人性化的网情控制----上海老范

来源：百度文库编辑：超级军网时间：2024/04/25 14:37:32

对BBS舆情掌控的建议 范海辛 网上BBS谈论风云已成当局必须掌控的一个新阵地，但如何掌控却是大有学问。 传统的管理手段，现在看来是弊多利少。这种手段即是由宣传部出钱聘用一批专职或兼职的网评员（俗称网特），在网上通过发帖或跟帖来掌控“舆论导向”。这批网评员大多为涉世不深的大学毕业生，熟悉电脑，但学术理论普遍较差。每个网评员都是匿名上网，一个人同时有好几个马甲。他们在网上往往以“愤青”或左派的面貌出现，对右派或有自由主义倾向的言论进行批判、围剿。但网上是一个易于讲理的地方，而网评员由于理论功底差，在论理方面稍逊一筹，故每每只能以骂战来应对，造成政府所聘网评员不但未能正确引导舆论，相反毒化了网络空气，使网络成为人身攻击，拉帮结派的场所。 有个别网站因为网评员的“努力奋战”，使得不同意见的网民纷纷流失，最终网站因“门前冷落鞍马稀”而日渐边缘。相反，在一些人气较旺的网站，由于上网的人多，帖子更新的速度快，面对数千网民的嘻笑怒骂，少数“网特”们的帖子由于说理性不强，根本无法起到“舆论导向”的作用。 因此，传统的管理手段在花了大量公帑后，所得结果最好不过是使网站变得冷清，网上舆情全是公款堆积出的假“舆情”，是自己骗自己或是下级骗上级的“皇帝的新衣”；搞得不好则是网评员个人意气用事，或是自以为代表官方，在网上口无遮拦胡说一通，非但未能把握舆论导向，反而贻笑大方，为党出丑。 是故，网评员的做法是个弊多利少的做法。 正确的做法是“治大国若烹小鲜”——无为而治。 首先我们要明白，在互联网时代，还以“舆论导向”来进行舆论管制的传统做法已全然失去合理性。除非中国倒退回去宣布禁绝互联网或人大立法宣布戒严、暂停宪法实施，否则以管报纸电台、电视台的方式来管互联网，本身就不具可行性。 其次，正如先主席毛泽东所言，“我们应当相信群众，我们应当相信党……”，作为人民的政党，首先要相信人民。如果执政党不相信人民，防民之口甚于防川，那么执政党根本不能有效执政。所谓相信人民就是相信人民不是儿童，他们有足够的理性，人民能够通过互联网自己教育自己。 “舆论导向”的提法还是源于“真理只在官府，民众皆为小儿”的封建专制神话，源于“民众不会自发产生马克思主义、马克思主义只能由少数精英向普罗大众灌输”的错误理论。经过建国50 多年的文化教育建设，中国民众的文化理论水平大幅提高，不见得只有干部才懂马克思主义。马克思主义既然是科学真理，民众在具有一定文化水平自然也可掌握。当然，最关键的是，民众都是能够承担法律责任的成年人，知道自己的利益所在，一般不会在网上鼓吹极端言论、毁损自己的利益。 BBS另一个重要功能是充当社会的出气孔和减压阀。言论自由应为民众提供一个可以伸冤、可以哭诉、可以骂街泄愤之处，这是在其他途径都堵塞后的最后的救济途径。如果每个网站都由精明强悍的网评员们一统天下，上来伸冤、哭诉的冤民都被网特及其马甲们骂得狗血喷头，那么当这个最后的孔道也被堵塞后，社会的危险不是减小了，而是加大了。 笔者正是在上述的前提下，提倡对网络BBS无为而治的。 当然，无为而治也不是放任不管。首先，BBS经营者、所有者要承担一定的监管责任，对于法律禁止的言论，譬如煽动颠覆，鼓吹分裂，挑拨民族团结的言论应予封杀并同时提交公安部门对之立案、侦察。其次，对于专事在网上进行人身攻击的ID，也应对之删除，以净化网络空气。 在此同时建议对网民实行实名与匿名双轨制，凡实名上网的在文责自负的同时，可享受若干特权。如，斑竹欲对实名帖进行锁帖、删帖时，需经一定程序。即由网站特邀部分知名人士和网民代表组成网上模拟法庭，由斑竹起诉，实名上网者自辩，最后由模拟法庭的法官与陪审团定夺。而匿名上网者则无此权，此外匿名上网者在网上进行人身攻击的，一经举报即可封其ID。 网络实行无为而治，还要不要网评员？我认为大部分网评员应解聘，少数有理论功底、且无人身攻击劣迹的，可留任。但其工作主要限于在网上转贴文章及资料。网评员是否实名，由其自定。但无论实名匿名，其身份应公开。网评员可针对一些需要纠正、需要警惕的倾向发表意见，但其意见只代表个人。 在目前大气候只能如此的情况下，建议能否对部分BBS舆情掌控进行“无为而治”的试点，探索在坚持党的领导的前提下的社会主义民主与言论自由的道路。                                            2005－8－13            对BBS舆情掌控的建议 范海辛 网上BBS谈论风云已成当局必须掌控的一个新阵地，但如何掌控却是大有学问。 传统的管理手段，现在看来是弊多利少。这种手段即是由宣传部出钱聘用一批专职或兼职的网评员（俗称网特），在网上通过发帖或跟帖来掌控“舆论导向”。这批网评员大多为涉世不深的大学毕业生，熟悉电脑，但学术理论普遍较差。每个网评员都是匿名上网，一个人同时有好几个马甲。他们在网上往往以“愤青”或左派的面貌出现，对右派或有自由主义倾向的言论进行批判、围剿。但网上是一个易于讲理的地方，而网评员由于理论功底差，在论理方面稍逊一筹，故每每只能以骂战来应对，造成政府所聘网评员不但未能正确引导舆论，相反毒化了网络空气，使网络成为人身攻击，拉帮结派的场所。 有个别网站因为网评员的“努力奋战”，使得不同意见的网民纷纷流失，最终网站因“门前冷落鞍马稀”而日渐边缘。相反，在一些人气较旺的网站，由于上网的人多，帖子更新的速度快，面对数千网民的嘻笑怒骂，少数“网特”们的帖子由于说理性不强，根本无法起到“舆论导向”的作用。 因此，传统的管理手段在花了大量公帑后，所得结果最好不过是使网站变得冷清，网上舆情全是公款堆积出的假“舆情”，是自己骗自己或是下级骗上级的“皇帝的新衣”；搞得不好则是网评员个人意气用事，或是自以为代表官方，在网上口无遮拦胡说一通，非但未能把握舆论导向，反而贻笑大方，为党出丑。 是故，网评员的做法是个弊多利少的做法。 正确的做法是“治大国若烹小鲜”——无为而治。 首先我们要明白，在互联网时代，还以“舆论导向”来进行舆论管制的传统做法已全然失去合理性。除非中国倒退回去宣布禁绝互联网或人大立法宣布戒严、暂停宪法实施，否则以管报纸电台、电视台的方式来管互联网，本身就不具可行性。 其次，正如先主席毛泽东所言，“我们应当相信群众，我们应当相信党……”，作为人民的政党，首先要相信人民。如果执政党不相信人民，防民之口甚于防川，那么执政党根本不能有效执政。所谓相信人民就是相信人民不是儿童，他们有足够的理性，人民能够通过互联网自己教育自己。 “舆论导向”的提法还是源于“真理只在官府，民众皆为小儿”的封建专制神话，源于“民众不会自发产生马克思主义、马克思主义只能由少数精英向普罗大众灌输”的错误理论。经过建国50 多年的文化教育建设，中国民众的文化理论水平大幅提高，不见得只有干部才懂马克思主义。马克思主义既然是科学真理，民众在具有一定文化水平自然也可掌握。当然，最关键的是，民众都是能够承担法律责任的成年人，知道自己的利益所在，一般不会在网上鼓吹极端言论、毁损自己的利益。 BBS另一个重要功能是充当社会的出气孔和减压阀。言论自由应为民众提供一个可以伸冤、可以哭诉、可以骂街泄愤之处，这是在其他途径都堵塞后的最后的救济途径。如果每个网站都由精明强悍的网评员们一统天下，上来伸冤、哭诉的冤民都被网特及其马甲们骂得狗血喷头，那么当这个最后的孔道也被堵塞后，社会的危险不是减小了，而是加大了。 笔者正是在上述的前提下，提倡对网络BBS无为而治的。 当然，无为而治也不是放任不管。首先，BBS经营者、所有者要承担一定的监管责任，对于法律禁止的言论，譬如煽动颠覆，鼓吹分裂，挑拨民族团结的言论应予封杀并同时提交公安部门对之立案、侦察。其次，对于专事在网上进行人身攻击的ID，也应对之删除，以净化网络空气。 在此同时建议对网民实行实名与匿名双轨制，凡实名上网的在文责自负的同时，可享受若干特权。如，斑竹欲对实名帖进行锁帖、删帖时，需经一定程序。即由网站特邀部分知名人士和网民代表组成网上模拟法庭，由斑竹起诉，实名上网者自辩，最后由模拟法庭的法官与陪审团定夺。而匿名上网者则无此权，此外匿名上网者在网上进行人身攻击的，一经举报即可封其ID。 网络实行无为而治，还要不要网评员？我认为大部分网评员应解聘，少数有理论功底、且无人身攻击劣迹的，可留任。但其工作主要限于在网上转贴文章及资料。网评员是否实名，由其自定。但无论实名匿名，其身份应公开。网评员可针对一些需要纠正、需要警惕的倾向发表意见，但其意见只代表个人。 在目前大气候只能如此的情况下，建议能否对部分BBS舆情掌控进行“无为而治”的试点，探索在坚持党的领导的前提下的社会主义民主与言论自由的道路。                                            2005－8－13

仅为代发,不代表支持或反对

老范这回说得太对了，但某某部那些榆木脑袋是听不进的。

每次我看有报天天读就来火,看不了几个镜头就被公益广告覆盖.今天连个老兵回忆几句松山之战也要覆盖,I服了U

还有卡了觉得不对又放，来回反复几次的，枉为小人！

<div class="quote">以下是引用f22在2006-3-27 18:42:00的发言： 还有卡了觉得不对又放，来回反复几次的，枉为小人！</div>不是枉为,他们当之无愧的小人

<div class="quote">以下是引用f22在2006-3-27 17:37:00的发言： 老范这回说得太对了，但某某部那些榆木脑袋是听不进的。</div>主要是那帮SB不相信人民自己有明辨是非的能力，老是自以为天底下除了他们以外的都是SB。

那天是你用一块红布，蒙住我双眼也蒙住了天

写得有点意思。好的政府，是不应该与民为敌的，更不会处心积虑处处设防。其实政府和百姓，都是一个篮子里的鸡蛋，即使再大的问题，大家也都会保护这个篮子，而不是打破它。

无为而治，多么漂亮的词汇。“舆论这个阵地，你不占领，敌人就要占领。”当拿美钞津贴的斗士们群集而动自由的泛滥在中国互联网的时候，自然会对这个词汇的现实作用感到欢欣鼓舞。拿美钞的网特文章导向性强不强？至少某些文章的隐蔽性比较强。谎言重复一千遍有没有作用？一定有作用。有一定水平的谎言作用更大。老范的文章就有一定的水平，应该能蒙住一些可爱的人。煽动颠覆的要管治，那么鼓吹那种所谓根本性的演变算不算也是一种颠覆呢？彼此心里都清楚。

传统的管理手段，现在看来是弊多利少。这种手段即是由宣传部出钱聘用一批专职或兼职的网评员（俗称网特），在网上通过发帖或跟帖来掌控“舆论导向”。这批网评员大多为涉世不深的大学毕业生，熟悉电脑，但学术理论普遍较差。每个网评员都是匿名上网，一个人同时有好几个马甲。他们在网上往往以“愤青”或左派的面貌出现，对右派或有自由主义倾向的言论进行批判、围剿。但网上是一个易于讲理的地方，而网评员由于理论功底差，在论理方面稍逊一筹，故每每只能以骂战来应对，造成政府所聘网评员不但未能正确引导舆论，相反毒化了网络空气，使网络成为人身攻击，拉帮结派的场所。 ——还有这么好的事？给工资么？这个老范，信口雌黄的本事也太多了吧？ [em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14][em14]

Yale Law JournalJune, 2003 Essays *2261 DIGITAL ARCHITECTURE AS CRIME CONTROL Neal Kumar Katyal <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;Fd1">[FNd1]</a> Copyright © 2003 Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.; Neal Kumar Katyal The first generation of cyberlaw was about what regulates cyberspace. Led by Larry Lessig's path-breaking scholarship isolating architecture as a constraint on behavior online, <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F1">[FN1]</a> a wide body of work has flourished. In a recent article, I took those insights and reverse-engineered them to show how attention to architecture in realspace (such as our city streets, parks, houses, and other buildings) constrains crime. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F2">[FN2]</a> It is time to begin a new generation of work, one that applies the lessons of realspace study back to the cybernetic realm. The question will not be what regulates cyberspace, but how to do so given the panoply of architectural, legal, economic, and social constraints. This Essay details how theories of realspace architecture inform the regulation of one aspect of cyberspace, computer crime. Computer crime causes enormous damage to the United States economy, with even a single virus causing damage in the billions of dollars and with a recent survey finding that ninety percent of corporations detected computer security breaches. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F3">[FN3]</a> Yet despite apparent metaphorical synergy, architects in realspace generally have not talked to those in cyberspace, and vice versa. There is little analysis of digital architecture and its relationship to crime, and the realspace architectural literature on crime prevention is often far too *2262 "soft" to garner significant readership among computer engineers. However, the architectural methods used to solve crime problems offline can serve as a template to solve them online. This will become increasingly obvious as the divide between realspace and cyberspace erodes. With wireless networking, omnipresent cameras, and ubiquitous access to data, these two realms are heading toward merger. Architectural concepts offer a vantage point from which to view this coming collision. This brief Essay sketches out design solutions to the problem of security in cyberspace. It begins by introducing four principles of realspace crime prevention through architecture. Offline, design can (1) create opportunities for natural surveillance（监视, 监督）, meaning visibility and susceptibility to monitoring by residents, neighbors, and bystanders; (2) instill a sense of territoriality so that residents develop proprietary attitudes and outsiders feel deterred from entering private space; (3) build communities; and (4) protect targets of crime. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F4">[FN4]</a> After introducing these concepts, the Essay discusses analogues to each principle in cyberspace. Naturally, the online and offline realms are not symmetric, but the animating rationales for the four principles can be translated to cyberspace. Some of the outlined modifications to digital architecture are major and will invariably provoke technical and legal concerns; others are more minor and can be implemented quickly to control computer crime. For example, we will see how natural surveillance principles suggest new virtues of open source platforms, such as Linux, and how territoriality outlines a strong case for moving away from digital anonymity toward pseudonymity. The goal of building communities will similarly expose some new advantages for the original, and now eroding, end-to-end architecture of the Internet--a design choice that eschewed barriers between computers and rejected preferences for certain types of content. Principles of community and target protection will illuminate why installing firewalls (which are simply pieces of hardware and software that prevent specified communications <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F5">[FN5]</a>) at end points will provide strong protection, why some computer programs subtly cue criminal acts, and why the government should keep some computer crimes secret. Throughout this Essay, each Section will employ the realspace architect's understanding of context to explain why many meta-claims in contemporary cyberlaw are too grand. These claims are proliferating and track the same binary formula: "open sources are more/less secure," "digital anonymity should be encouraged/prohibited," "end-to-end networks are *2263 more/less efficient," "peer-to-peer technologies are a threat/blessing," etc. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F6">[FN6]</a> Systematic predictions are possible about the benefits of open sources, end-to-end (e2e) networks, and the like, but caution is warranted before applying these predictions across the board. Such caution is a staple of crime prevention in realspace, as the four design principles are often in tension with each other. As this Essay progresses, these tensions will become evident in the cyberspace context as well. In total, these architectural lessons will help us chart an alternative course to the federal government's tepid approach to computer crime. In February of this year, after a year and a half of promising a revolutionary approach, the White House released its National Strategy To Secure Cyberspace. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F7">[FN7]</a> Unfortunately, the Strategy consists of little beyond an unbridled faith in "the market itself" to prevent cybercrime. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F8">[FN8]</a> By leaving the bulk of crime prevention to market forces, the government will encourage private barricades to develop--the equivalent of digital gated communities-- with terrible consequences for the Net in general and interconnectivity in particular. Just as safety on the street depends in part on public police and public architecture, so, too, in cyberspace.I. Digital Design Principles To Prevent CrimeToday, the damage caused by computer crime runs in the billions of dollars each year, making it one of the most economically damaging forms of crime in human history. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F9">[FN9]</a> Yet the extent of cybercrime today is still constrained by the costs of computers, bandwidth, and attaining computing skill, all of which are likely to diminish over time. As a result of these and other factors, we will soon face the possibility that the Net will become as unsafe as the downtown city street. The city-street analogy is worth thinking about, for some downtown streets effectively control crime. In any number of cities today, people simply avoid the streets at night altogether, making it difficult for them to be attacked. In others, lights or barricades make it more difficult to perpetrate crime. And in still others, police patrols provide a backdrop of safety that scares criminals away and encourages *2264 residents to come out of doors. What do these methods of control suggest about cyberspace? This Part applies four principles of design and crime prevention to explain how changes to digital code can have a dramatic effect on crime rates. In order to ease consideration of these changes, I will be speaking generically about "crime," rather than singling out its particular variants, such as viruses, worms, denial of service attacks, unauthorized access, unauthorized use, and identity theft. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F10">[FN10]</a> This simplification at times will obscure specific architectural solutions, yet the Essay's design is meant to underscore how, in both realspace and cyberspace, architectural changes have the potential to minimize a large number of crimes at once. <span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">

A. Natural Surveillance Natural surveillance refers to the use of architecture to create spaces that are easily viewed by residents, neighbors, and bystanders. The most sophisticated proponent of this approach was Jane Jacobs, who reasoned that "eyes on the street" would control crime. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F11">[FN11]</a> Using Greenwich Village as a model, Jacobs argued that if people could be brought out onto city streets and if the design of city blocks facilitated visibility, the crime rate would drop. Jacobs did not disaggregate types of crime; rather, she felt that much of it could be prevented best by ordinary people, not professional police officers and security guards. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F12">[FN12]</a> Yet a natural, and sometimes self-defeating, impulse is to close space off to prevent crime, rather than to open it up. The gated community is one such modern manifestation. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F13">[FN13]</a> In cyberspace, however, crime prevention is predominantly a less visible, professional enterprise. Much software today is "closed source," meaning that the programs' underlying computer code is hidden from its users. Just as closure in realspace can increase crime rates, so, too, in cyberspace. Because the underlying code is examined only by professionals *2265 (and often only by the firm developing the software), the number of people who can discover its vulnerabilities and repair them is far lower. Closed source programs, while an understandable reaction to the fear of crime, are often counterproductive. Computer platforms such as Linux (an open source alternative to Microsoft's Windows operating system) will have major security advantages because they can harness the power of natural surveillance in ways that closed platforms, such as Windows, cannot. Because more people can see the code, the likelihood that security vulnerabilities will be quickly discovered and patched rises. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F14">[FN14]</a> President Clinton's Technical Advisory Committee, for example, recognized that "access by developers to source code allows for a thorough examination that decreases the potential for embedded trap doors and/or Trojan horses." <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F15">[FN15]</a> Closure of code, like gated communities in realspace, may create a false sense of security. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F16">[FN16]</a> And programmers who work together within a firm may develop groupthink and miss vulnerabilities while having an incentive to hide their mistakes from the outside world if they think they won't get caught. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F17">[FN17]</a> Open source software, by expanding the pool of people who view the code, can harness the benefits of a diverse, far-flung group of minds and eyes to improve security. In two senses, natural surveillance operates differently online than it does offline. First, natural surveillance primarily works offline when the public watches potential offenders and disrupts specific criminal activity. Online, however, it works when professionals and program users eye the code. Their gaze is not directed to any particular offender; rather, it is *2266 directed at the architecture itself. This shift in gaze reveals an important fact about cyberspace--because code is omnipresent and cheap to alter (compared to bricks and mortar in realspace), it plays a larger role in regulation of behavior online than offline. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F18">[FN18]</a> This is both a blessing and a curse: It can help programs, particularly open source ones, adapt when vulnerabilities are found, but the ease with which architecture is changed can also facilitate exit and network fragmentation. Second, users who examine code for vulnerabilities cannot be equated with realspace bystanders. Only a small fraction of people can read source code, and those who do are most likely to do so when they expect some sort of reward, either an enhanced reputation or improved software product. As such, the pool of people available for natural surveillance online is smaller than it is offline. That fact does not spell the end of open source as a security model, for, as we shall see, sometimes smaller pools can bolster security by facilitating reputational rewards. But, when considered alongside the problem that open source programs make security holes in applications visible to potential cybercriminals, <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F19">[FN19]</a> one must pause before proclaiming that one side or the other has won the security debate. For these reasons, the generic and far too ideological debate in the literature over whether open source is inherently more or less secure than closed source <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F20">[FN20]</a> fails to capture the nuances of space and design principles. Any good architect will admit that what works is often a matter of context. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F21">[FN21]</a> Even Jacobs's vaunted natural surveillance, for example, fails in certain settings, which explains why houses in remote locations need *2267 fences, dogs, and other mechanisms to prevent trespass. The need for contextualization does not preclude predictions; it simply means that one must understand the conditions necessary for a given design to succeed. If the potential for natural surveillance is low, as it is with the remote house and its cyberspace counterpart, closure will provide a better security model than will openness. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F22">[FN22]</a> With fewer users, moreover, closure may also bolster security because the chance of a malicious individual discovering a vulnerability is lower as well. As the number of users declines, the chance that a vulnerability will be discovered diminishes while the ability to track users increases. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F23">[FN23]</a> The upshot is that open source operating systems, such as Linux, will have security advantages over their closed competitors, but that more specialized applications with few users (and therefore a low number of eyeballs gazing at the code) may be less secure as open source products than as their closed counterparts. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F24">[FN24]</a> Indeed, the weakness of the Microsoft platform was suggested, in a round-about way, by Microsoft Vice President Jim Allchin, who testified in antitrust proceedings that revealing Microsoft's source code to competitors "could damage national security and even threaten the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan." <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F25">[FN25]</a> Security by obscurity is no way to run sensitive systems, particularly in an era where infiltration of Microsoft by rogue employees, hacking, and brute force attacks using distributed computing power are not fanciful. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F26">[FN26]</a> *2268 B. Territoriality A second realspace crime-prevention technique is to construct landscapes and buildings that evince territoriality, a signal of stewardship of an area. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F27">[FN27]</a> Concerns about territoriality must be balanced against the need for natural surveillance, so that spaces are neither too open nor too closed. If they are too closed, bystanders and residents cannot self-police; if they are too open, intrusion and crime could increase. The goal of territoriality is to ensure that people begin to know each other and develop a sense of caring for an individual place. Compare, for example, a dormitory design that features a single grand entrance with one that uses an entryway system. The entryway students, with fewer students per door, are more likely to know and monitor each other and more likely to intervene in times of trouble. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F28">[FN28]</a> In cyberspace, the vast numbers of people who traverse individual areas such as websites make it difficult to promote caring through partial closure. Instead, a cyberspace solution must try to capture territoriality's root benefits without doing damage to the Net's principal design innovation--its openness. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F29">[FN29]</a> Territoriality in realspace is principally important because it permits bystanders to recognize intruders and intervene against them. In cyberspace, recognition of intruders, let alone intervention, is hampered by the fact that the Internet Protocol is built not to know a user's identity. Both small and large approaches to digital architecture, however, can help alleviate this problem. Consider, in the small category, Internet Protocol logging (IP logging). Every computer on the Internet has a specific address, designated by a series of numbers, so that the network can route data to it. While some IP addresses are "dynamic" and change with frequency, others are not. IP logging captures the numeric addresses of computers that access a particular website. The address may yield a computer in a fixed location, or *2269 perhaps an address assigned to a domain, such as America Online, in which case a request to the electronic service provider, under the auspices of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, may be necessary to couple the electronic address to a particular subscriber. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F30">[FN30]</a> IP logging therefore can facilitate after-the-fact tracing, and could deter crime ex ante. One of the main reasons why crime is pervasive on the Internet is anonymity. Everything from obscene and threatening speech <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F31">[FN31]</a> to copyright infringement, credit card fraud, and hacking is facilitated by anonymity. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F32">[FN32]</a> If websites started to log IP addresses, it would constrain some criminal activity. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F33">[FN33]</a> IP logging, however, will not detect more sophisticated criminals that "mask" their identity through a variety of techniques. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F34">[FN34]</a> As more of our lives are lived on the Net, stronger solutions will be required. Of course, anonymity often serves useful purposes--consider the whistle-blower who fears retaliation or the survivor of incest who wants to avoid revealing his identity to an online support network. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F35">[FN35]</a> The trick is to develop a strategy that targets the harmful consequences of anonymity without losing the advantages of the positive ones. One possibility, which may become available as biometric identification becomes cheap, <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F36">[FN36]</a> is for the government *2270 to issue unique data identifiers to every individual. Each person would possess a specific digital identity, verified by biometric information such as a fingerprint scan. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F37">[FN37]</a> That identity would not be presented to the outside world in cyberspace--a person could surf the Web using any pseudonym she wishes. But the pseudonym would be coupled to that hidden biometric data identifier, visible to the government only upon a showing of probable cause to a judge in a separate branch of government. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F38">[FN38]</a> The biometric data could be encrypted, with keys held only by trusted parties, or courts themselves, and with each decryption logged and reviewed. Individuals would be free to use as many pseudonyms as they wish on the Net, but all of them would be linked to that unique identifier. While verifiable pseudonymity would help law enforcement discover the true identity of offenders, it has severe costs. People may fear doing embarrassing things because of the potential for discovery and therefore socially important conduct like whistle-blowing could be chilled. Yet a digital fingerprint scheme, if done openly, might better protect such behavior than the ad hoc status quo. After all, some Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have revealed their customers' true identities in response to inquiries, <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F39">[FN39]</a> IP logging is already in use, and commercial intrusion detection systems exist today as well. Privacy online is protected in a haphazard, somewhat accidental fashion. If you buy a book under a particular screenname and e-mail address, you risk having that e-mail and screenname sold to other companies, perhaps with your real name attached *2271 to it. No law prevents such an act. And with thousands of companies that may have access to these data, and little transparency about what they do with the information, the chilling effect of potentially having one's identity revealed exists now, and will increase in the future as data-mining technologies proliferate. In this new world, the powerful and technologically savvy can remain anonymous, by buying (or otherwise creating) new digital identities, but the rest of us cannot. We may therefore have the worst of every world--anonymous cybercriminals and identifiable law-abiders. Alternatively, the law might go too far in the other direction and overfacilitate the piercing of anonymity. For example, a recent court decision requires the ISP Verizon to reveal the name of one of its subscribers to the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) because the RIAA suspects that the subscriber downloaded 600 copyrighted songs within one day. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F40">[FN40]</a> But language in the decision suggests that all providers of Internet services will be required to name those to whom they provide access upon a request by an aggrieved party. The upshot could be to cripple one of the most promising avenues for the Net's future: free wireless broadband. Many individuals and corporations are setting up wireless 802.11b (wi-fi) networks--and permitting outsiders to use the spare bandwidth. The possibility here is dramatic--entire cities could provide free wireless broadband access to the Net by linking users together. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F41">[FN41]</a> But users will not open up their bandwidth if doing so will expose them to legal liability for the acts of others. And individuals more generally will refrain from using anonymity for productive ends, such as whistle-blowing, when they fear that an ISP will be forced to reveal their identity upon a request by a private corporation. Cyberspace provides an opportunity to build appropriate privacy safeguards into the system, thereby liberating us from the age-old battle of trying to adapt legal principles to an existing architecture. Instead of haphazard approaches, one possibility is to design the system to permit verifiable and unrestricted pseudonyms, and support that design with legal prohibitions against the unauthorized disclosure of identity by websites, ISPs, and the government. Such a system would minimize, but not erase, fears of improper disclosure, and would therefore still have a chilling effect on socially beneficial communication. But that effect must be weighed *2272 alongside the costs of anonymity--in terms of crime and the concomitant loss of trust in the network. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F42">[FN42]</a> This proposal, which creates pseudonymity and tracing capabilities, suggests one model to which the Net might aspire, apart from "all or nothing" solutions to digital anonymity. The point here is not to offer a magic bullet answer; rather, it is to think about cyberspace the way an architect would--by isolating what structural problems exist and outlining a path for generating design-based solutions to them.

<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">C. Building Communities<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> The principle of building community stresses architecture that facilitates easy interaction and encourages reciprocity. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F43">[FN43]</a> Some neighborhood plans, for example, situate houses across the street from each other and use centralized parks to encourage people to meet one another and to let linkages between them blossom. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F44">[FN44]</a> Quite obviously, the ability to link to anyone's content on the World Wide Web is one way to facilitate such interactions online, as the rise of weblogs (blogs) demonstrates so well. But there are less obvious design features that follow this principle, too, such as the original Internet Protocol's end-to-end communication structure. End-to-end refers to the idea that application-level functions should not be built into the middle of the network, thereby ensuring that the Internet's routers and switches do not discriminate on the basis of content. As such, the network itself will not refuse to carry your data, whether it happens to be an MP3 music file, a law review article, or a streaming video signal. To the extent there is discrimination, it occurs at the edges of the network, since an individual computer may be configured to prevent any of these types of content from being received or sent. Therefore, e2e reduces the complexity of the core network and means that applications do not have to navigate around its particular programming features and quirks. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F45">[FN45]</a> By refusing to freeze into place preferences for particular content, the Internet <span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: purple; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">*2273<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> has spurred demand for new technologies that supplant the old ways of doing things. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F46">[FN46]</a><span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> A variety of proposals today seek to modify this fundamental architectural choice. Cisco, for example, has developed routers that prefer specified content and applications. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F47">[FN47]</a> In general, as these protocols get bundled into the routers and network layers, the threat to connectivity increases. Self-sustaining communities require a structure that permits change and decentralized growth. This was the original model of the Internet. In contrast, by moving toward a network that centralizes control, opportunities for advancement are stymied by the design limitations laced into the building plan. Imagine, for example, that in an attempt to restrict the sharing of copyrighted music files, routers refused to carry traffic from computers with IP addresses that are running the popular KaZaa file-sharing program. This architectural change would undoubtedly reduce file sharing, but it would also threaten the network's ability to use peer-to-peer computing in the future for needs that we may not be able to adequately foresee today. Just as some attempts to reduce crime through street closures have harmed communities, <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F48">[FN48]</a> <span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">architectural responses to crime in cyberspace can pose serious long-term costs. Generally speaking, both online and offline, open networks for communication and transportation promote growth, opportunity, and interconnectivity. And while digital architecture is easier to modify than realspace architecture--in that digital code can be deleted more easily than buildings can be bulldozed--in neither case will change always be easy. It is already difficult to persuade the corporations and entities that own the routers and other technology that make up the backbone of the Net to make changes for the good of the network more *2274 generally. Once they depart from the Net's current nondiscriminatory structure, it will be far more difficult to convince them to rebuild the architecture back in the "traditional," e2e-compliant, style, particularly when its benefits are public, rather than private, goods.<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> The argument, however, only goes so far. Just as our desire for open space does not translate into a requirement that houses have no doors, so too e2e does not require open access to all computers. Rather, the e2e principle suggests that most gates should be placed at the layer of individual computers, rather than at other layers where they would impede traffic and harm the network. Effective guards for private data are therefore a necessity. Yale University recently learned this lesson the hard way when it discovered that a Princeton University admissions officer had bypassed the simple password protection on the Yale site. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F49">[FN49]</a> Everyone roundly condemned the Princeton official, who was, of course, an intruder acting in an unprofessional manner. But few criticized Yale for using such a weak gate to protect its private data in the first place. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F50">[FN50]</a> Private firewalls must be strong and secure, precisely to encourage institutions to make their data and computers accessible to appropriate individuals. Without them, content providers will refrain from putting material online--whether it be notifications to successful applicants, products to be sold, accessibility to remote networks, or anything else. Just as the open source debate has been overly ideological, so, too, has the end-to-end one. Sometimes there are needs to break away from e2e principles. In realspace, for example, economies of scale counsel against placing barriers only at end points. For example, it is more efficient to monitor airports and other borders for crop-eating plants and bacteria than it is to employ self-protection by every possible victim. So, too, in cyberspace it is worth thinking about whether the chokepoints to virus protection should reside in the middle of the Net's architecture. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F51">[FN51]</a> Instead of forcing every individual to buy virus protection software and to properly update it, it may be more efficient to bulk scan e-mails and network communications <span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: purple; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">*2275<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> for viruses. Both Harvard Law School and Hotmail employ such systems today, <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F52">[FN52]</a> thereby reducing the need for end users to protect themselves. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F53">[FN53]</a><span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> One of the unforeseen advances in computer networking has been the emergence of peer-to-peer systems (p2p). In its most popular form--file sharing services such as Napster--p2p permits users to share content with one another without the use of a centralized server. The p2p model has the potential to revolutionize computing. Instead of everyone trying to access the CNN site at the same time, for example, a computer might simply "chain" CNN's content from another peer computer that has just visited the site. A second example: Search engines could become even more efficient by using the power of multiple computers and aggregated searches. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F54">[FN54]</a> Yet p2p applications require significant trust in one's peers, and fear of viruses, hacking, and other computer crimes has severely discouraged their use. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F55">[FN55]</a> Like open source and e2e, p2p is not necessarily good or bad in all contexts. Some have celebrated it explicitly, <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F56">[FN56]</a> others implicitly. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F57">[FN57]</a> And some have harshly attacked it. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F58">[FN58]</a> At the application level, one deep question is <span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: purple; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">*2276<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> whether p2p might provide a new security model. Already, p2p security applications are emerging, with companies such as McAfee using p2p to provide quick updates for its anti-virus software, thereby avoiding the peril of having millions of customers crash their servers looking for updates when new viruses hit the Net. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F59">[FN59]</a> In the preceding Section on territoriality, centralized law enforcement was highlighted as a way to control crime. But, as Jacobs might ask, could peers guarantee digital security instead? Unlike natural surveillance (which operates online before a crime is committed) and territoriality (which operates online after the crime has been committed), the use of architecture to enable real-time intervention by peers is difficult. Certain forms of crime might be prevented in this way, such as online harassment and stalking in chat rooms, but a large number of offenses (among them, unauthorized access and disruption, piracy, and child pornography) are not visible at all to peers.<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> Put differently, today cyberspace is dark. One cannot see what other users are doing at any given time. But, as concern about computer crime becomes greater, the architecture could flip--just as it did with the advent of gas lighting and electricity--and shed light on users in cyberspace. Imagine that each ISP customer, on a monthly basis, is randomly aggregated with forty-nine other customers. Each customer, or their pseudonym, would show up as a small avatar on the top right of the other forty-nine users' screens. A right-click at any moment would indicate what that person was doing, and an option would notify the authorities (either public or private) about suspicious activities. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F60">[FN60]</a> This is one possible future to envision, where p2p principles are harnessed to augment security. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F61">[FN61]</a> But there are serious costs, not just in terms of privacy, but also in terms of harm to the network. Realspace architects have found that it is often self-defeating to brightly illuminate areas to reduce crime--the upshot can be to scare users away from the street altogether and make the area look like "a prison yard." <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F62">[FN62]</a> <span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: purple; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">*2277<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> The drive to illuminate cyberspace, and harness the surveillance powers of peers, thus has the potential to scare people away from the Net, instead of encouraging them to use it. As ISPs begin thinking about using such surveillance methods, their actions may generate negative externalities on the community in cyberspace more generally. As such, we should resist any government pressure to illuminate cyberspace because doing so can harm the network as a whole. And we should be developing security solutions that blunt the tendency of providers to overilluminate their space in the name of reducing computer crime. In other words, the threats to anonymity and other (far more significant) forms of freedom on the Net do not simply originate from the state; preventing cybercrime through law and public architecture can forestall attempts to restrict these freedoms by private actors.<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">

Illumination is one of many examples in which subtle cues from the environment can alter crime rates. In recent years, much of the realspace research about such cues has fallen under the rubric of "the broken windows theory" of crime control, which posits that visible disorders should be punished because they breed further crime. The insight of its two original authors, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, was that these disorders are not always the most serious crimes like murder and rape, but instead could be as trivial as loitering and littering. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F63">[FN63]</a> Wilson and Kelling thus inverted the standard thinking about enforcement and suggested that it was more effective to focus on low-level crime. As crimes become more common, the norms that constrain crime erode, and more crimes take place as a result of that erosion. But Wilson and Kelling, in their attempt to stimulate legal reform, wrongly downplayed the role of architecture in solving the problem that they brilliantly identified. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F64">[FN64]</a> Just as certain realspace architectural choices can facilitate crime, computer programs can be written in ways that cue cybercrime as well. Consider Bearshare, a file-sharing program that operates on the Gnutella p2p network. Unlike many other file-sharing programs, Bearshare's <span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: purple; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">*2278<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> "monitor" feature allows a user to see all the requests that are being made of the Gnutella network in real time. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F65">[FN65]</a> Within twenty seconds, a user will glimpse dozens of requests for grotesque pornography, top-forty songs, and the like that flood the system. The user sees only the requests, with no user name or even IP address attached to them. Such visibility can induce crime--suggesting potential files available on the network--and can reduce the psychological barriers to downloading certain forms of content. By creating the perception that downloading such files is common, the architecture of the Bearshare program thus can generate additional crimes.<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> Computer programs must carefully control the cues that prompt crime, such as this Bearshare monitor feature. In realspace, environmental psychologists have shown that architects can manipulate subtle details to induce massive changes in behavior. The size and shape of tables will predict who talks to whom; the placement of lights in a lobby will make it easy to know where people will stand; the hardness of a chair will force people to get up quickly. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F66">[FN66]</a> <span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">Digital architecture has similar properties. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F67">[FN67]</a> Small changes to the way in which programs operate may have significant payoffs because digital architects can manipulate (indeed, already are manipulating) tastes in hidden ways.<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> Another suggestion follows from the darkness not of users, but of crime itself, in cyberspace. With most computer crimes, there are no broken windows to observe and no loiterers and panhandlers to avoid. While this poses challenges in terms of discovery and tracking down offenders, it also has a significant upside: It makes it harder for one crime to serve as a complement to another. Many corporate victims do not report cybercrime to the police because they fear alerting customers and shareholders to the lack of security. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F68">[FN68]</a> Because only the corporation has knowledge of the crime, no <span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: purple; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">*2279<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> one else is likely to discover it. The broken windows theory of crime control suggests that government might want to keep some forms of crime invisible--not only to encourage victims to come forward, but also to prevent social disorder wrought by complementary crimes and visible disorder. For example, most of the widely reported and publicly known computer crimes, such as Robert Morris's worm and the recent ILoveYou bug, prompted rashes of copycat crimes. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F69">[FN69]</a> The fear that ensues after a reported attack, moreover, can lead to less use of the Net--with pernicious consequences for its growth.<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> Therefore, for specialized attacks that are unlikely to be replicated and for which countermeasures are easily developed, government might provide assurances to victims that these crimes will remain secret to the extent possible. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F70">[FN70]</a> Of course, when the vulnerability is a more generalized one, such secrecy cannot be maintained, both for reasons of natural surveillance as well as the need to minimize damage through protecting targets.Illumination is one of many examples in which subtle cues from the environment can alter crime rates. In recent years, much of the realspace research about such cues has fallen under the rubric of "the broken windows theory" of crime control, which posits that visible disorders should be punished because they breed further crime. The insight of its two original authors, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, was that these disorders are not always the most serious crimes like murder and rape, but instead could be as trivial as loitering and littering. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F63">[FN63]</a> Wilson and Kelling thus inverted the standard thinking about enforcement and suggested that it was more effective to focus on low-level crime. As crimes become more common, the norms that constrain crime erode, and more crimes take place as a result of that erosion. But Wilson and Kelling, in their attempt to stimulate legal reform, wrongly downplayed the role of architecture in solving the problem that they brilliantly identified. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F64">[FN64]</a> Just as certain realspace architectural choices can facilitate crime, computer programs can be written in ways that cue cybercrime as well. Consider Bearshare, a file-sharing program that operates on the Gnutella p2p network. Unlike many other file-sharing programs, Bearshare's <span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: purple; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">*2278<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> "monitor" feature allows a user to see all the requests that are being made of the Gnutella network in real time. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F65">[FN65]</a> Within twenty seconds, a user will glimpse dozens of requests for grotesque pornography, top-forty songs, and the like that flood the system. The user sees only the requests, with no user name or even IP address attached to them. Such visibility can induce crime--suggesting potential files available on the network--and can reduce the psychological barriers to downloading certain forms of content. By creating the perception that downloading such files is common, the architecture of the Bearshare program thus can generate additional crimes.<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> Computer programs must carefully control the cues that prompt crime, such as this Bearshare monitor feature. In realspace, environmental psychologists have shown that architects can manipulate subtle details to induce massive changes in behavior. The size and shape of tables will predict who talks to whom; the placement of lights in a lobby will make it easy to know where people will stand; the hardness of a chair will force people to get up quickly. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F66">[FN66]</a> <span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">Digital architecture has similar properties. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F67">[FN67]</a> Small changes to the way in which programs operate may have significant payoffs because digital architects can manipulate (indeed, already are manipulating) tastes in hidden ways.<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> Another suggestion follows from the darkness not of users, but of crime itself, in cyberspace. With most computer crimes, there are no broken windows to observe and no loiterers and panhandlers to avoid. While this poses challenges in terms of discovery and tracking down offenders, it also has a significant upside: It makes it harder for one crime to serve as a complement to another. Many corporate victims do not report cybercrime to the police because they fear alerting customers and shareholders to the lack of security. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F68">[FN68]</a> Because only the corporation has knowledge of the crime, no <span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: purple; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">*2279<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> one else is likely to discover it. The broken windows theory of crime control suggests that government might want to keep some forms of crime invisible--not only to encourage victims to come forward, but also to prevent social disorder wrought by complementary crimes and visible disorder. For example, most of the widely reported and publicly known computer crimes, such as Robert Morris's worm and the recent ILoveYou bug, prompted rashes of copycat crimes. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F69">[FN69]</a> The fear that ensues after a reported attack, moreover, can lead to less use of the Net--with pernicious consequences for its growth.<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> Therefore, for specialized attacks that are unlikely to be replicated and for which countermeasures are easily developed, government might provide assurances to victims that these crimes will remain secret to the extent possible. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F70">[FN70]</a> Of course, when the vulnerability is a more generalized one, such secrecy cannot be maintained, both for reasons of natural surveillance as well as the need to minimize damage through protecting targets.<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"><span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">D. Target Protection The architectural approach to crime reduction begins by emphasizing that law alone cannot solve crime, for police officers can't be everywhere. Instead, society relies on citizens to prevent the bulk of crime. But some private action will be ineffective, and perhaps even harmful. After all, private actors try to prevent crime with whatever makeshift measures they have available, such as iron bars on windows or avoiding the streets altogether. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F71">[FN71]</a> But these forms of target protection can have serious negative externalities, particularly in their crippling of interconnectivity and their destruction of reciprocity. Bars on windows and other target hardening scare people away, fragmenting the community and the development of an ethos that promotes order. Thus, instead of decreasing crime, these acts of self-help can actually increase it. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F72">[FN72]</a>

*2280 One underappreciated function of public law enforcement, which might be called a liberal argument for crime control, is to cultivate and protect public networks. In cyberspace, the network concerns are omnipresent: For example, a virus will scare computer users into restricting their computer connections (particularly their e-mail and p2p networking), fear of interception leads many to fear using e-mail, and the possibility of credit card theft prompts many not to make online purchases. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F73">[FN73]</a> Assurances about security are necessary to promote the Internet's growth, just as they are necessary in realspace for vibrant and dynamic cities. In economic terms, the Net takes advantage of network effects. A network effect occurs when the utility of a good increases with the number of other agents who are consuming the same good. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F74">[FN74]</a> The Internet's value lies, at least in part, in exploiting these network effects. As more people come online and share more of their lives, the Internet's value increases. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F75">[FN75]</a> Vigorous enforcement of computer crime prohibitions can help ensure that the network's potential is realized. Without a strong public law enforcement presence on the Net, the Net risks balkanization into a series of separate systems. When people fear computer crime, they may only connect with other "trusted" computers, stifling one of the greatest communication innovations in our lifetime--the ability to connect directly with, and learn from, people with whom we lack any prior experience. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F76">[FN76]</a> Some today are even proposing a division of the *2281 Internet into two networks to bolster its security. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F77">[FN77]</a> In other words, we should fear the response to cybercrime--private architectures of control--nearly as much as the crimes themselves. Because computer crime will become easier to perpetrate as a result of increasing automation, bandwidth, and skills, private developers will have reason to put these architectures in place, with grave consequences for the network and freedom. When not carried out appropriately, target protection, like its cousins natural surveillance and territoriality, risks harm to the network by enabling destructive private precautions. The social costs of private precautions are not typically given much weight in legal discourse. Consider the famous Learned Hand test in torts, that negligence depends on whether the expense of private precautions (b) exceeds the probability of an accident (p) multiplied by the harm of that injury (l). In the case that gave rise to the test, a ship had broken away from its tow and smashed into a tanker. The ship owner sued the towing company, but the towing company said that the ship owner was contributorily negligent for not having an attendant on board. Hand sided with the towing company, reasoning that the ship owner could have avoided the accident with an attendant. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F78">[FN78]</a> Hand, however, focused only on the cost of precautions to the ship owner. While perhaps appropriate on those facts, this formula treats all forms of prevention as equal and unfortunately fails to consider the negative externalities of private precaution. It is from this vantage point, that a key cost of crime lies in the private reactions of potential victims, that one should assess the effectiveness of any computer security plan. Take, for example, the new cybersecurity initiative by the White House. Far from being a breakthrough document, the Strategy is a hodgepodge of concepts and consulting talk, devoid of a serious agenda. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F79">[FN79]</a> Both simple and complicated solutions to cybercrime *2282 were obscured by an antiregulatory, antigovernment bias that infected the Strategy's outlook and thinking from the start. In its single-minded focus on computer security, moreover, the White House did not pause to think about what values the Net serves. These failures are yoked together: The White House wants private industry to do the work of securing cyberspace, but the most obvious private sector response is to diminish connectivity. And if, as some have suggested, the burden for crime prevention is placed on ISPs, so that they are responsible for the criminal acts of their subscribers, the result will be harm to the Net and its users as ISPs purge their subscriber base of customers who arouse the faintest whiff of suspicion. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F80">[FN80]</a> There is a different path, one that situates the government as an active protector of the Net and its users, just as government protects city streets and their users. The Strategy announces that "[t]he federal government should . . . not intrude into homes and small businesses, into universities, or state and local agencies and departments to create secure computer networks." <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F81">[FN81]</a> While government intrusion is not typically something to be preferred, a careful discussion necessarily must examine the costs of failing to intrude. Yet all the Strategy gives us is some weak guidance in this regard <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F82">[FN82]</a> coupled with proclamations about the power of the market such as "federal regulation will not become a primary means of securing cyberspace" and "the market itself is expected to provide the major impetus to improve cybersecurity." <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F83">[FN83]</a> *2283 But, throughout its sixty-page report, the White House never really stopped to consider the harm caused by private ordering to prevent computer crime. This isn't merely an oversight. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F84">[FN84]</a> The "market itself" can help minimize cybercrime, but often at a cost that is too dangerous to bear. Like the White House, prominent academics have also not considered all the implications of this point. Consider two of Larry Lessig's major arguments in Code: (1) private ordering can pose dangers as severe as those levied by the state, and (2) architecture is a tool of control. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F85">[FN85]</a> Lessig's second claim leads him to fear government regulation of architecture because it may lack transparency. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F86">[FN86]</a> But, when considered in conjunction with the first, the second argument explains why the government should regulate architecture, and why such regulation is not as dire a solution as Lessig portrays. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F87">[FN87]</a> After all, when Congress regulates architecture, it does so *2284 against a backdrop of sunshine laws and practices--from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to open congressional hearings. Private code labors under no such constraint. Once it becomes clear that the White House proposal has not changed computer security in any concrete way, three options will emerge. Option one is for the executive branch to develop private agreements with industry. Certain benefits, whether financial or regulatory, might be promised in exchange for commitments by engineers to develop products that protect certain digital rights, or commitments by ISPs to facilitate law enforcement operations through tracking and monitoring of customers. Such agreements are done without publicity and without the benefit of open laws and meetings. These forms of coercive nonregulation permit the partially invisible hand of the executive branch's national security apparatus to clasp the fully invisible hand of the market, with dangerous consequences for transparency. Option two is for private industry to develop architectures of control on its own. These design choices can be hidden from public view in their entirety due to closure of the code. In the modern age, private architectures of control pose just as much, if not more, of a threat to transparency and individual freedom than public ones. Major conglomerates, whether they be Microsoft, AOL-Time Warner, or Cisco, can dramatically alter human behavior online with little need to be open and forthcoming in the process. If Microsoft fears viruses that attack its Outlook program, it can develop sophisticated ways to trace such criminals and embed these features in the code. If Hollywood fears the theft of copyrighted motion pictures, it can develop code that notifies the studio when someone is playing a movie without apparent authority. Some of these features might successfully be hidden from the public. And those that are discovered may not be resistible; because of massive market power and bundling of products, customers may not be able to exercise the choice to switch platforms or software. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F88">[FN88]</a> The final option, direct government regulation, is the best solution, but also the one least likely to be implemented today given the Administration's stated philosophy. This is a mistake. Government regulation of code is far more transparent than the two other alternatives, and can generate effective architecture that provides security and builds *2285 community. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F89">[FN89]</a> After all, the libertarian impulse in cyberspace ultimately will prove ineffectual because it depends on protocols of trust. When cybercriminals erode that trust, the openness that has characterized the Net will come under attack. The result will be greater amounts of private control over the Net, and a concomitant reduction in connectivity. Just as laws against street crime provide a baseline of safety, so too do laws against computer crime. Public enforcement of these laws is necessary to encourage people to use the Net and to reveal private information in a secure setting, and thereby unleash the positive force of network effects. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F90">[FN90]</a> Accordingly, the American government must not shy away from regulating code out of transparency concerns. If open source platforms are more secure, the government should be encouraging their development through government procurement strategies (instead of continuing to prop up the closed Microsoft system through its purchases). <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F91">[FN91]</a> If digital anonymity is a serious contributor to crime, government should be thinking about modifications to the architecture of the Net to minimize it. What it should not do is simply pretend that the market will solve the cybercrime problem. The market doesn't solve our realspace crime problems; after all, in many of those areas left to market forces, crime spirals out of control and the social network frays as individuals barricade themselves inside their residences. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F92">[FN92]</a> *2286 Instead of a tepid government approach to a major security problem, there is a different path. Obviously, part of such a strategy includes vibrant law enforcement, and law enforcement targeted not only at cyberterrorism, but also at identity theft, corporate hacking, privacy violations, credit card fraud, cyberstalking, and the gamut of crimes that scare people from using the Net. But in addition, it includes methods that encourage the development of better private and public architectural solutions. In my realspace architecture work, I detailed systems of regulation that could bring about such crime control through design. Consider five of them: (1) using building codes to mandate crime-prevention methods, (2) modifying default rules in contract (such as those between landlord and tenant) to penalize those who are in a better position to make design improvements but fail to do so, (3) employing tax expenditures to subsidize architectural investments, (4) requiring "Crime Impact Statements" when developers build housing or other significant projects, and (5) coupling tort liability for poor design with safe harbors for designing more secure products. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F93">[FN93]</a> Similar methods are available in cyberspace. For example, the federal government could use the equivalent of building codes to require proper design and performance standards for software. Performance standards, which do not specify a particular way of preventing crime, might prove particularly helpful given the context-dependent properties of digital architecture. The government could alter default rules for warranties in contract in order to provide incentives for software manufacturers to pay greater attention to cybersecurity. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F94">[FN94]</a> It could also use tax expenditures and government-subsidized research to study cybersecurity, and could even contemplate a "Center for Digital Disease Control," based on the realspace CDC model. It could use its procurement power--estimated at more than $50 billion a year on information technology <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F95">[FN95]</a>--to influence marketplace development of security products. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F96">[FN96]</a> Indeed, when President Clinton *2287 mandated that federal computers meet Energy Star requirements, it helped usher in an era of environment-friendly computing. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F97">[FN97]</a> The Crime Impact Statement, modeled after the Environmental Impact Statement required under federal law, is a realspace device that encourages developers to think about the consequences of their design on crime rates. In cyberspace, government could require companies that release major products, such as software platforms, to provide a similar impact statement, perhaps on a confidential basis. Statements could discuss some of the key security features of the software, such as its encryption and password protocols, certify that the trapdoors that programmers use to quickly make changes to the program have been removed, and explain how the program should be configured to prevent attack. Requiring statements alone will make it more likely that developers will ship their software in secure default modes. Because the impact statement does not mandate any particular form of architectural design, it couples the flexibility of a market-based solution with the government's ability to serve as a catalyst for reform. Another mechanism that harnesses the benefits of the market concerns insurance companies. In realspace, insurance companies profit through exploiting downward cost curves. They calculate premiums on the chance that a particular calamity will occur, such as robbery, and then educate their customers about methods that reduce the likelihood of the calamity occurring. This education gives the customer valuable information and simultaneously reduces the insurance company's expected payouts. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F98">[FN98]</a> Yet again, the parallels with digital code are striking, for government could use techniques to spur the use of insurance companies as educators and evaluators of cybersecurity practices. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F99">[FN99]</a> Insurance companies are already *2288 providing "hacker insurance," and some of them have asked the government to set cybersecurity benchmark standards. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F100">[FN100]</a> Either such standards or the adoption of modest common-law tort liability for poor design can induce insurance companies to play an educational role. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F101">[FN101]</a> If the price of using a proprietary web server doubled due to hacker insurance, for example, businesses would quickly switch products. And apart from the price, when insurance companies issue such policies, it will prompt those companies to teach their clients about good cybersecurity practices. Exploiting the educational power of insurance companies is one way to bolster computer security without the heavy hand of government design codes. But it, like so many other solutions, has been ignored due to a preconceived faith in the market as the solution to the cybercrime problem.

II. Conclusion<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">Crime of any sort, whether a mugging, terrorist incident, or computer hacking, prompts not only legal but architectural responses as well. Yet we as Americans think far too much about the law, and not enough about design. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F102">[FN102]</a> This Essay has continued my argument that to prevent crime, governments and citizens must devote far more attention to the positive and negative consequences of architecture. We should carefully avoid reflexive responses to crime like gated communities and their digital equivalents, for they often do little to prevent criminal acts and spur an atmosphere of fear. Unfortunately, the government today has adopted a stunted view of law enforcement in cyberspace, a view that threatens so much of what is valuable about the Net by encouraging private closure. By reverse-engineering the realspace analysis of architecture back to cyberspace, a better appreciation for how to regulate cyberspace is gained and new strategies for government regulation emerge.<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> <span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: purple; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">*2289<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> Besides the dangers of private architectural solutions, an understanding of realspace design informs other aspects of cyberspace. We have seen, for instance, how an architect treats context as central. For this reason, the emergence of computer crime as a major variable can invert some of the thinking by leading law professors. To take just three examples, Larry Lessig has argued powerfully in favor of e2e, Yochai Benkler in favor of open source software and peers, and Julie Cohen in favor of anonymity. <a href="http://international.westlaw.com/result/#FN;F103">[FN103]</a> But, respectively, inoculation against viruses might be best accomplished through scanning at levels higher than end points, some types of open source software are particularly vulnerable to hacking because they cannot harness natural surveillance, and anonymity can be a dangerous inducement to commit crimes on the Net.<span lang="EN-US" style="FONT-SIZE: 9.5pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"> In each of these areas, there are trade-offs to be made. But without some serious government attention to these problems and a strong recognition of the need for contextual solutions, the overall security and utility of the Net will be compromised. No matter how vigorous the law enforcement, or how robust the inducement for public architecture, the public sector alone will, of course, not solve the crime problem. But, through careful planning and incentives that leverage the power of the market, it can help develop the types of digital bricks and mortar that can both reduce crime and build community.

楼上的,考人吗?英语好我早当老总了.[em06]

hoho，网特倒打一耙呀！网特是对谁而言的呢？是受谁雇佣的呢？网特当然是指那些针对中国的中国利益的，受某些势力雇佣的（比如台独、美国、民运、FLG等）。老犯，别在那里捣浆糊！没用的。

<div class="quote">以下是引用国色牡丹在2006-3-28 11:23:00的发言： hoho，网特倒打一耙呀！网特是对谁而言的呢？是受谁雇佣的呢？网特当然是指那些针对中国的中国利益的，受某些势力雇佣的（比如台独、美国、民运、FLG等）。老犯，别在那里捣浆糊！没用的。</div>说老范是网特过了点吧

看不懂E文啊~~~~~[em03]

此文是应邀之作，据说还相当受重视，但后来如何不得而知。反正你要我提看法，我就实话实说。

太理想化了，就如同范的敌我问题一样现实就是现实，你无为而治，有人有为而占

据我估计，如要作个称职网特，起码要有硕士文凭，月薪4000元。宣传部财力够吗？

宣传部有钱着呢！

靠，就算宣传部钱多得要死，也不会拿来养网特啊，官老爷自己不会用吗？美国决定招聘一个志愿者坐飞船到火星去，这个志愿者很可能回不来。来应聘的有一个工程师，一个医生，一个律师。工程师“我要1百万美元”医生“我要2百万美元”律师把官员拉到一边说，“我报3百万美元...你1百万，我1百万，然后用剩下的100万把工程师送到火星去”......所以，就算老大真的给宣传部拨了足够聘请月薪4000硕士级网特的钱，估计真正在这里埋头苦干的也只是月薪560的待业青年。

对舆论的控制室一个习惯性动作，这好像是一个传统，能轻易打破吗？楼上大段的E文是考我们GRE水平吗？也不说一下大概要点，靠。

老范还是看看陈水便搞得舆情机构吧！你不是网特谁是网特？台湾那边网络什么样又不是没有人知道！

美国、美军在舆情控制特别是网情控制上大家也不是不知道的，前一阵子还曝光来的！

现实中封锁言论网上还要封锁这是身摸理论

人性化的网情控制----上海老范最人性化的战斗机好人性化的发明。。。中国经济的原动力------上海老范上海老范的网上口水战人性化。关于人性化管理的建议老毛子的中央指挥系统控制上海名媛的老照片发展上海,穷人走开?---------上海老范灭六国者六国也,谁是我们的敌人-----------上海老范理性与非理性的较量------上海老范