G20峰会的话题很火,那我就给各位提供这次G20的声明原文 ...

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下面红字的公报关键部分的中文翻译

尽管不是最终目标,但下列指标将会被用作评估。
i 公共债务与财政赤字,私有债务与私有储蓄率。
ii 由于贸易与净投资收入的流动而造成的外部不平衡,同时对汇率,货币,财政和其他政策也给与适当考虑

小小评论一下:

第一条明摆着是冲美国去的。
第二条提到了汇率,但是用词很谨慎。tg的外交人员估计嘴皮也说破了。

-----------------------
以下是这次G20的公报原文

1. We, the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, met today to address ongoing economic and financial challenges and to agree on a way forward to fulfill the mandates given to us by our Leaders.

2. The global recovery is strengthening but is still uneven and downside risks remain. While most advanced economies are seeing modest growth and persisting high unemployment, emerging economies are experiencing more robust growth, some with signs of overheating. We reaffirm our willingness to ensure a consistent and coordinated response to the challenges we face, address the root causes of the crisis and restore global economic growth on a sounder basis.

3. We reaffirm our commitment to coordinated policy action by all G20 members to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth. Our main priority actions include implementing medium term fiscal consolidation plans differentiated according to national circumstances in line with our Toronto commitment, pursuing appropriate monetary policy, enhancing exchange rate flexibility to better reflect underlying economic fundamentals and structural reforms, to sustain global demand, increase potential growth, foster job creation and contribute to global rebalancing. We discussed progress made since the Seoul Summit and stressed the need to reduce excessive imbalances and maintain current account imbalances at sustainable levels by strengthening multilateral cooperation. We agreed on a set of indicators that will allow us to focus, through an integrated two-step process, on those persistently large imbalances which require policy actions. To complete the work required for the first step, our aim is to agree, by our next meeting in April, on indicative guidelines against which each of these indicators will be assessed, recognizing the need to take into account national or regional circumstances, including large commodity producers.

While not targets, these indicative guidelines will be used to assess the following indicators: (i) public debt and fiscal deficits; and private savings rate and private debt (ii) and the external imbalance composed of the trade balance and net investment income flows and transfers, taking due consideration of exchange rate, fiscal, monetary and other policies.

We also adopted a timetable for developing the 2011 action plan that will implement our Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth and monitor the commitments already made. As agreed in Seoul, we call on the IMF to provide an assessment as part of the Mutual Assessment Process on progress towards external sustainability and consistency of policies at our October meeting. At that time, we will also review a report on the MAP including an action plan informed by the analysis on the root causes of persistently large imbalances based on the agreed guidelines. We will also review an assessment of progress made in meeting commitments made in Seoul.

4. The international monetary system (IMS) has proven resilient, but vulnerabilities remain, which raise the need to improve it in order to ensure systemic stability, promote orderly adjustment, and avoid disruptive fluctuations in capital flows, disorderly movements in exchange rates -- including advanced economies with reserve currencies being vigilant against excess volatility -- and persistent misalignement of exchange rates. Today we agreed on a work program aimed at strengthening the functioning of the IMS, including through coherent approaches and measures to deal with potentially destabilizing capital flows, among which macro-prudential measures, mindful of possible drawbacks; and management of global liquidity to strengthen our capacity to prevent and deal with shocks, including issues such as Financial Safety Nets and the role of the SDR. This will also require discussions on exchange rates issues and on the strengthening of IMF surveillance. We look forward to discussing at our next meeting in April a report from the IMF on the strengthening of the IMS and reports by the World Bank and the RDBs building on experiences, on actions to strengthen local capital markets and domestic currency borrowing in emerging and developing economies. In addition, we will benefit from the work of OECD on capital flows, and from the contributions of other relevant international organizations, such as UNCTAD.

5. We discussed concerns about consequences of potential excessive commodity price volatility and asked our deputies to work with international organizations and to report back to us on the underlying drivers and the challenges posed by these trends for both consumers and producers and consider possible actions. Keeping in mind the impact of this volatility on food security, we reiterated the need for long-term investment in the agricultural sector in developing countries. We welcomed the interim report by the IEF, IEA and OPEC to improve the quality, timeliness and reliability of the Joint Organization Data Initiative Oil (JODI oil) and call for further work on strategies to implement these recommendations to be detailed in their final report. Building on the Riyadh symposium held on January 24th, we encourage the IEF to provide concrete strategies to improve the producer-consumer dialogue at its next meeting on February 22nd 2011. Following our Leaders' request, we call on the IMF and IEF, as well as IEA, GECF and OPEC, to develop by October 2011 concrete recommendations to extend the G20's work on oil price volatility to gas and coal. We look forward to discussing at our next meeting the report of IEF, IEA, OPEC and IOSCO on price reporting agencies as well as the interim report on food security currently being undertaken by the relevant international organizations, and IOSCO's recommendations, and the FSB's consideration of next steps, on regulation and supervision of commodity derivatives markets notably to strengthen transparency and address market abuses.

6. We commit to pursuing the reform of the financial sector. Despite good progress, significant work remains. We will implement fully the Basel III new standards for banks within the agreed timelines while taking due account of the agreed observation periods and review clauses in respect of the liquidity standards. Likewise, we will implement in an internationally consistent and non-discriminatory way the FSB's recommendations on OTC derivatives and on reducing reliance on credit rating agencies' ratings. We look forward to the completion by the next Leaders' Summit of the following ongoing work on systemically important financial institutions as scheduled in the FSB work program for 2011: determination of Global-systemically important financial institutions by FSB and national authorities based on indicative criteria, a comprehensive multi-pronged framework with more intensive supervisory oversight; effective resolution capacity including in a cross-border context; higher loss absorbency measures through a menu of viable alternatives that may include, depending on national circumstances, capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in instruments ; and other supplementary requirements as determined by the national authorities including systemic levies. Once the framework initially applicable to G-SIFIs is agreed, we will move expeditiously to cover all SIFIs. We look forward to the 2 reports to be finalized by the BIS, IMF and FSB on macro-prudential frameworks and by the FSB, IMF and World Bank with input of national authorities on financial stability issues in emerging market and developing economies by our October meeting. We look forward to the recommendations that the FSB will prepare by mid-2011 on regulation and oversight of the shadow banking system to efficiently address the risks, notably of arbitrage, associated with shadow banking and its interactions with the regulated banking system. We call on IOSCO to develop by mid-2011 recommendations to promote markets' integrity and efficiency notably to mitigate the risks created by the latest technological developments. We also call on the FSB to bring forward for our next meeting comprehensive proposals to strengthen its governance, resources and outreach. We urge all jurisdictions to fully implement the FSB principles and standards on sounder compensation practices agreed by the G20 Leaders in Pittsburgh and call on the FSB to undertake ongoing monitoring in this area and look forward to receiving the results of a second thorough FSB peer review midyear to identify remaining gaps. We call on the OECD, the FSB and other relevant international organizations to develop common principles on consumer protection in the field of financial services by our October meeting. We reaffirm our commitment to more effective oversight and supervision, including regular stress testing of banks building on the Basel committee's principles.

下面红字的公报关键部分的中文翻译

尽管不是最终目标,但下列指标将会被用作评估。
i 公共债务与财政赤字,私有债务与私有储蓄率。
ii 由于贸易与净投资收入的流动而造成的外部不平衡,同时对汇率,货币,财政和其他政策也给与适当考虑

小小评论一下:

第一条明摆着是冲美国去的。
第二条提到了汇率,但是用词很谨慎。tg的外交人员估计嘴皮也说破了。

-----------------------
以下是这次G20的公报原文

1. We, the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, met today to address ongoing economic and financial challenges and to agree on a way forward to fulfill the mandates given to us by our Leaders.

2. The global recovery is strengthening but is still uneven and downside risks remain. While most advanced economies are seeing modest growth and persisting high unemployment, emerging economies are experiencing more robust growth, some with signs of overheating. We reaffirm our willingness to ensure a consistent and coordinated response to the challenges we face, address the root causes of the crisis and restore global economic growth on a sounder basis.

3. We reaffirm our commitment to coordinated policy action by all G20 members to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth. Our main priority actions include implementing medium term fiscal consolidation plans differentiated according to national circumstances in line with our Toronto commitment, pursuing appropriate monetary policy, enhancing exchange rate flexibility to better reflect underlying economic fundamentals and structural reforms, to sustain global demand, increase potential growth, foster job creation and contribute to global rebalancing. We discussed progress made since the Seoul Summit and stressed the need to reduce excessive imbalances and maintain current account imbalances at sustainable levels by strengthening multilateral cooperation. We agreed on a set of indicators that will allow us to focus, through an integrated two-step process, on those persistently large imbalances which require policy actions. To complete the work required for the first step, our aim is to agree, by our next meeting in April, on indicative guidelines against which each of these indicators will be assessed, recognizing the need to take into account national or regional circumstances, including large commodity producers.

While not targets, these indicative guidelines will be used to assess the following indicators: (i) public debt and fiscal deficits; and private savings rate and private debt (ii) and the external imbalance composed of the trade balance and net investment income flows and transfers, taking due consideration of exchange rate, fiscal, monetary and other policies.

We also adopted a timetable for developing the 2011 action plan that will implement our Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth and monitor the commitments already made. As agreed in Seoul, we call on the IMF to provide an assessment as part of the Mutual Assessment Process on progress towards external sustainability and consistency of policies at our October meeting. At that time, we will also review a report on the MAP including an action plan informed by the analysis on the root causes of persistently large imbalances based on the agreed guidelines. We will also review an assessment of progress made in meeting commitments made in Seoul.

4. The international monetary system (IMS) has proven resilient, but vulnerabilities remain, which raise the need to improve it in order to ensure systemic stability, promote orderly adjustment, and avoid disruptive fluctuations in capital flows, disorderly movements in exchange rates -- including advanced economies with reserve currencies being vigilant against excess volatility -- and persistent misalignement of exchange rates. Today we agreed on a work program aimed at strengthening the functioning of the IMS, including through coherent approaches and measures to deal with potentially destabilizing capital flows, among which macro-prudential measures, mindful of possible drawbacks; and management of global liquidity to strengthen our capacity to prevent and deal with shocks, including issues such as Financial Safety Nets and the role of the SDR. This will also require discussions on exchange rates issues and on the strengthening of IMF surveillance. We look forward to discussing at our next meeting in April a report from the IMF on the strengthening of the IMS and reports by the World Bank and the RDBs building on experiences, on actions to strengthen local capital markets and domestic currency borrowing in emerging and developing economies. In addition, we will benefit from the work of OECD on capital flows, and from the contributions of other relevant international organizations, such as UNCTAD.

5. We discussed concerns about consequences of potential excessive commodity price volatility and asked our deputies to work with international organizations and to report back to us on the underlying drivers and the challenges posed by these trends for both consumers and producers and consider possible actions. Keeping in mind the impact of this volatility on food security, we reiterated the need for long-term investment in the agricultural sector in developing countries. We welcomed the interim report by the IEF, IEA and OPEC to improve the quality, timeliness and reliability of the Joint Organization Data Initiative Oil (JODI oil) and call for further work on strategies to implement these recommendations to be detailed in their final report. Building on the Riyadh symposium held on January 24th, we encourage the IEF to provide concrete strategies to improve the producer-consumer dialogue at its next meeting on February 22nd 2011. Following our Leaders' request, we call on the IMF and IEF, as well as IEA, GECF and OPEC, to develop by October 2011 concrete recommendations to extend the G20's work on oil price volatility to gas and coal. We look forward to discussing at our next meeting the report of IEF, IEA, OPEC and IOSCO on price reporting agencies as well as the interim report on food security currently being undertaken by the relevant international organizations, and IOSCO's recommendations, and the FSB's consideration of next steps, on regulation and supervision of commodity derivatives markets notably to strengthen transparency and address market abuses.

6. We commit to pursuing the reform of the financial sector. Despite good progress, significant work remains. We will implement fully the Basel III new standards for banks within the agreed timelines while taking due account of the agreed observation periods and review clauses in respect of the liquidity standards. Likewise, we will implement in an internationally consistent and non-discriminatory way the FSB's recommendations on OTC derivatives and on reducing reliance on credit rating agencies' ratings. We look forward to the completion by the next Leaders' Summit of the following ongoing work on systemically important financial institutions as scheduled in the FSB work program for 2011: determination of Global-systemically important financial institutions by FSB and national authorities based on indicative criteria, a comprehensive multi-pronged framework with more intensive supervisory oversight; effective resolution capacity including in a cross-border context; higher loss absorbency measures through a menu of viable alternatives that may include, depending on national circumstances, capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in instruments ; and other supplementary requirements as determined by the national authorities including systemic levies. Once the framework initially applicable to G-SIFIs is agreed, we will move expeditiously to cover all SIFIs. We look forward to the 2 reports to be finalized by the BIS, IMF and FSB on macro-prudential frameworks and by the FSB, IMF and World Bank with input of national authorities on financial stability issues in emerging market and developing economies by our October meeting. We look forward to the recommendations that the FSB will prepare by mid-2011 on regulation and oversight of the shadow banking system to efficiently address the risks, notably of arbitrage, associated with shadow banking and its interactions with the regulated banking system. We call on IOSCO to develop by mid-2011 recommendations to promote markets' integrity and efficiency notably to mitigate the risks created by the latest technological developments. We also call on the FSB to bring forward for our next meeting comprehensive proposals to strengthen its governance, resources and outreach. We urge all jurisdictions to fully implement the FSB principles and standards on sounder compensation practices agreed by the G20 Leaders in Pittsburgh and call on the FSB to undertake ongoing monitoring in this area and look forward to receiving the results of a second thorough FSB peer review midyear to identify remaining gaps. We call on the OECD, the FSB and other relevant international organizations to develop common principles on consumer protection in the field of financial services by our October meeting. We reaffirm our commitment to more effective oversight and supervision, including regular stress testing of banks building on the Basel committee's principles.
好吧,我还是没看明白。。。
标准拼音 发表于 2011-2-22 10:13
{:jian:}, 你说对了,红色那段的第一句,老美自己人也看的很晕,骂起草的人当初中学英语没及格。
heavenstar_x 发表于 2011-2-22 10:18


    各打三十大板,但是都不重
不过这下奥黑不好受了,本来茶党要求削减预算就和执政党冲突就很严重,现在一来茶党不大叫才怪
看不明白的求解读
984343 发表于 2011-2-22 10:24

英文八股不比党八股差吧,:D

解读在此,http://lt.cjdby.net/thread-1076379-1-1.html
这。。。


我个人认为:各打三十大板
G19强烈要求美国解决自己的借债和赤字问题(但是没有强制力,所以看美国自己两党扯皮,不大可能真的解决问题)
同时隐晦的提了提顺差问题(美国人肯定施加了压力,但是在这方面所有新兴国家都不答应,同时土鳖什么时候认真执行过没有约束力的条约....)
总体来说:没用,大家该咋地就咋地。不过人民币升值是肯定免不了的,因为提振内需不仅是G20会议的要求,也是土鳖的基本国策;同时对奥黑及其后继者是不是有魄力让美国人暂时过苦日子不抱多大期待

我个人认为:各打三十大板
G19强烈要求美国解决自己的借债和赤字问题(但是没有强制力,所以看美国自己两党扯皮,不大可能真的解决问题)
同时隐晦的提了提顺差问题(美国人肯定施加了压力,但是在这方面所有新兴国家都不答应,同时土鳖什么时候认真执行过没有约束力的条约....)
总体来说:没用,大家该咋地就咋地。不过人民币升值是肯定免不了的,因为提振内需不仅是G20会议的要求,也是土鳖的基本国策;同时对奥黑及其后继者是不是有魄力让美国人暂时过苦日子不抱多大期待
因为政府的资源非常有限,在市场价格方面是有心无力的——这是以美国为首的世界各大主要工业国在东南亚经济危机后,为自己的不作为辩解的主要原因之一。
  即使是在20世纪80年代,相对于国际货币市场上的巨大交易额来说,参与“广场协议”的五国政府所能调用来执行公开操作的资金也是极其有限的,几乎“一眨眼就会被市场吞掉”。用经济学泰斗萨缪尔森的经典比喻来说,正如“人类最伟大的王,也无力改变大海中的洋流”一样,政府也不能随心所欲地干预国际货币市场。
  更何况,与会五国在“广场协议”上所承诺的种种政策,特别是与国内金融、财政政策挂钩的那些措施,其实也没有得到实质性的贯彻和实施。
邪恶的G-2