Mir-2一点资料

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The Polyus military testbed was put together on a crash basis as an answer to America's Star Wars program. It was built around a surplus TKS manned spacecraft and was meant to test prototype ASAT and Star Wars defense systems. It failed to reach orbit, but it had succeeded, it would have been the core module of a new Mir-2 space station. Its mere presence could have decisively changed the shape of the Cold War in its final months. [localimg=566,600]1[/localimg]

In 1985, it became clear that the Energia launch vehicle would be ready for launch before the Buran space shuttle that was its intended payload. Therefore Ministry of General Machine Building (MOM) issued a resolution ordering the launch of Energia with a mock-up of a spacecraft in the 100 metric ton class. In July 1985 General Designer D A Polukhin called together his workers and noted that MOM Minister O D Baklanov had given them the assignment of producing a 100 metric ton 'functional mockup' satellite by September 1986. It would normally take five years to develop such a spacecraft, and they had only one year - therefore it would have to be greatly simplified. The systems in development for the next generation of spacecraft at that time consisted only of equipment items in test configuration. KB Salyut had a range of spacecraft in production, including the 20-metric ton TKS manned logistics vehicle. The Skif-D 100-metric ton space platform was only in the design and drawing stage. The bureau proposed to create a spacecraft from a test stand version of the TKS mated to a mock-up built to the Skif-D drawings. Several modules and subsystems were also borrowed from the Buran. Major subcontractors included NPO Elektropribor, NPO Radiopribor, NPO Digital Mechanics, NIIMASh, KBKhM, and the Progress Factory. On 19 August 1985, MOM issued the detailed schedule for the spacecraft's completion. The Skif-D and all subsystems were delivered to Baikonur in August 1986. From August 1986 to January 1987 the Skif-DM underwent integration and final tests at the space centre. [localimg=360,270]2[/localimg][localimg=178,300]3[/localimg][localimg=732,465]4[/localimg]

The Polyus testbed contained means of defense against both ASAT weapons and beam weapons, though according to Kornilov's article these were only meant to conduct approach and docking tests. A cannon was mounted on Polyus to defend against ASAT weapons. An optical sighting system for the defensive cannon was included in addition to a sighting radar. By this means hostile ASAT weapons could be tracked without generating traceable signals. Experiments to check the efficiency of barium clouds in diffusing particle beams were also to have been conducted with Polyus. [localimg=505,600]5[/localimg]

The spacecraft was about 37 meters in length, 4.1 meters in diameter and weighed about 80 metric tons.[localimg=470,267]6[/localimg]

An article entitled "Unknown Polyus" by Yuri Kornilov, Chief Designer of the Salyut Design Bureau, had appeared in the journal "Earth and the Universe", and it provided details about the construction and testing of the first payload for the Energia rocket, the "Polyus" spacecraft. While Kornilov invites the reader to "read between the lines" and points out previous Soviet mis-statements about the Polyus, he was under a security ban which would lead to a 10 years in prison if he reveals (Soviet) "state" secrets. His article continues to claim that weapons systems tests were peaceful experiments. [localimg=720,335]8[/localimg]

On March 23, 1983, United States President Ronald Reagan set forth his vision of "Star Wars", a shield intended to defend the United States against nuclear attack from any place on Earth. The leader of the Soviet Union, Yuri Andropov, immediately accused the United States of seeking to militarily dominate the Soviet Union, and it kept he also authorized the design of counter-measures, including Polyus. Andropov sought to bring about a treaty banning military weapons from space until he fell ill in June, 1983.

The Soviet space program ran on a five year cycle and Kornilov complained that the Polyus spacecraft had less than the customary five years for development. It was decided that the Polyus would be the payload for the first launch of the Energia heavy lifter, then scheduled for the fall of 1986. Kornilov gives no reason for the rushed development.

Kornilov then goes on to declare that because of this rush Polyus was created by combining components from several current projects. The interface between Polyus and the Energia booster was adapted from the Buran Space Shuttle. The central module was adapted from a module for the Mir 2 Space Station. The replaceable and returnable space station to house cosmonauts was adapted from the upgrade of the existing TKS Transport Supply Spacecraft (Kosmos 929, 1267, 1443, 1668). Since the interface of the replaceable space station with the Proton launch vehicle was adapted to interface it with the central module, the rocket engines for orbital insertion had to be placed in the nose of the vehicle. This placement had catastrophic consequences for the Polyus spacecraft.

After Andropov's death in February, 1984 his successor Konstantin Chernenko continued to press for a treaty banning the militarization of space. None the less, apparently following the successful test by the US Army of an anti-ballistic missile on June 12, 1984, and the rejection of a Soviet diplomatic initiative on July 1, construction of the Polyus began at the Khrunichev Factory.

Design and construction of the platform was given the highest priority, and was under the personal supervision of Armaments Minister O D Baklanov (who later organized the coup against Michael Gorbachev) and Vice Minister O N Shishkin. These two met weekly with project leaders and issued immediate orders for the production of any needed components.

Chernenko's successor Michael Gorbachev denounced the militarization of space on his first diplomatic trips abroad in December, 1984. Following Chernenko's death on March 12, 1985, and his becoming leader, Gorbachev proposed a freeze on the development of space weapons.

Statements made at that time by Gorbachev confirm the impression left by this article and another by General Designer V.V. Pallo of Design Bureau Salyut that the Polyus was indeed a test bed for the Soviet counter measure to the United States "Stars Wars" program, an Orbital Weapons Platform. Platforms of this type would have been capable of delivering nuclear warheads from orbit to any point in the US in six minutes. Gorbachev pointedly called all US SDI technology "space strike" weapons and repeatedly warned that the Soviet response to Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would be "asymmetrical" and that SDI was "destabilizing". It kept that the nuclear warhead launch control system for the Orbital Weapons Platforms was being developed in a very rushed manner and the instability of the Orbital Weapons Platforms scared the Soviet leadership.

According to Kornilov's article, shortly before Polyus' launch President Gorbachev visited the Baikonur Cosmodrome and expressly forbid the on-orbit testing of its capabilities. Kornilov claims that Gorbachev was worried that it would be possible for the west to view this activity as an attempt to create a weapon in space and that such an attempt would compromise the country's leaderships' statements on the USSR's peaceful intent.


Kornilov points out a laser reflector but gives no information on any scientific experiments using it. He also states that personnel on ships, aircraft and the ground were to take part in experiments with Polyus. It kept they were to attempt to target the platform by radar, infra-red and visible light, and when the platform was detected they were to fire at it with lasers. If the laser hit the platform, the mirror would reflect it back to Earth, and thus the platform's stealthiness could be tested without making radio transmissions. Earlier launch pad photos showed that the Polyus was covered by an optically black shroud and it was suspected that this may have been radar absorptive as well.

The Polyus test bed had containers filled with a combination of Xenon and Krypton gases, which would produce light when released in Earth orbit. Container launches would be visible to ground observers, and a warhead launch system could thereby be tested without the use of radio transmissions.

Because of acceleration stresses the original flight plan called for the Polyus platform to ride back-end first under and in the wake of the core stage of the Energia rocket as it passed through the Phase of Maximum Dynamic Stress after launch. Since the engines for orbital insertion would then be in the nose it would be necessary for Polyus to yaw 180 degrees and then roll 90 degrees before they could be fired and Polyus placed in its working orbit. When the platform was finally launched on 15 May, 1987, the Polyus performed a 180 degree yaw turn and then continued the turn through to 360 degrees. Polyus then rolled and fired its orbital insertion engines, which caused it to de-orbit into the South Pacific.

Polyus's failure to achieve working orbit was caused by a faulty inertial guidance sensor. In the rush of construction an already built sensor had been stripped from an existing Cosmos spacecraft and then been inadequately tested, as the Polyus mock-up had been shipped to Baikonur by the time the test equipment arrived at the Khrunichev Factory. Those responsible for the failure were immediately fired or demoted.

No member of the Reagan or Bush administrations ever admitted or revealed publicly any knowledge of Polyus. The US Navy made no statements about any attempts to investigate the wreckage of Polyus, which lies on the floor of the South Pacific.

Article by Ed Grondine

Length: 37.00 m (121.00 ft). Maximum Diameter: 4.10 m (13.40 ft). Mass: 80,000 kg (176,000 lb).


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Polyus Chronology
1986 July 1 - Polyus mock-up delivered to Baikonur - Launch Vehicle: Energia.
A Polyus mock-up was delivered by the Krunichev Factory to Baikonur Cosmodrome, for tests of the Polyus/Energia interface. The spacecraft was about 37 meters in length, 4.1 meters in diameter and weighed about 80 metric tons.

1987 May 15 - Polyus - Program: Buran. Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: LC250. Launch Vehicle: Energia. FAILURE: No orbital insertion due to failure of the FGB attitude control system (Energia performed perfectly). Partial Failure.
Due to delays in completion of the enormous static test facility at Baikonur, which could test the entire Energia vehicle stack, it was decided to launch the vehicle without the verification the tests would provide. The launch of 6SL was planned for 11 May 1987 at 21:30 Moscow time. It was delayed five days when a leak was detected in the Block 3A electrical distribution section, then by another hour due to a fault LH2 thermostat. The launch vehicle performed successfully, but the Polyus payload failed to inject itself into orbit due to a guidance system failure. Additional Details: Polyus.The Polyus military testbed was put together on a crash basis as an answer to America's Star Wars program. It was built around a surplus TKS manned spacecraft and was meant to test prototype ASAT and Star Wars defense systems. It failed to reach orbit, but it had succeeded, it would have been the core module of a new Mir-2 space station. Its mere presence could have decisively changed the shape of the Cold War in its final months. [localimg=566,600]1[/localimg]

In 1985, it became clear that the Energia launch vehicle would be ready for launch before the Buran space shuttle that was its intended payload. Therefore Ministry of General Machine Building (MOM) issued a resolution ordering the launch of Energia with a mock-up of a spacecraft in the 100 metric ton class. In July 1985 General Designer D A Polukhin called together his workers and noted that MOM Minister O D Baklanov had given them the assignment of producing a 100 metric ton 'functional mockup' satellite by September 1986. It would normally take five years to develop such a spacecraft, and they had only one year - therefore it would have to be greatly simplified. The systems in development for the next generation of spacecraft at that time consisted only of equipment items in test configuration. KB Salyut had a range of spacecraft in production, including the 20-metric ton TKS manned logistics vehicle. The Skif-D 100-metric ton space platform was only in the design and drawing stage. The bureau proposed to create a spacecraft from a test stand version of the TKS mated to a mock-up built to the Skif-D drawings. Several modules and subsystems were also borrowed from the Buran. Major subcontractors included NPO Elektropribor, NPO Radiopribor, NPO Digital Mechanics, NIIMASh, KBKhM, and the Progress Factory. On 19 August 1985, MOM issued the detailed schedule for the spacecraft's completion. The Skif-D and all subsystems were delivered to Baikonur in August 1986. From August 1986 to January 1987 the Skif-DM underwent integration and final tests at the space centre. [localimg=360,270]2[/localimg][localimg=178,300]3[/localimg][localimg=732,465]4[/localimg]

The Polyus testbed contained means of defense against both ASAT weapons and beam weapons, though according to Kornilov's article these were only meant to conduct approach and docking tests. A cannon was mounted on Polyus to defend against ASAT weapons. An optical sighting system for the defensive cannon was included in addition to a sighting radar. By this means hostile ASAT weapons could be tracked without generating traceable signals. Experiments to check the efficiency of barium clouds in diffusing particle beams were also to have been conducted with Polyus. [localimg=505,600]5[/localimg]

The spacecraft was about 37 meters in length, 4.1 meters in diameter and weighed about 80 metric tons.[localimg=470,267]6[/localimg]

An article entitled "Unknown Polyus" by Yuri Kornilov, Chief Designer of the Salyut Design Bureau, had appeared in the journal "Earth and the Universe", and it provided details about the construction and testing of the first payload for the Energia rocket, the "Polyus" spacecraft. While Kornilov invites the reader to "read between the lines" and points out previous Soviet mis-statements about the Polyus, he was under a security ban which would lead to a 10 years in prison if he reveals (Soviet) "state" secrets. His article continues to claim that weapons systems tests were peaceful experiments. [localimg=720,335]8[/localimg]

On March 23, 1983, United States President Ronald Reagan set forth his vision of "Star Wars", a shield intended to defend the United States against nuclear attack from any place on Earth. The leader of the Soviet Union, Yuri Andropov, immediately accused the United States of seeking to militarily dominate the Soviet Union, and it kept he also authorized the design of counter-measures, including Polyus. Andropov sought to bring about a treaty banning military weapons from space until he fell ill in June, 1983.

The Soviet space program ran on a five year cycle and Kornilov complained that the Polyus spacecraft had less than the customary five years for development. It was decided that the Polyus would be the payload for the first launch of the Energia heavy lifter, then scheduled for the fall of 1986. Kornilov gives no reason for the rushed development.

Kornilov then goes on to declare that because of this rush Polyus was created by combining components from several current projects. The interface between Polyus and the Energia booster was adapted from the Buran Space Shuttle. The central module was adapted from a module for the Mir 2 Space Station. The replaceable and returnable space station to house cosmonauts was adapted from the upgrade of the existing TKS Transport Supply Spacecraft (Kosmos 929, 1267, 1443, 1668). Since the interface of the replaceable space station with the Proton launch vehicle was adapted to interface it with the central module, the rocket engines for orbital insertion had to be placed in the nose of the vehicle. This placement had catastrophic consequences for the Polyus spacecraft.

After Andropov's death in February, 1984 his successor Konstantin Chernenko continued to press for a treaty banning the militarization of space. None the less, apparently following the successful test by the US Army of an anti-ballistic missile on June 12, 1984, and the rejection of a Soviet diplomatic initiative on July 1, construction of the Polyus began at the Khrunichev Factory.

Design and construction of the platform was given the highest priority, and was under the personal supervision of Armaments Minister O D Baklanov (who later organized the coup against Michael Gorbachev) and Vice Minister O N Shishkin. These two met weekly with project leaders and issued immediate orders for the production of any needed components.

Chernenko's successor Michael Gorbachev denounced the militarization of space on his first diplomatic trips abroad in December, 1984. Following Chernenko's death on March 12, 1985, and his becoming leader, Gorbachev proposed a freeze on the development of space weapons.

Statements made at that time by Gorbachev confirm the impression left by this article and another by General Designer V.V. Pallo of Design Bureau Salyut that the Polyus was indeed a test bed for the Soviet counter measure to the United States "Stars Wars" program, an Orbital Weapons Platform. Platforms of this type would have been capable of delivering nuclear warheads from orbit to any point in the US in six minutes. Gorbachev pointedly called all US SDI technology "space strike" weapons and repeatedly warned that the Soviet response to Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would be "asymmetrical" and that SDI was "destabilizing". It kept that the nuclear warhead launch control system for the Orbital Weapons Platforms was being developed in a very rushed manner and the instability of the Orbital Weapons Platforms scared the Soviet leadership.

According to Kornilov's article, shortly before Polyus' launch President Gorbachev visited the Baikonur Cosmodrome and expressly forbid the on-orbit testing of its capabilities. Kornilov claims that Gorbachev was worried that it would be possible for the west to view this activity as an attempt to create a weapon in space and that such an attempt would compromise the country's leaderships' statements on the USSR's peaceful intent.


Kornilov points out a laser reflector but gives no information on any scientific experiments using it. He also states that personnel on ships, aircraft and the ground were to take part in experiments with Polyus. It kept they were to attempt to target the platform by radar, infra-red and visible light, and when the platform was detected they were to fire at it with lasers. If the laser hit the platform, the mirror would reflect it back to Earth, and thus the platform's stealthiness could be tested without making radio transmissions. Earlier launch pad photos showed that the Polyus was covered by an optically black shroud and it was suspected that this may have been radar absorptive as well.

The Polyus test bed had containers filled with a combination of Xenon and Krypton gases, which would produce light when released in Earth orbit. Container launches would be visible to ground observers, and a warhead launch system could thereby be tested without the use of radio transmissions.

Because of acceleration stresses the original flight plan called for the Polyus platform to ride back-end first under and in the wake of the core stage of the Energia rocket as it passed through the Phase of Maximum Dynamic Stress after launch. Since the engines for orbital insertion would then be in the nose it would be necessary for Polyus to yaw 180 degrees and then roll 90 degrees before they could be fired and Polyus placed in its working orbit. When the platform was finally launched on 15 May, 1987, the Polyus performed a 180 degree yaw turn and then continued the turn through to 360 degrees. Polyus then rolled and fired its orbital insertion engines, which caused it to de-orbit into the South Pacific.

Polyus's failure to achieve working orbit was caused by a faulty inertial guidance sensor. In the rush of construction an already built sensor had been stripped from an existing Cosmos spacecraft and then been inadequately tested, as the Polyus mock-up had been shipped to Baikonur by the time the test equipment arrived at the Khrunichev Factory. Those responsible for the failure were immediately fired or demoted.

No member of the Reagan or Bush administrations ever admitted or revealed publicly any knowledge of Polyus. The US Navy made no statements about any attempts to investigate the wreckage of Polyus, which lies on the floor of the South Pacific.

Article by Ed Grondine

Length: 37.00 m (121.00 ft). Maximum Diameter: 4.10 m (13.40 ft). Mass: 80,000 kg (176,000 lb).


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Polyus Chronology
1986 July 1 - Polyus mock-up delivered to Baikonur - Launch Vehicle: Energia.
A Polyus mock-up was delivered by the Krunichev Factory to Baikonur Cosmodrome, for tests of the Polyus/Energia interface. The spacecraft was about 37 meters in length, 4.1 meters in diameter and weighed about 80 metric tons.

1987 May 15 - Polyus - Program: Buran. Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: LC250. Launch Vehicle: Energia. FAILURE: No orbital insertion due to failure of the FGB attitude control system (Energia performed perfectly). Partial Failure.
Due to delays in completion of the enormous static test facility at Baikonur, which could test the entire Energia vehicle stack, it was decided to launch the vehicle without the verification the tests would provide. The launch of 6SL was planned for 11 May 1987 at 21:30 Moscow time. It was delayed five days when a leak was detected in the Block 3A electrical distribution section, then by another hour due to a fault LH2 thermostat. The launch vehicle performed successfully, but the Polyus payload failed to inject itself into orbit due to a guidance system failure. Additional Details: Polyus.
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军事网站的Polyus放在一起在基础回覆美国的《星球大战》节目。它是建立在一个剩余谢谢载人宇宙飞船,注定要试验样机试验和星球大战防御系统。它未能达到轨道,但它已经成功,这将是一个新的Mir-2核心模块的太空站。它可能是决定性的改变形状的冷战的最后几个月里它。[localimg = 566,600]1[/ localimg]
  
  在1985年,显然Energia运载火箭将准备发射航天飞机前,它Buran预期载荷。因此外交部大楼(妈妈)一般机器发出的决议展开Energia)与模型的飞船在100公吨。1985年的总设计师在七月召集一个Polukhin工人,并指出妈妈部长阿D Baklanov所赐给他们的任务产生100公吨的功能性模型的卫星9月底1986。这通常需要五年发展这样一个宇宙飞船,他们只有一年,所以我们要大大简化。这个系统的开发为下一代的飞船当时只包括设备的物品在测试配置。这个杰出的约了宇宙飞船在生产,包括20-metric吨。谢谢载人物流有限公司这个Skif-D 100-metric吨空间平台的设计和图纸仅在舞台上。提出了建立太空船局从实验台版的武林外传配置模型为Skif-D图纸。几个模块和系统也被借用Buran。主要包括组织NPO Elektropribor,分包商,非营利组织数字力学Radiopribor NIIMASh KBKhM、进步、工厂。1985年8月19日发表的详细计划,妈妈对飞船的完成。和所有的子系统Skif-D送到伪装1986年8月。从1986年8月至1987年1月的进行整合和最终测试Skif-DM在太空中心。[localimg 360,270]2号(= = 178,300 localimg localimg],[3]],[[/ localimg localimg = 732,465]4[/ localimg]
  
  这个Polyus试验地的手段都含有防御武器和光束武器试验,但据Kornilov文章的意思,这仅仅是实施方法和对接试验。一炮装在Polyus保卫克制反卫星武器。光学瞄准系统包括防守加农炮瞄准除了雷达。用这种方法可以跟踪试验武器的敌对而不会产生可追溯性的信号。实验来检查效率的云扩散的粒子束造影也已经展开与Polyus。[localimg = 505,600]5[/ localimg]
  
  宇宙飞船是37米长,4.1米直径和重约80吨。[localimg = 470,267]6[/ localimg]
  
  一篇题为“未知”,别列佐夫斯基Polyus Kornilov首席设计师设计了这个杰出,已经出现在《地球和宇宙”,并提供有关施工、检测的有效载荷的火箭,“Polyus Energia”宇宙飞船。虽然Kornilov邀请读者“阅读字里行间",并指出有关Polyus前苏联mis-statements,他是在一个安全的禁令会导致一个10年监禁,如果他揭示(苏联)“国家”的秘密。他的文章继续主张武器系统测试实验。[localimg和平= 720,335]8[/ localimg]
  
  1983年3月23日,美国总统罗纳德·里根地阐述了他的视力"星际大战"的、盾将美国的核打击从任何地点对地球上。在苏联的领导人,尤里安德罗波夫,立即谴责美国寻求军事统治的苏联,它使他还批准了设计对策,包括Polyus。安德罗波夫试图给来自太空的军事武器条约禁止直到他患病在六月,1983年。
  
  苏联太空计划在5年的周期和Kornilov抱怨Polyus飞船少于5年发展的习惯。这是决定Polyus将有效的第一次发射,然后将重扶正器Energia 1986年的秋季班。没有理由Kornilov冲的发展。
  
  Kornilov接着宣布,由于这些组件是由结合Polyus从当前的项目。Polyus之间的界面和Energia助力器是改编自Buran航天飞机。中央模块是一个模块为和平号太空站。2摘要该文对房子和空间站宇航员退还改编改进现有的困难的交通供给飞船(Kosmos九两九,1267、肝癌、1668)。摘要该文从空间站的接口与质子运载火箭是适应接口,它与中央模块,火箭发动机的轨道插入被放置在鼻子的车辆。这相位为Polyus了灾难性的后果的太空船。
  
  安娜于2月去世后安德罗波,1984年他的继任者康斯坦丁·候补继续为一个条约,禁止外空军备竞赛的空间。没有明显的成功的测试后被美国军队的一个区域反弹道导弹,1984年6月12日,苏联外交主动拒之于7月1日,建设始于Khrunichev Polyus工厂。
  
  平台的设计和施工中得到最高优先级,并且是根据个人监督武器部长阿D Baklanov(后来对迈克尔·戈尔巴乔夫的政变组织)和副部长Shishkin浸。这两个遇见每周和项目负责人签发的生产订单立即任何需要的部件。
  
  迈克尔·戈尔巴乔夫候补的继承人军事化的谴责他第外交的空间在十二月份,1984年出国旅行。下列候补去世,1985年3月12日,他成为领导人戈尔巴乔夫提议冻结,发展空间武器。
  
  当时的声明所留下的印象戈尔巴乔夫确认了这篇文章,另一个由总设计师的设计V.V. Pallo Polyus局,这个杰出的的确是一个测试床给苏联对抗美国《星战》的节目,轨道武器平台。这种类型的平台上已经能够在轨道上的核弹头,任何一点在美国六分钟。我们召集所有SDI戈尔巴乔夫巧妙的技术”的空间停工”武器和多次警告,苏联回应里根的战略防御主动选粹服务将是“不对称”、“不稳定”。四川省的核弹头的不断推出控制系统平台开发轨道的武器很匆忙的方式和不稳定的轨道武器平台吓坏了苏联的领导。
  
  根据文章,不久之后,达芬奇Kornilov Polyus推出总统戈尔巴乔夫的参观了伪装技术和明确禁止其能力的测试。在轨戈尔巴乔夫Kornilov声称,担心可能西部的看法,这种活动作为试图创造一种武器,在空间,这种尝试会削弱该国领导的陈述的和平意图苏联。
  
  
  指出激光Kornilov反射但没有给出任何科学实验资料使用它。他还声称人员在船舶、飞机和地面都参加了实验和Polyus。它一直都尝试通过雷达目标的平台,红外线、可见光,当这个平台检测他们用激光开火。如果激光打平台,镜子可以反映出它回到地球,因此可以测试平台的stealthiness没有无线电。早期的发射台照片显示Polyus是受光黑色的裹尸布,有人怀疑这可能是雷达吸收。
  
  这个Polyus测试床容器装满一个组合氙和氪气体,它会产生光当发表在地球轨道。集装箱发射将看到地面观察家,从而可以弹头发射系统测试没有使用无线电。
  
  由于加速度强调原飞行计划号召Polyus平台后台先是乘坐在核心阶段,当它经过Energia火箭发射相位的发射后的最大动应力。自从引擎轨道插入就会在鼻子就必须对偏航180度和Polyus然后滚90度发射之前,他们可以放置在其工作和Polyus轨道。当这个平台终于推出,1987年5月15日在180度进行了Polyus偏航转,然后继续通过对360度。然后滚开枪,它Polyus轨道插入引擎,这使它de-orbit到南太平洋地区。
  
  Polyus未能达到工作轨道是由于惯性制导传感器故障。在已建成的建筑是传感器被剥夺了现有的宇宙飞船从测试,然后一直不一样,被运往Polyus体验方面的测试设备到达Khrunichev工厂。那些负责发射失败立即或降职。
  
  任何会员的里根和布什行政公开承认过任何知识或显示Polyus。美国海军在声明,没有任何试图探讨Polyus残骸中,躺在地板上的南太平洋地区。
  
  文章以艾德Grondine
  
  长度:37.00 m(121.00英尺)。最大直径4.10 m(13.40英尺)。8公斤(176,000:磅)。
  
  
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  Polyus时代
  1986年7月1日- Polyus原型送到伪装-发射车:Energia)。
  一个模型是由Polyus Krunichev航天中心腾空而起,工厂测试Polyus / Energia)接口。宇宙飞船是37米长,4.1米直径和重约80吨。
  
  1987年5月15日- Polyus -程序:Buran。发射场:12。复杂:LC250发射。运载。Energia)。由于没有眼窝植入失败,失败的FGB姿态控制系统(Energia表现得)。部分失效。
  由于延误完工的巨大的静态测试设备在伪装,测试整个Energia堆栈,这是车辆决定车辆未经验证测试可以提供。发射计划在五月十一日6SL是1987年莫斯科时间晚上9点半。它被推迟了5天的时候发现泄漏块3A电力分配部分,然后由另一小时由故障LH2温控器。运载火箭成功地实施了有效,但Polyus注射本身没有进入轨道由于导航系统失效。更多细节:Polyus。