超级军网民国期间鸦片和政治的微妙关系
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/25 19:31:44
节录翻译于：Opium and the Politics of Gangsterism in Nationalist China, 1927-1945.
Contributors: Jonathan Marshall - author.
Publication Year: 1976
一些西方观察员敏锐地看到在中国根除鸦片真正的困难，南京政府一面在舆论上谴责外国势力在中国的麻醉品问题，一面公开在这方面盘剥自己的人民，这些情况使他们沮丧
。H. G. W. Woodhead，一个精明的中国政治观察家，用他一贯保守的陈述做出评论：
相当惊奇地在同一个上午在新闻报纸上读到来自一个中国通讯社的报道，这个报道陈述道：中国本年度总共有204个鸦片商被处死，目前国内大约有 30,000,000个鸦片和毒品
成瘾者。一个在广西百色的记者描述满载1,800,000盎司鸦片的商队的到来。在鸦片通过摩托艇运送到南宁或更远的地方前，这些它们被储存在鸦片稽查局的办公室里，直到支付必
须的税款。
美国官员忧虑到，世界上90％的鸦片在中国种植，他们尤其不满民族主义国家的政策。一些国务院官员很少意识到正在对美国的毒品输入比鸦片贸易更能降低中国吸收美国货
物的潜力。O. Edmund Clubb当时是驻中国事务处的一个官员，反对蒋介石用鸦片贸易来促进他纳粹式独裁的意图。Clubb和他在汉口的同僚亚当斯都强调鸦片交易在中国政治中严
重恶化的影响。亚当斯甚至指责蒋介石破坏反鸦片法，说蒋不仅仅是为了军费开支，倒不如说是为了个人的谋利。
早在1935年一个对中国毒品状况的研究，这个研究由一个叫Joseph Stilwel的不引人注目的美国军事附属机构写出，他们证实了这些观点。Stilwell估计一半的人“经常地或
偶尔地带有毒品”，五个人中至少有一个滥用毒品。（另外一个估计是，有7百万到7千万的瘾君子。）大量使用毒品使人身体衰弱，但Stilwell看到一些普遍的、险恶的结果：“
导致对工作冷淡，无积极的思想和雄心，加上毒品导致的身体行为习惯，根据吸食的程度，越来越多的受害者的社会价值趋于降低。”另外，鸦片交易占用很多有生产价值的经济
领域的资源。大量的中国人从事种植、运输和销售鸦片。因此，当蒋介石打破独立的四川鸦片生产的时候，仅仅在重庆和成都就2万人被迫失业
这些情况没有妨碍蒋的举措。在1935年5月29日，他废除鸦片缉查委员会，自己任鸦片缉查负责人。一个美国外交官评论：“这个改变为了简单化管理，当然也给总司令带来更
大的权力。”最少这个改变使一些事情简单化：“与禁止鸦片工作有关的人表示，当其他部门公布鸦片种植和税收规定时，很难成立一个禁鸦片部门。”裁减委员会的头头J. Heng
Liu成了卫生部门的主管。旧的禁鸦片规定被废除，“禁鸦”官员公开谈论他们的职责是为政府实现更多的鸦片税。甚至蒋要扩大他的独裁时，面临着一个新的竞争对手：日本。
Stilwell如此描述被日本人渗透的华北地区：一个辽阔的罂粟之地。便宜的日本麻醉品在天津和满州里生产，威胁着蒋的鸦片计划。
早在1935年10月，蒋派一个使者到天津，去为一个禁鸦委员会打下基础工作，这个委员会将登记所有鸦片成瘾或吸食者（和从他们身上收取费用）。1935年12月工作朝官方垄
断方向加速进行，当时政府通告，秘密的鸦片交易将通过在所有输送关口的收税和鸦片强行存储在公共仓库的方式来抑制。地方的垄断商预计仅在天津一地就开放不少于50个官方
代销商，他们以“用税收方式禁止”为幌子运作。
虽然广西自己也生产少量鸦片，但通过对从云南、贵州到广东这个华南的主要市场的鸦片在他们广阔的道路系统上运输的税收，他们收获相当多的税款。这个交易占三成到一
半的政府税收。一个美国情报报告阐述鸦片在广西与云南的关系中扮演的角色：
1930年，因为广西和云南之间敌对关系的原因，云南的军政首脑龙云将军禁止云南的鸦片对广西输出。接下来的日子里，广西的省财政大大受影响，他们很快就难以承受这种
局面。最后广西的当权者意识到和云南达成谅解的必要性。广西当局要求前广西军总司令Lu Tao将军前往云南商谈两省休战的事宜。通过 Lu Tao有效的呼吁和灵活的策略，在广西
方面许诺解散在广西寻求避难的云南叛军Hu Tze Chia将军的军队的前提下，云南的龙云将军同意通过广西输出鸦片。这次要求得到实现后，云南继续通过广西输出鸦片，这成为广
西的主要税收来源
西南政治派系由白和李领导，他们的力量源泉不仅仅因为远离南京，还来自相对稳定的鸦片税收。巨大、独立广东鸦片市场的存在，以及附近的地区妨碍着蒋介石对派系的消
灭。当共CD被迫离开江西，开始他们向西进入贵州的长征的时候，1935年春蒋看到他的机会来了。尽管贵州军阀努力获取广西和广东势力的支持，但蒋还是抓住这个理由派驻他的
军队进贵州，迫使他们进行对蒋有利的省政府和鸦片垄断改组。省主席王家烈将军受到蒋介石军队的压制而率部朝广西南逃。
为报复过去几年广西对蒋介石的强硬敌对，蒋意图通过转移贵州鸦片南方运输的中继线来迫使广西屈服。因为广西税收几乎单独依赖来自云南、贵州的鸦片借道到华南口岸运
输的过路税收。蒋介石的举措就税收而言大大地妨碍了广西省政府。因此广西与王嘉列将军的队伍联合反对中央政府。可以看到，如果蒋将继续封锁鸦片通过广西，蒋、桂军之间
的战争冲突将发生。 蒋派他信任的使者Li Zhong-gong（贵州人）去计划省的鸦片专营。在蒋介石的军队占领贵州后，Li成为财政专员，处理鸦片税收。在李的负责下，南京政府
命令贵州鸦片改道向北到长江（船运到汉口），而不是经过广西。他们还给云南施压，要他们照做。如Joseph Stilwell报告一样，“他们这样做，意图通过减少税收来源使广州更
容易屈服。结果非常成功。”广西开始陷入经济危机。
如果没有对云南鸦片输出的控制，蒋介石的杠杆作用究竟是有限的。当他们与云南本身的利益相冲突的时候，蒋对龙云主席的命令作用不大。因此，云南的鸦片专营在1935年
早期违反蒋明确的命令，安排鸦片“大量装运”通过广西，还在他们的库存里积累了上百万盎司的货，如果这些货通过广西输出，必定削弱蒋的计划。
蒋总司令试图通过提供可选择的有利可图的运输路线和鸦片市场与云南联盟。1935年春，当蒋的军队占领贵州的时候，南京政府开始大量的公路建设计划―――不仅是用来打
击共CD，就象一个驻云南的外交官阐述的那样： 有报告说，他们利用军事劳力修筑从贵阳到四川、云南和湖南的公路。显然蒋介石急于尽快完成云南、贵州、湖南的公路。东部的
终点站是成都。在湘东连接还未完工的汉－广铁路。它将为云南到汉口、广州消费中心的鸦片运输提供一条新的便利道路。它也将因而使他们完全避免经过广西，南京将得以对至
今还对抗中央的省份施加相当的压力，那些省份足足50％的税收来自道路经过税收，这些税收通过扣押来自云南、贵州的鸦片货物获取。
蒋介石在1935年秋天完成云南到贵州的公路。然而，不为这个总司令所知的是，贵州开始对云南的商队收取高额税收，云南当局在那条路上根本无利可图。广西得知这种情况
，就秘密与云南商谈，通过大大减少他们的通过税来吸引南生公司（负责云南官方的鸦片输出）改变他们的运输路线。当蒋介石闻知两省签署了协约，威胁到他所有的计划，他解
除了Li Zhong-gong财政专员的职务。不久又开始施压。
尽管广西继续在贵州九个他们控制的县中收到一些鸦片，“这个数量大大少于之前广西、广东在这方面的巨大损失，”一个美国麻醉品专家在1936年中记录道：“这是事实，
鸦片税在广东、广西和南京之间扮演着重要的角色。”广东军阀在1936年7月垮台，其后不久广西方面作出让步。
蒋介石成功地通过他的“鸦片封锁”在财政上扼死了华南军阀。1936年广西反叛的失败部分地反映了西南军阀的走投无路。从这点看，南京同时对鸦片交易和华中、华南政治
进行了控制。节录翻译于：Opium and the Politics of Gangsterism in Nationalist China, 1927-1945.
Contributors: Jonathan Marshall - author.
Publication Year: 1976
一些西方观察员敏锐地看到在中国根除鸦片真正的困难，南京政府一面在舆论上谴责外国势力在中国的麻醉品问题，一面公开在这方面盘剥自己的人民，这些情况使他们沮丧
。H. G. W. Woodhead，一个精明的中国政治观察家，用他一贯保守的陈述做出评论：
相当惊奇地在同一个上午在新闻报纸上读到来自一个中国通讯社的报道，这个报道陈述道：中国本年度总共有204个鸦片商被处死，目前国内大约有 30,000,000个鸦片和毒品
成瘾者。一个在广西百色的记者描述满载1,800,000盎司鸦片的商队的到来。在鸦片通过摩托艇运送到南宁或更远的地方前，这些它们被储存在鸦片稽查局的办公室里，直到支付必
须的税款。
美国官员忧虑到，世界上90％的鸦片在中国种植，他们尤其不满民族主义国家的政策。一些国务院官员很少意识到正在对美国的毒品输入比鸦片贸易更能降低中国吸收美国货
物的潜力。O. Edmund Clubb当时是驻中国事务处的一个官员，反对蒋介石用鸦片贸易来促进他纳粹式独裁的意图。Clubb和他在汉口的同僚亚当斯都强调鸦片交易在中国政治中严
重恶化的影响。亚当斯甚至指责蒋介石破坏反鸦片法，说蒋不仅仅是为了军费开支，倒不如说是为了个人的谋利。
早在1935年一个对中国毒品状况的研究，这个研究由一个叫Joseph Stilwel的不引人注目的美国军事附属机构写出，他们证实了这些观点。Stilwell估计一半的人“经常地或
偶尔地带有毒品”，五个人中至少有一个滥用毒品。（另外一个估计是，有7百万到7千万的瘾君子。）大量使用毒品使人身体衰弱，但Stilwell看到一些普遍的、险恶的结果：“
导致对工作冷淡，无积极的思想和雄心，加上毒品导致的身体行为习惯，根据吸食的程度，越来越多的受害者的社会价值趋于降低。”另外，鸦片交易占用很多有生产价值的经济
领域的资源。大量的中国人从事种植、运输和销售鸦片。因此，当蒋介石打破独立的四川鸦片生产的时候，仅仅在重庆和成都就2万人被迫失业
这些情况没有妨碍蒋的举措。在1935年5月29日，他废除鸦片缉查委员会，自己任鸦片缉查负责人。一个美国外交官评论：“这个改变为了简单化管理，当然也给总司令带来更
大的权力。”最少这个改变使一些事情简单化：“与禁止鸦片工作有关的人表示，当其他部门公布鸦片种植和税收规定时，很难成立一个禁鸦片部门。”裁减委员会的头头J. Heng
Liu成了卫生部门的主管。旧的禁鸦片规定被废除，“禁鸦”官员公开谈论他们的职责是为政府实现更多的鸦片税。甚至蒋要扩大他的独裁时，面临着一个新的竞争对手：日本。
Stilwell如此描述被日本人渗透的华北地区：一个辽阔的罂粟之地。便宜的日本麻醉品在天津和满州里生产，威胁着蒋的鸦片计划。
早在1935年10月，蒋派一个使者到天津，去为一个禁鸦委员会打下基础工作，这个委员会将登记所有鸦片成瘾或吸食者（和从他们身上收取费用）。1935年12月工作朝官方垄
断方向加速进行，当时政府通告，秘密的鸦片交易将通过在所有输送关口的收税和鸦片强行存储在公共仓库的方式来抑制。地方的垄断商预计仅在天津一地就开放不少于50个官方
代销商，他们以“用税收方式禁止”为幌子运作。
虽然广西自己也生产少量鸦片，但通过对从云南、贵州到广东这个华南的主要市场的鸦片在他们广阔的道路系统上运输的税收，他们收获相当多的税款。这个交易占三成到一
半的政府税收。一个美国情报报告阐述鸦片在广西与云南的关系中扮演的角色：
1930年，因为广西和云南之间敌对关系的原因，云南的军政首脑龙云将军禁止云南的鸦片对广西输出。接下来的日子里，广西的省财政大大受影响，他们很快就难以承受这种
局面。最后广西的当权者意识到和云南达成谅解的必要性。广西当局要求前广西军总司令Lu Tao将军前往云南商谈两省休战的事宜。通过 Lu Tao有效的呼吁和灵活的策略，在广西
方面许诺解散在广西寻求避难的云南叛军Hu Tze Chia将军的军队的前提下，云南的龙云将军同意通过广西输出鸦片。这次要求得到实现后，云南继续通过广西输出鸦片，这成为广
西的主要税收来源
西南政治派系由白和李领导，他们的力量源泉不仅仅因为远离南京，还来自相对稳定的鸦片税收。巨大、独立广东鸦片市场的存在，以及附近的地区妨碍着蒋介石对派系的消
灭。当共CD被迫离开江西，开始他们向西进入贵州的长征的时候，1935年春蒋看到他的机会来了。尽管贵州军阀努力获取广西和广东势力的支持，但蒋还是抓住这个理由派驻他的
军队进贵州，迫使他们进行对蒋有利的省政府和鸦片垄断改组。省主席王家烈将军受到蒋介石军队的压制而率部朝广西南逃。
为报复过去几年广西对蒋介石的强硬敌对，蒋意图通过转移贵州鸦片南方运输的中继线来迫使广西屈服。因为广西税收几乎单独依赖来自云南、贵州的鸦片借道到华南口岸运
输的过路税收。蒋介石的举措就税收而言大大地妨碍了广西省政府。因此广西与王嘉列将军的队伍联合反对中央政府。可以看到，如果蒋将继续封锁鸦片通过广西，蒋、桂军之间
的战争冲突将发生。 蒋派他信任的使者Li Zhong-gong（贵州人）去计划省的鸦片专营。在蒋介石的军队占领贵州后，Li成为财政专员，处理鸦片税收。在李的负责下，南京政府
命令贵州鸦片改道向北到长江（船运到汉口），而不是经过广西。他们还给云南施压，要他们照做。如Joseph Stilwell报告一样，“他们这样做，意图通过减少税收来源使广州更
容易屈服。结果非常成功。”广西开始陷入经济危机。
如果没有对云南鸦片输出的控制，蒋介石的杠杆作用究竟是有限的。当他们与云南本身的利益相冲突的时候，蒋对龙云主席的命令作用不大。因此，云南的鸦片专营在1935年
早期违反蒋明确的命令，安排鸦片“大量装运”通过广西，还在他们的库存里积累了上百万盎司的货，如果这些货通过广西输出，必定削弱蒋的计划。
蒋总司令试图通过提供可选择的有利可图的运输路线和鸦片市场与云南联盟。1935年春，当蒋的军队占领贵州的时候，南京政府开始大量的公路建设计划―――不仅是用来打
击共CD，就象一个驻云南的外交官阐述的那样： 有报告说，他们利用军事劳力修筑从贵阳到四川、云南和湖南的公路。显然蒋介石急于尽快完成云南、贵州、湖南的公路。东部的
终点站是成都。在湘东连接还未完工的汉－广铁路。它将为云南到汉口、广州消费中心的鸦片运输提供一条新的便利道路。它也将因而使他们完全避免经过广西，南京将得以对至
今还对抗中央的省份施加相当的压力，那些省份足足50％的税收来自道路经过税收，这些税收通过扣押来自云南、贵州的鸦片货物获取。
蒋介石在1935年秋天完成云南到贵州的公路。然而，不为这个总司令所知的是，贵州开始对云南的商队收取高额税收，云南当局在那条路上根本无利可图。广西得知这种情况
，就秘密与云南商谈，通过大大减少他们的通过税来吸引南生公司（负责云南官方的鸦片输出）改变他们的运输路线。当蒋介石闻知两省签署了协约，威胁到他所有的计划，他解
除了Li Zhong-gong财政专员的职务。不久又开始施压。
尽管广西继续在贵州九个他们控制的县中收到一些鸦片，“这个数量大大少于之前广西、广东在这方面的巨大损失，”一个美国麻醉品专家在1936年中记录道：“这是事实，
鸦片税在广东、广西和南京之间扮演着重要的角色。”广东军阀在1936年7月垮台，其后不久广西方面作出让步。
蒋介石成功地通过他的“鸦片封锁”在财政上扼死了华南军阀。1936年广西反叛的失败部分地反映了西南军阀的走投无路。从这点看，南京同时对鸦片交易和华中、华南政治
进行了控制。
Contributors: Jonathan Marshall - author.
Publication Year: 1976
一些西方观察员敏锐地看到在中国根除鸦片真正的困难，南京政府一面在舆论上谴责外国势力在中国的麻醉品问题，一面公开在这方面盘剥自己的人民，这些情况使他们沮丧
。H. G. W. Woodhead，一个精明的中国政治观察家，用他一贯保守的陈述做出评论：
相当惊奇地在同一个上午在新闻报纸上读到来自一个中国通讯社的报道，这个报道陈述道：中国本年度总共有204个鸦片商被处死，目前国内大约有 30,000,000个鸦片和毒品
成瘾者。一个在广西百色的记者描述满载1,800,000盎司鸦片的商队的到来。在鸦片通过摩托艇运送到南宁或更远的地方前，这些它们被储存在鸦片稽查局的办公室里，直到支付必
须的税款。
美国官员忧虑到，世界上90％的鸦片在中国种植，他们尤其不满民族主义国家的政策。一些国务院官员很少意识到正在对美国的毒品输入比鸦片贸易更能降低中国吸收美国货
物的潜力。O. Edmund Clubb当时是驻中国事务处的一个官员，反对蒋介石用鸦片贸易来促进他纳粹式独裁的意图。Clubb和他在汉口的同僚亚当斯都强调鸦片交易在中国政治中严
重恶化的影响。亚当斯甚至指责蒋介石破坏反鸦片法，说蒋不仅仅是为了军费开支，倒不如说是为了个人的谋利。
早在1935年一个对中国毒品状况的研究，这个研究由一个叫Joseph Stilwel的不引人注目的美国军事附属机构写出，他们证实了这些观点。Stilwell估计一半的人“经常地或
偶尔地带有毒品”，五个人中至少有一个滥用毒品。（另外一个估计是，有7百万到7千万的瘾君子。）大量使用毒品使人身体衰弱，但Stilwell看到一些普遍的、险恶的结果：“
导致对工作冷淡，无积极的思想和雄心，加上毒品导致的身体行为习惯，根据吸食的程度，越来越多的受害者的社会价值趋于降低。”另外，鸦片交易占用很多有生产价值的经济
领域的资源。大量的中国人从事种植、运输和销售鸦片。因此，当蒋介石打破独立的四川鸦片生产的时候，仅仅在重庆和成都就2万人被迫失业
这些情况没有妨碍蒋的举措。在1935年5月29日，他废除鸦片缉查委员会，自己任鸦片缉查负责人。一个美国外交官评论：“这个改变为了简单化管理，当然也给总司令带来更
大的权力。”最少这个改变使一些事情简单化：“与禁止鸦片工作有关的人表示，当其他部门公布鸦片种植和税收规定时，很难成立一个禁鸦片部门。”裁减委员会的头头J. Heng
Liu成了卫生部门的主管。旧的禁鸦片规定被废除，“禁鸦”官员公开谈论他们的职责是为政府实现更多的鸦片税。甚至蒋要扩大他的独裁时，面临着一个新的竞争对手：日本。
Stilwell如此描述被日本人渗透的华北地区：一个辽阔的罂粟之地。便宜的日本麻醉品在天津和满州里生产，威胁着蒋的鸦片计划。
早在1935年10月，蒋派一个使者到天津，去为一个禁鸦委员会打下基础工作，这个委员会将登记所有鸦片成瘾或吸食者（和从他们身上收取费用）。1935年12月工作朝官方垄
断方向加速进行，当时政府通告，秘密的鸦片交易将通过在所有输送关口的收税和鸦片强行存储在公共仓库的方式来抑制。地方的垄断商预计仅在天津一地就开放不少于50个官方
代销商，他们以“用税收方式禁止”为幌子运作。
虽然广西自己也生产少量鸦片，但通过对从云南、贵州到广东这个华南的主要市场的鸦片在他们广阔的道路系统上运输的税收，他们收获相当多的税款。这个交易占三成到一
半的政府税收。一个美国情报报告阐述鸦片在广西与云南的关系中扮演的角色：
1930年，因为广西和云南之间敌对关系的原因，云南的军政首脑龙云将军禁止云南的鸦片对广西输出。接下来的日子里，广西的省财政大大受影响，他们很快就难以承受这种
局面。最后广西的当权者意识到和云南达成谅解的必要性。广西当局要求前广西军总司令Lu Tao将军前往云南商谈两省休战的事宜。通过 Lu Tao有效的呼吁和灵活的策略，在广西
方面许诺解散在广西寻求避难的云南叛军Hu Tze Chia将军的军队的前提下，云南的龙云将军同意通过广西输出鸦片。这次要求得到实现后，云南继续通过广西输出鸦片，这成为广
西的主要税收来源
西南政治派系由白和李领导，他们的力量源泉不仅仅因为远离南京，还来自相对稳定的鸦片税收。巨大、独立广东鸦片市场的存在，以及附近的地区妨碍着蒋介石对派系的消
灭。当共CD被迫离开江西，开始他们向西进入贵州的长征的时候，1935年春蒋看到他的机会来了。尽管贵州军阀努力获取广西和广东势力的支持，但蒋还是抓住这个理由派驻他的
军队进贵州，迫使他们进行对蒋有利的省政府和鸦片垄断改组。省主席王家烈将军受到蒋介石军队的压制而率部朝广西南逃。
为报复过去几年广西对蒋介石的强硬敌对，蒋意图通过转移贵州鸦片南方运输的中继线来迫使广西屈服。因为广西税收几乎单独依赖来自云南、贵州的鸦片借道到华南口岸运
输的过路税收。蒋介石的举措就税收而言大大地妨碍了广西省政府。因此广西与王嘉列将军的队伍联合反对中央政府。可以看到，如果蒋将继续封锁鸦片通过广西，蒋、桂军之间
的战争冲突将发生。 蒋派他信任的使者Li Zhong-gong（贵州人）去计划省的鸦片专营。在蒋介石的军队占领贵州后，Li成为财政专员，处理鸦片税收。在李的负责下，南京政府
命令贵州鸦片改道向北到长江（船运到汉口），而不是经过广西。他们还给云南施压，要他们照做。如Joseph Stilwell报告一样，“他们这样做，意图通过减少税收来源使广州更
容易屈服。结果非常成功。”广西开始陷入经济危机。
如果没有对云南鸦片输出的控制，蒋介石的杠杆作用究竟是有限的。当他们与云南本身的利益相冲突的时候，蒋对龙云主席的命令作用不大。因此，云南的鸦片专营在1935年
早期违反蒋明确的命令，安排鸦片“大量装运”通过广西，还在他们的库存里积累了上百万盎司的货，如果这些货通过广西输出，必定削弱蒋的计划。
蒋总司令试图通过提供可选择的有利可图的运输路线和鸦片市场与云南联盟。1935年春，当蒋的军队占领贵州的时候，南京政府开始大量的公路建设计划―――不仅是用来打
击共CD，就象一个驻云南的外交官阐述的那样： 有报告说，他们利用军事劳力修筑从贵阳到四川、云南和湖南的公路。显然蒋介石急于尽快完成云南、贵州、湖南的公路。东部的
终点站是成都。在湘东连接还未完工的汉－广铁路。它将为云南到汉口、广州消费中心的鸦片运输提供一条新的便利道路。它也将因而使他们完全避免经过广西，南京将得以对至
今还对抗中央的省份施加相当的压力，那些省份足足50％的税收来自道路经过税收，这些税收通过扣押来自云南、贵州的鸦片货物获取。
蒋介石在1935年秋天完成云南到贵州的公路。然而，不为这个总司令所知的是，贵州开始对云南的商队收取高额税收，云南当局在那条路上根本无利可图。广西得知这种情况
，就秘密与云南商谈，通过大大减少他们的通过税来吸引南生公司（负责云南官方的鸦片输出）改变他们的运输路线。当蒋介石闻知两省签署了协约，威胁到他所有的计划，他解
除了Li Zhong-gong财政专员的职务。不久又开始施压。
尽管广西继续在贵州九个他们控制的县中收到一些鸦片，“这个数量大大少于之前广西、广东在这方面的巨大损失，”一个美国麻醉品专家在1936年中记录道：“这是事实，
鸦片税在广东、广西和南京之间扮演着重要的角色。”广东军阀在1936年7月垮台，其后不久广西方面作出让步。
蒋介石成功地通过他的“鸦片封锁”在财政上扼死了华南军阀。1936年广西反叛的失败部分地反映了西南军阀的走投无路。从这点看，南京同时对鸦片交易和华中、华南政治
进行了控制。节录翻译于：Opium and the Politics of Gangsterism in Nationalist China, 1927-1945.
Contributors: Jonathan Marshall - author.
Publication Year: 1976
一些西方观察员敏锐地看到在中国根除鸦片真正的困难，南京政府一面在舆论上谴责外国势力在中国的麻醉品问题，一面公开在这方面盘剥自己的人民，这些情况使他们沮丧
。H. G. W. Woodhead，一个精明的中国政治观察家，用他一贯保守的陈述做出评论：
相当惊奇地在同一个上午在新闻报纸上读到来自一个中国通讯社的报道，这个报道陈述道：中国本年度总共有204个鸦片商被处死，目前国内大约有 30,000,000个鸦片和毒品
成瘾者。一个在广西百色的记者描述满载1,800,000盎司鸦片的商队的到来。在鸦片通过摩托艇运送到南宁或更远的地方前，这些它们被储存在鸦片稽查局的办公室里，直到支付必
须的税款。
美国官员忧虑到，世界上90％的鸦片在中国种植，他们尤其不满民族主义国家的政策。一些国务院官员很少意识到正在对美国的毒品输入比鸦片贸易更能降低中国吸收美国货
物的潜力。O. Edmund Clubb当时是驻中国事务处的一个官员，反对蒋介石用鸦片贸易来促进他纳粹式独裁的意图。Clubb和他在汉口的同僚亚当斯都强调鸦片交易在中国政治中严
重恶化的影响。亚当斯甚至指责蒋介石破坏反鸦片法，说蒋不仅仅是为了军费开支，倒不如说是为了个人的谋利。
早在1935年一个对中国毒品状况的研究，这个研究由一个叫Joseph Stilwel的不引人注目的美国军事附属机构写出，他们证实了这些观点。Stilwell估计一半的人“经常地或
偶尔地带有毒品”，五个人中至少有一个滥用毒品。（另外一个估计是，有7百万到7千万的瘾君子。）大量使用毒品使人身体衰弱，但Stilwell看到一些普遍的、险恶的结果：“
导致对工作冷淡，无积极的思想和雄心，加上毒品导致的身体行为习惯，根据吸食的程度，越来越多的受害者的社会价值趋于降低。”另外，鸦片交易占用很多有生产价值的经济
领域的资源。大量的中国人从事种植、运输和销售鸦片。因此，当蒋介石打破独立的四川鸦片生产的时候，仅仅在重庆和成都就2万人被迫失业
这些情况没有妨碍蒋的举措。在1935年5月29日，他废除鸦片缉查委员会，自己任鸦片缉查负责人。一个美国外交官评论：“这个改变为了简单化管理，当然也给总司令带来更
大的权力。”最少这个改变使一些事情简单化：“与禁止鸦片工作有关的人表示，当其他部门公布鸦片种植和税收规定时，很难成立一个禁鸦片部门。”裁减委员会的头头J. Heng
Liu成了卫生部门的主管。旧的禁鸦片规定被废除，“禁鸦”官员公开谈论他们的职责是为政府实现更多的鸦片税。甚至蒋要扩大他的独裁时，面临着一个新的竞争对手：日本。
Stilwell如此描述被日本人渗透的华北地区：一个辽阔的罂粟之地。便宜的日本麻醉品在天津和满州里生产，威胁着蒋的鸦片计划。
早在1935年10月，蒋派一个使者到天津，去为一个禁鸦委员会打下基础工作，这个委员会将登记所有鸦片成瘾或吸食者（和从他们身上收取费用）。1935年12月工作朝官方垄
断方向加速进行，当时政府通告，秘密的鸦片交易将通过在所有输送关口的收税和鸦片强行存储在公共仓库的方式来抑制。地方的垄断商预计仅在天津一地就开放不少于50个官方
代销商，他们以“用税收方式禁止”为幌子运作。
虽然广西自己也生产少量鸦片，但通过对从云南、贵州到广东这个华南的主要市场的鸦片在他们广阔的道路系统上运输的税收，他们收获相当多的税款。这个交易占三成到一
半的政府税收。一个美国情报报告阐述鸦片在广西与云南的关系中扮演的角色：
1930年，因为广西和云南之间敌对关系的原因，云南的军政首脑龙云将军禁止云南的鸦片对广西输出。接下来的日子里，广西的省财政大大受影响，他们很快就难以承受这种
局面。最后广西的当权者意识到和云南达成谅解的必要性。广西当局要求前广西军总司令Lu Tao将军前往云南商谈两省休战的事宜。通过 Lu Tao有效的呼吁和灵活的策略，在广西
方面许诺解散在广西寻求避难的云南叛军Hu Tze Chia将军的军队的前提下，云南的龙云将军同意通过广西输出鸦片。这次要求得到实现后，云南继续通过广西输出鸦片，这成为广
西的主要税收来源
西南政治派系由白和李领导，他们的力量源泉不仅仅因为远离南京，还来自相对稳定的鸦片税收。巨大、独立广东鸦片市场的存在，以及附近的地区妨碍着蒋介石对派系的消
灭。当共CD被迫离开江西，开始他们向西进入贵州的长征的时候，1935年春蒋看到他的机会来了。尽管贵州军阀努力获取广西和广东势力的支持，但蒋还是抓住这个理由派驻他的
军队进贵州，迫使他们进行对蒋有利的省政府和鸦片垄断改组。省主席王家烈将军受到蒋介石军队的压制而率部朝广西南逃。
为报复过去几年广西对蒋介石的强硬敌对，蒋意图通过转移贵州鸦片南方运输的中继线来迫使广西屈服。因为广西税收几乎单独依赖来自云南、贵州的鸦片借道到华南口岸运
输的过路税收。蒋介石的举措就税收而言大大地妨碍了广西省政府。因此广西与王嘉列将军的队伍联合反对中央政府。可以看到，如果蒋将继续封锁鸦片通过广西，蒋、桂军之间
的战争冲突将发生。 蒋派他信任的使者Li Zhong-gong（贵州人）去计划省的鸦片专营。在蒋介石的军队占领贵州后，Li成为财政专员，处理鸦片税收。在李的负责下，南京政府
命令贵州鸦片改道向北到长江（船运到汉口），而不是经过广西。他们还给云南施压，要他们照做。如Joseph Stilwell报告一样，“他们这样做，意图通过减少税收来源使广州更
容易屈服。结果非常成功。”广西开始陷入经济危机。
如果没有对云南鸦片输出的控制，蒋介石的杠杆作用究竟是有限的。当他们与云南本身的利益相冲突的时候，蒋对龙云主席的命令作用不大。因此，云南的鸦片专营在1935年
早期违反蒋明确的命令，安排鸦片“大量装运”通过广西，还在他们的库存里积累了上百万盎司的货，如果这些货通过广西输出，必定削弱蒋的计划。
蒋总司令试图通过提供可选择的有利可图的运输路线和鸦片市场与云南联盟。1935年春，当蒋的军队占领贵州的时候，南京政府开始大量的公路建设计划―――不仅是用来打
击共CD，就象一个驻云南的外交官阐述的那样： 有报告说，他们利用军事劳力修筑从贵阳到四川、云南和湖南的公路。显然蒋介石急于尽快完成云南、贵州、湖南的公路。东部的
终点站是成都。在湘东连接还未完工的汉－广铁路。它将为云南到汉口、广州消费中心的鸦片运输提供一条新的便利道路。它也将因而使他们完全避免经过广西，南京将得以对至
今还对抗中央的省份施加相当的压力，那些省份足足50％的税收来自道路经过税收，这些税收通过扣押来自云南、贵州的鸦片货物获取。
蒋介石在1935年秋天完成云南到贵州的公路。然而，不为这个总司令所知的是，贵州开始对云南的商队收取高额税收，云南当局在那条路上根本无利可图。广西得知这种情况
，就秘密与云南商谈，通过大大减少他们的通过税来吸引南生公司（负责云南官方的鸦片输出）改变他们的运输路线。当蒋介石闻知两省签署了协约，威胁到他所有的计划，他解
除了Li Zhong-gong财政专员的职务。不久又开始施压。
尽管广西继续在贵州九个他们控制的县中收到一些鸦片，“这个数量大大少于之前广西、广东在这方面的巨大损失，”一个美国麻醉品专家在1936年中记录道：“这是事实，
鸦片税在广东、广西和南京之间扮演着重要的角色。”广东军阀在1936年7月垮台，其后不久广西方面作出让步。
蒋介石成功地通过他的“鸦片封锁”在财政上扼死了华南军阀。1936年广西反叛的失败部分地反映了西南军阀的走投无路。从这点看，南京同时对鸦片交易和华中、华南政治
进行了控制。
附原文：
Opium and the Politics of Gangsterism in Nationalist China, 19
Western observers, some of whom were sensitive to the real difficulties of eradicating opium from China, were nevertheless dismayed by the open program of
the Nanjing Government to exploit its own citizens while publicly blaming
the foreign powers for China's narcotics problem. Thus
H. G. W. Woodhead, a sharp observer of Chinese politics,
commented with his usual understatement:
It is rather curious to read in the newspapers on the same
morifing a report from one Chinese news agency stating
that altogether 204 opium traffickers have been executed in
China during the current year; from another that at present
there are about 30,000,000 opium and drug addicts in the
country; and from a correspondent in Poseb (Kwangsi) a
description of the arrival in that city of a caravan carrying
1,800,000 ounces of opium, which was stored in the offices
of the Opium Suppression Bureau until it had paid the
required taxes, previous to shipment by motor boat to
Nanning and beyond.34
American officials, concerned that over 90 percent of the world's opium grew in China, were particularly critical of
Nationalist policies. Some State Department officials were less concerned that the drugs were entering the United States than that the opium trade was
diminishing China's potential to absorb American goods. 35 O. Edmund Clubb, then a foreign service officer in China, objected to Chiang's use of the opium
traffic to further his designs for a "Nazi" style dictatorship. Both Clubb and his colleague in Hankou, Walter Adams, emphasized the enormously corrupting
influence of the opium trade on Chinese politics. Adams even charged that Chiang
Kai-shek was breaking the anti-opium laws not just for military expenditures, but for personal enrichment as well.
A study of China's narcotics situation in early 1935 written by an obscure American military attachg named
Joseph Stilwell only confirmed these opinions. Stilwell estimated that half the population "regularly or occasionally
partake of drugs" and that fully one person in five abused them. (Other estimates ranged from 7 to 70 million addicts.) 37 Heavy use of narcotics was
physically debilitating, but Stilwell saw a more common, and insidious, effect: "The resulting indifference toward work, constructive thought and ambition,
plus the inertia produced by the physical action of the drug, tend to reduce the social value of the victim more and more
according to the degree of his addiction." Moreover, the opium traffic diverted resources from more productive
economic sectors. Huge numbers of Chinese were employed in the growing, transportation, and retailing of opium; thus when Chiang Kai- shek cut into
independent Sichuan opium production he forced 20,000 people out of work in Chengdu and Choneqing alone.。 38
Such conditions did not deter Chiang. On May 29, 1935, he abolished the Opium Suppression Commission and
appointed himself Opium Suppression Superintendent. "This change is expected to simplify the administration but of course puts greater power than ever in the
hands of the Generalissimo," commented an American diplomat. At least the change would simplify matters: "Persons connected with the opium suppression work
have stated that it was difficult to have a suppression bureau while other bureaus were publishing regulations for the growing and taxing of opium." 39 J.
Heng Liu, head of the disbanded commission, became Director of the Health Administration. 40 Old (and unenforced) regulations for opium suppression were
discarded, and "suppression" officials talked openly of their duty to realize more opium revenue for the government. 41Even as Chiang attempted to extend his
monopoly, he faced a new competitor: Japan. Areas of North China infiltrated by Japan were described by Stilwell as "one vast poppy field." 42 Cheap Japanese
narcotics produced in Tianjin and Manchuria threatened to disrupt Chiang's planned opium sales network in the region.
Back in October 1935, Chiang sent an emissary to Tianjin to lay the groundwork for an opium suppression committee which would register (and collect fees
from) all addicts and smokers. Work towards an official monopoly
accelerated in late December 1935 when the government announced that clandestine trade would be suppressed by means of a tax on all imports and by forced
storage of opium in public warehouses. The local monopoly agency expected to open no less than 50 official sales agencies in Tianjin alone, under the guise
of "prohibition by means of taxation."
Although Guangxi produced little opium itself, it earned considerable revenue by taxing opium shipped on its extensive road system from Yunnan and Guizhou
to Guangdong, the major southwest market. This traffic accounted for between a third and a half of the government's revenue. One American intelligence report
explained the role of opium in Guangxi's relations with Yunnan:
During the year 1930, as a result of a hostile relationship between Kwangsi and Yunnan, General Lung Yun, Yun-
nan's military governor, prohibited the exportation of Yunnan opium into Kwangsi. The following year, Kwangsi's
provincial finance was greatly affected and the situation soon became intolerable. Finally, the authorities of
Kwangsi realized the necessity of reaching a compromise with Yunnan, and General Lu Tao, formerly a commander-in-chief of Kwangsi Army, was requested by
Kwangsi auiborities to proceed to Yunnan and negotiate
for a truce. Through Lu Tao's able appeal and clever tactics, General Lung Yun of Yunnan agreed to export opium
through Kwangsi on condition that the latter would undertake to disband the troops of General Hu Tze Chia
whose rebellious army of Yunnan had sought refuge in Kwangsi. Since this request was carried out, the export of
Yunnan opium through Kwangsi has continued and has become one of the chief sources of Kwangsi's revenue.
The Southwestern Political Clique, led by Bai and Li, derived their strength not only from their distance from
Nanjing, but also from the relatively stable revenues opium provided. The existence of a large, independent opium market in Guangdong and nearby regions
frustrated Chiang's efforts to undermine the clique.
Chiang saw his chance to move in the spring of 1935, when the Communists, forced out of Jiangxi, began their Long March to the west and entered Guizhou.
Despite the efforts of the Guizhou militarists to draw support from Guangxi and Guangdong provincial forces, Chiang seized the excuse to move his armies into
Guizhou and force a reorganization of the provincial government-and its opium monopoly-in line with his interests. 58 General Wang Jia-lie, governor of the
province, fled south with his troops towards Guangxi when pressed by Chiang's armies.
Chiang hoped to force Guangxi into submission by diverting Guizhou opium away from the southern transit route
in retaliation for Kwangsi's strong opposition to General Chiang Kai-shek during the past few years.
As Kwangsi depends almost solely for revenue derived from transportation taxes on Yunnan and Kweicbow opium
en route to the South China Coast, General Chiang's action has seriously handicapped the provincial government in the matter of revenue. Consequently Kwangsi
has aligned herself with General Wang Chia-lieb's troops against the Central Government and it is expected that if General Chiang persists in maintaining a
blockade against opium
through Kwangsi, actual warfare will take place between General Chiang and the Kwangsi troops. Chiang sent his trusted emissary, Li Zhong-gong (a native of
Guizhou), to study the provincial opium monopoly. After
Chiang's armies conquered Guizhou, Li became Commissioner of Finance to manage the opium revenues. 60 With Li in charge, the Nanjing government ordered
Guizhou opium diverted north to the Yangtze (for shipment to the Hankou monopoly) rather than through Guangxi; it also pressed Yunnan to follow suit. As
Joseph Stilwell reported, "It was done with the intent of making Canton more tractable by reducing its sources of revenue and the result was highly
successful." Guangxi began experiencing an economic crisis. 61
Without control of Yunnan's opium exports, however, Chiang's leverage was limited. His orders to Governor Long
Yuri carried little weight when they conflicted with Yunnan's self-interest. Thus, against Chiang's express orders, the Yunnan opium monopoly in early 1935
made "enormous shipments" of opium through Guangxi and accumulated millions of ounces more in its stocks which, if exported through Guangxi, could undercut
Chiang's plans. 62
The Generalissimo tempted Yunnan into an alliance by providing alternative profitable transport routes and markets for opium. In April 1935, while his armies
occupied Guizhou, the Nanjing government began a massive program of highway construction—not just for use against the Communists, as one American diplomat
stationed in Yunnan explained:
It is reported that military labor is being utilized in the construction of highways radiating from Kweiyang to
Szechuan, Yunnan and Hunan. [ Chiang Kai-shek] appeared to be particularly anxious to complete the Yunnan,
Kweicbow, Hunan highway as soon as possible. The eastern terminus will be Hengchow, in Eastern Hunan, where it will connect with the as yet uncompleted
Hankow-Canton
Railway. . . . It will furnish a new and convenient route for the opium caravans from Yunnan to centers of consumption at Hankow and Canton. It will then be
quite possible for them to avoid Kwangsi altogether, and Nanking
will be in a position to exert considerable pressure on the hitherto recalcitrant rulers of that province who derive fully 50 percent of their revenue from
transit taxes levied on opium caravans from Yunnan and Kweichow.
Chiang completed the Yunnan-Guizhou highway in autumn 1935. However, unbeknown to the Generalissimo,
Guizhou began charging such high taxes on the Yunnan caravans that Yunnan authorities realized no profit at all on that route. Guangxi learned of this
predicament and secretly negotiated a large reduction its transit tax to induce the Nan Seng company (in charge of official Yunnan. opium exports) to change
its shipping route. When Chiang learned that the two provinces had signed a treaty, threatening all of his schemes, he fired Li Zhong-gong as Commissioner of
Finance. 64 Soon the squeeze began again.
Although Guangxi continued to receive some opium from the nine counties of Guizhou it controlled, "the amount
is very much less than before and Guangxi and Guangdong suffer tremendous loss in this respect," an American narcotics expert noted in mid-1936. "It is,
therefore, true that opium revenue plays an important part in the present dispute
between Kwangtung-Kwangsi and Nanking." 65 Guangdong collapsed in July 1936, and Guangxi gave in shortly thereafter. 66
Chiang had succeeded through his "opium blockade" in strangling the Southwest Clique financially. The abortive 1936
Guangxi revolt reflected in part the desperation of the southwestern warlords. From this point on Nanjing exercised
control over both the opium traffic and the politics of central and southern China. 67
Chinese Opium and the International Market
One of the results of the development of an organized drug traffic in China is the increasing export of opium and its derivatives (morphine and heroin) from
China to foreign countries, including the United States. It is reported that important members of the international drug ring now reside in Shanghai to
control this traffic. It is not known whether or not Chiang Kai-shek's organization has connections with the international ring, but in view of his old
connections with the Ch'ing-Hung Pang (Shanghai underworld gang dealing in everything from opium to blackmail to assassination) it is thought entirely
possible.68
U.S. Consular dispatch from Hankow, 11 April 1934
China's emergence in the twentieth century as the world's leading opium producer fundamentally transformed
the structure of the world narcotics traffic. With an output of more than 12,000 tons annually, China dwarfed all other producing countries combined. The
small fraction of Chinese opium that entered international markets hit the consuming countries like a flood. By the late 1920s China was a net exporter of
opium, and within a few years it replaced the Near East as the world's opium smuggling center. By the mid-1930s, Chinese heroin dominated the American
market, which may explain the obvious concern with which officials in the Department of State and Bureau of Narcotics kept tabs on opium developments in
China. 69
As early as the 1920s, British authorities in Hong Kong seized an average of about 20,000 taels of Chinese opium
illegally smuggled into the colony each year; no one knows how much more made it past the customs authorities. In the first ten months of 1931, customs
officials in Macao seized 19,900 taels of Chinese opium. Clearly, China could not confine within its borders the vast quantities of opium it produced. 70
The U.S. Bureau of Narcotics reported in 1931 that most of the opium smuggled into the United States entered
Pacific ports such as Seattle and San Francisco. The exact source was unknown, but the "greater bulk" was "manu-
factured and packed somewhere in the Far East. . . ." 71 The traffic was almost impossible to stop because, in the words of one agent, "the smuggling of
opium into the United States is conducted on a huge scale by well organized highly financGl sic] gangs." 72
In 1933, opium seizures in the U.S. doubled those of 1932, thanks to a "marked recrudescence" of opium
smuggling and smoking. By now the Bureau of Narcotics knew that "Practically all of the prepared opium seized came from China," and expressed concern that
Chinese opium production was on the rise. 73
Even more serious, the Bureau of Narcotics discovered by 1933 that "heroin manufactured clandestinely in China and Darien is also entering the United States
in considerable quantities . . ." 74 By 1935 most of America's heroin originated in Shanghai and Tianjin laboratories. 75 Harry Anslinger, head of the
Bureau, reported in 1934 that Chinese heroin production had "increased tremendously":
further, confidential police information and statements of traffickers indicated that a considerable proportion of this heroin was being smuggled into the
United States, either directly from the Far East or by transshipment from
European ports. Although in 1934 a number of notorious international narcotics traffickers transferred their head-
quarters from China, Darien and Manchuria to Europe, most of them continued to maintain contact with former
associates in the Far East. These persons were reported to be actively engaged in smuggling heroin into the United
Opium and the Politics of Gangsterism in Nationalist China, 19
Western observers, some of whom were sensitive to the real difficulties of eradicating opium from China, were nevertheless dismayed by the open program of
the Nanjing Government to exploit its own citizens while publicly blaming
the foreign powers for China's narcotics problem. Thus
H. G. W. Woodhead, a sharp observer of Chinese politics,
commented with his usual understatement:
It is rather curious to read in the newspapers on the same
morifing a report from one Chinese news agency stating
that altogether 204 opium traffickers have been executed in
China during the current year; from another that at present
there are about 30,000,000 opium and drug addicts in the
country; and from a correspondent in Poseb (Kwangsi) a
description of the arrival in that city of a caravan carrying
1,800,000 ounces of opium, which was stored in the offices
of the Opium Suppression Bureau until it had paid the
required taxes, previous to shipment by motor boat to
Nanning and beyond.34
American officials, concerned that over 90 percent of the world's opium grew in China, were particularly critical of
Nationalist policies. Some State Department officials were less concerned that the drugs were entering the United States than that the opium trade was
diminishing China's potential to absorb American goods. 35 O. Edmund Clubb, then a foreign service officer in China, objected to Chiang's use of the opium
traffic to further his designs for a "Nazi" style dictatorship. Both Clubb and his colleague in Hankou, Walter Adams, emphasized the enormously corrupting
influence of the opium trade on Chinese politics. Adams even charged that Chiang
Kai-shek was breaking the anti-opium laws not just for military expenditures, but for personal enrichment as well.
A study of China's narcotics situation in early 1935 written by an obscure American military attachg named
Joseph Stilwell only confirmed these opinions. Stilwell estimated that half the population "regularly or occasionally
partake of drugs" and that fully one person in five abused them. (Other estimates ranged from 7 to 70 million addicts.) 37 Heavy use of narcotics was
physically debilitating, but Stilwell saw a more common, and insidious, effect: "The resulting indifference toward work, constructive thought and ambition,
plus the inertia produced by the physical action of the drug, tend to reduce the social value of the victim more and more
according to the degree of his addiction." Moreover, the opium traffic diverted resources from more productive
economic sectors. Huge numbers of Chinese were employed in the growing, transportation, and retailing of opium; thus when Chiang Kai- shek cut into
independent Sichuan opium production he forced 20,000 people out of work in Chengdu and Choneqing alone.。 38
Such conditions did not deter Chiang. On May 29, 1935, he abolished the Opium Suppression Commission and
appointed himself Opium Suppression Superintendent. "This change is expected to simplify the administration but of course puts greater power than ever in the
hands of the Generalissimo," commented an American diplomat. At least the change would simplify matters: "Persons connected with the opium suppression work
have stated that it was difficult to have a suppression bureau while other bureaus were publishing regulations for the growing and taxing of opium." 39 J.
Heng Liu, head of the disbanded commission, became Director of the Health Administration. 40 Old (and unenforced) regulations for opium suppression were
discarded, and "suppression" officials talked openly of their duty to realize more opium revenue for the government. 41Even as Chiang attempted to extend his
monopoly, he faced a new competitor: Japan. Areas of North China infiltrated by Japan were described by Stilwell as "one vast poppy field." 42 Cheap Japanese
narcotics produced in Tianjin and Manchuria threatened to disrupt Chiang's planned opium sales network in the region.
Back in October 1935, Chiang sent an emissary to Tianjin to lay the groundwork for an opium suppression committee which would register (and collect fees
from) all addicts and smokers. Work towards an official monopoly
accelerated in late December 1935 when the government announced that clandestine trade would be suppressed by means of a tax on all imports and by forced
storage of opium in public warehouses. The local monopoly agency expected to open no less than 50 official sales agencies in Tianjin alone, under the guise
of "prohibition by means of taxation."
Although Guangxi produced little opium itself, it earned considerable revenue by taxing opium shipped on its extensive road system from Yunnan and Guizhou
to Guangdong, the major southwest market. This traffic accounted for between a third and a half of the government's revenue. One American intelligence report
explained the role of opium in Guangxi's relations with Yunnan:
During the year 1930, as a result of a hostile relationship between Kwangsi and Yunnan, General Lung Yun, Yun-
nan's military governor, prohibited the exportation of Yunnan opium into Kwangsi. The following year, Kwangsi's
provincial finance was greatly affected and the situation soon became intolerable. Finally, the authorities of
Kwangsi realized the necessity of reaching a compromise with Yunnan, and General Lu Tao, formerly a commander-in-chief of Kwangsi Army, was requested by
Kwangsi auiborities to proceed to Yunnan and negotiate
for a truce. Through Lu Tao's able appeal and clever tactics, General Lung Yun of Yunnan agreed to export opium
through Kwangsi on condition that the latter would undertake to disband the troops of General Hu Tze Chia
whose rebellious army of Yunnan had sought refuge in Kwangsi. Since this request was carried out, the export of
Yunnan opium through Kwangsi has continued and has become one of the chief sources of Kwangsi's revenue.
The Southwestern Political Clique, led by Bai and Li, derived their strength not only from their distance from
Nanjing, but also from the relatively stable revenues opium provided. The existence of a large, independent opium market in Guangdong and nearby regions
frustrated Chiang's efforts to undermine the clique.
Chiang saw his chance to move in the spring of 1935, when the Communists, forced out of Jiangxi, began their Long March to the west and entered Guizhou.
Despite the efforts of the Guizhou militarists to draw support from Guangxi and Guangdong provincial forces, Chiang seized the excuse to move his armies into
Guizhou and force a reorganization of the provincial government-and its opium monopoly-in line with his interests. 58 General Wang Jia-lie, governor of the
province, fled south with his troops towards Guangxi when pressed by Chiang's armies.
Chiang hoped to force Guangxi into submission by diverting Guizhou opium away from the southern transit route
in retaliation for Kwangsi's strong opposition to General Chiang Kai-shek during the past few years.
As Kwangsi depends almost solely for revenue derived from transportation taxes on Yunnan and Kweicbow opium
en route to the South China Coast, General Chiang's action has seriously handicapped the provincial government in the matter of revenue. Consequently Kwangsi
has aligned herself with General Wang Chia-lieb's troops against the Central Government and it is expected that if General Chiang persists in maintaining a
blockade against opium
through Kwangsi, actual warfare will take place between General Chiang and the Kwangsi troops. Chiang sent his trusted emissary, Li Zhong-gong (a native of
Guizhou), to study the provincial opium monopoly. After
Chiang's armies conquered Guizhou, Li became Commissioner of Finance to manage the opium revenues. 60 With Li in charge, the Nanjing government ordered
Guizhou opium diverted north to the Yangtze (for shipment to the Hankou monopoly) rather than through Guangxi; it also pressed Yunnan to follow suit. As
Joseph Stilwell reported, "It was done with the intent of making Canton more tractable by reducing its sources of revenue and the result was highly
successful." Guangxi began experiencing an economic crisis. 61
Without control of Yunnan's opium exports, however, Chiang's leverage was limited. His orders to Governor Long
Yuri carried little weight when they conflicted with Yunnan's self-interest. Thus, against Chiang's express orders, the Yunnan opium monopoly in early 1935
made "enormous shipments" of opium through Guangxi and accumulated millions of ounces more in its stocks which, if exported through Guangxi, could undercut
Chiang's plans. 62
The Generalissimo tempted Yunnan into an alliance by providing alternative profitable transport routes and markets for opium. In April 1935, while his armies
occupied Guizhou, the Nanjing government began a massive program of highway construction—not just for use against the Communists, as one American diplomat
stationed in Yunnan explained:
It is reported that military labor is being utilized in the construction of highways radiating from Kweiyang to
Szechuan, Yunnan and Hunan. [ Chiang Kai-shek] appeared to be particularly anxious to complete the Yunnan,
Kweicbow, Hunan highway as soon as possible. The eastern terminus will be Hengchow, in Eastern Hunan, where it will connect with the as yet uncompleted
Hankow-Canton
Railway. . . . It will furnish a new and convenient route for the opium caravans from Yunnan to centers of consumption at Hankow and Canton. It will then be
quite possible for them to avoid Kwangsi altogether, and Nanking
will be in a position to exert considerable pressure on the hitherto recalcitrant rulers of that province who derive fully 50 percent of their revenue from
transit taxes levied on opium caravans from Yunnan and Kweichow.
Chiang completed the Yunnan-Guizhou highway in autumn 1935. However, unbeknown to the Generalissimo,
Guizhou began charging such high taxes on the Yunnan caravans that Yunnan authorities realized no profit at all on that route. Guangxi learned of this
predicament and secretly negotiated a large reduction its transit tax to induce the Nan Seng company (in charge of official Yunnan. opium exports) to change
its shipping route. When Chiang learned that the two provinces had signed a treaty, threatening all of his schemes, he fired Li Zhong-gong as Commissioner of
Finance. 64 Soon the squeeze began again.
Although Guangxi continued to receive some opium from the nine counties of Guizhou it controlled, "the amount
is very much less than before and Guangxi and Guangdong suffer tremendous loss in this respect," an American narcotics expert noted in mid-1936. "It is,
therefore, true that opium revenue plays an important part in the present dispute
between Kwangtung-Kwangsi and Nanking." 65 Guangdong collapsed in July 1936, and Guangxi gave in shortly thereafter. 66
Chiang had succeeded through his "opium blockade" in strangling the Southwest Clique financially. The abortive 1936
Guangxi revolt reflected in part the desperation of the southwestern warlords. From this point on Nanjing exercised
control over both the opium traffic and the politics of central and southern China. 67
Chinese Opium and the International Market
One of the results of the development of an organized drug traffic in China is the increasing export of opium and its derivatives (morphine and heroin) from
China to foreign countries, including the United States. It is reported that important members of the international drug ring now reside in Shanghai to
control this traffic. It is not known whether or not Chiang Kai-shek's organization has connections with the international ring, but in view of his old
connections with the Ch'ing-Hung Pang (Shanghai underworld gang dealing in everything from opium to blackmail to assassination) it is thought entirely
possible.68
U.S. Consular dispatch from Hankow, 11 April 1934
China's emergence in the twentieth century as the world's leading opium producer fundamentally transformed
the structure of the world narcotics traffic. With an output of more than 12,000 tons annually, China dwarfed all other producing countries combined. The
small fraction of Chinese opium that entered international markets hit the consuming countries like a flood. By the late 1920s China was a net exporter of
opium, and within a few years it replaced the Near East as the world's opium smuggling center. By the mid-1930s, Chinese heroin dominated the American
market, which may explain the obvious concern with which officials in the Department of State and Bureau of Narcotics kept tabs on opium developments in
China. 69
As early as the 1920s, British authorities in Hong Kong seized an average of about 20,000 taels of Chinese opium
illegally smuggled into the colony each year; no one knows how much more made it past the customs authorities. In the first ten months of 1931, customs
officials in Macao seized 19,900 taels of Chinese opium. Clearly, China could not confine within its borders the vast quantities of opium it produced. 70
The U.S. Bureau of Narcotics reported in 1931 that most of the opium smuggled into the United States entered
Pacific ports such as Seattle and San Francisco. The exact source was unknown, but the "greater bulk" was "manu-
factured and packed somewhere in the Far East. . . ." 71 The traffic was almost impossible to stop because, in the words of one agent, "the smuggling of
opium into the United States is conducted on a huge scale by well organized highly financGl sic] gangs." 72
In 1933, opium seizures in the U.S. doubled those of 1932, thanks to a "marked recrudescence" of opium
smuggling and smoking. By now the Bureau of Narcotics knew that "Practically all of the prepared opium seized came from China," and expressed concern that
Chinese opium production was on the rise. 73
Even more serious, the Bureau of Narcotics discovered by 1933 that "heroin manufactured clandestinely in China and Darien is also entering the United States
in considerable quantities . . ." 74 By 1935 most of America's heroin originated in Shanghai and Tianjin laboratories. 75 Harry Anslinger, head of the
Bureau, reported in 1934 that Chinese heroin production had "increased tremendously":
further, confidential police information and statements of traffickers indicated that a considerable proportion of this heroin was being smuggled into the
United States, either directly from the Far East or by transshipment from
European ports. Although in 1934 a number of notorious international narcotics traffickers transferred their head-
quarters from China, Darien and Manchuria to Europe, most of them continued to maintain contact with former
associates in the Far East. These persons were reported to be actively engaged in smuggling heroin into the United
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