我朝凶猛：6弹射器HM，6LHDs，3LPDs，。。。

:victory: :D :victory:

China Links Power To Economic Security
May 4, 2009
By Richard D. Fisher, Jr.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/g ... Economic%20Security

China is expanding its force-projection capabilities on land, sea and in the air with a range of weapons. The primary goal is to protect economic interests through control of the western Pacific. But China also seeks to counter U.S. naval power in the region and make alliances with strategically placed countries like Iran and Pakistan.

China’s military buildup was acknowledged in the 2009 edition of the Pentagon’s China Military Power report to Congress. “China’s economic development is increasingly dependent upon sustained international stability and secure access to foreign markets and resources,” it states. “[M]ilitary and civilian strategists have begun to discuss the role of the armed forces in protecting and advancing China’s broader political and economic interests.”

In the first two installments of this three-part series, we covered China’s gains in increasingly sophisticated information technologies (DTI March, p. 39) and precision weapons (DTI April, p. 48). This report examines its moves to expand conventional systems.

Such evolution is reflected in official and semi-official Chinese statements, military exercises and deployments, and in the development or acquisition of new means to project power. In late 2004, President Hu Jintao began saying that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “must provide a security guarantee for national interests.” The next year, for the first time, China invited Russian military forces to the Shandong Peninsula to conduct joint and combined-arms “Peace Mission” exercises under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

In December 2006, China’s national defense white paper stated that the army looks to develop “transregional mobility,” the PLA navy “aims at the gradual extension of the strategic depth of offshore defensive operations,” and the PLA air force seeks “strategic projection.”

The meaning of these terms was partially defined by the Peace Mission exercises, which saw the PLA make a small but unprecedented combined-arms deployment. An air force airborne unit with mechanized armor joined a medium-weight army unit that traveled by train, and JH-7A fighter-bombers and army helicopters deployed by air. Plans are underway for SCO forces to exercise in China, likely in August.

Writing in the Communist Party journal Quishi in July 2007, navy commander Adm. Wu Shengli listed as among his service’s missions maintenance of “the safety of oceanic transportation and the strategic passageway for energy.” Most of China’s tanker-carried petroleum travels though the Strait of Malacca. Last December, China sent a small task force of one Type 052B and one Type 052C air-defense destroyers and a support ship to join navies protecting shipping from Somali pirates. One of the destroyers was replaced in April by a new Type 054A air-defense frigate.

While this is a small start for naval deployments, it is possible that China may turn its investments in new ports and facilities in Myanmar, Chittagong harbor in Bangladesh and the port of Gwadar in Pakistan into access for warships. Academy of Social Sciences expert Ye Hailin in February termed the Indian Ocean China’s “sea of destiny,” and advocated reducing reliance on the Strait of Malacca by building energy routes on land via ports in Pakistan and Myanmar. In March, China and Pakistan held a 10-day naval exercise.

Pakistan and Iran are SCO “observers.” They could see increasing bilateral or multilateral military exercises with China if they become full members.

China’s navy might be larger and better able to conduct operations in the Indian Ocean and beyond by the end of the next decade. On Mar. 20, defense minister Liang Guanglie may have put to rest decades of speculation when he told his Japanese counterpart, Hamada Yasukazu, “China’s navy is . . . rather weak; we need to develop an aircraft carrier.” Such development actually began in the 1980s under then-navy commander Liu Huaqing, who became principal vice chairman of the central military commission (CMC). Liu famously quipped that he would “die with his eyes open” if China did not build a carrier.

In leaks to Japanese and Hong Kong reporters in January, PLA and Chinese shipbuilding officials said that by 2020, the navy may have up to four indigenously designed and built aircraft carriers, two conventional and two nuclear. In addition, the Russian-Ukrainian carrier Varyag, acquired by China in 2002, will be refurbished for training.

Russian technology may figure heavily in carrier designs. In April, a Chinese television show interviewed experts who speculated that the new carrier would be similar to the Varyag, and employ a ski-jump. But the show also explored a unique configuration with up to six catapults. :D Carriers may be built at Dalian, the location of the Varyag, and at an expanded shipyard on Changxing Island near Shanghai. An early base for China’s carrier force will likely be a new naval base on Hainan Island.

China’s carrier air wing is also gathering. Candidate aircraft may include: upgraded Sukhoi Su-33s from Russia; a version of Shenyang Aircraft Corp.’s J-11 modified for carrier operations; a new Shenyang fighter sometimes called J-13, which is smaller than the Su-33 but has stealth features; and a carrier version of Chengdu Aircraft Corp.’s J-10 fighter.

It is expected that Hongdu’s L-15 twin-engine supersonic trainer will become a carrier trainer. Sources indicated in 2005 that China could be developing a carrier-based AWACS.

China’s carrier may also feature unmanned combat aerial vehicles. An L-15 carrier trainer would be one candidate, while purpose-designed versions like Shenyang’s Warrior Eagle could also go to sea.

Heavy naval amphibious capabilities will increase over the next decade. In late 2006, China launched its first 20,000-ton Type 071-class LPD (landing platform dock), which has a well deck that can hold a hovercraft for over-the-horizon force transport. This could be followed by a similarly sized flat-deck LHD (landing helicopter dock) called Type 081. Some sources suggest the PLA will build an initial force of six Type 081s and three Type 071s, :D which could carry several thousand troops and supporting armor. Marine and army amphibious units are deploying a new family of fast amphibious armored vehicles, which use water pump jets and planing surfaces for high speed.

The PLA is also developing large transport aircraft and mechanized forces for distance projection. While Russia and China work out the sale of 32-34 new-build Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft with 50-ton load capabilities, China is reorganizing its aircraft industries in a way that may streamline the development of heavy airlifters. This could still involve a great deal of help from Russia and Ukraine, which had hoped to promote a turbofan version of the Antonov An-70. A 2007 concept from the former AVIC-1 consortium showed a 60-ton-capable C-17-like airlifter. This program, however, will also depend on China successfully developing large, high-bypass turbofan engines, a traditional weakness.

In the meantime, the PLA is mechanizing airborne forces, which are nominally under air force command but controlled by the CMC. After Russia failed to sell China its BMD series airborne tank, China revealed its own BMD-like infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) in 2005, which uses the same heavy airborne parachute. In 2006, the PLA revealed a new family of medium-weight 8 X 8 combat vehicles. The IFV version, the VN-1, was shown for the first time at IDEX in Abu Dhabi last February. This 18-25-plus-ton family will feature an air-transportable 105-mm. tank and 122-mm. artillery versions. The VN-1 is expected to gradually replace 6 X 6 fighting vehicles, and be used to form more medium-weight army units that could follow rapidly deployed but lighter mechanized airborne units.

If budgets continue to increase, the PLA could be capable of deploying modest long-range naval and airborne mechanized army forces by the 2020s. While the PLA may not be able to project large-scale forces and may still lack the basing infrastructure of the U.S., China can be expected to gain considerable political leverage from its potential to make distant-force deployments. This could significantly constrain American strategic options and erode security guarantees, forcing many U.S. allies to greatly increase defense spending to deter China.


Richard D. Fisher, Jr., is a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center of Arlington, Va., and author of China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Praeger, 2008).

Concept: CCTV

:victory: :D :victory:

China Links Power To Economic Security
May 4, 2009
By Richard D. Fisher, Jr.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/g ... Economic%20Security

China is expanding its force-projection capabilities on land, sea and in the air with a range of weapons. The primary goal is to protect economic interests through control of the western Pacific. But China also seeks to counter U.S. naval power in the region and make alliances with strategically placed countries like Iran and Pakistan.

China’s military buildup was acknowledged in the 2009 edition of the Pentagon’s China Military Power report to Congress. “China’s economic development is increasingly dependent upon sustained international stability and secure access to foreign markets and resources,” it states. “[M]ilitary and civilian strategists have begun to discuss the role of the armed forces in protecting and advancing China’s broader political and economic interests.”

In the first two installments of this three-part series, we covered China’s gains in increasingly sophisticated information technologies (DTI March, p. 39) and precision weapons (DTI April, p. 48). This report examines its moves to expand conventional systems.

Such evolution is reflected in official and semi-official Chinese statements, military exercises and deployments, and in the development or acquisition of new means to project power. In late 2004, President Hu Jintao began saying that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “must provide a security guarantee for national interests.” The next year, for the first time, China invited Russian military forces to the Shandong Peninsula to conduct joint and combined-arms “Peace Mission” exercises under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

In December 2006, China’s national defense white paper stated that the army looks to develop “transregional mobility,” the PLA navy “aims at the gradual extension of the strategic depth of offshore defensive operations,” and the PLA air force seeks “strategic projection.”

The meaning of these terms was partially defined by the Peace Mission exercises, which saw the PLA make a small but unprecedented combined-arms deployment. An air force airborne unit with mechanized armor joined a medium-weight army unit that traveled by train, and JH-7A fighter-bombers and army helicopters deployed by air. Plans are underway for SCO forces to exercise in China, likely in August.

Writing in the Communist Party journal Quishi in July 2007, navy commander Adm. Wu Shengli listed as among his service’s missions maintenance of “the safety of oceanic transportation and the strategic passageway for energy.” Most of China’s tanker-carried petroleum travels though the Strait of Malacca. Last December, China sent a small task force of one Type 052B and one Type 052C air-defense destroyers and a support ship to join navies protecting shipping from Somali pirates. One of the destroyers was replaced in April by a new Type 054A air-defense frigate.

While this is a small start for naval deployments, it is possible that China may turn its investments in new ports and facilities in Myanmar, Chittagong harbor in Bangladesh and the port of Gwadar in Pakistan into access for warships. Academy of Social Sciences expert Ye Hailin in February termed the Indian Ocean China’s “sea of destiny,” and advocated reducing reliance on the Strait of Malacca by building energy routes on land via ports in Pakistan and Myanmar. In March, China and Pakistan held a 10-day naval exercise.

Pakistan and Iran are SCO “observers.” They could see increasing bilateral or multilateral military exercises with China if they become full members.

China’s navy might be larger and better able to conduct operations in the Indian Ocean and beyond by the end of the next decade. On Mar. 20, defense minister Liang Guanglie may have put to rest decades of speculation when he told his Japanese counterpart, Hamada Yasukazu, “China’s navy is . . . rather weak; we need to develop an aircraft carrier.” Such development actually began in the 1980s under then-navy commander Liu Huaqing, who became principal vice chairman of the central military commission (CMC). Liu famously quipped that he would “die with his eyes open” if China did not build a carrier.

In leaks to Japanese and Hong Kong reporters in January, PLA and Chinese shipbuilding officials said that by 2020, the navy may have up to four indigenously designed and built aircraft carriers, two conventional and two nuclear. In addition, the Russian-Ukrainian carrier Varyag, acquired by China in 2002, will be refurbished for training.

Russian technology may figure heavily in carrier designs. In April, a Chinese television show interviewed experts who speculated that the new carrier would be similar to the Varyag, and employ a ski-jump. But the show also explored a unique configuration with up to six catapults. :D Carriers may be built at Dalian, the location of the Varyag, and at an expanded shipyard on Changxing Island near Shanghai. An early base for China’s carrier force will likely be a new naval base on Hainan Island.

China’s carrier air wing is also gathering. Candidate aircraft may include: upgraded Sukhoi Su-33s from Russia; a version of Shenyang Aircraft Corp.’s J-11 modified for carrier operations; a new Shenyang fighter sometimes called J-13, which is smaller than the Su-33 but has stealth features; and a carrier version of Chengdu Aircraft Corp.’s J-10 fighter.

It is expected that Hongdu’s L-15 twin-engine supersonic trainer will become a carrier trainer. Sources indicated in 2005 that China could be developing a carrier-based AWACS.

China’s carrier may also feature unmanned combat aerial vehicles. An L-15 carrier trainer would be one candidate, while purpose-designed versions like Shenyang’s Warrior Eagle could also go to sea.

Heavy naval amphibious capabilities will increase over the next decade. In late 2006, China launched its first 20,000-ton Type 071-class LPD (landing platform dock), which has a well deck that can hold a hovercraft for over-the-horizon force transport. This could be followed by a similarly sized flat-deck LHD (landing helicopter dock) called Type 081. Some sources suggest the PLA will build an initial force of six Type 081s and three Type 071s, :D which could carry several thousand troops and supporting armor. Marine and army amphibious units are deploying a new family of fast amphibious armored vehicles, which use water pump jets and planing surfaces for high speed.

The PLA is also developing large transport aircraft and mechanized forces for distance projection. While Russia and China work out the sale of 32-34 new-build Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft with 50-ton load capabilities, China is reorganizing its aircraft industries in a way that may streamline the development of heavy airlifters. This could still involve a great deal of help from Russia and Ukraine, which had hoped to promote a turbofan version of the Antonov An-70. A 2007 concept from the former AVIC-1 consortium showed a 60-ton-capable C-17-like airlifter. This program, however, will also depend on China successfully developing large, high-bypass turbofan engines, a traditional weakness.

In the meantime, the PLA is mechanizing airborne forces, which are nominally under air force command but controlled by the CMC. After Russia failed to sell China its BMD series airborne tank, China revealed its own BMD-like infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) in 2005, which uses the same heavy airborne parachute. In 2006, the PLA revealed a new family of medium-weight 8 X 8 combat vehicles. The IFV version, the VN-1, was shown for the first time at IDEX in Abu Dhabi last February. This 18-25-plus-ton family will feature an air-transportable 105-mm. tank and 122-mm. artillery versions. The VN-1 is expected to gradually replace 6 X 6 fighting vehicles, and be used to form more medium-weight army units that could follow rapidly deployed but lighter mechanized airborne units.

If budgets continue to increase, the PLA could be capable of deploying modest long-range naval and airborne mechanized army forces by the 2020s. While the PLA may not be able to project large-scale forces and may still lack the basing infrastructure of the U.S., China can be expected to gain considerable political leverage from its potential to make distant-force deployments. This could significantly constrain American strategic options and erode security guarantees, forcing many U.S. allies to greatly increase defense spending to deter China.


Richard D. Fisher, Jr., is a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center of Arlington, Va., and author of China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Praeger, 2008).

Concept: CCTV