超级军网见面礼:对中国军工及PLA现代化的全面分析2004/2
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/25 17:33:50
[B]ANALYZING CHINA’S DEFENSE INDUSTRIES
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION[/B]
Statement Of Evan S. Medeiros, Ph.D
Associate Political Scientist
Before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Hearing on Chinese Military Modernization and Cross-Strait Politico-Military Relations
February 6, 2004
I would like to begin by thanking Chairman Robinson, Vice-Chairman D’Amato and the
two co-Chairmen for today’s session, Commissioners Ellsworth and Wortzel, for inviting
me to speak today to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. I commend
the Commission for holding today’s hearing on trends in Chinese military modernization
and the implications for cross-Strait political-military relations. These are issues that have a
direct bearing on U.S. national security interests as well as those of U.S. friends and allies
in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s rise as an economic and military power in Asia raises
numerous questions about the future prospects for stability in the region. These are
questions well worth dedicating significant time and resources to answer.
I have been asked to speak on the capabilities of China’s defense industry - the part of the
Chinese economy involved in the production of weapons systems and related military
technologies. This is an issue that The Corporation has lately devoted effort to
researching, especially in light of the organizational changes within the Chinese military
and the continued growth of the Chinese economy in recent years. The capabilities of
China’s defense industry has received far too little attention among the international
community of China watchers. Important changes have occurred since the late 1990s, and
these deserve closer scrutiny.
Overall Trends
In the last five years, China’s defense industry has become far more productive than in
past decades. The defense industrial reforms implemented in the late 1990s, unlike the
one adopted in previous years, were substantial and have positively influenced the quality
of China’s defense industrial output. Gone are the days of widespread inefficiency and a
paucity of innovation in defense production. Chinese defense firms have improved their
R&D techniques, production processes and, thus, the quality of their output. These
improvements have been gradual and incremental, but they can be expected to continue
to accumulate in the future, assuming the Chinese economy continues growing. China’s
defense firms produce a wide range of increasingly advanced weapons that, in the shortterm,
are relevant to a possible conflict over Taiwan as well as China’s long-term military
presence in Asia.
To be sure, my argument is not that China’s defense industry has been completely
renovated and is now churning out global state-of-the-art weapons systems on par with
major Western nations. Progress has been mixed across the defense industry and
numerous systematic weaknesses remain. These continued problems should not be
discounted. Rather, my argument to this Commission is that it is high time to revisit the
conventional wisdom about China’s defense industrial complex; the focus of current
research needs to include the gradual improvements and future progress of China’s
defense industrial complex. Over the last 20 years, one of the most prominent and
consistent conclusions drawn from research on China’s defense industrial complex has
been the weaknesses and limitations of Chinese defense production capabilities.2 A new
look at this critical issue is needed. The words of General Li Jinai, the head of China’s
General Armaments Department, testify to the salience of revisiting this topic, “there has
been a marked improvement in national defense scientific research and in building of
weapons and equipment. The past five years has been the best period of development in
the country’s history.”
What is China’s Defense Industry?
China’s defense industry is compromised of 11 state-owned enterprises that, in one form
or another, have historically always been involved in production of military goods. These
firms cover the general industrial areas of nuclear affairs, aerospace, aviation,
shipbuilding, ordnance, and electronics. The companies are:
China National Nuclear Group Corporation (www.cnnc.com.cn)
China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Group Corporation (www.cnecc.com)
China Aerospace Science and Technology Group Corporation
(www.cascgroup.com.cn)
China Aerospace Science and Industry Group Corporation (www.casic.com.cn)
China Aviation Industry Group Corporation I (www.avicl.com.cn)
China Aviation Industry Group Corporation II (www.avic2.com.cn)
China State Shipbuilding Group Corporation (www.cssc.net.cn)
China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (www.csic.com.cn)
China North Industries Group Corporation (www.norincogroup.com.cn)
China South Industries Group Corporation (www.chinasouth.com.cn)
China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (www.cetc.com.cn)
Currently, these firms are not controlled by the Chinese military. Rather they are civilian
entities under the authority of the State Council and its subordinate organ, the State
Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND,
Guofang Keji Gongye Weiyuanhui). These firms are contracted by the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) to produce military items. China’s defense industrial firms are
completely different entities from the PLA-owned companies and factories (known as
jundui qiye or military enterprises). The latter were set up and run by PLA authorities in
the 1980s and 1990s until Jiang Zemin forced the PLA to divest from commercial
business activities in 1999.4
Since the early 1980s, China defense industrial firms have diversified away from
exclusive military production to producing civilian goods for domestic and international
markets. This was an important part of Deng’s Xiaoping’s economic reform program
which sought to lessen the defense industry’s heavy reliance on government support.
Current estimates of the amount of civilian production in each of the eleven large defense
corporation ranges from 65% to 90% depending on the particular firm. Thus, even though
these enterprises are officially considered by the government as defense industrial firms,
they are also primarily involved in producing civilian goods and services, and thus are
intertwined with China’s huge civilian economy. In addition, there are a growing number
firms that do not belong to the eleven defense-industrial conglomerates (especially in the
information technology (IT) sector) which produce goods under contract for the military.
The line between defense industrial firms and civilian firms in China is increasingly
blurred, which complicates analysis of the performance of China’s defense industrial
base.
Salience of Examining China’s Defense Industry
The salience of researching China’s defense industrial capability stems from several
considerations which are directly relevant to today’s hearing. First, Chinese leaders are
unlikely to have a long-term policy of relying primarily on imported weapons. The ability
of China’s defense industries to produce modern weapons, therefore, will be an important
determinant of China’s future military power. Second, understanding China’s defense
industrial capabilities is critical to answering questions about whether China’s has the
ability to translate its growing economic resources into building a modern military.6
Third, China’s defense output serves as an indicator of national technological progress.
China’s ability to overcome some of the perennial weakness of its defense industrial
complex, such as systems integration and serial production of high-tech weapons
platforms, may serve as a sign of a broader modernization in China’s science and
technology base.
[em00][em08][em09]
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION[/B]
Statement Of Evan S. Medeiros, Ph.D
Associate Political Scientist
Before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Hearing on Chinese Military Modernization and Cross-Strait Politico-Military Relations
February 6, 2004
I would like to begin by thanking Chairman Robinson, Vice-Chairman D’Amato and the
two co-Chairmen for today’s session, Commissioners Ellsworth and Wortzel, for inviting
me to speak today to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. I commend
the Commission for holding today’s hearing on trends in Chinese military modernization
and the implications for cross-Strait political-military relations. These are issues that have a
direct bearing on U.S. national security interests as well as those of U.S. friends and allies
in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s rise as an economic and military power in Asia raises
numerous questions about the future prospects for stability in the region. These are
questions well worth dedicating significant time and resources to answer.
I have been asked to speak on the capabilities of China’s defense industry - the part of the
Chinese economy involved in the production of weapons systems and related military
technologies. This is an issue that The Corporation has lately devoted effort to
researching, especially in light of the organizational changes within the Chinese military
and the continued growth of the Chinese economy in recent years. The capabilities of
China’s defense industry has received far too little attention among the international
community of China watchers. Important changes have occurred since the late 1990s, and
these deserve closer scrutiny.
Overall Trends
In the last five years, China’s defense industry has become far more productive than in
past decades. The defense industrial reforms implemented in the late 1990s, unlike the
one adopted in previous years, were substantial and have positively influenced the quality
of China’s defense industrial output. Gone are the days of widespread inefficiency and a
paucity of innovation in defense production. Chinese defense firms have improved their
R&D techniques, production processes and, thus, the quality of their output. These
improvements have been gradual and incremental, but they can be expected to continue
to accumulate in the future, assuming the Chinese economy continues growing. China’s
defense firms produce a wide range of increasingly advanced weapons that, in the shortterm,
are relevant to a possible conflict over Taiwan as well as China’s long-term military
presence in Asia.
To be sure, my argument is not that China’s defense industry has been completely
renovated and is now churning out global state-of-the-art weapons systems on par with
major Western nations. Progress has been mixed across the defense industry and
numerous systematic weaknesses remain. These continued problems should not be
discounted. Rather, my argument to this Commission is that it is high time to revisit the
conventional wisdom about China’s defense industrial complex; the focus of current
research needs to include the gradual improvements and future progress of China’s
defense industrial complex. Over the last 20 years, one of the most prominent and
consistent conclusions drawn from research on China’s defense industrial complex has
been the weaknesses and limitations of Chinese defense production capabilities.2 A new
look at this critical issue is needed. The words of General Li Jinai, the head of China’s
General Armaments Department, testify to the salience of revisiting this topic, “there has
been a marked improvement in national defense scientific research and in building of
weapons and equipment. The past five years has been the best period of development in
the country’s history.”
What is China’s Defense Industry?
China’s defense industry is compromised of 11 state-owned enterprises that, in one form
or another, have historically always been involved in production of military goods. These
firms cover the general industrial areas of nuclear affairs, aerospace, aviation,
shipbuilding, ordnance, and electronics. The companies are:
China National Nuclear Group Corporation (www.cnnc.com.cn)
China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Group Corporation (www.cnecc.com)
China Aerospace Science and Technology Group Corporation
(www.cascgroup.com.cn)
China Aerospace Science and Industry Group Corporation (www.casic.com.cn)
China Aviation Industry Group Corporation I (www.avicl.com.cn)
China Aviation Industry Group Corporation II (www.avic2.com.cn)
China State Shipbuilding Group Corporation (www.cssc.net.cn)
China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (www.csic.com.cn)
China North Industries Group Corporation (www.norincogroup.com.cn)
China South Industries Group Corporation (www.chinasouth.com.cn)
China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (www.cetc.com.cn)
Currently, these firms are not controlled by the Chinese military. Rather they are civilian
entities under the authority of the State Council and its subordinate organ, the State
Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND,
Guofang Keji Gongye Weiyuanhui). These firms are contracted by the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) to produce military items. China’s defense industrial firms are
completely different entities from the PLA-owned companies and factories (known as
jundui qiye or military enterprises). The latter were set up and run by PLA authorities in
the 1980s and 1990s until Jiang Zemin forced the PLA to divest from commercial
business activities in 1999.4
Since the early 1980s, China defense industrial firms have diversified away from
exclusive military production to producing civilian goods for domestic and international
markets. This was an important part of Deng’s Xiaoping’s economic reform program
which sought to lessen the defense industry’s heavy reliance on government support.
Current estimates of the amount of civilian production in each of the eleven large defense
corporation ranges from 65% to 90% depending on the particular firm. Thus, even though
these enterprises are officially considered by the government as defense industrial firms,
they are also primarily involved in producing civilian goods and services, and thus are
intertwined with China’s huge civilian economy. In addition, there are a growing number
firms that do not belong to the eleven defense-industrial conglomerates (especially in the
information technology (IT) sector) which produce goods under contract for the military.
The line between defense industrial firms and civilian firms in China is increasingly
blurred, which complicates analysis of the performance of China’s defense industrial
base.
Salience of Examining China’s Defense Industry
The salience of researching China’s defense industrial capability stems from several
considerations which are directly relevant to today’s hearing. First, Chinese leaders are
unlikely to have a long-term policy of relying primarily on imported weapons. The ability
of China’s defense industries to produce modern weapons, therefore, will be an important
determinant of China’s future military power. Second, understanding China’s defense
industrial capabilities is critical to answering questions about whether China’s has the
ability to translate its growing economic resources into building a modern military.6
Third, China’s defense output serves as an indicator of national technological progress.
China’s ability to overcome some of the perennial weakness of its defense industrial
complex, such as systems integration and serial production of high-tech weapons
platforms, may serve as a sign of a broader modernization in China’s science and
technology base.
[em00][em08][em09]
[此贴子已经被作者于2004-3-7 13:53:45编辑过]
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION[/B]
Statement Of Evan S. Medeiros, Ph.D
Associate Political Scientist
Before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Hearing on Chinese Military Modernization and Cross-Strait Politico-Military Relations
February 6, 2004
I would like to begin by thanking Chairman Robinson, Vice-Chairman D’Amato and the
two co-Chairmen for today’s session, Commissioners Ellsworth and Wortzel, for inviting
me to speak today to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. I commend
the Commission for holding today’s hearing on trends in Chinese military modernization
and the implications for cross-Strait political-military relations. These are issues that have a
direct bearing on U.S. national security interests as well as those of U.S. friends and allies
in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s rise as an economic and military power in Asia raises
numerous questions about the future prospects for stability in the region. These are
questions well worth dedicating significant time and resources to answer.
I have been asked to speak on the capabilities of China’s defense industry - the part of the
Chinese economy involved in the production of weapons systems and related military
technologies. This is an issue that The Corporation has lately devoted effort to
researching, especially in light of the organizational changes within the Chinese military
and the continued growth of the Chinese economy in recent years. The capabilities of
China’s defense industry has received far too little attention among the international
community of China watchers. Important changes have occurred since the late 1990s, and
these deserve closer scrutiny.
Overall Trends
In the last five years, China’s defense industry has become far more productive than in
past decades. The defense industrial reforms implemented in the late 1990s, unlike the
one adopted in previous years, were substantial and have positively influenced the quality
of China’s defense industrial output. Gone are the days of widespread inefficiency and a
paucity of innovation in defense production. Chinese defense firms have improved their
R&D techniques, production processes and, thus, the quality of their output. These
improvements have been gradual and incremental, but they can be expected to continue
to accumulate in the future, assuming the Chinese economy continues growing. China’s
defense firms produce a wide range of increasingly advanced weapons that, in the shortterm,
are relevant to a possible conflict over Taiwan as well as China’s long-term military
presence in Asia.
To be sure, my argument is not that China’s defense industry has been completely
renovated and is now churning out global state-of-the-art weapons systems on par with
major Western nations. Progress has been mixed across the defense industry and
numerous systematic weaknesses remain. These continued problems should not be
discounted. Rather, my argument to this Commission is that it is high time to revisit the
conventional wisdom about China’s defense industrial complex; the focus of current
research needs to include the gradual improvements and future progress of China’s
defense industrial complex. Over the last 20 years, one of the most prominent and
consistent conclusions drawn from research on China’s defense industrial complex has
been the weaknesses and limitations of Chinese defense production capabilities.2 A new
look at this critical issue is needed. The words of General Li Jinai, the head of China’s
General Armaments Department, testify to the salience of revisiting this topic, “there has
been a marked improvement in national defense scientific research and in building of
weapons and equipment. The past five years has been the best period of development in
the country’s history.”
What is China’s Defense Industry?
China’s defense industry is compromised of 11 state-owned enterprises that, in one form
or another, have historically always been involved in production of military goods. These
firms cover the general industrial areas of nuclear affairs, aerospace, aviation,
shipbuilding, ordnance, and electronics. The companies are:
China National Nuclear Group Corporation (www.cnnc.com.cn)
China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Group Corporation (www.cnecc.com)
China Aerospace Science and Technology Group Corporation
(www.cascgroup.com.cn)
China Aerospace Science and Industry Group Corporation (www.casic.com.cn)
China Aviation Industry Group Corporation I (www.avicl.com.cn)
China Aviation Industry Group Corporation II (www.avic2.com.cn)
China State Shipbuilding Group Corporation (www.cssc.net.cn)
China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (www.csic.com.cn)
China North Industries Group Corporation (www.norincogroup.com.cn)
China South Industries Group Corporation (www.chinasouth.com.cn)
China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (www.cetc.com.cn)
Currently, these firms are not controlled by the Chinese military. Rather they are civilian
entities under the authority of the State Council and its subordinate organ, the State
Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND,
Guofang Keji Gongye Weiyuanhui). These firms are contracted by the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) to produce military items. China’s defense industrial firms are
completely different entities from the PLA-owned companies and factories (known as
jundui qiye or military enterprises). The latter were set up and run by PLA authorities in
the 1980s and 1990s until Jiang Zemin forced the PLA to divest from commercial
business activities in 1999.4
Since the early 1980s, China defense industrial firms have diversified away from
exclusive military production to producing civilian goods for domestic and international
markets. This was an important part of Deng’s Xiaoping’s economic reform program
which sought to lessen the defense industry’s heavy reliance on government support.
Current estimates of the amount of civilian production in each of the eleven large defense
corporation ranges from 65% to 90% depending on the particular firm. Thus, even though
these enterprises are officially considered by the government as defense industrial firms,
they are also primarily involved in producing civilian goods and services, and thus are
intertwined with China’s huge civilian economy. In addition, there are a growing number
firms that do not belong to the eleven defense-industrial conglomerates (especially in the
information technology (IT) sector) which produce goods under contract for the military.
The line between defense industrial firms and civilian firms in China is increasingly
blurred, which complicates analysis of the performance of China’s defense industrial
base.
Salience of Examining China’s Defense Industry
The salience of researching China’s defense industrial capability stems from several
considerations which are directly relevant to today’s hearing. First, Chinese leaders are
unlikely to have a long-term policy of relying primarily on imported weapons. The ability
of China’s defense industries to produce modern weapons, therefore, will be an important
determinant of China’s future military power. Second, understanding China’s defense
industrial capabilities is critical to answering questions about whether China’s has the
ability to translate its growing economic resources into building a modern military.6
Third, China’s defense output serves as an indicator of national technological progress.
China’s ability to overcome some of the perennial weakness of its defense industrial
complex, such as systems integration and serial production of high-tech weapons
platforms, may serve as a sign of a broader modernization in China’s science and
technology base.
[em00][em08][em09]
[此贴子已经被作者于2004-3-7 13:53:45编辑过]
[B]ANALYZING CHINA’S DEFENSE INDUSTRIESAND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION[/B]
Statement Of Evan S. Medeiros, Ph.D
Associate Political Scientist
Before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Hearing on Chinese Military Modernization and Cross-Strait Politico-Military Relations
February 6, 2004
I would like to begin by thanking Chairman Robinson, Vice-Chairman D’Amato and the
two co-Chairmen for today’s session, Commissioners Ellsworth and Wortzel, for inviting
me to speak today to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. I commend
the Commission for holding today’s hearing on trends in Chinese military modernization
and the implications for cross-Strait political-military relations. These are issues that have a
direct bearing on U.S. national security interests as well as those of U.S. friends and allies
in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s rise as an economic and military power in Asia raises
numerous questions about the future prospects for stability in the region. These are
questions well worth dedicating significant time and resources to answer.
I have been asked to speak on the capabilities of China’s defense industry - the part of the
Chinese economy involved in the production of weapons systems and related military
technologies. This is an issue that The Corporation has lately devoted effort to
researching, especially in light of the organizational changes within the Chinese military
and the continued growth of the Chinese economy in recent years. The capabilities of
China’s defense industry has received far too little attention among the international
community of China watchers. Important changes have occurred since the late 1990s, and
these deserve closer scrutiny.
Overall Trends
In the last five years, China’s defense industry has become far more productive than in
past decades. The defense industrial reforms implemented in the late 1990s, unlike the
one adopted in previous years, were substantial and have positively influenced the quality
of China’s defense industrial output. Gone are the days of widespread inefficiency and a
paucity of innovation in defense production. Chinese defense firms have improved their
R&D techniques, production processes and, thus, the quality of their output. These
improvements have been gradual and incremental, but they can be expected to continue
to accumulate in the future, assuming the Chinese economy continues growing. China’s
defense firms produce a wide range of increasingly advanced weapons that, in the shortterm,
are relevant to a possible conflict over Taiwan as well as China’s long-term military
presence in Asia.
To be sure, my argument is not that China’s defense industry has been completely
renovated and is now churning out global state-of-the-art weapons systems on par with
major Western nations. Progress has been mixed across the defense industry and
numerous systematic weaknesses remain. These continued problems should not be
discounted. Rather, my argument to this Commission is that it is high time to revisit the
conventional wisdom about China’s defense industrial complex; the focus of current
research needs to include the gradual improvements and future progress of China’s
defense industrial complex. Over the last 20 years, one of the most prominent and
consistent conclusions drawn from research on China’s defense industrial complex has
been the weaknesses and limitations of Chinese defense production capabilities.2 A new
look at this critical issue is needed. The words of General Li Jinai, the head of China’s
General Armaments Department, testify to the salience of revisiting this topic, “there has
been a marked improvement in national defense scientific research and in building of
weapons and equipment. The past five years has been the best period of development in
the country’s history.”
What is China’s Defense Industry?
China’s defense industry is compromised of 11 state-owned enterprises that, in one form
or another, have historically always been involved in production of military goods. These
firms cover the general industrial areas of nuclear affairs, aerospace, aviation,
shipbuilding, ordnance, and electronics. The companies are:
China National Nuclear Group Corporation (www.cnnc.com.cn)
China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Group Corporation (www.cnecc.com)
China Aerospace Science and Technology Group Corporation
(www.cascgroup.com.cn)
China Aerospace Science and Industry Group Corporation (www.casic.com.cn)
China Aviation Industry Group Corporation I (www.avicl.com.cn)
China Aviation Industry Group Corporation II (www.avic2.com.cn)
China State Shipbuilding Group Corporation (www.cssc.net.cn)
China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (www.csic.com.cn)
China North Industries Group Corporation (www.norincogroup.com.cn)
China South Industries Group Corporation (www.chinasouth.com.cn)
China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (www.cetc.com.cn)
Currently, these firms are not controlled by the Chinese military. Rather they are civilian
entities under the authority of the State Council and its subordinate organ, the State
Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND,
Guofang Keji Gongye Weiyuanhui). These firms are contracted by the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) to produce military items. China’s defense industrial firms are
completely different entities from the PLA-owned companies and factories (known as
jundui qiye or military enterprises). The latter were set up and run by PLA authorities in
the 1980s and 1990s until Jiang Zemin forced the PLA to divest from commercial
business activities in 1999.4
Since the early 1980s, China defense industrial firms have diversified away from
exclusive military production to producing civilian goods for domestic and international
markets. This was an important part of Deng’s Xiaoping’s economic reform program
which sought to lessen the defense industry’s heavy reliance on government support.
Current estimates of the amount of civilian production in each of the eleven large defense
corporation ranges from 65% to 90% depending on the particular firm. Thus, even though
these enterprises are officially considered by the government as defense industrial firms,
they are also primarily involved in producing civilian goods and services, and thus are
intertwined with China’s huge civilian economy. In addition, there are a growing number
firms that do not belong to the eleven defense-industrial conglomerates (especially in the
information technology (IT) sector) which produce goods under contract for the military.
The line between defense industrial firms and civilian firms in China is increasingly
blurred, which complicates analysis of the performance of China’s defense industrial
base.
Salience of Examining China’s Defense Industry
The salience of researching China’s defense industrial capability stems from several
considerations which are directly relevant to today’s hearing. First, Chinese leaders are
unlikely to have a long-term policy of relying primarily on imported weapons. The ability
of China’s defense industries to produce modern weapons, therefore, will be an important
determinant of China’s future military power. Second, understanding China’s defense
industrial capabilities is critical to answering questions about whether China’s has the
ability to translate its growing economic resources into building a modern military.6
Third, China’s defense output serves as an indicator of national technological progress.
China’s ability to overcome some of the perennial weakness of its defense industrial
complex, such as systems integration and serial production of high-tech weapons
platforms, may serve as a sign of a broader modernization in China’s science and
technology base.
[em00][em08][em09]
[此贴子已经被作者于2004-3-7 13:53:45编辑过]
part 2
Past Portrait of China’s Defense Industry
For the past twenty years, the conventional wisdom has been that China’s defense
industry was broken, decaying and unable to meet the needs of a military in desperate
needs of modernization. For much of that time period, that assessment was correct.
China’s defense industry exhibited numerous weaknesses at all levels of the system, from
government procurement to factory production. At the level of government procurement,
decisions about which company would produce a particular item were made by
administrative fiat or ministerial bargaining rather through competitive bidding based on
the relative capabilities of various manufacturers. As a result, defense producers had little
financial interest in improving the quality of the weapons systems or the efficiency with
which they manufactured or designed them. In such a regime, the ability to produce a
quality product had a minimal relationship to the orders received or the profits
generated.
In addition to the lack of financial incentives for innovation, China’s Soviet-designed
approach to industrial organization also inhibited the supply of innovation. Under the
Soviet model, R&D institutes were organizationally separate from the actual
manufacturers. This feature was common, though not universal, in China’s defense
industry during the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, a hierarchical organizational structure
discouraged the horizontal knowledge flows that are critical to technological progress.
This knowledge flow problem was undoubtedly exacerbated by the extreme secrecy
associated with defense production in China.
Other major problems exhibited by China’s defense enterprises included excessive
capacity, redundant personnel, inflexibility in hiring and firing, loss of quality personnel
to the non-state-owned sector, incorrectly priced inputs, poor management practices, and
the inefficient geographic distribution of industry due to a 1960s and 1970s policy of
relocating defense firms to remote interior areas known as China’s “Third Line”
(disanxian).
The Chinese government’s efforts in the 1980s and most of the 1990s to overcome these
weaknesses was largely ineffective. Beijing relied on essentially two strategies: defense
conversion and institutional reorganization. Both strategies, especially their poor
implementation, failed to reform the operations of China’s defense firms to make them
more innovative and efficient. Defense conversion was a largely troubled process for
most Chinese firms which found it difficult to convert easily their production
infrastructure to producing civilian, commercial goods. Defense enterprises were
hampered by legal constraints and difficulties in attracting foreign partners who could
provide new capital, know-how and technologies. These problems were further
exacerbated by the weaknesses in technology absorption capabilities, project
management, and the technical skills of the labor force. As a result, many civilian goods
produced by defense firms were low quality, uncompetitive and thus generated few
profits.
Similar to China’s experience with defense conversion, institutional re-organization was
largely a cosmetic and ineffective pathway to substantial and sustained reform of China’s
decaying defense production capabilities. This approach involved a lot of changing of
names and shuffling of organizational responsibilities but few of the systematic
consolidation and rationalization measures needed to increase efficiency and bolster
innovation.
The weaknesses of China’s defense production capabilities over the last 20 years are
reflected by two major indicators: (1) the technological backwardness of many of the
systems produced in the 1980s and 1990s, and the long R&D and production timelines
for most indigenously built weapons platforms; and (2) China’s extensive purchases of
major weapons systems from foreign countries. The history of China’s defense industry
is replete with examples of weapon systems with severe technological weaknesses and
limitations. While many tanks, artillery, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface
missiles, surface ships, submarines, and air-to-air missiles entered service in the PLA
since 1980, for the most part these new designs have been incremental improvements on
earlier versions, which in many cases trace their lineage back to 1950s-era Soviet
technology.
The Changing Shape of China’s Defense Industry
In the late 1990s, the situation began to change. The government started to increase
weapons procurement funding. From 1990 to 2002, the official defense budget allocation
for weapons procurement grew from RMB 5 billion to RMB 57.3 billion. These increases
are twice the rate of growth of the official defense budget. Also the share of the budget
devoted to weapons procurement increased from 16.3 % to 33.8 % in this time period.
From the period 1997-2002, according to official Chinese budget figures the amount of
funding for equipment grew 124%, more than the other two categories in the official
defense budget.
Beyond increased funding for weapons procurement, the government finally adopted
reforms which indicate a recognition of the depth of the problems in China’s defense
industrial system and the failures of past approaches. Beginning in Spring 1998 during
the 9th Meeting of the National People’s Congress, China’s leadership initiated a new
series of policies to reform the operation of the defense procurement system at the
government-level and, second, to restructure the defense industries at the enterprise-level
of operations. These policies initiated institutional changes in the management of China’s
defense industry in ways that outstrip past efforts in both scope and depth. These reforms
also importantly began to influence incentive structures in the defense industry.
In March 1998, the government abolished the military-influenced Commission on
Science Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), which had been
created in 1982, and replaced it with a strictly civilian agency of the same name but under
the control of the State Council. The old COSTIND, which reported to both the State
Council and the military, had been very heavily involved in decisions on R&D and the
purchase of military equipment. The restructured COSTIND’s responsibilities, resources
and authority were substantially circumscribed. It longer has a dominant role in decisions
about PLA acquisitions of new military equipment or the direct management of defense
industry enterprises. The restructured COSTIND, a shell of its former incarnation, is
generally meant to function as the administrative and regulatory agency for China’s
major defense enterprises.
The second major organizational reform, following the “civilianization” of COSTIND,
was the creation in April 1998 of a new general department of the PLA known as the
General Armaments Department (GAD - Zong Zhuangbei Bu). GAD assumed the
responsibilities for military procurement of the old COSTIND combined with the roles
and missions of other parts of the General Staff and General Logistics Departments
involved in weapons procurement. The responsibilities of GAD include the life cycle
management of the PLA’s weapons systems (from R&D to retirement) and running
China’s weapons testing, evaluation and training bases.
The significance of the “civilianization” of COSTIND and the creation of GAD is twofold.
First, these policy changes centralized China’s military procurement system.
Previously, responsibilities for PLA purchases were divided between numerous civilian
and military organizations, each with distinct and conflicting interests. For example,
COSTIND’s former predominant influence in this process produced numerous
inefficiencies. Second, the 1998 reforms separated the builders from the buyers. This
organizational change further rationalized the procurement system and aimed to reduce
conflicts of interest and corruption. GAD represents the PLA interests whereas
COSTIND, as a civilian agency, now mainly handles industrial planning and the
administrative affairs of defense firms.
Past Portrait of China’s Defense Industry
For the past twenty years, the conventional wisdom has been that China’s defense
industry was broken, decaying and unable to meet the needs of a military in desperate
needs of modernization. For much of that time period, that assessment was correct.
China’s defense industry exhibited numerous weaknesses at all levels of the system, from
government procurement to factory production. At the level of government procurement,
decisions about which company would produce a particular item were made by
administrative fiat or ministerial bargaining rather through competitive bidding based on
the relative capabilities of various manufacturers. As a result, defense producers had little
financial interest in improving the quality of the weapons systems or the efficiency with
which they manufactured or designed them. In such a regime, the ability to produce a
quality product had a minimal relationship to the orders received or the profits
generated.
In addition to the lack of financial incentives for innovation, China’s Soviet-designed
approach to industrial organization also inhibited the supply of innovation. Under the
Soviet model, R&D institutes were organizationally separate from the actual
manufacturers. This feature was common, though not universal, in China’s defense
industry during the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, a hierarchical organizational structure
discouraged the horizontal knowledge flows that are critical to technological progress.
This knowledge flow problem was undoubtedly exacerbated by the extreme secrecy
associated with defense production in China.
Other major problems exhibited by China’s defense enterprises included excessive
capacity, redundant personnel, inflexibility in hiring and firing, loss of quality personnel
to the non-state-owned sector, incorrectly priced inputs, poor management practices, and
the inefficient geographic distribution of industry due to a 1960s and 1970s policy of
relocating defense firms to remote interior areas known as China’s “Third Line”
(disanxian).
The Chinese government’s efforts in the 1980s and most of the 1990s to overcome these
weaknesses was largely ineffective. Beijing relied on essentially two strategies: defense
conversion and institutional reorganization. Both strategies, especially their poor
implementation, failed to reform the operations of China’s defense firms to make them
more innovative and efficient. Defense conversion was a largely troubled process for
most Chinese firms which found it difficult to convert easily their production
infrastructure to producing civilian, commercial goods. Defense enterprises were
hampered by legal constraints and difficulties in attracting foreign partners who could
provide new capital, know-how and technologies. These problems were further
exacerbated by the weaknesses in technology absorption capabilities, project
management, and the technical skills of the labor force. As a result, many civilian goods
produced by defense firms were low quality, uncompetitive and thus generated few
profits.
Similar to China’s experience with defense conversion, institutional re-organization was
largely a cosmetic and ineffective pathway to substantial and sustained reform of China’s
decaying defense production capabilities. This approach involved a lot of changing of
names and shuffling of organizational responsibilities but few of the systematic
consolidation and rationalization measures needed to increase efficiency and bolster
innovation.
The weaknesses of China’s defense production capabilities over the last 20 years are
reflected by two major indicators: (1) the technological backwardness of many of the
systems produced in the 1980s and 1990s, and the long R&D and production timelines
for most indigenously built weapons platforms; and (2) China’s extensive purchases of
major weapons systems from foreign countries. The history of China’s defense industry
is replete with examples of weapon systems with severe technological weaknesses and
limitations. While many tanks, artillery, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface
missiles, surface ships, submarines, and air-to-air missiles entered service in the PLA
since 1980, for the most part these new designs have been incremental improvements on
earlier versions, which in many cases trace their lineage back to 1950s-era Soviet
technology.
The Changing Shape of China’s Defense Industry
In the late 1990s, the situation began to change. The government started to increase
weapons procurement funding. From 1990 to 2002, the official defense budget allocation
for weapons procurement grew from RMB 5 billion to RMB 57.3 billion. These increases
are twice the rate of growth of the official defense budget. Also the share of the budget
devoted to weapons procurement increased from 16.3 % to 33.8 % in this time period.
From the period 1997-2002, according to official Chinese budget figures the amount of
funding for equipment grew 124%, more than the other two categories in the official
defense budget.
Beyond increased funding for weapons procurement, the government finally adopted
reforms which indicate a recognition of the depth of the problems in China’s defense
industrial system and the failures of past approaches. Beginning in Spring 1998 during
the 9th Meeting of the National People’s Congress, China’s leadership initiated a new
series of policies to reform the operation of the defense procurement system at the
government-level and, second, to restructure the defense industries at the enterprise-level
of operations. These policies initiated institutional changes in the management of China’s
defense industry in ways that outstrip past efforts in both scope and depth. These reforms
also importantly began to influence incentive structures in the defense industry.
In March 1998, the government abolished the military-influenced Commission on
Science Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), which had been
created in 1982, and replaced it with a strictly civilian agency of the same name but under
the control of the State Council. The old COSTIND, which reported to both the State
Council and the military, had been very heavily involved in decisions on R&D and the
purchase of military equipment. The restructured COSTIND’s responsibilities, resources
and authority were substantially circumscribed. It longer has a dominant role in decisions
about PLA acquisitions of new military equipment or the direct management of defense
industry enterprises. The restructured COSTIND, a shell of its former incarnation, is
generally meant to function as the administrative and regulatory agency for China’s
major defense enterprises.
The second major organizational reform, following the “civilianization” of COSTIND,
was the creation in April 1998 of a new general department of the PLA known as the
General Armaments Department (GAD - Zong Zhuangbei Bu). GAD assumed the
responsibilities for military procurement of the old COSTIND combined with the roles
and missions of other parts of the General Staff and General Logistics Departments
involved in weapons procurement. The responsibilities of GAD include the life cycle
management of the PLA’s weapons systems (from R&D to retirement) and running
China’s weapons testing, evaluation and training bases.
The significance of the “civilianization” of COSTIND and the creation of GAD is twofold.
First, these policy changes centralized China’s military procurement system.
Previously, responsibilities for PLA purchases were divided between numerous civilian
and military organizations, each with distinct and conflicting interests. For example,
COSTIND’s former predominant influence in this process produced numerous
inefficiencies. Second, the 1998 reforms separated the builders from the buyers. This
organizational change further rationalized the procurement system and aimed to reduce
conflicts of interest and corruption. GAD represents the PLA interests whereas
COSTIND, as a civilian agency, now mainly handles industrial planning and the
administrative affairs of defense firms.
to be continued
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本人网页:
http://janewwl.yourblog.org
会有大量E文和中文军事内容逐步上传.已上传第1期---中国的对外军售(在军事杂志放送区 有同样内容)
欢迎多提宝贵建议.
共同提高!
本人网页:
http://janewwl.yourblog.org
会有大量E文和中文军事内容逐步上传.已上传第1期---中国的对外军售(在军事杂志放送区 有同样内容)
欢迎多提宝贵建议.
共同提高!
自己顶一下
斑主, 好文,非常深刻. 请把剩下的部分贴上来
楼上的大侠们，文中的cross-strait是什么意思？不是台湾海峡吧？
楼上的大侠们，文中的cross-strait是什么意思？不是台湾海峡吧？-----------------------就是哪个意思
اهلا وسهلا
我学的第二外语是英语，哭~
我学的第二外语是英语，哭~
<B>以下是引用<I>geneweapon</I>在2004-4-24 21:37:00的发言：</B>
楼上的大侠们，文中的cross-strait是什么意思？不是台湾海峡吧？-----------------------就是哪个意思
应该翻作海峡两岸或跨海峡更确切些。这篇文章是从U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission的一个听证会的证词中摘的。
It's just so so !