保卫太平洋 - 美国政府智库兰德公司提出对付中国的政策

China’s Military Strategy
America needs to retain a strategic as well as a technological advantage. Chinese military doctrinal writings discuss how to defeat a militarily superior adversary such as the United States. We found these writings in openly published Chinese-language books on military strategy, articles in Chinese military journals, reports from Chinese military newspapers, and recent Western studies of Chinese security policy. We found in the writings at least seven strategic principles that have implications for U.S. forces in the Pacific.

The first strategic principle is seizing the initiative early in a conflict. Chinese military analysts note that Iraq, by not seizing the initiative in the 1991 Gulf War, allowed the United States to build up its forces until it had overwhelming superiority. If China is to be victorious against a militarily superior power, China must go on the offensive from the very beginning. In the context of a conflict between the United States and China, this means that U.S. forces stationed permanently in the Western Pacific will be critical, because China is likely to go on the offensive before additional forces can be brought into the theater.

A second and related strategic principle for defeating a militarily superior adversary is the importance of surprise. Surprise is valuable not only for an immediate tactical advantage but also as an important way of seizing the initiative. Surprise puts the adversary in the position of reacting to China’s moves, making it easy to maintain the initiative thereafter. In the context of a conflict between the United States and China, this means that the ability of U.S. forces in the Pacific to avoid and survive surprise attacks will be critical.

Related to the first two strategic principles is a third one: the value of preemption. If China waits for a militarily superior adversary to commence hostilities, it will be difficult for China to seize the initiative, and the adversary will likely wield the preponderance of forces. If, by contrast, China initiates a conflict, China can seize the initiative and may also enjoy an initial advantage in the local balance of forces. Preemption also greatly increases the chances of successfully achieving surprise. In the context of a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan, this means that China might initiate hostilities by preemptively attacking U.S. forces in the region, even before China has attacked Taiwan, on the presumption that the United States will inevitably intervene in a conflict with Taiwan.

A fourth strategic principle is raising the costs of conflict. At least some Chinese military analysts believe that the United States is sensitive to casualties and economic costs and that the sudden destruction of a significant portion of our forces would result in a severe psychological shock and a loss of will to continue the conflict. When this principle is combined with the preceding two, it suggests a belief that a preemptive surprise attack on U.S. forces in the Pacific could cause the United States to avoid further combat with China. Although the last time such a strategy was attempted in the Pacific the ultimate results were not favorable for the country that attacked, the Chinese military doctrinal writings that we examined did not acknowledge such historical counterexamples.

A fifth strategic principle is that of limited strategic aims. A militarily inferior country cannot expect to achieve total victory over a militarily superior adversary. But if its aims are limited, the inferior country could create a situation in which the costs to its adversary of reversing the results of an initial offensive exceed the benefits of such a reversal, and therefore the adversary will choose to live with the results. In the context of a conflict between the United States and China, this principle suggests that if China’s leadership believes it can quickly accomplish its military aims and present the United States with a fait accompli (such as the invasion and occupation of Taiwan) without threatening any truly vital U.S. interests, then China might embark on such a conflict even if its leadership recognizes that the United States could ultimately prevail if it desired.

The sixth and seventh strategic principles are avoiding direct confrontation and conducting “key point strikes,” or concentrated attacks. China knows that it cannot win in direct, force-on-force combat with the United States. However, all militaries rely on certain critical functions, any one of which, if disrupted, will render a military unable to operate effectively. Chinese doctrine identifies five such targets: command systems, information systems, weapon systems, logistics systems, and the linkages between the systems. In the context of a conflict between the United States and China, this means that the United States must be prepared for attacks that are focused less on its main combat forces than on key support systems.

Perhaps no U.S. military vulnerability is as important, in Chinese eyes, as its heavy reliance on its information network, which includes command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Chinese strategists believe that the U.S. military’s awesome power derives in large degree from its effective integration and use of information technology. Successfully attacking that system will affect U.S. combat capabilities much more profoundly than would directly targeting combat platforms. Chinese strategists also believe that the U.S. military information network is not just vulnerable but also fragile. Thus, the foundation of the U.S. military’s success can also be its undoing.

Proposed U.S. Counterstrategy
Based on the weapons being fielded by China’s military and on the vulnerability of U.S. assets to the types of attacks described in China’s military doctrine, we offer six recommendations for mitigating the potential effects of such attacks.

Our first recommendation is to strengthen passive defenses at U.S. air bases and aviation fuel storage facilities in the Western Pacific. The ability of China’s ballistic missiles to disrupt flight operations at air bases would be reduced by strengthening runways (for example, by adding a layer of concrete to them) and increasing rapid runway repair capabilities. The ability of the missiles to destroy aircraft on the ground would be reduced by constructing hardened aircraft shelters, because aircraft are most vulnerable when they are parked in the open. Constructing underground fuel tanks would similarly reduce the vulnerability of fuel supplies.

Our second recommendation is to deploy air defense systems with antiballistic missile capabilities, both on land and at sea, near all air bases and other facilities in the Western Pacific that the United States would use in the event of a conflict with China (see Figure 2). By themselves, ballistic missiles are capable of damaging only runways and “soft” targets, such as unsheltered aircraft and aboveground fuel tanks. But China is also developing cruise missiles and acquiring aircraft with precision-guided munitions, which are capable of destroying “hard” targets, including aircraft shelters and buried fuel tanks. To the extent to which air defense systems are capable of intercepting ballistic missiles and preventing the shutdown of runway operations, U.S. fighter aircraft stationed at those bases would be able to defend them from cruise missile and aircraft attacks. And even if land- or sea-based air defense systems were unsuccessful at defeating ballistic missile attacks, they would also be capable of defending the bases against follow-on attacks by cruise missiles and manned aircraft.



Our third recommendation, designed to undermine Chinese special operations forces and covert operatives, is to extend the coordination that now exists between U.S. and local forces in Korea to U.S. facilities in Japan and Guam. Chinese military doctrinal writings recommend using special operations forces and covert operatives to attack key strike points at air bases and other facilities. Because such attacks would generally originate from areas outside of U.S. military bases, the local security forces will be critical lines of defense, as will be the coordination between local forces and U.S. base forces. Given the ongoing threat from North Korean special operations forces, these defenses have long been in place at U.S. facilities in Korea, but now they should exist at U.S. facilities in Japan and Guam as well. The bases can further reduce their vulnerability to covert operatives by installing antisniper systems, fortifying perimeter security, and shielding key areas from outside view.

Our fourth recommendation is to establish more U.S. air bases in the region or, alternatively, to operate land-based aircraft from a broader range of existing locations. Increasing the number of airfields that China would have to neutralize and thus reducing the amount of Chinese firepower that could be devoted to each target would decrease the possibility that one or two Chinese attacks could significantly disrupt U.S. military operations in the region.

Our fifth recommendation is to consider deploying an additional U.S. aircraft carrier in the region. Currently, the United States keeps one aircraft carrier full time in the Western Pacific. Given the many threats to land-based aircraft, having an additional aircraft carrier on the scene could become extremely valuable. The closest additional carriers (other than those that might be transiting through the region) are now based on the U.S. west coast. Because a conflict with China could begin with little warning, as much as two weeks could elapse before an additional aircraft carrier would reach the area of combat operations. An aircraft carrier based in Hawaii would still take at least a week to reach the waters near Taiwan. An aircraft carrier departing from Singapore, by contrast, could arrive in three days, and one departing from Guam could arrive in about two days.

Our sixth recommendation is to reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. information network. Many of the above proposals for defending against attacks on critical facilities will also reduce the vulnerability of information networks to physical attack. But given the interest that Chinese military writers have shown in this topic, it seems likely that, in the event of a conflict with the United States, China will devote significant resources to computer network attacks and related information operations. The effectiveness of such efforts will depend largely on exploiting poor U.S. information-security practices. Conversely, the potential damage from Chinese information operations can be reduced significantly by enforcing proper security practices for U.S. military information systems: eliminating known security vulnerabilities, using software encryption, isolating critical systems from publicly accessible networks, eliminating unencrypted links to secure computers, enhancing user identification measures, and monitoring network activity.

Given the possibility that China could nonetheless succeed in disrupting U.S. information systems despite these measures, the U.S. military should also maintain and exercise the ability to conduct operations without continuous, high-bandwidth communications between units. Such operations could entail using communications technologies that are out of date by modern standards or even using completely autonomous operations, without data from remote sensors or direction from higher headquarters.

These suggestions do not represent an exhaustive list of enhancements that should be made to the U.S. force posture in the Pacific. We have not performed an economic cost-benefit analysis of these options, and so we cannot definitively say that the military benefits of the recommendations made here exceed the financial costs of implementing them. We can say, however, that in light of what we know about China’s current and future military capabilities and its military doctrine, the potential Chinese threat to U.S. facilities in the Western Pacific is real and growing, and there are a number of concrete actions that the United States can take to reduce the threat.

原帖由 太平洋巡逻队 于 2007-4-16 14:37 发表
图很漂亮，请教这个背景是哪个地方？

427607

原帖由 无恶不作 于 2007-4-16 09:32 发表

兰德公司在美国政府的影响力非同小可，甚至可以说是一个半政府组织，主要核心人员都是退役军人或者情报人员。在最近中美军事关系改善的环境下发美国发这种报告不觉得很不合流吗？看来他跟你什么友好都是空谈， ...

原帖由 水下幽灵 于 2007-5-31 08:32 发表

100多年前，义和团的思路和你的一样就是盲目地对外宣战。对于中美关系悲观论者来说，“唯一值得恐惧的只是恐惧本身而已”，因为冷战结束苏联解体时，是美国灭亡中国的最佳时机，他没有那样做，而是等到中国强 ...

原帖由 JCFERRET 于 2007-5-31 09:38 发表
日本介入，当然是在美国介入这个背景下。

美国对中国存有敌意，这个你怎么每次都要掩盖呢？

原帖由 JCFERRET 于 2007-5-31 09:45 发表
我可没有危言耸听。
美国总是要给自己找对手的，对美国来说，无论是台湾问题还是大中东计划，最终都是要达成对中国的包围和遏制。

你就不要谈战略了，你不懂战略的。连那位王专家都没资格在我面前谈战略，只 ...

原帖由 水下幽灵 于 2007-5-31 09:49 发表

面对大叔对火龙的以攻为守，你的应对战略是什么？王专家没说过我不懂战略。

原帖由 水下幽灵 于 2007-5-31 09:19 发表
军委委员不是指派的，是选出来的。再说了，你这句话什么意思？肉食者谋之。又何间也？处于谦虚的考虑别人也不好回答，所以你得自问自答。
防人之心不可误没错，但这种防备也要讲究迂回思想和纵横手法，不能直来直去，专取鹰派的观点说事，那样也许能糊弄知识有限的FF，但还是糊弄不住少数人。

而真理历来都不是掌握在多数人手里。所以你是在断章取义。

原帖由 JCFERRET 于 2007-5-31 09:56 发表

王湘穗自己就不太懂事，他说的话本来就不值得理会。一个小说作家懂什么？

不过你放心，任何人都不会相信你懂战略的，一个搞行政管理的，能懂什么军事战略。

原帖由 JCFERRET 于 2007-5-31 10:13 发表

我从来没说我是搞行政管理的哦。
行政岗，不是行政管理。

你有句话说对了，动不动战略在于对知识的掌握程度，军事战略则在于对装备技术、基础理论的掌握程度。换句话说，理工科基础如何。
你理工科基础如 ...

原帖由 水下幽灵 于 2007-5-31 10:19 发表

又在转移话题，又在故意挑起社科和理工之争，又忘了克劳塞维茨的格言“战争既不属于艺术范畴，也不属于自然科学范畴，而是属于社会科学范畴。”
你的军事知识太贫乏了，之所以震荡的厉害，也仅仅是因为你是只 ...

原帖由 JCFERRET 于 2007-5-31 10:26 发表
任何人见过过现代战争，就不敢这么说了。
隐身技术，电磁场，通信技术，这些是社会科学范畴？

现代军事知识嘛，首先是理工科知识。没有理工科知识，不要谈现代军事。

当然了，古代战争也需要理工科知识， ...

原帖由 水下幽灵 于 2007-5-31 10:31 发表

那用你半瞎的军事观点解读一下五次中东战争吧！是不是阿拉伯人的苏式装备没有以色列的美式装备厉害，我愿洗耳恭听，你忽悠吧！

原帖由 雪千寻 于 2007-5-31 10:32 发表
你们两个人啊........
都给我先复习一遍人家克老大的上下文......我上面贴了......
拿着一整段中间的一句话来争论什么呀......

原帖由 JCFERRET 于 2007-5-31 10:35 发表

哈哈，文科没毕业的居然指责别人是半瞎。

说实话，苏式装备还确实不如美式装备。
阿拉伯人的军事素质也确实差点，知道差在哪里么？对装备的掌握不行，战术不行。指挥水平不行。

说到底，还是技术上不行 ...

原帖由 JCFERRET 于 2007-5-31 10:45 发表

苏联教官还真没教好。所以阿拉伯军队出现过以密集队形投入，遭到炮火严重杀伤的情况。

而且mig21这种个别战例是不能说明全部问题的。

所谓偏科，是指不学理工科课程。