正主义挑战的上升将需要一定程度上的国力它只能通过持续繁荣的经济，强有力的军事和一个被大部分世界所推崇的政府与社会。重视提高国内治理，扩充美国技术、移民和能力的优势、颁布税收和福利的可持续的财政政策。
The preservation of vital American interests in Asia and Europe is no longer guaranteed if the United States buries its head in the sands of the Middle East.
如果美国还把头埋在中东的沙漠中，美国在亚欧地区至关重要的利益就无法再得到保障了。By Ely Ratner and Thomas Wright November 21 译文来源:龙腾网
By Ely Ratner 和 Thomas Wright 十一月二十一日稿
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Ely Ratner is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Thomas Wright is a fellow and director of the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution.
Ely Ratner在新美国安全中心亚太安全计划中担任项目副主任，同时也是一名资深研究员。Thomas Wright则为布鲁金斯学会国际秩序和策略项目主任和研究人员。
The unraveling of the Middle East under the weight of the Sunni-Shiite rivalry and the rise of the Islamic State is enough of a national security challenge to keep the United States busy for a decade or more. But with more and more American advisers on the ground in Iraq — and a steady stream of videotaped atrocities on the Internet — there is a risk that Washington will once again revert to a foreign policy focused disproportionately on that region.
逊尼派和什叶派穆斯林的争斗而导致的中东混乱局面和新伊斯兰国（ISIS）的的兴起，对于美国的国家安全已是巨大挑战，这已经够美国喝一壶的了。往前往伊拉克的美国安全顾问越来越多，但是网上的的暴力冲突视频却仍在源源不断的发布，也许华盛顿的对外政策再次错估了地区重要性
Yes, the United States maintains key interests in the Middle East: Israel’s security, nuclear nonproliferation, stable energy supplies and counterterrorism. But we cannot lose sight of the most significant challenge to American power and leadership in a quarter-century: China and Russia acting like revisionist powers, trying to undermine key elements of the existing international order, including territorial boundaries and long-standing security partnerships. If this challenge is left unchecked, the world could again be divided into spheres of influence, with an ever-present risk of conflict among the major powers.
诚然，美国在中东的核心利益依然需要维持：以色列的安全，防止核扩散，稳定的能源供应和反恐。但我们不能忽视在二十五年内对美国的实力和霸权最大的挑战：中国和俄罗斯正表现为修正主义，试图破坏现有的关键国际秩序，包括边界问题和长期安全伙伴关系。如果放任他们不管，世界又会重新被划分成各个势力范围，届时，大国之间的发生冲突的风险永远无法解决。
-------------译者：时间段基地-审核者：寒灯独夜人------------
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. foreign policy has assumed that major powers largely share common interests and threats — or that they will over time, as emerging powers integrate into the global economy. As a result, policymakers have regarded Asia and Europe as stable and self-sustaining regions relative to the scourge of dictatorship, failed states and transnational threats in the Middle East.
自苏联解体之后，美国外交政策的制定是建立在下列假设上的：各大国在很大程度上享有共同利益并面临同样的风险；亦或者随着时间的推移，他们将作为新兴力量融入全球经济中。因此，政策制定者把亚洲和欧洲视作稳定和独立自主的地区，与此形成对比的是饱受独裁祸害、拥有失败国家及跨国威胁的中东地区。
But the great lesson so far this century is that the U.S.-led order is neither as universally accepted nor as binding as many in Washington have assumed. After the global financial crisis threw American leadership into question, Russia and China have increasingly engaged in actions that reflect an attitude of zero-sum competition with the United States. With a mix of hubris and historical grievance, both are redrawing their regions’ maps by grabbing new territory and bullying their neighbors with calibrated exercises of coercion and force.
但迄今为止最大的教训便是由美国所主导的秩序既没有得到普遍认同，也不像美国政府所设想的那样具有约束力。经历全球经济危机后，美国的领导力受到了质疑，而俄罗斯与中国越来越多的动作也表明了要与美国进行零和竞争的态度。在傲慢的心态与历史屈辱感的共同驱使下，两个国家正通过抢夺新领土来扩张版图，并用显示着压迫与力量的标准化演习来威胁邻国安全。
In Europe, Russia annexed Crimea in the first instance of European irredentism since World War II and invaded eastern Ukraine. The Baltic states are rightly worried that Vladimir Putin may test NATO’s security commitment. In Asia, China has deftly pulled economic, legal and military levers to advance its expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and it has worked to erode U.S. alliances by driving wedges between Japan and South Korea while cozying up to other U.S. allies such as Thailand.
俄罗斯吞并克里米亚并且入侵东乌克兰是二战以来欧洲首个领土收复实例。波罗的海诸国无疑十分担心弗拉基米尔·普京将会检验检验北约对他们的安全承诺是否真的奏效。在亚洲，中国已经巧妙地操纵经济、法律和军事杠杆，推进其在南中国海日益膨胀的海权请求，它在讨好美国其他盟友如泰国的同时，已经通过离间日本和韩国之间关系来削弱美国的军事联盟。
The Economist recently suggested that “fortunately, there is scant evidence to support the idea of a global Chinese effort to upend the international order.” But this should provide little comfort. Historically, most revisionism has begun regionally — including Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries, and even Nazi Germany and imperial Japan in the 1930s. Global consequences came later. Rising powers usually care more about their neighborhoods than far-away continents.
有经济学家最近表示，“幸运的是，全球华人正在试图改变国际秩序观这一说法还没有足够的证据支持。”这只能聊以自慰罢了。从历史来看，大多数修正主义开始时多是区域性质的，包括19和20世纪俄罗斯，20世纪30年代的纳粹德国和日本军国主义，然后才有地区蔓延至全球。正在崛起的大国通常更在意其邻国而不是其他遥远的大陆。
Moreover, there is little solace in arguing that Russian and Chinese revisionism is self-defeating in the long run. From this perspective, the United States should be heartened that Putin’s Russia is in economic and demographic decline and that China’s assertiveness is merely tightening the coalition against it as Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam all seek closer military ties with the United States and one another.
我们有这样一种安慰自己的说法——从长远来看俄罗斯和中国的修正主义是自我毁灭。从这个角度，美国应该感到欣慰的是：普京的俄罗斯在经济和人口都在下降，中国的强硬使得反对他的集团——如澳大利亚，印度，日本，菲律宾和越南——更加团结，更加积极地寻求与美国和彼此之间的军事联合。
But even if such trends continue, isolated and anxious powers can be just as troublesome as confident ones — precisely because they believe time is not on their side. It doesn’t matter that Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping may be pursuing bad grand strategies: The costs of their mistakes will reverberate well beyond their borders, just as the world often paid a price for the follies of revisionists past.
但是即使趋势如此，被孤立的焦虑政权（注：指俄罗斯）和讨人厌的自负政权（注：指中国）只会认为时机不对。这并不干扰普京和中国主席习*近*平继续推行在邪恶的大策略：他们所犯的错误所带来的代价，其影响将将远远超出国界，就像世界以前为修正主义买单一样。
The good news is that, unlike Putin’s Russia, China is not committed or destined to a revisionist path. President Obama’s trip to Beijing this month demonstrated that it is possible to steer the relationship with China toward a more stable course — but it required the full attention of the U.S. government, including months of negotiations and shuttle diplomacy by Secretary of State John Kerry and national security adviser Susan Rice.
好消息是，和俄罗斯不同，中国还没有确定一定会走修正主义道路。奥巴马总统本月访问了北京，此举表明，将中美关系转向更稳定的阶段是有可能的——但是，对于谈判的月数和国务卿John Kerry和国家安全顾问Susan Rice的穿梭外交（注：穿梭外交指，短时间内穿梭于各方寻求达到目标的外交），美国政府应高度谨慎。
This is all the more reason Washington can ill afford another decade narrowly focused on battling insurgents and refereeing sectarian and tribal feuds in the Muslim world. Preventing the rise of revisionism will require different military, diplomatic and economic tools than those honed over 13 years of war and nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan.
这就使得华盛顿更加无法负担起又一个十年来勉强专注于打击穆斯林世界的叛乱分子，宗教裁定和部落纷争。防止修正主义的崛起需要不同的军事、外交和经济手段超过于在伊拉克和阿富汗13年的战争和国家建设。
Russia and China present distinct challenges. Russia is a declining power focused on the acquisition of land on a continent that has left nationalism behind. China is a rising power focused on expanding its maritime territory in a regional cauldron of nationalist sentiments. But in both cases the United States will have to focus its policies on maintaining peaceful competition. Obama’s playbook in China was right: Seek to expand areas of cooperation — such as climate change and trade — while pursuing military and diplomatic means to prevent and manage crises.
俄罗斯和中国呈现出不同的挑战。俄罗斯势力下滑集中于遗留民族主义的大陆所收购的国土上。中国势力的崛起则集中于领海范围扩大和在民族主义情感的大熔炉里。但是在这两种情况下美国不得不专注其政策于维护和平的竞争。奥巴马在中国的做法是正确的：试图扩大合作领域——诸如贸易与气候改变——从事军事和外交手段预防和管理危机。
But equally important will be committing resources to develop new military and economic approaches that better deter and punish revisionist moves. Sanctions have been the weapon of choice against Russia but have not succeeded in altering Putin’s ambitions. In addition to designing more sophisticated economic instruments, the United States must also rethink its approach to military deterrence — including tailoring responses to low-level provocations in the South and East China seas, providing assistance to non-allied governments such as Ukraine and Vietnam if they are excessively coerced, and shoring up U.S. alliances for tests that are surely coming, including deploying NATO troops to the Baltic states and repositioning forces in the Pacific.
但同样重要的是分配更多资源来发展威慑和惩罚的修正主义运动的新军事和经济策略。针对俄罗斯的武器制裁（注：可能指对乌克兰的武器援助）却没有成功地改变普京的野心。除了设计更复杂的经济制裁手段，美国还必须重新考虑它军事威慑策略——包括调整对中国南海和东海小规模挑衅的应对策略，为受压迫的非盟国政府如乌克兰和越南提供援助，当然，前提是它们能支持美国加紧部署军力以应对未来的挑战——包括在波罗的海国家和太平洋地区重新部署北约部队。
Complementing these military relationships, Washington should regard conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and its sister trade agreement in Europe as top priorities in order to renew U.S. economic leadership.
除了这些军事关系，华盛顿应该优先进行跨太平洋伙伴关系协议和它在欧洲的姊妹贸易协定，以恢复美国的经济领导地位。
Finally, rising to the revisionist challenge will require a degree of national strength that can be sustained only through a thriving economy, a powerful military, and a government and society that are admired by much of the world. This places a premium on improving domestic governance; leveraging America’s advantages in technology, immigration and energy; and enacting sustainable fiscal policies on revenue and entitlements.
最后，修正主义挑战的上升将需要一定程度上的国力它只能通过持续繁荣的经济，强有力的军事和一个被大部分世界所推崇的政府与社会。重视提高国内治理，扩充美国技术、移民和能力的优势、颁布税收和福利的可持续的财政政策。
The preservation of vital American interests in Asia and Europe is no longer guaranteed if the United States buries its head in the sands of the Middle East.
如果美国还把头埋在中东的沙漠中，美国在亚欧地区至关重要的利益就无法再得到保障了。