超级军网国家利益：日本总体规划在战争中打败中国
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/24 21:10:53
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.com
论坛地址：http://www.ltaaa.com/bbs/thread-336994-1-1.html
Japan's Master Plan to Defeat China in a War
日本总体规划在战争中打败中国
In recent years, significant attention has been paid to the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). China's defense budget, which has increased ten fold in the last twenty five years, has funded the construction of a modern, ocean-going navy. This includes the recently fielded aircraft carrier, Liaoning, as well as fleets of destroyers, frigates, corvettes, replenishment ships, and amphibious assault ships.
几年来，人们对中国人民解放军海军（PLAN）表现了显著关注。中国的国防预算在过去的25年里已经增长了10倍，以此建立起一个现代化的远洋海军。这包括最近最近启用的航空母舰--辽宁舰，以及舰群中的驱逐舰，护卫舰，补给舰和两栖攻击舰。译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
The PLAN is indeed an impressive force, but local geography will create challenges during wartime. Japan controls a string of islands that form the Miyako Strait, which Chinese naval forces must transit to enter the western Pacific. Properly fortified, the Japanese-held Ryukyu Islands could conceivably block passage of the Strait altogether.
中国海军的确是一支强军，但本地区的地理环境在战时可能（对其）造成挑战。日本控制着由一连串岛屿组成的宫古海峡，这也是中国海军进入西太平洋的必经之地。在适当的加筑下，日本控制的琉球群岛可以有效地阻碍海峡两岸的通行。
The Ryukyus have been used to defend Japan before. Okinawa, the gateway to the Home Islands, was fortified by Japan during World War II and then invaded by the Allies. The southern half of the chain, the Sakashima Islands, were used as staging areas for kamikaze fighters during the Battle of Okinawa.
琉球群岛以前就已被用来防卫日本。冲绳，日本主岛的门户，在二战期间被加固强化，但之后被盟军涌入。而在岛链的南端，先岛诸岛曾在冲绳战役中，被用作神风敢死队的跳板。
Japan, which spends roughly a quarter as much on defense as China, could use the Ryukyus to execute an Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) plan in the Miyako Strait. Like any good A2/AD strategy, such a plan in the Strait would require a fraction of the spending necessary to overcome it.
日本，国防花销大约是中国的四分之一，可以在宫古海峡利用琉球群岛进行反介入，区域拒止（A2/AD）战略。就像任何可行的A2/AD战略，在海峡执行如此计划总归需要一些必要的花费克服困难。
The PLAN has three fleet commands. The North Sea Fleet, based in Qingdao, is oriented towards the Yellow Sea and beyond while the East Sea Fleet, based in Ningbo, is oriented toward the East China Sea and beyond.
中国海军有三大舰队。位于青岛的北海舰队，其作用于但不仅限于黄海，而坐落于宁波的东海舰队，面向的则是东海以及更深区域。
Together, the North and East Sea Fleets field 16 destroyers, 32 frigates, all five of China's nuclear attack submarines, and around 40 diesel electric submarines of varying ages. Backing this up would be aircraft of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the People's Liberation Army Navy Air Force and the conventionally armed ballistic missiles of the Second Artillery Corps.
北海舰队和东海舰队总计共16艘驱逐舰，32艘护卫舰，全部5艘中国核攻击潜艇和大约40艘各期柴电潜艇，和与此相补充的，中国人民解放军空军，中国人们解放军海军航空兵以及二炮。
The most direct route for both fleets is the Miyako Strait, a gateway formed by Japan's Sakishima Islands. A gap 160 miles wide between Miyako Island and the island of Okinawa provides access to the open Pacific and beyond. Chinese naval task forces have recently made a habit of passing through the strait.
两大舰队的直线出海路径就是通过宫古海峡，也是日本先岛群岛的门户。这宫古岛和冲绳岛间160英里的缺口就是太平洋及远洋的入口。中国海军最近频繁出入海峡，将之引为常态。
It's difficult to accurately predict a conflict between China and Japan, but in many scenarios China will have to force the Miyako Strait. Japan thus has the advantage of preparing the battlefield, as well as being able to deploy a multi-layered network of sensors and weapons.
想要精确预测日本与中国间冲突是十分困难的，不过在很多场合下中国只能选择取道宫古海峡。因此，日本在准备战地上具有优势，同时也有能力在此部署一个多层次的监测和武器网络。
The radar network consisting of AN/TPY-2 radars would stand guard against ballistic missile attacks by the Second Artillery Corps. This would be backed up by the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force's (MSDF) BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers, of which there are currently four. Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors would provide point defense against aircraft and ballistic missiles, respectively.
由AN/TPY-2雷达构成的雷达网可以防卫二炮袭来的弹道导弹。同时还有作为补充的四艘日本海上自卫队BMD（译注：海基宙斯盾弹道导弹防御系统）巡洋舰和驱逐舰。而爱国者PAC-2和PAC-3导弹拦截系统则能分别防御飞机和弹道导弹。
The three RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned surveillance aircraft Japan is reportedly procuring can conduct ocean surveillance, shadowing PLAN ships and providing real-time targeting information to Japan's joint forces commander. They can also monitor the Chinese mainland, tracking activity at airfields, ports, missile bases and other military facilities.
而三架据传可以为日本取得的RQ-4"全球鹰"无人侦察机可以进行海洋监测，追踪中国海军舰船并向日本联合舰队指挥官提供实时的目标信息。它们也可监控中国大陆，追踪机场，港口，导弹基地亦或其他军事设施。
Finally, although not currently in operation, Japan could deploy an array of hydrophones across the Strait similar to the SOSUS network that covered the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap during the Cold War. The system would enable Japan to monitor Chinese submarines in peacetime, and efficiently eliminate them during wartime.
最后，尽管目前没有启用，日本还可在海峡两岸水下设立一套SOSUS（译注：水下声音侦查评估分析系统），就如同冷战期间覆盖了格陵兰岛-冰岛-英国间的海上缺口。该系统可使日本在和平时代监听中国潜艇，从而在战时能有效消除它们。
The Japanese commander charged with defense of the Ryukyus would take the information from aerial, land, sea and subsea sensors and piece together a coherent picture of the battlefield. The commander could then use this intelligence to preserve his own forces while striking at Chinese forces where they are weak, both technically and professionally.
日本负责琉球防御的指挥官能够通过空中，陆地，水下声呐提供的信息拼凑出连贯的战场局势。他可以利用这些情报在保护自己部队的同时重击中国军队薄弱之处，既专业又有技术。
Japan's fleet of 16 submarines, in the process of being increased to 22, will be the most effective active defense. The JMSDF submarine fleet, composed of the newer Soryu and older Oyashio-class diesel electric submarines, is one of the most professional and technologically advanced in the world. The idea would be to direct Japan's strength in submarine warfare against Chinese weaknesses in anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
日本在扩充已有的16艘潜艇至22艘，它们将是最有效的主动防御力量。由新建苍龙号和旧式"亲潮"级柴电潜艇组成的日本海上自卫队潜艇编队是世界上最专业和科技最先进的力量之一。这就是中日反潜战（ASW）中针对中国弱点的最直接力量。
Assuming a wartime surge of 11 JMSDF submarines, with a handful to watch the northern frontier with Russia, Japan could form a picket of eight submarines. Operating on a front from Taiwan to the southern Japanese island of Kyushu, the Chinese Navy would need to anticipate an average of one Japanese submarine every 82 miles, an unpleasant prospect.
假设战时动用日本海上自卫队11艘潜艇，其中少量看守与俄罗斯相邻的北部边境，日本仍可投入8艘潜艇（用于作战）。部署在从台湾到日本九州岛南部，而中国海军平均每82海里就要侦测到1艘潜艇，前景并不乐观。
Aircraft will also play a key role, and the aircraft of the Japan Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) and MSDF would also contribute heavily to the fight. Operating from Okinawa and Kyushu, Japan's fleet of E-767 and E-2D early warning aircraft would detect enemy aircraft and direct the air battle. F-15J fighters would be vectored to intercept Chinese fighter sweeps. The F-15Js would also be tasked with destroying China's airborne early warning and tanker aircraft, seriously degrading the People's Liberation Army Air Force's ability to operate over Japanese territory.
飞机也将起到重要作用，日本航空自卫队的飞机和海上自卫队都将对战斗极为有利。部署在冲绳和九州的日本E-767和E-2D先期预警机编队将侦测到敌机并直接开始空战。F-15J战机将径直拦截中国战斗机并将其横扫。F-15J也承担破坏中国先期预警机和空中加油机的作战任务，大幅降低中国空军在日本领土进行部署的能力。
Japanese airfield space supporting the Ryukyus is limited, and a priority would be placed on F-15Js and their air superiority capability. Backing them up from bases farther away on mainland Japan would be the JASDF's F-2 fighters, recently upgraded to carry medium range AAM-4B radar-guided air to air missiles. The F-2s could also conduct anti-ship missions with Type 93 anti-ship missiles, likely in conjunction with attacks from submarines and surface ships.
日本在琉球的机场容纳空间是有限的，并将有限放置具有最优对空能力的F-15Js。而作为它们补充的，将是较远日本主岛基地的航空自卫队F-2战斗机，最近经过升级携带中程AAM-4B雷达制导导弹。F-2战斗机也通过93型反舰导弹执行反舰任务，并与水上舰艇和潜艇协力作战。
日本海上自卫队的巡逻机包括新川崎P1和旧式P-3C"猎户座"，它们将监测并打击中国潜艇。日本有超过90架P-3Cs和少量的P-1s。
In the event of war, the MSDF would organize at least two surface task forces centered around its Hyuga and Izumo class helicopter carriers. Each carrier will be equipped with at least six anti-submarine warfare helicopters, allowing it to hunt Chinese submarines over a wide area. Each would be protected by an Aegis destroyer of the Kongo or Atago classes. Other task forces would be centered around an Aegis destroyer and charged with providing area defense against conventionally armed ballistic missiles.
在战争中，海上自卫队将以日向和出云级直升机航空母舰为中心组成至少两个作战任务编队。每艘航母至少配备6架反潜直升机，其将在大范围海域搜寻中国潜艇。而每一航母又被金刚或爱宕级宙斯盾驱逐舰所保护。其他任务部队以宙斯盾驱逐舰为中心，负责常规弹道导弹的区域防卫。
To support the A2/AD plan, Japan could organize a fleet of "street fighters", the 200-ton guided missile patrol boats of the Hayabusa class. The six Hayabusa class ships are each armed with four SSM-1B anti-ship missiles, roughly equivalent to the American Harpoon missile, and are capable of speeds of up to 46 knots. The Hayabusas could mount hit and run attacks on Chinese ships, hiding out among the Sakishima Islands between raids.
为了支撑A2/AD计划，日本可能组建一套"街头霸王"编队，包括200吨位的隼级导弹巡逻艇。这6艘隼级导弹巡逻艇各配备了4枚SSM-1B反舰导弹，大体上相当于美国的鱼叉导弹，而且最高能达到46节的速度。隼级对中国舰艇可以执行游击战术，出击间隙藏匿于先岛群岛。
Finally, Type-88 land-based anti-ship missiles will keep Chinese forces at bay, preventing landings on the islands of Miyakojima, Ishigakijima, and even Okinawa. Not only will these missiles protect populated islands, they will shape the battlefield, creating zones where Chinese ships will have to worry about multiple threats. A mobile system, the Type 88 would be a difficult threat for China to neutralize.
最后，88型陆基反舰导弹将使中国军队只能停在海湾，防止可能在宫古岛，石垣岛，甚至冲绳进行的登陆。而且，这些导弹不仅可以保护岛屿，也将改变战场，使中国舰船不得不应对这一区域多样的威胁。88型是一种可移动导弹系统，这将使中国难以消除其威胁。
Japan has several batteries of Type 88-missiles, which mount six missiles per transporter truck. The Type-88 has a range of nearly 100 miles, meaning that missiles mounted on Miyakojima and Okinawa would overlap in range, completely covering the strait. Theoretically, there are enough populated islands to target Chinese ships with land-based anti-ship missiles all the way from Taiwan to Kyushu. Notably, in recent years Japan has held exercises that utilized Type-88 missiles near the Strait.
日本有很多88型导弹的炮架，每辆导弹发射车装载6枚导弹。88型导弹射程近100英里，这意味着安置在宫古岛和冲绳岛的导弹范围将会叠加，完全覆盖海峡。理论上讲，从台湾到九州有足够多的群岛，将部署以中国舰船为目标的陆基反舰导弹。值得注意的是，近年来日本已在海峡附近使用88型导弹进行演习。
It's worth noting that Joint operations will be critical for any JSDF A2/AD campaign. In the past, Japanese military forces have been notoriously parochial, duplicating capability, withholding intelligence from other branches and preventing effective unity of command. In our scenario, the joint forces commander will be directing air, land and sea forces toward a common goal.
值得注意的是，联合行动是任何日本自卫队A2/AD活动的关键。在过去，日本军队实力明显受限，复制能力，从支部情报被截留，防止统一有效的指挥。在我们(设定)的场景中，联合作战指挥官将使空军，陆军和海军朝向同一目标。
In that regard, the joint forces commander will need to be able to communicate with his forces by secure means. Without the ability to receive information and pass orders over vast distances, the Japanese defense would proceed in piecemeal and be defeated in such. Adopting a modern digital communications system like the U.S. standard Link 16 will help ensure communications even in the face of Chinese electronic jamming.
在这方面，联合作战指挥官将要能够与军队通过安全方式通讯。（如果）没有接受信息和远距离传达指令的能力，日本的防卫力量将会变得零碎并因这一点而被击败。采用现代化数字通讯系统，如美国16号链接标准，甚至将能在中国电子干扰下保持通讯。
Nonetheless, most of the systems to support this strategy are already in place. Others, such as a SOSUS network for the Ryukyus, secure digital communications, and joint operations proficiency are easily attainable and not terribly expensive. Still other improvements, such as the XASM-3 hypersonic anti-ship missile, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and more Aegis destroyers are already on the way.
不过，支撑此战略的大多数系统已经就位。而其他的，如为琉球建立水下声音侦查评估分析系统，安全数字通信和熟练的联合作战能力是很容易达到，也不是很贵。其他改进项目也是如此，如XASM-3高超音速反舰导弹，F-35联合作战战斗机，更多的宙斯盾驱逐舰都指日可待。
Japan's A2/AD plan would be the strategic equivalent of aikido, the Japanese martial art that emphasizes self defense. Aikido emphasizes turning the enemy's strength and momentum against himself. Similarly, the SDF would draw the enemy out into the Ryukyus, away from its land-based power, where it could be defeated. Such a strategy is more in tune with the Japanese public's pacifist tendencies and an easier sell politically.
日本的A2/AD计划在战略上和合气道类似，是一种重在自卫的日本武术。合气道强调以彼之力还施彼身。与此类似，自卫队会将敌人引至远离其陆基力量，可被击败的琉球。这策略与日本民众的和平主义倾向相适应，也是较容易兜售的政策。
Japan cannot hope to match China's defense spending. Although Japan has raised defense spending two years in a row, the increases have been modest and in line with Japan's mediocre economic performance. An A2/AD strategy is an economical way to deter China in peacetime and defeat it in wartime.
日本与中国相同国防开支将是不可期望的。尽管日本已经连续两年增长国防开支，（但）这增长适中，是与日本表现平平的经济相称的。A2/AD策略在经济上比较合算，其在和平年代威慑中国而在战时能够击败中国。
Kyle Mizokami is a writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he co-founded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch.
作者介绍：Kyle Mizokami 是旧金山的一名作家，曾为The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast撰文。（译注：包括《外交官》《外交政策》等知名杂志）其在2009年联合创始了名叫"日本安全观察"的防卫与安全博客。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.com
论坛地址：http://www.ltaaa.com/bbs/thread-336994-1-1.html
Japan's Master Plan to Defeat China in a War
日本总体规划在战争中打败中国
In recent years, significant attention has been paid to the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). China's defense budget, which has increased ten fold in the last twenty five years, has funded the construction of a modern, ocean-going navy. This includes the recently fielded aircraft carrier, Liaoning, as well as fleets of destroyers, frigates, corvettes, replenishment ships, and amphibious assault ships.
几年来，人们对中国人民解放军海军（PLAN）表现了显著关注。中国的国防预算在过去的25年里已经增长了10倍，以此建立起一个现代化的远洋海军。这包括最近最近启用的航空母舰--辽宁舰，以及舰群中的驱逐舰，护卫舰，补给舰和两栖攻击舰。译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
The PLAN is indeed an impressive force, but local geography will create challenges during wartime. Japan controls a string of islands that form the Miyako Strait, which Chinese naval forces must transit to enter the western Pacific. Properly fortified, the Japanese-held Ryukyu Islands could conceivably block passage of the Strait altogether.
中国海军的确是一支强军，但本地区的地理环境在战时可能（对其）造成挑战。日本控制着由一连串岛屿组成的宫古海峡，这也是中国海军进入西太平洋的必经之地。在适当的加筑下，日本控制的琉球群岛可以有效地阻碍海峡两岸的通行。
The Ryukyus have been used to defend Japan before. Okinawa, the gateway to the Home Islands, was fortified by Japan during World War II and then invaded by the Allies. The southern half of the chain, the Sakashima Islands, were used as staging areas for kamikaze fighters during the Battle of Okinawa.
琉球群岛以前就已被用来防卫日本。冲绳，日本主岛的门户，在二战期间被加固强化，但之后被盟军涌入。而在岛链的南端，先岛诸岛曾在冲绳战役中，被用作神风敢死队的跳板。
Japan, which spends roughly a quarter as much on defense as China, could use the Ryukyus to execute an Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) plan in the Miyako Strait. Like any good A2/AD strategy, such a plan in the Strait would require a fraction of the spending necessary to overcome it.
日本，国防花销大约是中国的四分之一，可以在宫古海峡利用琉球群岛进行反介入，区域拒止（A2/AD）战略。就像任何可行的A2/AD战略，在海峡执行如此计划总归需要一些必要的花费克服困难。
The PLAN has three fleet commands. The North Sea Fleet, based in Qingdao, is oriented towards the Yellow Sea and beyond while the East Sea Fleet, based in Ningbo, is oriented toward the East China Sea and beyond.
中国海军有三大舰队。位于青岛的北海舰队，其作用于但不仅限于黄海，而坐落于宁波的东海舰队，面向的则是东海以及更深区域。
Together, the North and East Sea Fleets field 16 destroyers, 32 frigates, all five of China's nuclear attack submarines, and around 40 diesel electric submarines of varying ages. Backing this up would be aircraft of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the People's Liberation Army Navy Air Force and the conventionally armed ballistic missiles of the Second Artillery Corps.
北海舰队和东海舰队总计共16艘驱逐舰，32艘护卫舰，全部5艘中国核攻击潜艇和大约40艘各期柴电潜艇，和与此相补充的，中国人民解放军空军，中国人们解放军海军航空兵以及二炮。
The most direct route for both fleets is the Miyako Strait, a gateway formed by Japan's Sakishima Islands. A gap 160 miles wide between Miyako Island and the island of Okinawa provides access to the open Pacific and beyond. Chinese naval task forces have recently made a habit of passing through the strait.
两大舰队的直线出海路径就是通过宫古海峡，也是日本先岛群岛的门户。这宫古岛和冲绳岛间160英里的缺口就是太平洋及远洋的入口。中国海军最近频繁出入海峡，将之引为常态。
It's difficult to accurately predict a conflict between China and Japan, but in many scenarios China will have to force the Miyako Strait. Japan thus has the advantage of preparing the battlefield, as well as being able to deploy a multi-layered network of sensors and weapons.
想要精确预测日本与中国间冲突是十分困难的，不过在很多场合下中国只能选择取道宫古海峡。因此，日本在准备战地上具有优势，同时也有能力在此部署一个多层次的监测和武器网络。
The radar network consisting of AN/TPY-2 radars would stand guard against ballistic missile attacks by the Second Artillery Corps. This would be backed up by the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force's (MSDF) BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers, of which there are currently four. Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors would provide point defense against aircraft and ballistic missiles, respectively.
由AN/TPY-2雷达构成的雷达网可以防卫二炮袭来的弹道导弹。同时还有作为补充的四艘日本海上自卫队BMD（译注：海基宙斯盾弹道导弹防御系统）巡洋舰和驱逐舰。而爱国者PAC-2和PAC-3导弹拦截系统则能分别防御飞机和弹道导弹。
The three RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned surveillance aircraft Japan is reportedly procuring can conduct ocean surveillance, shadowing PLAN ships and providing real-time targeting information to Japan's joint forces commander. They can also monitor the Chinese mainland, tracking activity at airfields, ports, missile bases and other military facilities.
而三架据传可以为日本取得的RQ-4"全球鹰"无人侦察机可以进行海洋监测，追踪中国海军舰船并向日本联合舰队指挥官提供实时的目标信息。它们也可监控中国大陆，追踪机场，港口，导弹基地亦或其他军事设施。
Finally, although not currently in operation, Japan could deploy an array of hydrophones across the Strait similar to the SOSUS network that covered the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap during the Cold War. The system would enable Japan to monitor Chinese submarines in peacetime, and efficiently eliminate them during wartime.
最后，尽管目前没有启用，日本还可在海峡两岸水下设立一套SOSUS（译注：水下声音侦查评估分析系统），就如同冷战期间覆盖了格陵兰岛-冰岛-英国间的海上缺口。该系统可使日本在和平时代监听中国潜艇，从而在战时能有效消除它们。
The Japanese commander charged with defense of the Ryukyus would take the information from aerial, land, sea and subsea sensors and piece together a coherent picture of the battlefield. The commander could then use this intelligence to preserve his own forces while striking at Chinese forces where they are weak, both technically and professionally.
日本负责琉球防御的指挥官能够通过空中，陆地，水下声呐提供的信息拼凑出连贯的战场局势。他可以利用这些情报在保护自己部队的同时重击中国军队薄弱之处，既专业又有技术。
Japan's fleet of 16 submarines, in the process of being increased to 22, will be the most effective active defense. The JMSDF submarine fleet, composed of the newer Soryu and older Oyashio-class diesel electric submarines, is one of the most professional and technologically advanced in the world. The idea would be to direct Japan's strength in submarine warfare against Chinese weaknesses in anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
日本在扩充已有的16艘潜艇至22艘，它们将是最有效的主动防御力量。由新建苍龙号和旧式"亲潮"级柴电潜艇组成的日本海上自卫队潜艇编队是世界上最专业和科技最先进的力量之一。这就是中日反潜战（ASW）中针对中国弱点的最直接力量。
Assuming a wartime surge of 11 JMSDF submarines, with a handful to watch the northern frontier with Russia, Japan could form a picket of eight submarines. Operating on a front from Taiwan to the southern Japanese island of Kyushu, the Chinese Navy would need to anticipate an average of one Japanese submarine every 82 miles, an unpleasant prospect.
假设战时动用日本海上自卫队11艘潜艇，其中少量看守与俄罗斯相邻的北部边境，日本仍可投入8艘潜艇（用于作战）。部署在从台湾到日本九州岛南部，而中国海军平均每82海里就要侦测到1艘潜艇，前景并不乐观。
Aircraft will also play a key role, and the aircraft of the Japan Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) and MSDF would also contribute heavily to the fight. Operating from Okinawa and Kyushu, Japan's fleet of E-767 and E-2D early warning aircraft would detect enemy aircraft and direct the air battle. F-15J fighters would be vectored to intercept Chinese fighter sweeps. The F-15Js would also be tasked with destroying China's airborne early warning and tanker aircraft, seriously degrading the People's Liberation Army Air Force's ability to operate over Japanese territory.
飞机也将起到重要作用，日本航空自卫队的飞机和海上自卫队都将对战斗极为有利。部署在冲绳和九州的日本E-767和E-2D先期预警机编队将侦测到敌机并直接开始空战。F-15J战机将径直拦截中国战斗机并将其横扫。F-15J也承担破坏中国先期预警机和空中加油机的作战任务，大幅降低中国空军在日本领土进行部署的能力。
Japanese airfield space supporting the Ryukyus is limited, and a priority would be placed on F-15Js and their air superiority capability. Backing them up from bases farther away on mainland Japan would be the JASDF's F-2 fighters, recently upgraded to carry medium range AAM-4B radar-guided air to air missiles. The F-2s could also conduct anti-ship missions with Type 93 anti-ship missiles, likely in conjunction with attacks from submarines and surface ships.
日本在琉球的机场容纳空间是有限的，并将有限放置具有最优对空能力的F-15Js。而作为它们补充的，将是较远日本主岛基地的航空自卫队F-2战斗机，最近经过升级携带中程AAM-4B雷达制导导弹。F-2战斗机也通过93型反舰导弹执行反舰任务，并与水上舰艇和潜艇协力作战。
日本海上自卫队的巡逻机包括新川崎P1和旧式P-3C"猎户座"，它们将监测并打击中国潜艇。日本有超过90架P-3Cs和少量的P-1s。
In the event of war, the MSDF would organize at least two surface task forces centered around its Hyuga and Izumo class helicopter carriers. Each carrier will be equipped with at least six anti-submarine warfare helicopters, allowing it to hunt Chinese submarines over a wide area. Each would be protected by an Aegis destroyer of the Kongo or Atago classes. Other task forces would be centered around an Aegis destroyer and charged with providing area defense against conventionally armed ballistic missiles.
在战争中，海上自卫队将以日向和出云级直升机航空母舰为中心组成至少两个作战任务编队。每艘航母至少配备6架反潜直升机，其将在大范围海域搜寻中国潜艇。而每一航母又被金刚或爱宕级宙斯盾驱逐舰所保护。其他任务部队以宙斯盾驱逐舰为中心，负责常规弹道导弹的区域防卫。
To support the A2/AD plan, Japan could organize a fleet of "street fighters", the 200-ton guided missile patrol boats of the Hayabusa class. The six Hayabusa class ships are each armed with four SSM-1B anti-ship missiles, roughly equivalent to the American Harpoon missile, and are capable of speeds of up to 46 knots. The Hayabusas could mount hit and run attacks on Chinese ships, hiding out among the Sakishima Islands between raids.
为了支撑A2/AD计划，日本可能组建一套"街头霸王"编队，包括200吨位的隼级导弹巡逻艇。这6艘隼级导弹巡逻艇各配备了4枚SSM-1B反舰导弹，大体上相当于美国的鱼叉导弹，而且最高能达到46节的速度。隼级对中国舰艇可以执行游击战术，出击间隙藏匿于先岛群岛。
Finally, Type-88 land-based anti-ship missiles will keep Chinese forces at bay, preventing landings on the islands of Miyakojima, Ishigakijima, and even Okinawa. Not only will these missiles protect populated islands, they will shape the battlefield, creating zones where Chinese ships will have to worry about multiple threats. A mobile system, the Type 88 would be a difficult threat for China to neutralize.
最后，88型陆基反舰导弹将使中国军队只能停在海湾，防止可能在宫古岛，石垣岛，甚至冲绳进行的登陆。而且，这些导弹不仅可以保护岛屿，也将改变战场，使中国舰船不得不应对这一区域多样的威胁。88型是一种可移动导弹系统，这将使中国难以消除其威胁。
Japan has several batteries of Type 88-missiles, which mount six missiles per transporter truck. The Type-88 has a range of nearly 100 miles, meaning that missiles mounted on Miyakojima and Okinawa would overlap in range, completely covering the strait. Theoretically, there are enough populated islands to target Chinese ships with land-based anti-ship missiles all the way from Taiwan to Kyushu. Notably, in recent years Japan has held exercises that utilized Type-88 missiles near the Strait.
日本有很多88型导弹的炮架，每辆导弹发射车装载6枚导弹。88型导弹射程近100英里，这意味着安置在宫古岛和冲绳岛的导弹范围将会叠加，完全覆盖海峡。理论上讲，从台湾到九州有足够多的群岛，将部署以中国舰船为目标的陆基反舰导弹。值得注意的是，近年来日本已在海峡附近使用88型导弹进行演习。
It's worth noting that Joint operations will be critical for any JSDF A2/AD campaign. In the past, Japanese military forces have been notoriously parochial, duplicating capability, withholding intelligence from other branches and preventing effective unity of command. In our scenario, the joint forces commander will be directing air, land and sea forces toward a common goal.
值得注意的是，联合行动是任何日本自卫队A2/AD活动的关键。在过去，日本军队实力明显受限，复制能力，从支部情报被截留，防止统一有效的指挥。在我们(设定)的场景中，联合作战指挥官将使空军，陆军和海军朝向同一目标。
In that regard, the joint forces commander will need to be able to communicate with his forces by secure means. Without the ability to receive information and pass orders over vast distances, the Japanese defense would proceed in piecemeal and be defeated in such. Adopting a modern digital communications system like the U.S. standard Link 16 will help ensure communications even in the face of Chinese electronic jamming.
在这方面，联合作战指挥官将要能够与军队通过安全方式通讯。（如果）没有接受信息和远距离传达指令的能力，日本的防卫力量将会变得零碎并因这一点而被击败。采用现代化数字通讯系统，如美国16号链接标准，甚至将能在中国电子干扰下保持通讯。
Nonetheless, most of the systems to support this strategy are already in place. Others, such as a SOSUS network for the Ryukyus, secure digital communications, and joint operations proficiency are easily attainable and not terribly expensive. Still other improvements, such as the XASM-3 hypersonic anti-ship missile, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and more Aegis destroyers are already on the way.
不过，支撑此战略的大多数系统已经就位。而其他的，如为琉球建立水下声音侦查评估分析系统，安全数字通信和熟练的联合作战能力是很容易达到，也不是很贵。其他改进项目也是如此，如XASM-3高超音速反舰导弹，F-35联合作战战斗机，更多的宙斯盾驱逐舰都指日可待。
Japan's A2/AD plan would be the strategic equivalent of aikido, the Japanese martial art that emphasizes self defense. Aikido emphasizes turning the enemy's strength and momentum against himself. Similarly, the SDF would draw the enemy out into the Ryukyus, away from its land-based power, where it could be defeated. Such a strategy is more in tune with the Japanese public's pacifist tendencies and an easier sell politically.
日本的A2/AD计划在战略上和合气道类似，是一种重在自卫的日本武术。合气道强调以彼之力还施彼身。与此类似，自卫队会将敌人引至远离其陆基力量，可被击败的琉球。这策略与日本民众的和平主义倾向相适应，也是较容易兜售的政策。
Japan cannot hope to match China's defense spending. Although Japan has raised defense spending two years in a row, the increases have been modest and in line with Japan's mediocre economic performance. An A2/AD strategy is an economical way to deter China in peacetime and defeat it in wartime.
日本与中国相同国防开支将是不可期望的。尽管日本已经连续两年增长国防开支，（但）这增长适中，是与日本表现平平的经济相称的。A2/AD策略在经济上比较合算，其在和平年代威慑中国而在战时能够击败中国。
Kyle Mizokami is a writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he co-founded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch.
作者介绍：Kyle Mizokami 是旧金山的一名作家，曾为The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast撰文。（译注：包括《外交官》《外交政策》等知名杂志）其在2009年联合创始了名叫"日本安全观察"的防卫与安全博客。
论坛地址：http://www.ltaaa.com/bbs/thread-336994-1-1.html
Japan's Master Plan to Defeat China in a War
日本总体规划在战争中打败中国
In recent years, significant attention has been paid to the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). China's defense budget, which has increased ten fold in the last twenty five years, has funded the construction of a modern, ocean-going navy. This includes the recently fielded aircraft carrier, Liaoning, as well as fleets of destroyers, frigates, corvettes, replenishment ships, and amphibious assault ships.
几年来，人们对中国人民解放军海军（PLAN）表现了显著关注。中国的国防预算在过去的25年里已经增长了10倍，以此建立起一个现代化的远洋海军。这包括最近最近启用的航空母舰--辽宁舰，以及舰群中的驱逐舰，护卫舰，补给舰和两栖攻击舰。译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
The PLAN is indeed an impressive force, but local geography will create challenges during wartime. Japan controls a string of islands that form the Miyako Strait, which Chinese naval forces must transit to enter the western Pacific. Properly fortified, the Japanese-held Ryukyu Islands could conceivably block passage of the Strait altogether.
中国海军的确是一支强军，但本地区的地理环境在战时可能（对其）造成挑战。日本控制着由一连串岛屿组成的宫古海峡，这也是中国海军进入西太平洋的必经之地。在适当的加筑下，日本控制的琉球群岛可以有效地阻碍海峡两岸的通行。
The Ryukyus have been used to defend Japan before. Okinawa, the gateway to the Home Islands, was fortified by Japan during World War II and then invaded by the Allies. The southern half of the chain, the Sakashima Islands, were used as staging areas for kamikaze fighters during the Battle of Okinawa.
琉球群岛以前就已被用来防卫日本。冲绳，日本主岛的门户，在二战期间被加固强化，但之后被盟军涌入。而在岛链的南端，先岛诸岛曾在冲绳战役中，被用作神风敢死队的跳板。
Japan, which spends roughly a quarter as much on defense as China, could use the Ryukyus to execute an Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) plan in the Miyako Strait. Like any good A2/AD strategy, such a plan in the Strait would require a fraction of the spending necessary to overcome it.
日本，国防花销大约是中国的四分之一，可以在宫古海峡利用琉球群岛进行反介入，区域拒止（A2/AD）战略。就像任何可行的A2/AD战略，在海峡执行如此计划总归需要一些必要的花费克服困难。
The PLAN has three fleet commands. The North Sea Fleet, based in Qingdao, is oriented towards the Yellow Sea and beyond while the East Sea Fleet, based in Ningbo, is oriented toward the East China Sea and beyond.
中国海军有三大舰队。位于青岛的北海舰队，其作用于但不仅限于黄海，而坐落于宁波的东海舰队，面向的则是东海以及更深区域。
Together, the North and East Sea Fleets field 16 destroyers, 32 frigates, all five of China's nuclear attack submarines, and around 40 diesel electric submarines of varying ages. Backing this up would be aircraft of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the People's Liberation Army Navy Air Force and the conventionally armed ballistic missiles of the Second Artillery Corps.
北海舰队和东海舰队总计共16艘驱逐舰，32艘护卫舰，全部5艘中国核攻击潜艇和大约40艘各期柴电潜艇，和与此相补充的，中国人民解放军空军，中国人们解放军海军航空兵以及二炮。
The most direct route for both fleets is the Miyako Strait, a gateway formed by Japan's Sakishima Islands. A gap 160 miles wide between Miyako Island and the island of Okinawa provides access to the open Pacific and beyond. Chinese naval task forces have recently made a habit of passing through the strait.
两大舰队的直线出海路径就是通过宫古海峡，也是日本先岛群岛的门户。这宫古岛和冲绳岛间160英里的缺口就是太平洋及远洋的入口。中国海军最近频繁出入海峡，将之引为常态。
It's difficult to accurately predict a conflict between China and Japan, but in many scenarios China will have to force the Miyako Strait. Japan thus has the advantage of preparing the battlefield, as well as being able to deploy a multi-layered network of sensors and weapons.
想要精确预测日本与中国间冲突是十分困难的，不过在很多场合下中国只能选择取道宫古海峡。因此，日本在准备战地上具有优势，同时也有能力在此部署一个多层次的监测和武器网络。
The radar network consisting of AN/TPY-2 radars would stand guard against ballistic missile attacks by the Second Artillery Corps. This would be backed up by the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force's (MSDF) BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers, of which there are currently four. Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors would provide point defense against aircraft and ballistic missiles, respectively.
由AN/TPY-2雷达构成的雷达网可以防卫二炮袭来的弹道导弹。同时还有作为补充的四艘日本海上自卫队BMD（译注：海基宙斯盾弹道导弹防御系统）巡洋舰和驱逐舰。而爱国者PAC-2和PAC-3导弹拦截系统则能分别防御飞机和弹道导弹。
The three RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned surveillance aircraft Japan is reportedly procuring can conduct ocean surveillance, shadowing PLAN ships and providing real-time targeting information to Japan's joint forces commander. They can also monitor the Chinese mainland, tracking activity at airfields, ports, missile bases and other military facilities.
而三架据传可以为日本取得的RQ-4"全球鹰"无人侦察机可以进行海洋监测，追踪中国海军舰船并向日本联合舰队指挥官提供实时的目标信息。它们也可监控中国大陆，追踪机场，港口，导弹基地亦或其他军事设施。
Finally, although not currently in operation, Japan could deploy an array of hydrophones across the Strait similar to the SOSUS network that covered the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap during the Cold War. The system would enable Japan to monitor Chinese submarines in peacetime, and efficiently eliminate them during wartime.
最后，尽管目前没有启用，日本还可在海峡两岸水下设立一套SOSUS（译注：水下声音侦查评估分析系统），就如同冷战期间覆盖了格陵兰岛-冰岛-英国间的海上缺口。该系统可使日本在和平时代监听中国潜艇，从而在战时能有效消除它们。
The Japanese commander charged with defense of the Ryukyus would take the information from aerial, land, sea and subsea sensors and piece together a coherent picture of the battlefield. The commander could then use this intelligence to preserve his own forces while striking at Chinese forces where they are weak, both technically and professionally.
日本负责琉球防御的指挥官能够通过空中，陆地，水下声呐提供的信息拼凑出连贯的战场局势。他可以利用这些情报在保护自己部队的同时重击中国军队薄弱之处，既专业又有技术。
Japan's fleet of 16 submarines, in the process of being increased to 22, will be the most effective active defense. The JMSDF submarine fleet, composed of the newer Soryu and older Oyashio-class diesel electric submarines, is one of the most professional and technologically advanced in the world. The idea would be to direct Japan's strength in submarine warfare against Chinese weaknesses in anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
日本在扩充已有的16艘潜艇至22艘，它们将是最有效的主动防御力量。由新建苍龙号和旧式"亲潮"级柴电潜艇组成的日本海上自卫队潜艇编队是世界上最专业和科技最先进的力量之一。这就是中日反潜战（ASW）中针对中国弱点的最直接力量。
Assuming a wartime surge of 11 JMSDF submarines, with a handful to watch the northern frontier with Russia, Japan could form a picket of eight submarines. Operating on a front from Taiwan to the southern Japanese island of Kyushu, the Chinese Navy would need to anticipate an average of one Japanese submarine every 82 miles, an unpleasant prospect.
假设战时动用日本海上自卫队11艘潜艇，其中少量看守与俄罗斯相邻的北部边境，日本仍可投入8艘潜艇（用于作战）。部署在从台湾到日本九州岛南部，而中国海军平均每82海里就要侦测到1艘潜艇，前景并不乐观。
Aircraft will also play a key role, and the aircraft of the Japan Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) and MSDF would also contribute heavily to the fight. Operating from Okinawa and Kyushu, Japan's fleet of E-767 and E-2D early warning aircraft would detect enemy aircraft and direct the air battle. F-15J fighters would be vectored to intercept Chinese fighter sweeps. The F-15Js would also be tasked with destroying China's airborne early warning and tanker aircraft, seriously degrading the People's Liberation Army Air Force's ability to operate over Japanese territory.
飞机也将起到重要作用，日本航空自卫队的飞机和海上自卫队都将对战斗极为有利。部署在冲绳和九州的日本E-767和E-2D先期预警机编队将侦测到敌机并直接开始空战。F-15J战机将径直拦截中国战斗机并将其横扫。F-15J也承担破坏中国先期预警机和空中加油机的作战任务，大幅降低中国空军在日本领土进行部署的能力。
Japanese airfield space supporting the Ryukyus is limited, and a priority would be placed on F-15Js and their air superiority capability. Backing them up from bases farther away on mainland Japan would be the JASDF's F-2 fighters, recently upgraded to carry medium range AAM-4B radar-guided air to air missiles. The F-2s could also conduct anti-ship missions with Type 93 anti-ship missiles, likely in conjunction with attacks from submarines and surface ships.
日本在琉球的机场容纳空间是有限的，并将有限放置具有最优对空能力的F-15Js。而作为它们补充的，将是较远日本主岛基地的航空自卫队F-2战斗机，最近经过升级携带中程AAM-4B雷达制导导弹。F-2战斗机也通过93型反舰导弹执行反舰任务，并与水上舰艇和潜艇协力作战。
日本海上自卫队的巡逻机包括新川崎P1和旧式P-3C"猎户座"，它们将监测并打击中国潜艇。日本有超过90架P-3Cs和少量的P-1s。
In the event of war, the MSDF would organize at least two surface task forces centered around its Hyuga and Izumo class helicopter carriers. Each carrier will be equipped with at least six anti-submarine warfare helicopters, allowing it to hunt Chinese submarines over a wide area. Each would be protected by an Aegis destroyer of the Kongo or Atago classes. Other task forces would be centered around an Aegis destroyer and charged with providing area defense against conventionally armed ballistic missiles.
在战争中，海上自卫队将以日向和出云级直升机航空母舰为中心组成至少两个作战任务编队。每艘航母至少配备6架反潜直升机，其将在大范围海域搜寻中国潜艇。而每一航母又被金刚或爱宕级宙斯盾驱逐舰所保护。其他任务部队以宙斯盾驱逐舰为中心，负责常规弹道导弹的区域防卫。
To support the A2/AD plan, Japan could organize a fleet of "street fighters", the 200-ton guided missile patrol boats of the Hayabusa class. The six Hayabusa class ships are each armed with four SSM-1B anti-ship missiles, roughly equivalent to the American Harpoon missile, and are capable of speeds of up to 46 knots. The Hayabusas could mount hit and run attacks on Chinese ships, hiding out among the Sakishima Islands between raids.
为了支撑A2/AD计划，日本可能组建一套"街头霸王"编队，包括200吨位的隼级导弹巡逻艇。这6艘隼级导弹巡逻艇各配备了4枚SSM-1B反舰导弹，大体上相当于美国的鱼叉导弹，而且最高能达到46节的速度。隼级对中国舰艇可以执行游击战术，出击间隙藏匿于先岛群岛。
Finally, Type-88 land-based anti-ship missiles will keep Chinese forces at bay, preventing landings on the islands of Miyakojima, Ishigakijima, and even Okinawa. Not only will these missiles protect populated islands, they will shape the battlefield, creating zones where Chinese ships will have to worry about multiple threats. A mobile system, the Type 88 would be a difficult threat for China to neutralize.
最后，88型陆基反舰导弹将使中国军队只能停在海湾，防止可能在宫古岛，石垣岛，甚至冲绳进行的登陆。而且，这些导弹不仅可以保护岛屿，也将改变战场，使中国舰船不得不应对这一区域多样的威胁。88型是一种可移动导弹系统，这将使中国难以消除其威胁。
Japan has several batteries of Type 88-missiles, which mount six missiles per transporter truck. The Type-88 has a range of nearly 100 miles, meaning that missiles mounted on Miyakojima and Okinawa would overlap in range, completely covering the strait. Theoretically, there are enough populated islands to target Chinese ships with land-based anti-ship missiles all the way from Taiwan to Kyushu. Notably, in recent years Japan has held exercises that utilized Type-88 missiles near the Strait.
日本有很多88型导弹的炮架，每辆导弹发射车装载6枚导弹。88型导弹射程近100英里，这意味着安置在宫古岛和冲绳岛的导弹范围将会叠加，完全覆盖海峡。理论上讲，从台湾到九州有足够多的群岛，将部署以中国舰船为目标的陆基反舰导弹。值得注意的是，近年来日本已在海峡附近使用88型导弹进行演习。
It's worth noting that Joint operations will be critical for any JSDF A2/AD campaign. In the past, Japanese military forces have been notoriously parochial, duplicating capability, withholding intelligence from other branches and preventing effective unity of command. In our scenario, the joint forces commander will be directing air, land and sea forces toward a common goal.
值得注意的是，联合行动是任何日本自卫队A2/AD活动的关键。在过去，日本军队实力明显受限，复制能力，从支部情报被截留，防止统一有效的指挥。在我们(设定)的场景中，联合作战指挥官将使空军，陆军和海军朝向同一目标。
In that regard, the joint forces commander will need to be able to communicate with his forces by secure means. Without the ability to receive information and pass orders over vast distances, the Japanese defense would proceed in piecemeal and be defeated in such. Adopting a modern digital communications system like the U.S. standard Link 16 will help ensure communications even in the face of Chinese electronic jamming.
在这方面，联合作战指挥官将要能够与军队通过安全方式通讯。（如果）没有接受信息和远距离传达指令的能力，日本的防卫力量将会变得零碎并因这一点而被击败。采用现代化数字通讯系统，如美国16号链接标准，甚至将能在中国电子干扰下保持通讯。
Nonetheless, most of the systems to support this strategy are already in place. Others, such as a SOSUS network for the Ryukyus, secure digital communications, and joint operations proficiency are easily attainable and not terribly expensive. Still other improvements, such as the XASM-3 hypersonic anti-ship missile, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and more Aegis destroyers are already on the way.
不过，支撑此战略的大多数系统已经就位。而其他的，如为琉球建立水下声音侦查评估分析系统，安全数字通信和熟练的联合作战能力是很容易达到，也不是很贵。其他改进项目也是如此，如XASM-3高超音速反舰导弹，F-35联合作战战斗机，更多的宙斯盾驱逐舰都指日可待。
Japan's A2/AD plan would be the strategic equivalent of aikido, the Japanese martial art that emphasizes self defense. Aikido emphasizes turning the enemy's strength and momentum against himself. Similarly, the SDF would draw the enemy out into the Ryukyus, away from its land-based power, where it could be defeated. Such a strategy is more in tune with the Japanese public's pacifist tendencies and an easier sell politically.
日本的A2/AD计划在战略上和合气道类似，是一种重在自卫的日本武术。合气道强调以彼之力还施彼身。与此类似，自卫队会将敌人引至远离其陆基力量，可被击败的琉球。这策略与日本民众的和平主义倾向相适应，也是较容易兜售的政策。
Japan cannot hope to match China's defense spending. Although Japan has raised defense spending two years in a row, the increases have been modest and in line with Japan's mediocre economic performance. An A2/AD strategy is an economical way to deter China in peacetime and defeat it in wartime.
日本与中国相同国防开支将是不可期望的。尽管日本已经连续两年增长国防开支，（但）这增长适中，是与日本表现平平的经济相称的。A2/AD策略在经济上比较合算，其在和平年代威慑中国而在战时能够击败中国。
Kyle Mizokami is a writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he co-founded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch.
作者介绍：Kyle Mizokami 是旧金山的一名作家，曾为The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast撰文。（译注：包括《外交官》《外交政策》等知名杂志）其在2009年联合创始了名叫"日本安全观察"的防卫与安全博客。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.com
论坛地址：http://www.ltaaa.com/bbs/thread-336994-1-1.html
Japan's Master Plan to Defeat China in a War
日本总体规划在战争中打败中国
In recent years, significant attention has been paid to the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). China's defense budget, which has increased ten fold in the last twenty five years, has funded the construction of a modern, ocean-going navy. This includes the recently fielded aircraft carrier, Liaoning, as well as fleets of destroyers, frigates, corvettes, replenishment ships, and amphibious assault ships.
几年来，人们对中国人民解放军海军（PLAN）表现了显著关注。中国的国防预算在过去的25年里已经增长了10倍，以此建立起一个现代化的远洋海军。这包括最近最近启用的航空母舰--辽宁舰，以及舰群中的驱逐舰，护卫舰，补给舰和两栖攻击舰。译文来源:龙腾网 HTTP://WWW.LTAAA.COM
The PLAN is indeed an impressive force, but local geography will create challenges during wartime. Japan controls a string of islands that form the Miyako Strait, which Chinese naval forces must transit to enter the western Pacific. Properly fortified, the Japanese-held Ryukyu Islands could conceivably block passage of the Strait altogether.
中国海军的确是一支强军，但本地区的地理环境在战时可能（对其）造成挑战。日本控制着由一连串岛屿组成的宫古海峡，这也是中国海军进入西太平洋的必经之地。在适当的加筑下，日本控制的琉球群岛可以有效地阻碍海峡两岸的通行。
The Ryukyus have been used to defend Japan before. Okinawa, the gateway to the Home Islands, was fortified by Japan during World War II and then invaded by the Allies. The southern half of the chain, the Sakashima Islands, were used as staging areas for kamikaze fighters during the Battle of Okinawa.
琉球群岛以前就已被用来防卫日本。冲绳，日本主岛的门户，在二战期间被加固强化，但之后被盟军涌入。而在岛链的南端，先岛诸岛曾在冲绳战役中，被用作神风敢死队的跳板。
Japan, which spends roughly a quarter as much on defense as China, could use the Ryukyus to execute an Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) plan in the Miyako Strait. Like any good A2/AD strategy, such a plan in the Strait would require a fraction of the spending necessary to overcome it.
日本，国防花销大约是中国的四分之一，可以在宫古海峡利用琉球群岛进行反介入，区域拒止（A2/AD）战略。就像任何可行的A2/AD战略，在海峡执行如此计划总归需要一些必要的花费克服困难。
The PLAN has three fleet commands. The North Sea Fleet, based in Qingdao, is oriented towards the Yellow Sea and beyond while the East Sea Fleet, based in Ningbo, is oriented toward the East China Sea and beyond.
中国海军有三大舰队。位于青岛的北海舰队，其作用于但不仅限于黄海，而坐落于宁波的东海舰队，面向的则是东海以及更深区域。
Together, the North and East Sea Fleets field 16 destroyers, 32 frigates, all five of China's nuclear attack submarines, and around 40 diesel electric submarines of varying ages. Backing this up would be aircraft of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the People's Liberation Army Navy Air Force and the conventionally armed ballistic missiles of the Second Artillery Corps.
北海舰队和东海舰队总计共16艘驱逐舰，32艘护卫舰，全部5艘中国核攻击潜艇和大约40艘各期柴电潜艇，和与此相补充的，中国人民解放军空军，中国人们解放军海军航空兵以及二炮。
The most direct route for both fleets is the Miyako Strait, a gateway formed by Japan's Sakishima Islands. A gap 160 miles wide between Miyako Island and the island of Okinawa provides access to the open Pacific and beyond. Chinese naval task forces have recently made a habit of passing through the strait.
两大舰队的直线出海路径就是通过宫古海峡，也是日本先岛群岛的门户。这宫古岛和冲绳岛间160英里的缺口就是太平洋及远洋的入口。中国海军最近频繁出入海峡，将之引为常态。
It's difficult to accurately predict a conflict between China and Japan, but in many scenarios China will have to force the Miyako Strait. Japan thus has the advantage of preparing the battlefield, as well as being able to deploy a multi-layered network of sensors and weapons.
想要精确预测日本与中国间冲突是十分困难的，不过在很多场合下中国只能选择取道宫古海峡。因此，日本在准备战地上具有优势，同时也有能力在此部署一个多层次的监测和武器网络。
The radar network consisting of AN/TPY-2 radars would stand guard against ballistic missile attacks by the Second Artillery Corps. This would be backed up by the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force's (MSDF) BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers, of which there are currently four. Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors would provide point defense against aircraft and ballistic missiles, respectively.
由AN/TPY-2雷达构成的雷达网可以防卫二炮袭来的弹道导弹。同时还有作为补充的四艘日本海上自卫队BMD（译注：海基宙斯盾弹道导弹防御系统）巡洋舰和驱逐舰。而爱国者PAC-2和PAC-3导弹拦截系统则能分别防御飞机和弹道导弹。
The three RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned surveillance aircraft Japan is reportedly procuring can conduct ocean surveillance, shadowing PLAN ships and providing real-time targeting information to Japan's joint forces commander. They can also monitor the Chinese mainland, tracking activity at airfields, ports, missile bases and other military facilities.
而三架据传可以为日本取得的RQ-4"全球鹰"无人侦察机可以进行海洋监测，追踪中国海军舰船并向日本联合舰队指挥官提供实时的目标信息。它们也可监控中国大陆，追踪机场，港口，导弹基地亦或其他军事设施。
Finally, although not currently in operation, Japan could deploy an array of hydrophones across the Strait similar to the SOSUS network that covered the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap during the Cold War. The system would enable Japan to monitor Chinese submarines in peacetime, and efficiently eliminate them during wartime.
最后，尽管目前没有启用，日本还可在海峡两岸水下设立一套SOSUS（译注：水下声音侦查评估分析系统），就如同冷战期间覆盖了格陵兰岛-冰岛-英国间的海上缺口。该系统可使日本在和平时代监听中国潜艇，从而在战时能有效消除它们。
The Japanese commander charged with defense of the Ryukyus would take the information from aerial, land, sea and subsea sensors and piece together a coherent picture of the battlefield. The commander could then use this intelligence to preserve his own forces while striking at Chinese forces where they are weak, both technically and professionally.
日本负责琉球防御的指挥官能够通过空中，陆地，水下声呐提供的信息拼凑出连贯的战场局势。他可以利用这些情报在保护自己部队的同时重击中国军队薄弱之处，既专业又有技术。
Japan's fleet of 16 submarines, in the process of being increased to 22, will be the most effective active defense. The JMSDF submarine fleet, composed of the newer Soryu and older Oyashio-class diesel electric submarines, is one of the most professional and technologically advanced in the world. The idea would be to direct Japan's strength in submarine warfare against Chinese weaknesses in anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
日本在扩充已有的16艘潜艇至22艘，它们将是最有效的主动防御力量。由新建苍龙号和旧式"亲潮"级柴电潜艇组成的日本海上自卫队潜艇编队是世界上最专业和科技最先进的力量之一。这就是中日反潜战（ASW）中针对中国弱点的最直接力量。
Assuming a wartime surge of 11 JMSDF submarines, with a handful to watch the northern frontier with Russia, Japan could form a picket of eight submarines. Operating on a front from Taiwan to the southern Japanese island of Kyushu, the Chinese Navy would need to anticipate an average of one Japanese submarine every 82 miles, an unpleasant prospect.
假设战时动用日本海上自卫队11艘潜艇，其中少量看守与俄罗斯相邻的北部边境，日本仍可投入8艘潜艇（用于作战）。部署在从台湾到日本九州岛南部，而中国海军平均每82海里就要侦测到1艘潜艇，前景并不乐观。
Aircraft will also play a key role, and the aircraft of the Japan Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) and MSDF would also contribute heavily to the fight. Operating from Okinawa and Kyushu, Japan's fleet of E-767 and E-2D early warning aircraft would detect enemy aircraft and direct the air battle. F-15J fighters would be vectored to intercept Chinese fighter sweeps. The F-15Js would also be tasked with destroying China's airborne early warning and tanker aircraft, seriously degrading the People's Liberation Army Air Force's ability to operate over Japanese territory.
飞机也将起到重要作用，日本航空自卫队的飞机和海上自卫队都将对战斗极为有利。部署在冲绳和九州的日本E-767和E-2D先期预警机编队将侦测到敌机并直接开始空战。F-15J战机将径直拦截中国战斗机并将其横扫。F-15J也承担破坏中国先期预警机和空中加油机的作战任务，大幅降低中国空军在日本领土进行部署的能力。
Japanese airfield space supporting the Ryukyus is limited, and a priority would be placed on F-15Js and their air superiority capability. Backing them up from bases farther away on mainland Japan would be the JASDF's F-2 fighters, recently upgraded to carry medium range AAM-4B radar-guided air to air missiles. The F-2s could also conduct anti-ship missions with Type 93 anti-ship missiles, likely in conjunction with attacks from submarines and surface ships.
日本在琉球的机场容纳空间是有限的，并将有限放置具有最优对空能力的F-15Js。而作为它们补充的，将是较远日本主岛基地的航空自卫队F-2战斗机，最近经过升级携带中程AAM-4B雷达制导导弹。F-2战斗机也通过93型反舰导弹执行反舰任务，并与水上舰艇和潜艇协力作战。
日本海上自卫队的巡逻机包括新川崎P1和旧式P-3C"猎户座"，它们将监测并打击中国潜艇。日本有超过90架P-3Cs和少量的P-1s。
In the event of war, the MSDF would organize at least two surface task forces centered around its Hyuga and Izumo class helicopter carriers. Each carrier will be equipped with at least six anti-submarine warfare helicopters, allowing it to hunt Chinese submarines over a wide area. Each would be protected by an Aegis destroyer of the Kongo or Atago classes. Other task forces would be centered around an Aegis destroyer and charged with providing area defense against conventionally armed ballistic missiles.
在战争中，海上自卫队将以日向和出云级直升机航空母舰为中心组成至少两个作战任务编队。每艘航母至少配备6架反潜直升机，其将在大范围海域搜寻中国潜艇。而每一航母又被金刚或爱宕级宙斯盾驱逐舰所保护。其他任务部队以宙斯盾驱逐舰为中心，负责常规弹道导弹的区域防卫。
To support the A2/AD plan, Japan could organize a fleet of "street fighters", the 200-ton guided missile patrol boats of the Hayabusa class. The six Hayabusa class ships are each armed with four SSM-1B anti-ship missiles, roughly equivalent to the American Harpoon missile, and are capable of speeds of up to 46 knots. The Hayabusas could mount hit and run attacks on Chinese ships, hiding out among the Sakishima Islands between raids.
为了支撑A2/AD计划，日本可能组建一套"街头霸王"编队，包括200吨位的隼级导弹巡逻艇。这6艘隼级导弹巡逻艇各配备了4枚SSM-1B反舰导弹，大体上相当于美国的鱼叉导弹，而且最高能达到46节的速度。隼级对中国舰艇可以执行游击战术，出击间隙藏匿于先岛群岛。
Finally, Type-88 land-based anti-ship missiles will keep Chinese forces at bay, preventing landings on the islands of Miyakojima, Ishigakijima, and even Okinawa. Not only will these missiles protect populated islands, they will shape the battlefield, creating zones where Chinese ships will have to worry about multiple threats. A mobile system, the Type 88 would be a difficult threat for China to neutralize.
最后，88型陆基反舰导弹将使中国军队只能停在海湾，防止可能在宫古岛，石垣岛，甚至冲绳进行的登陆。而且，这些导弹不仅可以保护岛屿，也将改变战场，使中国舰船不得不应对这一区域多样的威胁。88型是一种可移动导弹系统，这将使中国难以消除其威胁。
Japan has several batteries of Type 88-missiles, which mount six missiles per transporter truck. The Type-88 has a range of nearly 100 miles, meaning that missiles mounted on Miyakojima and Okinawa would overlap in range, completely covering the strait. Theoretically, there are enough populated islands to target Chinese ships with land-based anti-ship missiles all the way from Taiwan to Kyushu. Notably, in recent years Japan has held exercises that utilized Type-88 missiles near the Strait.
日本有很多88型导弹的炮架，每辆导弹发射车装载6枚导弹。88型导弹射程近100英里，这意味着安置在宫古岛和冲绳岛的导弹范围将会叠加，完全覆盖海峡。理论上讲，从台湾到九州有足够多的群岛，将部署以中国舰船为目标的陆基反舰导弹。值得注意的是，近年来日本已在海峡附近使用88型导弹进行演习。
It's worth noting that Joint operations will be critical for any JSDF A2/AD campaign. In the past, Japanese military forces have been notoriously parochial, duplicating capability, withholding intelligence from other branches and preventing effective unity of command. In our scenario, the joint forces commander will be directing air, land and sea forces toward a common goal.
值得注意的是，联合行动是任何日本自卫队A2/AD活动的关键。在过去，日本军队实力明显受限，复制能力，从支部情报被截留，防止统一有效的指挥。在我们(设定)的场景中，联合作战指挥官将使空军，陆军和海军朝向同一目标。
In that regard, the joint forces commander will need to be able to communicate with his forces by secure means. Without the ability to receive information and pass orders over vast distances, the Japanese defense would proceed in piecemeal and be defeated in such. Adopting a modern digital communications system like the U.S. standard Link 16 will help ensure communications even in the face of Chinese electronic jamming.
在这方面，联合作战指挥官将要能够与军队通过安全方式通讯。（如果）没有接受信息和远距离传达指令的能力，日本的防卫力量将会变得零碎并因这一点而被击败。采用现代化数字通讯系统，如美国16号链接标准，甚至将能在中国电子干扰下保持通讯。
Nonetheless, most of the systems to support this strategy are already in place. Others, such as a SOSUS network for the Ryukyus, secure digital communications, and joint operations proficiency are easily attainable and not terribly expensive. Still other improvements, such as the XASM-3 hypersonic anti-ship missile, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and more Aegis destroyers are already on the way.
不过，支撑此战略的大多数系统已经就位。而其他的，如为琉球建立水下声音侦查评估分析系统，安全数字通信和熟练的联合作战能力是很容易达到，也不是很贵。其他改进项目也是如此，如XASM-3高超音速反舰导弹，F-35联合作战战斗机，更多的宙斯盾驱逐舰都指日可待。
Japan's A2/AD plan would be the strategic equivalent of aikido, the Japanese martial art that emphasizes self defense. Aikido emphasizes turning the enemy's strength and momentum against himself. Similarly, the SDF would draw the enemy out into the Ryukyus, away from its land-based power, where it could be defeated. Such a strategy is more in tune with the Japanese public's pacifist tendencies and an easier sell politically.
日本的A2/AD计划在战略上和合气道类似，是一种重在自卫的日本武术。合气道强调以彼之力还施彼身。与此类似，自卫队会将敌人引至远离其陆基力量，可被击败的琉球。这策略与日本民众的和平主义倾向相适应，也是较容易兜售的政策。
Japan cannot hope to match China's defense spending. Although Japan has raised defense spending two years in a row, the increases have been modest and in line with Japan's mediocre economic performance. An A2/AD strategy is an economical way to deter China in peacetime and defeat it in wartime.
日本与中国相同国防开支将是不可期望的。尽管日本已经连续两年增长国防开支，（但）这增长适中，是与日本表现平平的经济相称的。A2/AD策略在经济上比较合算，其在和平年代威慑中国而在战时能够击败中国。
Kyle Mizokami is a writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he co-founded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch.
作者介绍：Kyle Mizokami 是旧金山的一名作家，曾为The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast撰文。（译注：包括《外交官》《外交政策》等知名杂志）其在2009年联合创始了名叫"日本安全观察"的防卫与安全博客。
日本人还没睡醒而已,要改变只能靠实力碾压,现在只要压制其不能破釜成舟就够了
有本事你也规划个，没本事别bb
冲出星云 发表于 2015-3-3 17:39
有本事你也规划个，没本事别bb
总参资料库里打日本的作战方案不知道有多少，吹牛逼谁不会
有本事你也规划个，没本事别bb
总参资料库里打日本的作战方案不知道有多少，吹牛逼谁不会
日本人真的知道什么叫总体战吗
俺觉得关键是本子的雷达，爱国者，盾舰能拦住多少二炮的导弹才是关键；本子的岛就那么大，就在那也不会跑，即使它的雷达和反导兵器能拦截一些二炮导弹，那么二炮就会乖乖的发射那么些导弹等你去拦么？
关键时刻二炮可以爆大量导弹或者采用高机动对抗模式的导弹，即使鬼子的雷达能侦测到，面对铺天盖地的高机动弹道导弹，爱国者和盾舰能有多高的拦截概率呢？
再加上，战时鬼子的雷达能不能保全都是个问题，土共这么多年来发展这么多机载反辐射弹药，加上土共那么多飞豹，苏30，歼11/16，轰6K，还有即将服役的歼20，打起仗来鬼子的雷达能不能保证不被轰平都是问题
关键时刻二炮可以爆大量导弹或者采用高机动对抗模式的导弹，即使鬼子的雷达能侦测到，面对铺天盖地的高机动弹道导弹，爱国者和盾舰能有多高的拦截概率呢？
再加上，战时鬼子的雷达能不能保全都是个问题，土共这么多年来发展这么多机载反辐射弹药，加上土共那么多飞豹，苏30，歼11/16，轰6K，还有即将服役的歼20，打起仗来鬼子的雷达能不能保证不被轰平都是问题
还有，作者预测本子可以部署水下监听网监测土共潜艇，你怎么就确定打起仗来土共就那么多性能特定的潜艇呢？
真到关键时刻土共不会爆094、093？还就那么点潜艇乖乖等着你监测？
真到关键时刻土共不会爆094、093？还就那么点潜艇乖乖等着你监测？