超级军网美国的真正目的是围堵中国？
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/20 05:18:17
US's real intention is to contain China?
● By Charles F. Hawkins
霍金斯（华盛顿）
In recent years it's been a vogue in Chinese defence research and academic think tanks to posit that the real strategic intention of the United States is to contain growing Chinese power.
International relations analysts in Beijing and Shanghai used to tell me that “China feels pressure from the sea,” a reference to substantial US naval forces in the region.
After September 11, these same analysts suggested that China might begin “feeling pressure from the west,” indicating concern over growing counter-terrorism forces the US has stationed in Central Asia.
Given additional build up of US forces in places like Guam, and rumours of beefing up Wake Island, it's easy to see how Chinese security analysts can look at the empirical data and come up with the conclusions they do.
Then there is the apparent strengthening of military cooperation and strategic redirection of the US-Japan Alliance. With the on-going tensions between Japan and China it is natural for analysts in China to assume the worst.
So what's really going on? Is the US deliberately - under the guise of fighting terrorists - drawing a strategic noose around China's neck?
For answers we should first look at who is doing the analysing in China. Most of my colleagues in Beijing and Shanghai are academics with little or no military experience, and no practical understanding of the use of military force. They would easily confuse the role of a naval aircraft carrier task force with that of an infantry division. More subtly, it is easy for those who would carry on a secret strategy of their own to impute the same motives and desires to others.
Second, it is helpful to look at the capabilities and intent of US forces stationed around China's periphery.
Take South Korea, for example. US forces are there for one purpose only, and that is to deter aggression against South Korea, and win decisively should aggression occur.
The Eighth Army - the principal US fighting force on the Peninsula - has no capability to project power onto Mainland China. It is almost entirely a ground force and oriented only toward the defence of South Korea.
In Central Asia, US forces are stationed in a number of bases, all with the primary mission to defeat terrorists.
It is ridiculous to think that the US military in Central Asia has any capability to project power against China's western areas. Besides, what would possibly be their objective if they could - the vast, relatively unpopulated, unindustrialised reaches of arid land in China's west?
As for US-Japan partnership, the main reason is to deter aggression and fight successfully if deterrence fails.
During the Cold War this meant being prepared to fight the Soviet Union and North Korea.
Today, increasingly, deterrence is directed toward China should it decide to use force to unite with Taiwan - the only conceivable reason that the US and China would come to blows.
And except for the period of the Vietnam War, US force structure in Asia Pacific has always been less than it was in Europe, and its posture more widely dispersed.
Now that the US is in the process of rebalancing its forces globally to better fight the War On Terrorists, additional force strength has been withdrawn from Asia
Pacific and a larger number will be pulled out of Europe.
Most of these military billets will come back to the US while the remainder will be redistributed to regions closer to hotbeds of terrorists.
To balance diminishing US force strength in Asia Pacific, Japan is being asked to make a slightly greater military commitment to the alliance. There is no doubt Japan can do this, but can this be done in a way that allays the concerns of Chinese analysts?
In the final analysis the worries of my Chinese colleagues fail the test of reasonableness.
The US is not drawing a strategic ring of military bases around China, and except for deterring aggression against Taiwan, has no intention or capability to contain the rising power of China.
The writer is a senior defence analyst in Washington, D.C.and a frequent visitor to Asia. He contributes this article to Lianhe Zaobao.
美国的真正目的是围堵中国？
研究防务和中美课题的中国智囊团近年流行一种说法，认为美国真正的战略目标是围堵日益强大的中国。
北京和上海的国际问题专家以前常对我说：“中国感受到从海上来的压力”。他们指的是美国海军在区域里相当可观的实力。
九一一事件后，这些分析员对美国在中亚驻扎的打恐部队表示关注，认为中国可能会开始“感受到从西边来的压力”。
中国安全分析员看到美国在关岛等地集结了大量兵力，加上美国要在威克岛加强军力的谣言，因此得出上述的结论是不足为奇的。
在中国和日本关系紧张的时刻，美国同日本加强军事合作和美日联盟的战略转向，更让中国分析员往最坏的方面想。
实际情况到底如何呢？打恐战争是不是真的只是个借口，目的是让美国把绞索套紧在中国的脖子上？
要得到答案，我们首先得看看这些中国分析员的背景。我在北京和上海的大多数同行，都是没有军事经验的学术人员，对调兵遣将也一知半解。
他们大概分不清楚一支航空母舰特遣部队和一个步兵师所扮演的不同角色。另外，一些自己有秘密策略的人，往往会有一种微妙的心里，认为别人也同样别有居心。
其次，我们应该探讨部署在中国周边，比如韩国、日本和中亚等地的美军，肩负什么任务和能够发挥什么作用。
以驻韩国的美军为例，他们唯一的任务就是防止韩国受到侵略，一旦韩国受到侵略，则必须取得决定性的胜利。
美国第八陆军是朝鲜半岛上的主要战斗力量，它并没有能力把军力投射到中国境内。它几乎完全是支地面部队，也只以韩国的国防为目标。
中亚的美军分布在几个基地，基本的目标都是击垮恐怖分子。认为美国在中亚的军队可以把军力投射到中国西部是荒谬的想法。就算他们有这个能力，也没有理由这么做。中国西部是大片干旱的土地，和国内其他地方比较，不但人烟稀少，发展也缓慢。
至于美日军事伙伴关系，它的主要目的是阻止侵略行为，并在阻吓失去作用时成功击退侵略者。
在冷战时期，这意味着随时准备同前苏联和朝鲜开战。现在，可能以武力统一台湾的中国，已经成为阻吓的对象。台湾问题是可能导致美国和中国发生军事冲突的唯一原因。
此外，除了在越战期间，在亚太区域的美军人数向来比美国在欧洲的驻军少，分布的地区也比较广。为了更有效的进行打恐战争，美国已经开始在全球重新部署军力。
除了在亚太的额外军力，美国也将从欧洲撤出大批的军队。这些军队大部分会调回美国，其他则会部署在比较接近恐怖活动猖獗的地带。
为了弥补东亚区域美国军力的缩减，华盛顿要求日本在军事上作出较大的承诺。日本当然有这个能力，问题是它是否能够采取可以消除中国分析家疑虑的方式，来负起更大的责任。
总而言之，中国分析家的结论经不起考验，他们的担忧是没有理由的。美国并没有通过建立军事基地把中国包围起来的战略计划。除了阻吓中国向台湾动武，美国也没有意图或者能力遏制中国日益强大的国力。
·作者Charles F. Hawkins是美国资深防务问题分析家。此文专供本报发表，叶琦保译。US's real intention is to contain China?
● By Charles F. Hawkins
霍金斯（华盛顿）
In recent years it's been a vogue in Chinese defence research and academic think tanks to posit that the real strategic intention of the United States is to contain growing Chinese power.
International relations analysts in Beijing and Shanghai used to tell me that “China feels pressure from the sea,” a reference to substantial US naval forces in the region.
After September 11, these same analysts suggested that China might begin “feeling pressure from the west,” indicating concern over growing counter-terrorism forces the US has stationed in Central Asia.
Given additional build up of US forces in places like Guam, and rumours of beefing up Wake Island, it's easy to see how Chinese security analysts can look at the empirical data and come up with the conclusions they do.
Then there is the apparent strengthening of military cooperation and strategic redirection of the US-Japan Alliance. With the on-going tensions between Japan and China it is natural for analysts in China to assume the worst.
So what's really going on? Is the US deliberately - under the guise of fighting terrorists - drawing a strategic noose around China's neck?
For answers we should first look at who is doing the analysing in China. Most of my colleagues in Beijing and Shanghai are academics with little or no military experience, and no practical understanding of the use of military force. They would easily confuse the role of a naval aircraft carrier task force with that of an infantry division. More subtly, it is easy for those who would carry on a secret strategy of their own to impute the same motives and desires to others.
Second, it is helpful to look at the capabilities and intent of US forces stationed around China's periphery.
Take South Korea, for example. US forces are there for one purpose only, and that is to deter aggression against South Korea, and win decisively should aggression occur.
The Eighth Army - the principal US fighting force on the Peninsula - has no capability to project power onto Mainland China. It is almost entirely a ground force and oriented only toward the defence of South Korea.
In Central Asia, US forces are stationed in a number of bases, all with the primary mission to defeat terrorists.
It is ridiculous to think that the US military in Central Asia has any capability to project power against China's western areas. Besides, what would possibly be their objective if they could - the vast, relatively unpopulated, unindustrialised reaches of arid land in China's west?
As for US-Japan partnership, the main reason is to deter aggression and fight successfully if deterrence fails.
During the Cold War this meant being prepared to fight the Soviet Union and North Korea.
Today, increasingly, deterrence is directed toward China should it decide to use force to unite with Taiwan - the only conceivable reason that the US and China would come to blows.
And except for the period of the Vietnam War, US force structure in Asia Pacific has always been less than it was in Europe, and its posture more widely dispersed.
Now that the US is in the process of rebalancing its forces globally to better fight the War On Terrorists, additional force strength has been withdrawn from Asia
Pacific and a larger number will be pulled out of Europe.
Most of these military billets will come back to the US while the remainder will be redistributed to regions closer to hotbeds of terrorists.
To balance diminishing US force strength in Asia Pacific, Japan is being asked to make a slightly greater military commitment to the alliance. There is no doubt Japan can do this, but can this be done in a way that allays the concerns of Chinese analysts?
In the final analysis the worries of my Chinese colleagues fail the test of reasonableness.
The US is not drawing a strategic ring of military bases around China, and except for deterring aggression against Taiwan, has no intention or capability to contain the rising power of China.
The writer is a senior defence analyst in Washington, D.C.and a frequent visitor to Asia. He contributes this article to Lianhe Zaobao.
美国的真正目的是围堵中国？
研究防务和中美课题的中国智囊团近年流行一种说法，认为美国真正的战略目标是围堵日益强大的中国。
北京和上海的国际问题专家以前常对我说：“中国感受到从海上来的压力”。他们指的是美国海军在区域里相当可观的实力。
九一一事件后，这些分析员对美国在中亚驻扎的打恐部队表示关注，认为中国可能会开始“感受到从西边来的压力”。
中国安全分析员看到美国在关岛等地集结了大量兵力，加上美国要在威克岛加强军力的谣言，因此得出上述的结论是不足为奇的。
在中国和日本关系紧张的时刻，美国同日本加强军事合作和美日联盟的战略转向，更让中国分析员往最坏的方面想。
实际情况到底如何呢？打恐战争是不是真的只是个借口，目的是让美国把绞索套紧在中国的脖子上？
要得到答案，我们首先得看看这些中国分析员的背景。我在北京和上海的大多数同行，都是没有军事经验的学术人员，对调兵遣将也一知半解。
他们大概分不清楚一支航空母舰特遣部队和一个步兵师所扮演的不同角色。另外，一些自己有秘密策略的人，往往会有一种微妙的心里，认为别人也同样别有居心。
其次，我们应该探讨部署在中国周边，比如韩国、日本和中亚等地的美军，肩负什么任务和能够发挥什么作用。
以驻韩国的美军为例，他们唯一的任务就是防止韩国受到侵略，一旦韩国受到侵略，则必须取得决定性的胜利。
美国第八陆军是朝鲜半岛上的主要战斗力量，它并没有能力把军力投射到中国境内。它几乎完全是支地面部队，也只以韩国的国防为目标。
中亚的美军分布在几个基地，基本的目标都是击垮恐怖分子。认为美国在中亚的军队可以把军力投射到中国西部是荒谬的想法。就算他们有这个能力，也没有理由这么做。中国西部是大片干旱的土地，和国内其他地方比较，不但人烟稀少，发展也缓慢。
至于美日军事伙伴关系，它的主要目的是阻止侵略行为，并在阻吓失去作用时成功击退侵略者。
在冷战时期，这意味着随时准备同前苏联和朝鲜开战。现在，可能以武力统一台湾的中国，已经成为阻吓的对象。台湾问题是可能导致美国和中国发生军事冲突的唯一原因。
此外，除了在越战期间，在亚太区域的美军人数向来比美国在欧洲的驻军少，分布的地区也比较广。为了更有效的进行打恐战争，美国已经开始在全球重新部署军力。
除了在亚太的额外军力，美国也将从欧洲撤出大批的军队。这些军队大部分会调回美国，其他则会部署在比较接近恐怖活动猖獗的地带。
为了弥补东亚区域美国军力的缩减，华盛顿要求日本在军事上作出较大的承诺。日本当然有这个能力，问题是它是否能够采取可以消除中国分析家疑虑的方式，来负起更大的责任。
总而言之，中国分析家的结论经不起考验，他们的担忧是没有理由的。美国并没有通过建立军事基地把中国包围起来的战略计划。除了阻吓中国向台湾动武，美国也没有意图或者能力遏制中国日益强大的国力。
·作者Charles F. Hawkins是美国资深防务问题分析家。此文专供本报发表，叶琦保译。
● By Charles F. Hawkins
霍金斯（华盛顿）
In recent years it's been a vogue in Chinese defence research and academic think tanks to posit that the real strategic intention of the United States is to contain growing Chinese power.
International relations analysts in Beijing and Shanghai used to tell me that “China feels pressure from the sea,” a reference to substantial US naval forces in the region.
After September 11, these same analysts suggested that China might begin “feeling pressure from the west,” indicating concern over growing counter-terrorism forces the US has stationed in Central Asia.
Given additional build up of US forces in places like Guam, and rumours of beefing up Wake Island, it's easy to see how Chinese security analysts can look at the empirical data and come up with the conclusions they do.
Then there is the apparent strengthening of military cooperation and strategic redirection of the US-Japan Alliance. With the on-going tensions between Japan and China it is natural for analysts in China to assume the worst.
So what's really going on? Is the US deliberately - under the guise of fighting terrorists - drawing a strategic noose around China's neck?
For answers we should first look at who is doing the analysing in China. Most of my colleagues in Beijing and Shanghai are academics with little or no military experience, and no practical understanding of the use of military force. They would easily confuse the role of a naval aircraft carrier task force with that of an infantry division. More subtly, it is easy for those who would carry on a secret strategy of their own to impute the same motives and desires to others.
Second, it is helpful to look at the capabilities and intent of US forces stationed around China's periphery.
Take South Korea, for example. US forces are there for one purpose only, and that is to deter aggression against South Korea, and win decisively should aggression occur.
The Eighth Army - the principal US fighting force on the Peninsula - has no capability to project power onto Mainland China. It is almost entirely a ground force and oriented only toward the defence of South Korea.
In Central Asia, US forces are stationed in a number of bases, all with the primary mission to defeat terrorists.
It is ridiculous to think that the US military in Central Asia has any capability to project power against China's western areas. Besides, what would possibly be their objective if they could - the vast, relatively unpopulated, unindustrialised reaches of arid land in China's west?
As for US-Japan partnership, the main reason is to deter aggression and fight successfully if deterrence fails.
During the Cold War this meant being prepared to fight the Soviet Union and North Korea.
Today, increasingly, deterrence is directed toward China should it decide to use force to unite with Taiwan - the only conceivable reason that the US and China would come to blows.
And except for the period of the Vietnam War, US force structure in Asia Pacific has always been less than it was in Europe, and its posture more widely dispersed.
Now that the US is in the process of rebalancing its forces globally to better fight the War On Terrorists, additional force strength has been withdrawn from Asia
Pacific and a larger number will be pulled out of Europe.
Most of these military billets will come back to the US while the remainder will be redistributed to regions closer to hotbeds of terrorists.
To balance diminishing US force strength in Asia Pacific, Japan is being asked to make a slightly greater military commitment to the alliance. There is no doubt Japan can do this, but can this be done in a way that allays the concerns of Chinese analysts?
In the final analysis the worries of my Chinese colleagues fail the test of reasonableness.
The US is not drawing a strategic ring of military bases around China, and except for deterring aggression against Taiwan, has no intention or capability to contain the rising power of China.
The writer is a senior defence analyst in Washington, D.C.and a frequent visitor to Asia. He contributes this article to Lianhe Zaobao.
美国的真正目的是围堵中国？
研究防务和中美课题的中国智囊团近年流行一种说法，认为美国真正的战略目标是围堵日益强大的中国。
北京和上海的国际问题专家以前常对我说：“中国感受到从海上来的压力”。他们指的是美国海军在区域里相当可观的实力。
九一一事件后，这些分析员对美国在中亚驻扎的打恐部队表示关注，认为中国可能会开始“感受到从西边来的压力”。
中国安全分析员看到美国在关岛等地集结了大量兵力，加上美国要在威克岛加强军力的谣言，因此得出上述的结论是不足为奇的。
在中国和日本关系紧张的时刻，美国同日本加强军事合作和美日联盟的战略转向，更让中国分析员往最坏的方面想。
实际情况到底如何呢？打恐战争是不是真的只是个借口，目的是让美国把绞索套紧在中国的脖子上？
要得到答案，我们首先得看看这些中国分析员的背景。我在北京和上海的大多数同行，都是没有军事经验的学术人员，对调兵遣将也一知半解。
他们大概分不清楚一支航空母舰特遣部队和一个步兵师所扮演的不同角色。另外，一些自己有秘密策略的人，往往会有一种微妙的心里，认为别人也同样别有居心。
其次，我们应该探讨部署在中国周边，比如韩国、日本和中亚等地的美军，肩负什么任务和能够发挥什么作用。
以驻韩国的美军为例，他们唯一的任务就是防止韩国受到侵略，一旦韩国受到侵略，则必须取得决定性的胜利。
美国第八陆军是朝鲜半岛上的主要战斗力量，它并没有能力把军力投射到中国境内。它几乎完全是支地面部队，也只以韩国的国防为目标。
中亚的美军分布在几个基地，基本的目标都是击垮恐怖分子。认为美国在中亚的军队可以把军力投射到中国西部是荒谬的想法。就算他们有这个能力，也没有理由这么做。中国西部是大片干旱的土地，和国内其他地方比较，不但人烟稀少，发展也缓慢。
至于美日军事伙伴关系，它的主要目的是阻止侵略行为，并在阻吓失去作用时成功击退侵略者。
在冷战时期，这意味着随时准备同前苏联和朝鲜开战。现在，可能以武力统一台湾的中国，已经成为阻吓的对象。台湾问题是可能导致美国和中国发生军事冲突的唯一原因。
此外，除了在越战期间，在亚太区域的美军人数向来比美国在欧洲的驻军少，分布的地区也比较广。为了更有效的进行打恐战争，美国已经开始在全球重新部署军力。
除了在亚太的额外军力，美国也将从欧洲撤出大批的军队。这些军队大部分会调回美国，其他则会部署在比较接近恐怖活动猖獗的地带。
为了弥补东亚区域美国军力的缩减，华盛顿要求日本在军事上作出较大的承诺。日本当然有这个能力，问题是它是否能够采取可以消除中国分析家疑虑的方式，来负起更大的责任。
总而言之，中国分析家的结论经不起考验，他们的担忧是没有理由的。美国并没有通过建立军事基地把中国包围起来的战略计划。除了阻吓中国向台湾动武，美国也没有意图或者能力遏制中国日益强大的国力。
·作者Charles F. Hawkins是美国资深防务问题分析家。此文专供本报发表，叶琦保译。US's real intention is to contain China?
● By Charles F. Hawkins
霍金斯（华盛顿）
In recent years it's been a vogue in Chinese defence research and academic think tanks to posit that the real strategic intention of the United States is to contain growing Chinese power.
International relations analysts in Beijing and Shanghai used to tell me that “China feels pressure from the sea,” a reference to substantial US naval forces in the region.
After September 11, these same analysts suggested that China might begin “feeling pressure from the west,” indicating concern over growing counter-terrorism forces the US has stationed in Central Asia.
Given additional build up of US forces in places like Guam, and rumours of beefing up Wake Island, it's easy to see how Chinese security analysts can look at the empirical data and come up with the conclusions they do.
Then there is the apparent strengthening of military cooperation and strategic redirection of the US-Japan Alliance. With the on-going tensions between Japan and China it is natural for analysts in China to assume the worst.
So what's really going on? Is the US deliberately - under the guise of fighting terrorists - drawing a strategic noose around China's neck?
For answers we should first look at who is doing the analysing in China. Most of my colleagues in Beijing and Shanghai are academics with little or no military experience, and no practical understanding of the use of military force. They would easily confuse the role of a naval aircraft carrier task force with that of an infantry division. More subtly, it is easy for those who would carry on a secret strategy of their own to impute the same motives and desires to others.
Second, it is helpful to look at the capabilities and intent of US forces stationed around China's periphery.
Take South Korea, for example. US forces are there for one purpose only, and that is to deter aggression against South Korea, and win decisively should aggression occur.
The Eighth Army - the principal US fighting force on the Peninsula - has no capability to project power onto Mainland China. It is almost entirely a ground force and oriented only toward the defence of South Korea.
In Central Asia, US forces are stationed in a number of bases, all with the primary mission to defeat terrorists.
It is ridiculous to think that the US military in Central Asia has any capability to project power against China's western areas. Besides, what would possibly be their objective if they could - the vast, relatively unpopulated, unindustrialised reaches of arid land in China's west?
As for US-Japan partnership, the main reason is to deter aggression and fight successfully if deterrence fails.
During the Cold War this meant being prepared to fight the Soviet Union and North Korea.
Today, increasingly, deterrence is directed toward China should it decide to use force to unite with Taiwan - the only conceivable reason that the US and China would come to blows.
And except for the period of the Vietnam War, US force structure in Asia Pacific has always been less than it was in Europe, and its posture more widely dispersed.
Now that the US is in the process of rebalancing its forces globally to better fight the War On Terrorists, additional force strength has been withdrawn from Asia
Pacific and a larger number will be pulled out of Europe.
Most of these military billets will come back to the US while the remainder will be redistributed to regions closer to hotbeds of terrorists.
To balance diminishing US force strength in Asia Pacific, Japan is being asked to make a slightly greater military commitment to the alliance. There is no doubt Japan can do this, but can this be done in a way that allays the concerns of Chinese analysts?
In the final analysis the worries of my Chinese colleagues fail the test of reasonableness.
The US is not drawing a strategic ring of military bases around China, and except for deterring aggression against Taiwan, has no intention or capability to contain the rising power of China.
The writer is a senior defence analyst in Washington, D.C.and a frequent visitor to Asia. He contributes this article to Lianhe Zaobao.
美国的真正目的是围堵中国？
研究防务和中美课题的中国智囊团近年流行一种说法，认为美国真正的战略目标是围堵日益强大的中国。
北京和上海的国际问题专家以前常对我说：“中国感受到从海上来的压力”。他们指的是美国海军在区域里相当可观的实力。
九一一事件后，这些分析员对美国在中亚驻扎的打恐部队表示关注，认为中国可能会开始“感受到从西边来的压力”。
中国安全分析员看到美国在关岛等地集结了大量兵力，加上美国要在威克岛加强军力的谣言，因此得出上述的结论是不足为奇的。
在中国和日本关系紧张的时刻，美国同日本加强军事合作和美日联盟的战略转向，更让中国分析员往最坏的方面想。
实际情况到底如何呢？打恐战争是不是真的只是个借口，目的是让美国把绞索套紧在中国的脖子上？
要得到答案，我们首先得看看这些中国分析员的背景。我在北京和上海的大多数同行，都是没有军事经验的学术人员，对调兵遣将也一知半解。
他们大概分不清楚一支航空母舰特遣部队和一个步兵师所扮演的不同角色。另外，一些自己有秘密策略的人，往往会有一种微妙的心里，认为别人也同样别有居心。
其次，我们应该探讨部署在中国周边，比如韩国、日本和中亚等地的美军，肩负什么任务和能够发挥什么作用。
以驻韩国的美军为例，他们唯一的任务就是防止韩国受到侵略，一旦韩国受到侵略，则必须取得决定性的胜利。
美国第八陆军是朝鲜半岛上的主要战斗力量，它并没有能力把军力投射到中国境内。它几乎完全是支地面部队，也只以韩国的国防为目标。
中亚的美军分布在几个基地，基本的目标都是击垮恐怖分子。认为美国在中亚的军队可以把军力投射到中国西部是荒谬的想法。就算他们有这个能力，也没有理由这么做。中国西部是大片干旱的土地，和国内其他地方比较，不但人烟稀少，发展也缓慢。
至于美日军事伙伴关系，它的主要目的是阻止侵略行为，并在阻吓失去作用时成功击退侵略者。
在冷战时期，这意味着随时准备同前苏联和朝鲜开战。现在，可能以武力统一台湾的中国，已经成为阻吓的对象。台湾问题是可能导致美国和中国发生军事冲突的唯一原因。
此外，除了在越战期间，在亚太区域的美军人数向来比美国在欧洲的驻军少，分布的地区也比较广。为了更有效的进行打恐战争，美国已经开始在全球重新部署军力。
除了在亚太的额外军力，美国也将从欧洲撤出大批的军队。这些军队大部分会调回美国，其他则会部署在比较接近恐怖活动猖獗的地带。
为了弥补东亚区域美国军力的缩减，华盛顿要求日本在军事上作出较大的承诺。日本当然有这个能力，问题是它是否能够采取可以消除中国分析家疑虑的方式，来负起更大的责任。
总而言之，中国分析家的结论经不起考验，他们的担忧是没有理由的。美国并没有通过建立军事基地把中国包围起来的战略计划。除了阻吓中国向台湾动武，美国也没有意图或者能力遏制中国日益强大的国力。
·作者Charles F. Hawkins是美国资深防务问题分析家。此文专供本报发表，叶琦保译。