超级军网美称中国从以色列获取军事技术 美国阻挠也没用
来源：百度文库 编辑：超级军网 时间：2024/04/26 07:10:01
原标题：美媒：中国与以色列关系不断发展 成重要经济伙伴
美国《世界政策杂志》网站1月14日文章，原题：以色列的中国选项 去年12月30日，中国宣布将于转年启动与以色列的自贸谈判。这一未来协定将有助于人们了解此前常常被忽略的中以关系。从冷战时期的相互敌对，到非官方合作，再到目前的公开合作，北京与耶路撒冷的关系不断发展。
在1992年正式建交之前，两国关系便出现了新的动力。上世纪70年代末，中国领导人邓小平将外交政策与激进的政治宣言分离开来，从实用主义的目的出发与其他国家相接触。在此背景下，以色列对于中国而言有很大的裨益。以色列是一个发达国家，能给中国提供精密技术和宝贵的专业知识。
在邓小平时代，武器贸易推动中以建立全新关系。2002年，以色列成为仅次于俄罗斯的中国第二大武器系统供应国，同时也成为中国获取精密军事技术的重要渠道。尽管美国后来施加重重阻挠，但非直接通道依然畅通。在希伯来大学和海法大学教学的中以关系专家伊扎克·希霍尔博士说：“最主要的问题在于中间领域，即以色列军民两用高科技的灰色地带。”
由于实行实用主义的地缘政治政策，中国在以色列右翼人士中尤其受到欢迎。以色列保守派别的经贸部长纳夫塔利·贝内特2013年访问北京和上海，并与中国政府部长以及企业高管展开会谈。他表示：“在我们举行的20场会议中，没有人问过我们有关阿拉伯、巴勒斯坦或占领的问题，中国人关心的只是以色列的高科技、创新，以及我们如何将这些技术带到中国。”欧美对以色列的警告则与北京形成鲜明对比，使得以色列更倾向于中国选项。
有人担心伊朗与中国关系过于紧密。希霍尔博士告诉以色列官员们要忘记这些问题，这与以色列毫无关系，因为中国有自身利益在其中。中国与伊朗的关系并不表明中国同情伊朗或伊朗政府。美国纽约大学全球事务中心高级研究员阿隆·本-梅尔博士也认为，中国与两个互为敌人的国家都保持良好关系，会对未来产生积极影响，因为北京的立场能够防止中东的地区对手爆发直接冲突。
尽管如此，耶路撒冷明白，最重要的政治和军事保护者依然是美国。尽管中国可以成为耶路撒冷的重要经济伙伴，并帮助其缓解来自西方的批评，但这并不能提供完整的政治缓冲。最终，以色列依然要向华盛顿负责。
美称中国从以色列获取军事技术 美国阻挠也没用_新闻_腾讯网
http://news.qq.com/a/20150116/020311.htm?tu_biz=v1
原标题：美媒：中国与以色列关系不断发展 成重要经济伙伴
美国《世界政策杂志》网站1月14日文章，原题：以色列的中国选项 去年12月30日，中国宣布将于转年启动与以色列的自贸谈判。这一未来协定将有助于人们了解此前常常被忽略的中以关系。从冷战时期的相互敌对，到非官方合作，再到目前的公开合作，北京与耶路撒冷的关系不断发展。
在1992年正式建交之前，两国关系便出现了新的动力。上世纪70年代末，中国领导人邓小平将外交政策与激进的政治宣言分离开来，从实用主义的目的出发与其他国家相接触。在此背景下，以色列对于中国而言有很大的裨益。以色列是一个发达国家，能给中国提供精密技术和宝贵的专业知识。
在邓小平时代，武器贸易推动中以建立全新关系。2002年，以色列成为仅次于俄罗斯的中国第二大武器系统供应国，同时也成为中国获取精密军事技术的重要渠道。尽管美国后来施加重重阻挠，但非直接通道依然畅通。在希伯来大学和海法大学教学的中以关系专家伊扎克·希霍尔博士说：“最主要的问题在于中间领域，即以色列军民两用高科技的灰色地带。”
由于实行实用主义的地缘政治政策，中国在以色列右翼人士中尤其受到欢迎。以色列保守派别的经贸部长纳夫塔利·贝内特2013年访问北京和上海，并与中国政府部长以及企业高管展开会谈。他表示：“在我们举行的20场会议中，没有人问过我们有关阿拉伯、巴勒斯坦或占领的问题，中国人关心的只是以色列的高科技、创新，以及我们如何将这些技术带到中国。”欧美对以色列的警告则与北京形成鲜明对比，使得以色列更倾向于中国选项。
有人担心伊朗与中国关系过于紧密。希霍尔博士告诉以色列官员们要忘记这些问题，这与以色列毫无关系，因为中国有自身利益在其中。中国与伊朗的关系并不表明中国同情伊朗或伊朗政府。美国纽约大学全球事务中心高级研究员阿隆·本-梅尔博士也认为，中国与两个互为敌人的国家都保持良好关系，会对未来产生积极影响，因为北京的立场能够防止中东的地区对手爆发直接冲突。
尽管如此，耶路撒冷明白，最重要的政治和军事保护者依然是美国。尽管中国可以成为耶路撒冷的重要经济伙伴，并帮助其缓解来自西方的批评，但这并不能提供完整的政治缓冲。最终，以色列依然要向华盛顿负责。
美称中国从以色列获取军事技术 美国阻挠也没用_新闻_腾讯网
http://news.qq.com/a/20150116/020311.htm?tu_biz=v1
谁让以色列是美利坚爹呢
这个调调怎么那么像阿三的
这种调调像极了阿三
2015-1-16 13:19 上传
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/ ... 80%99s-china-option
On December 30, China announced an initiative to establish a free-trade agreement with Israel. This prospective treaty sheds new light on an often overlooked relationship. From Cold War hostility to unofficial collaboration and now open cooperation, the Beijing-Jerusalem connection is still developing and can be especially beneficial for Israel, so isolated in its corner of the world. Yet Israel and its principal ally—the United States—must carefully manage this relationship against the backdrop of U.S.-China rivalry.
A new Sino-Israeli dynamic emerged before the two countries even established formal diplomatic ties in 1992. In the late 1970s, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping detached the country’s foreign policy from its radical political narrative. Under Mao Zedong, Beijing was largely isolated. The country opposed the Western bloc, with state media rejecting Israel as, “a dagger thrust by U.S. imperialism.” China also broke with the Soviet Union.
After Mao’s death, Deng embraced realpolitik, making his country a pivotal world actor by engaging other states for utilitarian purposes. In this context, Israel has much to offer China, while the Palestinians present mostly ideological satisfaction. Eighteen percent of West Bank Palestinians and 30 percent of Gazans live below the poverty line, making them an unlikely outlet for Chinese consumer products. There is little for Beijing to buy from the Palestinian territories, whose primary exports include olive oil, building stones, and furniture. Israel, on the other hand, is a developed country with a population that can afford imported goods. The Israelis can also offer China sophisticated technology and valuable expertise. Dr. Alon Ben-Meir, a Senior Fellow at NYU’s Center for Global Affairs summed up the Chinese position: “business is business, politics is politics.”
Deng’s tenure saw the historically tense Beijing-Jerusalem paradigm reverse, with weapons transfers stimulating a new relationship. In 1986, Israel discreetly agreed to terminate arms contracts with Taiwan. China, for its part, promised not to provide Syria M-9 ballistic missiles. Beijing further committed to refrain from re-exporting Israeli technology to Jerusalem’s foes. By 2002, Israel ranked “secondly only to Russia as a weapons system provider to China and as a conduit for sophisticated military technology,” according to a report from the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, an American congressional panel. Formal defense coordination stagnated after the United States vetoed the Israel’s China-bound arms exports.
In 2004, this developed into a full-blown political crisis as the United States demanded Jerusalem withhold Israeli-built drones returned by China for repairs. However, indirect channels remain and the Sino-Israeli trade actually expanded after the incident. Israeli telecommunications and aerospace products, for instance, still contribute to Chinese military upgrades. Dr. Yitzhak Shichor, who taught at Hebrew University and University of Haifa, specializes in Sino-Israeli relations. “The main problem is in the middle, in this gray area of [Israeli] high-tech which could be of dual use implications,” he says.
The IAI Harop (above) was the subject of a three-way political controversy. China returned the Israeli-built military drones for upgrades and the United States demanded Jerusalem withold them.
Washington may be able to block direct weapons shipments. However, soft transfers, including personnel exchanges and knowledge sharing are more difficult to regulate. Israeli engineers can provide military expertise by working in China as they did in South Africa during the apartheid era. The new free-trade agreement may ease labor transit between the two countries. This means China could have easier access to such technical know-how by way of individual Israeli experts.
While it is difficult for the United States to impede intellectual exchanges, many in Israel remain conscious of American concerns. When the Technion—Israel Institute of Technology opened a campus in China, university officials “were very worried,” notes Dr. Shichor, “because they also have a campus in the United States, at Cornell University.” As with academics and engineers, there is little the United States can do to prevent Israeli and Chinese military and intelligence officials from interacting, short of direct interference. In 2010, the heads of Israel’s Home Front Command and its military intelligence agency visited China. In 2012, Lieutenant General Benny Gantz, then Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff, met Beijing’s top brass on a similar trip.
Thanks to their geopolitical pragmatism, China is becoming particularly popular with the Israeli right wing. Israel’s conservative Minister of Economy Naftali Bennett visited Beijing and Shanghai in 2013 to negotiate with government ministers and business executives. While there, he remarked that, “In all the 20 meetings we held, not once were we asked about the Arabs, or about the Palestinians, or about any occupation or anything else. All [the Chinese] care about is Israeli high-tech, Israeli innovations, how we can bring these technologies here.”
Bennett called this, “something amazing.” His reaction is unsurprising, given Israeli fears of external pressure on the Palestinian issue. In July 2014, 12 European Union member states warned citizens to avoid trade with Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Citing IDF misconduct, American Presidents have scrutinized and suspended certain arms transfers to Israel, as did Barack Obama during the 2014 Gaza War and George W. Bush, during the Second Intifada. Such actions stand in stark contrast to Beijing’s approach, adding new appeal for Israel’s China option and a prospective free-trade accord.
Still, not all Israelis reflexively support stronger ties with Beijing. Some view these links with concern through the prism of intimate Iran-China ties. Yitzhak Shichor briefed members of Israel’s government on the topic before Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 2013 China visit. Shichor says he told the officials, “Forget about these issues. It has nothing to do with Israel because China has its own interests. Its relations with Iran by no means reflect any kind of sympathy for the Iranians or the government.” Alon Ben-Meir frames China’s relationship with Tehran in a positive light, suggesting that, “a single party [China] that has good relationships with two enemies…can also have some kind of a positive implication for the future because the Chinese have a vested interest.” Unlike the United States, China boasts good relations with both Iran and Israel. Beijing’s position here could keep the Middle East’s regional antagonists from direct confrontation.
Potential benefits with respect to Iran remain a sideshow to far more consequential Sino-Israeli economic ties. Beijing is already the Jewish state’s largest Asian trading partner. Some 60 percent of the Chinese population lives on less than $5 a day, meaning Israel cannot expect much success selling consumer technologies to its East Asian partner. Accordingly, as bilateral exchanges grow, Israel’s greatest interest will lie in direct trade with the Chinese state in both the civil sphere and, indirectly, the defense sector.
A critical benefit, Dr. Shichor adds, is that, “China would never impose any sanctions or any boycott like any of the European countries or even American universities.” He reflects that, on the contrary, “[China] can benefit from Western boycotts and so on because [the Chinese] are very much interested in Israeli technology.” Naftali Bennett and like-minded Israeli leaders correctly identify that Beijing will not impose political pressure on Israel over actions in the Palestinian territories. Here, the United States must tread carefully. Punishing Israel for new alliances can drive the country closer to China. Being too cautious might reward belligerent behavior.
A diverse foreign policy incorporating both traditional Western partners and new associates like China will undoubtedly benefit Israel, divorcing it from outside pressure while boosting the country’s international profile. However, Jerusalem will recall that its most important political and military patron remains the United States. While Israel benefits from $3 billion in American arms support annually, Chengdu fighter jets have yet to appear on the country’s air bases and Jerusalem has never waged a war with Chinese funding. Dr. James Nolt, a China expert and Campus Dean at NYIT-Nanjing further noted that China, “has no Mediterranean fleet and little inclination or capacity to supply arms to Israel during a war emergency as the US did in 1973.” Officials like Naftali Bennett must temper their excitement. While China can provide Jerusalem a strong economic partner and relief from Western criticism, this is not a complete political respite. Ultimately, Israel will have to answer to Washington, not Beijing.
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/ ... 80%99s-china-option
On December 30, China announced an initiative to establish a free-trade agreement with Israel. This prospective treaty sheds new light on an often overlooked relationship. From Cold War hostility to unofficial collaboration and now open cooperation, the Beijing-Jerusalem connection is still developing and can be especially beneficial for Israel, so isolated in its corner of the world. Yet Israel and its principal ally—the United States—must carefully manage this relationship against the backdrop of U.S.-China rivalry.
A new Sino-Israeli dynamic emerged before the two countries even established formal diplomatic ties in 1992. In the late 1970s, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping detached the country’s foreign policy from its radical political narrative. Under Mao Zedong, Beijing was largely isolated. The country opposed the Western bloc, with state media rejecting Israel as, “a dagger thrust by U.S. imperialism.” China also broke with the Soviet Union.
After Mao’s death, Deng embraced realpolitik, making his country a pivotal world actor by engaging other states for utilitarian purposes. In this context, Israel has much to offer China, while the Palestinians present mostly ideological satisfaction. Eighteen percent of West Bank Palestinians and 30 percent of Gazans live below the poverty line, making them an unlikely outlet for Chinese consumer products. There is little for Beijing to buy from the Palestinian territories, whose primary exports include olive oil, building stones, and furniture. Israel, on the other hand, is a developed country with a population that can afford imported goods. The Israelis can also offer China sophisticated technology and valuable expertise. Dr. Alon Ben-Meir, a Senior Fellow at NYU’s Center for Global Affairs summed up the Chinese position: “business is business, politics is politics.”
Deng’s tenure saw the historically tense Beijing-Jerusalem paradigm reverse, with weapons transfers stimulating a new relationship. In 1986, Israel discreetly agreed to terminate arms contracts with Taiwan. China, for its part, promised not to provide Syria M-9 ballistic missiles. Beijing further committed to refrain from re-exporting Israeli technology to Jerusalem’s foes. By 2002, Israel ranked “secondly only to Russia as a weapons system provider to China and as a conduit for sophisticated military technology,” according to a report from the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, an American congressional panel. Formal defense coordination stagnated after the United States vetoed the Israel’s China-bound arms exports.
In 2004, this developed into a full-blown political crisis as the United States demanded Jerusalem withhold Israeli-built drones returned by China for repairs. However, indirect channels remain and the Sino-Israeli trade actually expanded after the incident. Israeli telecommunications and aerospace products, for instance, still contribute to Chinese military upgrades. Dr. Yitzhak Shichor, who taught at Hebrew University and University of Haifa, specializes in Sino-Israeli relations. “The main problem is in the middle, in this gray area of [Israeli] high-tech which could be of dual use implications,” he says.
The IAI Harop (above) was the subject of a three-way political controversy. China returned the Israeli-built military drones for upgrades and the United States demanded Jerusalem withold them.
Washington may be able to block direct weapons shipments. However, soft transfers, including personnel exchanges and knowledge sharing are more difficult to regulate. Israeli engineers can provide military expertise by working in China as they did in South Africa during the apartheid era. The new free-trade agreement may ease labor transit between the two countries. This means China could have easier access to such technical know-how by way of individual Israeli experts.
While it is difficult for the United States to impede intellectual exchanges, many in Israel remain conscious of American concerns. When the Technion—Israel Institute of Technology opened a campus in China, university officials “were very worried,” notes Dr. Shichor, “because they also have a campus in the United States, at Cornell University.” As with academics and engineers, there is little the United States can do to prevent Israeli and Chinese military and intelligence officials from interacting, short of direct interference. In 2010, the heads of Israel’s Home Front Command and its military intelligence agency visited China. In 2012, Lieutenant General Benny Gantz, then Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff, met Beijing’s top brass on a similar trip.
Thanks to their geopolitical pragmatism, China is becoming particularly popular with the Israeli right wing. Israel’s conservative Minister of Economy Naftali Bennett visited Beijing and Shanghai in 2013 to negotiate with government ministers and business executives. While there, he remarked that, “In all the 20 meetings we held, not once were we asked about the Arabs, or about the Palestinians, or about any occupation or anything else. All [the Chinese] care about is Israeli high-tech, Israeli innovations, how we can bring these technologies here.”
Bennett called this, “something amazing.” His reaction is unsurprising, given Israeli fears of external pressure on the Palestinian issue. In July 2014, 12 European Union member states warned citizens to avoid trade with Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Citing IDF misconduct, American Presidents have scrutinized and suspended certain arms transfers to Israel, as did Barack Obama during the 2014 Gaza War and George W. Bush, during the Second Intifada. Such actions stand in stark contrast to Beijing’s approach, adding new appeal for Israel’s China option and a prospective free-trade accord.
Still, not all Israelis reflexively support stronger ties with Beijing. Some view these links with concern through the prism of intimate Iran-China ties. Yitzhak Shichor briefed members of Israel’s government on the topic before Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 2013 China visit. Shichor says he told the officials, “Forget about these issues. It has nothing to do with Israel because China has its own interests. Its relations with Iran by no means reflect any kind of sympathy for the Iranians or the government.” Alon Ben-Meir frames China’s relationship with Tehran in a positive light, suggesting that, “a single party [China] that has good relationships with two enemies…can also have some kind of a positive implication for the future because the Chinese have a vested interest.” Unlike the United States, China boasts good relations with both Iran and Israel. Beijing’s position here could keep the Middle East’s regional antagonists from direct confrontation.
Potential benefits with respect to Iran remain a sideshow to far more consequential Sino-Israeli economic ties. Beijing is already the Jewish state’s largest Asian trading partner. Some 60 percent of the Chinese population lives on less than $5 a day, meaning Israel cannot expect much success selling consumer technologies to its East Asian partner. Accordingly, as bilateral exchanges grow, Israel’s greatest interest will lie in direct trade with the Chinese state in both the civil sphere and, indirectly, the defense sector.
A critical benefit, Dr. Shichor adds, is that, “China would never impose any sanctions or any boycott like any of the European countries or even American universities.” He reflects that, on the contrary, “[China] can benefit from Western boycotts and so on because [the Chinese] are very much interested in Israeli technology.” Naftali Bennett and like-minded Israeli leaders correctly identify that Beijing will not impose political pressure on Israel over actions in the Palestinian territories. Here, the United States must tread carefully. Punishing Israel for new alliances can drive the country closer to China. Being too cautious might reward belligerent behavior.
A diverse foreign policy incorporating both traditional Western partners and new associates like China will undoubtedly benefit Israel, divorcing it from outside pressure while boosting the country’s international profile. However, Jerusalem will recall that its most important political and military patron remains the United States. While Israel benefits from $3 billion in American arms support annually, Chengdu fighter jets have yet to appear on the country’s air bases and Jerusalem has never waged a war with Chinese funding. Dr. James Nolt, a China expert and Campus Dean at NYIT-Nanjing further noted that China, “has no Mediterranean fleet and little inclination or capacity to supply arms to Israel during a war emergency as the US did in 1973.” Officials like Naftali Bennett must temper their excitement. While China can provide Jerusalem a strong economic partner and relief from Western criticism, this is not a complete political respite. Ultimately, Israel will have to answer to Washington, not Beijing.